Canada Gazette

Aviation security remains a primary concern for the Government of Canada and is one of the major priorities identified in Canada's National Security Policy. In this context, protecting passengers is a key objective of Transport Canada. The proposed Identity Screening Regulations (IS Regulations) are required to implement a new program, Passenger Protect, to enhance the security of air transportation. Enhanced aviation security will be achieved through the accurate screening of passengers for persons who pose an immediate threat to aviation security, the effective co-delivery and compliance by air carriers so that a specified person who is identified through the screening process is denied boarding pursuant to an emergency direction, a public awareness campaign to help passengers understand the requirements of the program and an efficient mechanism that addresses complaints in a fair and timely manner.

The proposed IS Regulations will require air passengers who appear to be 12 years of age or older to present either one piece of government-issued photo identification or two non-photo pieces of government-issued identification before being allowed to board an aircraft. This will allow the air carrier and Transport Canada to confirm the identity of the passenger and the Minister or an authorized official to issue an emergency direction denying boarding to individuals who pose an immediate threat to aviation security, that is, to any aircraft or aerodrome or other aviation facility, or to the safety of the public, passengers or crew members. Requesting identification would be consistent with procedures currently used by airlines today and, therefore, would not represent a significant departure or expense.

The Passenger Protect Program adds an additional layer to address threats to civil aviation. Terrorist groups continue to target civil aviation and seek means to defeat existing security initiatives. Passenger Protect envisages using a watch list as a tool to enhance aviation security. Watch lists are widely used in a border security context. Passenger Protect applies this security feature to air travel.

The Public Safety Act, 2002, which received Royal Assent on May 6, 2004, made several changes to the Aeronautics Act (referred to hereafter as the Act). The Act gives the Minister of Transport new powers and legislative tools to enhance aviation security:

The proposed Regulations would apply in respect of the following passenger-carrying flights if the passengers are screened before boarding for weapons, explosive substances, incendiary devices or their components, or other dangerous items that could be used to jeopardize the security of an aerodrome or an aircraft:

Subpart 5 of Part VII of the Canadian Aviation Regulations applies in respect of the operation by a Canadian air operator, in an air transport service or in aerial work involving sightseeing operations, of an aeroplane that has a maximum certificated take-off weight of more than 8 618 kg (19 000 pounds) or for which a Canadian type certificate has been issued authorizing the transport of 20 or more passengers; a helicopter that has a seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, of 20 or more; or any aircraft that is authorized by the Minister to be operated under this Subpart.

If the aircraft involved meets the types identified above, the following table illustrates when the proposed IS Regulations would have to be applied by the air carrier:

^* PBS = Pre-board screening of passengers for weapons, explosive substances, incendiary devices or their components or other dangerous items that could be used to jeopardize the security of an aerodrome or an aircraft

In carrying out section 4.81 of the Act, Transport Canada would work closely with Canadian law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify "specified persons," persons who have been assessed to pose an immediate threat to aviation security. The Minister, or a designated officer of the Department, would determine who these "specified persons" are. Air carriers would be able to identify specified persons through a secure online system.

A boarding pass is defined to include a ticket or other document that is both accepted by an air carrier and approved by an aerodrome operator as confirmation of the holder's status as a passenger on a flight. A self-printed boarding pass is one printed by the passenger—for example, using a home computer.

In practical terms, passengers checking in could expect the following examples of events to occur if the proposed IS Regulations are implemented:

(a) If the name of the passenger does not match the name of a specified person, the system would allow the person to print a boarding pass and the passenger could proceed.

(b) If the name of the passenger matches the name of a specified person, the system should not allow the person to print a boarding pass. In such a case, the air carrier could indicate to the passenger that there is an issue with the booking and designate a time and place to resolve the identification issue.

(a) An agent of the air carrier screens persons who appear to be 12 years of age or older before issuing a boarding pass by comparing each person's name with the names of specified persons.

(b) If the person's name matches the name of a specified person, the agent would request one piece of government-issued photo identification that shows the person's name, date of birth and gender or two pieces of government-issued identification at least one of which shows the person's name, date of birth and gender.

(c) If an individual presents identification with a name, date of birth and gender not matching those of a specified person, an agent of the air carrier would issue a boarding pass and the passenger could proceed.

(d) If an individual presents identification with a name, date of birth and gender matching those of a specified person, an agent of the air carrier would immediately contact Transport Canada.

(e) In cases where Transport Canada is informed of a match, Transport Canada would take further steps to verify that the person reported and the specified person is the same person.

