




National  
Defence

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# CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

*April 1992*

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Canada

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**CANADIAN  
DEFENCE POLICY  
1992**


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## INTRODUCTION

The past few years have marked a turning point in global affairs. The world in which Canada must seek its security has undergone profound changes. As a result, many of the assumptions which underpinned our security policy for over forty years are no longer valid. On the one hand, seemingly durable regimes have collapsed; old, now unfamiliar countries have reappeared on our maps; democracy has spread to areas where many despaired ever to see it bloom; and disputes long thought intractable are finding solutions. On the other hand, significant uncertainties accompany the rapid and far-reaching social, economic and political transformations of the international scene, and new sources of regional conflict and global instability surface with disconcerting regularity.

The whirlwind of contemporary events is having a major impact on Canada's security interests. Today, the number of certainties is far outweighed by the number of uncertainties. The new world is at once a safer and more volatile place. Faced with these challenges, the Government decided to elaborate a new framework for Canadian defence. Its broad outline and key features were announced on 17 September 1991, and this Statement's purpose is to provide a fuller account of the policy, taking into account the impact of the 1992 federal budget. It sketches in some detail the realistic, prudent, and affordable plans that will enable the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to carry out their responsibilities beyond the turn of the century. Future Annual Statements will likewise allow for additional course corrections. They will also provide the Government with a flexible vehicle to acquaint Parliament and Canadians with adjustments to our defence policy in the years ahead.



Marcel Masse

Minister of National Defence

April 1992

## I - INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The international environment in which Canada seeks its security and prosperity has changed dramatically in the recent past. For Canadian defence policy, the most significant of all recent international developments are undoubtedly the changes that have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the whole, the trend has been encouraging, although the transition to more democratic societies has been accompanied by political and economic instability which could lead to wider conflict.

The new defence policy announced last September recognized that the general improvement in East-West relations was brought about by changes in Soviet foreign policy. Accelerating reform in the Soviet Union, along with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from former satellite countries, resulted in a significant reduction in the conventional threat to NATO in Europe. Political uncertainty and the significant potential for increased instability in Eastern Europe, as shown by the failed coup in the Soviet Union, called for caution. The policy also suggested that the course of reform could eventually change the fundamental nature of the Soviet Union itself.

This prediction has been borne out by the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union as a political entity. The future of the Commonwealth of Independent States remains unclear, but political power has been ceded to newly independent states. Another important development was the pledge of the Commonwealth of Independent States to fulfil international obligations in respect of current treaties and agreements signed by the Soviet Union. The precise fate of the Soviet military apparatus remains uncertain, but with conventional force reductions and decentralized control, these forces can no longer be said to pose a cohesive and immediate threat to the rest of Europe. Moreover, the threat once posed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal is also being significantly reduced as a result of Russian decisions to reciprocate American unilateral initiatives. There is no doubt, however, that even after all current and anticipated arms reduction agreements have been implemented, Russian strategic forces will continue to possess a very potent arsenal.

The disintegration of the Soviet empire is only one of many events that have accelerated the transformation of the world. New as well as long-submerged forces are today stirring bright hopes and dark fears. Some are benign; others could be destabilizing.

Nationalism is in the ascendant. It can be a powerful, constructive force. Yet, as ancient nations reappear, ethnic hatreds also rekindle the violent confrontations of earlier eras. Ironically, even as nationalism reshapes the borders of Central and Eastern Europe, the nations of the continent's western half are foregoing sovereign prerogatives in the interest of greater economic



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efficiency and political stability. At their historic December 1991 meeting in Maastricht, European Community leaders agreed to further monetary integration and increased cooperation in security and defence matters.

The adoption of a broader approach to national and global security, brought about by international concern over such issues as the environment, population growth and the availability of critical resources, is a clear factor of stability. The inability of any one state on its own to solve these problems encourages greater cooperation and joint problem-solving across frontiers. Yet the same issues can also be divisive. Cross-border pollution and overfishing are major international irritants. Third World demographic pressures and increasing flows of migrants and refugees are fuelling fear, discontent and a resurgence of right-wing ideologies in Europe.

Religion is once again becoming a source of tension and division in various parts of the world. Fundamentalist solutions of one sort or another are seen as tempting alternatives to a failed past and a bleak future, particularly where experimentation with democracy and free-market economics have failed to achieve anticipated gains. In the Muslim world, where fundamentalism has long been one of the main vehicles for opponents to authoritarian rule, it is gaining strength both as a result and in the face of political liberalization and continuing economic difficulties. At times, separate trends come to reinforce each other; concerns and fears across the Mediterranean are fed by the rise of extreme ideologies on both shores.

The globalization of the economic system and the integration of markets in Europe, North America and elsewhere are the result of both international cooperation and the promotion of various national interests. Often, they require major adjustments. The difficulties encountered in the latest round of negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have underscored how painful these trade-offs can be and why some key governments have been unable to accept the solutions proposed so far. Where interests cannot be reconciled, trade issues may come to play a more prominent role in shaping international alignments.

Another concern is the widening gulf between the developed and developing worlds. The clash of ideas, cultures and economies, while no longer predicated on superpower rivalry, is continuing in a more varied and unpredictable form. The challenge is to overcome differences without resorting to force, through existing and possibly new instruments of multilateralism and cooperation.

In this respect, Canada continues to view NATO as an engine of peaceful change towards a new order of stability in Europe. Our willingness to make forces available to NATO, in the event of a crisis or war, underscores our intention to remain closely engaged in European security issues. At the same

time, NATO provides a framework for discussion with the new states to the East on how to achieve the objective of a Europe whole and free.

The end of the division of the world into East and West has provided more scope for the United Nations and other organizations to function more effectively. In the years just before the Gulf War, reduced tensions between Washington and Moscow allowed the UN to record significant achievements -- in Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Namibia, Haiti and Cambodia. The eviction of Iraq from Kuwait was a far greater success for collective security under the auspices of the UN: it restored faith in the ability of the world community to uphold the principles contained in the UN Charter through collective action. Heightened expectations will be difficult to meet, but they have been sustained by recent accomplishments: in the last few days of 1991, the Secretary General helped work out a negotiated solution to twelve years of insurgency in El Salvador; in earlier weeks, one of his representatives obtained the release of Western hostages held in Lebanon for several years; in January 1992, another UN diplomat secured a fragile ceasefire in the Yugoslav civil war and the UN Security Council held its first ever meeting at the Head of State or Government level; and now the UN is deploying some of the largest peacekeeping contingents ever in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. Clearly, the United Nations has acquired renewed legitimacy, although long-standing budget difficulties still need resolution. It will be incumbent on all states to preserve and advance this new approach to international problem-solving.

Events, trends and forces currently reshaping the world will present new challenges and generate new risks for Canadian society. Economic and demographic pressures in many countries could lead to more illegal immigration, drug smuggling and terrorism. It is also conceivable that conflict could break out as a result of disputes over resources. If the UN is indeed given an enhanced role in mediating and sometimes putting an end to such conflict, Canada could be asked even more frequently than in the past to provide personnel to maintain or restore peace. The Canadian Government may also be called upon to commit the Canadian Forces to multinational operations similar to those in the Persian Gulf. Either prospect underlines the important role that military forces can play in pursuit of broader foreign policy objectives.

## **II - CANADA'S STRATEGIC POLICY**

As a responsible member of the world community, Canada seeks the maintenance of a peaceful international order in which to pursue its own interests. Canadians do not, and cannot, look with equanimity on violent conflict anywhere in the world. It is not only reprehensible in itself, but also corrosive to international order and stability. Canada remains, therefore, committed to defence and collective security, arms control and disarmament, and the peaceful

resolution of disputes. Fulfilling these commitments, in conjunction with like-minded nations, will contribute to a safer, more secure international environment.

Canada has no aggressive intentions toward any country. It has neither the need nor the desire to initiate violence in the pursuit of political objectives. Our aim is to deter the use of force or coercion against Canada and Canadian interests and to be able to respond adequately should deterrence fail.

There is no external threat unique to Canada. Nevertheless, we cannot isolate ourselves from the world. We must be concerned about threats to the larger community of nations with whom we live, work and trade. Moreover, we have not today, nor will we have in the foreseeable future, the population and resources necessary to defend, unaided, our national territory. Successive Canadian governments have, therefore, recognized that there is no alternative to collective defence. They have sought to work together for international peace and security in conjunction with those nations with which we share political principles and economic structures, as well as social values, and to which we are bound by history and tradition.

### At Home

Military capability is in itself an essential element of national policy, even in peacetime. The government is responsible for the surveillance and control of areas under Canadian jurisdiction, be they on land, in the air or at sea, regardless of any immediate or apprehended activity by anyone else. This responsibility is particularly important in a country as large and as sparsely populated as Canada. In essence, every nation needs a basic capacity to monitor the approaches to and control its own territory, airspace and maritime economic zones. Having that capability is an integral component of sovereignty and an important aspect of governance in a modern state.

In this context, space-based surveillance, navigation and communication systems are becoming increasingly important, particularly as their accessibility to military and civilian users grows in the years ahead. We must be prepared to make the best use of these technologies in meeting our security requirements, while upholding Canada's long-standing commitment to the peaceful development of space.

