
Français		Home		Contact Us		Help		Search		canada.gc.ca		Canada International

Home > Media Room

Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

Canadian Offices Abroad

Services for Canadian Travellers

Services for Business

Canada in the World

About the Department

SPEECHES

2007 - 2006 - 2005 - 2004 - 2003 - 2002 - 2001 - 2000 - 1999 - 1998 - 1997 - 1996

Print friendly version - Printing Tips

<html> <head> <meta name="Generator" content="Corel WordPerfect 8"> <title>MR. GRAHAM - ADDRESS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW SCHOOL, GOODMAN LECTURE - TORONTO, ONTARIO</title> </head> <body text="#000000" link="#0000ff" vlink="#551a8b" alink="#ff0000" bgcolor="#c0c0c0"> CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY THE HONOURABLE BILL GRAHAM, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GOODMAN LECTURE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW SCHOOL TORONTO, Ontario January 13, 2003 Thank you very much for inviting me to give this year's Goodman Lecture. Having taught at this law school, I consider the invitation a great honour. I admit that I am somewhat intimidated by the prospect of facing the sharp legal minds of the students and faculty, and I am certainly aware of the high qualifications of my predecessors in this lecture series. In case anyone thinks that there is any academic merit to this talk, I have taken the precaution of describing it as a "political perspective." While this is partially designed to permit me to engage in generalities that are not based upon serious academic research, it is also, in my view, justifiable, given the subject matter. For I am sure that you will agree with me that international law is one legal discipline where the intersection with politics is most extensive. As I used to put it to my students, "International law is to other law what Swiss cheese is to cheese; the substance is similar but there are a lot more holes in it." I think it's fair to say from my present perspective that those holes are usually filled by the politics of international relations rather than by the discipline of binding obligations that we see in the domestic legal system. What I would like to talk to you about today is my reaction to the astonishing developments that have taken place in our international legal architecture in recent years, developments that are having such an enormous impact both on the conduct of affairs between countries and on our domestic legal and political systems here in Canada. The subject is too vast to treat in much detail here, but I would like to give you an overview, from my political perspective, of what some of these changes have been, and what their implications are for us lawyers, both internationally and domestically. In the end, I want to pose the question of whether there exists a distinctively Canadian contribution to the evolution of the global legal order, one that both reflects our values and has a distinctive role to play in the development of international norms and institutions. Let me begin by noting some of the changes that have taken place. On a personal note, I must say that I have been witness in my relatively short professional life to an extraordinary growth in the volume and complexity of applicable international norms. Nothing better illustrates that growth than comparing the curriculum of the law school that I attended in these buildings from 1961 to 1964 with the rich variety of international offerings that are available to you today. When I was here as a student we had two courses: Public International Law and Private International Law. The former dealt with fairly dry and limited rules that related to state-to-state relations; the latter, with the problems of individuals caught in situations where more than one national legal regime might apply to their person or conduct. Private International Law was viewed by us as mind-bogglingly complex but of some practical consequence. In fact, when I went into practice I was perceived as being the only person in the firm who understood it, (or perhaps considered it important), which probably explains how I early on found myself travelling more widely, and working on transactions that no one else, not even my seniors Walter Williston or John Sopinka, wanted to touch. Public International Law was perceived as, and indeed was, a pretty narrow subject dealing with the relations between states. The jurisprudence studied related to boundary disputes, the laws of war and other subjects that generally would be of interest only to someone thinking of working for a government. It was held in little esteem by professors and practitioners alike. Indeed, when I told Dean Wright that I intended to do my doctorate in Paris he was horrified that a promising student would think of not going to Harvard; when I justified my choice by saying that I wanted to get a French perspective on international law he told me, and he was a person of strong opinions, that I was throwing my life away and did his best to dissuade me from this disastrous course. If you contrast that situation and those attitudes with the rich international environment that prevails here today a mere 40 years later, you would not recognize the institution. And the same would be true, I believe, of the practice that is conducted in most law firms around the country. When I first began practising law some 35 years ago, I became aware, but only vaguely, that the distinctions that we had established between international and domestic rules of law left much to be desired. They did not adequately reflect the degree of integration, particularly economic, that was taking place around me as I travelled or worked for clients for whom I sought to provide legal solutions to problems that were less and less domestic in nature and more and more influenced by events beyond any one set