Nuclear disarmament and Non-Proliferation

THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

Introduction to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT)

In November 1993, following years of inconclusive discussions, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) received a strong mandate from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to negotiate a legally-binding Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT). By mid-summer 1996, after two years of intensive, difficult negotiations in the CD, it at last seemed possible that substantial progress could be achieved and by August 1996 an "agreed" draft text for the CTBT had emerged. Throughout the negotiations, Canada’s objective was to secure a global, comprehensive agreement. Opposition by some CD members to the Treaty’s adoption in the CD (which operates by consensus) led to a move, spearheaded by Canada and others, to introduce the draft treaty directly in the UNGA. This happened in mid-September 1996 and the CTBT was declared open for signature in New York on September 24, 1996. Canada’s Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was one of the first signatories.

Later that same day Mr. Axworthy referred to the CTBT in his statement to UNGA 51:

"Mr. President, the search for new tools and means to use them collectively cannot be a substitute for the reinforcement of existing mechanisms to build peace. We are about to take an historic step forward on the nuclear disarmament agenda. Today the CTBT was opened for signature. This Treaty is the result of decades of hope and effort, by people around the world, to end nuclear testing. This morning, I signed the Treaty on behalf of Canada; it will soon be ratified. We call upon all member states of the United Nations to do the same, so that the Treaty can enter into force well before we enter the 21st century.

The adoption of the CTBT marks a watershed in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The children of tomorrow should, hopefully, never have to know what a nuclear test is. If we can succeed in this, and if we can vigorously pursue the goal of systematically and progressively reducing nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them, we can ensure that they know less and less about this terrible scourge on humanity."

For more up-to-date information on the number of signatories and ratifications, please visit the CTBT website at http://pws.ctbto.org.

Canada had actively advocated the conclusion of a CTBT since the 1960s. This commitment had been reiterated many times by successive Canadian Governments. The leaders of the G-8 also reaffirmed their collective pledge to put the CTBT into action in a secure multilateral context, within the framework of international law and the forum of the United Nations.

Efforts to secure an end to all nuclear weapons testing and other forms of nuclear explosions began virtually at the time of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Gradual progress on limited nuclear testing led to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The PTBT prohibited nuclear testing anywhere but underground. It was only in 1991 that hopes for an end to all nuclear testing at last seemed likely. By then the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France had agreed to a self-imposed moratoria in their nuclear testing programs (only China had refused to join) and in November 1993 the CD in Geneva received a strong mandate from the 44th UNGA to negotiate a legally-binding CTBT.

Negotiations on the CTBT opened in the CD in January 1994, chaired by Ambassador Marin Bosch of Mexico who, by the session’s close, was able to pass on an initial "rolling" text of 93 pages to his successor as Chair, Polish Ambassador Ludwik Dembinski, in January 1995. That year saw substantial progress on the negotiation of verification provisions but little movement on the central political issues until August, when the U.S. and France pledged themselves to the idea of a zero threshold CTBT (i.e. no testing regardless of size). When Netherlands’ Ambassador Jaap Ramaker took over the Chair in January 1996, the "rolling" text still had more than 1200 brackets around disputed text or options.

In February 1996, Australia and Iran each submitted draft or “model” treaty texts, which showed areas of agreement and how the mass of brackets could be eliminated. While differing in detail, the Iranian and Australian texts approached many of the outstanding problems in similar ways. Ambassador Ramaker was thereby assisted in tabling a Chair’s text. Because of strong opposition by India, Pakistan, China and Russia to any "premature" attempt to circumvent the rolling text, Ambassador Ramaker chose to pull the text together in two stages. At the end of March 1996, he tabled an "Outline of a Draft Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban" comprising a preamble and 17 articles, but with much of the rolling text still bracketed. On May 28 1996, he presented a complete "Draft Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty", consisting of a preamble and 17 articles with no brackets.

To this were attached various annexes and protocols covering the treaty’s verification. On June 28, the last day of the second part of the 1996 session, Ambassador Ramaker tabled a revised draft treaty (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.1). Many CD delegations considered that they had been mandated by the 50th UNGA (in consensus resolution UNGA 50/65) to bring to it the finalized text of the CTBT for endorsement before it closed on 16 September 1996, so that the treaty could be opened for signature once the 51st UNGA session began. Given this deadline, and support for the draft treaty text from four of the nuclear-weapon states, Ambassador Ramaker refused to re-open negotiations in the CD’s Nuclear-Test-Ban Committee when it reconvened on 29 July. However, the text was modified with minor clarifications and one substantive amendment after the U.S. and China had agreed on on-site inspection (OSI) decision making. On 14 August Ambassador Ramaker published his final text (CD/NTB/WP.330/Rev.2), which is that which later came to the UNGA.

Although agreement in principle on the text of the CTBT had been reached at the CD during summer 1996, opposition to its adoption led to a move, spearheaded by Canada, to introduce the draft treaty directly at UNGA 50. This happened in mid-September and the CTBT was finally declared open for signature in New York on September 24, 1996.

The CTBT is a landmark international agreement providing for the complete prohibition of every kind of nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. The test ban will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, or the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It also mandates an extensive and thorough monitoring regime including an intrusive verification regime permitting on site inspections (OSI) in the case of suspected breaches of the Treaty. There is no doubt that national security and international security are better served with the CTBT than they could ever have been without it.

In March 1997, the first CTBT Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) open to all signatories established the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) and settled its basic staffing, appointed an Executive Secretary, formed Working Groups "A" and "B" (open to all signatories) to advise on administrative and technical matters respectively. By the end of March 1997, the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) and the PTS opened for business in Vienna, its designated Headquarters, and the process of treaty implementation begun.

There is still much work to be done to ensure that the CTBT fulfils expectations. The two Working Groups meeting on a regular basis and the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) meets to consider and approve the results of the Working Groups.

The CTBT prohibits the carrying out of nuclear explosions. To quote from the relevant CTBT texts:

"ARTICLE I: BASIC OBLIGATIONS

Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."

The CWC, however, imposes a much broader ban in relation to chemical weapons. To quote from the relevant CWC treaty texts:

"ARTICLE I: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

To use chemical weapons;

To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;

To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention

Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare."

As a result of this difference in scope between the two treaties, the verification regimes each establishes are also very different. To summarize briefly, the CWC verification regime involves detailed reporting by industry, regular inspection of facilities, and on-site inspections on demand. Under the CTBT, verification is based primarily on the extensive monitoring on a worldwide basis of seismic and other activities which, if anomalous, could indicate that a nuclear explosion might have occurred. Only in such a case could an on-site inspection be initiated.