Canadians continue to suffer from the actions of those who disregard Canadian laws and jurisdictions. Problems of the 1990s facing governments include drug smuggling, a decaying environment and costly clean-ups, declining fish stocks, illegal immigration and terrorism. All demand national action. National Defence resources are required to detect and monitor potentially harmful

activities and to support the enforcement activities of other government departments when their own capabilities are exceeded.

The Canadian Forces also have statutory obligations in domestic affairs which reach beyond the narrow definition of defence policy. Throughout Canada's history, it has been the practice to employ the armed forces to reinforce or supplement the civilian law enforcement agencies in preventing, suppressing or controlling real or apprehended riots, insurrections and other disturbances of the peace, whenever it was considered that civilian resources were inadequate or insufficient. Disciplined, well-trained, well-commanded troops employing well-established military doctrine are necessary to accomplish such tasks.

### North America

The United States is our closest and most important neighbour. No other country or even group of countries has such a direct and massive impact on all facets of Canadian life. In no other country are our interests so extensive or so vital. Not surprisingly, our most important external security relationship is with the United States.

In the North American context, only the United States has the full arsenal of weapons necessary to defend a continent as vast, as diversified and as thinly populated as ours. At the same time, the United States relies upon us to undertake a reasonable effort in our own defence. If we were to fail to do so, we could expect demands from the United States with regard to its own northern security requirements. These could well be incompatible with full Canadian independence and sovereignty. In short, some degree of defence effort is required if we are to remain an independent nation.

There has been a marked decline in the direct military threat to North America. The strategic arms reduction treaty and unilateral cuts announced since its signature will lead to dramatic reductions in the number and operational readiness of the weapons of greatest concern to North America. Yet, these measures alone are not enough to limit appreciably the damage that, theoretically, could be inflicted on Canada. The nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union remain sufficient to devastate this continent. At a time of ongoing instability in the Commonwealth of Independent States, prudence requires that we take these capabilities into account in the formulation of our defence policy.

The size of our country, its strategic location, and the limited resources that we can devote to defence mean that, for the foreseeable future, Canada will maintain its long-standing relationship with the United States. In the past we have chosen to develop that relationship through the Ogdensburg Declaration, which gave birth to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and within the



broader context of the North Atlantic Alliance. Regardless of recent changes in the world, Canada must continue to control access to its airspace, sea approaches and land area. The North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) arrangements and other plans for the defence of the continent continue to serve us well in this regard.

### Europe

Apart from the United States, Europe remains the only part of the world in which we have the full scope of interests and relations -- political, economic, social, cultural, ethnic and historical, in addition to a security relationship which predates Confederation.

History has shown that instability or conflict in Europe can have a direct impact on Canada. At the most elementary level, a European problem can become a political issue in Canada if it touches Canadians of recent European origin. Violence and disorder can lead to demands upon Canada in terms of peacekeeping, aid and an influx of immigrants. At the highest level, a crisis in Europe could still lead to a global conflict because of the enormous interests at stake. While the threat of East-West bloc-to-bloc conflict, so feared over the last 45 years, has disappeared with the demise of both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Soviet Union, the risk of a crisis stemming from a local issue, that draws in the major powers, has probably increased precisely because of the breakdown of the bloc-to-bloc security structure.

Canada's fundamental interests in trans-Atlantic security, and in broader Canada-Europe relations, dictate that we seek to play a part in any new European security structure. The objective must be to ensure that any such arrangement is so constructed as to promote greater peace and stability, and a climate in which we can pursue our other interests.

Our most basic security interest in Europe is to prevent the use or threat of force in the conduct of European affairs. At a more general level, it is in Canada's interest to contribute to the preservation of democracy where it is well established, and to further its development elsewhere. European security will best be assured between democratic states and within a reasonable balance of military force. This interest can be promoted in the following ways:

- by maintaining a transformed North Atlantic Alliance to preserve not only the benefits of collective security for its member states, including Canada, but also the engagement of the United States as a stabilizing influence in European affairs;
- by further negotiating pan-European arms control, reducing existing forces and agreeing to national ceilings; and

- by supporting the evolution of a cooperative security regime through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which includes Canada, the United States and the new republics emerging from the former Soviet Union, and which provides a key mechanism for cooperation, consultation, conflict prevention and resolution, and possibly peacekeeping.

### Canada's Contribution to NATO

German unification, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a European security identity, and the achievement of concrete progress in arms control provide the elements for a new European security environment. With the end of the East-West confrontation in Europe, NATO is adapting its purpose, strategy and force structure to the new circumstances. Alliance political leaders acknowledged, following their July 1990 summit in London, that the strategy based on the concepts of Flexible Response and Forward Defence, which served NATO so effectively for a quarter century, had to be updated.

The new NATO strategy, unveiled at the Rome summit in November 1991, starts from the premise that the threat of a simultaneous full-scale attack on all of the Alliance's fronts has effectively vanished. It also recognizes, however, that all risks have not disappeared: the new regimes of Central and Eastern Europe confront major social, economic and political difficulties. Everywhere these are compounded by resurfacing ethnic tensions.

The new NATO strategic concept is based on a significantly diminished forward presence and a minimal nuclear capability. It puts a premium on the maintenance of sufficient, flexible and highly mobile standing forces throughout the Alliance; available, well-trained, suitably equipped and sufficiently large military reserves; and the means to ensure a timely flow of supplies and reinforcements across the Atlantic in a crisis. It also requires enhanced Alliance political cohesion.

Canada's geographic and demographic realities have for many years dictated a collective approach to security within the framework of alliances with countries whose values and aspirations are compatible with ours. We also fully recognize the contribution that the Atlantic Alliance has made to stability and dialogue in Europe. Canadians participated actively and constructively in the fundamental rethinking of the Atlantic Alliance's purposes, doctrines and deployments. We support whole-heartedly the new strategic concept they helped define. It is a concrete illustration of the fact that NATO is now placing less emphasis on its military dimension and giving new prominence to its political role and its value as a trans-Atlantic and, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, a pan-European and Eurasian bridge. Canada remains firmly committed to

collective defence through membership in NATO and to making worthwhile contributions to the Alliance, both in Europe and in North America, consistent with our interests and capabilities.

The new strategic situation and budgetary pressures have led all Allies stationing forces in Central Europe to reduce their presence on the former Central Front. Within two years, Canada will cease to maintain its military bases in Europe and its current commitment to NATO of the land and air formations of the Canadian Forces Europe command. Nevertheless, in addition to the defence of our own territory, as well as our air and maritime approaches, we will:

- contribute a battalion group, with prepositioned equipment, to serve either with the NATO Composite Force or the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) in northern Norway;
- contribute naval and air forces to NATO operations in the Atlantic, and participate in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic;
- make available to NATO, in the event of a crisis or war in Europe, a brigade group and two squadrons of CF-18 aircraft based in Canada;
- participate in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system (with about 150 personnel);
- contribute approximately 200 personnel to serve in staff positions at various headquarters in Europe;
- devote appropriate resources to arms control verification in Europe;
- participate in NATO common-funded programs; and
- offer, on a cost recovery basis, the opportunity for Allied forces to conduct training on our territory.

Canada's commitment to the NATO alliance and to the collective defence of Europe and North America remains unchanged. The cancellation of our earlier decision to leave a stationed task force of 1,100 troops in Europe in no way alters that commitment. Rather, it is driven by the evolving international situation and the difficult fiscal circumstances we face at home. Even so, our contribution to collective defence is enhanced by the modernization of our forces, which itself will be made possible by the troop reductions and redeployments carried out to provide funds for capital acquisition. Moreover, we have demonstrated our readiness to contribute to the defence of North America, which is part of the NATO area. Finally, by making our contingency formations available to NATO, we will keep Canada involved in the continued planning for NATO's multinational operational tasks.

### Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region has become increasingly important to Canadian well-being and security. Our interests in the region are primarily economic: our trade with Pacific Rim nations has exceeded our European trade for several years, and Japan is our second-largest trading partner. The region also provides

a major source of new immigrants as well as foreign investment. Its growing significance to the world economy is highlighted not only by Japan, the world's second-largest economy, but by the high growth rates of new industrial powers like South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Canada plays an active role in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, where it has pushed for increased dialogue on trade and other issues.

The Asia-Pacific region, despite its great prosperity, may be prone to political and military instability in the years ahead. There is no fundamental strategic threat in Asia, but volatile situations abound. They derive from such indigenous sources as ethnic conflict, economic disparity, territorial disputes and domestic political instability. As the Asia-Pacific region is also an area where the armed forces of major military powers converge, it is characterized by continuing tension and significant defence expenditures. Multilateral arrangements for managing security issues remain relatively undeveloped.

Although Canada is not a major player in military affairs in the Asia-Pacific region, we do have an interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in that area, as our 1990 proposal of a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue clearly demonstrated. Against the prospect of possible changes in Asia-Pacific security relations, and in light of the increasing need for fisheries patrols, environmental surveillance and drug interdiction, we will distribute our forces more evenly between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets to achieve a better balance of maritime capabilities between the East and West coasts. Additional naval and air resources will enable us to contribute more effectively to the protection of our interests in the North Pacific. Canada will also follow closely and participate appropriately in evolving discussions on Asia-Pacific security issues.