(f) In the case of a positive match, emergency directions may be issued: one to the air carrier directing it not to allow the person to board, and one directing the person not to board.

(g) An agent of the air carrier would inform the person of the emergency directions and provide the person denied boarding with information to contact Transport Canada.

(h) Using this information, the person could obtain clarification or reconsideration of the decision.

(a) If the name of the person does not match the name of a specified person, the kiosk would print a boarding pass and the person could proceed.

(b) If the name of the person matches the name of a specified person, the kiosk should not print a boarding pass. In such a case, the person would have to check in at the counter.

With respect to the standard for government identification, the air carrier must either ask for one piece of government-issued photo identification that shows a name, date of birth and gender or for two pieces of government-issued identification, at least one of which shows a name, date of birth and gender. The date of birth and gender are required to reduce the risk of false positives. Two pieces of non-photo government identification would be accepted as an alternative as Transport Canada recognizes that not all passengers flying within Canada will have government-issued photo identification. Passengers may still be required by air carriers to carry government-issued photo identification for international flights, however, depending on the laws and regulations of the foreign destination.

An advisory group would convene as required to receive and review intelligence on persons who are assessed by the originators of this intelligence to pose an immediate threat to aviation security, should they board an aircraft. The advisory group, working with the benefit of legal advice, would be responsible for ensuring that the information supporting a designation for a specified person is accurate, up to date and as complete as possible. The advisory group would make recommendations to the Minister concerning the designation of individuals, or the removal of the designation.

The assessment of whether an individual poses an immediate threat to aviation security would have to include an evaluation of whether there is a reasonable expectation that the person would commit an act of unlawful interference in civil aviation should they be permitted to board an aircraft. The act of unlawful interference would constitute an offence under the Canadian Criminal Code. Assessments will be done on a case-by-case basis using public and classified information. Classified information will flow from the CSIS, which collects information based on the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and from the RCMP, which collects information based on the Criminal Code.

Under the Passenger Protect Program, CSIS and the RCMP would collect and use information, and receive intelligence from foreign and multilateral intelligence and law enforcement agencies on individuals who might pose an immediate threat to aviation security. Pursuant to privacy requirements, memoranda of understanding between CSIS, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency and Transport Canada will be concluded to facilitate the exchange of intelligence with Transport Canada for the purpose of identifying specified persons and protecting the personal information of Canadians.

The Minister would form an opinion on whether an individual poses an immediate threat based on information provided by the advisory group. The information on each individual will be considered on its own merits and an individual denied access to an aircraft on the basis of a specified person designation will have access to a reconsideration mechanism.

Transport Canada will hold, control and manage the names of specified persons. The composition of the advisory group may differ from case to case, depending on circumstances, but could include a senior officer of CSIS, a senior officer of the RCMP, a manager from Transport Canada's Intelligence Branch, other Transport Canada officials, as required, and representatives from any other relevant Canadian government department or agency, as required.

The ability to act quickly in emergency situations is an important aspect of the Passenger Protect Program. For example, it may be necessary in some cases for the Minister, or an officer designated by the Minister, to issue an emergency direction to stop an individual from boarding an aircraft before the individual has been designated a specified person. The advisory group should be able to rapidly assess available information and make recommendations to the Minister, or a designated official, to add or to remove a name.

Designating persons as specified persons would be a dynamic process, with reconsideration based on intelligence information. Transport Canada will review specified persons information as required, or at least every 30 days.

An individual who has been specified may trigger the issuance by Transport Canada of two emergency directions: one to the air carrier directing it not to allow the person to board, and one directing the person not to board. The emergency direction for the air carrier will be provided prior to flight. The air carrier will inform the individual that an emergency direction has been issued and, when possible, indicate how the individual can contact Transport Canada to get a copy of the emergency direction and provide guidance on how to pursue a review or reconsideration.

Steps have been taken in designing the process to minimize the risk of false matches of persons with the same or similar names to someone on the list. Using in-person identification, providing a date of birth to air carriers and requiring Transport Canada to make the no-board determination will all reduce the risk of false positive matches. However, should such a situation arise, passengers may seek recourse when an emergency direction is issued due to a mistake at some stage of the process. In a case where there is a mistake and an emergency direction has been issued to a false positive, once the individual notifies Transport Canada and confirms that they are not the person who had been specified, the Department will work with the individual and the air carrier to solve the problem as soon as possible. The nature of the problem will be investigated and follow-up action will be taken, including a notation indicating that a false positive exists for a particular name. The individual will be contacted, informed of the error, and advised how to avoid misidentification on future flights.

