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CANADIAN Social Trends

Features

Also in this issue

Court referrals for a group of youth and young adults

by Anthony Matarazzo

This article has been adapted from the report "Court Careers of a Canadian Birth Cohort" which is part of the *Crime and Justice Research Paper Series*. For a full list of references, please see the original report which is available free at www.statcan.ca/english/research/85-561-MIE/85-561-MIE2005006.htm.

In 2005, a violent upsurge in deadly shootings took the lives of 52 people in Toronto. The worst attacks took place in the summer and fall, in what residents now call "The Summer of the Gun." Many of the suspects, as well as their victims, were teens or young adults. On Boxing Day, a running gun battle between young members of rival gangs on Toronto's busy Yonge Street killed one 15-year-old shopper and wounded six other passers-by.[1] In May 2006, a 12-year-old in Alberta and her 23-year-old boyfriend were charged with first-degree murder in the deaths of her parents and younger brother.

As horrifying as these crimes by young people are, they are so rare that they fall completely outside the range of normal adolescent criminal behaviour. Most of the offences committed by teenagers can be considered part of growing up – acting out, testing limits, trying to win the approval of peers. In fact, the rambunctious behaviour of teenagers has chafed at adults in every generation.

One of the most basic questions about juvenile delinquency is actually the most difficult to answer. What percentage of young people actually commits crimes? Only by knowing the extent of the problem can authorities develop effective solutions that protect society without throwing away the future of an immature offender.

Through self-report surveys, which rely on respondents to admit to any criminal acts, it appears that adolescent involvement in minor 'illegal' behaviour is fairly widespread, but that few are brought to the attention of the police or referred to court for formal processing. For the majority of these young people, this behaviour is temporary and very few go on to become persistent and serious offenders.[2]

Official data, on the other hand, suggest that a small segment of the youth population has formal contact with criminal justice authorities and that an even smaller proportion is responsible for the majority of criminal activity. Unlike self-report delinquency, official crime data measures illegal behaviour which has first been detected, then reported to authorities, and subsequently dealt with—formally or informally—by the police or courts. As such, these data may be best seen as providing valuable and necessary information on the response of the criminal justice system to illegal activities, as opposed to actual levels of crime in society.

This article examines involvement with the court system of young Canadians born between April 1979 and March 1980. It identifies how large a proportion of them were referred to court and the type of offence with which they were charged. Using data from the Youth Court Survey and the Adult Criminal Court Survey, it follows them as they moved from youth to young adulthood—that is, from age 12 to 21, inclusive.

Almost one in five individuals referred to court by age 21

Almost one in five (18%) Canadians born between April 1979 and March 1980 were referred to youth court or adult criminal court in relation to offences they committed before their 22nd birthday. Males comprised the vast majority of the group of 59,000 offenders and were almost four times more likely to be referred to court, at 28% compared with only 8% of females over the 10-year period.

Of these young individuals who appeared before a judge, 72% were found guilty of the offence with which they were charged. This rate of conviction also varied considerably between the sexes, with nearly three-quarters (74%) of males but 61% of females being found guilty.

While these estimates must be compared with those from other studies with caution, the *overall* prevalence rates for this birth cohort are consistent with those reported in similar studies conducted in Denmark, England, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States.[3]

How old are young people committing their first offence?

The relationship between age and crime has become a "staple" in criminological research. Many studies have revealed a pattern that shows a sharp

CST Just under one in five members of the study cohort appeared in court at least once during the period 1991 to 2001

	Birth cohort (April 1, 1979 to March 31,1980)		
	Population *	Number referred to court	% referred to court
Total	323,328	59,000	18
Male	165,900	46,909	28
Female	157,428	12,091	8

* These figures represent the estimated number of 21-year-olds in the six provinces in 2000/01.

Sources: Statistics Canada, Youth Court and Adult Court Statistics, 1991 to 2001; Annual Demographic Statistics, 2003.

CST What you should know about this study

This study uses the Youth Court Survey and the Adult Criminal Court Survey to trace the path through the court system of all people born between April 1, 1979 and March 31, 1980. Individuals are included in the study population if they had been charged with at least one federal statute offence that was referred to court between April 1, 1991 and March 31, 2001. The data cover six provinces which collectively account for about 78% of Canada's youth population: Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Manitoba and British Columbia are excluded from the study because they did not provide the adult court data which is necessary to follow the birth cohort to age 21.

Referral

The term "referral" signifies offences being brought to youth court or adult criminal court which occurred on the same date, whether or not there was a finding of guilt. As such, the terms "offence" and "offenders" used throughout this article refer to offences allegedly committed and alleged offenders.

Study population

Using the court survey data, one cannot track exactly the same group of individuals for ten years—from their 12th birthday up to their 22nd birthday. However, population data by province for each age and sex may be used to estimate the size of the birth cohort for each year as the individuals aged from 12 to 21 years old. For calculating overall prevalence rates, the study used the largest approximate population (the number of 21-year-olds in 2000) as its base; age-specific rates, on the other hand, simply used yearly population data to determine the approximate population of each corresponding age group.

Classification of offences

Offences are classified into four groups—against the person, against property, against the administration of justice, and other — according to the nature of the most serious charge resulting from the incident. The most serious charge representing the case being referred to court is classified using a seriousness scale developed by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada. Readers should note that this classification procedure may result in the number of less serious offences being underestimated.

Offences against the person: This category includes homicide, attempted murder, robbery, sexual assault, other sexual offences, major and common assault, uttering threats, criminal harassment and other crimes against the person.

Offences against property: This category includes theft, break and enter, fraud, mischief, possession of stolen property, and other property crimes.

Offences against administration of justice: This category includes failure to appear, breach of probation, unlawfully at large, failure to comply with an order, offences under the *Young Offenders Act*, and other administration of justice offences.

Other offences: This category includes weapons offences, prostitution, disturbing the peace, residual Criminal Code offences, impaired driving and other Criminal Code traffic offences, drug possession, drug trafficking and other federal statute offences.

Males were almost four times more likely than females to be referred to court

Note: Female axis has been scaled up to highlight differences in male/female age-related prevalence rates
Source: Statistics Canada, Youth Court Survey and Adult Criminal Court Survey, 1991 to 2001; Annual Demographic Statistics, 2003.

More than 4 in 10 male cohort members who were referred to court first appeared after their 18th birthday



Source: Statistics Canada, Youth Court Survey and Adult Criminal Court Survey, 1991 to 2001; Annual Demographic Statistics, 2003.

increase in offending activities during early adolescence, with a marked peak in the mid- to late-teen years; this is then followed by a steady decline into adulthood.[4] When using official court data, the relationship between age and crime may be presented in two different ways – *age-at-onset* and *age-specific prevalence* – depending on the research objective. Age-at-onset identifies the age of the individual at the time of the offence which led to their first court referral; age-specific prevalence highlights each age at which individuals were involved in an incident which resulted in charges being referred to court.