### Broader International Community

While superpower competition for regional influence now seems to be a thing of the past, the potential for instability and war persists throughout much of the world. In many countries, traditional sources of conflict, including historical enmities and border disputes, have been compounded by the proliferation of ever more sophisticated weapons. The Gulf War and its aftermath, as well as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, highlight the need to curb the spread of advanced military technologies to volatile regions. Dire economic conditions have compounded a new generation of security problems, including those posed by domestic instability, refugees and international drug traffic.

The Persian Gulf conflict provided a forceful illustration of how quickly and unexpectedly regional disputes can degenerate into crises and wars. Such situations could come to involve Canada and the Canadian Forces in a number of ways. At the most fundamental level, Canada has an interest in fostering



collective security, so that unprovoked aggression can be firmly deterred through internationally agreed sanctions, and swiftly opposed by the international community, should deterrence fail. If collective security is to be effective, however, adequate means of enforcement must be available, and the willingness to use them, if political and economic pressures do not prevail, must be evident. In the future, the Government may choose to commit the Canadian Forces to more military operations in support of collective security. Canada therefore maintains a brigade group of about 6,000 soldiers and two CF-18 squadrons of 18 aircraft each, capable of assignment to multilateral contingency operations of the type carried out in the Gulf. Canada also retains the inherent capability to deploy selected maritime forces worldwide.

The Canadian Forces will likewise continue to be involved in multilateral peacekeeping operations. Our experience and competence in this field are second to none, and the international community will continue to call upon Canada to assist in the design and conduct of such missions.

Indeed, our involvement in UN and other peacekeeping and stabilization operations could well stretch the capabilities of the Canadian Forces, as calls upon our expertise increase in number and frequency. Over the past few years, multilateral organizations have begun to employ impartial outside military forces in innovative ways to deal with regional instability. Such forces have provided disaster relief, helped in postwar reconstruction, ensured the protection of refugees, supervised fair elections, assisted nations to manage the transition to independence, and even protected ethnic minorities.

### Conclusion

The future will involve opportunities for enhanced cooperation on security issues, as well as a great deal of uncertainty and instability. As we move forward in this emerging environment, the Canadian Forces will remain an important instrument of Canadian foreign policy. The defence of Canada's sovereignty, our continued participation in collective security arrangements, and our aspiration to help resolve regional conflict, all call for the maintenance of flexible, capable armed forces. These forces will have to adapt to new domestic realities and new geostrategic conditions on the basis of the following priorities:

- defence, sovereignty and civil responsibilities in Canada;
- collective defence arrangements through NATO, including our continental defence partnership with the United States;
- international peace and security through stability and peacekeeping operations, arms control verification and humanitarian assistance.

### III - DEFENCE PLANNING

The Canadian Forces require a long-term program that is affordable, that enables them to respond to a rapidly evolving and fluid international situation, and that satisfies the domestic concerns of the Canadian people. This program must achieve a balance among the resources devoted to personnel, operations and maintenance, and capital. It must ensure that there are sufficient personnel to achieve our fundamental objectives. It must maintain a level of operations so that personnel are trained and ready to respond to a full range of potential challenges. Above all, the defence program must devote sufficient funds to capital in order to ensure that the Forces will have the tools to do the job.

At the same time, this program must search rigorously for the minimum necessary in each category of expenditure. National Defence cannot maintain high personnel levels at the expense of its capital budget. The Canadian Forces cannot operate at an intensity that prematurely wears out their equipment. The Department cannot retain infrastructure that is no longer essential. Limited funds for capital will be used frugally on the highest priority items.

The two certainties in Canadian defence planning over the next decade will be international change and fiscal restraint. The evolving, yet unpredictable geostrategic situation suggests that defence planning needs to focus on versatile general purpose forces to enable the Government to pursue a wide variety of objectives at minimum cost. The Canadian Forces will be directed not against a single threat, but towards a range of tasks which are not necessarily related. Such forces have to be flexible and, given the distances over which Canada must exercise jurisdiction, have as much reach as affordable.

Fiscal restraint means that the size of the Regular Forces will decline. As that happens, some of the existing facilities will no longer be needed. That infrastructure will have to be identified and eliminated if the Forces are to avoid being strangled by an imbalance in personnel, operations and maintenance costs.

There is a requirement, which is driven by considerations of security of supply and the economy, to maintain a degree of capability for equipment support within Canada. Defence also plays a role, along with other government departments, in promoting industrial development. On occasion, there are unique Canadian requirements which can be met only through national research and development. Consequently, the maintenance of a minimum level of defence research and development is essential.

Nevertheless, National Defence can be more economical in its capital acquisitions. It will, therefore, endeavour to:

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- define its requirements in a manner that maximizes utility across the widest possible range of defence roles;
  - reduce the number of types of equipment it operates;
  - whenever possible, purchase equipment whose performance has been demonstrated in the field;
  - evaluate carefully the cost of marginal increases in the capability of new equipment; and
  - avoid unique Canadian solutions that require expensive and risky research, development or modification of existing equipment.

The Department of National Defence is staffed by a mix of civilian and military personnel. National Defence Headquarters provides command and control, as well as national leadership to the unified Canadian Forces. The Forces maintain integrated systems such as supply, personnel management, materiel, finance, common training, and a unified system of staff schools and colleges. These joint systems have proven to be efficient and effective and, equally important, provide a common basis of professional training for our maritime, land, air and supporting forces.

The Canadian Forces represent a Total Force (Regular and Reserve), integrated across Maritime, Mobile, Air and Communications Commands. With a smaller Regular Force component, the Reserves will play a more critical and important role.

A greatly altered geostrategic situation and the consequent increase in threat warning time means that we can reduce the readiness of certain elements of the Canadian Forces without jeopardizing Canadian security. It will enable the Department to reduce activity rates and training in some traditional areas. This in turn means that combat and training assets, which are expensive and hard to replace, will be subject to less wear and tear.

Nevertheless, the essentials of defence cannot be forgotten. Armies, navies and air forces, are, in essence, people with special equipment brought together in operational structures and trained in the profession of arms. Each represents a collection of combat skills and fighting capabilities which, once lost, cannot be easily or quickly replaced. Canada's experience in both world wars is testimony to this essential lesson. In each service, there is a minimum essential level of military capability that must be sustained.

### Funding

In recent years, the Government has found it possible to reduce planned defence expenditures in light of changing geopolitical circumstances and other pressing national priorities. Together, the policy announced in September 1991

and the 1992 federal budget imposed cuts of \$2.2 billion over the next five years relative to the previously planned defence funding levels.

These cuts are in addition to reductions of \$3.4 billion announced through the 1989 and 1990 federal budgets, so that the Department of National Defence, given other fiscal adjustments, has contributed nearly \$6 billion to deficit reduction since 1989. The increase of \$230 million in 1992/93 defence expenditures relative to the 1991/92 levels (exclusive of spending related to the Gulf War) represents no real growth; it only covers forecast national inflation.

National Defence will, over time, strive to establish a better balance between the funds devoted to personnel, operations and maintenance, and capital. The relative share of the defence budget devoted to capital will increase from 22 to 26 percent within four years, while a target figure of 30 percent will be maintained. In contrast, the share devoted to personnel will decrease. Five per cent of the capital budget will continue to be devoted to research and development.

### Personnel

In September 1991, there were about 84,000 Regulars, 29,000 Primary Reservists and 33,000 full-time civilians in the Department of National Defence, as well as 15,000 Supplementary Ready Reserve volunteers. It was announced at that time that the strength of the Regular Force would be reduced to 76,000 by 1994/95. The 1992 federal budget reduced that number further, to about 75,000 in 1995/96. These reductions will, to the extent possible, be effected through attrition. The Primary Reserve will be increased to 40,000 and the Supplementary Ready Reserve to about 25,000 over the 15-year planning period. Although Reserve goals remain valid, the spending reductions arising out of the 1992 Budget will slow the rate of their achievement.

To a large extent, the relatively high number of civilians in the Department stems from the amount of infrastructure to be maintained. Civilians carry out most of the support tasks at Canadian Forces bases and other facilities located across the country. Given this infrastructure, it would be counterproductive from both a military and economic standpoint for armed forces personnel to perform such duties.

### Infrastructure

The Department maintains infrastructure across Canada built up over two world wars. This infrastructure has not been rationalized in proportion to cuts that have reduced the Canadian Forces to about two-thirds of their previous size. National Defence cannot continue to maintain excess facilities. Redundant or under-utilized infrastructure must be reduced if savings are to be made with



respect to personnel, operations and maintenance. The Advisory Group on Defence Infrastructure, established in September 1991, will study the issues and problems involved in the rationalization of Canadian Forces facilities and report to the Minister by the end of May 1992. In addition, the Department is establishing a task force to identify surplus urban property. The task force will seek to maximize savings from the disposal of these holdings, while balancing the Government's financial and social policy goals with local land use requirements.

