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Crowe v. Canada (C.A.) [2003] 4 F.C. 321 Date: 20030417
Dockets: A-195-02 A-196-02
Citation: 2003 FCA 191
CORAM: ROTHSTEIN J.A.
BETWEEN: A-195-02 DOUGLAS L. CROWE
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
A-196-02 KENNETH A. CUSH
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
Heard at Calgary, Alberta, on April 2, 2003.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 17, 2003.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: EVANS J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: ROTHSTEIN J.A. MALONE J.A. Date: 20030417
Dockets: A-195-02 A-196-02
Citation: 2003 FCA 191
CORAM: ROTHSTEIN J.A. EVANS J.A. MALONE J.A.
BETWEEN: A-195-02 DOUGLAS L. CROWE
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
A-196-02 KENNETH A. CUSH
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EVANS J.A.
A. INTRODUCTION
[1] Douglas L. Crowe and Kenneth A. Cush are judges of the Provincial Court of Alberta. They were also members of the Alberta Provincial Judges' Association during the years 1996 and 1997. They each claimed a deduction of $1,500.00 from their income for each of the tax years 1996 and 1997 in respect of the annual dues that they had paid to maintain their membership in the Association.
[2] The Minister of National Revenue disallowed the claims. The Tax Court of Canada dismissed their appeal in a decision reported as Crowe v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2002] 2 C.T.C. 2513. The appellants now appeal to this Court. Since a single statement of facts has been agreed for both cases and the appeals were heard together, one set of reasons will be given and a copy placed in each file.
[3] Subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) permits a taxpayer to deduct dues paid "to maintain membership in an association of public servants the primary object of which is to promote the improvement in the members' conditions of employment or work, ...". The issue to be decided in this appeal is whether provincial court judges are "public servants" for the purpose of this provision.
[4] Counsel for the Crown also argued that, even if judges are "public servants", the appellants are still not entitled to the deduction because the "primary object" of the Association cannot be said to be "to promote the improvement in the members' conditions of employment or work". Because I conclude that judges are not public servants within the meaning of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv), it will not be necessary to decide this issue.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [5] While the lengthy agreed statement of facts need not be set out here, some background is appropriate. Although most Judges of the Provincial Court belong to the Association, membership is not mandatory. The objects of the Association, as registered in Alberta's corporate registry on March 2, 1994, are, among other things, to discuss, study and consider matters of common interest to or relating to the welfare of judges of the Provincial Court of Alberta and to recommend to the appropriate authorities the enactment and implementation of such measures and policies as will, in the opinion of the Association, enhance the membership thereof to the end that there will be [a] strong independent Provincial Court of Alberta better able to continually improve its role in the administration of justice within Alberta.
[6] The remuneration of Provincial Court judges has been a contentious matter since 1989 when the Government of Alberta decided to abandon the practice that it had followed since the mid-1970s of fixing the salaries of Provincial Court judges as a percentage of the salary paid to federally appointed judges. In 1994, the salaries of Provincial Court judges were reduced by 5% by Order in Council as part of the Alberta Government's deficit reduction plan.
[7] The Association was granted status as an intervener in litigation brought by Provincial Court judges to challenge the constitutional validity of both the Order in Council and the absence of a provision for a cost of living increment to their salaries. The matter was ultimately determined by the Supreme Court of Canada, along with cases concerning the independence of the judges of other provincial courts: Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 ("Judges' Reference").
[8] As a result of that decision, a Judicial Compensation Commission was established in Alberta in 1998 for determining judicial compensation until April 30, 2000. The Association played a part in establishing an agreed framework for the Commission, and presented briefs and evidence to it on judicial salary levels and pensions. The Association obtained a declaration from the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, which was upheld in the Court of Appeal, that an Order in Council giving Judges a smaller salary increase than the Commission had recommended was unconstitutional.
[9] The Association took part in discussions with the Government on the establishment of a second Judicial Compensation Commission to deal with salaries from April 1, 2000 to March 31, 2003. Again, the Association made representations to the Commission on behalf of the Judges.