While the overall pattern of age-at-onset for both males and females resembled the general age-crime curve reported in most studies, this pattern varies between the sexes. Among males in the study cohort, the number committing a first offence leading to a court referral increased continually up to the ages of 16 to 18. This onset peaked at 18, when approximately 4% of male cohort members became first-time offenders.

For females, on the other hand, there was a much sharper increase in the number of first-time offenders at younger ages and a much earlier peak occurring at age 15. At that age, approximately 1% of the female cohort was involved in an incident that led to their first court referral. The female pattern of onset then drops substantially as it seems the maturation process reduces this type of behaviour.

Four out of ten cohort members appeared in court after age 18

The majority of individuals in the cohort committed their first offence between the ages of 12 and 17. There were, however, a substantial number of individuals referred to court for the first time at older ages. The literature, generally based on self-report or police data, widely reports that criminal offending usually begins in childhood or early adolescence.

However, this is not borne out when official court data on referrals and warnings is examined.

Four out of ten cohort members who were referred to court first went into the system after an incident which occurred after their 18th birthday. This pattern varied between the sexes with 42% of male onset and 34% of female onset occurring after this time. Both of these rates, however, would be considerably higher if cohort members could have been tracked later into adulthood.

This overall pattern may reflect, in part, a tendency for police, prosecutors, and other screening agencies to deal with alleged offenders younger than 18 by means other than the formal court process. Sections of the *Young Offenders Act* specifically encouraged authorities to use alternatives to the formal court process in jurisdictions when it was possible. These alternatives often relied on police discretion to use such measures as warnings, cautions and referrals to community programs. These types of extrajudicial measures allowed for early intervention with young people while reducing the burden on the courts and corrections facilities.

Most young people referred to court for property-related crimes

As with age-at-onset, the overall rates of referral to court at each specific age also resembled the commonly reported age-crime curve. The patterns of referral are similar for males and females, except that prevalence for females rises relatively faster at young ages and peaks earlier at the age of 16, when 1.7% of the female cohort was referred to court. In contrast, the peak age of prevalence for males in the cohort (7.6%) was 18 years.

Up to the age of 16, more males and females are referred to court for property-related incidents than for any other type of offence. The rate then falls quite sharply. (See "What

CST About one-third of offenders in the female cohort also appeared for the first time as adults



Source: Statistics Canada, Youth Court Survey and Adult Criminal Court Survey, 1991 to 2001; Annual Demographic Statistics, 2003.

CST The peak age for court referrals is 15 for females and 18 for males



Note: Female axis has been scaled up to highlight male/female differences.
Source: Statistics Canada, Youth Court Survey and Adult Criminal Court Survey, 1991 to 2001; Annual Demographic Statistics, 2003.

CST **Court referral rates for offences other than property-related offences peak at 18 and 19 for males**



Source: Statistics Canada, Youth Court Survey and Adult Criminal Court Survey, 1991 to 2001; Annual Demographic Statistics, 2003.

CST **Court referrals for females committing property crimes peak at age 16**



Source: Statistics Canada, Youth Court Survey and Adult Criminal Court Survey, 1991 to 2001; Annual Demographic Statistics, 2003.

you should know about this study" for a list of crimes included in each offence category.)

For males, rates of referral to court for offences against the person and against the administration of justice increase slowly up to age 18 and then remain relatively stable into adulthood. Rates for other related offences, on the other hand, peaks at age 19 when the rate is almost twice as high as those for the remaining categories. This jump may be due partly to the police being less lenient with adults than with adolescents, and partly to higher rates of drinking-driving offences among 18- to 21-year-olds.

In contrast, females continue to go to court mainly for property-related offences until age 21, at which time the likelihood of referral for each type of offence is approximately equal. The rate of referral for an incident involving an offence against a person also peaks three years earlier for female (age 15) than for male cohort members.

Summary

As teenagers make the transition into early adulthood, many may be involved in behaviour which could be considered "law-violating". For many, however, this behaviour goes undetected and simply represents a regular part of "growing up". For others, not only is this behaviour detected but it is also reported, marking their first contact with the formal criminal justice system and setting a different pathway in this *life course* transition.

For most young people, these contacts are for very minor types of infractions and are often isolated to the early years of adolescence. Prevalence rates of court referral provide some indication of the nature and extent of these behaviours, and highlight the "size of the problem" from the perspective of the criminal justice system. More importantly, however, they also highlight the number of young lives in which

Canadian courts have an opportunity to intervene and set back onto the right path to adulthood.

Anthony Matarazzo is a senior research analyst with the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada.

1. http://www.canadafreepress.com/2005/toronto123005.htm. Accessed May 18, 2006.
2. Le Blanc, M. and M. Fréchette. 1989. *Male Criminal Activity from Childhood Through Youth: Multilevel and Developmental Perspectives*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
3. Comparisons of prevalence estimates must be made with caution because studies differ in many ways: for example, the historical period when the population was observed, the period of their lives when the population was observed, the indicator of criminal behaviour which was used (e.g. police contact, arrest, apprehension, or charging; referral to court, or conviction), the range of illegal behaviour which was included (e.g. traffic violations, juvenile status offences such as truancy, etc.) and the juvenile and criminal justice process in effect in the jurisdiction(s) studied—particularly the screening and diversion practices for young persons, which might significantly reduce official reports of offending.
4. Piquero, A.R., D.P. Farrington and A. Blumstein. 2003. "The criminal career paradigm." *Crime and Justice. A Review of Research*. Vol. 30. M. Tonry (ed.).

When is junior moving out? Transitions from the parental home to independence

by Pascale Beaupré, Pierre Turcotte and Anne Milan

Children obtain most of their early socialization at home with their parents, where they acquire the experiences and ideas that will influence their adult years.[1] Consequently, leaving the parental home is a significant event for both parents and children. For the parents, it may represent relief, pride in having fulfilled their parental role, and joy at seeing their children move towards greater independence. For the children, the first departure is a symbolic marker as they make the transition from youth to adulthood.

However, there has been a substantial increase in children still living at home long past the age when their parents expected them to leave. The largest growth has occurred among young adults in their late 20s or early 30s: between 1981 and 2001, the proportions doubled from 12% to 24% for those aged 25 to 29 and from 5% to 11% for those aged 30 to 34.[2]

Most of this increase took place during the early 1980s and early 1990s, years during which Canada endured two of the most severe labour recessions since the 1930s. Given the context, it does seem fair to ask whether young adults are really taking longer to leave the nest than their parents did.

This article uses data from the 2001 General Social Survey (GSS) to examine patterns in leaving the parental home. It compares the transition process for five birth cohorts, with the focus on Wave 1 Boomers (born 1947-56) and Generation X (born 1967-76). The differences in patterns of leaving the parental home are examined, and then the principal factors associated with a young person's initial departure from home are identified.

More children staying home longer

According to the 2001 GSS, only 87% of Generation X had left the parental home at least once and (as expected) almost all of Wave 1 had done so. Of course, leaving the parental home does not preclude a child from returning, but the transition of Wave 1s seems relatively smooth compared with Gen Xers. About 14% of Wave 1 Boomers returned home after their first attempt at leaving, while almost one-quarter (22%) of Gen Xers had boomeranged.