Specified persons who attempt to board a flight and receive an emergency direction may, if they object to this decision, pursue an internal review or reconsideration of their case. The first step would be a submission for reconsideration within 30 days to Transport Canada's Office of Reconsideration (OOR), which would review the application and validate the information through appropriate sources. The goal is to provide a non-judicial, efficient mechanism for any member of the public to have their case reviewed by persons independent of those who made the original recommendation.

Once the OOR confirms the identity of the individual and that they have been assessed as posing an immediate threat to aviation security, the file would be forwarded to an independent external advisor. The advisor would be tasked with reviewing the decision to place a person on the list. A report would be prepared for the OOR for consideration by the Minister, or a designated officer of the Department. If the OOR recommends that the individual retain their designation as a specified person, and the Minister concurs, Transport Canada will send a letter to the applicant advising of the decision. If the OOR recommends that the specified person designation be revoked, and the Minister or a designated officer of the Department agrees, this would be done and the individual would be informed of the decision.

The OOR would utilize the services of a small number of Transport Canada officials with security clearances. The OOR will make use of external independent advisors with security clearances that would be called in to review reconsideration cases. Other OOR functions would include keeping records about complaints received, managing the reconsideration requests so they are dealt with in a timely manner, and responding to correspondence from, or concerns expressed by, the public. The OOR will regularly report publicly on its activities, while maintaining the confidentiality of specific information.

The intent of the OOR is to provide the public with an efficient and non-legal means of review. However, individuals would also have the option of complaining to the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP (CPC), or the Canadian Human Rights Commission, where the request would be handled according to normal procedures. Individuals have the further option of taking the case to Federal Court for judicial review.

The proposed IS Regulations would come into force for domestic flights starting on the date they are registered. This is anticipated in early 2007. As many more Canadians fly domestically than internationally, Canada will realize enhanced security for a majority of air travelers as soon as possible. In the second phase, the proposed Regulations are anticipated to come into force for international flights to and from Canada, operated by foreign and Canadian carriers, later in 2007.

The advantage of maintaining the status quo lies in avoiding regulation and enforcement, and consequent costs. The disadvantage is that in the absence of a regulatory framework ensuring that individuals who pose an immediate threat to passengers and the public are denied boarding, international commitments for passenger assessment will not be achieved and the beneficial effects of the program will be lost. Accordingly, this option was rejected.

The advantage of a voluntary program lies in avoiding much regulation and enforcement, keeping costs to Government low. However, in the absence of a regulatory framework to support the program, there is a low confidence that all air carriers would achieve full compliance. In addition, some resources would still be required to ensure that the voluntary program was fully implemented, so costs to Transport Canada would be the same as for the program in option 3, with much lower effectiveness. As this option was not considered to provide a meaningful enhancement of aviation security, this option was rejected.

The Passenger Protect initiative, with the proposed IS Regulations, has the advantages of enhancing aviation security in a manner that is consistent with international practices and developments, of respecting the privacy of Canadians and of avoiding an undue burden on industry. In addition, the program would be a significant step toward achieving the goal of developing a comparable approach to passenger assessment, which the Security and Prosperity Partnership identified as a milestone for improved aviation security. Although there are costs associated with the program, these are not significant when compared to benefits. Accordingly, adoption of this option is recommended.

There are a number of benefits to the proposed IS Regulations. First, they will reduce the risk of an aviation security incident. While it is difficult to quantify the reduction in risk that would result from the implementation of the proposed IS Regulations, security authorities in foreign governments and international organizations have identified similar programs as essential security tools. The Canadian Border Services Agency and its predecessors have identified hundreds of individuals representing a serious threat to Canada's security through a program that identifies specific individuals.

In the worst case, an aviation security incident could result in a similarly devastating loss of life, destruction of property and damage to the environment as occurred during the attacks of September 11, 2001. Impacts to the Canadian economy could be expected to be direct and indirect. Indirect impacts are measured by the impacts one economic sector has on others through its demands on those sectors' goods and services as inputs for its own production processes.

In 2004, Canadian commercial aviation industries accounted for $3.78 billion (all figures in 1997 dollars), or approximately 0.4% of gross domestic product. International air commodity trade totalled $79 billion. Over all modes of transportation, Canada's commodity trade with the United States totalled $557 billion.