[10] Since 1994, 90% of the time of the Executive Committee of the Association has been spent on issues relating to judicial compensation, judicial independence and litigation with the Government of Alberta. The Association incurred legal expenses of $1,500,000.00 in connection with these activities.
C. THE TAX COURT'S DECISION [11] The Tax Court Judge held that the Association was an "association" within the meaning of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv), although this is not a term defined by the Income Tax Act. He noted that the words "public servants" were also undefined, but concluded that they did not include members of the judiciary because of judges' constitutional status as independent office holders who are precluded by the Constitution from bargaining over the terms and conditions of work with the Government, the source of their compensation.
[12] The Judge also concluded that, if he was wrong on this point, the primary object of the Association during the relevant period had been the promotion of its members' conditions of employment or work. Accordingly, if they had been public servants, the appellants would have been able to deduct the dues paid to the Association.
D. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
E. ANALYSIS [13] As I have already indicated, the only question to be decided in this appeal is whether, as Judges of the Provincial Court of Alberta, the appellants are "public servants" and the Association to which they have paid the membership dues that they are claiming to deduct is an "association of public servants". This is an issue of statutory interpretation and, as such, the Tax Court Judge's conclusion is reviewable on a standard of correctness.
[14] The appellants say that the Tax Court Judge erred in concluding that they could not be "public servants" because of the independent status of judges under the Constitution. Their counsel submitted that, in interpreting the disputed words, the Judge gave too little weight to their statutory context. Counsel argued that, for the purpose of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv), "public servants" should be construed broadly to mean any one paid from the public purse. Her argument was that judicial independence is not compromised by permitting the appellants, as taxpayers, to deduct dues paid to the Association, which has sought to enhance the terms and conditions of their work, including their independence and compensation.
[15] In contrast, the respondent says that the term "public servants" has a general meaning in both ordinary speech and the law and that, since it is not a specially defined term in the Income Tax Act, its general meaning is an important part of the background against which subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) should be interpreted. Indeed, counsel argued, the statutory context of the Income Tax Act supports the meaning borne by the words "public servants" in other contexts, namely, persons employed in the public service who are subject to supervision and who work under a contract of employment which they negotiate with the Government. As independent office holders who are precluded by the Constitution from labour relations bargaining with the Government over their terms and conditions of work, judges are not public servants.
[16] Before embarking on any exercise of statutory interpretation a court should recall the sentence that the Supreme Court of Canada has often said best captures the approach followed by Canadian courts. It is found in Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
"public servants": ordinary meaning [17] If, instead of "public servants", Parliament had used the words "civil servants", judges would not have been included. Conversely, if Parliament had used the words "public servants or holders of public office" judges might well have been included. However, counsel for the appellants submits, the meaning of "public servants" is less clear cut and could well include judges who are serving the public by administering justice.
[18] In my opinion, however, the balance of the evidence favours the conclusion that, as ordinarily understood, the term "public servants" does not include judges but approximates to "civil servants" or "government employees", not independent office holders. It does not include members of the judicial branch of government which performs its work independently of the executive and legislative branches.
[19] For example, The Canadian Oxford dictionary (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001) defines a public servant as a "government employee, esp. of a federal government". The definition in Merriam-Webster's collegiate dictionary, 10th ed. (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1998) is very similar, namely, "government official or employee". The ITP Nelson Canadian dictionary of the English language: an encyclopedic reference (Toronto: ITP Nelson, 1997) defines "public servant" to mean "civil servant". A somewhat broader range of meanings is reported in Webster's third new international dictionary of the English language (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1986), including "a holder of public office" and "an individual ... rendering public service".
[20] The French text of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) uses the word "fonctionnaires", which is defined in Le nouveau petit Robert: dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1996) as "personne qui remplit une fonction publique; personne qui occupe, en qualité de titulaire, un emploi permanent dans les cadres d'une administration publique (spécialit. l'État)".
