Canada in the World: Canadian International Policy

Video Interview Jocelyn Coulon Subscribe to eNewsletter and/or Email Alerts and Podcasts

Video Interview (in French with English transcripts)

Note: The opinions presented are not necessarily those of the Government of Canada.

Introduction	2 min 49 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime
Canada’s historical involvement	5 min 32 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime
The difference between antipersonnel mines and small arms	4 min 00 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime
What have we achieved in terms of nuclear non-proliferation?	3 min 18 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime
Myths about nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups	4 min 49 sec	Windows Media l QuickTime

Introduction

My name is Jocelyn Coulon, and I am the director of the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, a research group based at the Université de Montréal and affiliated with the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales or CÉRIUM, a research centre created by the university two years ago.  CÉRIUM also includes 13 other study and research units on international issues.  Therefore, the network that I direct is one of several entities that compose CÉRIUM. 

What does this mean on a day-to-day basis?  The Réseau was designed to bring together Francophone researchers, practitioners, diplomats, journalists and other specialists in the field of peace operations, because we came to realize that the English-speaking world had become quite well-organized in this area, while the Francophone world lacked a forum in which people could come together to discuss and share ideas. 

The way we chose to facilitate meetings, discussions and exchanges was to create a network and to provide it with a dynamic focus, in the form of a Web site that disseminates daily information on peacekeeping operations around the world, whether carried out by the United Nations, NATO or other organizations.  This is one aspect of my activities. 

Of course, I am also a commentator on international affairs for the daily newspaper La Presse and for various electronic media, including Radio-Canada.  I am here today to speak about disarmament and non-proliferation.  Although I’m not a specialist in these areas, I have, since 1984 or so, observed, written about, and sought to explain issues of peace and security.  Therefore, I have obviously had occasion to cover these particular aspects of Canadian foreign policy and world politics in the course of the past twenty years.

Canada’s historical involvement

The issues of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation have concerned Canadian diplomatic circles since the Second World War and I believe that the fundamental work on the subject was written by Michel Fortmann and Albert Legault, whose study focused on the crucial years of disarmament and arms control, that is the period from 1950 to 1960 or up to the mid-1970s. 

Why was Canada so concerned with these issues?  Because this was a period in history—the Cold War—in which there truly were two camps, the East and the West, that were staring each other down, sometimes even confronting each other and taking the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe, one example being the Cuban missile crisis of 1960.  Canada has always striven to slow down the arms race and to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, but chemical and biological weapons as well. 

Throughout the past 40 or 50 years, this has been the central concern of Canadian foreign policy; aside from our relations with the United States, it has been our most important field of action on the international scene.  Thus, Canada took part in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and submitted proposals on disarmament and on limiting nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.  Canada also came out against what is commonly referred to as the weaponization of space—to prevent the launching into outer space of weapons that could threaten the security of our communications systems, as well as international security as a whole.  Placing nuclear weapons—or any type of weapon—in space could have tragic consequences for the entire planet.

It can therefore be said that since 1945, and especially since the 1950s and 1960s, Canada has actively put forward proposals and played an essential role as a consistent supporter of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. 

The area in which Canada has made its most important mark, obviously, has been with what one might call more personal initiatives, a good example being the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention.  This is an area where Canada has truly played a leadership role—for two major reasons. 

Firstly, Canada realized that the Disarmament Conference negotiations in Geneva were going nowhere in terms of this particular aspect of disarmament and that it would be necessary therefore to step outside the United Nations process and the rather narrow framework of the Disarmament Conference in order to restart the debate on the elimination of antipersonnel mines. 

This was effected through the personal diplomatic efforts of Lloyd Axworthy, but also those of the Canadian government, which joined forces with other countries and a number of NGOs actively involved in the fight against antipersonnel mines.  This process led to the signing of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention in 1997, which was a great victory for Canadian diplomacy.  One hopes and wants to believe that all the signatories, and all those who subsequently ratified the Convention, will respect it, which is to say that they will completely eliminate antipersonnel mines, as well as stop making and trading in these devices.  There are, of course, major countries that have not signed the Convention, but a significant step has nonetheless been taken.

The difference between antipersonnel mines and small arms

The difficulty is that antipersonnel mines do not get about on their own through streets and countryside, planting themselves on roads, and so on.  These mines are usually deployed by recognized bodies, armies, soldiers, or guerrillas who deliberately plant them at essential defence points.  With small arms and handguns, things get more complicated.  Both are legal, at least until they are declared otherwise.  They are legal because they are considered useful in defending the state or ensuring internal security: police forces must have a certain number of small arms and handguns to maintain law and order, while armies need them to defend the sovereignty of the state.  Because of this, I believe it is highly unlikely that we will ever see a total prohibition of small arms. 

What we need to do is to prevent them from falling into the hands of illegal groups who have no right to use “legitimate violence.”  By this I mean that the international community recognizes that certain states and certain groups within states have the right to use “legitimate violence,” while others do not.  This is in fact where the first problem lies. 

