Nuclear disarmament and Non-Proliferation

THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)

The CTBT verification regime, when completed, will be the most highly intrusive monitoring system yet developed. Because of this, a separate section on the verification regime is appropriate as this is the 'heart' of the CTBT.

The CTBT calls for the establishment of an International Monitoring System (IMS) comprised of 337 monitoring stations and laboratories to detect and identify with a high degree of confidence all explosions greater than one kilotonne in the atmosphere, underwater or underground, anywhere on earth. (While only partially operational in 1998, the IMS easily detected and identified the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests explosions.) In future, the IMS will deter states from entertaining clandestine nuclear tests.

The CTBT verification regime has to be in place and be fully operational by the time the Treaty enters into force. The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization has been tasked with this endeavour. Together with the Preparatory Commission, a plenary body of all states signatories, the PTS is taking necessary measures to ensure the effective establishment of the global verification regime foreseen in the CTBT.

The CTBT verification regime includes a number of components, which are spelled out largely in Article IV of the Treaty and in a Protocol:

• the IMS, which is to be supported by the International Data Centre (IDC);
• procedures for consultation and clarification;
• procedures for on-site inspections (OSI), which include the use of aerial overflights; and
• "confidence building measures" relating to the voluntary provision of information on large chemical explosions and invitations for observers to attend such explosions.

There are also provisions for improving the verification system.

The IMS will be a substantial international undertaking constituting a prominent example of one type of "cooperative monitoring". Four monitoring technologies are specified for the IMS - seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound - and will be deployed at stations around the world. There is also provision for the establishment, in conjunction with some of the contemplated radionuclide monitoring stations, of noble gas monitoring facilities. The IMS will be "placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat" but all monitoring facilities of the IMS will be owned and operated "by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them..." There is provision for compensation to a State Party from the CTBTO by prior agreement if the State Party assumes any of the costs associated with the monitoring facilities which it hosts or for which it is responsible.

Among the duties of the CTBTO Technical Secretariat (largely through the IDC) will be to process, analyze and report routinely on IMS data according to agreed procedures. In addition, the IDC, among other things, will produce specified standard products (e.g. reports) for States Parties; customize its standard products for individual state parties by applying nationally specified event screening criteria; and assist individual States Parties with expert technical analysis of IMS data and other relevant data (the resulting output from such analysis will be available to all states parties). A number of other provisions for technical assistance by the IDC to states parties are also outlined. Raw and processed data from the IMS will be made available to states parties for their own analysis.

During the negotiations of the CTBT, a number of states recognized the utility of satellite-based sensors for monitoring a CTBT but also noted that the cost of establishing a dedicated CTBT satellite system would be very high. There was also sensitivity on the part of some states concerning the use of data from existing satellites. These states argued that the use of data from nationally-owned satellites (i.e. national technical means (NTM)) could be discriminatory and open to abuse. Other states considered, however, that data from NTM would greatly assist effective verification. In the end, the Treaty specified that:

"For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States."

It is increasingly likely that satellite imagery of the quality required for monitoring and verification purposes will become available on a commercial basis. This will constitute an area for further research as the CTBTO takes up the challenge of developing a cost-effective verification mechanism.

The Treaty specifies as a guideline for an on-site inspection that it is to be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible. Relevant timelines for various steps in the on-site inspection process are spelled out. An inspection will be undertaken by a team organized by the CTBTO of up to 40 persons (except during any ground drilling phase) assembled from a list it is to maintain. Inspectors will receive training from the CTBTO. Subject to agreement by the inspected state party, the state party requesting an inspection may send an observer on the inspection.

The inspection team has the right to conduct an overflight over the inspection area during the on-site inspection to obtain a general orientation of the inspection area and optimize the locations for ground-based inspection activities. Additional overflights using specified monitoring equipment may be conducted but only with the agreement of the inspected state party. The inspected state can also impose restrictions on overflights. The inspected state has the right to provide the aircraft used for overflights or, if a CTBTO aircraft is used, to check it to ensure that it is equipped with approved inspection equipment.

The Treaty also includes provisions for managed access to installations and locations within the inspection area. There also are provisions concerning sample collection, including a stipulation that, whenever possible, analysis of samples is to be done on-site and that the inspected state party can obtain duplicate samples.

Another feature of the Treaty is a provision allowing for penalties if an inspection request is not approved or if an inspection is terminated because it is considered to be frivolous or abusive.

At the November 2001 Article XIV Conference to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the CTBT, Canada, Sweden and Australia co-sponsored a seminar hosted by the UK-based NGO Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) on the margins of the conference called “Verifying the CTBT: Capabilities, Progress and Challenges”. The seminar was an opportunity for eminent scientists and to show delegations attending the Conference the reliability and effectiveness of the CTBT’s verification regime.