[21] Similarly, Le Robert & Collins super senior: grand dictionnaire français-anglais, anglais-français (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert; Glasgow, Great Britain: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000) defines "fonctionnaire" as "state employee; (dans l'administration) [ministère] government official, civil servant; [municipalité] local government officer ou official". This dictionary also notes that, in France, "le service publique" has a wider connotation than "civil service"and includes "teachers, social service staff, post office workers and employees of the French rail service." Despite the variety of the positions in this list, it notably does not include judge.
[22] I do not say that in ordinary speech the words "public servants" or "fonctionnaires" are limited to civil servants, although this may be their paradigm meaning. They are also used more generally to refer to people employed in the public service, more broadly understood. However, the dictionaries do not indicate that judges are included, although I suppose that if asked to categorize judges as either public servants or private employees, a person might well say that they were public servants.
"public servants": general statutory contexts [23] Counsel for the respondent submitted that the general legal meaning of "public servant" may be indicated by its use in other statutes, which show that the term is closely connected to, even if not precisely synonymous with, "civil servant". For example, the Public Service Employment Act, 1966-67, 14-15-16 Eliz. II, c. 71, replaced the Civil Service Act, 1960-61, 9-10 Eliz. II, c.57. As a result, the Civil Service Commission became the Public Service Commission.
[24] The Public Service Commission's power to appoint employees into the public service is analogous to the Civil Service Commission's power to appoint employees into the civil service. Similarly, the Alberta Public Service Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-42, provides for the appointment of employees into the public service. In contrast, the federal government's power to appoint judges is derived from sections 96 and 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Judges' Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, not the Public Service Employment Act. Similarly, the government of Alberta's power to appoint judges is contained in the Provincial Court Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-31, not the province's Public Service Act.
[25] Counsel for the respondent also pointed to the Public Servants Invention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-32, as further evidence that "public servants" normally means "civil servants", and not judges. Thus, "public servant" is defined in section 2 to mean
[26] I agree with these submissions, although I would also observe that the introduction of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) in 1951 preceded the statutory changes in nomenclature from civil to public service, which suggests that Parliament intended to include more than those employed in government departments. It is difficult to say with any precision how far the category of "public servants" was intended to extend beyond the core civil service. Nonetheless, it is not a term that would have been taken to include judges.
[27] I also agree that the fact that both federal and provincial legislation extends to judges some of the benefits provided in public service statutes does not make judges civil or public servants: Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R 673 at 708. Indeed, the express extension of these provisions to judges only serves to emphasize that, in the absence of such a provision, judges are not covered by public service legislation because they are not members of the public service as that term is normally used in statutes.
"public servants": constitutional context [28] Neither the Constitution nor, generally speaking, the jurisprudence interpreting it, expressly and specifically states that judges are, or are not, public servants. The closest is R. v. Campbell (1994), 160 A.R. 81 (Alta. Q.B.), one of the cases in which it was argued that the Alberta Government's reduction of the salaries of Provincial Court judges and the absence of an appropriate mechanism for determining the judges' compensation were incompatible with the constitutional principle of judicial independence. D.C. McDonald, J. was of the view that judges are not public servants. He stated (at 131): In Canada it is inaccurate to refer to a judge as a "public employee" because an employee or, to use legal terminology, a "servant", is subject to the control of his or her employer or "master" as to the manner in which he or she performs his or her duties. A judge is not subject to the control of the Crown (the executive government) or of the legislature as to the manner in which he or she performs his or her judicial functions. This is the essence of judicial independence.
[29] Another suggestive case is Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, in which a member of a provincial regulatory agency, the Public Utilities Board, claimed damages for breach of contract when his office disappeared on the statutory abolition of the agency. Wells had been appointed by Order in Council during good behaviour until the age of 70. Writing for the Court, Major J. said that the employment relationship between the Crown and senior public employees was based on contract to which "the general law of contract will apply unless specifically superseded by explicit terms in the statute or agreement." Major J. concluded that Wells's employment relationship was governed by contract. He said (at paras. 31-32): This is the case for most senior public officers. Exceptions are necessary for judges, ministers of the Crown and others who fulfil constitutionally defined state roles. The terms of their relationship with the state are dictated by the terms and conventions of the Constitution. ...
