EVALUATION OF THE PEACEBUILDING AND HUMAN SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

EVALUATION REPORT

Evaluation Division (SIE)

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 1990s were a decade which confronted Western governments with the need to engage in new forms of intervention abroad, without the doctrine or the policy instruments which would ensure success. The result was a decade of trial and error, one of whose bright spots was the emergence of the idea of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding's central insights are that conflict tends to be cyclical and that the best way to arrest the cycle of conflict is to intervene with the right instruments during the brief window between the end of a conflict and the return to hostilities. Peacebuilding focuses on strengthening the capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence.

Among Western countries, Canada has been the foremost proponent of peacebuilding, formally launching the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative in October 1996. While CIDA was first to begin policy work and programming in peacebuilding, it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, and the new Bureau of Global Affairs in DFAIT which inspired and launched the Initiative.

The flagship mechanism for the Initiative was a $20 million Peacebuilding Fund, drawn from CIDA resources but co-managed by the two departments. From the outset, however, it was recognized that DFAIT should dedicate some resources of its own to meet its priorities for peacebuilding. Hence the creation in the fall of 1997 of the DFAIT Peacebuilding Program. The priorities of the Program were to build Canadian domestic capacity for peacebuilding, to strengthen multilateral peacebuilding mechanisms, to help to develop policy, and to support catalytic projects in policy areas and in countries that CIDA found ineligible for official development assistance.

With an annual base of $1 million during its first two years, the Program could support some important enterprises such as financing the management of a data base of Canadian civilians with peacebuilding expertise (CANADEM) and the operations of an umbrella organization of Canadian NGOs with interest and expertise in peacebuilding (the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee). But the balance remaining left Program administrators with only limited scope to explore the frontiers of peacebuilding and respond to the many ideas and suggestions for worthy peacebuilding projects received from the Minister, the department, missions abroad, Canadian NGOs, and others.

The Program nonetheless was able to make significant progress in a number of areas. Activities included helping to explore the role of the UN and regional organizations in conflict prevention, educating representatives of countries on the UN Security Council, debriefing the heads of UN operations, helping to train UN staff, developing policy in such areas as small arms, children in conflict, free media, economic incentives to influence conflict situations, policing and legal reform, civil rights, and democracy and elections. The program also financed a variety of country-specific initiatives intended to engage parties in dialogue and to impart knowledge about how to build structures for peace. Geographic regions included the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe.

In 1999, a new management framework along with an increase in funding to $3 million a year and a changing relationship with CIDA's Peacebuilding Fund, positioned the Program for the future. The principal change was to situate the Program within a broader human security context, which encompassed the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative but went beyond it in a number of areas. Henceforth, funding proposals would not only be expected to meet the general objectives of the Initiative but also to support the overall goal of contributing to the creation of a sustainable environment for human security in societies in conflict. The result was a retitling of the program (it would henceforth be called the Peacebuilding and Human Security Program), and a determination to focus the Program on policy development, research, advocacy and consultations, while responding as creatively as possible to requests for funding for projects in the field.

As Program administrators learned from their experience, their strategy was to keep the main goals in mind; to continue to see the Peacebuilding Fund as the principal source of funding for projects in the field, using the Program as back-up; to focus the Program on "the knowledge business"; to recognize that the resources available were limited and try to make them stretch as far as possible; to anticipate as well as respond creatively to ideas and proposals from stakeholders, particularly the Minister, the department and its missions, and key NGOs; and to stay open to new ideas and be willing to experiment, even if there were risks.

The Program has met the objectives set for it in 1997. But it has also achieved results which may be more important in the long run. It has helped to clarify thinking about what peacebuilding is and about the policy instruments peacebuilding can generate to address situations which have long posed obstacles to achieving sustainable peace in war-torn societies. It has drawn attention to the relatively ad hoc way in which deployments of peacebuilding specialists now take place and to the need for a more systematic and better funded approach. The policy issues it has addressed have helped to illustrate how much policy work remains to be done, particularly in integrating disciplines and developing more "horizontal" approaches to solving problems.

The advent of peacebuilding should stimulate debate within government about how it manages development assistance and how it is organized to conduct "helping" operations abroad.

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2. INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The following is an evaluation of the Peacebuilding and Human Security Program of the Department of the Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

The Peacebuilding and Human Security Program emerged from the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative announced in October 1996 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for International Cooperation. The announcement included reference to the creation of a Canadian Peacebuilding Fund to be administered by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to assist countries making the transition from war to peace, with the aim of bridging the gap in programming between humanitarian relief and development assistance. The Fund was initially endowed with $10 million per annum for two years.

Within the following year, DFAIT established a separate fund known as the Peacebuilding Program to provide the department with an independent source of funds to support peacebuilding projects which were not eligible for funding by or were considered a low priority for the CIDA Fund. The Program initially received $1 million in annual funding from departmental reference levels; in the fall of 1999, the level was raised to $3 million per annum.

The evaluation was commissioned by the Office of the Inspector General (SIX) of the department with a view to meeting Treasury Board requirements for an evaluation of the Program after two years of operation and to provide Program managers with an independent assessment of the management and administration of the Program. Coincident with the evaluation, SIX also commissioned a financial audit of the Program.

The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the progress of the Program since inception, recognizing that it has only been in existence a short time, that it breaks new ground in the field of foreign policy, that it is still in evolution, and that the experimental character of much of its work defies the application of standard summative evaluation criteria. While the evaluation focuses particularly on the first two years of the Program -- from fall of 1997 to the spring of 1999 -- it also addresses both earlier and later developments.

ISSUES ADDRESSED

The evaluation was designed to explore four questions:

1. The extent to which the Program has been able to meet the objectives both of Canadian policy in respect of peacebuilding and human security and of clients/stakeholders.

2. The results achieved taking account of the short history of the Program and the human and financial resources accorded it.

3.   The extent and degree of effectiveness of the activities and measures undertaken, including whether these constituted the most likely means of achieving desired objectives.

4.   The lessons learned from the brief experience of the Program and the information which should be collected to meet the needs of future evaluations.

In light of the origins of the Program, no evaluation is possible without some discussion of the Program's relationship to the CIDA Fund, the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative from which both sprang, and the policy debates of the 1990s on international humanitarian intervention. Inevitably, the evaluation also addresses some dimensions of DFAIT's relations with CIDA as they relate to peacebuilding and Canadian contributions to international peace operations. The evaluation makes no assessment of the Fund or of CIDA's administration of it.

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation was conducted over three months, between November 1999 and January 2000, and it drew on four main sources of information:

- Academic and other literature related to international peacebuilding;

- Studies by the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT);

- DFAIT planning and operational documents including departmental submissions to Treasury Board and internal communications; and

- Interviews with some 25 individuals with personal knowledge of the Canadian Peacebuilding Program, from the most senior to the most junior ranks of government, at DFAIT, CIDA and central agencies, and in the NGO and academic communities.

These sources have their strengths and weaknesses.

The literature on peacebuilding is becoming voluminous and now covers the field reasonably well. But one gets the impression that there is not much new being written on the subject, that not much work extends beyond analysis into prescription, and that there are relatively few authors with a real vocation for the subject. The intelligentsia is behind governments and international organizations in this respect.

Governments and international organizations have been exploring the idea of peacebuilding for over ten years now, and they have produced some remarkable studies on how to improve the conduct of international peace operations. Some of the work is conceptual, but much of it provides practical advice for foreign ministries and aid agencies. While the evaluation could draw on some of this work, it was beyond the scope of the project to do much with it.

DFAIT papers, both official and unofficial, provided valuable insights into the origins of plans and proposals which eventually saw the light of day, attesting to the inventiveness and diligence of public servants in both providing guidance to and following the instructions of the government. Records are not research-friendly, however.

As expected, interviews were the single most important source of information for the evaluation. They covered a sufficiently broad cross-section of the peacebuilding community in Ottawa to provide reliable soundings on the main issues explored. Unfortunately, we were not able to interview one or two individuals whose views would have helped to fill out the picture. To encourage individuals to speak freely, interviews were conducted "off the record" under journalistic rules protecting sources and confidences.

An advisory board, consisting of officials in the Office of the Inspector General and the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division (AGP) assisted in the evaluation, including reviewing the findings of the final report.

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3.   BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

THE DILEMMA OF INTERVENTION

The end of the Cold War produced many surprises. Ten years later, two stand out. First, states and national groups whose ambitions had been kept in check by the rivalry between East and West were freer to resort to force to achieve their political goals. As fears diminished that regional conflicts might unleash nuclear war, the way was clear for dictators and despots to rekindle ancient animosities and renew old cycles of violence. The decade which followed saw a dramatic increase in the number of conflicts worldwide, from an average of less than five per year to almost 20.

Second, public opinion exerted enormous pressure on Western Governments to intervene in these conflicts to spare the civilians who constituted the overwhelming majority of the casualties. Modern communications had made people more aware of the human costs of conflicts, and people now believed not only that governments should be held to certain standards of behaviour in respect of human rights and democratic processes but also that the international community had a responsibility to intervene to protect oppressed peoples and innocent bystanders when a country falls into such disarray that no governing body can end it.

This posed a dilemma. There was no doctrine to deal with the situation and traditional forms of international engagement were patently inadequate to the task. The UN Charter and other instruments of international law dealt with aggression across borders, not the turbulence and ambiguity arising within the borders of failed states. In the past, the international community either had taken enforcement action against external aggressors or had organized peacekeeping operations to umpire cease-fire between belligerent states. But the new situation required something more. The challenge was to interrupt cycles of internal violence and to create conditions which ensured that a peace process was not easily reversed. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping were both still necessary, as was development assistance. But in many cases it was clear they were not sufficient to put war-torn societies on the path to sustainable peace.

A distinguishing characteristic of the 1990s, it turned out, was the advent of what were termed "second generation" peace operations. Where once the international community's ambitions had been limited to brokering cease-fire and monitoring peace settlements, more and more Western nations and others came to be involved in "humanitarian" interventions in single countries, attempting to use a variety of means to bring an end to internecine wars, provide emergency relief, and mediate between communities. For the first time, the big powers themselves began to contribute military forces to international peacekeeping operations. Nor were these forces any longer confined to international borders or cease-fire lines; now they were deployed "in country", often spread over large areas with a presence in major urban centres. And alongside them worked large numbers of civilians engaged by international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide humanitarian assistance, rebuild institutions of government, and in general try to facilitate the successful transition from war to peace.

A DIFFICULT DECADE

Until about the mid point of the 1990s, it was possible to argue that the international community had had more successes than failures in its newly expanded security role. The UN and NATO had successfully ejected Iraq from Kuwait, enforced a no-fly zone in northern Iraq to protect aid channels to "Kurdistan", helped with transitions in old Cold War battlefields from Angola and Mozambique to El Salvador and Nicaragua, and assisted with elections in Cambodia. Then came a series of catastrophes which bewildered and demoralized the international community: Somalia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia.