Using life-table estimates, it is possible to examine the changes across generations in the timing of children's first departure from the parental home. Younger Wave 1 male Boomers (born 1952-56) had a 59% probability of leaving by age 21, compared with 46% for younger Generation X males (born 1972-76). On the other hand, older Gen Xers had a higher likelihood of leaving by age 21 than older Wave 1s (born 1947-51), at 53% versus 49%. (Table of cumulative probabilities for all cohorts in Table A.1.)

Women tended to leave home earlier than men, largely because they marry or cohabit at younger ages[3], and in this study, this was especially the case for women in the older cohorts. There was a two-thirds probability that both older and younger Wave 1 women had first launched before turning 21; the probability dropped to 59% and then 55% for older and younger Generation X women. (See Table A.1.)

Of course, economic conditions had changed considerably between the time that Wave 1 quit the nest and the time that Gen X was expected to leave. Well-paying unionized jobs were not nearly as plentiful, and real wages for young workers had fallen, reducing the incentive and opportunity for independence. (See "It's a wild world: Changing labour market conditions after the postwar boom").

CST What you should know about this study

This study is based on data from the 2001 General Social Survey (GSS) on family history. The GSS interviewed 24,310 individuals aged 15 and over, living in private households in the 10 provinces. One section of the survey collected data on the number of times respondents left the parental home and their age at the time of each of these events. Information about first and last departure allows the process of "launching from home" to be examined for several generations of Canadians. This study is based on individuals aged 15 to 69 in 2001.[1]

Five birth cohorts are examined, with the text focusing on Wave 1 Boomers and Generation X:
Generation Y – born between 1977 and 1986, and 15 to 24 years old at the time of the survey;
Generation X – born 1967 to 1976, aged 25 to 34;
Wave 2 Boomers – born 1957 to 1966, aged 35 to 44;
Wave 1 Boomers – born 1947 to 1956, aged 45 to 54; and
War/Depression generation – born 1932 to 1946, aged 55 to 69 at the time of the 2001 GSS.

The process of leaving home is analysed in two steps. First, life-tables are used to calculate the cumulative probabilities that highlight the differences in the intensity and timing of home-leaving between cohorts. Second, event history analysis is used to identify the demographic and socio-economic factors associated with the home-leaving process. These factors are presented as risk ratios. Involuntary departures (such as parental deaths) and all departures before age 15 are excluded from this analysis.

Launch: A child's first departure from the parental home to live independently. If the child does not return, the launch is described as successful.

Boomerang: A child's return to the parental home after a period of living independently (usually assumed to be a minimum of four months in many studies).

Risk ratio: Ratio of the estimated probability of an event occurring (e.g., leaving home for the first time) versus the estimated probability of the event occurring for a reference group. For example, if the probability of leaving home for the first time at age 21 was 20% for Wave 1 Baby Boomers and it was 10% for the reference cohort (say, the War/Depression generation) after controlling for all other variables in the model, then the risk ratio would be 2.0. Risk ratios over 1.0 indicate a higher risk associated with that characteristic, compared to the reference group; a risk ratio less than 1.0 indicates a lower risk.

The risk ratios were calculated based on a proportional hazard model using the following explanatory variables: birth cohort; family environment when the respondent was age 15 (family composition, number of siblings, mother's and father's main activity, mother's birthplace); the respondent's place of residence when he or she was 15 (region/province, size of town/city); and the level of education the respondent had obtained by the time he or she first left the parental home; and the respondent's employment status at the time of first departure. Separate models were run for men and women.

1. Based on respondents' interpretation and recollection of the age at which they first left home.

The reasons for leaving the parental home have also changed. Most young adults today move out voluntarily to pursue educational or employment opportunities, or simply live independently of their parents. However, studies have consistently found that children who leave home for these reasons are significantly more likely to boomerang than those who leave to marry and set up their own conjugal household.[4]

Birth cohort a key predictor of leaving home earlier

Researchers have been examining the path to independence for many years, and have identified a number of important influences on the transition from the parental home to independence. A wide variety of factors unique to the individual and the family play a role, of course; on the larger stage, general economic conditions, jobs opportunities, family financial pressures and regional diversity are also linked.[5]

Exactly how old a young person is when he or she first leaves the parental home depends on their unique situation. However, a risk ratio calculated using a proportional hazard model can estimate the probability that a person's first departure will occur at a younger or older age than a reference individual, when all other factors are controlled for. (See "What you should know about this study" for the list of variables included in the model.)

CST **By age 21, about half of men in Wave 1 and Gen X had left their parents' home for the first time**



Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2001.

CST **But over half of women in Wave 1 and in Generation X had left home by age 20**



Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2001.

Earning a living is a key step to independence, so the state of the economy plays an important role when a young person is deciding whether to leave home. Reaching adulthood in a good or bad job market is entirely an accident of birth, and it is not surprising that young men from Generation X had a 16% lower probability of an early first departure than men in the War/Depression cohort. Similarly, women had a 12% lower risk of leaving home at a given age if they belonged to Gen X than to the 1932-46 cohort, which reached adulthood during the economic heyday of the 1950s and 1960s, while the younger cohort faced the difficult labour market of the 1990s.

Non-traditional and large families encourage earlier first departure

Children who experience family disruption during their childhood generally leave home earlier, probably as a way to deal with difficult relationships or other problems in the family.[6] This seems to be especially true of women. When all other variables are controlled for, women who spent at least part of their childhood in a step-family had a 57% higher risk of leaving at a younger age than women who grew up in an intact family (both biological parents present). Men raised in a step-family also had a greater likelihood of leaving home earlier, but the increased risk (30%) was substantially lower than for women from step-families. In short, the presence of a step-parent seems to encourage young adults to leave home at an earlier age.

Generally, young people who leave home before age 18 due to an unstable family situation may not feel they have the option of returning home if they need help. This tends to expose premature leavers to having lower educational attainment, poorer labour market attachment and associated difficulties. In contrast, staying in a stable home environment after age 25 can provide a child with

CST Demographic and socioeconomic factors associated with leaving home for the first time

Respondent characteristics	Men	Women
	Risk ratios	
Birth cohort		
War/Depression	*1.00*	*1.00*
Wave 1 Boomers	0.99	1.09
Wave 2 Boomers	0.92*	0.95
Generation X	0.84*	0.88*
Generation Y	0.57*	0.58*
Family structure while growing up		
Two-parent intact family	*1.00*	*1.00*
Step-parent	1.30*	1.57*
Lone-parent	1.16*	1.22*
Other	1.13	1.69*
Number of siblings		
Only child	0.93	1.01
One sibling	*1.00*	*1.00*
Two siblings	1.06	1.07
Three siblings	1.20*	1.13*
Four siblings or more	1.26*	1.22*
Main activity of mother when respondent was age 15		
Mother worked	*1.00*	*1.00*
Did not work	0.88*	0.92*
Main activity of father when respondent was age 15		
Father worked	*1.00*	*1.00*
Did not work	1.34	1.32
Birth place of mother		
Mother born in Canada	*1.00*	*1.00*
Born outside Canada	0.69*	0.77*