of borders. When I came to teach Public International Law and International Trade Law, I had to explain to my students why I believed that the borders between the domestic and international legal systems were giving way to an interdependence or "interpermeability" between the two systems, to use the term of our colleague in Ottawa, Jon Fried, or "transnational law," the phrase invented by Myers MacDougall. The reasons for this growing interdependence between the domestic and international legal systems are, of course, evident: they reflect the forces of global interdependence that are largely the result of technological advances, particularly in communications, that have, in many areas, made it impossible to isolate domestic and international activities. The world of law can hardly escape the consequences of what is occurring in the worlds of commerce, health and the environment. In no area is the post-World War II reality of global interdependence more evident than in the astonishing growth of norms that regulate international trade and investment. But it is also impossible to ignore when we are speaking about the environment, health, organized crime, or indeed, practically any other subject that, until recently, was considered the exclusive domain of domestic politics and thus of the disciplines established by national legal systems. The Joint Committee studying Canada's foreign policy, on which I served when I first was elected, recognized the significance of these developments from a political perspective, and highlighted the blurring lines between domestic and foreign policy formulation, such that neither can be considered in isolation of the other. It seems to me that this intense interdependence requires a new approach by politicians who must recognize today that solutions to many domestic political problems can only be crafted by first recognizing the constraints that global or regional forces impose on us, and then by seeking solutions through international as well as domestic mechanisms. This new political reality has a corresponding juridical component that imposes considerations particularly relevant to lawyers, who are now challenged to create a legal framework within which the global and domestic legal systems can function in harmony. Such a legal framework benefits Canadians, enabling our domestic regime to assimilate external influences that come with our membership in an interdependent global society. At the same time, this framework also enables us to project our interests and values abroad, thereby helping to shape those same outside forces that affect us. This new international legal framework will have to come to grips with some serious challenges both at the international and domestic levels if global interdependence is to be a productive rather than a destructive force. It must lay the basis for a pluralistic international order that accommodates different cultures, such as the Anglo-American or common law traditions, civil law, Chinese and Arabic systems, and African customary laws, while at the same time allowing domestic civil societies sufficient freedom to feel comfortable within the constraints imposed by homogenizing international rules. But the changes I have been describing are not limited in their impact to the legal world outside our borders. If we look at the Canadian experience, we see an ever more extensive influence of international norms on our domestic jurisprudence. Some authors, such as Gibran Van Ert in his recent book titled, Using International Law in Canadian Courts, are critical about our courts' receptiveness to, and familiarity with, international norms. Some judges, such as Mme. Justice Wilson in the National Corn Growers case, for example, have queried the degree to which the interpretation of domestic legislation is to be tested in light of our international obligations, even when that legislation is specifically incorporating those very norms. One might have some sympathy with her concern for the courts' expertise in understanding the complexities of international agreements; but in my view, the courts are being driven by the necessity that our jurisprudence reflect the reality of an interdependent world. When we look at the evidence, we do find in the cases a greater receptiveness and deference to international precepts. Increasingly, constitutional cases appeal directly to principles of international law when dealing with issues as crucial as a province's right of unilateral succession, war crimes and crimes against humanity, extradition and deportation. Many Charter cases make reference to generally accepted human rights norms when considering the Charter's scope and application. In addition to this process of incorporating international norms into our domestic legal system, there are less obvious examples, such as the incorporation of international commercial law concepts into provincial legislation. In the case of recent legislation involving international commercial arbitration and the sale of goods, for example, a strong case can be made that foreign concepts based on European civil law are being introduced into our common law systems. Now I'd like to turn from generalities to some specific examples showing the impact of changes in the international legal order in recent years, ones that demonstrate the intersection of legal issues with the complexities of international and domestic politics. When we look at the evolution of international norms toward a more comprehensive and "tight" legal system, nowhere has this process been more marked than in the area of international trade and economic law. When I taught the law of the GATT some 20 years ago I constantly made distinctions between the nature of the obligations contained in it and other legal systems. It was plausibly said that its norms were less constraining than those