Never had more effort been made to solve world problems. The UN Charter and international law had been stretched beyond recognition to provide grounds for intervention. For the first time, NATO had conducted "out-of-area" operations. Apart from the Gulf War, the international community on four occasions despatched large numbers of forces to places few people could find on a map: 22,000 to Cambodia, 28,000 to Somalia, 38,000 to Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia; and at the end of the decade 49,000 to Kosovo. And the cost of international operations was no longer being measured in millions but in billions of dollars; Yugoslav operations cost $1.6 billion, Kosovo likely will cost two to three times as much.

But never had such operations encountered such dramatic setbacks. Peacekeepers had been fired on, their "safe havens" overrun, and they themselves disarmed, held hostage, or killed. During the four years of UNPROFOR, 210 peacekeepers died. Peacekeepers had even been at the scene when mass murders had taken place. Relief supplies had been confiscated by warring parties and relief workers assaulted and killed. Interventions expected to last a few months stretched into years, as conflicts flared up after brief periods of rest and resupply.

By the end of the decade, many were wondering what had gone wrong. Some thought that interventions themselves might be part of the problem:

> *"An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. Too many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention. Imposed armistices ... artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace."* [1]

Against this background was born the idea of "third generation" peace operations, sometimes described as "peacebuilding". Peacebuilding reflects a more results-oriented approach to the pursuit of international peace and security. Encompassing elements of both peacekeeping and development assistance, it proposes that the ultimate goal of international intervention should be the establishment of the conditions necessary for sustainable peace. Foremost among these are an indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence and the infrastructure for ensuring the long-term security of individuals.

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[1] Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance", Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, No.4

THE IDEA OF PEACEBUILDING

The term "peacebuilding" entered the lexicon in 1992 when the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, submitted a report to the 47th General Assembly entitled *An Agenda for Peace*. Since the end of the Cold War, he observed, the UN's security functions were no longer being crippled by repeated vetoes in the Security Council and demands for UN intervention were surging. To meet these demands, he suggested the UN aim to achieve five objectives:

- before conflict erupts, to identify situations which could lead to violence and, through *preventive diplomacy,* to try to remove the sources of danger,
- when conflict has erupted, to engage in *peacemaking* to resolve issues,
- after fighting has ended, to preserve the peace through *peacekeeping* and helping to implement peace agreements,
- before conflict erupts again, to assist in *peacebuilding* through rebuilding institutions and infrastructures and developing bonds between people,
- finally, to address the underlying causes of conflict such as economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.

In the words of the report:

> "When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence."

Since its appearance, the term *peacebuilding* has defied common definition. But beyond the debate over what it means are some important insights -- that violence tends to be cyclical, that it has both political and socio/economic dimensions, and that international assistance has to address both dimensions to break repeated cycles of violence and achieve durable peace.

Peacebuilding provided the link between security and development, each of which had hitherto proposed distinctive and sometimes competing architectures for dealing with the problems of developing countries. One of the consequences has been that the security and development communities have had to learn to work with each other. Both, however, have entertained suspicions about the concept of peacebuilding.

Until the end of the Cold War, the pursuit of international security focused almost exclusively on the security of states -- protecting the territorial integrity and political independence of states. Peacebuilding, in contrast, accentuates the security of individuals, sometimes in circumstances which compromise the sovereign integrity of states. Security traditionalists have worried about the long-term consequences of an expansive interpretation of security which includes human security, effectively abandoning four hundred years of doctrine placing the state not the individual at the centre of international affairs. Some have also been concerned that a preoccupation with peacebuilding and human security would further syphon off resources from defence budgets already depleted by demands for a "peace dividend".

The development community was also resistant at first. Traditionally, the ODA policy community had focused on the plight of the poorest countries and on development assistance, in the belief these were the route to peace and prosperity, with little reference to the political context in which recipient countries functioned. Many, in fact, believed that development would transform politics. In the 1970s and 1980s, as concern about the human rights performance of recipient countries became an issue, Western governments began to talk about the desirability of linking ODA to measures to achieve good governance, human rights, and democratic development. But the ODA community instinctively opposed conditionality believing it to be antithetical to ODA's primary mission of alleviating poverty in the Third World. Only in the 1990s did leading ODA organizations, such as the World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, begin to acknowledge that the legitimacy and effectiveness of political and administrative institutions were essential for the success of development policies and programs.

Some in the ODA community now suspect that proponents of peacebuilding are intent on transforming the development portfolio into an instrument of international relations, commandeering resources which should be devoted to poverty alleviation and using them to serve vague geopolitical ends.

The ensuing discussion provided the opportunity to rethink basic concepts and produced institutional innovations in a number of international organizations and Western countries. Organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and the OSCE have been exploring and experimenting with new approaches to intervening in conflict situations. Notable research work includes the War-torn Societies Project (WSP) jointly managed by the UN Research Institute for Social Development and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva; the OECD policy guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation; and the report of the Carnegie Commission on Strengthening Cooperative Approaches to Conflict Prevention. Among Western countries, Canada has been the foremost proponent of peacebuilding.

THE CANADIAN PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVE

Origins

The origins of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative can be traced to a high level meeting of the DAC in May 1995. At that meeting, the Canadian government, represented by senior CIDA officials, sponsored discussion of the 1990s' trend of more and more humanitarian assistance being extended to developing countries in conflict. As a result of the discussion, the DAC established a special task force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation charged with developing policy principles and guidelines for aid agencies trying to cope with the new context in which they had to operate. The task force began its work in January 1996 and published its report in May 1997[2].

While CIDA and the Economic Policy Bureau at DFAIT were engaged in the DAC discussions, other units in DFAIT were also beginning to focus on the issue. These included the International

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[2] Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, A Policy Statement by Development Ministers, Aid Agency Heads and Senior Officials Responsible for Development Cooperation, meeting as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Security Bureau (IDD), whose responsibilities included regional security and peacekeeping; and the newly established Global Affairs Bureau (AGD), whose mandate encompassed many of the items on the "new international agenda" including peacebuilding and democratic development.

Discussion within CIDA and DFAIT began to converge after evaluations of the Rwanda debacle pointed to the need for new policy directions. In the words of a senior CIDA official, one of the conclusions of an aid donors evaluation of Rwanda was that "humanitarian assistance was a substitute for political will to resolve conflict". After personally reviewing the report, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, instructed his department to explore what Western governments might do to arrest the repeated cycles of violence which were generating the need for humanitarian assistance. Over the summer, officials in both departments began working on concept papers for a Canadian initiative on peacebuilding.

Within DFAIT, there was some concern to avoid "high sounding top-down" international initiatives based on "formal institutionalized vehicles" which went nowhere because they were threatening to entrenched interests. The key was to take a problem-solving approach, identify real issues which needed to be worked on such as improving rapid response, and get international agencies and NGOs to work more cooperatively together. With respect to Canada's own capacity to assist, early thinking in the department focused on the establishment of a "joint DFAIT/CIDA policy mechanism which will initiate and coordinate peacebuilding programming" and on the creation of a fund to undertake "effective programming" in selected areas[3]. There was discussion of the fund ranging in size from $30 to $60 million.

At CIDA, thinking was along somewhat different and more modest lines. Instead of joint policy development and management of peacebuilding programming, CIDA officials had in mind a "small CIDA-DFAIT committee which would act on Ministers' requests in addition to reviewing possible actions and recommending them jointly to the two ministers". The focus of effort would also be quite narrow: to enable the government to respond more rapidly in meeting the vital "peace, security and development needs" of countries within or emerging from crisis. Interventions would be short-term "typically lasting no more than three to six months", and they would be limited to fewer policy areas[4] and to "countries eligible for international assistance". Supporting funds would be in the range of $5 million; a fund of $30 million would be just too labour intensive for the Agency to handle.

Notwithstanding the evident differences in approach, by the fall of 1996 it was clear that both DFAIT and CIDA were ready to move forward on a Canadian peacebuilding initiative. In September, DFAIT staff began preparing a speech for the Minister taking the initiative public

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[3] One draft listed fifteen (15) areas: preventive peacebuilding, political/constitutional restructuring, civil society, human rights reporting, ceasefire monitoring, conflict resolution training, public sector capacity building, refugee repatriation, electoral assistance, security forces training, media training, civilian peacekeeping, justice, demobilization, early warning analysis, and capacity building.

[4] One CIDA briefing paper listed just four areas: governance, judiciary, human rights, and strengthening mechanisms for conflict resolution. Due to "cost and complexity" and because these "could be addressed through other mechanisms", it excluded demilitarization, demobilization, demining, restoration of infrastructure, and return of refugees and displaced people.

while CIDA came forward with a proposal for a supporting fund in the amount of $20 million over two years.

The October 1996 speech

The Canadian commitment to peacebuilding was formally announced on October 30, 1996 in a speech which the Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered at York University. In the speech, entitled Building Peace to Last: Establishing a Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, Lloyd Axworthy cited as the most significant challenge of the post-Cold War era "building sustainable peace in countries prone to recurring cycles of violence". While peacekeeping remained an important tool, "the conflicts we face now are no longer purely military in nature, nor will they be resolved by military solutions alone. They occur within states, rather than between them, but they tend to spill over into surrounding regions. And they are characterized by long-term cycles of violence in the absence of the capacity to sustain a peaceful society."

In light of these developments, a number of Western countries had begun "to rethink the whole concept of security". Out of this rethinking had emerged two concepts: *human security* and, as the means to secure it, *peacebuilding*. To restore and sustain peace in countries affected by conflict, the security of individuals was as important as that of states. Peacebuilding aimed to build "a sustainable infrastructure for human security" by creating "the minimal conditions under which a country can take charge of its destiny, and social, political and economic development become possible". Axworthy described peacebuilding as "casting a life line to foundering societies struggling to end the cycle of violence, restore civility and get back on their feet. After the fighting has stopped and the immediate humanitarian needs have been met, there exists a brief critical period when a country sits balanced on a fulcrum. Tilted the wrong way, it retreats into conflict. But with the right help, delivered during that brief critical window of opportunity, it will move toward peace and stability."

In Axworthy's view, peacebuilding was characterized by four traits:

- A willingness to intervene in situations where the risk of failure is much higher than in traditional multilateral activities;
- Rapid, flexible and coordinated responses to situations where speed is of the essence, where the focus is on addressing the real problems of particular regions or states, and where links are made between security, economic and social development, and governance;
- Preparedness including the development of stand-by capacity, along with ongoing analysis, priority setting and early warning; and
- Partnerships between countries, international organizations, NGOs, and citizens.

Canada, Axworthy declared, was prepared to offer an example of leadership to the international community by putting its own assets to use in peacebuilding. These included "the wealth of skills and institutions that Canadians have developed in nurturing our own democracy" and the application of Canadian information technology to the cause of peace.

The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative

In the speech, Axworthy announced that he and the Minister for International Cooperation had decided to launch a "Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative" to meet several needs:

- the need "to coordinate our programs and policies that support conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction'"
- the need "to establish priorities and spend our money strategically", and
- the need for "a catalyst that can mobilize and bring together ideas, actions and funds".