Respondent characteristics	Men	Women
	Risk ratios	
Religious attendance at age 15		
Weekly	*1.00*	*1.00*
Sometimes	1.06	1.11*
Never	1.22*	1.27*
Region of residence at age 15		
Atlantic	1.10*	1.18*
Quebec	*1.00*	*1.00*
Ontario	1.15*	1.10*
Prairies	1.54*	1.64*
British Columbia	1.42*	1.50*
Outside Canada	1.09	1.06
Size of city where respondent lived at age 15		
Less than 5,000	1.44*	1.80*
5,000 to 24,999	1.36*	1.60*
25,000 to 99,999	1.27*	1.39*
100,000 to 999,999	1.10*	1.17*
1,000,000 or more	*1.00*	*1.00*
Level of schooling when respondent left home		
Less than secondary	0.92	1.12*
Had secondary diploma	*1.00*	*1.00*
Postsecondary degree, certificate or diploma	1.12*	0.94
Employment status when respondent left home		
Did not work	*1.00*	*1.00*
Did work	1.13*	1.03

* Statistically significant difference from reference group (shown in italics) at $p < 0.05$.

Note: Risk ratios were generated with a proportional hazard model. Risk ratios over 1.0 indicate a higher risk associated with that characteristic, compared to the reference group; a risk ratio less than 1.0 indicates a lower risk.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2001.

more resources to pursue a higher education or to build up savings, thus building a solid foundation for adult independence.[7]

Growing up in a large family also promotes being independent sooner rather than later. Men with three siblings had a 20% greater chance of moving out compared to someone the same age with only one sibling. Similarly, women had an 13% greater chance. And having four or more brothers or sisters at home increased the probability of leaving home earlier even more.

Parental employment linked to first launch

Having a mother who was not in the paid labour force during their adolescence seems to reduce the likelihood of moving out of the parental home, when all other factors are controlled for. Compared to people the same age whose mothers had worked outside the home, men had a 12% lower and women an 8% lower probability of leaving home if their mothers had not been employed when they were 15. However, the effect of having an unemployed father was not statistically significant for either young men or women.

Mother's place of birth and the respondent's teenaged religious attendance habits influence home leaving

A young person's cultural background can influence the process of leaving home, and ethnicity and religious observance play significant roles. Researchers have noted that if a family has preserved some of the ethnic norms and preferences of a familistic culture intact, children tend

CST It's a wild world: Changing labour market conditions after the postwar boom

Economic conditions in Canada have changed substantially since the 1960s and early 1970s when the first wave of the baby boom left home. Many of these changes have effectively slowed the transition from adolescence to adulthood; indeed, in some instances, it is fair to say that they may have changed the definition of adulthood.

After the Second World War, demand for skilled labour increased and enrolment in postsecondary education skyrocketed. By 1971, 46% of the prime working-age population (aged 25 to 54) had more than twelve years of schooling, compared to 10% in 1951. Over the same period, the percentage with a university degree more than doubled from 2% to 5%.

Due in part to the rapidly improving educational levels of the workforce, the 1950s and 1960s produced the biggest earnings gains of the century in real terms – almost 43% and 37%, respectively. This was the job market into which the first wave of the baby boom graduated.

The labour market which greeted the second wave of the baby boom was considerably different. In 1973, the oil crisis catapulted the economy into a period of simultaneous high unemployment and high inflation. In the late 1970s, interest rates were increased sharply to beat down inflation. Economists generally agree that the resulting recession of 1981-82 was the most severe since the Depression.

By 1983, the economy was pulling out of recession and job growth accelerated. However, it became apparent that the position of workers under age 35 was worsening. In the late 1970s, the real earnings of young workers began to fall in Canada and other industrialized nations. Young men bore the brunt of this trend, although young women also experienced relative declines in earnings. So although the mid- to late-1980s are frequently remembered as years of excessive conspicuous consumption, most young workers were comparatively worse off.

The recession of 1990-92 was not as severe as that 10 years before, but it lasted longer. Downsizing — the permanent elimination of jobs — was significantly higher, the recovery was slower to take hold, there was little full-time job creation until late in the decade, and wages remained flat.

In the 1990s, firms increasingly began to control their costs using non-permanent workers, and Gen X found itself looking for work in a job market that would probably be unrecognizable to their parents. Instead of hiring new employees, firms contracted their work out to other firms and self-employed individuals. This strategy effectively blocks work opportunities for young people, who are usually too inexperienced to successfully bid for contract work. In addition, even though unemployment rates remained above 10%, unemployment insurance regulations were tightened up and the new restrictions fell particularly hard on young people.

However, the 1990s ended with a strong economic recovery. Unemployment levels were lower than they had been for 10 years, income tax rates began to drop and disposable income started to rise faster than inflation.

Throughout these uneasy years, many young people stayed in school to improve their education and skills. But at the same time, postsecondary tuition fees more than doubled and governments offered students less grant assistance. Now more dependent on loans to pay for their studies, Gen Xers were entering the labour market with substantially increased debt loads.

- For more information, see "100 Years of Labour Force", *Canadian Social Trends* 57: 2-14; "100 Years of Education" and "100 Years of Income and Spending", *Canadian Social Trends* 59: 3-12.

to launch at older ages than those with British backgrounds.[8] According to the GSS, men whose mother was born in a foreign country had a 31% lower probability of moving out early than men whose mother was Canadian-born; the probability for women was 23% lower.

The importance of family and kinship ties to people with strong religious beliefs has been well-documented,[9] and respondents who often attended religious services in their youth might internalize these values. Certainly, compared with respondents who had attended services once a week, individuals who had never attended as a teen were more likely to depart at a younger age: the probability was 22% higher for men and 27% higher for women, when all other factors are controlled for.

Westerners more likely to leave home early

Region of residence, especially during childhood, has an effect on patterns of leaving home because it tends to create, support or reinforce social norms. Compared to adults who spent at least part of their childhood in Quebec, people who grew up in any other province had a greater likelihood of launching early. The highest probabilities were recorded in the West: they were 64% greater for women and 54% greater for men who had grown up in the Prairies, and 50% and 42% greater, respectively, if they had lived in British Columbia as a teen. The differences were not as great in Ontario or Atlantic Canada, but the risk ratios were significantly higher compared to Quebec, when all other factors are controlled for.

Smaller towns prompt earlier departures from the nest

People raised in small towns (less than 5,000) had the greatest likelihood of leaving home, compared to those raised in cities with populations over one million. Women, especially, left small towns at a younger age. When all other variables are controlled for, they had an 80% greater probability of an early first departure, while men had a 44% greater likelihood. Even those who grew up in a mid-size city of 25,000 to 100,000 had a higher likelihood of leaving sooner.