contained in normal treaties, and indeed the economists who mainly administered the GATT preferred it that way. The last thing they wanted to see was the "judicialization" of the GATT, which they feared would be destroyed if legally enforceable and binding obligations replaced a loose negotiating framework. On my first trip to Geneva I found, to my surprise, that there were only two lawyers working at the GATT Secretariat. Today, of course, the GATT's successor, the WTO, is increasingly given to judicial interpretation. Indeed, from 1995 to mid-December 2002, the Dispute Settlement and Appellate Bodies considered some 275 cases on 180 distinct matters. These decisions are relatively binding and have a good record of compliance, something that is significant in the evolution of an effective international legal system. They also have significant consequences and raise issues of considerable political sensitivity in the member states--issues such as the sustainability of our marketing boards in the dairy industry in Canada or the role of the nation state in defining the safety of food products in Europe. The management of all this has been accompanied by a cultural revolution, with thousands of lawyers now based in Geneva and around the world directly or indirectly engaged in analyzing and applying these rules, and in a manner, if I may make an aside, that is very much derived from Anglo-American approaches--much to the irritation of proponents of the European civil law tradition. The development of the WTO and of international financial institutions forms part of the framework for the free market system of global capitalism. The IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank, while not "judicialized" to the degree of the WTO, have seen a similar evolution. Canada has led attempts to develop a more stable international financial system to prevent the reoccurrence of financial crises, such as the devastating Asian financial crisis of 1997. At the G8 and G20, we have promoted a rules-based system that curbs the financial speculative flow causing these crises. Yet in spite of these developments, even proponents of global capitalism increasingly recognize that the institutional framework is in need of serious reform. George Soros, hardly a Marxist voice, stated in his book, On Globalization, that "international trade and global financial markets are very good at generating wealth, but they cannot take care of other social needs, such as the preservation of peace, the alleviation of poverty, protection of the environment, labour conditions or human rights." His concern has been echoed by such eminent economists as Joseph Stiglitz and others. In the end, we must face the fact that the "judicialization"of the international system may only exacerbate its problems if the rules are inadequate or skewed toward the interests of some parties to the detriment of others. Canadian policy has recognized that the rules do need changing. We were in the forefront of efforts to make the Doha round of the WTO focus on development--and the Prime Minister brought this perspective to the G8 meeting in Kananaskis last June. Some concerns are particularly acute. On the public health front, for example, it is crucial that there be a speedy resolution to the WTO negotiations on intellectual property rights and access to drugs for people in developing countries, particularly in Africa, who are suffering from disease epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. We are working with the United States, the Europeans, and developing countries to find a way forward on this issue that enables access while protecting the value and role of intellectual property, so that new and better medicines will continue to be developed. Negotiations have been ongoing in Geneva, and we hope to have a solution to this impasse soon. This development-focused agenda for changing the rules of global obligations is also evident in Canada's approach to the evolution of free trade throughout the Americas. At the Quebec City Summit, we not only pursued reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers as a way of raising standards of living in the hemisphere, but we also insisted on a comprehensive approach to hemispheric integration involving a commitment to democracy, combatting corruption, enacting judicial reform, and aiding health throughout the Americas. The Democracy Charter of the Americas is a major legacy of the Quebec Summit and the work of the Canadian government and it has already had a major impact on countries of the Americas, such as Peru. This is often ignored by critics of the Summit, but somewhat ironically the achievements are largely due to Canadian insistence that civil society throughout the hemisphere be engaged in the process. A specific example of a Canadian perspective being brought to bear on the development of international law is the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As you all know, the Rome Statute of the ICC has entered into force and the Court has become a reality. Nearly 140 countries have signed the Rome Statute and 87 are already party to it, a fact that demonstrates the overwhelming international public and political support for the Court. Such a development would have been entirely unforeseeable when I studied public international law 40 years ago. Canada had a key role in shaping this extraordinarily important international instrument. This was the result of the work of many, but it is appropriate to single out the work of Philippe Kirsch, now our Ambassador to Sweden, as the Chair of the main negotiating committee at the Rome Diplomatic Conference and the subsequent Preparatory Commission. I should also add that, throughout the process, civil society's informed and highly skilled advice and support for the Court were absolutely critical to Canada's success in