Axworthy described the Initiative as "taking the first steps in what we expect to be a longer-term process. We already possess many of the tools needed to respond to complex emergencies ... but we need to create a new way of organizing our activities. Our aim is not to take over existing activities, but rather to ensure they work together in a coherent manner". Among the early steps to be taken would be the following:

- Increasing public consultations and bringing NGO experts into policy-making.
- Creating a roster of Canadian human rights experts available on short notice to the UN Centre for Human Rights, for example to help verify and implement peace accords.
- Establishing a peacebuilding fund of $10 million per year for two years.

THE CANADIAN PEACEBUILDING FUND

In announcing the establishment of the Canadian Peacebuilding Fund, Axworthy noted that the fund was not a large one "aimed at financing all Canadian initiatives under the rubric of peacebuilding. (Nor) is it meant to finance related activities that are already being addressed by other mechanisms, such as de-mining, demobilization of troops, restoration of capital infrastructure, return of refugees and displaced persons, and long-term development assistance". Rather the aim was to "fill urgent gaps in Canadian programming and, above all, to act as a catalyst, to spark new approaches and to mobilize Canadian talent and expertise".

Among the "new approaches" suggested were development of tools to enable the government:

- "to respond quickly and effectively to the complex requirements of building peace -- putting in place the elements necessary to promote trust and confidence among diverse communities within states", and
- "to promote cooperative relations between states in ways that contribute to real human security -- not simply the false and cold peace of military armed stand-offs".

The Minister said that he and the Minister for International Cooperation would "jointly determine and approve initiatives under the Fund". He also said that ministers intended to work together to "streamline decision making, co-ordinate activities within Canada and beyond, ensure broad consultation and information sharing, and speed up our responses to crises". In addition, other federal departments and NGOs would be "brought on board to ensure a coherent political, military, humanitarian and development assistance approach to complex emergencies".

The Fund would be financed through the reallocation of existing CIDA official development assistance (ODA) resources, and projects would have to be consistent with the terms and conditions of CIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance Program. Projects, therefore, would have to meet ODA criteria, take place in countries eligible to receive Canadian ODA, and be consistent with current CIDA policies and priorities. The Fund would be administered by CIDA, but an interdepartmental steering committee would provide policy guidance on funding decisions and both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for International Cooperation would approve projects and public announcements related to these projects.

The Fund became operational in April 1997, and it has since supported in the range of 100 projects in Asia, Africa, Central America, the Middle East, and Central Europe. Projects have included support for the investigation of human rights violations, public education on conflict resolution techniques, voter education, and arms collection. The Fund has also been drawn on to help finance projects administered by other organizations such as the United Nations and the L. B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

At the time the Fund was being established, there was concern to ensure that the Fund serve the purpose for which it was intended. As one individual commented, it was important to avoid having a framework "so loose you could do whatever you wanted as long as you called it the right thing". Officials in the two departments, therefore, collaborated in the preparation of a "Strategic Framework" to reflect a common understanding on the "aims and approaches" to peacebuilding to be undertaken within the framework of the Initiative and on the activities to be supported by the Fund. Officials were concerned to resolve definitional issues and to establish parameters to protect the Fund from projects of dubious relevance.

Hammered out between DFAIT at CIDA, the Strategic Framework document articulated a Canadian definition of peacebuilding, placed peacebuilding in a broader policy context, outlined a strategic approach to setting priorities for Canadian peacebuilding activities, and in the process helped to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the two departments.

Definition of peacebuilding

The Strategic Framework was notable, one official explained, for "settling the definitional debates" of 1995 and 1996. As defined in the document:

> *"Peacebuilding is the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence. Ultimately, peacebuilding aims at building human security, a concept which includes democratic development, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security."* [5]

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[5] The UN report, <u>An Agenda for Peace,</u> defined it as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".

Canada has since used this definition in all its public documents and presentations on peacebuilding (e.g. in the successful Canada/Japan Peacebuilding Symposium in 1999).

Policy context

The Strategic Framework also helped to explain how peacebuilding fit with other public policy initiatives. As the document noted, Canada already had an extensive record in peacebuilding, with many Canadian diplomatic and development assistance activities over the years having made a direct contribution to peacebuilding [6]. The Initiative would contribute by helping to "further mobilize Canadian expertise and experience" on peacebuilding. Moreover, "peacebuilding will be developed as a foreign policy priority within DFAIT programmes while peacebuilding activities will continue to be mainstreamed into regular CIDA programming as much as possible in order to develop a sustainable approach to peacebuilding".

Strategic approach

Describing the Fund as "a catalyst which will stimulate local sustainable initiatives towards peace", the document said it would be used to "respond quickly to urgent peacebuilding situations in ODA countries by supporting targeted, short-term (maximum 18 months), one-time interventions at a critical juncture in the peace consolidation process ... where possible (using) Canadian peacebuilding capacity directed at selected geographic and sectoral niches". Funds would be limited to activities "which cannot be funded through other CIDA mechanisms for reasons of speed, level of risk or type of intervention". Optimally, "the Fund will intervene at the point of convergence of several criteria: urgent peacebuilding needs, rapid response, selected niches, geographic focus and availability of appropriate Canadian capacity".

Roles and responsibilities

In developing the Strategic Framework, officials in CIDA and DFAIT were also able to work out relatively detailed arrangements for joint management of peacebuilding activities supported by the Fund, the main elements of which were as follows:

- The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for International Cooperation would jointly approve peacebuilding strategies and initiatives;

- A committee of assistant deputy ministers (ADMs) would advise ministers on policy and program issues and review proposals being submitted to ministers;

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[6] A notable example was Canada's involvement in the former Yugoslavia. DFAIT officers participated in the Steering Board for the Peace Implementation Council to help define international policy on civilian implementation of the peace process in Bosnia, and several were seconded to the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo. DFAIT also provided support for the participation of DND experts in arms control verification and confidence building measures under the Dayton Accords, and led an OSCE fact-finding mission to Kosovo to investigate human rights violations. CIDA had provided humanitarian relief and other support valued at approximately $100 million, including support for landmine removal, reform of health services, repair of infrastructure, promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and elections. DFAIT and CIDA had also collaborated on peacebuilding initiatives in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Middle East.

- An Interdepartmental Peacebuilding Working Group, co-chaired by the director of the DFAIT Peacebuilding and Human Security Division (AGP) and the Chief of the CIDA Peacebuilding Unit, would provide day-to-day management and administration;

- CIDA would focus its efforts on peacebuilding projects in the field, while DFAIT would focus on Canadian capacity building and consultations with civil society. Together, they would work on the multilateral environment supporting peacebuilding.

In practice, the ADM committee ceased to operate after October 1997 and the coordination function was devolved to the working level committee, which has continued to meet regularly.

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4. THE PEACEBUILDING AND HUMAN SECURITY PROGRAM

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

When the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative was launched in October 1996, it included the creation of a Canadian Peacebuilding Fund of $10 million per year to be jointly managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The two main objectives of the Initiative and the Fund were to strengthen Canadian peacebuilding capacity and to promote Canadian participation in international peacebuilding activities.

In a September 1997 submission to Treasury Board seeking approval for a separate Peacebuilding Program, DFAIT noted that its purpose would be to support the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative "in policy areas which fall outside the priorities of the CIDA Peacebuilding Fund". While proposals to be funded by the Program would be expected to meet one or both of the overall objectives of the Initiative, the department set out three specific objectives for the Program:

- to build domestic Canadian capacity for peacebuilding through research, policy development, public consultations, and training,
- to strengthen multilateral peacebuilding mechanisms,
- to support catalytic peacebuilding projects in countries or in policy areas that fall outside the priorities for Canadian official development assistance.

The department identified four kinds of projects to be funded by the Program:

- projects devoted to building Canadian research, analysis and training capacity in peacebuilding,
- contributions to international organizations that would give Canada a stake in the management of their peacebuilding activities,
- conferences, seminars and public consultations on peacebuilding topics which would take place in Canada rather than in developing countries, and
- peacebuilding projects in countries which were not eligible to receive Canadian ODA, such as the former Soviet Union and the Middle East..

RESOURCES

In the fall of 1997, Treasury Board approved a new "Class of Contributions in support of the DFAIT Peacebuilding Program". The Program was resourced at $1 million per year but with authority to disburse up to $2.5 million per year should there be policy reasons to do so and additional resources became available. Treasury Board also approved up to 15% (i.e. $150,000) to be used for operational expenses (e.g. travel, publications, consultancy contracts, and related support activities).

In FY 97/98, disbursements totalled $650,000 for grants and contributions and $262,000 for operations, leaving a free balance of approximately $87,000. In FY 98/99, the entire $850,000 for contributions was disbursed along with an additional $135,000 secured from other sources.

In 1999, Program funding was increased to $3 million per year, with Treasury Board approving expenditures up to $ 5 million.

The Program was located in the department's Global and Human Issues Bureau (AGD) in the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division (AGP). Under supervision of a director, the Program was managed by a program manager and was able to draw on the assistance of six divisional officers with mandates to develop policy and promote initiatives in designated subject areas. In 1999, the Program acquired a dedicated administrator.

ACTIVITIES

With funds only becoming available in August 1997 and the first projects not going forward to the Minister until November, the Program's first year was effectively half over before it began. Nonetheless, it was able to launch a number of initiatives in pursuit of its three main objectives. Notable examples included:

- the development of a registry of Canadian civilian experts available for deployment on peacebuilding missions (the Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Development),

- the establishment of an umbrella organization for NGOs and academic and research institutions working on peacebuilding issues (the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee),

- a number of studies and conferences on the UN's peacebuilding experience, and

- peacebuilding projects related to peace processes in Palestine, Cyprus, Africa, and Guatemala.

Some of these initiatives were carried forward into FY 98/99. New projects in the second and third year took the Program into more regions of the world (Ireland, Central Asia, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and East Timor) and into a wider range of peacebuilding subjects such as war-affected children, the media, gender issues, and economic agendas in civil wars.

EVOLUTION OF THE PROGRAM

In the spring of 1999, an internal review of the Program was conducted and a revised management framework was prepared. The principal change was to situate the Program within a broader human security context, which encompassed the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative but went beyond it in a number of areas. Henceforth, funding proposals would not only be expected to meet the general objectives of the Initiative but also to support the overall goal of contributing to the creation of a sustainable environment for human security in societies in conflict.

As explained in the department's submission to Treasury Board, "Over the past two years, we have developed a better understanding of the role which peacebuilding can play as one of a set of measures aimed at creating a sustainable environment for human security."

The result was a retitling of the Program (it would henceforth be called the *Peacebuilding and Human Security Program*); a determination to focus the Program on supporting Canada's efforts to remain at the forefront of international policy development and advocacy on peacebuilding and human security; and a refining of the objectives of the Program. These now became:

- to support consultations with domestic stakeholders and international government and NGO partners,
- to advocate adoption, compliance, and implementation of international norms and agreements on human security issues,
- to provide intellectual leadership in policy development and to fund applied research on models and methods of peacebuilding,
- to enable mediation and negotiation in support of Canada's political and diplomatic involvement in international peace processes, and
- to support training for building effective capacity to conduct peacebuilding.