Geography influences the cost of housing, job availability and access to higher education. Young adults in a very large city might delay moving out because the cost of setting up an independent household is prohibitive, while those from less urban areas may accelerate their first launch because they can only obtain education, employment or labour market skills in a bigger city.[10]

Men with higher education leave sooner

Education is also associated with an earlier first departure. Men who have at least some postsecondary education had a 12% higher chance of leaving the parental home than young men who were the same age but had only high school graduation. For women, the opposite is true; that is, women without high school had a 12% greater probability of leaving home at a younger age than those with secondary completion.

The literature generally suggests that having personal income is an important predictor of leaving home sooner rather than later.[11] The risk of leaving home at a younger age was 13% higher for employed than unemployed men whereas there was no statistically significant difference in risk between employed and unemployed young women.

Summary

Leaving the parental home is seen as an important event on the path to adulthood, although young adults today seem to delay leaving the nest. The exact timing of the first departure may be influenced by many factors, such as relationship formation, educational or employment opportunities, or expectations about establishing an independent household.

The GSS shows that those born during the early to mid 1950s left home earlier than later cohorts of young adults. In addition, young adults are more likely to leave home sooner rather than later if they spend at least part of their childhood in a non-traditional family, have more than two siblings, have a Canadian-born mother, did not attend religious services during adolescence, live in a region outside Quebec and grow up in a smaller town.

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CST Table A.1 Cumulative probabilities of first leaving home for men and women

Age at first departure	Generation/Age in 2001 at time of survey/Years of birth cohort										
	Generation Y		Generation X		Wave 2 Boomers		Wave 1 Boomers		War/ Depression		
	15 to 19	20 to 24	25 to 29	30 to 34	35 to 39	40 to 44	45 to 49	50 to 54	55 to 59	60 to 64	65 to 69
	1982 to 1986	1977 to 1981	1972 to 1976	1967 to 1971	1962 to 1966	1957 to 1961	1952 to 1956	1947 to 1951	1942 to 1946	1937 to 1941	1932 to 1936
Men	probabilities										
15	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
16	0.7	2.3	1.9	2.5	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.2	3.3	3.5	4.8
17	2.7	5.1	6.1	6.5	6.9	7.1	7.5	7.6	10.2	9.6	10.4
18	6.5	10.1	12.4	12.6	16.6	13.5	19.0	13.9	16.4	16.5	21.1
19	11.9	20.4	26.4	31.4	33.4	29.0	37.5	27.3	30.5	27.8	33.4
20	...	28.4	37.1	43.3	44.1	41.1	49.0	38.0	39.5	39.7	39.9
21	...	34.7	46.3	53.0	52.4	51.2	58.6	49.4	51.8	47.4	50.8
22	...	42.2	53.0	60.0	61.1	58.9	65.6	60.5	60.5	55.4	60.5
23	...	48.9	57.7	65.4	69.2	65.0	72.1	70.1	69.8	64.3	67.2
24	...	53.6	62.9	70.5	73.8	71.1	78.1	76.3	74.8	70.5	74.5
25	...	...	68.1	75.2	78.3	75.8	82.8	83.3	79.3	77.0	79.4
26	...	...	71.7	78.8	83.5	80.6	86.5	87.9	85.3	83.9	84.0
27	...	...	75.5	82.1	86.2	83.3	88.0	90.0	87.3	86.9	87.3
28	...	...	78.0	85.7	88.9	86.7	89.5	91.9	89.9	88.8	91.2
29	...	...	80.7	86.9	91.0	88.5	90.6	92.8	91.7	90.2	92.6
30	...	...	...	88.8	91.7	89.4	91.3	93.2	92.8	91.5	93.6
31	...	...	...	89.9	92.4	90.5	92.8	94.1	93.0	93.8	94.6
32	...	...	...	90.7	93.4	91.0	93.2	94.2	93.7	94.5	95.2
33	...	...	...	91.7	94.2	91.3	93.7	94.2	94.5	95.5	96.4
34	...	...	...	92.2	94.5	91.9	94.2	94.6	95.0	96.0	96.6
35	...	...	...	...	94.8	92.2	94.6	94.8	95.1	97.0	96.6
Women	probabilities										
15	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
16	1.6	1.6	4.0	3.1	2.7	2.4	3.4	2.7	3.2	5.4	5.0
17	4.7	5.8	9.0	7.1	9.1	8.0	8.7	7.9	10.0	13.2	12.9
18	10.0	14.8	19.1	17.3	20.4	18.1	20.9	18.7	21.8	21.4	23.6
19	16.8	28.7	37.4	38.0	40.1	37.3	40.9	37.9	40.1	40.4	37.3
20	...	39.5	48.8	50.0	50.7	52.0	54.1	50.8	48.9	54.1	47.9
21	...	48.9	55.2	58.6	58.8	61.5	65.1	65.2	60.4	63.0	58.7
22	...	56.0	62.5	66.5	67.9	72.1	74.3	76.6	71.3	72.5	70.8
23	...	62.0	68.5	73.0	75.4	77.9	80.8	82.6	77.6	79.4	78.9
24	...	64.7	73.5	77.7	80.7	82.1	85.6	86.0	84.3	83.9	84.0
25	...	...	78.3	81.3	84.2	84.9	89.5	89.3	87.4	86.8	88.9
26	...	...	82.4	85.4	88.8	88.4	91.8	90.2	90.4	89.4	91.2
27	...	...	86.1	88.2	90.6	89.8	93.8	91.6	91.7	90.0	92.9
28	...	...	88.3	90.4	92.0	90.7	94.8	92.5	93.5	91.0	93.5
29	...	...	89.5	91.3	93.1	92.2	95.4	93.2	95.0	92.5	94.8
30	...	...	...	92.3	94.4	93.1	95.7	94.4	96.0	92.8	95.5
31	...	...	...	93.1	94.9	94.5	95.9	95.3	96.5	94.8	96.6
32	...	...	...	93.9	95.1	95.2	96.4	95.7	96.6	95.0	97.0
33	...	...	...	94.5	95.4	95.3	96.7	95.9	96.8	95.5	97.2
34	...	...	...	94.5	96.3	95.8	96.7	96.3	97.1	95.9	97.3
35	...	...	...	...	96.3	95.9	96.8	96.5	97.3	96.4	97.4

... not applicable

Source: Statistics Canada, Life tables generated from General Social Survey, 2001.

Interreligious unions in Canada

by Warren Clark

Religion is only one of many characteristics that may be important in the search for a partner. As such it may be traded off for other desirable traits.[1] Friends and family may also influence the choice of a partner. In some religious groups a marriage outside the faith may be forbidden or only allowed if the outsider converts or promises to raise any children from the marriage in the partner's religion. In very secular societies where religious identity is weak, religion may be viewed as a matter of indifference in the selection of a partner.[2]

This article uses data from the Census of Population and the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) to examine the prevalence of interreligious conjugal unions and the social and demographic factors associated with their occurrence. The EDS is used to create models of the probability that a person in a couple is in an interreligious union where the impact of all other socio-demographic variables in the model is removed except the one being examined.