developing an international consensus on the need for the ICC, and later, on its substantive and procedural elements. I very much regret that the United States withdrew its support for the Court. While respecting the opinion of our U.S. colleagues, I (along with our European allies) find the intensity of their present campaign against the Court mystifying. To suggest, as the President's spokesperson did recently, that the Court would subject "Americans-- civilians and military--to arbitrary standards of justice" ignores the efforts that were made to accommodate U.S. concerns when drafting the treaty. Safeguards ensure that no American, or Canadian for that matter, could ever be subject to a frivolous or political prosecution. The principle of complementarity in Article 17 of the ICC Statute ensures that the International Criminal Court is not a threat to democratic states whose legal systems enshrine the rule of law. Rather, it is a modern and necessary tool of international justice. The creation of the ICC will ensure that those responsible for the most serious crimes known to humankind--genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity--will be held accountable for their actions and will be judged in accordance with commonly accepted principles applied with full respect for the rights of the accused. This, I suggest to you, is precisely the approach that Canadian values demand we take in facing the new menace of international terrorism, and it is the very approach that we and our allies have sought to bring to the development of international law throughout the past 50 years. I want to emphasize that Canada and the United States share similar values on such basic foreign policy principles as the rule of law and democracy, or even the merits of free trade. As neighbours and allies, Canadians recognize and respect the enormous power that the United States wields in the world today, largely to the benefit of global security. We also recognize, as Janice Stein points out, that the United States is today "the most significant player in the construction of the global security architecture and the management of threats." Indeed, I think most Canadians would agree that the way in which we manage our relationship with the United States is the principal key to both our prosperity and our security. However, even as partners in security and prosperity, we can and do disagree. For example, wherever possible Canada has looked to rules-based institutional and multilateral approaches to international issues. In contrast, the United States, while not automatically rejecting multilateral approaches, does not rely on them to the same extent. The dangers of this unilateralism were recently referred to by my European colleague, Javier Solana, who said, "Acting alone has the advantage of clarity of purpose, but at the cost of legitimacy and thus, of effectiveness in the longer term." It is useful to contrast the approach adopted by the United States in the debate in the UN Security Council last fall on the ICC, with the words of that great American jurist, Robert Jackson, who said at Nuremberg, "We are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us." Many political and legal figures in the United States today do recognize that American concerns are addressed by the ICC. Senator Patrick Leahy has expressed this point of view in saying, "As the world unites to combat terrorism, we should be active partners in encouraging an end to impunity for human rights violators, not sceptical detractors." It is more than a little ironic, then, that many of the same voices that attack the Court are now calling for the prosecution of criminal conduct in the event of action in Iraq. In the end, though, I am confident that the United States will overcome its hostility to the ICC, as it has in other areas where its interests lie in cooperating with other states, and that it will recognize the Court's potential as a key instrument in ensuring global security. When we speak of new instruments for our collective security we also must recognize the new challenges that we face from terrorism. We all know that after the events of September 11, Canada immediately joined the United States to intervene in Afghanistan to pursue those responsible. Today we must face a much more difficult and complicated task: devising a response to terrorism built upon a coherent and integrated framework that aims to enhance both national and individual security. In so doing we must recognize the nature of the challenge presented by modern terrorism. Terrorism today is essentially international in nature and depends on the very same modern communications networks that underpin commercial prosperity around the world. The terrorists are, in fact, turning against us the very tools that we developed with a view to creating an integrated world. In this context, we must ensure that the actions we take to contain terrorism do not exacerbate those very problems or, indeed, create new ones that will haunt future generations. So, though it is clear that we will not, and indeed cannot, hesitate in our resolve to act whenever it is necessary and appropriate, we must also recognize that the central challenge in responding to terrorism (apart from containing it) is to uphold the values and norms we cherish: democracy and respect for the rule of law and human rights, both in our domestic and in our international responses. We therefore share the concerns of the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights regarding excessive measures taken in several parts of the world to combat terrorism, and we have stated our position clearly in Geneva at the Human Rights Commission: the fight against terrorism must not be used as a pretext for repression. The principles of human security require that we combat both the evils of international