The second problem is that illegal groups are in fact getting hold of small arms and handguns and trading in these weapons across entire continents.  This is happening in Africa, which is not to say that Africa is the only continent to experience this problem; however, borders in Africa are certainly more porous than in many other parts of the world.  The question then becomes: what can we do to prevent these groups from obtaining these weapons?  How do we prevent weapons from circulating freely between countries: in other words, how do we control the movement of weapons?  Should there be a marking system or an arms registration system?  Would such measures enable us to seize weapons more easily and destroy them in an effort to reduce their numbers?  These are difficult questions to answer. 

My feeling is that the many campaigns and measures introduced in Africa in the past ten years or so have produced some results, but that these results have been quite limited.  In the case of small arms, I believe that the best way to combat their proliferation would be to start addressing the underlying causes of conflicts.  Once a conflict is resolved, part of the small arms proliferation problem is solved as well. 
 
What have we achieved in terms of nuclear non-proliferation?

From a philosophical standpoint, I believe that the major powers should set an example in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation.  Instead, we have seen the major powers expand their nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities in the past ten years. 

On the nuclear side, there has, admittedly, been a reduction in the number of weapons.  Someone said a while ago that the number of warheads has been reduced from 70,000 to 25,000―clearly a step in the right direction.  But surely we must all recognize that 25,000 is still an enormous number of warheads.  More troubling still is the fact that the major powers are improving and perfecting their nuclear warheads and making them more accurate. 

 As a result, we are still far from anything resembling nuclear disarmament.  These developments also send a message to those who signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as those outside the Treaty, the message being that the major powers reserve the right not only to improve and refine their stock of nuclear weapons, but also to use these weapons if they so choose.  Refining and improving warheads and the vehicles used to transport them, such as planes and missiles, creates an increased capacity and flexibility to use these weapons in conflict situations, to an extent that did not exist 30 or 40 years ago, when nuclear arms were seen as weapons of last resort that could terrorize and destroy entire populations. 

As technology advances, nuclear weapons may well become battlefield weapons, which would be a most dangerous development.  On the conventional weapons side, one observes that military budgets are rising, at least in the United States.  Military spending may not have risen as a proportion of the gross national product, but looking at the numbers, it is clear that the United States and other countries are increasing their spending on military hardware and are once again actively involved in the arms trade.  This also sends a message that disarmament is for others and that armament is a tool that larger powers can use to maintain their ascendancy over the international community.  Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any great awareness of these issues.

Myths about nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups 
 

Attention has been focused on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, since possession of nuclear weapons can have enormous repercussions.  Conventional bombs can kill many people, but nuclear weapons can bring about destruction on a far greater scale.  The major powers worry that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of rogue states or failed states, or even terrorists groups. 

Here, distinctions need to be made: nuclear weapons are not easily transferable.  The potential to create nuclear weapons cannot be acquired overnight.  I believe that the Iraq experience has clearly demonstrated this: despite the billions of dollars invested by Saddam Hussein and the fact that UNSCOM weapons inspectors discovered numerous nuclear production chains in 1991, the inspectors discovered no meaningful evidence that weapons existed.  Perhaps if Iraq had been able to continue investing billions of dollars, it might have developed nuclear weapons, but we know that this did not happen. 

Can the same be said with respect to Iran? No doubt it can.  After all, India and Pakistan were able to develop nuclear weapons through their civilian production chains and by making massive investments in this form of weaponry.  Still, it is now clear that the prediction made by John F. Kennedy in the 1960s—that there would be 25 nuclear states in the world by the 1970s—has not been borne out.  Today, there are eight declared nuclear states in the world if one counts Israel (Israel has not declared that it has nuclear weapons, but it is commonly assumed that it does).  So, we are well short of Kennedy’s prediction. 

 As to whether nuclear weapons could be transferred into the hands of terrorists, I suppose such a thing could happen, but would a state that possesses nuclear weapons actually provide such weapons to terrorists and run the risk that the terrorists might one day use those weapons against it?  This scenario strikes me as completely absurd and when I hear politicians in the West and elsewhere speak of such a threat I can only assume that they are indulging in propaganda in order to frighten people with something that is fundamentally unreasonable and illogical.  State-owned nuclear weapons remain in the hands of the state. 

Thirdly, if it is so easy to build an atomic bomb—some maintain that a person could practically build one in their basement—why have terrorist groups with millions of dollars at their disposal not done so already?  Clearly, creating a nuclear weapon is not as easy as some would have us believe.  The international community certainly has cause to be concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but we should not lose our sense of proportion.

What I find more worrying is the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, which are far more readily available.  The means to create chemical and biological weapons exist wherever civilian chemical industries that produce fertilizers, medications, etc. are found.  Now, such weapons are also very fragile—they cannot be deployed just anywhere, under any circumstance.  But they nonetheless represent a more serious threat than nuclear weapons and certainly warrant as much attention as the issue of non-proliferation.

Last Updated:2006-10-18

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