Interreligious unions refer to marriages and common-law unions where partners are from different broad religious groups. For example, if a husband is a Buddhist and the wife is a Roman Catholic, this union is considered to be interreligious because each partner is from a different broad religious group. However, unions between people of different denominations within the same broad religious group are not considered interreligious; for example, an Anglican/Presbyterian union is not interreligious as both partners are Protestants.

Nearly one in five Canadians in couples are in interreligious unions

Given declining religious affiliation and increasing cultural diversity, the number of interreligious unions has increased in Canada. In 1981, 15% of people in couples were in an interreligious union. By 2001, interreligious unions had grown to 19% of couples: of the 14.1 million Canadians in couples, nearly 2.7 million had a partner from a different religious group.[3] Despite the increase in interreligious unions, most Canadian couples are homogamous unions where both partners are from the same broad religious group.

What was once incongruous, now accepted

Not surprisingly, over half of interreligious unions are between Catholics and Protestants, the two largest religious groups in Canada. The 1.3 million people in Catholic/Protestant unions represented 9.6% of all persons in couples in 2001, up from 8.6% in 1981. Increasing numbers of young Catholics and Protestants intermarry because of a commonly shared culture.

Catholic/Protestant unions are not evenly distributed geographically as the availability of same-faith partners has a negative effect on the frequency of interreligious unions. In Quebec, where 83% of the population is Catholic and only 5% is Protestant, only 2% of Catholics in couples are married to (or in common-law relationships with) Protestants. In Ontario, where there are nearly equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants, 18% of Catholics in couples are in interreligious unions with a Protestant. In Newfoundland and Labrador, where Catholics are outnumbered by Protestants, 25% of Catholics in couples are in interreligious unions with a

CST Interreligious unions less likely among Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs

Religious group	1981	1991	2001		
			Both sexes	Men	Women
	% of population in couples who are in interreligious unions				
Total	15	17	19	19	19
No religion	38	27	25	32	17
Catholic	12	14	16	15	17
Protestant	14	17	21	19	23
Mainline Protestant[1]	15	19	23	21	25
Conservative Protestant[2]	9	11	13	11	15
Other Protestant	15	22	25	23	27
Orthodox Christian	23	25	26	27	24
Christian n.i.e.	19	18	18	15	20
Muslim	13	11	9	11	6
Jewish	9	12	17	19	16
Buddhist	19	16	19	16	22
Hindu	11	10	9	9	8
Sikh	4	4	3	4	3
Other Eastern religions	26	24	27	25	29
Other religions[3]	41	41	46	40	50

1. Mainline Protestant includes Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, United Church.
2. Conservative Protestant includes Baptist, Pentecostal, Nazarene, Evangelical Free, Mennonite, Salvation Army, Reformed, Christian and Missionary Alliance and other smaller groups.
3. Other religions includes New Age, Aboriginal Spirituality, Pagan, Scientology, Satanist, Wicca, Gnostic, Rastafarian, Unity, New Thought, Pantheist and other small religious groups.

Note: Protestant breakdown is based on definitions by Nock, David A. 1993. "The organization of religious life in Canada." in *The Sociology of religion – A Canadian Focus*, edited by W.E. Hewitt, Toronto: Butterworths; and Bibby, Reginald W. 1987. "Fragmented Gods, The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada." Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd.

Source: Statistics Canada, Censuses of Population.

Protestant. This data illustrates that interreligious unions are related to the degree of religious homogeneity of the population; when the population is relatively homogeneous, there are few opportunities for majority religious groups to marry outside their group, and few opportunities for minority religious groups to marry within their group.[4] (Table A.1)

Conservative Protestants less likely to be in interreligious unions

Religious groups that are more traditional in religious doctrine have higher levels of involvement in their religious community and are less likely to be in interreligious unions.[5] Conservative Protestants[6] are more likely to have high religiosity and are less likely (13%) to be in interreligious unions than Mainline Protestants[7] (23%) or Catholics outside Quebec (27%).

More interreligious unions with "no religion" spouse

Generally, interreligious couples find it easier if one or both partners do not possess strong religious convictions or if one party is willing to convert. Men are less religious and are more likely to report "no religion" than women. The imbalance of potential partners with "no religion" means that men with no religious affiliation are more likely to be in interreligious unions than women are.

As the percentage of the population with "no religion" has grown to 17% in 2001 from 7% in 1981, interreligious unions where one partner professes "no religion" has decreased to 25% in 2001 from 38% in 1981 as the availability of potential "no religion" partners has increased. It is not surprising that the second and third largest interreligious unions groups in 2001 now involve a "no religion" partner with a Catholic or Protestant. Since 1991, the number of Catholic/no religion unions have increased by 52% while Protestant/no religion unions have increased by 18%. As "no religion" is more common among young adults, these interreligious unions are predominantly young couples. People who report a religious affiliation, but have lower levels of religiosity are more likely to select a partner with "no religion" than someone with higher levels of religiosity.

Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus least likely to be in interreligious unions

Many immigrants citing Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism as their religion, arrived in Canada between 1991 and 2001. As such, they are more likely to have a strong cultural association with the marital traditions of their country of origin. In fact, for these three religious groups, interreligious unions are less likely in 2001 than in 1981.

About 71% of Muslim couples resided in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. The most common interreligious union involving a Muslim partner is with a Catholic, representing 4% of Muslims in couples. According to the Census, only 1% of Muslims in couples are in a conjugal union with someone who has no religion. Sikhs and Hindus are most likely to be in interreligious unions with Catholics or Protestants and rarely with those with no religion.

Although many Buddhists in couples have recently arrived in Canada, many also arrived earlier. Perhaps because of this longer history in Canada, and also because they are less likely to be highly religious, Buddhists are more likely to be in

interreligious unions than Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus. The most frequent Buddhist interreligious union is with a partner who has no religion.

Orthodox Christians are more likely to be in interreligious unions

Orthodox churches developed in Greece, many of the countries of south-eastern Europe, the Middle East and Russia. When immigration brought large numbers of new residents from these parts of the world to Canada, their numbers included many Orthodox Christians. Over 70% of Orthodox Christians in couples were born outside Canada, but only about 25% arrived recently. According to the Census, Orthodox Christians are one of the most likely groups to be in an interreligious union (26%). After accounting for socio-demographic variables, the EDS probability models also support this finding.

Orthodox Christians are most likely to be in interreligious unions with Catholics. This may be associated with their geographic proximity and also with the many similarities between Orthodoxy and Catholicism.[8] Over half of Orthodox Christians in couples are located in Montreal and Toronto, where Catholics represent the largest religious group.

Interreligious unions increasing among the Jewish religious group

According to the Census, interreligious unions have become more frequent among Jewish couples, 17% being interreligious in 2001 compared with 9% in 1981. Only 8% of those with a Jewish religion arrived in Canada between 1991 and 2001, so people who have the Jewish religion have a longer history in Canada than many other religious groups. Jewish couples are concentrated in Montreal and Toronto (75%). Perhaps because of the cultural diversity of these large cities, interreligious unions between Jewish and other religious groups have become more common, particularly with Catholics and Protestants.