The Program would continue to work on four substantive priorities (conflict prevention, small arms proliferation, war-affected children, and gender and peacebuilding) while also exploring a broader range of human security issues.

In the fall of 1999, at the opening of a new session of Parliament, the government announced that it would be giving "increased prominence to human security in its foreign policy, working to achieve meaningful progress in the councils of the world on a global human security agenda". Officials were under instruction to develop a strategy for the pursuit of Canada's human security agenda and to ensure that program resources were positioned to support the strategy.

OUTPUTS

During its first two years of operation (FY 97/98 and FY 98/99), the Program has supported some 30 projects a year. Projects have varied widely in shape and size, with financial assistance ranging from a few thousand dollars for organizing a conference to more than half a million dollars over two years for developing and administering CANADEM.

Since the start of the Program, projects have been grouped together and reported under headings which have changed over time to reflect the evolution in thinking about the Program and its value-added to the department. But the main categories have remained relatively constant: (a) building Canadian capacity for peacebuilding, (b) strengthening multilateral mechanisms, (c) developing policy in selected areas, and (d) taking country-specific initiatives in non-ODA countries. In addition, the Program has devoted a considerable portion of its time and resources to (e) consultations with other stakeholders.

A.   Building Canadian capacity for peacebuilding

From the time the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative was first launched, there was a priority on ensuring that Canada had an effective capacity to engage in peacebuilding.

CANADEM

Over the years, many departments and agencies of government have contributed personnel in support of international peace operations. By far the largest contingent has come from DND, with significant numbers also being drawn from the RCMP and from CIDA, DFAIT, Justice, Solicitor General, and Elections Canada. But until the mid-1990s there was no concerted effort to identify private sector expertise in Canada which might be available for deployment abroad on UN or other international missions. In 1996, DFAIT began work on a roster of Canadian human rights experts, but the project was overtaken when CANADEM (the Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights) was launched in February 1997 -- one of the first and still the most costly of the projects financed by the Program.

The model for CANADEM was NORDEM, a Norwegian data bank established in 1993 which collects the names of personnel available for international deployment. CANADEM describes itself as a stand alone, non-profit organization, operating at arms length from government, whose mandate is to become "a comprehensive civilian standby mechanism" to facilitate staffing UN and other international peace operations. It is in the process of building a "Resource Bank" of Canadian civilians with expertise or special interest in international human rights, democracy and peacebuilding, and a smaller "Roster of Experts" listing Canadians with "extensive international experience and the potential to make significant contributions to peace operations". It encourages individuals to register with CANADEM [7] and does some marketing of its data to the UN, the OSCE and other international organizations.

The cost of CANADEM's operations is borne entirely by the Peacebuilding Program, whose contribution is devoted largely to supporting the salaries and operating expenses of the four or five members on staff. Contributions totaled $136,500 in FY 97/98, $218,000 in FY 98/99, and $300,000 in FY 99/00. CANADEM charges no fees for its services.

During its first year and half of operation, CANADEM deployed people at the rate of only a few dozen a year. The explanations which have been offered for this low utilization rate include the fact that CANADEM was just getting off the ground and the temporary drop-off in international missions immediately after the Rwanda operation. In 1999, however, there was a dramatic increase in deployments, which totaled 114. Much of this was due to the OSCE's search for people to assist in Kosovo. Almost all the deployments resulted from solicited requests; only five were the result of individuals seeking out opportunities of their own.

In 1998, the Program financed an evaluation of CANADEM which found that it was functioning well and had achieved some important results.

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[7] CANADEM invites individuals to identify skills in the following areas: management, human rights, refugees, security, legal, electoral, reconstruction, design and evaluation, training, medical, political and conflict management, governance systems, media, field communications, information technology, logistics and mines.

Other capacity building

In addition to supporting CANADEM, the Program has also helped to build Canadian capacity for peacebuilding in other ways. In its first year in operation, the Program financed a collaborative effort between the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (pp. 25-26) and Carleton University to conduct a survey of the peacebuilding activities of Canadian NGOs, research institutions, and academic establishments. The survey aimed at determining the nature and geographical scope of Canadian peacebuilding activities, the organizations involved, their training needs, and the implications for government policy. It also looked at possible niches for Canadian peacebuilding activities in policy development, human rights, social reconstruction, capacity building, and training.

Conscious of the importance of equipping Canadians to be deployed on peacebuilding missions with the knowledge and skills required to be successful, the Program has also made a start on transferring the knowledge and skills acquired through its policy development and research work into training programs. The first such endeavour has been to co-sponsor with the United Kingdom the development of a course on gender issues for military and civilian participants in international peace operations. The course is being developed in collaboration with CIDA and DND. It is designed to sensitize peacekeepers to how the different roles which men and women play in society, particularly in developing countries, can affect their view of conflict and their response to various pressures in post-conflict situations, as well as to equip peacekeepers with practical tools for dealing with the gender issue. The total value of the project is $300,000, with Canada and the UK splitting the cost.

B.   Strengthening Multilateral Mechanisms

The counterpart to building domestic capacity for peacebuilding is enhancing the capacity of international institutions to conduct effective peacebuilding operations. The Program has tackled the issue in a number of ways: helping to explore the role of the UN and regional organizations in conflict prevention, educating representatives of countries on the UN Security Council, debriefing the heads of UN operations, and funding the training of UN staff.

Helping to explore the role of the UN and regional organizations in conflict prevention

International organizations obviously play a key role in peacebuilding, but their effectiveness is often limited by charters, modes of operation and resource levels designed for earlier times when inhibitions were greater against "interfering" in the internal affairs of members. Coming to terms with this reality and finding appropriate methodologies to assist in intra-state conflicts has been a challenge.

When the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict presented the results of a major study reviewing the conflict prevention work of the UN and a sample of regional and non-governmental organizations, the Canadian Peacebuilding Program and IDRC jointly sponsored a conference at which staff from the UN and other organizations could discuss the findings and recommendations of the study.

Educating representatives of countries on the UN Security Council

With the support of the Program, the International Peace Academy in New York organized a series of seminars for representatives of countries on the UN Security Council. The seminars were designed to improve representatives' understanding of conflict situations under discussion in the Council by arranging for them to meet with individuals having recent field experience with the issues.

Debriefing the heads of UN operations

Most UN peace operations are now managed on the ground by a senior UN executive who serves as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG). How effectively such people perform their function is often key to the successful outcome of an operation and learning from their experience is critical to improving the design and implementation of peace operations.

In July 1998, the Program collaborated with a Norwegian NGO to bring together 14 past and present SRSGs to talk about their experiences and to discuss how their role could be strengthened. The meeting was attended by the Secretary General, Kofi Annan; chaired by the Deputy Secretary General, Louise Fréchette; and observed by a panel of specialists who prepared a report highlighting the findings of the discussion (they noted the importance of planning, coherence and coordination). The report was delivered to Fréchette who undertook to follow up on its recommendations.

Training UN staff

The Program has made two contributions of $30,000 to help fund the Fellowship Programme in Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy run by the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The programme is the only one in the UN system which provides UN staff with training in the area of peacebuilding.

C.   Developing policy

During its first two years of operation, the Peacebuilding Program supported a wide variety of projects intended to explore key peacebuilding issues and to develop policy guidance for dealing with them. The main projects were the following:

Small arms

- A Project Ploughshares meeting to advance NGO planning on cooperative and coordinated international action to control small arms;
- A study for the United Nations by the Canadian Center for International Peace and Security on lessons learned in the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of ex-combatants;
- Project PrepCom, a small arms website hosted by the Monterey Institute for International Studies and supported by the International Action Network on Small Arms whose purpose is to promote international action on the problems associated with the proliferation, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons;

- An international policy forum on "microdisarmament";
- Support for an NGO planning meeting on small arms;
- Support for an extensive survey by the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa on the impact of the availability of small arms on the Southern African region and the development of an action plan to control their proliferation.

Children in conflict

- A roundtable to canvass the views of Canadian and international NGOs and Canadian government officials on the issue of child soldiers and the development of strategy on children in armed conflict;
- Support for the Child Soldiers Coalition (CSC), an international coalition working towards a ban on the use of children in combat;
- Support for CSC research into the recruitment and participation of child soldiers in conflicts in Asia, Europe and Latin America;
- Support for the work of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict;
- The commissioning of a policy paper on war-affected children (Nigel Fisher);
- A joint Canadian Red Cross/Canadian government workshop on effective programs to meet the needs of children during and after armed conflict, conducted during an annual conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent in Geneva;
- Preparation for workshops in Ghana on war affected children.

Free media

- Preparation of a policy paper on the role of the media in peacebuilding by the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS);
- An IMPACS review of the state of free media in APEC countries which formed the basis for discussion at the APEC conference in Vancouver in November 1997;
- A workshop organized by IMPACS engaging high profile journalists, government officials and business leaders to discuss the role of freedom of information legislation and to consider policy options to advance greater transparency in trade negotiations, particularly in the APEC context.

Economic incentives

- Support for an OECD/DAC study on development cooperation incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations;
- A conference on economic agendas in civil wars.

Policing and legal reform

- A McGill university seminar on policing and legal reform;
- An African police training program in Ghana focusing on the skills required for human rights monitoring and the monitoring of local police forces.

Civil rights

• A McGill university meeting of scholars and practitioners from a wide variety of countries to exchange experiences and study the problems of institutionalizing citizenship rights in new democracies.

Democracy and Elections

• Canadian membership in the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Stockholm, which is dedicated to the promotion and advancement of norms, rules and guidelines in the field of sustainable democracy and the improvement of electoral processes.

D. Country specific initiatives

The Program also supported country-specific initiatives intended to engage parties in dialogue and to impart knowledge about how to build durable structures for peace. Ideas for initiatives came from the Minister's office, geographic bureaux in DFAIT, Canadian missions, international organizations, NGOs, and sometimes parties directly involved.

Projects tended to be concentrated on the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, with priority on negotiation and mediation to assist geographic bureaux in the field at critical junctures. The principal projects were the following:

Middle East

• Support for an IDRC/McGill university series of meetings between Palestinians and Israelis on Palestinian refugee issues;
• A five-day workshop bringing together policy leaders from the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus to promote intercommunal dialogue and discuss alternative futures and peacebuilding scenarios;
• Support for an OSCE seminar in Amman on peacebuilding in the Mediterranean, to discuss democratization and the rule of law, the role of civil society, conflict prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation.

Africa

• Support for an elections monitor during the elections in Kenya;
• Support for conflict resolution training in Canada for Somali civil society leaders;
• Research on the links between the diamond trade in Sierra Leone and the ongoing war, exploring the motivation of the antagonists and the impact of foreign investment;
• Support for the War Torn Societies Project to facilitate a dialogue process between respected Ethiopian and Eritrean scholars to analyze technical issues relevant to building peace in these countries;

Latin America

- Support for the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission to assist in the collection of testimonies of Guatemalan refugees in Canada affected by the armed conflict;
- Support for the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala to promote awareness of the report of the Historical Clarification Commission.