Based on the events of September 11, 2001, it could be anticipated that a major aviation security incident could result in a shutdown of the aviation sector, with major impacts on other modes of transportation. This would impact passenger volumes, which could then take two to three years to return to previous levels. This would also impact airports, as carriers would adjust flights to reflect lower demand levels, as well as NAV CANADA. It is also reasonable to expect that there would be significant new expenses to government and industry to satisfy the requirements of international partners. A minor incident, such as use of the Canadian aviation system as a conduit by persons representing a threat to international aviation security, could have impacts ranging from a partial shutdown of the aviation sector to a complete shutdown.

Benefits to the program could include increased passenger confidence in aviation transportation and greater efficiency in identifying immediate threats to aviation security, thus increasing security overall. The relative security benefit of the program is even greater for flights to Canada from some foreign countries where other aviation security standards, such as physical screening, are weaker than standards in Canada.

The cost to the Government of Canada for the implementation of the IS Regulations and the Passenger Protect Program are $13.8 million over five years, and $2.9 million per year ongoing. Implementation expenses include policy and regulatory development, maintenance of data pertaining to specified persons, negotiation and implementation of memoranda of understanding with air carriers, awareness campaigns, training, oversight of air carriers and the establishment of a 24-7 capacity to receive calls and respond, and maintenance of the OOR.

Costs to air carriers are expected to be low and are accepted by the industry. Cost will include establishment of communications links to Transport Canada, follow-on computer software adjustments, time required to check passenger names against the names of specified persons, and to resolve possible matches.

Costs to aerodrome operators are expected to be negligible, as the low number of expected occurrences should not require increases to police response capabilities at aerodromes.

While it is impossible to precisely determine the costs and benefits to a security program such as Passenger Protect, the importance of the aviation industry, the modest cost of the program and the consequences of a failure in aviation security clearly indicate that the costs of the program are far outweighed by the benefits. The catastrophic human, economic and environmental consequences of a serious aviation transportation security incident would extend far beyond the aviation sector, affecting road, rail and marine transportation, as well as cross-border trade with the United States.

Transport Canada completed a preliminary environmental scan to determine whether important environmental effects (positive and adverse) are likely at a strategic or conceptual level as a result of the proposed Regulations. Results of the scan indicate that the proposed IS Regulations are not likely to result in adverse environmental effects, and as such, none of the regulatory provisions would require a substantial environmental assessment under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.

A key indirect positive outcome for the environment can be expected from the reduction in the risk of a major security breach or event (e.g. terrorist attack) with catastrophic environmental and human consequences. Overall, any hardships experienced by persons are considered minimal compared to the national interest in protecting passengers on aircraft, employees and members of the public from the potential devastating consequences of the acts of terrorism, and from potential sabotage or other acts, accidents, or other incidents of a similar nature.

In accordance with the Privacy Impact Assessment Policy of the Treasury Board of Canada, a privacy impact assessment (PIA) was conducted to identify the privacy- and security-related risks that are associated with its operation of the Passenger Protect Program and find ways to mitigate those risks. In addition, the observations and recommendations of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada were considered during the PIA process and addressed by Transport Canada in the design of the program.

Mitigation strategies for risks identified by the PIA have been identified and have been implemented, are in the process of being implemented, or will be implemented at the appropriate stage of program development. Of note,

The proposed IS Regulations are consistent with the principles of Smart Regulation in minimizing the regulatory burden on Canadians as much as possible, while reducing the risk of threats to the aviation transportation system. Transport Canada has consulted with industry and union representatives and other federal government departments and agencies during the development of the proposed Regulations. Where areas of concern have arisen, they have received full consideration (see the consultation section below for details). The program has been developed keeping in mind to the greatest extent possible legal, privacy, and security considerations.

The proposed Regulations were developed based on feedback from consultations with the public via focus groups and meetings with interested groups, such as civil liberties groups, community groups, industry groups, and multilateral groups, such as the Advisory Group on Aviation Security.

Criteria for designation as a specified person: Some stakeholders expressed a desire that the criteria designating an individual as a specified person should be made public, to increase transparency and alleviate public concerns. Transport Canada will provide a public statement on the criteria to be used. This will assure stakeholders and the public that the criteria will be based on the Act and that only individuals who have been determined to be an immediate threat to aviation security can be designated.

Comparing passenger names with those of specified persons: Some industry stakeholders indicated that it was important for them to be able to compare names of passengers with those of specified persons as early in the ticketing process as possible, while others were concerned that matching names too early in the ticketing process could lead to mistakes due to the lack of in-person verification of identity. Airlines will have the option of checking names at the time of ticket purchase if they wish. However, Transport Canada will only issue an emergency direction close to the time of flight, as required by the Act.