Young couples more likely to be interreligious

Increasingly common interreligious unions may indicate a decline in the importance of religion in social life, or that Canadians are becoming more tolerant of people outside their own religious group.[9] Others argue that secularization has resulted in the declining influence of religion as a factor in selecting a mate while the influence of education has increased.[10]

Many factors are associated with the frequency of interreligious unions. (Table A.2) Older Canadians are less likely to be in interreligious unions. This may be because they entered into their marriage or common-law union when Canadian society was more homogenous than it is today, and had fewer opportunities to find partners from a different faith. American researchers also suggest that because interreligious unions are less likely to survive than homogamous unions, older people who have been married or in a common-law union longer than younger cohorts have simply undergone attrition, leaving fewer interreligious unions among older people.[11]

Home language makes a difference

Catholics who speak only English at home are much more likely to be in interreligious unions than their French-speaking counterparts both in and outside Quebec. Most French-speaking Canadians are Catholics, but the minority who are Protestants are more likely to be in interreligious unions than either English-speaking Protestants or Catholics who speak only French at home. Most of those who speak only a non-official language at home have only recently arrived in Canada and as such, their choice of partners is more reflective of the traditions of their home country. Only 8% of those in couples who speak a non-official language at home are in interreligious unions.

CST Young adults in couples are more likely to be in interreligious unions



Source: Statistics Canada, Censuses of Population

Interreligious unions more likely for highly educated people of "other" religions

Researchers have found it is more likely that more highly-educated minority groups marry outside their group than lesser-educated peers.[12] Some suggest that highly-educated people may have more individualistic attitudes and are therefore less influenced by family and community to select a mate from their ancestral religious group.[13] Others suggest that highly-educated groups have wider intellectual horizons as well as higher levels of socioeconomic achievement, both of which may be traded off against religious compatibility.[14]

According to the 2001 Census, those with less than high school graduation are much less likely to be in interreligious unions, but this may be related to age (older people have less education). The EDS probability models show that after accounting for other characteristics such as age, education has a significant effect on the probability of couples being in an interreligious union primarily for "other religions"[15] and Catholics outside Quebec. There is no significant effect for Protestants and the effect for Quebec Catholics and those with "no religion" is mixed. (Table A.3)

When co-religionists are scarce, interreligious unions more likely

If individuals with particular traits are scarce, they are more likely to be in interreligious unions. However, this does not always hold true. According to the 2001 Census, people in almost every religious group living in communities with a low concentration of co-religionists of the opposite sex are more likely to be in interreligious unions than people in communities with high concentrations of co-religionists. For example, among Catholic couples outside Quebec, 39% are in interreligious unions if the concentration of Catholics is low (less than 20%) in their community. However, where there is a high concentration (50% or more),

CST **Most religious groups are more likely to be in interreligious unions if there are few co-religionists in their community**



Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, 2001.

20% of Catholics in couples are in interreligious unions. The only religious groups which contradict this finding are Buddhists and "Christian n.i.e. (not include elsewhere)".

Parents interreligious? Adult children more likely to be interreligious

Parents often play a key role in the development of attitudes and values of their children and are more likely to pass on their religiosity and religious affiliation if they have a common religious background.[16] According to the 2002 EDS probability models, after accounting for other socio-demographic factors, people whose parents were of different faiths were more likely to be in an interreligious union themselves. This was observed for Catholics, Protestants, and other religions, but not the "no religion" group.

CST What you should know about this study

Data in this article are from the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Censuses of Population and from the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS). Interreligious unions refer to couples who at the time of the Census were married or living common-law with a partner from a different religious group. The Census asked respondents to report a specific religious denomination or group even if they were not practicing members of the group. People with no connection or affiliation with any religious group were asked to indicate that they had "No religion". "No religion" also includes atheists, agnostics, humanists, free thinkers and others who for whatever reason indicated that they were without a religious affiliation. This article refers to the following religious groups: Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Christian n.i.e. (not included elsewhere), Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Other Eastern religions, "other religions" and "no religion". Marriages or common-law unions between denominations within a group (e.g. between a Roman Catholic and a Polish Catholic) are not counted as interreligious in this article whereas a union between two broad groups such as between a Protestant and a Buddhist is considered to be an interreligious union.

The Census records the current religion of respondents at the time of the Census. Current religion underestimates interreligious unions because a marriage or common-law union may lead to religious conversion of one of the partners. A religious conversion of a partner at the time of union formation is not collected by the Census.

Data from the 2002 EDS was used to develop five logistic regression models (Quebec Catholics, Catholics outside Quebec, Protestants, "Other religions", "No religion") to estimate probabilities of a person in a couple being in an interreligious union. The following variables were included in each model: gender, age, marital status, parents in an interreligious union when the respondent was aged 15, province of residence, religion of mother, religion of respondent, religiosity of respondent, highest level of schooling, home language and size of community where respondent lived in 2001. Predicted probabilities were calculated holding all variables at their mean value except the variable of interest.

The EDS surveyed the non-Aboriginal population aged 15 and over. About 42,500 people were interviewed of which 21,800 were in a conjugal union and were included in one of the logistic regression models.

Religiosity was measured using four dimensions – religious affiliation, attendance at religious services, personal religious practices, and importance of religion – in a simple additive scale. Individuals with no religious affiliation were assigned a score of 0, while those with an affiliation received a score of 1 to 13. People were grouped into three broad categories based on their religiosity index, low (0-5), moderate (6-10) and high (11-13). The group with 'low religiosity' includes persons with no religious affiliation.

This article uses the following terms:

Interreligious unions – couples where each partner is from a different religious group.

Homogamous unions – couples where partners are from the same religious group including unions between two people with no religion.

Co-religionists – people who are in the same broad religious group as the respondent

Highly religious people less likely to be in interreligious unions

Several studies confirm that those who have higher levels of religiosity place more importance on religious compatibility when selecting a mate than persons with lower levels of religiosity.[17] Those with high religiosity may feel a strong affinity to their own religion and feel uncomfortable in other religious settings, especially those whose doctrine and religious practices are distant from their own tradition.[18] Therefore it is not surprising that the EDS probability models show that after accounting for other social-demographic factors, those with high religiosity are least likely to be in an interreligious union.

Summary

With increasing cultural diversity in Canada, interreligious conjugal unions are on the rise, but still the vast majority of couples have partners from the same broad religious group. Of course, the likelihood of an interreligious union is associated with where you are, how homogeneous the religious mix of your community is, how religious you are, how traditional the doctrine of your religion is, and how long you've been in Canada. People in communities which are religiously homogeneous and people who are highly religious are less likely to be in interreligious unions. Immigrants are also less likely to be in interreligious unions.

