The Ottawa Treaty

Well, the answer is less simple than you may think. That is to say, we have a tendency to first attribute it to the personality of Minister Axworthy, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister at the time, a bit like the creation of peacekeepers is attributed to Lester Pearson. We also tend to attribute it to Canadian leadership in general, a use of resources that are a bit unusual, for example the networks of non-governmental organizations that have operated in that field, and local organizations.

What we are discovering more and more—in any case the indications that I am beginning to find because I have some of my students working on it—is first that there was a movement that existed and that preceded the Canadian initiative. Canada, or the Foreign Affairs Minister, took advantage of a wave that was forming; he caught it at the beginning, but the movement was already under way before most of Canada’s involvement. Particularly in Belgium, there were many initiatives that had been undertaken in the fight against anti-personnel mines. So already you can see that Canada was not the central player; it would support the process a lot, and the fact that the process culminated in Ottawa is a bit of a recognition of that role. But I think that today we have come to have a slightly more balanced view of the role the Minister and the Canadian government played on that issue.

There are also certain authors who are starting to see the importance of the involvement of the Prime Minister’s Office. It wasn’t just the Foreign Affairs Minister; we know that Jean Chrétien—well, Jean Chrétien’s office—also gave a few nudges to encourage the movement. But another important thing is that it was a process that resonated with the population for the reasons that I mentioned a bit earlier. It is regarded as a particularly vicious way to wage war, and in large part it offended the sensibilities and values that Canadians hold dear. And so, that resonated and I think that it’s part of the process by which Canadians build their own identity. The reason I think there are so many people who are interested in that process and why we have put so much emphasis on Canada’s role is that it allows Canadians to distinguish themselves from others on the international stage. Not necessarily in the eyes of others, but in their own eyes. Because for Canadians there is always that question of what differentiates them from Americans. Or what do Canadians do to distinguish themselves from other Westerners? That kind of identity question is constantly cropping up.

And this initiative for the fight against anti-personnel mines was able to partially fulfill that role by saying, “Here’s an example of what Canadians can do on the international stage and can effectively contribute on the international stage, and distinguish themselves from other countries and especially from the United States—the United States that has always had tremendous difficulty accepting the reality of the treaty on anti-personnel mines.” So for Canadians that hits a nerve. You could almost say that “it flatters a national ego,” which is not a bad thing. It helps create a feeling of identity and therefore of national unity. It helps, if you like, to stimulate Canadians’ self-perception, and so at the same time it also helps convince them to support their government. From that standpoint, it has what is probably a very clear effect at the national level.

A changing identity?

Indeed, we could perhaps open up a bit on the future as well, to ask ourselves whether in fact this whole idea that I’m exploring a bit with you, saying that this responds to certain values of the Canadian identity, is it as solid as all that? Is it expected to change over time? What we have, in fact, been seeing for a few years now is that a new identity is perhaps beginning to develop in Canada, one that is more continentalist—in fact, one that is much more in line with the United States (perhaps it’s stronger, in any case it seems to me to be stronger in the West). What we are seeing in, for example, the decision made by the Harper government regarding the conflict in Lebanon, in which it resolutely supports Israel’s position, is perhaps a sign that the way Canadians perceive the use of force, accept the use of force or regard the use of force as legitimate is in the process of changing. And if, indeed, this change is truly happening, that may have an impact by somewhat devaluing measures such as arms control and disarmament by saying that the solution is not to prevent conflicts through measures of that kind, ones whose effectiveness we are not too sure of, but that instead it’s better to return to the good old methods, namely the use of force.

So that means reinforcing the armed forces, increasing the number of troops, bolstering Canada’s ability to act at the international level by going out into the field like we’re doing in Afghanistan, for example. So, is there not a change gradually occurring that could make this mission or this role that Canadians like to give themselves, or like to see themselves take on, is it not going to change to perhaps a more traditional approach? It’s possible. It’s also possible inasmuch as Canada’s traditional networks have a tendency to erode. The United Nations, largely because of American action, is marginalized or at least less respected, or has less capacity for initiative than before. Does that not jeopardize—because the United Nations is the main vehicle for Canadian action on arms control and disarmament—will that not have an impact as well? In fact, there is perhaps reason to ask ourselves how it can be revitalized. And perhaps that partially involves the role of Foreign Affairs, not only to act on the international stage, which I think has been very well done to date, but to familiarize Canadians a bit more with what is being done. When I said at the beginning of the interview that Canadians are generally unaware of what their government is specifically doing at the international level, perhaps it is the duty of Foreign Affairs and the government to advertise these things a bit more and to talk a little more to Canadians about what is being done. And even up to a certain point, because it’s one of the lessons of the success of the Ottawa Process, is there not reason to try to seek more support from civil society, more expertise on the technical, political and social fronts, for arms control and especially non-proliferation projects?