Asia

- Support for an analysis of conflict in South Asia;
- Training for Central Asian foreign ministry personnel in practical approaches to peacebuilding;
- Deployment of two Canadian medical personnel to a Norwegian field hospital in East Timor.

Europe

- Support for the International Fund for Ireland which organizes youth exchanges taking Irish youngsters to countries where multiculturalism works.

E.   Consultations

When Lloyd Axworthy launched the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative in October 1996, he announced two specific measures in immediate support of the Initiative. One was the creation of the Peacebuilding Fund. The other was an intention to "bring NGO experts into the policy-making process" through cooperation with "the NGO-led Peacebuilding Contact Group" and the convening of a "formal consultation on peacebuilding".

The Peacebuilding Contact Group[8] had been set up at CIDA's urging in 1994 and was jointly chaired by Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares and an official at CIDA. According to a participant in the Group, it started out as a vehicle for bringing together NGOs already interested and working in the field and for exploring the relationship between humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. The Group organized seminars on peacebuilding and had begun to examine "lessons learned after Rwanda". It had also met with the Minister and with DFAIT officials and had put forward "a whole lot of proposals for policy development and for systematically extracting lessons learned out of organizations working on the ground, whether they were development organizations working on conflict or not, for example MSF (Médecins sans frontières)".

At a conference in November 1995 attended by over a 100 people representing NGOs, government and the academic community, the Group adopted a series of decisions which led "through an evolutionary process" to the creation of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) in 1997. The CPCC describes itself as "a collaborative network of Canadian

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[8] It was also known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on NGOs and Peacebuilding

NGOs, NGIs[9], academics and other individuals from a wide range of sectors engaged in a dynamic process of learning and action in peacebuilding". Its goal is "to engender greater coherence and effectiveness in building peace through fostering collaboration and coordination among diverse groups and sectors in Canada, and their partners overseas". The CPCC meets four times a year to set policy directions, has an Executive Committee of up to ten elected members (representing the various sectors of the CPCC network) which handles CPCC affairs in between the quarterly meetings, and a full-time Coordinator for the day-to-day management of the organization.

The Peacebuilding Program has been funding the CPCC since October 1997, in the amount of $57,000 in the first year and $100,000 per year thereafter. The funds pay for the salary and operating expenses of the Coordinator and for CPCC's assistance in organizing the department's annual consultations on peacebuilding and other consultations. The Program is the primary source of funding for the CPCC, with members also contributing $30,000 per year.

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[9] Non-governmental organizations and non-governmental institutions (e.g. universities, research institutes etc.

5. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

The following discusses the Program's success in meeting designated objectives, the effectiveness of the strategy pursued, and the results achieved. Section 6 addresses lessons learned from the experience of the Program.

MEETING OBJECTIVES

Need for the Program

When ministers announced their objectives for the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative in October 1996, there was an expectation that the Canadian Peacebuilding Fund would provide the means necessary to achieve these objectives. Within a few months, however, it was clear that the Fund would be able to meet only part of DFAIT's needs.

From the outset, the Canadian Peacebuilding Fund proved to be an awkward construct. While both DFAIT and CIDA could rightly claim some authorship of the initiative, much of the demand for funds initially came from DFAIT but CIDA held the purse strings. Though joint management structures were put in place to administer the Fund, there remained important differences between the two departments in how funds should be spent. Among these were the following:

- DFAIT intended the Fund to encompass a relatively wide scope of activity, while CIDA was reticent to become involved in policy areas or countries which had not been priorities in the past and with which the Agency had little experience.

- DFAIT envisaged funds being spent on projects which might include a heavily political or security component, an area traditionally off-limits to development agencies.

- DFAIT wanted funds to be available for more speculative and exploratory ventures than CIDA's project management standards would normally find acceptable.

- Finally, DFAIT wanted funds for building Canadian domestic capacity in peacebuilding, which meant spending money in Canada on Canadians not just in the field on particular peacebuilding projects.

The Fund was also premised on an assumption which the peacebuilding specialists in both DFAIT and CIDA shared, but was not always well founded. This was that bilateral programs in the two departments might not have sufficient confidence in emerging governments to be prepared to associate Canada with initiatives to assist them or to venture into non-traditional forms of assistance to help the transition from war to peace.

Not surprisingly, the first year was a difficult one. An example of the kind of problem DFAIT encountered was described by a senior officer in the following terms:

"It was becoming very clear in 1996 (before the creation of the Fund) that we were sending out missions whose objectives were changing but whose tools were the same. A group of DND peacekeepers ... insisted on meeting with us. We have a message for you, they said. You're missing it. We are out there, doing what we can with whatever we have. But we have to do it on the sly. Scrounging supplies to build schools. On the security side, there are a whole lot of other things to do besides observation ... Canada has to get its act together.

"We realized there were institutional gaps, funding gaps. What we needed was small amounts of money, flexible, responsive, not a whole program as CIDA prefers, for projects that were increasingly linked to foreign policy concerns, linked to what we do, things like confidence-building measures, not what ODA agencies do, even if it was useful to development. No one knew what worked, what the lessons were, what the guidelines should be. But there was no generic funding, no ODA budget for new thinking informed by practice in the field and vice versa. Just some for this, not for that.

"We hoped the Peacebuilding Fund would fill the gap, but it (was) a disappointment under joint management."

Outside the department, views were not very different:

- A central agency official commented that "the essence was timing for peacebuilding, but at CIDA there was always tension between meeting field requirements (and) management and administrative requirements. The problem was that they just didn't define peacebuilding the same way."

- In the view of an academic observer, "Once the Minister announced the creation of the Fund, there was a lot of confusion (about) criteria, which needs qualified. The Fund turned out to be neither quick nor responsive."

- Even in CIDA, there was concern. "The idea was to use the $10 million strategically to get things started which could be taken up by long term development assistance. But ... relationships between the multilateral and bilateral programs only started to click about a year ago."

As a result, while the Strategic Framework was being put in place and officials were learning how to make the joint funding mechanism work better, thinking within DFAIT returned to an earlier idea of creating a DFAIT fund "to fill the gaps in the gaps". In some respects, CIDA had even encouraged this. At the time the Fund was being set up, the Minister for International Cooperation had asked what DFAIT itself was prepared to "put on the table"[10]. In the event, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was able to secure $1 million for a separate DFAIT peacebuilding fund, initially known as the Canadian Peacebuilding Program.

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[10] Program Review had just reconfirmed that DFAIT was a policy rather than a program agency. In any case, every year DFAIT contributes in excess of $100 million to the UN, the primary organization involved in peacebuilding, including some $50 million for peacekeeping. In FY 99/00, $100 million represented fully 7.5% of DFAIT's budget.

Responding to new objectives

In the spring of 1999, mid way through its second year of operations, the Program was reoriented to meet a new set of objectives. Several factors appear to have had an influence:

First, with the initial two-year funding of the CIDA Fund due to expire at the end of March 1999, CIDA advised DFAIT that it was not prepared to renew the Fund under the previous terms. Instead, it would "mainstream" the fund into CIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance Program at the same level as in the past (i.e. $10 million per annum). The net effect of the decision was that DFAIT would no longer exercise any direct authority over the disposition of Fund resources, although the consultations mechanisms would remain in place and CIDA would continue to be open to proposals from DFAIT for peacebuilding projects[11].

Second, CIDA's views on the appropriate use of the Fund had evolved to the point where it was no longer averse to funding certain kinds of projects which it had previously considered to be ineligible for funding. These included some projects to build Canadian domestic capacity for peacebuilding and to strengthen multilateral peacebuilding mechanisms, as well as projects on such issues as small arms proliferation and training in civil-military relations. As a result, there was more scope to use Program resources to meet specific DFAIT needs.

Third, attitudes had also changed within the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division at DFAIT. After more than a year of seeing its role as "doing things the Fund would not do", the division shifted "psychologically and operationally" to a more proactive approach, establishing its own parameters and doing things which reflected DFAIT priorities.

Fourth, DFAIT's experience over the previous months suggested that the department's real value-added probably lay in policy development and in advice and training on peacebuilding and human security, rather than in "field-level projects".

Fifth, in June 1999, in the context of a budget rebalancing exercise to reorient spending on new priorities, DFAIT increased annual funding for the Program from $1 million to $3 million beginning in FY 99/00, which significantly expanded its potential.

Overcoming obstacles

In pursuing its objectives, the Program faced three obstacles: it was small, it was new, and it was controversial.

<u>Small</u>

With a budget of $1 million a year during its first two years, almost half of which was pre-committed to CANADEM, CPCC and IDEA, the Program was hardly resourced to effect major changes in the focus and direction of Canadian foreign policy. The most it could reasonably be

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[11] The decision appears to have been a unilateral one on CIDA's part and not expected by officials. In light of these developments, Program personnel revised the management framework and articulated new objectives.

expected to do was promote the peacebuilding concept within government, perhaps make some converts, and in the process do some good.

Not was it simply a matter of the Program "competing" with the CIDA Fund, which was resourced at $10 million a year, itself a rather modest sum considering the hopes residing in it. Neither the Program nor the Fund provided the main resource base or impetus for the very substantial peacebuilding work done by both DFAIT and CIDA through their bilateral programs.

The best illustration is Bosnia, the problem child of peacebuilding in the 1990s. To date, Bosnia has been the beneficiary of $212 million in Canadian peacebuilding assistance, with another $100 million announced for the future[12]. This assistance has been arranged entirely by DFAIT's Central, East and South Europe Bureau (RBD) working in close collaboration with CIDA's Central and East Europe Branch[13]. To help implement the Dayton peace accords, it was these two units -- not the Program or the Fund -- which developed the policy parameters for Canadian assistance to Bosnia, identified and planned the peacebuilding projects which would be undertaken, prepared the Cabinet submissions, and implemented the plans[14].

New

If the Program had few resources to begin with, it was also venturing into territory which was largely unexplored by governments, international organizations, NGOs, or the academic community.

The term "peacebuilding" itself had not entered the political lexicon until 1992 and did not gain public currency until the mid-1990s. Organizations which used the term each had their own view of what it meant. In Canada, the first attempt to arrive at a common definition was made only months before the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative was announced. As a researcher at IDRC observed, "We spent two years talking about what peacebuilding is, trying to define it"[15]. But the problem of defining what peacebuilding meant paled in comparison to the difficulty of reaching consensus on the range of activities to be included in a peacebuilding program. By some definitions, peacebuilding includes everything from conflict prevention to conflict resolution to post-conflict reconstruction. An early challenge for the Program was to operationalize the concept, a task which outside observers believe it had some success in

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[12] These sums do not include money spent caring for refugees or money spent by DND.

[13] The parties involved acknowledge that working together has sometimes been difficult, but they say they share a common objective, take a "like-minded approach", and are both determined "to get in there and make things happen". A senior DFAIT official commented: "the mechanism in place works pretty darn well ... we give foreign policy advice, they manage the money". Confidence is sufficiently high on both sides that "when we needed core funding for something, we went to CIDA and got it in a month".