The fundamental terms and conditions of these relationships cannot be modified by either party, even by agreement. For instance, a judge cannot negotiate his or her salary or other terms of employment. ... These individuals still serve under specified terms. The mechanism for enforcement of those terms is not in contract, but through a declaration of the constitutional guarantees underlying their positions.
[30] Thus, Major J. found in the Constitution the basis of the distinction between the legal relationship to the state of judges and of other "senior public officials", including a member of an administrative agency that enjoys a significant degree of decision-making and operational independence from the Executive. This suggests to me that judges are not readily included in the general category of "public servants".
[31] This point is underscored by judicial statements to the effect that, even though judges are paid from the public purse, their constitutional status means that they are not civil servants: see, for example, Judges Reference at para. 143. However, since the words in dispute in the present appeal are "public servants", these cases only take the analysis so far. Nonetheless, these constitutional principles do form part of the interpretive context. In particular, they support the view that, in the wider legal system in which the Income Tax Act is located, judges are differentiated from public employees.
"public servants": Income Tax Act [32] As I have already indicated, the Income Tax Act does not define the words "public servants". Counsel for the respondent pointed out that in paragraph 250(1)(c) Parliament used the words "officer or servant of Canada", thus indicating that servants do not include officers. However, since "public servants" in subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) is a composite term, paragraph 250(1)(c) is of limited significance.
[33] Counsel for the appellants argued that the definitions in subsection 248(1) of other key terms in subsection 8(1) indicate not only that the Act does not preclude the possibility that a judge can be a public servant, but also that it contemplates it. Thus, since an "employee" includes an "officer", and "office" includes "a judicial office", judges are employees for the purpose of subsection 8(1). Moreover, the "employer" in respect of an officer is defined as the "person from whom the officer receives the officer's remuneration" which, in the case of the appellants, is the Government of Alberta. "Employer" is not defined as the person who controls how the officer performs her or his work. Finally, subsection 248(1) introduces the notion of "service" by defining "employment" as "the position of an individual in the service of some other person (including Her Majesty ... )".
[34] From these definitions and the structure of subsection 8(1), counsel argued that "public servants" must be either employees or officers and that, since "office" includes judicial office, public servants can include judges. Further, since judges are employees by virtue of these definitions they are in "employment" and "serve" Her Majesty. Counsel denied that her argument committed her to the syllogism that since public servants are employees or officers, terms that include judges, all employees or office holders, including judges, are therefore public servants. Rather, she made the more modest claim that, on the wording of the Act, a judge may be a public servant and that the extended definitions contained in subsection 248(1) shake the term "public servants" in subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) free from the grip of its general meaning as excluding judges.
[35] In my opinion, this argument does not significantly advance the appellants' position. To say that judges "serve" the public by administering justice does not necessarily make them "public servants" for the purpose of the Income Tax Act. The definitional gap is not closed. Further, taxpayers claiming a deduction under any of the provisions of subsection 8(1) must establish that they meet the criteria of eligibility. To succeed in their claim under subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv), the appellants must establish that, as judges, they are public servants. It does not seem very useful to say that the Act does not in terms preclude the possibility that judges may fall within the term, "public servants". This still leaves us with the initial question: are judges included in this term?
[36] In my view, the answer to this question does not lie in shuffling the deck of statutory definitions. It is more productive to inquire into the purpose underlying subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv). The deduction has existed in its present form since it was first introduced in 1951: Income Tax Act, S.C. 1948, c. 52, subsection 11(10), as added by S.C. 1951, subsection 3(3). However, counsel were unable to uncover any legislative history in the form of Parliamentary debates, white papers or technical notes explaining the reason for its introduction and its intended scope.