terrorism and the abuse of fundamental human rights. Properly conceived, the concept of human security implies that security of the state and security of the person are mutually reinforcing. The one cannot be effectively assured without the other. A culture of respect for human rights cannot flourish in a context of insecurity, and real security (whether at the national or the individual level) can be achieved only in a context where human rights are protected. Social stability can be preserved only within societies that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, where dissent tends to take constructive, non-violent forms. Short-term gains may be made in states where national authorities impose social order by suppressing individual rights, but these solutions may come at the expense of long-term stability. Violations of human rights marginalize voices of moderation, tolerance and respect, and give unwarranted legitimacy to radical elements. In the long run, repressive measures merely serve to perpetuate conflict and instability. Much has been said recently about addressing what are referred to as the "root causes" of terrorism. I do not believe that the rhetoric of social and economic injustice used by some can justify terror and the deliberate death and devastation visited upon innocent civilians. Nothing can justify these acts, which strike at the very foundations of our societies and the respect that we owe one another as human beings. That said, we will never eradicate terrorism if we do not recognize that it thrives in certain political environments that are favourable to its emergence, and that enable it to find support in the general population. But it will not be easy to address the underlying political conditions that feed terrorist activities in places such Kashmir, the Middle East, Chechnya or Sri Lanka. While we often speak of the internationalization of such conflicts, the international framework for dealing with them is in an embryonic state. Outsiders have difficulty addressing conflicts without the full participation of the interested parties--a participation that often is reluctant or completely lacking. Unfortunately, the fight against terrorism is going to be with us for a long time. For this reason, we must step back and look for the means to address the surfeit of fear and the deficit of dignity in societies around the world, and recognize that the architects of terror can often exploit these conditions to garner support from people who feel frustrated and powerless. Without democratic political options that are open and effective channels for dissent, support for terrorism is likely to grow. Our actions in the global fight against terrorism must, therefore, complement other aspects of our foreign policy, including the promotion and protection of human rights, the development of a rules-based international system, and our efforts to combat poverty, corruption, marginalization and alienation. The common goal of these policies is the development of a stable international order, where all human beings are able to live in freedom and dignity. These are among the reasons why Canada became deeply engaged in establishing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which sought to develop new thinking on the question of when the international community may legitimately intervene in the affairs of states. Worldwide consultations undertaken by the Commission, and its subsequent report, The Responsibility to Protect, produced a recognition that while state sovereignty is a basic principle of international law and politics, it is accompanied by a responsibility for protecting citizens; and this in turn implies an accompanying responsibility for preventing the abuse of citizens' rights. As the report reminds us, "Preventive strategies must work to promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented." Failure to focus on these societal factors amounts to addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of deadly conflict. These are hardly new concepts. As early as the Helsinki accords and the subsequent formation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the states parties recognized that the true security of European states could be ensured only where there was respect for human rights in neighbouring states. What is new in the ICISS report is its analysis of the factors that constitute a state's failure to exercise effective sovereignty, and that provide the basis on which intervention by other states may be justified. The Commission has reframed the debate, moving the focus from the contentious "right to intervene" toward the responsibility of individual states to protect their citizens. In extreme cases--such as genocide or ethnic cleansing--if a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities, the obligation then falls on the international community. This is highly controversial terrain but there is clearly a need for acceptable legal principles if we are to replace power diplomacy with rules-based diplomacy. This presents special challenges and opportunities for lawyers who are called upon to craft universally accepted instruments of governance. In the long run, these will be the only effective way to define the rules under which the international community may intervene in the affairs of sovereign states. Crafting such instruments will also require the willingness and skills to create collectively agreed solutions: individual states, however powerful, acting alone will never have the resources necessary to deal with the menace of cyberterrorism or with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, which we fear may become all too readily available to the determined and skilled enemy that all civilized societies face today. While the context is different, I believe that similar concepts of when intervention is