Date: 19980424

Docket: A-768-95

CORAM:      STONE, J.A.

         LINDEN, J.A.

         ROBERTSON, J.A.     

    

BETWEEN:

    

    

     NOVOPHARM LIMITED

     Appellant

     - and -

     GLAXO GROUP LIMITED and

     GLAXO CANADA INC.

     Respondents

Heard at Toronto, Ontario, Thursday April 23, 1998

Judgment delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, Thursday April 23, 1998

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:      STONE, J.A.

CONCURRED BY:      LINDEN, J.A.

     ROBERTSON, J.A.

Date: 19980424

Docket: A-768-95

CORAM:      STONE, J.A.

         LINDEN, J.A.

         ROBERTSON, J.A.

BETWEEN:

     NOVOPHARM LIMITED

     Appellant

     - and -

     GLAXO GROUP LIMITED and

     GLAXO CANADA INC.

     Respondents

     REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

     (Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario

     on Thursday April 23, 1998)

STONE, J.A.:

[1]      The appellant seeks to set aside an order of the Trial Division of November 16, 1995, which was amended by the subsequent order of October 22, 1996, permitting the respondents to produce documents for "Counsels' Eyes Only".

[2]      While it is clear that protective orders of that kind are not unknown in litigation of this kind - validity and infringement of a patent - it is also clear that they are not lightly made. This is obviously because they represent a serious inroad into the right that an opposite party ordinarily has of seeing all documents that contains evidence of relevance to the issues in the dispute.

[3]      The care with which the Court approaches the granting of an order of this kind is graphically illustrated by the case of Deprenyl Research Ltd. v. Canguard Health Technologies Inc. (1992), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 228 (F.C.T.D.), where Strayer, J. (as he then was) stated at pages 239-30:

An order preventing counsel from showing relevant evidence to his client in order to get instructions, while not unknown, should only be granted in very unusual circumstances. The onus is on the defendants to establish the need for such a restriction on the ordinary disclosure of materials which may be relevant to the issues in the case, and the evidence so far is not compelling.

[4]      In the present case an affidavit was filed in support of the motion for the order in which it was stated:

16.      Many of the documents which have already been identified by the Plaintiffs as being documents which may be included in the affidavits of documents are confidential to the Plaintiffs. The public disclosure of such documents and the information therein will prejudice the Plaintiffs.

17.      Furthermore, many of the documents already identified by the Plaintiffs as documents which may be included in the affidavits of documents contain information which is confidential and is of such an extremely sensitive character that its disclosure to the opposing party will be highly prejudicial to the Plaintiffs.

18.      The release of this information will prejudice the Plaintiffs by allowing the public, including the competitors of the Plaintiffs, to make use of the information for their own commercial interests contrary to the interests of the Plaintiffs.

        

[5]      Counsel for the appellant described this evidence as consisting merely of "bald" statements that are insufficient to support the order that was made and is now under attack. Because of that counsel contends that this Court would be well justified in interfering with what is undoubtedly a discretionary order on the basis that an error in principle was committed. We agree with those submissions.

[6]      In our view, the evidence in support of the motion was insufficient to satisfy the onus on the respondents. It is lacking in any description of the type or class of document that the respondents assert would cause prejudice if it reached the eyes of the appellant or of the public including any competitor. If evidence of that sort had been presented it would have assisted the Court in better assessing the assertions of alleged prejudice and in being satisfied that the granting of what can only be regarded as a rather extraordinary order was justified in the circumstances.

[7]      The appeal will be allowed with costs. The order of the Trial Division will be allowed to stand for a period of thirty days in order to permit the respondents time to seek a fresh protective order. Upon the expiration of that period of thirty days, the order will be struck.

"A.J. Stone"

J.A.

     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

Date: 19980324

Docket: A-768-95

BETWEEN:

NOVOPHARM LIMITED

     Appellant

- and -

GLAXO GROUP LIMITED and

GLAXO CANADA INC.

     Respondents

    

     REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

    

     FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

     Names of Counsel and Solicitors of Record

DOCKET:                      A-768-95

STYLE OF CAUSE:                  NOVOPHARM LIMITED

                    

                        -and-

                    

GLAXO GROUP LIMITED and

GLAXO CANADA INC.

DATE OF HEARING:             APRIL 23, 1998

PLACE OF HEARING:             TORONTO, ONTARIO

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OF THE COURT BY:             STONE, J.A.

DATED:                      APRIL 24, 1998

APPEARANCES:                  Ms. Carol Hitchman

                    

                             For the Appellant

                        Mr. Peter R. Wilcox

                             For the Respondents

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:          Ms. Carol Hitchman

                        Hitchman & Sprigings

                        Barristers and Solicitors

                        120 Adelaide Street West, Suite 2340

                        Toronto, Ontario, M5H 1T1     

                             For the Appellant

                          Mr. Gunars Gaikis

                        Smart and Bigar

                        Barristers and Solicitors

                        P.O. Box 39, Station P

                        439 University Avenue, Suite 2300

                        Toronto, Ontario, M5S 2S6

                             For the Respondents