[37] Counsel for the appellants submitted that, as taxpayers and workers, judges should, like others, be entitled to claim legitimate deductions from their income. The underlying rationale of the subparagraph is that taxpayers should not be taxed on that part of their income paid in membership dues to an association to support its activities undertaken to improve the terms and conditions of members' employment. Counsel argued that permitting judges the benefit of the deduction in subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) could not reasonably be said to impair their independence. Accordingly, there was no reason to interpret the term "public servants" narrowly. In exceptional circumstances, a court must resort to the residual presumption by interpreting the Income Tax Act in favour of the taxpayer: Québec (Communauté urbaine) v. Corp. Notre-Dame de Bon-Secours, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 18-20.
[38] In my opinion, however, a purposive approach to the interpretation of the subparagraph does not favour the appellants. First, the broad rationale of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) suggested by counsel for the appellants does not explain why the subparagraph limits eligible membership dues to those paid to "associations of public servants". If the purpose were as broad as counsel suggested, one would have expected subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) to have applied to membership dues paid to any association of employees, whether unionized or not, in both the public and the private sectors which existed to improve its members' terms and conditions of employment. Hence, an interpretation of "public servants" that goes beyond its general meaning cannot be justified by reference to the policy rationale of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) advanced on behalf of the appellants.
[39] Second, the appellants' interpretation of "public servants" ignores the labour relations context of the provision, which is principally concerned to permit the deduction of dues paid to a trade union as defined under either the general federal labour relations statute, or the applicable provincial legislation. It is reasonable to infer from this that, by "associations of public servants", Parliament had in mind associations that, although not certified under federal or provincial labour law as bargaining agents, did in fact negotiate collectively with the employer on behalf of their members fro improvements to their working conditions.
[40] When what is now subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv) was first added to the Income Tax Act, in 1951, most employees of the federal and all provincial governments, except Saskatchewan, were excluded from the collective bargaining regimes created by labour relations statutes. Collective bargaining took place, however, but it was neither regulated not recognized by legislation. Thus, for instance, collective bargaining in the federal public service took place in the National Joint Council, a body consisting of representatives of federal government staff associations and senior government officials that had been created in 1944 to advise the Treasury Board on working conditions in the federal public service: see J. Finkelman and S. Goldenberg, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Montreal Institute for Research on Public Policy: Montreal, 1993) at 5-9.
[41] Even today, most jurisdictions in Canada exclude government employees from general labour relations statutes. For example, the definition of "trade union" in section 3 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. c. L-2, is as follows:
[42] While this is broad enough to cover associations of public servants, section 6 provides that Part I of the Code, which includes section 3, does not apply to employment by Her Majesty. Consequently, the words "employers" and "employees" in the definition of "trade union" in section 3 do not include employees of Her Majesty or Her Majesty. Therefore, "trade union" in subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv)(A) of the Income Tax Act does not include an organization of employees of the federal Crown. Their membership dues are therefore deductible as paid to an "association of public servants" that satisfies the criteria of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv).
[43] Similar, but not identical language was used in the original version of this provision: Income Tax Act, S.C. 1948, c. 52, subparagraph 11(10)(d)(i), as added by S.C. 1951, c. 51, subsection 3(3). The federal labour legislation then in force, the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 152, paragraph 2(1)(r), contained a definition of "trade union" similar to that now in the Code. Section 55 excluded organizations of federal civil servants from the definition of "trade unions" by providing that, with certain exceptions, Part I did not apply to "Her Majesty in right of Canada or employees of her Majesty in right of Canada".
[44] Provincial labour relations legislation also typically excludes the public service: see, for example, the Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1, paragraph 1(x) and subsection 4(2). Separate statutory regimes govern collective labour relations in the public service of both Canada and the provinces: see, for example, Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P- 35; Public Service Employee Relations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-43.