The Canadian Forces bases in Germany located at Baden-Soellingen and Lahr will be closed, respectively, in 1993 and 1994, as we complete the withdrawal of our major formations from Europe. We shall continue to implement the base reductions and closures announced as part of the 1989 federal budget. In view of recent changes in the international environment and fiscal constraints, the Department will not proceed at this time with the construction of the Forward Operating Location in Kuujuaq, Quebec, Canadian Forces Station Bermuda will be closed in 1994, and the Canadian Forces will consolidate their regional supply and publications depots into two central locations in Edmonton and Montreal.

### The Total Force

A highly motivated, well-trained, properly equipped Reserve Force capable of assuming a greater role in the defence of Canada is integral to the success of the Forces' operations and activities, both at home and abroad.

The Primary Reserve comprises the Militia, the Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve and the Communications Reserve. Its authorized strength was increased by approximately 2,000 in 1989, 1,700 in 1990 and 1,600 in 1991. The Primary Reserve now comprises about 29,300 servicemen and women.

The Supplementary Reserve has been reorganized into the Supplementary Ready Reserve and the Supplementary Holding Reserve. The former comprises the most militarily current and fittest members, who volunteer to be assigned to specific wartime positions or tasks in existing Canadian Forces units. The Supplementary Holding Reserve is made up of those less current members who would not be available for early military duty in an emergency. The Supplementary Ready Reserve currently provides a little over 15,000 volunteers.

Over the longer term, the Regular Force will be smaller than it is today. In this context, implementation of the Total Force will become even more important. The objectives are to achieve greater integration and a more effective partnership between the Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces. For the most part, tasks will be assigned to the Canadian Forces as a whole rather than specifically to Regulars or Reservists. Structures will be adopted to enable the use of a combination of Regulars and Reservists as

circumstances dictate, depending on the type of unit, readiness requirements and skills required to accomplish the mission. The Reserves will continue to play a vital role in linking the Forces with Canadian society. Moreover, the Reserves will provide some of the skills and knowledge that we may not be able to maintain economically in the Regular Force, and will allow a more efficient application of scarce resources. For these reasons, our objectives with respect to the Total Force will more than ever remain valid.

### Official Languages

In response to the 1988 Official Languages Act, National Defence introduced an updated Official Languages Master Implementation Plan which calls for incorporating the use of both French and English into all aspects of the Department's activities.

This is being achieved in two ways. First, additional French language units have been designated in the Canadian Forces so that francophones working in French can enjoy career progression opportunities comparable with those available to anglophones working in an English environment. Second, the Forces have expanded their capacity to provide basic and intermediate training in both official languages.

A review of the linguistic requirements of all military and civilian positions began in 1991. Progress has been made in the staffing of bilingual military positions. Civilian francophone participation in the Department's labour force has also increased, though representation remains too low within the Executive Group. Expanded areas of search and aggressive recruiting have already been employed in order to attract additional qualified francophones in the Department's civilian workforce.

As a truly national institution, the Canadian Forces are making a major contribution to the unity of the country. They see their efforts to improve their official language capabilities and programs in that light. Already, participation in second language training has nearly doubled, courses have been lengthened and standards upgraded. Military personnel maintain a presence across Canada. The two official language groups work side by side every day to ensure Canada's security within a variety of functional contexts. Problems inevitably arise from time to time. They are addressed with the same dedication and effort the Canadian Forces demonstrate in all matters that affect the welfare of the nation.

### National Defence and the Economy

The operations of the Department of National Defence support the establishment and maintenance of a modern, capable defence industrial base, and have an important impact on the Canadian economy. Defence expenditures

generate jobs, business profits and exports. The defence program confers economic benefits on all of the economy's major industrial groups, and while not primarily intended for regional development, it does produce substantial economic activity across the country.

Major contributions to the Canadian economy, which are less well known but of particular importance to our long-term security, are research and development, defence-related economic cooperation with our allies and training. All enhance Canada's ability to meet the readiness, mobilization and sustainment requirements of the armed forces and are an integral aspect of defence planning.

**Research and Development** - The Department of National Defence, in cooperation with other federal departments, supports a wide range of defence-related research and development in Canada. This support helps develop and maintain Canadian scientific and technological expertise and enhances the overall competitiveness of Canadian industry.

The Defence Industry Productivity Program, managed by the Department of Industry, Science and Technology, assists Canadian manufacturers by promoting technological advances that strengthen Canada's overall technology base. This program is an effective use of federal funds, returning an average of 14 dollars in export sales for every dollar invested. The Department also collaborates with industry in such areas as search and rescue, space-based surveillance and arms control verification. Under the terms of the Defence Industrial Research Program, government shares the costs of defence-related research with industry, gaining additional resources and expertise from the private sector. Industry retains ownership of the new technology and is generally free to exploit it in the commercial marketplace. This enables industry to pursue and secure new markets, while providing government with a reservoir of defence-related capabilities.

**Cooperative Programs** - Significant industrial benefits flow from Canada's cooperation in the research, development and production of defence goods with the United States, largely through the Defence Development and Production Sharing Arrangements. They call for roughly balanced cross-border defence trade over time and give Canadian firms an opportunity to compete for U.S. defence contracts on the normal commercial basis of price, quality and delivery. In recent years, major products of Canadian origin have found their way into the U.S. inventory, including a tactical radio system and a recovery system for landing helicopters on destroyers and frigates.

This access to the American market has allowed Canadian manufacturers to demonstrate their ability to produce high-quality goods suitable for the military and civilian markets of our NATO allies. Standardization programs provide further opportunities for Canadian equipment and technology to be sold to our

Alliance partners. Canadian companies have developed recognized expertise in niche markets which include aircraft, simulation, drones and remotely-piloted vehicles, as well as military equipment designed for use in the Arctic.

**Training** - The Canadian Forces employ, educate and train Canadians on a national scale. The requirement to maintain skills at optimum levels for operational effectiveness demands a significant investment in personnel training, and skill enhancement from the basic to the most advanced levels. This commitment to training has made the Canadian Forces a highly qualified and skilled sector of the Canadian labour force such that, after successful employment with the Forces, thousands of members take back to the civilian workforce a vast array of marketable skills and expertise in fields as diverse as aerospace engineering, air traffic control, public affairs, medicine, social work, and surveying. State of the art training ensures that the qualifications of military personnel are equivalent to those of their civilian counterparts, and that they have the skills required to perform their roles in a professional, expert, and competent manner.

The Canadian Forces Training System carries out its activities at 36 locations, offering 1,700 courses in 138 occupations. Additional training is provided on the job and by the Commands. There are three military colleges and four professional development institutes, including the Land Forces Staff College, Staff School, Staff College and the National Defence College. The current review of defence infrastructure is taking a close look at whether significant savings might be achieved through the consolidation of these facilities.

### Defence in the North

The objectives of National Defence, with respect to the North, are to uphold Canadian sovereignty by exercising surveillance, demonstrating presence, helping civilian agencies cope with non-military contingencies and advising government on measures to deal with new challenges.

These objectives will be pursued in various ways. National Defence will expand the Rangers. It will retain an airborne battalion capable of reacting to short notice emergencies in remote areas. It will conduct research and develop systems of particular applicability to the North. It will coordinate its activities and plans with other departments and governments, assisting civil authorities in public welfare emergencies, including search and rescue operations. The Canadian Forces will continue to carry out surveillance of the North and its air and sea approaches. They will develop and maintain maritime, land and air plans, and carry out training exercises in the North.

A number of specific initiatives are improving the ability of the Canadian Forces to contribute to sovereignty and security in the North. The acquisition of



three Arctic and Maritime Surveillance aircraft will make possible an increase in northern air surveillance patrols. The completion of the North Warning System will significantly enhance the capability of the Canadian Forces to monitor the use of Canadian airspace. The upgrading of northern airfields and the acquisition of Hercules aircraft with an air refuelling capability will enable the air force, for the first time in Canadian history, to deploy fighters anywhere across the Canadian North. The installation of a sub-surface acoustic detection system to monitor movements at a number of strategic choke-points in the Canadian Archipelago, and to monitor activity in the Arctic basin, will give Canada an unprecedented detection and surveillance capability in the North. Plans to develop a facility in northern Quebec will also expand the Canadian Forces' presence in the North and facilitate training in Arctic conditions.

Northern Region, encompassing the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, is headquartered in Yellowknife. It will be renamed Canadian Forces Northern Area and remain under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

### Space

Space is an important component of the international security environment. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies to a growing number of countries around the world is of primary concern. As a result, the United States and Russia will examine the possibility of cooperating on the development of ballistic missile defences.

Canada will need to address these and other space-related security issues as they evolve. Over the longer term, we will have to acquire an appropriate capability in space-based surveillance systems. We can assume that, eventually, space-based systems will be capable of monitoring our territory, our airspace, our ocean approaches and other areas under our jurisdiction. The Canadian Forces will benefit from improved surveillance, communications and navigation provided by these systems. For National Defence, the most cost-effective way of deploying such systems and maintaining control over Canada's sovereign airspace may be to address this problem in cooperation with other agencies. Whatever option Canada chooses, it must find ways of keeping abreast of new technologies and ensuring that its own national requirements can be met to the greatest degree possible. It is clear, however, that space-based systems are extremely expensive and that Canada's final decision may well rest on resolving the issues of affordability and priority.