legitimate must inform our position on how to resolve the crisis presented by Iraq. That is why we, while fully recognizing the danger posed by Saddam Hussein, have always insisted that the best way to deal with Iraq is through the Security Council as the global institution charged with this responsibility. That is why we welcome the United States' determination to work through the U.N. system and continue to place the focus on Resolution 1441 and its rigorous enforcement. In my speech to the U.N. in the fall, the day following President Bush's intervention, I expressed Canada's view that we must act in this crisis so that our institutions of global governance emerge from it strengthened and not diminished. And as we face the more recent menace posed by North Korea, I am more than ever convinced of the correctness of that policy. As I prepared this lecture and thought about the issues I've raised with you today, the question that kept coming to mind was, do these and other international efforts of ours amount to a uniquely Canadian approach that significantly contributes to the formulation and application of positive international norms? I have an answer, and I hope that you will agree with me. In the first place, I believe that Canada does have a significant influence on the way that international legal instruments are being developed in the world and that this influence flows both from our history and from our present national character. Permit me here to digress for a moment while I relate an analogy from the eminent American scholar, Joseph Nye. In his book The Paradox of American Power, he compared the exercise of global power to playing on a complex three-dimensional chess board. For him the three chess boards represent, respectively: military power, where Nye describes a unipolar world, dominated by the U.S.; economic power, a tri-polar level where the U.S. must contend with the EU, Japan, and perhaps China; and "the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside government control," including forces ranging from culture to terrorism. The point of Nye's model is that moves on any one level influence the pieces at the other levels. And it is on the third level, where no one power is predominant, that Canada can wield great influence. I do believe that Canada has something unique to offer the world: our experience in working and living together in a vast multicultural country, and in so doing, promoting respect, understanding and tolerance of one another. We are often our most vociferous critics, and that is of fundamental importance in a free and democratic society. But I have to say that it is always striking to travel abroad and realize that, by just about any standard, we are greatly admired as a truly vibrant and successful society. And when I travel abroad, I often tell the story of my own constituency right here in Toronto. I represent an area that includes St. Jamestown, where some 12,000 people speak 57 languages. We wouldn't have relative peace, harmony, social justice and cooperation with one another in that area if we did not have a sense of respect for one another, and a willingness to work together to solve our problems. Our present political and social structures are, of course, a product of our past, which began with Canada's aboriginal inhabitants and the French and British who settled here. Our country's birth constituted a gamble that we could create a bilingual and bicultural nation in a largely anglophone North America. That original bargain established the unique Canadian polity, characterized by respect and tolerance for the other, and a recognition of the enrichment that comes when two cultures and languages work together for their mutual benefit. Later immigrants added their texture to our increasingly complex and diverse mosaic. And with each wave of immigration, Canada has grown stronger. Today our cultural diversity is the hallmark of our national identity. It gives us strength in the world because the world is in us. These historical and social realities inform our legal and political institutions in a way that complements our ability to provide new directions in international law that are particularly suited to the needs of today's global society. Our legal society is one of the few in the world integrating the two major systems of common law and civil law; we are bicultural in a juridical sense. And to that important dimension, we can add the diversity and sensitivity of a multicultural society; our commitment to enshrining gender equality in our national institutions; and our ongoing national efforts to give just recognition to the claims of Canada's Aboriginal peoples. These characteristics have stood us in good stead in working with other players to craft international legal instruments that take account of the common values of different cultures, whether in the economic sphere, as with the WTO or international commercial arbitration, or in highly political areas such as the ICC. In short, our domestic legal institutions, which reflect our cultural reality, are assets that allow us to play an important role on the third level of Joe Nye's geopolitical chess board. In my professional work and travel, I am constantly reminded of Canada's potential for contributing distinctively to the development of legal structures beyond our borders. Last May I was in Israel and had the privilege of spending a few hours with Chief Justice Barak, one of the world's great and courageous jurists. On his desk the Chief Justice had reports of Supreme Court of Canada decisions relating to the Charter, and these decisions, he told me, inform much of Israel's jurisprudence and, indeed, of other common law countries as diverse as India and South Africa. In his view, Canada's Charter significantly contributes to the development of legal systems of common law countries