Federal Court of Appeal - Meyer v. Canada (Attorney General)

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Date: 20030228

Docket: A-51-02

Neutral citation: 2003 FCA 107

CORAM: STRAYER J.A.

ROTHSTEIN J.A.

MALONE J.A.

BETWEEN:

DOROTHY LOUISE MEYER

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

CANADA PENSION APPEALS BOARD

Respondents

Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on February 25, 2003

Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on February 28, 2003.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: ROTHSTEIN J.A.

CONCURRED IN BY: STRAYER J.A.

MALONE J.A.

Date: 20030228

Docket: A-51-02

Neutral citation: 2003 FCA 107

CORAM: STRAYER J.A.

ROTHSTEIN J.A.

MALONE J.A.

BETWEEN:

DOROTHY LOUISE MEYER

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

CANADA PENSION APPEALS BOARD

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROTHSTEIN J.A.

[1] The issue in this judicial review from a decision of the Pension Appeals Board is whether subsection 67(3) of the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8, as amended, applies to an application for pension benefits made by estates.

[2] The applicant's mother died in 1998. Although her mother had contributed to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), she had never applied for pension benefits. The applicant, in her capacity as the executrix of her mother's estate, applied for pension benefits shortly after her mother's death.

[3] The Minister paid the applicant, as executrix, pension benefits for the twelve month period before the death of her mother. Although originally there was some confusion as to the provision that actually applied in this case, the Pension Appeals Board found that the applicable provision was paragraph 67(3)(a). Subsection 67(3) provides:

(3) Where a person who has applied to receive a retirement pension attains the age of sixty-five years before the day on which the application is received, the pension is payable commencing with the latest of

(a) the twelfth month before the month after the month in which the applicant applied or the month of January 1995, whichever is later,

(b) the month in which the applicant reaches the age of sixty-five years, or

(3) Dans le cas où le requérant a atteint l'âge de soixante-cinq ans avant la réception de la demande, la pension est payable et commence avec le dernier en date des mois suivants_:

a) le dernier en date du douzième mois précédant le mois suivant celui au cours duquel la demande a été présentée ou du mois de janvier 1995;

b) le mois au cours duquel le requérant atteint l'âge de soixante-cinq ans;

c) le mois choisi par le requérant dans la demande.

[4] The applicant says that subsection 67(3) does not apply to estates and that it only applies in the case of applications by living persons. On that interpretation, the applicant says that the limitation in paragraph 67(3)(a) to twelve months' retroactivity of benefits does not apply in this case. She says that her mother's estate should be entitled to some 20 years of retroactivity - for the period from the date when her mother turned sixty-five years of age to the time of her death at eighty-five years of age.

[5] It is common ground that, to the extent subsection 67(3) was intended to apply to estates, it has been poorly drafted. Nonetheless, I am impelled to the conclusion that it does apply to applications by estates and that the limitation to twelve months' retroactivity of benefits is applicable in this case.

[6] The applicant's argument is premised on the English version of subsection 67(3). She says that its opening words indicate an intention to limit its application to applicants who are "persons" as opposed to "estates". However, the French version of subsection 67(3) uses the term "requérant", which is the more general term including both persons (personne) and estates (ayants droits). Section 2(1) defines applicant and requérant:

"applicant" means, in Part II,

(a) a person or an estate that has applied for a benefit,

...

« requérant » Dans la partie II_:

a) personne ou ayants droit qui ont fait une demande de prestation;

...

Reference to the French version makes it clear that, while subsections 67(1) and (2), by their express terms, do not apply to estates, subsection 67(3) does apply to the broader category of applicants as defined in subsection 2(1), that is, to estates as well as to living persons. The better interpretation is broader, rather than narrower, in the case of subsection 67(3).

[7] An interpretation of subsection 67(3) that includes applications by estates avoids an absurd result. If subsection 67(3) only applied to applications by living persons, living applicants would be limited to twelve months' retroactivity whereas, in case of applications by estates, there would be no limit on retroactivity. To read the legislation as conferring on survivors or beneficiaries of an estate access to greater benefits than living contributors would be patently absurd.

[8] The applicant made thorough and articulate submissions and chose to interpret an ambiguous provision in her favour. For that she cannot be faulted. Nonetheless, for the reasons given, I cannot agree with her interpretation.

[9] The application should be dismissed, but without costs.

"Marshall Rothstein"

J.A.

"I agree

B.L. Strayer J.A."

"I agree

B. Malone J.A."

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET: A-51-02

STYLE OF CAUSE: Dorothy Louise Meyer v. Attorney General of Canada et al

PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario

DATE OF HEARING: February 25, 2003

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: ROTHSTEIN J.A.

CONCURRED IN BY: STRAYER, MALONE JJ.A.

DATED: February 28, 2003

APPEARANCES:

Ms. Dorothy L. Meyer ON HER OWN BEHALF

Mr. Stephen Latté FOR THE RESPONDENTS

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Mr. Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Deputy Attorney General of Canada