[14] Special circumstances help to explain why this collaboration worked so well. In the early 1990s, DFAIT had established a bureau of assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and in 1995 transferred it to CIDA because of the latter's superior strengths in program delivery. There was no question, therefore, that both political and developmental considerations drove the program in Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.

[15] An agreed definition, of course, was finally arrived at in the Strategic Framework. See p. 14.

doing. In the view of one individual, "there was tremendous movement away from abstract conceptual work to real efforts to give meaning to what peacebuilding and human security mean ... these are no longer blanket terms, they're beginning to have substance".

Operationalizing peacebuilding faced its own obstacles. For the most part, it was a process of trial and error, experimentation, success and failure. The Program moved into new areas of public policy, required the adoption of untried or unproven methods, depended on new partnerships, ran risks, breached the boundaries of traditional notions of sovereignty, and bumped up against bureaucratic conservatism.

<u>Obstacles</u>

Some of the resistance that the Program received pre-dated the Program itself. A year before, DFAIT had established its Global Affairs Bureau (AGD) to enhance the department's capacity to deal with the new global agenda. While many saw the bureau as an inspired response to the needs of the times, others questioned its relevance to the mandate of the department. In their eyes, whatever the bureau touched was suspect -- and the bureau was the principal home, responsibility centre, and advocate of peacebuilding and human security within DFAIT.

Behind the resistance there appear to have been elements of both incomprehension and fear. Foreign policy traditionalists tended to view foreign and domestic affairs as separate universes. Accustomed to an agenda consisting of international peace and security issues and economic and trade issues, they considered the department's increasing involvement in such "global" issues as governance and human rights, the environment, health, crime, drugs, and terrorism as misguided. Even if G-7 summit meetings were now preoccupied with these issues, it was not for DFAIT but for other departments to deal with them. Peacebuilding seemed more of the same. Some dismissed the Program's policy development work as "all talk, all process, no results".

The Peacebuilding Program also represented something of a threat to the established order within DFAIT. There was concern that it might draw resources away from other programs and portend a reorientation of the department's mission and mode of operation. At CIDA, there were fears DFAIT Peacebuilding Program might overlap with the Agency's programs.

In the event, the Program was able to work around these obstacles.

STRATEGY AND EFFECTIVENESS

The strategy which determined how decisions were made to utilize Program funds was largely conditioned by four main drivers: the amount of money available; the division of labour with CIDA; demands from the Minister's office and others; and experience with the Program.

The amount of money available

During its first two years of operation (FY 97/98 and FY 98/99), the Program was funded at $1 million a year. Of this, $850,000 was allocated for grants and contributions and $150,000 for operations. Beginning in FY 99/00, Program funds increased to $3 million a year.

By any measure, these amounts are not large to implement a major policy initiative. Moreover, some 45% of the budget in each of the first two years[16] was effectively out of reach, going to support annual contributions to three activities judged essential to the Program's mandate: CANADEM, CPCC, and Canadian membership in the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Stockholm (IDEA). In effect, the Program had between $350,000 and $400,000 per year to respond to project proposals and to pursue initiatives of its own design.

For two years after start-up, therefore, Program administrators had little money to work with, had to pool their resources with others' to get some projects off the ground, and continued to rely on the CIDA Fund for most of what they wanted to accomplish. The situation improved in 1999 when the budget was raised to $3 million, but the raise was unexpected and had not been planned for.

Division of labour with CIDA

When the CIDA Fund was created, DFAIT officials pointed out that a "whole strategy had been developed for the kinds of projects that would be funded" and that they had planned to concentrate on "six or seven program areas". But when shared jurisdiction of the Fund proved to be difficult to manage and a separate DFAIT fund was created, it was not simply a matter of having the same "six or seven program areas" drive the resourcing decisions of the Program. The Fund still existed, was still co-managed by DFAIT, and continued to support many of the initiatives emanating from the department or from missions abroad. The challenge was to find an effective division of labour between the Fund and the Program, the former offering DFAIT clients "poor predictability" and the latter limited financial assistance.

Officials overseeing peacebuilding budgets in the two departments agree that a satisfactory relationship was eventually worked out between them. As one senior officer in CIDA commented, "We hit it off conceptually and worked out a sharing of activity, where we wanted to see some joint decisionmaking in complex areas. We worked in a coordinated way, ensured that political and development projects were brought more together". In the opinion of a DFAIT officer, "We're working well together now. Setting up our own program helped."

CIDA's decision to assume full control over management of the Fund (in the spring of 1999) also appears to have helped improve relations between the two departments. As one DFAIT official observed, there was "a dramatic improvement in the climate with CIDA once we were not placed in the position of insisting that our ADM and the Minister sign off on CIDA funds, share in the announcements". With one department no longer "counter-managing money for which another department was accountable", there was now "an aligning of management with accountability". One consequence was that DFAIT had stopped sending project ideas over to CIDA with what amounted to instructions that they be supported; they were now forwarded with a polite suggestion that CIDA "might wish to consider" taking action on them.

What did happen, in the view of one DFAIT officer, was that "we started to define ourselves in our own terms, not in opposition to CIDA". In the words of another DFAIT officer, "we grew into the role. We started getting DFAIT some space of its own outside of CIDA's priorities and focus,

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[16] Approximately 40.5% in FY 97/98 and 49% in FY 98/99.

in the process discovering what our scope was and what we were meant to do". The first two years had been "a learning experience for everyone", and had helped the DFAIT Peacebuilding Program become "more conscious of what its value-added is". In the words of one officer, "We came to the realization we were in the knowledge business, not programs but research, training, consultations and so on."

In the meantime, the interdepartmental committee has continued to meet, with the parties sharing information on what is happening in donor networks and on what projects they have in their pipelines, discussing emerging thematic and geographic priorities, and consulting on evaluation methods. In the words of one participant, "discussions have become much more collegial and substantive, we're coordinating because we see the value of it".

Demands from the Minister's office and others

Since inception, the Minister and his political staff had been actively engaged in the department's peacebuilding activities -- defining and promoting the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, framing the issues, and generating the resources required. Not surprisingly, the Minister's office was also one of the main generators of ideas and proposals for Canadian peacebuilding projects. But suggestions also came from other quarters: geographic bureaux of the department, Canadian missions abroad, CIDA and other government departments and agencies with overseas interests and operations, Canadian NGOs and NGIs, and international organizations. In addition, the Program itself initiated projects.

A major preoccupation for Program administrators was to channel activity into priority areas and to resist the pressure to support projects which were not only a poor fit for the Program but also poor prospects for follow-through. As one administrator commented, "There is not much constituency for program coherence ... consistency is the biggest challenge we face".

Some inconsistency is to be expected of a new program exploring the scope for enterprising activity in a potentially vast policy area, and some may even be desirable. Whatever the parameters of the Program may be, they not only anticipate but encourage rapid response to peacebuilding opportunities. Such opportunities have to be seized as and when they arise, and they are unlikely to do so in any consistent pattern. It may be mark of success, therefore, that the Program demonstrated some "inconsistency" by supporting a variety of different initiatives to promote peacebuilding.

Program administrators in fact appear to have been quite adept at managing the many demands which were placed on the Program, beginning with those originating in the Minister's office -- arguably the Program's most important "client" and the one requiring the most care and attention. As it happened, it took a little while before the parties developed a comfortable relationship with each other.

An early observer of the Fund and the Program with experience working in the Minister's office offers a thesis to explain why there were tensions at first and why a strong working relationship later developed between the Minister and the department. The Minister and his staff had moved over to DFAIT from Human Resources Development Canada where they had been actively involved the policy area . So when the Minister and his staff first began to propose new policies at DFAIT and were met with "discussion, debate and suggestions for alternatives", there was a

propensity to conclude that "the desks were resisting change rather than just the course selected". Over time, however, "they began to realize in fact people were just as enthusiastic as the Minister ... it wasn't obstructionism but resistance for policy reasons". Thereafter, "the relationship improved a lot, the peacebuilding people really helped".

HRDC was also a department where policy initiatives typically translated into programs. At DFAIT, it proved rather more difficult to translate policy into programs. Not only was DFAIT not a department with substantial program funds[17], but the Peacebuilding Fund turned out to be less accessible than first hoped for[18]. And when the Program was created, the funds available were relatively modest.

Ministerial initiatives took a variety of forms. In some cases, it was a matter of the department "picking up signals from the Minister" and relaying them back in the form of proposals. At other times, the Minister would identify a general need and request the department to develop some options for consideration. And sometimes, the Minister's office would convey very precise instructions with the expectation that action follow immediately.

Over time, Program administrators developed the kind of dialogue with ministerial staff which allowed them to explore the intentions behind initiatives, to provide considered responses to proposals which needed refinement, and "sometimes to explain why an idea didn't fit the program or wouldn't work". In the view of one official, the dialogue helped the parties to reach some consensus "on what a foreign ministry does and what kind of projects it was practical for it to undertake in the field".

Administrative experience

If experience helped in the division of labour with CIDA and in the development of a mutually-supportive relationship with the Minister's office, it also helped to improve the general administration of the Program.

With greater clarity about its value-added and what it should specialize in, the Program was in a better position to insist that requests to tap into its scarce resources be more closely tied to priorities, that requesters "make a good case", and that Program administrators be able to exercise more control over how funds were used and receive feedback on the results achieved.

Experience also helped the Program to determine what kind of in-house expertise it should be developing, in respect of both peacebuilding issues and administration.

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[17] The budget of HRDC's National Child Benefit program alone is approximately equal to DFAIT's total budget.

[18] There were times when the minister's office, DFAIT geographic bureaux and CIDA bilateral programs all shared the same frustrations with the eligibility criteria of the Fund. But when proposals were turned down, the reasons appear to have been quite reasonable -- even predictable.

Elements of the Strategy

As Program administrators learned from their experience, the basic elements of the strategy they pursued became the following:

- Keep the main goals in mind:
  -- build Canadian capacity for peacebuilding,
  -- strengthen multilateral mechanisms for peacebuilding,
  -- develop policy in selected areas of peacebuilding,
  -- take country-specific initiatives as catalysts for peacebuilding, and
  -- consult with other Canadian stakeholders.
- Continue to see the Peacebuilding Fund as the principal source of funding for projects in the field, using the Program as back-up.
- Focus the Program on "the knowledge business".
- Recognize that the resources available are limited and try to make them stretch as far as possible. Leverage them whenever possible.
- Anticipate as well as respond creatively to ideas and proposals from stakeholders, particularly the Minister, the department and its missions, and key NGOs.
- Stay open to new ideas and be willing to experiment, even if there are risks.

RESULTS ACHIEVED

Broad objectives

As noted earlier, the Program was assigned three broad objectives:

1. To build domestic Canadian capacity for peacebuilding through research, policy development, public consultations, and training,
2. To strengthen multilateral peacebuilding mechanisms,
3. To support catalytic peacebuilding projects in countries or in policy areas that fall outside the priorities for Canadian official development assistance.