### The Environment

The Department of National Defence is committed to ensuring that its policies and activities are consistent with safeguarding the environment.

Concern about the environment is not new to National Defence. Over the last decade, the Department has demonstrated this concern in a number of ways. It has significantly reduced the amount of energy used in its facilities. Working with Forestry Canada and industry, DND has conducted inventories and developed plans for the sustainable development of forests on departmental property. The Department devotes particular attention to responsible management of property used for operational training, and has developed procedures to ensure that sites are returned to an environmentally sound state when no longer needed. In March 1992, an agreement was reached with Environment Canada to set aside 420-square kilometres on the eastern boundary of Canadian Forces Base Suffield, Alberta as a national wildlife area.

Building on past successes, the Department will continue to contribute to the achievement of the overall environmental goals set by the Government. The Canadian Forces will continue to take environmental concerns into account when planning and executing training missions and operations. An environmentally sensitive approach to departmental decision-making will be pursued so that "green" considerations are given equal weight along with operational, logistic, financial and human concerns. Finally, the Minister intends to establish an Advisory Committee on the Environment to provide advice to the Department.

## IV - THE CANADIAN FORCES

### Maritime Forces

#### The Present

Canada's maritime forces operate from naval and air bases on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The surface fleet consists primarily of destroyers and frigates. These, along with other maritime forces, are organized into task groups. The older frigates were designed for anti-submarine warfare, but are now being replaced by new ones with a more general purpose capability. The destroyers are being modernized to provide Canadian task groups with a broader range of capabilities. Operational support ships, capable of replenishing two ships simultaneously, supply needed fuel, ammunition and stores to ships of the task groups when operating for extended periods away from their bases. The importance of such self-supporting, combat-ready formations capable of deployment anywhere in the world at short notice was demonstrated during the Gulf War. The fleet also includes mine countermeasures vessels and smaller vessels for coastal patrol and training.

The underwater fleet consists of a submarine squadron based on the Atlantic Coast. Despite their many years of service, these boats are equipped with modern combat control equipment and weapons. Maritime Command also includes two diving establishments, one on each coast, supported by small

diving vessels and an ocean-going ship, based in Halifax, which operates deep-diving submersibles.

Air Command's Maritime Air Group operates both shipborne helicopters and shore-based fixed-wing patrol aircraft under the operational control of the Commander of Maritime Command. Helicopters perform anti-submarine duties, as well as other missions ranging from reconnaissance to transport. The maritime patrol aircraft operate over Canadian ocean areas larger than the nation's entire land mass, alone or in cooperation with ships and submarines. They also deploy worldwide for training and operations.

Canadian maritime forces are supported by a network of bases and stations that provide training, administration, supply, maintenance and repair support. A comprehensive command, control and communications infrastructure links the whole. The Maritime Commander oversees all fleet operations from headquarters in Halifax, and commands Pacific forces through the Deputy Commander, located in Esquimalt, British Columbia.

#### The Future

The maritime forces of the future will be asked to respond to a new set of challenges. The focus for the Canadian navy, first and foremost, will be the Canadian areas of maritime responsibility off our East and West coasts. As the classic threat in Europe declines, the importance of protecting the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic will diminish.

Despite these trends, Canada will retain the capacity to contribute to NATO forces assigned the sea control mission in the North Atlantic. We will also maintain versatile, general-purpose maritime forces which can be deployed to other areas of the world in support of Canadian interests.

The maritime forces will be trained and equipped to conduct sea patrols for the protection of Canadian sovereignty, particularly with respect to fisheries, drug interdiction and our maritime economic zones. Greater use of our maritime areas of national jurisdiction will increase the demands placed upon the maritime forces for search and rescue and environmental monitoring.

The emerging international security environment and the new demands on our maritime forces will lead to changes in the deployment of our maritime resources. We will distribute available capability more evenly between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Increased Canadian presence in the Pacific will enhance sovereignty, enable the navy to carry out national roles more effectively and signal Canada's increasing interest in Pacific security.

The navy's new priorities and roles will require a broader military capability. Reservists will be expected to provide a significant proportion of the crews of the new maritime coastal defence vessels. They will also have opportunities to serve in other ships to augment Regular Force crews, and they will continue to be the mainstay of the Maritime Coastal Defence and the Naval Control of Shipping Organizations.

Submarines greatly enhance the flexibility of maritime forces and increase our ability to carry out surveillance and enforcement in our maritime areas of responsibility. In a project continuing beyond the end of the 15-year planning period, the navy will replace its three Oberon Class submarines with up to six modern conventional submarines, in order to provide an underwater capability in both the Atlantic and Pacific.

Destroyers, frigates, corvettes, coastal patrol vessels, submarines, and long-range patrol and coastal patrol aircraft will combine into a potent and capable force which will demonstrate Canada's seriousness in maintaining its jurisdiction in its waters.

In structuring the maritime forces, we will seek to:

- maintain the capability to conduct surveillance and control in waters under Canadian jurisdiction;
- achieve a more even balance of naval assets between the East and West coasts;
- maintain a balanced surface, sub-surface, and air capability;
- decrease emphasis on capabilities required for protection of the sea lines of communication;
- promote the Total Force by increasing involvement of Naval Reserves;
- increase our surveillance capability in the Arctic; and
- increase the capability to support the civil authorities.

The personnel targets for the maritime forces will be approximately 10,000 Regulars, 5,000 Primary Reservists and 3,500 Supplementary Reservists.

Maritime Command will operate 16 destroyers and frigates, two upgraded replenishment vessels (the third will be retired in the mid-1990s), three submarines, one diving support vessel, 12 coastal patrol vessels, and corvettes. It will thus be in a position to operate two task groups, one on each coast. Maritime Command will also continue to operate two bases, five stations and two other naval facilities.

The following air assets will provide maritime air support for both East and West coasts:

- long-range patrol aircraft;
- shipborne helicopters;

- Arctic and Maritime Surveillance aircraft; and
- coastal patrol aircraft.

The major portion of the capital budget devoted to maritime forces will, over the planning period, be spent on the following:

- Canadian patrol frigates;
- modernized Tribal Class destroyers;
- corvettes;
- coastal patrol vessels;
- a diving support vessel;
- submarines;
- Naval Reserve divisions;
- a fleet school in Quebec for the Naval Reserve; and
- replacement infrastructure.

## Land Forces

### The Present

Land forces are deployed today in Canada, within Mobile Command, and in Europe, within Canadian Forces Europe.

Mobile Command Headquarters is located in St-Hubert, Quebec. The field forces of the Command, which are the headquarters, units and formations that can be deployed to conduct or support operations, are concentrated predominantly in three formations of brigade-group size. 5e Brigade mécanisée du Canada is in Eastern Canada, based in Valcartier, Quebec, and Gagetown, New Brunswick; the Special Service Force is in Central Canada, based in Petawawa and London, Ontario; and 1 Canadian Brigade Group is deployed across the West, with its headquarters in Calgary. These formations have common territorial defence and domestic operations responsibilities in Canada, but each could also be tasked to undertake or provide forces for peacekeeping or contingency operations abroad. The land forces in Canada are supported by the helicopter squadrons of 10 Tactical Air Group.

In addition to their general responsibilities, some of the field forces in Canada have specific operational taskings or unique capabilities. One of the infantry battalions in 1 Canadian Brigade Group is assigned for NATO employment, in times of tension, in North Norway as part of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) or the NATO Composite Force. In addition, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, a principal element of the Special Service Force, has the primary task of reaction to emergencies or other operational requirements in Northern Region and is on standby for UN operations.

Mobile Command also encompasses the various elements that support and sustain the field forces. These include nine support bases and appropriate



ranges and training facilities. The latter include the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown, the Airborne Centre in Edmonton and a number of regimental and branch battle schools. The units of the Militia have the role of generating forces for employment throughout the Total Force. In particular, Militia units will provide trained personnel to bring the field force formations to full establishment and to form deployment troops for specified employment in emergencies.

The principal Land Force element in Canadian Forces Europe is 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, based in Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, Germany. Until recently, this formation was a component of the 1st Canadian Division commitment to NATO. Effective 1 April 1992, the divisional commitment terminated and was replaced with that of a brigade group, mounted from Canada. At the completion of the withdrawal of land forces from Europe, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group will be removed from the order of battle.

### The Future

The Land Force is currently undergoing a major restructuring which encompasses the reorganization of the Regular and Reserve components into a Total Force army. A major feature of that restructuring is the regionalization of the army into areas covering the southern part of the country. The Land Force of the future will maintain a general purpose combat capability. This requires the maintenance of functional military skills associated with modern combat and the ability to integrate these skills effectively. This will provide the government with the basic military capability for known commitments and for situations which cannot now be anticipated.

In designing the future Land Force, we have sought to:

- maintain balanced structures that retain their flexibility and mobility;
- maintain a general purpose combat capability;
- provide for one battalion group to deploy to North Norway as part of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) or the NATO Composite Force;
- provide the capability for UN peacekeeping or stability operations;
- maintain a capability for contingency operations anywhere in the world up to the brigade-group level that would also be available to NATO;
- provide greater support to the Militia to foster the Total Force;
- maintain sufficient forces for aid of the civil power and assistance to civil authorities; and
- improve the capability for arms control verification.

