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<html> <head> <meta name="Generator" content="Corel WordPerfect 8"> <title>MR. AXWORTHY - ADDRESS AT THE OPENING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL - BRUSSELS, BELGIUM</title> </head> <body text="#000000" link="#0000ff" vlink="#551a8b" alink="#ff0000" bgcolor="#c0c0c0"> 96/56 CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY PRÉSIDENT D'HONNEUR THE HONOURABLE LLOYD AXWORTHY, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE OPENING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL BRUSSELS, Belgium December 10, 1996 This document is also available on the Department's Internet site: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca It is my great pleasure to welcome you to this meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session. We should begin by expressing our appreciation to the Secretary-General for the dedication, vigour and inspiration he has brought to his first year in office. Our meeting takes place at what is, I believe, a defining moment for this organization. Decisions that we make over this next year will have a significant impact into the future. In recent years, the world has experienced a profound geopolitical shift. The tectonic plates of international relations have realigned themselves and, as always when two plates meet, spectacular forces have been unleashed. The aftershocks of these movements have not yet died away, but a new landscape has emerged. New countries have taken shape, and people have made their voices heard in the world in a way they could not have before. Now it is our turn to give a more permanent shape and structure to these changes. We must define how long-term security can be achieved in this new landscape. At this meeting we will take the next steps toward the inclusion in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] of new members from Central and Eastern Europe. In doing so, we must equally ensure that such decisions enhance the international security system throughout the transatlantic community, building a new sense of co-operation between NATO and non-NATO members alike. Collectively, we have already overseen some important changes within NATO, and have set other processes of change in motion: There has been just over a year of peace in Bosnia, where the most severe conflict in post-World War II Europe raged through nearly five years; that peace was won in part through the sacrifices made by the men and women of IFOR [Peace Implementation Force] -- especially the 52 who gave their lives, from both NATO and non-NATO countries. At this meeting we will endorse the mandate for the international military component in the next critical phase of the Bosnian peace process. This takes place against the backdrop of the continuing struggle of the people of Serbia to make their voices heard. We will mark the fifth anniversary tomorrow of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and, I hope, begin work on the next phase in building the new Transatlantic Partnership that will promote stronger ties between NATO on the one hand and non-NATO countries on the other. This has been a prelude to the larger transformation we will now pursue. Five objectives should guide us as we plan that transformation. First, we need to recognize that the notion of security itself is broadening. We face a whole new range of human security challenges: from human rights to sustainable development, from overcoming ethnic conflict to ridding the world of land mines. These are the issues that the new SFOR [Stabilization Force] must address as we move from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Bosnia. The continued freedom of indicted war criminals is one of the greatest threats to a durable peace, and if SFOR departs without having contributed to the apprehension of these people, I believe we will have left the seeds of future conflict in Bosnia to germinate. We must also make every effort to assist and encourage the Bosnian authorities in totally eliminating the production and use of land mines. Until the ground is safe to walk on and until it is safe for farmers to plant crops, economic reconstruction is severely hampered. It is outrageous that land mines continue to be produced in Bosnia. If we succeed, Bosnia can serve as a model that inspires the whole world to eliminate altogether these vicious weapons that victimize so many innocent people. Second, we should base enlargement decisions on clear, justifiable criteria. Those who are invited to join NATO must offer: stable and durable democratic governments, with established records of respect for human rights and the principles of good governance; clear and unequivocal civilian control over the military, together with transparency and accountability in military budgets and management; durable settlements to any disputes with neighbouring countries in full effect; and, finally, well-established economic transformation. Countries that meet these standards will both gain from and contribute to the Alliance's security. Third, the Alliance should make the right arrangements now and offer the broadest possible partnership to those countries that will not join us this time. Security in the Atlantic area will not be enhanced by etching new distinctions across the face of Europe. Ukraine plays a special role in post-Cold War Europe, and NATO should recognize this through a distinctive partnership. For the Baltic area, the Alliance has a special responsibility. If the three Baltic states do not join the Alliance in the first wave, NATO should pursue a policy of active engagement. We can also help by encouraging the creation of new relationships between the Baltic states and Russia. Clearly, the greatest challenge to NATO in terms of non-member states is its relationship with Russia. We must ensure that the Alliance no longer looks like a string of command posts lined up from the Arctic to the Mediterranean, all facing Russia. We cannot guarantee that Russia will accept enlargement. But we have to satisfy ourselves that we have taken every reasonable step to address its concerns. Equally, we have the right to ask the Russians themselves to look at NATO with new eyes. Fourth, Canada believes that reform and reorientation of NATO structures should go hand-in-hand with enlargement. NATO was conceived as, and remains, a collective defence alliance. But in an era when the very concept of security is being transformed, so too is NATO's mandate, and so too must be its structures. A reformed command structure should make enlargement more affordable, give the Alliance the flexibility it needs to address new challenges in new ways, including through all-European operations, and send a clear signal that NATO is no longer totally geared to a massive threat from the east, but faces a diversity of challenges requiring a diversity of responses. What matters for Canada is not the nationality of commanders or their staffs -- we continue to believe in an integrated structure -- but whether NATO can be effective in facing new challenges and in reinforcing both Europe's role in the Alliance and North America's engagement in it. Fifth, as we turn to the future, NATO must maintain the transparency and equality between members that has been its greatest strength. It is in none of our interests to weaken Alliance solidarity with closed-door decision making and special-status membership. History will judge our Alliance not only by how we fought the Cold War, but also by the new order we built in its aftermath. The effort required of us is great, but the rewards can be greater still. Thank you. </body> </html>

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