The Program was active in each area, made progress across the board, and delivered measurable improvements over the situation which existed before the Program was launched. Specific accomplishments included the following:

Building Canadian capacity for peacebuilding

- The establishment of the Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM)
- A survey of the nature and scope of Canadian peacebuilding activities, the organizations involved, and their training needs;
- The development of a course on gender issues in peacebuilding;
- The establishment of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee;
- Annual consultations with Canadian NGOs on peacebuilding.

Strengthening multilateral peacebuilding mechanisms

- Exploring the role of the UN and regional organizations in peacebuilding;
- Educating representatives of countries on the UN Security Council on international conflict situations coming before the Council;
- Debriefing the heads of UN operations and documenting the lessons learned from their experience;
- Funding the peacebuilding training of UN staff.

Supporting catalytic peacebuilding projects in countries or in policy areas that fall outside the priorities for Canadian official development assistance

Countries

- Palestine
- Cyprus
- Sierra Leone
- Ethiopia/Eritrea
- Northern Ireland

Policy areas

- conflict prevention
- small arms
- children in conflict
- free media
- economic incentives and disincentives in civil wars
- policing and legal reform
- civil rights
- democracy and elections
- gender and peacebuilding

Specific observations

CANADEM

Among the individuals interviewed for this study, there seems little doubt that CANADEM has served a useful purpose and should continue in operation. But there were questions about the direction it should take in future.

Canada currently has a very fragmented system for finding and deploying people abroad. Within the government, there are many different organizations involved, each with its own mandate, priorities, systems and resources. As one official noted, "Every mission is staffed in a different way". CANADEM is but the most recent addition to the mix. *Where does it fit, and should it have a coordinating function?*

CANADEM now represents 10% to 20% of the current budget of the Peacebuilding Program, a heavy burden for a relatively small program particularly when there is an expectation of repeated funding. *Should it be financed in some other way?*

CANADEM currently costs $300,000 a year to operate, and about 100 of those registered with CANADEM are selected for deployment every year. So it costs about $3000 for each person to be found. *Over the long term, what would be an acceptable ratio of cost to deployment?*

CANADEM helps people to be found, but it has almost no resources to prepare them for deployment and none to actually deploy them. This can pose two kinds of problems. International missions typically have budgets to pay for people, but administrative requirements can hold up deployments for weeks or months and compromise rapid response. Also, departments may have an interest in placing a Canadian in a key position abroad, but may not have ready access to the resources necessary to do so. As one senior official in DFAIT observed, "We don't have a way of deploying experts in anything but an ad hoc way." *Should CANADEM be resourced to support at least some deployments?*

Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinaring Committee

Investing in the CPCC appears to have been a wise decision. According to Program administrators, the organization is "so valuable in so many ways, low overhead for all the work they do". The CPCC has helped to provide "credibility" to the department's determination to consult with the NGO peacebuilding community. It has served as "a good conduit, a channel to get our message out and to hear from people", and it had proven its "worth to policy advisors". The CPCC has also helped to alleviate some of the burden of managing the department's relations with the NGOs, 300 of whom now attend the annual peacebuilding consultations.

Program administrators consider the fourth annual consultations held at the end of February 2000 to have been the most successful ever. In addition to extensive participation on the part of NGOs, DFAIT geographic bureaux were actively engaged and CIDA was well represented by experts and by the minister responsible for CIDA. The consultations were also notable for the high quality of discussion among participants on the challenges of peacebuilding and peacebuilding strategies.

From the CPCC's perspective, the relationship also appears to have been a beneficial one. The Program's financial support allowed the CPCC to commission a Carleton Universty group to conduct a census of Canadian NGOs in peacebuilding. It also helped the CPCC to play its coordinating role among Canadian NGOs, identify policy gaps where Canada could make a difference, avoid duplicating what other NGOs are doing, organize meetings and workshops, commission papers, and stay in contact with the relevant departments and agencies.

Among members of the CPCC, there appears to be a high level of satisfaction with the work that has been done. The organization has influenced government decisions on what Canada's peacebuilding priorities should be. It has helped members get funding for overseas projects. And it has arranged meetings with government decision-makers so that members could have some impact on policy.

For the future, CPCC members appear to hope for progress on two fronts. First, members want more feedback from government on what the CPCC's impact has been. While members are happy with the consultations which have been taking place, some wonder "whether the government is really listening". The Minister regularly acknowledges and thanks members for their contributions, and there is a "good and honest dialogue" with departmental officials. But when members make recommendations "they don't always get a response". Since other NGOs lobby the government independent of the CPCC, it is difficult for members "to attribute something to the results of our consultations".

Second, the CPCC could do more with more money. More research. More thorough research. More engagement with members. And more consultations across the country.

Other results

The Program also produced results of other kinds, some of which may turn out to be more important in the long run than the objectives assigned to it at the beginning. Among these are the following:

1. It has helped to clarify thinking about what peacebuilding is and about the policy instruments and operational tools peacebuilding can generate to address situations which have posed obstacles to achieving sustainable peace in war-torn societies.

2. It has helped to put "peacebuilding" on the agenda within government. The term is now widely accepted and used to describe activities which range far beyond the operations of the Program itself.

3. It has broadened the constituency of support for peacebuilding activities within DFAIT, throughout government, and in the NGO community, and thereby made it more likely that peacebuilding will become an integral part of Canadian foreign policy.

4. In advancing the process of identifying Canadian capacity for peacebuilding, it has drawn attention to the relatively ad hoc way in which deployments of peacebuilding specialists now take place and to the need for a more systematic and better funded approach.

5. It has contributed to improving the peacebuilding capacity of international institutions, but in the process has demonstrated that the UN in particular has been slow to learn the lessons of the 1990s and to integrate these into its operations.

6. The policy issues it has addressed, which may be among peacebuilding's most difficult ones, have helped to illustrate how much policy work remains to be done, particularly in integrating disciplines and developing more "horizontal" approaches to solving problems. There is almost no established body of expertise on peacebuilding on which governments or others can now draw.

7. The opportunities which the Program has found to do some practical peacebuilding in the field generated some important lessons about what works and what doesn't work in

promoting negotiations and mediation, including the importance of selecting projects which involve the right people and can be supported over time.

8.   After a difficult beginning, DFAIT has developed a good working relationship with CIDA on peacebuilding. Not only has this improved collaboration between the two departments, but it has resulted in CIDA becoming more overtly conscious of the political context of development assistance and prepared to support a broader range of peacebuilding activities.

9.   The Program has plugged into a professional network of expertise in and out of government, which helps to channel information and ideas into the department and helps to develop the partnerships the department will need to engage in successful peacebuilding in future.

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6. LESSONS LEARNED

Some three years after the launch of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative and two years after the inauguration of the Canadian Peacebuilding and Human Security Program, it is possible to point to a number of lessons learned from the experience. While these might not be agreeable to everyone associated with the Program, they are offered as propositions to be tested over the months and years to come.

General

1. *Be prepared to encounter resistance when introducing innovations.* Innovations in foreign policy are rare, can be misunderstood, and are likely to be resisted. Peacebuilding is arguably a major innovation with significant scope for transforming how states approach their international obligations to assist others. This poses a number of challenges to orthodoxy in international security policy and development assistance programming.

2. *Stick to it.* Diligence in the pursuit of change is critical. Change is not often readily accepted or easily implemented. The benefits are not always obvious at the outset, while the perceived losses and potential costs can seem very large. Peacebuilding is becoming accepted as a "mainstream" tool of foreign policy, but it is not yet fully supported throughout the foreign policy community.

3. *Keep the message clear and simple.* Peacebuilding has been plagued by definitional problems since it made its introduction in a report of the UN Secretary General in 1992. At times, it has been defined so broadly as to seem more an ideology than a policy. In consequence, it is as likely to be an object of ridicule as a source of inspiration. Rhetoric and analysis have buried the message that traditional methods of assisting war-torn societies have had little lasting impact and that the time has come for a more results-oriented approach.

The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative

4. *Position the initiative in a larger institutional context.* The fate of most initiatives is to burn brightly for a moment and then flame out. The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative avoided this fate by being anchored in peacebuilding units in both DFAIT and CIDA and by receiving dedicated funding. These measures helped to protect and sustain the Initiative in its early years. To remain viable over the longer term, however, ownership of the Initiative must be transferred from the policy to the program elements of the two departments. The Initiative will have succeeded when peacebuilding has become integral to the operations of the DFAIT and CIDA geographic bureaux and branches.

5. *Work on relationships with key partners.* The October 1996 speech which launched the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative asserted "the urgent need" to co-ordinate DFAIT and CIDA policies and programs on peacebuilding. It took some time, however, before the two departments developed comfortable working arrangements on peacebuilding. Much

of the credit is due the peacebuilding units in DFAIT and CIDA which determined to overcome the institutional and other obstacles to effective collaboration.

6. *Joint management of funds is not a good idea.* At the time the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative was being planned, it was accepted that DFAIT was a policy department without significant program resources and that most or all of the funds for the Initiative would have to come from CIDA's budget. The arrangements made for DFAIT and CIDA to co-manage the funds did prove to be workable, but they were administratively cumbersome and created resentments on both sides.

The Canadian Peacebuilding and Human Security Program

7. *It takes a village.* When it was first introduced, peacebuilding was a largely alien concept in the department and frequently dismissed as a "flaky new approach" to foreign policy. For it to grow and take its rightful place in departmental priorities, it needed protection and encouragement. Fortunately, it found these in both the higher echelons and at the working level.

8. *A million dollars ain't what it used to be.* Initial funding to the tune of $1 million allowed the Program to support a few key operations (CANADEM and CPCC) and to launch a handful of projects in key policy areas and geographic regions. But it was not nearly enough to meet departmental demands for support for peacebuilding initiatives, let alone to effect a transformation in how DFAIT and CIDA "do peace".

9. *A clear mandate is the key to effectiveness over the long term.* From the outset, the Program has benefitted from articulate affirmations of its mandate. But the mandate has been evolving as priorities have changed and as new resources have come on stream. With the Program on the threshold of a new era, a careful focusing of effort and marshalling of resources will be critical.

10. *Important work remains to be done in operationalizing the concept of peacebuilding.* Peacebuilding experience has been accummulating for several years, in Canada and elsewhere, but peacebuilding policy and peacebuilding instruments are still largely undeveloped.

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7.   THE FUTURE

Peacebuilding and human security

Stripped of its rhetoric, peacebuilding not only represents an important addition to the international agenda but also holds the potential to raise standards for international action.

Effective peacebuilding requires states, international organizations and NGOs to address issues which have not traditionally featured on their agenda -- but which are the key to helping out societies unable to cope with political, economic or social pressures. Peacebuilding appreciates the importance of intervention before violence occurs and the pointlessness of investing in development projects which civil wars will target for destruction. Peacebuilding explores how to rebalance economic incentives to favour peace over conflict. It is about taking small arms out of the hands of civilian irregulars not just disarming regular troops and decommissioning tanks and artillery. It involves the reintegration of teenage warriors into society. It intrudes on internal affairs to promote civil debate. It understands that there will be no ending of intercommunal strife without effective policing, trust in the judiciary, the rule of law, free elections, free and responsible media, good governance, and a host of intangibles which collectively produce a political culture which is able to resolve disagreement without resort to violence.