[45] In contrast, judges are constitutionally prohibited from bargaining with the government that pays them the terms and conditions under which they work. This point was made in the passage from Wells quoted at paragraph 29 of these reasons, and in the Judges' Reference case (at paras. 186-87): [N]egotiations for remuneration from the public purse are indelibly political. For the judiciary to engage in salary negotiations would undermine public confidence in the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, and thereby frustrate a major purpose of section11(d) [of the Charter].
The appearance of independence would be lost, because salary negotiations bring with them a whole set of expectations about the behaviour of the parties to the negotiations which are inimical to judicial independence. The major expectation is of give and take. ... [T]he reasonable person might conclude that judges would alter the manner in which they adjudicate in order to curry favour with the executive ... [T]he reasonable person might expect that judges would adjudicate in such a manner so as to exert pressure on the Crown.
[46] As a result of the constitutional ban on compensation negotiations between judges and their "employer", the Court mandated the creation of judicial compensation commissions to make recommendations to the government. The Alberta Provincial Judges' Association was active in the design of the first two Alberta commissions, made representations to them on behalf of its members and instituted litigation challenging the constitutionality of the government's rejection of the first commission's recommendations.
[47] In my view, however, these activities are so far removed from the familiar patterns of collective bargaining over pay and conditions between trades unions and employers that I cannot attribute to Parliament an intention to include judges' associations in the words "association of public servants". Indeed, in the Judges' Reference case, (at para. 188) Lamer C. J. expressly distinguished the "horse-trading" that takes place between the parties in the course of labour relations bargaining from expressions of concern and representations by chief justices and chief judges of courts, or by representative organizations such as the Canadian Judicial Council, the Canadian Judges Conference, and the Association of Provincial Court Judges, on the adequacy of current levels of remuneration. Those representations merely provide information and cannot, as a result, be said to pose a danger to judicial independence.
[48] I do not think that the advent of judicial compensation commissions has significantly eroded this distinction. Given the labour relations context of subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv), it would be incongruous to find in the same category, namely, "public servants", two fundamentally different groups of workers: those who may bargain over terms and conditions of employment or work and those who are constitutionally precluded from such activities.
F. CONCLUSIONS [49] For these reasons, I am satisfied that the Tax Court Judge was correct to interpret the words "association of public servants the primary object of which is to promote the improvement in the members' conditions of employment or work, ..." as inapplicable to the Alberta Provincial Judges' Association since judges are not "public servants" for this purpose.
[50] The term "public servants" has a general meaning in both ordinary speech and the law which does not include judges and which fits comfortably with the purpose and context of the provision of the Income Tax Act under consideration here. Accordingly, the appellants were not entitled to deduct from their income in the tax years 1996 and 1997 their membership dues in the Association under subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iv).
[51] I would dismiss the appeals with costs.
"John M. Evans" J.A.
"I agree Marshall Rothstein J.A."
"I agree B. Malone J.A." FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-195-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: Douglas L. Crowe v. Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF HEARING: Calgary, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: April 2, 2003
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: Evans J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: Rothstein J.A. Malone J.A.
DATED: April 17, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Dr. Sheilah L. Martin, Q.C. FOR THE APPELLANT
Mr. William L. Softley Ms. Brooke E. Sittler (Dept. Of Justice - Edmonton) FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
CODE HUNTER LLP, Calgary, AB. FOR THE APPELLANT
Morris A. Rosenburg Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE RESPONDENT FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-196-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: Kenneth A. Cush v. Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF HEARING: Calgary, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: April 2, 2003
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: Evans J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY: Rothstein J.A. Malone J.A.
DATED: April 17, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Dr. Sheilah L. Martin, Q.C. FOR THE APPELLANT
Mr. William L. Softley Ms. Brooke E. Sittler (Dept. Of Justice - Edmonton) FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
CODE HUNTER LLP, Calgary, AB. FOR THE APPELLANT
Morris A. Rosenburg Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE RESPONDENT |
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