There will be fundamental changes in the command and control of the land forces in Canada. Command of all land forces will be exercised through a geographically oriented area structure. Within this structure, area commanders will be delegated command, support and training responsibility for all land forces -- both Regulars and Reserves -- within their geographical boundaries. In addition, they will have specified operational responsibilities, particularly with respect to domestic and territorial defence operations.

Land Force Western Area, encompassing the Prairie Provinces, with its headquarters in Edmonton, and Land Force Central Area, encompassing the province of Ontario, with its headquarters in Toronto, have already been established. The remaining two land force areas will become effective in 1992: Land Force Quebec Area, encompassing the province of Quebec, headquartered in Montreal; and Land Force Atlantic Area, encompassing the Maritime Provinces, headquartered in Halifax.

The field forces will be superimposed on this command structure. For the most part, they will continue to consist of the three field formations currently in Canada. These formations will be similarly structured, to include infantry, armour, field and air defence artillery, engineers, communications, medical, military police, intelligence and combat service support units. Tactical aviation support will continue to be provided through the assignment of air force resources.

There will be, however, several changes from the existing structure. The Regular Force strength of the field forces will be reduced, with the balance to be made up by Reservists. The Canadian Airborne Regiment will be retained within the structure as a rapid reaction force, but will be reduced to battalion size. Finally, 1st Canadian Division Headquarters is being reduced in size and will become a task force headquarters for use in territorial defence and contingency operations.

The personnel targets for the Land Force will be approximately 19,300 Regulars, 29,500 Primary Reservists and 7,000 Supplementary Reservists.

For the next few years, the principal equipment capabilities of the Land Force will be found in the existing inventory. This includes the Leopard C1 tank, the M109 self-propelled howitzer and the M113 armoured personnel carrier. In due course, some of the army's core equipment capabilities will be replaced. Over the planning period, the major portion of the capital budget devoted to the Land Force will be spent on:

- light armoured vehicles;
- short-range anti-armour weapons and ammunition;
- modernized 105mm howitzers;
- replacement machine guns and additional small arms;

- tactical command, communication and information equipment;
- a close air-defence weapon;
- Militia training and support centres;
- area headquarters and armouries;
- ranges and training areas;
- general engineering support equipment; and
- a light logistic vehicle.

## Air Forces

### The Present

The major air force formations under Air Command are the five air groups based in Canada and the air element in Europe. They are supported by a Reserve structure and by bases, stations, schools and other facilities.

In Canada, Air Command provides combat-ready forces for surveillance and control of Canadian airspace, and for the collective air defence of North America. It also provides air support to the maritime and land forces.

Air Command elements are organized into fighter, transport, maritime, tactical and Reserve groups. Air Command Headquarters in Winnipeg commands all air forces. The forces of Maritime Air Group and 10 Tactical Air Group, along with associated Air Reserve units, are, respectively, under the operational control of Maritime and Mobile Commands, for assigned missions.

The Canadian Forces commitment to Europe, which included the two fighter squadrons of 1 Canadian Air Division, based at Baden-Soellingen, has been reduced to one squadron of 24 aircraft in 1992. Operations in Europe will cease by 1993.

The Air Reserve comprises one group headquarters, two tactical aviation wings, three air reserve squadrons, and 20 augmentation flights. As the name indicates, the latter provide personnel to augment bases and units.

### The Future

Although the geostrategic context has changed dramatically over the past few years, the air forces must maintain their skills in warning, attack assessment and defence against air attack. It would not be prudent to assume that there will never again be an air threat to North America. Moreover, we must still maintain our capability for surveillance and control of our national territory for the most elementary considerations of sovereignty. We need a capacity to monitor our airspace as currently provided by radar and aircraft. We also need to be able to challenge, and if necessary control, intruders. These are basic national requirements independent of any particular threat. In light of Canadian



geography, we also require these capabilities over the widest possible area of Canadian jurisdiction, including the North.

Air Reservists will be employed across the full spectrum of operational and support activities. The Air Reserve augmentation flights will be expanded to assist in the operation, administration, maintenance and logistic support of the air force.

Multipurpose tactical and strategic airlift is essential if the Canadian Forces are to be able to respond to the diverse tasks expected of them. It will remain a high priority because of the flexibility it provides in deploying other resources. The air forces will need airlift and air-to-air refuelling sufficient to support the forward deployment of fighters in the North and for international contingency operations. The land forces will need airlift for the continuing Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) commitment, for operations in Canada, for contingency operations abroad and for peacekeeping. We will also have to consider what our requirements might be for expanded disaster and humanitarian assistance, both at home and abroad.

In designing the air forces of the future, we have sought to:

- maintain aerospace surveillance and defence forces in Canada;
- develop a Total Force air force by the increased integration of Reserve personnel into air units;
- maintain maritime patrol and increase coastal patrol and enforcement capability;
- increase air-to-air refuelling capability;
- maintain adequate global and domestic airlift;
- increase capability to support other government departments;
- improve the capability for search and rescue;
- maintain capability to deploy up to two CF-18 squadrons for contingency operations anywhere in the world that would also be available to NATO; and
- improve the capability for arms control verification.

The personnel targets for the air forces will be approximately 18,500 Regulars, 3,000 Primary Reservists and 3,000 Supplementary Reservists.

CF-18 attrition will be mitigated by blending into the Canada-based fleet the aircraft that will be available following our departure from Europe. Four fighter squadrons will be assigned the air defence role in North America, two each at Cold Lake, Alberta and Bagotville, Quebec. In addition, the squadrons will maintain a limited air-to-surface capability to provide support to maritime operations, as well as support to land operations, in defence of Canada. As outlined above, two of these CF-18 squadrons will also be available for contingency operations anywhere in the world. In addition, there will be one

operational training unit with 20 CF-18s and one fighter lead-in training unit with 25 CF-5s. The remaining CF-18s and CF-5s will help maintain the authorized unit establishment for these squadrons throughout the planning period.

There will be three composite squadrons at Comox, British Columbia and Shearwater, Nova Scotia for combat support, electronic warfare training and coastal patrol.

The air forces will provide support to the maritime forces for anti-submarine warfare, surveillance, search and rescue, and other national tasks. Three maritime patrol squadrons, as well as a training unit, will be equipped with long-range patrol aircraft and Arctic and Maritime Surveillance aircraft. Two maritime helicopter squadrons and a training squadron will be equipped with shipborne helicopters.

The air forces will provide general purpose support to the land forces with three tactical aviation squadrons located in Edmonton, Petawawa, and Valcartier; a training squadron in Gagetown; one multi-role squadron in Ottawa; and two reserve aviation wings in Toronto and Montreal. Three squadrons will operate utility tactical transport helicopters.

There will be additional general purpose support to maritime, land and national tasks. One strategic transport, VIP and refuelling squadron will be located in Trenton. Three tactical transport squadrons will be located in Edmonton and Trenton with Hercules aircraft. One transport squadron will operate out of Ottawa. Finally, four search and rescue squadrons and a rescue unit will fly from Comox, Edmonton, Trenton, Greenwood, Nova Scotia and Gander, Newfoundland with search and rescue helicopters and Hercules aircraft.

Over the planning period, the major portion of the capital budget devoted to air forces will be spent on the following:

- the North American Air Defence Modernization program;
- coastal patrol aircraft;
- combat-support aircraft;
- shipborne helicopters;
- SAR helicopters
- utility tactical transport helicopters;
- upgrades to sensor and avionics systems, including a CF-18 mid-life update;
- a precision-guided weapons capability;
- improved crew-training technologies;
- space-based surveillance systems; and
- consideration of a replacement for the CF-18.

## V - NATIONAL ROLES

The Canadian Forces are deeply involved in national roles which contribute to the social, cultural, and economic development of Canada.

The Canadian Forces equip and operate (with the Coast Guard) the four regional Rescue Coordination Centres and provide ships and aircraft, as well as ground personnel, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in support of overall search and rescue operations. In addition, the Forces are responsible for air search and rescue and contribute resources to the Coast Guard which, as an element of the Department of Transport, retains primary responsibility for marine operations. Both Transport Canada and the Department of National Defence also support the activities of the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association and its 6,500 volunteers and 1,000 private aircraft. In 1991, the rescue centres responded to 8,316 incidents. These included 922 air, 6,622 marine, 560 humanitarian and 212 civil aid cases.

The Canadian Forces, in particular the navy and Maritime Air Group, contribute to the protection of our fish stocks in support of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The Canadian Forces have committed themselves to provide Fisheries and Oceans, at no cost, with ships and aircraft for agreed periods of surveillance. The Canadian Forces are also committed to supporting the Solicitor General, in particular the RCMP, in the fight against drug smuggling and potential terrorism.

Even though no formal agreement yet exists between the Department of National Defence and Environment Canada or the Coast Guard, with respect to environmental disasters or emergencies on land or at sea, the Canadian Forces have long been involved in the protection of the environment.

### Capabilities

The Canadian Forces are well equipped to respond to most emergency situations. While current policy does not call for specific training or special equipment to deal with civil emergencies, much of the Forces' materiel and the expertise developed through normal training is suitable for such missions.