Implicitly, peacebuilding argues that Western governments must take a more holistic and indeed all-encompassing approach to "doing good" abroad and to focus more on end results. And, in the final analysis, the results which matter are not just the security and wellbeing of states but also of individuals.

Peacebuilding and human security are intimately related. The first is the means for achieving the second. While both have received attention, the future will likely see greater emphasis placed on human security -- as the goal which should inform national and international efforts to assist war-torn societies.

In April 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs released a concept paper on human security[19] which set out the case for an international political agenda designed to achieve a very specific and measurable result, enhancing people's safety and their "freedom from violent and non-violent threats". The paper acknowledged the continued importance of national security but argued that it should not be an end in itself. Rather, the security of the state was a means for ensuring the security and wellbeing of people. Nor could one be achieved without the other. Nothing improved the legitimacy, stability and security of the state like a secure population. And nothing improved the security of the population like the effective governance of a "democratic state that values its own people and protects minorities".

The paper also argued that human development and human rights were likewise contingent on human security. Neither could be achieved in conditions of political violence and crime, when

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[19] The paper was entitled <u>Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World</u> and was circulated at a meeting on human security held in Lysoen, Norway, May 19-20, 1999, attended by foreign ministers and representatives from ten countries.

people lacked confidence in society's ability to protect them. Conversely, "human security provides an enabling environment for human development".

In brief, the Minister was advocating not only a more "people-oriented" approach to foreign policy but also a more results-oriented one -- with the material improvement in the welfare of individuals the measure of success.

Looking forward

Most foreign policy is non-discretionary in nature, the daily business of responding quickly and creatively to international developments in order to protect and promote national interests which might be affected by these developments. As globalization proceeds apace, space and time are compressed and foreign ministries have to devote increasing shares of their scarce resources to maintaining the infrastructure and personnel needed to ensure a rapid response capability. If they have any resources left to support initiatives of any kind, the issue is whether to commit the funds to enhancing current policy or embark on new ventures.

Canada has so many global interests that just minding them absorbs almost all of DFAIT's $1.3 billion budget. In FY 99/00, 55% of the budget was devoted simply to running the organization, with another 35% committed to assessed contributions to international organizations and to support for other government departments abroad. The balance, about $135 million, was all that remained to finance all the department's foreign policy operations, trade and economic policy operations, international business development, public diplomacy, training, and discretionary grants and contributions programs. (By way of comparison, CIDA's budget is due to grow by $145 million per year over the next three years.)

Against this background, a foreign policy aiming to be effective in the fields of peacebuilding and human security cannot hope to succeed unless certain conditions are met:

First, the department at large must adopt peacebuilding and human security as a major vocation. Unless these feature prominently in the department's foreign policy and operations agenda, including in its public diplomacy and corporate outreach programs, and are recognized as priorities in its discretionary activities, there is little likelihood of generating the energy and commitment required to make them succeed.

Second, policy and operations must be closely linked, with the initiative increasingly shifting to the geographic bureaux and the missions. Peacebuilding started as niche diplomacy, has become central, and must now be "internalized". There is a continuing role for policy development and policy promotion within the department, but the ultimate test is whether the geographic bureaux and the missions themselves assume "ownership" of the peacebuilding policy.

Third, the department must have more money for peacebuilding and human security. No major initiative, especially one aiming to effect a transformation in Canadian foreign policy as profound as the venture into peacekeeping of the mid 1950s, can hope to succeed without a substantial budget. The 2000 federal budget provides an additional $50 million over five years for this purpose.

Fourth, the department must focus its efforts more narrowly. To date, the Peacebuilding and Human Security Program has cast a wide net, exploring a relatively large number of subjects and supporting projects on almost every continent. Too much diffusion of effort runs the risk of accomplishing nothing of lasting value. Human security, after all, is about achieving results.

Fifth, the government as a whole must support the initiative. Many departments and agencies already do so, but much of the collaboration is ad hoc and depends on the ability of organizations to find resources to contribute to international operations when they are already over-extended at home. The absence of a Cabinet committee to set policy direction and guide cooperation among the parties is lamentable.

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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing leads to the following conclusions:

- The Peacebuilding and Human Security Program has met the objectives set for it when the Program was launched in 1997.

- The Program has also achieved several other important results which position it for a greater role within the department, across government, and within the Canadian foreign policy community.

- The Program has made intelligent use of the scarce resources it had to work with, employing these effectively to launch initiatives to explore the new terrain of peacebuilding and Canadian capabilities in peacebuilding.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As it enters a distinctively new phase with significantly increased resources at its disposal, the Program might consider the following suggestions for the future:

1. Arrange a public "relaunching" of the Peacebuilding and Human Security Program, placing the program in the larger context of Canadian foreign policy, articulating the philosophy to be adopted to assist war-torn societies, and outlining a more focused approach in using the new resources available.

<u>**Response**</u>
Canada's foreign policy for human security and its operationalization through Human Security Program initiatives was publicly launched with the widespread dissemination of the publication/brochure entitled, "Freedom From Fear" in September/October, 2000. This brochure was distributed throughout Canada, at the United Nations, internationally, and is available on the new DFAIT Human Security Website. The specific, focussed approach to be adopted in using the new resources available to the Program was approved by Cabinet and Treasury Board, and is outlined in communications material on the Program.

2. Establish priorities for the new Program, working with CIDA to ensure an appropriate division of labour.

<u>**Response**</u>
The framework and priorities for the new Program were developed in consultation with CIDA, and there is close consultation with CIDA on all proposed Program or CIDA-funded initiatives, to ensure complementarity of effort and avoid duplication.

> *(a) Policy development*

- Ensure that DFAIT, CIDA and IDRC collectively have the best data available anywhere in the world on "what works" in peacebuilding, drawing on Canadian and others' experience.

Response
DFAIT/AGP, CIDA and IDRC are all members of an informal network of donors working in the area of conflict prevention, human security and post-conflict reconstruction, which meets every six months to exchange information and lessons learned from operational initiatives. CIDA has compiled a "Compendium of Operational Frameworks for Peacebuilding", which includes contributions from donor agencies, the UN, and civil society. This compendium represents the cutting edge of our collective international knowledge about how to design effective peacebuilding initiatives. DFAIT/AGP and CIDA are also represented on the OECD Development Assistance Committee Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development, which has the mandate of promoting policy and programming coherence among donors working on conflict issues.

- Develop the strategies and policy tools to allow the Program to contribute to the design of Canadian and international peacebuilding initiatives which will produce specific and measurable results.

Response
A Performance Framework for Planning, Management and Evaluation of initiatives under the new Human Security Program has been developed and is being implemented. This tool is of invaluable assistance in the design, assessment, monitoring and evaluation of Program initiatives. The Framework has been welcomed by partners in Canada and internationally as a useful and applicable contribution to the design of Canadian and international peacebuilding initiatives geared towards the establishment of performance indicators and the measurement of results.

- Work with CIDA and IDRC on the development of criteria for the design of humanitarian relief and development assistance programs to ensure they enhance peacebuilding and human security over the long term.

Response
Both DFAIT/AGP and CIDA have been working closely with IDRC for over two years on IDRC's Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Initiative (PCIA). This initiative is aimed at increasing awareness about the impact of development assistance programs on conflict situations and ensuring that this awareness contributes to strengthening the design of these programs to mitigate any possible negative impacts. The PCIA framework has been shared with the informal donor network referred to above, and has been the subject of several international workshops to test the methodology, involving a wide range of stakeholders.

- Select two or three major subject areas for research, and propose to allies that they take the lead on others.

Response
DFAIT has established five priority issue areas under the human security agenda, each with several sub-issues, which represents our program of work in the area of human security for the

five-year period ending 2005. Simultaneously, we have developed partnerships with a wide range of UN agencies, other governments, and civil society organizations aimed at furthering our understanding of these and related issues. Examples include joint research initiatives on children and peace support operations with members of the 13-country Human Security Network; and our collaboration in the development of gender training material for peace support operations with the United Kingdom.

       (b) Capacity building

- Establish a national approach (possibly a government agency) for dealing with the problem of recruiting and deploying abroad Canadian peacebuilding and human security specialists.

Response
Under the new Human Security Program, DFAIT has created a Deployment Coordination Unit to facilitate, and, where necessary, fund expert deployments to human security-oriented field missions. Its mandate includes domestic capacity-building. A primary objective therein is to catalyze better horizontal management of expert deployment issues, both within and outside government, which includes but is not limited to the questions of recruitment and deployment.

- Develop a more integrated and focused "learning program" for Canada and its peacebuilding allies, working on both (a) the design of effective projects taking lessons learned into account, and (b) more in-depth study of key peacebuilding issues.

Response
The Performance Framework for Planning, Management and Evaluation of the Human Security Program addresses the recommendation contained in (a). The Program itself contains a Policy Research envelope, with the objective of promoting more in-depth study of human security/peacebuilding issues. A key component of this envelope is the new Human Security Fellowships Program, which provides fellowships for both academic and non-academics to pursue research on human security issues.

- Link up with suitable Canadian and/or other institutions to develop an initial set of training programs reflecting the learning.

Response
The Human Security Program has supported numerous training initiatives on human security and peacebuilding issues by internationalorganizations such as the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the UN Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), national and local programs, and Canadian organizations. In addition, DFAIT/AGP has participated in training programs coordinated by CIDA and IDRC. Training is a key strategic focus of the Program.

(c) Preventive diplomacy

- Encourage a strengthening of the department's intelligence and research capacity to enhance early warning.

Response

As mentioned above, the new Human Security Fellowship Program will sponsor research on a number of issues, including early warning. One of the first fellowship winners will be addressing `Monitoring for Human Security' which includes a review of international roles related to early warning and recommendations for increased effectiveness. This study will be of great utility in enhancing the Department's understanding and capacity for early warning.

- Mandate missions and the geographic bureaux to identify suitable opportunities for Canadian or allied preventive diplomacy initiatives.

Response

Under the Program, we have been supporting preventive diplomacy initiatives recommended by the geographic bureaux. We are currently working with the geographics to develop regional human security strategies which would provide a human security framework for our policy and programming initiatives.

- Explore the feasibility of "adopting" selected countries for special Canadian interest.

Response

Countries where the priority issue areas of the human security agenda are most prevalent are the focus of the Human Security Program.

3. Build collaborative arrangements with major powers to encourage their active involvement in peacebuidling and human security.

Response

As mentioned above, Canada is working closely with members of the Human Security Network, the European Union and others on a wide range of human security issues.

4. Encourage a debate within government about re-thinking the whole way it is organized for and conducts helping operations abroad, with the objective of eliminating the artificial institutional divides which prevent an integrated and cost-efficient approach to foreign operations.

Response

In June, 2000, DFAIT launched the creation of the Interdepartmental Program Advisory Committee on Human Security, with the aim of promoting greater policy and programming coherence in the Canadian government's approach to human security. This body brings together a wide range of government departments, and has proven invaluable in facilitating dialogue and collaboration on a wide range of human security issues.

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