Notification: It was asked whether Transport Canada could inform individuals who had been identified as a specified person. As noted above, Transport Canada explored with air carriers the options available to inform specified individuals who have entered the ticketing process that they will not be permitted to board an aircraft. However, there are several impediments to advance notification of persons who are not in the ticketing process. For specified individuals not living in Canada, it would be difficult to locate and inform such persons. In cases where the background information is classified or there is a warrant, it would not be possible to notify the individual. The Privacy Act may also limit the information that could be disclosed, including information that was received from other agencies. The Department believes that by publishing the criteria to be used for listing, the public will be well informed as to the reasons for being placed on the list.

Notification of the RCMP: Stakeholders inquired why it would be necessary to contact the RCMP National Operations Centre when no crime is being committed. Transport Canada responded that the RCMP plays a central role in the National Counter-terrorism Plan. In addition, under the Act, the RCMP is permitted to disclose information about the identification of an individual who has been designated a specified person, while Transport Canada is not.

Policing costs: Aerodrome operators believe that the program may increase demands on the police to respond to the potential increase in airline personnel's requests for police response when an emergency direction is issued and are concerned that they will incur the associated policing costs. Transport Canada does not believe that the frequency of incidents will place a significant additional demand on police response capability at airports.

Police response: Unions are concerned about worker safety and have noted the need for a police response when there is a confirmed specified person. Transport Canada agrees that if a worker has any concerns about safety related to the issuing of an emergency direction, a police presence should be requested in the same way that it would be for other issues and incidents that would require a police presence. Further, in the case of a confirmed match, Transport Canada will be contacting the RCMP.

Denial of boarding: There were inquiries on the process of denying access to aircraft. Transport Canada indicated that airlines are already denying boarding on various grounds but that if airlines wished, they could request a security or police presence.

Liability: Industry stakeholders were concerned about false positives and the responsibility for such errors. Transport Canada assured them that identifications would be based on more than name alone. With communication between the air carrier and the Transport Canada program officer possible on a 24-hour basis, few errors are expected.

Further consultation and awareness: Through a series of meetings commencing in 2004, Transport Canada has discussed the proposed program with air carriers and their representative organization, the Air Transport Association of Canada. Beginning in August 2005, further discussions and consultations with additional stakeholders have been undertaken and will continue as Transport Canada advances its work towards implementing Passenger Protect for domestic flights (Phase I) and international flights (Phase II). Examples of stakeholders included in consultations are labour unions, police of local jurisdiction, civil liberties and community groups, additional air carriers such as foreign air carriers, and foreign governments. A public awareness campaign is planned as part of the implementation of the Passenger Protect Program. In addition, awareness and training material will be developed to train air carrier personnel.

Transport Canada would be relying upon air carriers to implement the proposed IS Regulations. To ensure that roles and responsibilities are fully understood, memoranda of understanding will be developed and signed with air carriers.

Air carriers may call upon police agencies of local jurisdiction for security assurance at the time the news of the emergency direction is delivered to the individual.

Under the Act, contraventions of the Act and the proposed IS Regulations may be enforced by prosecution in the criminal courts or by the taking of administrative enforcement action. Under section 7.6 of the Act, relevant sections of the proposed IS Regulations may in future be designated as carrying an administrative monetary penalty if contravened.

Transport Canada will implement work to ensure that the Passenger Protect Program is fair, equitable and effective. The program involves graduated and progressively more severe actions concerning non-compliance. Voluntary compliance by the regulated aviation community is the preferred approach and the main objective of the program. Prosecutions will be reserved for the most serious cases. In this regard, it should be noted that Transport Canada would not hesitate to consider prosecution as a first response for serious contraventions, especially those contraventions that are committed wilfully or that threaten the security of air transportation.

Jim Marriott, Director, Regulatory Affairs — Security, Transport Canada, 330 Sparks Street, Place de Ville, Tower C, 13th Floor, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0N5, 613-990-5520 (telephone), 613-996-6381 (fax), marrioj@tc.gc.ca (email).

Notice is hereby given that the Governor in Council, pursuant to sections 4.71 (see footnote a) and 4.9 (see footnote b) of the Aeronautics Act, proposes to make the annexed Identity Screening Regulations.