whereby collective and individual rights are balanced so as to enhance social stability. More recently, I had the opportunity to speak to former Premier Bob Rae as he prepared to advise Tamil representatives to the peace talks now taking place in Thailand, and earlier I had met with the Prime Minister and Constitutional Affairs Minister of Sri Lanka. All three emphasized the key role that the Canadian federal experience and our Charter will have in enabling Sri Lanka to establish a system for political autonomy within a federal structure and guarantees of personal liberties based upon modern pluralistic governmental structures. As Canadian lawyers, you may have the opportunity to participate in the evolution of international legal systems, whether by working on issues related to the ever-increasing range of international economic and political institutions; by contributing to the development of legal structures in other countries; or by working within Canada on the assimilation of international legal norms to our own common law, civil law and constitutional affairs. Even those of you who do not specialize in these areas will, I believe, be increasingly exposed in your practice to the impact of international legal matters on domestic law, or be involved in transnational legal transactions. Both my political position and my own legal experience lead me to urge you to consider the opportunities you have to contribute to a better world as an international lawyer. As global interdependence grows, Canada needs its best minds to tackle the challenges of integrating our legal systems with evolving international norms and institutions. I also believe that the world needs the expertise that Canadian lawyers can bring to the tasks of devising new economic agreements, new political and judicial institutions, new human rights protocols, and new national constitutions and rules of good governance. And I believe that Canada's role in fashioning the International Criminal Court, for example, made a significant contribution to filling in one of the important gaps in the international legal system. What is more, Canadian perceptions of justice informed the substantive and jurisdictional norms of the Court to a degree that we can well cite as a significant contribution in the sense that I alluded to earlier. Let me close by returning, if I dare, to that Swiss cheese metaphor I inflicted on you at the beginning of my talk. I hope I may have gone some way in showing you that indeed, international law is notable in having its legal substance thoroughly intermixed with the murkier substance of international politics. But there's another similarity as well I can point to: if the holes in Swiss cheese make it the metaphysical oddity of the cheese world, it's correspondingly true that international law is something of an anomaly in the legal sphere. You are all familiar with the features distinguishing international law from domestic law: the absence of a universally accepted legislator together with problems associated with interpretation, application and enforcement. The flip side of these features is the extraordinary potential of international law to transform the sphere of human relations it deals with, by changing the terrain of international power politics dominated by superpower interests into a rules-based system that adjudicates the interests of all on a fair and principled basis. Of course, power politics will never be absent from the international system, even as its legal architecture becomes increasingly developed. But the negotiation of power relations is not the only point of the international system. In a recent essay in the New York Times Magazine, Canadian author Michael Ignatieff wrote that "America's allies want a multilateral order that will essentially constrain American power," one that will tie it down "like Gulliver with a thousand legal strings." What Ignatieff's account misses, though, is the fact that the multilateral order is not just about the restraint of power by rules; more importantly, it's about what the community of nations can achieve together that no country can achieve alone. It brings the potential for, and is the only solution to, addressing problems that have no borders, such as endemic poverty, disease, environmental degradation, organized crime and terrorism. These problems can be solved only by making constructive use of our world's increasing interdependence. This is the reason why the legal work that goes into the construction and functioning of international institutions is, in my view, such a challenging and worthwhile field. I hope that you agree with me in this, and that you will carry on the fine work that Canadian lawyers have contributed to the creation of a better world for all of us through building on those Canadian values that I talked of earlier and that I believe inform the scholarly work that Professors Knopp, Trebilcock, Cook and others at this school (not to mention others throughout the country) are doing today. If I may be permitted to end on a personal note, I would like to say what an enormous privilege it is to be our country's foreign minister and what a terrible sense of responsibility one feels, particularly in times such as this, in bringing the voice of our country into the councils of the world. I do believe, however, that, in performing my role, I have been greatly influenced by the values and discipline acquired in this place, whether as a student, or later as a faculty member. I hope that you will be able to say the same thing when, in the future, you come to reflect on the direction that your legal career will have taken you. Thank you. </body> </html>

2007 - 2006 - 2005 - 2004 - 2003 - 2002 - 2001 - 2000 - 1999 - 1998 - 1997 - 1996

Print friendly version - Printing Tips



Last Updated: 2006-10-30	Top of Page	Important Notices