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Canada in the World: Canadian International Policy
Resources


Video Interview
Martin Wolf
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Martin Wolf discusses contemporary globalization and its implications for the Great Powers.

Educated at Oxford University, Mr. Wolf was a senior economist at the World Bank and has a well-deserved reputation for rigorous thinking, deep insight and sharp delivery. He is the author of numerous articles and several books on political economy and the world economy, and has won several prestigious awards for his journalism, including the CBE (Commander of the British Empire) in 2000 "for services to financial journalism" and the Decade of Excellence Award at the 2003 Business Journalists of the Year Awards.
He is currently the associate editor and chief economics commentator at the Financial Times.

View Mr. Wolf's presentation "Future of Globalization" (PDF) delivered at Foreign Affairs Canada in February '06. View a summary of his presentation: HTML | PDF 

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Note: The opinions presented are not necessarily those of the Government of Canada.


 Contemporary Globalization3 min 19 sec Windows Media |QuickTime 

 Economic and Political Changes

4 min 19 sec

Windows Media
|QuickTime

 Globalization and the Great Powers

4 min 1 sec

Windows Media
|QuickTime

 Much to Gain

2 min 52 sec 

Windows Media
|QuickTime 

(Video players are available here: QuickTimeWindows Media)

Transcript:

Contemporary Globalization

I am Martin Wolf and I am chief economics commentator for the Financial Times in
London. The globalization process at the moment is often described as the second one. It is important to place it in a historical context. There was a previous period, between 1870 and 1914, when the world economy also integrated. That went into reverse between the two wars with a series of disasters. There has been a slow recovery of integration, which started with the developed countries in the fifties, sixties and seventies and then spread quite quickly in the rest of the world with a series of big policy changes-in China, after 1978, when Deng Xiaoping started the reforms; the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was immensely important; the reforms in India, particularly in 1991; and a series of similar market-oriented opening reforms throughout most of the world, including the developed countries. In their different ways. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were also part of this process. That was really because it came to be realized by the late seventies that the central planning system, the inward-looking sort of development process that had been seen as being the most advanced in the world-Stalin's model in large measure-didn't work very well. That was the intellectual part.

 

Beyond that, there have also been some quite important technological changes. Over this period, the most important have been in communications technologies. There has been a massive decline in the cost of collecting and distributing information across the world. That has allowed integration of companies across the world. Production is really integrated to an extraordinary degree. Retailers can manage their production and supply lines across oceans. Previously they could hardly do so even across state borders. For example, Wal-Mart buys enormous quantities from China and can manage that process extremely precisely because of modern technology and the know-how and organization that goes with that. Modern technology has created modern global financial markets, 24-hour financial markets. That is a new phenomenon in the world. That is sort of the second element.

As a result of these things coming together, billions of people have been integrated into the world economy. There's a huge increase in the labour supply in the world-predominantly unskilled and mostly from Asia-that has sort of turbocharged the whole process. So those are the three major things going on: technology, policy change and, as a result of these two things, the entry of billions of people into the world economy. And that is contemporary globalization.


Economic and Political changes

There are some very profound economic and also social, cultural and political changes going on. I'm focusing predominantly on economics and politics, but I think that the cultural aspect is clearly very important. Ease of communications means that ideas and images which circulate in one part of the world circulate immediately in all parts of the world. Therefore, you get reactions that you would never historically have expected when societies were still relatively hermetically sealed. So these are important.

 

In terms of economics, first of all there has been a huge opening of every economy in the world. It is becoming more integrated in the world, more dependent on trade. And this is not just in goods, it is also true in services. Indeed, for the first time, large parts of services-especially those bits that can be put into computers and sent down wires-these services are more tradable than goods. That is an enormous revolution. It has encouraged also a huge expansion in foreign direct investment, which has grown about two and a half times as fast as the world economy in the last 15 years. That is linked with the opening to foreign know-how that comes with FDI. It has been true of the U.S. and it has been true of China. Quite different countries have accepted that.

 

There is the rise of trade, the rise of FDI and therefore the rise of the multinational as a major player. There have been associated with all this, increasingly, some very big changes in relative prices. Obviously, the prices of computers, computing and communications have collapsed. We know that. But there have been shifts in the relative price of unskilled labour -- declines in the developed world, particularly -- partly because of increased competition from low-wage areas and partly because of the new technologies, which have given a big relative increase to the rewards of highly skilled people. That is another important factor. So the unskilled position has deteriorated, leading to either lower wages or higher unemployment, depending on how each economy manages its welfare state. It is a big challenge for the welfare state.

 

Finally, in the recent period we are seeing a big increase in demand for resources because of the growth of China and, to a lesser degree, India, which are very resource-intensive, very energy-intensive. They are generating a very large part of the global incremental demand for resources. About 45 percent of the world's incremental demand for oil is coming from these countries, much more than from the existing developed countries. This is a big change and it is going to continue because they are in a very energy-intensive phase of their development. So these are very profound economic changes.