Interested persons may make representations to the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities concerning the proposed Regulations within 75 days after the date of publication of this notice. All representations must be in writing and cite the Canada Gazette, Part I, and the date of publication of this notice and be sent to Jim Marriott, Director, Regulatory Affairs — Security, Transport Canada, Place de Ville, Tower C, 13th Floor, 330 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0N5 (tel.: 613-990-5520; fax: 613-996-6381; e-mail: marrioj@tc.gc.ca).

Persons making representations should identify any of those representations the disclosure of which should be refused under the Access to Information Act, in particular under sections 19 and 20 of that Act, and should indicate the reasons why and the period during which the representations should not be disclosed. They should also identify any representations for which there is consent to disclosure for the purposes of that Act.

"boarding pass" includes a ticket or other document that is both accepted by an air carrier and approved by an aerodrome operator as confirmation of the holder's status as a passenger on a flight. (carte d'embarquement)

2. These Regulations apply in respect of the following passengercarrying flights if the passengers are screened before boarding for weapons, explosive substances, incendiary devices or their components or other dangerous items that could be used to jeopardize the security of an aerodrome or an aircraft:

(a) domestic flights that depart from aerodromes listed in the schedule to the CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations and are conducted by air carriers under Subpart 5 of Part VII of the Canadian Aviation Regulations; and

(b) international flights that depart from or will arrive at aerodromes listed in the schedule to the CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations and are conducted by air carriers

(i) under Subpart 1 of Part VII of the Canadian Aviation Regulations using aircraft that have a maximum certificated take-off weight (MCTOW) of more than 8 618 kg (19,000 pounds) or have a seating configuration, excluding crew seats, of 20 or more, or

(ii) under Subpart 5 of Part VII of the Canadian Aviation Regulations.

3. (1) An air carrier shall, before issuing a boarding pass to any person who appears to be 12 years of age or older, screen the person by comparing his or her name with the names of persons specified to the air carrier by the Minister under paragraph 4.81(1)(b) of the Act.

(2) If the name of the person is the same as that of a person specified to the air carrier, the air carrier shall ask the person for one piece of government-issued photo identification that shows his or her name, date of birth and gender or for two pieces of government-issued identification at least one of which shows his or her name, date of birth and gender.

(3) If the name, date of birth and gender on the identification are the same as those of a person specified to the air carrier, the air carrier shall immediately so inform the Minister.

4. An air carrier shall not allow a person to print a boarding pass at a kiosk or off the Internet if the person's name is the same as that of a person specified to the air carrier by the Minister under paragraph 4.81(1)(b) of the Act.

5. (1) An air carrier shall, at a boarding gate, screen any person who appears to be 12 years of age or older by asking the person for one piece of government-issued photo identification that shows his or her name, date of birth and gender or for two pieces of government-issued identification at least one of which shows his or her name, date of birth and gender.

(2) If the name on the identification is not the same as the name on the person's boarding pass, the air carrier shall compare the name, date of birth and gender on the identification with those of persons specified to the air carrier by the Minister under paragraph 4.81(1)(b) of the Act.

(3) If the name, date of birth and gender on the identification are the same as those of a person specified to the air carrier, the air carrier shall immediately so inform the Minister.

6. If an air carrier informs the Minister that the name, date of birth and gender on the identification of a person being screened are the same as those of a person specified to the air carrier by the Minister under paragraph 4.81(1)(b) of the Act, the air carrier shall provide the Minister with an e-mail address and fax number to which the Minister can send emergency directions respecting the person.

7. If an emergency direction is made in respect of a person specified to an air carrier by the Minister under paragraph 4.81(1)(b) of the Act, the Minister shall provide the air carrier with contact information for the Department of Transport's Office of Reconsideration and the air carrier shall make that contact information available to the person.

8. If an air carrier informs the Minister that the name, date of birth and gender on the identification of a person being screened are the same as those of a person specified to the air carrier by the Minister under paragraph 4.81(1)(b) of the Act, the screening is not completed until the Minister or a person authorized by the Minister under section 4.77 of the Act makes an emergency direction or informs the air carrier that an emergency direction will not be made.

9. (1) If the Minister specifies a person to an air carrier under paragraph 4.81(1)(b) of the Act, no person shall disclose any information respecting the specified person that was provided to the air carrier by the Minister for the purposes of these Regulations including the specified person's name, date of birth, gender and the fact that he or she was specified.

(2) The air carrier shall ensure that access to information respecting the specified person is restricted to air carrier employees, agents or contractors who require that access to carry out their duties.

10. (1) These Regulations, except paragraph 2(b), come into force on the day on which they are registered.