Maritime Command maintains one ship at no more than eight hours' notice to sail and one ready duty Aurora long-range patrol aircraft on each coast. Additional forces on each coast are maintained at notice ranging from 12 to 48 hours, making it possible to quickly dispatch a force to sea if required. Additional aircraft and helicopters may also be provided in the same time frame. These resources have previously served in fisheries patrols, search and rescue, interdiction of illicit drugs, deterrence of illegal immigration and pollution control. The fleet diving units on both coasts can also be made available on short notice

and provide expertise in underwater work, including inspection, salvage, welding, cutting, repairs, demolition, oil recovery, and bomb and ordnance disposal.

Mobile Command forces maintain a state of readiness which will permit quick responses to emergencies, including the provision of humanitarian assistance. Three battalion-sized immediate reaction units are on 12 hours' notice, one in each of Quebec, Ontario and Western Canada. Each of them keeps a 100-soldier strong company-size force on eight hours' notice. Depending on the distance to be travelled, the first troops can normally be expected to reach any suitable airport in Canada within approximately 12 hours. In an emergency, Mobile Command could very rapidly muster approximately 1,800 personnel to deal with a situation anywhere in Canada. A large proportion of army equipment is well suited to deal with civil emergencies. Everything from man-pack radios to portable generators, axes, saws, pneumatic augers, jeeps and large cargo vehicles would be available.

Air Command maintains fighter and search and rescue aircraft on various stages of alert. Search and rescue response time is 30 minutes during working hours and two hours at other times. At anytime, four CF-18s are on alert somewhere in Canada. They could, in an emergency, be tasked for national missions, to do visual reconnaissance or searches for vessels. Other fighter aircraft could be prepared for short-notice alert in approximately 12 hours. Air Transport Group maintains one C-130 on two hours' standby in Edmonton as a contingency for a major air disaster in the North. This aircraft could be used in an emergency situation, and it is normally possible to provide other Hercules aircraft within two hours at either Trenton or Edmonton.

Because of their particular skills and the special relevance of those skills to civil emergencies, the Military Engineers warrant special mention. Their expertise is available at nearly all defence establishments. Mobile Command also has three combat engineer regiments currently located at Chilliwack, British Columbia, Petawawa, and Valcartier, and an independent field squadron in Gagetown. 1 Construction Engineering Unit, a national unit whose role is to provide strategic construction engineer support, is located at Winnipeg. All of these units can provide at least some engineering support in any emergency situations, especially natural disasters. Military engineers have specialized equipment and are capable of accomplishing a wide range of tasks that might be required following a natural disaster, such as damage assessment, emergency repairs, provision of potable water, auxiliary power units, temporary accommodation, general clean-up, specialized transportation (e.g. shallow water boats and rafts for flooded areas) and expedient bridging.

There are two types of medical units in the Canadian Forces capable of providing support in disasters and emergency situations: the three field ambulance units assigned to Mobile Command, and 1 Canadian Field Hospital

assigned to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel). The hospital can provide general surgery, X-ray and laboratory services and sterile medical supplies. It has a 140 bed capability, including 60 intensive care, 40 intermediate care, and 40 minimum care beds, with an overall expansion capability of 50 percent. Deployment of an advanced surgical centre requires 96 hours to mobilize, and 10 C-130 flights. The hospital is self-contained and can re-locate by sea, by road, or by air. Each field ambulance unit has an evacuation platoon on 12 hours' notice to move, which can be deployed using two C-130s. Up to 80 patients can be held by each field ambulance unit for short periods in a crisis situation. Their normal role, however, is medical evacuation, life-sustaining treatment enroute and treatment of minor medical conditions.

Given their comprehensive command and control system, the Canadian Forces have the means to make a substantial contribution in most emergency situations in terms of coordination, communications and transportation. Massive disasters, such as an earthquake, could, however, quickly overwhelm the Forces' capabilities. As the Forces have only a limited capability to deal with large marine oil spills, the most effective assistance they could offer in such circumstances would be in specific areas of expertise, such as communications and logistics support.

One of the initiatives announced as part of the 1992 federal budget is the integration of Emergency Preparedness Canada into the Department of National Defence. This will eliminate overhead costs associated with the maintenance of two separate organizations, and will serve to streamline the emergency planning process.

In addition, responsibility for the Special Emergency Response Team function will be transferred from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to the Department of National Defence, with the handover of operations to occur in 1993. The military team, to be known as Joint Task Force Two, will be composed of carefully selected military personnel from across the Canadian Forces.

### The New Policy

As the Minister announced in September 1991, "the support provided to the civil authorities by the armed forces is liable to assume critical importance" in the years ahead. We will intensify surveillance and monitoring operations in support of Canadian sovereignty. Departmental resources and capabilities will be provided in response to natural disasters at home and abroad. With respect to environmental emergencies, the Department will continue to offer communications, logistics and medical support and where feasible, increase the range of assistance available to aid in environmental protection or clean-up activities. Overall, the Department will place increased emphasis on the ability to



assist civil authorities in areas such as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, environmental monitoring, deterrence of illegal immigration, search and rescue, and protection of economic zone resources.

To achieve these objectives, the Department will determine how it can contribute most effectively to such activities and will undertake to prepare and implement appropriate and effective support programs, particularly where activities also provide a significant return in terms of military training. It will negotiate formal agreements with other government departments confirming the type and level of support that can be made available. The Department is also reviewing current cost recovery policies and procedures to ensure associated costs are kept to an absolute minimum and are fully consistent with the provisions of existing government regulations.

## VI - PEACEKEEPING

Canadians are justifiably proud of the contributions the Canadian Forces have made to international peacekeeping. Canada's men and women in uniform have contributed to every United Nations peacekeeping mission since 1947. Over 80,000 service personnel participating in nearly 30 separate operations have made a tangible difference in the pursuit of peace. Some 80 deaths remind us that such missions have not been without sacrifice. We remain ready to assist the United Nations and other international bodies in their efforts to maintain world stability whenever we can make a genuine contribution to the success of their initiatives.

Since mid-1991, five new United Nations peacekeeping missions have been undertaken. Canada is participating in all of them. Canadian military observers are serving with the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (34 personnel). Canadian military observers are monitoring the ceasefire between government and insurgent forces as part of the UN Angola Verification Mission (15 personnel). The Canadian contingent of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador is helping to oversee the implementation of the recent ceasefire between the government and the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (17 personnel). Canada is contributing to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in support of efforts to bring peace and democracy to that troubled country (20 personnel, to be increased to 103). Canada is also deploying a large number of troops to Croatia as part of the UN Protection Force established in Yugoslavia (1,150 personnel).

In addition, the Canadian Forces are continuing to participate in nine other missions:

- UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (airlift of headquarters);
- Office of the Secretary General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1 person);

- UN Command Military Armistice Commission/Korea (1 person);
- UN Truce Supervision Organization/Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria (19 personnel);
- UN Disengagement Observer Force/Israel, Syria (212 personnel);
- Multinational Force and Observers/Egypt, Israel (25 personnel);
- UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (575 personnel);
- UN Iraq/Kuwait Observation Mission (51 personnel); and
- European Community Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia (12 personnel),

### The Future

As the world moves away from the Cold War, the importance of regional conflict management and, consequently, peace-restoring and peacekeeping, will probably increase. Present trends make it highly unlikely that global war could break out as a result of a direct East-West confrontation. We must, however, remain alert to the danger that broader hostilities could result from escalation of one or more regional conflicts.

The underlying causes of regional conflict -- differences of race, religion or ideology, territorial disputes, population pressures and scarce resources -- will not diminish in importance. The differences between the "North" and the "South" will remain and possibly grow. The spread of sophisticated weaponry throughout the Third World can be expected to continue. The ambitions of some regional powers, and their relatively advanced economic and social development, could encourage the proliferation of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Not all problems will lend themselves to United Nations intervention, nor is the UN the only relevant international agency. The Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community, the Organization for African Unity, the Arab League and the Association of South-East Asian Nations all have a role to play in reducing the risk of serious disputes in their respective areas of influence. In matters of war and peace, these organizations do not enjoy nearly the same credibility as the UN. Yet, as a member of the first four, our country may find that over time any or all of them may wish to call on Canada to provide peacekeeping forces.

In planning for peacekeeping, we must be aware of the changing nature of conflict and the consequent impact on the type of peacekeeping forces needed in the future. Relatively few conflicts today actually pit sovereign states against each other. The largest proportion involve national governments fighting dissidents or secessionist movements. Alternatively, a history of repression may induce the world community to ensure the fairness of elections and the peaceful transition to democracy as it did through the UN in Haiti between October 1990

and February 1991. It could also conceivably become involved where local criminal groups generate substantial civil conflict and social unrest.

While the need for traditional peacekeeping forces will no doubt remain, new forms of instability may call for a new spectrum of international response. This response might cover the field from preventive action, including training in general governmental administration, running of elections, tax collection, and law enforcement, to international armed actions of the type foreseen in the UN Charter aimed at restoring a legitimate government subverted by criminal elements or a neighbour.