 

Then, with globalization, we have what I have called the "globalization of bads." Not just good things are traded freely. Bad things like narcotics, trafficking of people and problems about managing the flows of diseases across borders have also increased. We are worried about piracy and counterfeiting of products. Some of this is less important, but some is very important, if we are talking for example about drugs or the counterfeiting of engine parts for airplanes. Managing that is a big issue. And migration itself, the trafficking of people, is part of that.

 

Finally, there is a huge change in relative power going on as part of these processes, with the rise of new great powers. China has an economy now bigger than Britain's. It is going to be the second biggest economy in the world, probably the largest trader in the world, within 10 years, possibly sooner. There is a big change in relative power. So a whole host of huge economic, political and social changes are under way.


Globalization and the Great Powers

There is always competition between great powers. However, I remain optimistic that it can be managed, short of war. There are pretty obvious reasons why one might hope that. If you have the capacity to destroy human civilization, and these countries do, war is not an intelligent policy choice, even if your aim is security. That is a way of generating absolute insecurity. Direct war among the great powers has not occurred since the Second World War. This is not an accident. I mean it really is unimaginably dangerous in a way, which has transformed the possibility of looking at war as a normal instrument of policy. Yes, war with proxies is possible, but war among powers is much less so.

 

Taiwan is manageable, I think. The Americans have made it clear to the Taiwanese that they will not support Taiwan if they make a unilateral declaration of independence. The Taiwanese understand that. Short of that, I think the Chinese can live with the status quo because they must realize that time is on their side. The Taiwanese inevitably are becoming more and more a part of their economic system. So I think that it is manageable.

 

It is true that the United States is trying to create-and China is more or less automatically creating -- a set of regional allies to contain China's expansion -- some of which are quite provocative in the South China Sea. Japan is part of that, India is part of that. It is not clear which way Russia is going to go. But I don't think we should overstate that, because none of these countries actually is seriously thinking of going to war with China, nor do I think that China is seriously thinking of going to war with them. I agree that there is a competition element and the United States will clearly want to balance China's military power, that is true. But it seems to me that it is manageable, short of war. I hope so, partly because -- and this is different from previous great-powers relations -- these countries have incredibly deep ties, and growing ties economically, as there is a very large amount of American investment in China. There are a very large number of American companies that rely on China for their products, for their activities, for their day-to-day operations even. There is a whole range of them and they are expected to do more and more of it. China of course is a very important source of potential demand for them as well. China has purchased a very large amount of U.S. treasury bills. It has been a very satisfactory owner of these; it is stable and helping to keep interest rates low.

 

There are lots of geopolitical issues as well -- the management of terrorism, for example-where they clearly need to cooperate. If we are ever going to think about global warming issues, they are also going to have to cooperate over that. So while I do accept that there is an element of competition in these relationships, there is also a fairly compelling need to cooperate because we have one pretty fragile planet to share. And the war option, which is ultimately how great powers dealt with these problems in the past, just seems to me to be in this case unmanageable, impossible-and with each passing year, as China becomes a greater power, more stupendously destructive.


Much to Gain

So far, the developed countries in general have been doing pretty well in this new area of globalization. There are some parts of our communities for which that is not true, but since the West-and here I include Japan to some extent-has the world's stock of know-how, the world's most sophisticated companies and the institutions that generate new knowledge, it has some very powerful assets in this world. China wants all this. What is China trying to do? It is trying to acquire what we have, to learn what we have. So, what we have is valuable to China and there are returns to be gained in allowing China access to it. There are potential profits for our companies and markets for our companies. So we have a lot, it seem to me, to gain from this.

 

The crucial point to understand is that China exports in order to import, like every other country. It has a bit of a surplus, but mostly it imports. It imports raw materials-and that is good for a raw materials exporter, a resources exporter like Canada. It imports a lot of know-how, directly and indirectly, through FDI, but also through capital goods, components and so forth. Our countries supply that. Commercial services, say, of all kinds -- Britain is very good at it. There is a whole range of things the Chinese don't know how to do. They don't know how to run a financial system, they don't really know how to run a company. These are all new things for them. Their legal institutions are very primitive. They need a lot of help. In fact, a lot of the work in law related to China goes through Hong Kong. That's another set of opportunities.

 

The crucial point to understand is that they offer formidable competition in some areas and formidable opportunities in others. Economies in the rest of the world-including the developed countries, which are very well situated from this point of view-have to focus on becoming complementary. That will happen, to some degree, naturally. The market will just drive it. But we have to think about developments that will make us complementary to China rather than competitive and accept that we will play a smaller part in a larger economic world. A lot of developed countries-Japan and Germany are very good examples-are doing very well out of the Chinese resurgence because they provide things that the Chinese don't have and won't have for a very long time. It is still a poor country with a pretty undeveloped technological base.