MR. GRAHAM - ADDRESS AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE - OTTAWA, ONTARIO
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NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY
THE HONOURABLE BILL GRAHAM,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
FOR THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
DEBATE ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE
OTTAWA, Ontario
May 15, 2003
It is my honour to rise before the House to address the motion put forth by the Bloc Québecois on missile defence.
Let me begin by noting that this is not the same debate we had back in the 1980s, when Canada was considering the
Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," which the United States was then proposing. For many reasons, that system of
missile defence was abandoned, and current plans do not resurrect it. What is now at issue, is a much more limited missile
defence system, and a vastly changed world of new threats and international relationships in which we live and to which we
must make appropriate adjustments.
One key change is that missile defence is now moving from theory to reality. The Bush administration has designated it as
one of its top security priorities, committing substantial energy and funds to the project. President Bush has declared that by
autumn 2004, the United States will field an initial set of missile defence capabilities for protecting the continental United
States, and possibly Canadian territory along the U.S. border.
This will include ground- and sea-based interceptors, bolstering existing capabilities. In addition, the United States has
recently concluded an agreement with the U.K. to upgrade the Fylingdales early warning radar, and it is also in discussions
with Denmark to upgrade the early warning radar located in Greenland. These two sites will permit the United States to
secure complete radar coverage of North America.
In preparation for its development of a missile defence program, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty last June. Subsequently, President Bush and President Putin of Russia signed a treaty binding their countries to
significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals, and to consultations on missile defence. The United States is also making
efforts to assure China that missile defence is not designed to undermine the Chinese strategic deterrent. These
developments have significantly changed the geopolitical landscape.
There is no doubt that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems is indeed a growing
problem. While Canada does not believe itself to be under the same threat from ballistic missiles as does the United States,
we must remember that ballistic missile defence [BMD] cannot be evaluated simply in light of our perception of the current
situation. Rather, BMD is an attempt to project security into the future, to confront, and perhaps to deter, threats that might
arise; it is very difficult to predict the kinds of danger that future generations will face.
Due to these changed circumstances, the Government of Canada has been re-evaluating its position on missile defence. Let
me emphasize that this is not a new issue. We have been in dialogue with the U.S. for years on its plans, although only now
have these plans started to take shape. As we consider a possible role for Canada in these plans, let me assure this House
that any decision we take on this issue will be wholly based on our assessment of what is in the best interests of Canada and
Canadians.
The paramount issue we are considering here today is the safety and security of Canadians, now and in the future. We share
the same continent with the United States, and we live in a more dangerous world of weapons proliferation among state and
non-state actors. We cannot afford to take for granted that we will not be affected by attacks on our shared continent. An
attack on Seattle would inevitably be an attack on Vancouver, as would an attack on Buffalo be one on Toronto, or in fact,
one on Toronto would be one on Buffalo and one on Vancouver would be one on Seattle. I reiterate that this may possibly
come not only from states but from non-state actors.
And we must keep in mind that any participation we might undertake in missile defence would be only one aspect of a
comprehensive Canadian approach to ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Through continued diplomatic
engagement, we will reinforce our efforts to dissuade those who would proliferate missiles and missile technologies. We
are not abandoning, as seems to be suggested by the opposition, our other forms of defence of the continent and our other
diplomatic initiatives to make this a safer world.
These efforts are complemented by the multilateral arms control measures we have continually supported. Canada is a
founding member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which was established in 1987 to counter missile
proliferation by controlling the trade in missile equipment and related materials. Our country was also instrumental in
developing the Hague Code of Conduct, which establishes the only existing standards regarding ballistic missiles and
related activities.
Another important Canadian priority pertains to our long-standing opposition to the weaponization of space. Here we must
be careful to distinguish weaponization of space from the continuing use of space for military purposes such as navigation,
mapping, communications, surveillance, arms control verification and intelligence gathering, which are currently conducted
today by many countries.
But let me reiterate that Canada remains firmly opposed to the installation of weapons in space. The U.S. missile defence
system to be in place by 2004 does not include the installation of weapons in space. We are watching developments in the
U.S. very closely, we regularly voice our concerns, and any discussions we have on BMD will enable us to voice those
concerns more clearly and more cogently.
Another fundamental consideration for Canada must be our interest in the future of NORAD, the North American
Aerospace Defence Command, which since 1958 has served us well for the joint defence of this continent. Our personnel
work side by side in detecting and tracking missiles, and in responding to air threats. There is a great deal of overlap in the
NORAD mission and missile defence, and many assets are used for both missions. If missile defence is an exclusively
American project and thus remains outside of NORAD, the role and relevance of this partnership, so crucial to our
participation in the defence of North America, will come into question. Over the decades, NORAD has provided us with
essential intelligence gathering and surveillance of our territory. As we look to the future, Canada must continue to play an
integral role in the defence of North America, and we can best achieve this if we are to ensure the role of NORAD, where
we will continue to have an important voice.
Exploring our options with respect to missile defence is fully in keeping with Canada's long history of cooperation with the
United States on our shared border and on continental security. In addition to NORAD, we are partners with the U.S. on the
Smart Border Initiative, a 30-point plan for an open and secure border. Our two countries are also working together on the
binational planning group for emergency preparedness against terrorist attacks and natural disasters. In light of this ongoing
cooperation, it only makes sense to explore whether missile defence might be another layer of security partnership in our
mutual interest.
The best way to ensure that Canadian interests are being served is to remain engaged in dialogue with the United States on
all issues of our shared continental security. The Americans have made their intentions clear. That is why this Government
believes it is our responsibility to pursue talks with the United States, in order to ensure the security of Canadians and the
future of NORAD. Of course, many questions remain about our possible role in this developing missile defence system, but
these questions can be answered only by engaging our U.S. allies in formal discussions, in the interests of all Canadians. By
entering into discussions, we will be able to address our concerns about the future of NORAD, about the weaponization of
space, and about any associated costs.
We say to this House, that we must discuss these issues. If we do not achieve our negotiating goals, we do not have to enter
into an agreement. But if we do not discuss these issues, we know one thing--that we will be surrendering our voice, in fact
our sovereignty, and ceding to the United States the role of unilaterally determining the shape of the defence of North
America, and that for generations to come.
This would run counter to our traditions established since Ogdensberg in 1940, when we firmly established the fact that
Canada is a partner with the United States in the defence of North America. It would run counter to our interests. It would
put the safety of future generations--who will face dangers that are today unknown--exclusively in the hands of a friendly
power, another power, our friendly neighbour, but one with whom we wish to share our defence, not be dependent upon.
Thank you.