Canada's future in peacekeeping is likely to be a continuation of its past. We have recently been invited to help the UN establish large-scale operations in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. In the long term, we expect the demand for peacekeeping missions to grow. We will continue to participate in accordance with the Government's criteria, and provide troops and observers to the maximum extent possible given the structure and commitments of the Canadian Forces. Given the expansion of peacekeeping into new fields, such as electoral assistance, Canada can also expect to receive further requests for civilian support to peacekeeping. One important precedent was the dispatch of members of the RCMP to Namibia as part of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in 1990.

We recognize that the UN is likely in practice to continue to call on us in a number of roles. As we cannot predict its requirements from one operation to the next, Canada can remain a credible potential peacekeeper only if it maintains an array of trained personnel and operational units covering the spectrum of possible peacekeeping functions. To this end, the Canadian Forces will maintain a contingency battalion, an air transport element and a communications element as UN standby forces.

Finally, care must be taken not to take the Canadian Forces' expertise for granted. Our past successes have not been due to a specialization in the requirements of peacekeeping tasks, but to the general purpose nature of our forces, which are highly trained, adequately equipped, well-commanded, disciplined, professional and prepared for the hardship of conflict. Our value as international peacekeepers is the result of the professionalism of our forces.

#### Humanitarian Assistance

In recent years, the Canadian Forces have provided humanitarian assistance in Armenia, Montserrat, Jamaica, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Russia and Estonia, as well as to Kurdish refugees on the Turkish-Iraqi border. For the most part, the Department of National Defence responds to requests for assistance through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which is the lead agency for



the federal government in this area. In executing international emergency and humanitarian assistance projects, CIDA often relies on the skills and resources of the Canadian Forces, whose logistical capabilities are well suited to the task at hand. Indeed, the Forces possess many of the highly specialized skills (medical, engineering, air transport and communications) most needed in the early stages of an international relief effort. The Canadian Forces will continue to provide assistance whenever possible within the limits of their capabilities, and wherever the scale of human suffering is such that local and international civilian resources cannot cope.

## VII - ARMS CONTROL

The maintenance of adequate defences and the pursuit of arms control are complementary aspects of broader security policy, the ultimate aim of which is to prevent hostilities. Countries determined to acquire large, modern arsenals will do so irrespective of any agreements. Arms control does, however, make it difficult to build up offensive capabilities and thus offers a way to enhance mutual security. As part of its commitment to strengthen international stability, Canada has pursued a variety of arms control initiatives.

### Nuclear Arms Control

Canada takes an active part in multilateral nuclear negotiations and consultations. We welcome the remarkable progress achieved over the past few years in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and look to further progress in talks with the successor states to the Soviet Union, which have signalled their intention to abide by existing agreements. We are also pleased to have had a voice in the decisions of the Atlantic Alliance to cut its nuclear arsenal in Europe by some 90 percent in little more than a dozen years. Where once NATO relied on a wide variety of nuclear warheads, including those for short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, nuclear mines, nuclear depth charges, cruise missiles, nuclear artillery shells and anti-aircraft weapons, all that will remain are limited numbers of air-delivered weapons.

**Nuclear Testing** - Canada will support efforts toward an early agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, so as to end nuclear testing. As the Government supports an incremental, but deliberate and progressive approach to a nuclear test ban, we welcomed the 1990 Bush-Gorbachev agreement on verification protocols, which finalized the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. The conclusion of these two treaties, which restrict the yield of permissible underground nuclear weapons tests to 150 kilotons, represents one of the most important accomplishments in the limitation of nuclear tests to date. For its part, Canada has upgraded the seismic array station in Yellowknife as a means of nuclear tests verification.

**Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT)** - The Non-Proliferation Treaty, originally signed in 1968, is intended, inter alia, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Since it came into effect in 1970, no additional state has overtly acquired nuclear weapons, but several are suspected of either possessing nuclear weapons or having advanced research and production programs. The parties to the agreement will meet again in 1995 to discuss the future of the treaty. As one of the treaty's original supporters, and a member of the London Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose uniform code for nuclear exports goes beyond NPT obligations, Canada will advocate the indefinite extension of the treaty's term. It will also support the strengthening and refining of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard system, especially its "special inspection" element, and press for global adherence to the regime.

### Conventional Arms Control

**Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)** - The treaty signed in 1990 by the nations of the NATO Alliance, on one side, and those of the then Warsaw Pact, on the other, provided a tangible building block for a cooperative European security foundation by limiting the weapons best suited to surprise attacks and large-scale offensives.

In ongoing follow-up negotiations, Canada is focusing on national manpower and equipment ceilings, rather than alliance totals, particularly as states now independent from the former Soviet Union insist on maintaining their own military establishments. Canada has endorsed the position, taken by the other CFE signatories, that the quantity of armaments held by any one country in the reduction zone ought to be reduced to the lowest level possible. As a matter of general principle, we have held that the goal of greater conventional stability can best be achieved by the reduction of force levels to those required for self-defence. We continue to work for early ratification by the successor states to the Soviet Union, and are actively cooperating with them on the treaty's eventual implementation.

**Confidence- and Security-Building Measures** - In negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures held under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Canada's goal is to seek greater transparency in military activities and build on the program of reciprocal inspections and observations now in place. Because contacts between military organizations enhance a common appreciation of each member state's security problems, Canada also supports exchanges of views such as the Seminars on Military Doctrine and Strategies held in February 1990 and October 1991. In May 1991, Canada and the former Soviet Union signed an agreement designed to reduce the possibility of incidents arising when the two countries' armed forces exercise or operate in close proximity to each other. In March 1992, new negotiations began in Helsinki. With its expanded membership, the CSCE has

displayed a willingness to actively pursue solutions to problems arising from the new situation in Europe. Canada continues to attach considerable importance to the Conference, as it remains a useful forum in which to support these goals and advance our security interests.

In 1989, US President Bush revived President Eisenhower's 1955 Open Skies proposal, which would permit flights by unarmed surveillance aircraft over the territory of all members of NATO and the then Warsaw Pact. On 6 January 1990, in a demonstration of support, Canada and Hungary tested flight procedures over Hungary. A "return" flight was conducted for the same purpose over Canada in January 1992. In February 1990, Canada hosted the first Open Skies conference, which was followed by a second meeting in Budapest several months later. An agreement was signed at the March 1992 CSCE meeting in Helsinki.

#### Other Multilateral Arms Control

**Chemical Weapons** - Canada attaches a high priority to the negotiations at the 39-nation Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, which is pursuing a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention banning the development, production, possession and use of chemical weapons. Following the Gulf War, the Department participated in several inspections directed at chemical weapons facilities in Iraq in support of the UN Special Commission.

**Missile Technology Control Regime** - In 1987, the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) announced a coordinated policy to control the export of missile equipment and technology that could contribute to the acquisition of ballistic missiles by other countries. If successful, attempts to control the proliferation of these systems, which could potentially deliver nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, will usefully complement such agreements as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada will seek to broaden the scope of the regime and increase its membership.

**Arms Transfers** - Efforts to curb arms transfers were intensified in 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War. On 18 October 1991, the five permanent members of the Security Council agreed to common guidelines for the export of conventional weapons. In November 1991, the UN First Committee passed a resolution calling on member states to provide data on their imports and exports of significant categories of weapons, such as main battle tanks, combat aircraft and large calibre artillery systems. Canada co-sponsored the resolution, which was approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1991.

**Verification** - Canada will continue its work at the United Nations in support of effective verification regimes, and devote resources toward the verification of any agreement to which Canada is a signatory. In addition to the Department's

existing Directorate of Nuclear and Arms Control Policy, a new Directorate of Arms Control Verification Operations coordinates and executes National Defence obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document. New and prospective agreements, such as the Open Skies accord and a chemical weapons treaty, will also entail Department of National Defence involvement.

## **CONCLUSION**

Since 1989, the international environment has changed dramatically. In light of this transformation, Canada is working to enhance existing institutions and create new ones where necessary, in the interests of stability and cooperation. This Statement sets out the military contribution Canada expects to make to these efforts, and how the Canadian Forces will continue to defend and promote our security and well-being.

While the challenges the Canadian Forces face abroad are changing, so too are the domestic factors affecting defence policy. Canadians are enlarging their definition of national security and looking to the Canadian Forces to play a greater role in assistance to civil authorities. The new defence policy addresses the need for the Canadian Forces to play a greater role in those areas which more directly affect the daily lives of the Canadian people.

A sound defence rests ultimately on a solid economy and healthy public finances. The defence program set out in this Statement was designed within a funding framework that allows for no more than the minimum defence effort consistent with Canadian security requirements.

While the principles of Canadian defence policy remain valid, they will need to be interpreted in light of the evolving geostrategic and regional security situation. In the face of continuing volatility and unpredictability, Canada will seek to work through existing institutions to promote stability. Despite enhanced opportunities for cooperation, the possibility of conflict cannot be ignored. We must retain the capability to respond, as we have done in the past, in NATO, in collective actions such as those carried out in the Gulf and in peacekeeping operations.

With a clear and affordable policy designed to meet Canadian needs and supported by the Canadian people, a concrete program designed to implement that policy, and steady, predictable long-term funding, the Department of National Defence will be able to field forces which respond to the challenges we face, while continuing to offer its members an opportunity to serve their country with pride.