This section provides an informal summary/analysis of the CTBTO. As the CTBT has not yet entered into force, a system of provisional institutions agreed upon by the states signatories late in 1996 is substituting for those permanent bodies and systems contemplated in the Treaty.

Structure

The CTBTO will be established in Vienna, where the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) is already based. It will comprise a Conference of States Parties, expected to meet annually, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat, headed by a Director-General. The CTBTO is to be an independent body but could share expertise and facilities with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Conference of States Parties will be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party will have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. The Conference will meet in regular sessions, which will be held annually, unless it decides otherwise. The Conference may also be convened as an Amendment Conference (Article VII) and/or as a Review Conference (Article VIII).

The Conference will consider, inter alia, questions, matters or issues within the scope of the Treaty, including making recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues raised by States Parties. It will also oversee the implementation of, and review compliance with the Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose. The Conference will also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in either of them for the exercise of their functions.

The Executive Council will consist of 51 members, elected from six geographically determined regions, thus: 10 from Africa, 7 from Eastern Europe, 9 from Latin America, 7 from the Middle East and South Asia, 10 from North America and Western Europe, and 8 from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. One third of the seats are to be filled taking into account particular criteria, one seat per region allocated by alphabetic rotation (to ensure that State Party is excluded), and the rest designated from among the States Parties in each region by rotation or election. In the section to be filled according to certain criteria, political and security interests are to be taken into account, alongside International Monitoring System (IMS) facilities, expertise and experience in monitoring, "nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data", and States Party's budgetary contribution to the CTBTO.

The Council will be the executive organ of the Organization. As such it will be responsible to the Conference. It will carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with the Treaty. In so doing, it will act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation.

While the Conference of States Parties is to be the principal CTBT body once the Treaty has entered into force, the Executive Council will have the greatest political role in decision making. It would take decisions on matters of substance and procedure as well as permitting or preventing on-site inspections (OSIs).

The CTBT verification regime will consist of an IMS of four basic technologies, non-mandatory consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. There was basic agreement on the number and location of monitoring stations to provide global networks of seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic monitors.

The IMS will comprise 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations, a network of 11 hydroacoustic monitors, 60 infrasound stations and a network of 80 stations for measuring radionuclides in the atmosphere. The IMS also designates 40 of the 80 radionuclide stations to monitor the presence of relevant noble gases as well as radioactive particulates. While the CTBT omits specific mention of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and satellite based sensors as sources of verification information, States Parties, under terms of the Treaty, are not precluded from using information obtained through "national technical means of verification" (providing it is done consistent with "generally recognized principles of international law and without violating the sovereignty of States").

There are provisions for "improvement of the verification regime", which could allow EMP, satellites or other technology to be incorporated in the IMS subject to the consensus of the Executive Council. In this manner, technologies can be either added or deleted from the IMS without requiring the full process of an Amendment Conference. It would also be possible, under separately established "cooperative arrangements" for any State Party to make available supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the IMS, although it may be that this was only intended to apply to the IMS-type technologies.

Unless the responsible State is willing to provide funding, the CTBTO will pay for establishing new facilities identified as necessary for the primary networks, upgrading existing primary or auxiliary facilities to the international standards, operating and maintaining primary IMS facilities, transmitting IMS data, both processed and raw, analyzing samples and authenticating data from auxiliary stations. The Treaty text provides that a State Party may offset against its assessed financial contribution by up to half its annual financial liability its costs for establishing and operating its stations (but only "by agreement.") Overall, the costs of the CTBTO will be met by all States Parties in accordance with the UN scale of assessments adjusted to take account of the difference in membership of the two organizations.

The International Data Centre (IDC), attached to the Technical Secretariat, would be responsible for processing the mass of raw data from the IMS stations and sending it to States Parties in a variety of forms. In particular, the IDC would screen data in accordance with internationally standardized criteria established by the CTBTO, filter it according to nationally requested criteria, and provide some additional technical assistance to States Parties.

Confidence-building measures (CBM) relate to voluntary notification of chemical explosions and calibration of the IMS stations, but do not encompass any transparency or measures relating to existing test sites. Consultation and clarification have been made voluntary, not mandatory, but nevertheless could be sought immediately if any request for an on-site-inspection is received. Time-lines are also suggested, so that results of such exchanges of information can be of assistance in the process of deciding on the need for an OSI.

Any State Party to the Treaty will have the right to request an OSI on the territory of another State Party, to establish whether a suspect event is a nuclear explosion. A country may base its request on evidence from the IMS, and/or on evidence it has collected itself using methods, termed "national technical means" (NTMs), which can include satellite imagery or EMP. If a request for an OSI is received, the Executive Council of the CTBTO must decide within 96 hours whether or not to authorize the OSI. Each OSI will be made by a team of experts, selected by the Director-General of the CTBTO from a list of experts nominated by the States Party. The inspection team may spend up to 130 days on-site and will produce a report on its findings from the OSI for the Technical Secretariat, for review by the Executive Council. The State inspected will be able to comment.

The draft treaty allows any relevant kind of information, including NTMs, but 'consistent with generally recognized principles of international law'. Countries such as Pakistan, Iran and China had raised repeated concerns about the admissibility of NTMs. The draft treaty contains several safeguards against abuse, including the requirements that verification - including any OSI request - must be based on objective information relevant to the Treaty's subject, namely to clarify whether a nuclear test or explosion had been carried out, and that the sovereignty of States would be respected.

Last Updated:
2004-09-15

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