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2. Voas, David. 2003. "Intermarriage and the demography of secularization." *British Journal of Sociology*. 54(1): 83-108.
3. In general, this article uses broad religious groups to identify those who are in interreligious unions. If a union between people of two different denominations within one of the broad religious groups was considered an interreligious union then the number of people in interreligious unions in 2001 would have been 3.35 million or 24% of all people in unions compared to 2.68 million when broad religious groups as defined in this article are used.
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5. Kalmijn. 1998.
6. Conservative Protestant includes Baptist, Pentecostal, Nazarene, Evangelical Free, Mennonite, Salvation Army, Reformed, Christian and Missionary Alliance and other smaller groups.
7. Mainline Protestant includes Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian and United Church.
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CST Table A.1 Religions of partners in conjugal unions

Religion of respondent	
Catholic ('000s)	6,200.2
Religion of partner	(%)
Catholic	84.0
Protestant	10.9
No religion	3.7
Orthodox	0.5
Others	0.8
Protestant ('000s)	4,483.6
Religion of partner	(%)
Protestant	78.7
Catholic	15.1
No religion	4.9
Others	1.3
No religion ('000s)	2,005.2
Religion of partner	(%)
No religion	74.7
Catholic	11.6
Protestant	11.1
Christian n.i.e	0.9
Buddhist	0.6
Others	1.2
Christian n.i.e. ('000s)	323.8
Religion of partner	(%)
Christian n.i.e.	82.3
No religion	6.1
Catholic	5.0
Protestant	4.6
Muslim	0.5
Others	1.5
Orthodox Christian('000s)	243.0
Religion of partner	(%)
Orthodox Christian	74.3
Catholic	13.4
Protestant	7.9
No religion	2.8
Jewish	0.6
Muslim	0.5
Others	0.5
Muslim ('000s)	239.2
Religion of partner	(%)
Muslim	91.4
Catholic	3.8
Protestant	1.4
No religion	1.3
Hindu	0.6
Orthodox	0.6
Others	0.4
Jewish ('000s)	159.7
Religion of partner	(%)
Jewish	82.6
Catholic	6.0
Protestant	5.6
No religion	3.9
Orthodox	0.9
Christian n.i.e.	0.5
Others	0.5
Hindu ('000s)	146.0
Religion of partner	(%)
Hindu	91.2
Catholic	3.0
Protestant	1.9
No religion	1.0
Muslim	0.9
Sikh	0.9
Christian n.i.e.	0.7
Others	0.6
Buddhist ('000s)	142.6
Religion of partner	(%)
Buddhist	80.8
No religion	7.8
Catholic	5.8
Protestant	3.5
Christian n.i.e.	1.1
Others	1.1
Sikh ('000s)	136.9
Religion of partner	(%)
Sikh	96.9
Protestant	0.6
Catholic	0.6
No religion	0.5
Others	0.5
Other religions ('000s)	22.0
Religion of partner	(%)
Other religions	54.5
No religion	18.5
Protestant	11.8
Catholic	10.4
Christian n.i.e	1.6
Buddhist	1.5
Jewish	0.6
Others	1.7
Eastern religions ('000s)	17.4
Religion of partner	(%)
Eastern religions	72.6
No religion	7.9
Protestant	7.0
Catholic	6.0
Hindu	1.5
Muslim	1.2
Buddhist	1.0
Other religions	0.6
Others	1.5

Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, 2001.

CST Table A.2 Interreligious unions are increasing

	Population in couples	Total	Religious groups				
			Quebec Catholics	Catholics outside Quebec	Protestants	Other religions[1]	No religion
	('000s)		(Percent of population in couples in interreligious unions)				
2001	14,120	19	3	27	21	16	25
1991	12,840	17	2	25	17	16	27
1981	11,221	15	2	21	14	16	38
2001							
Gender							
Male	7,064	19	3	26	19	16	32
Female	7,056	19	3	29	23	16	17
Age							
15-29	1,374	25	5	37	33	20	28
30-44	5,169	23	4	32	28	17	26
45-59	4,529	18	3	26	21	16	24
60+	3,048	11	2	15	11	11	24
Marital status							
Married	11,803	18	3	25	19	14	24
Common-law union	2,317	25	3	43	42	50	28
Religion							
No religion	2,005	25	...	...	...	...	25
Catholic	6,200	16	3	27	...	...	...
Protestant	4,484	21	...	...	21	...	...
Mainline Protestant[2]	3,155	23	...	...	23	...	...
Conservative Protestant[3]	871	13	...	...	13	...	...
Other Protestant	458	25	...	...	25	...	...
Orthodox Christian	243	26	...	...	...	26	...
Christian n.i.e.	324	18	...	...	...	18	...
Muslim	239	9	...	...	...	9	...
Jewish	160	17	...	...	...	17	...
Buddhist	143	19	...	...	...	19	...
Hindu	146	9	...	...	...	9	...
Sikh	137	3	...	...	...	3	...
Other Eastern religions	17	27	...	...	...	27	...
Other religions	22	46	...	...	...	46	...
Highest level of schooling							
Less than high school graduation	3,807	14	2	19	16	10	21
High school diploma or some postsecondary	3,297	20	3	30	23	16	25
Trades or college certificate or diploma	4,136	22	3	31	23	21	29
University-educated	2,879	21	5	30	24	17	25

Table A.2 Interreligious unions are increasing (continued)

	Population in couples	Total	Religious groups				
			Quebec Catholics	Catholics outside Quebec	Protestants	Other religions[1]	No religion
	('000s)		(Percent of population in couples in interreligious unions)				
Home language							
English only	9,253	26	23	34	21	26	28
French only	3,080	3	2	3	28	27	23
Other only	1,557	8	5	7	12	6	11
English & French	43	22	15	18	54	33	22
English & other	162	9	8	8	16	7	16
French & other	20	9	8	7	16	7	29
English, French & other	5	11	5	14	19	14	28
Generational status							
First (Immigrants)	3,480	16	8	17	19	11	19
Second[4]	2,093	24	8	32	20	27	29
Third[5]	8,547	19	2	31	22	27	28
Size of community							
Rural and small town Canada	3,084	16	2	26	16	23	26
Under 25,000	378	20	1	26	21	23	27
25,000-249,999	2,605	20	1	30	21	23	27
250,000-999,999	2,980	23	2	30	23	19	27
1,000,000 and over	5,072	18	5	24	27	13	23
Concentration of co-religionists[6]							
Low – Less than 20%	2,823	24	...	39	34	16	30
Moderate – 20% to 49%	8,221	22	2	27	21	...	21
High – 50% or more	3,075	7	3	20	15	...	13
Census metropolitan areas (CMA)							
Montréal	1,532	9	5	...	35	14	24
Ottawa-Gatineau	491	23	5	25	33	19	31
Toronto	2,142	20	...	21	25	12	24
Calgary	443	27	...	37	25	17	26
Edmonton	428	27	...	32	24	21	27
Vancouver	907	23	...	35	24	15	19

... not applicable

1. Includes Orthodox Christian, Christian n.i.e., Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Other Eastern religions and other religions.
2. Mainline Protestant includes Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, United Church.
3. Conservative Protestant includes Baptist, Pentecostal, Nazarene, Evangelical Free, Mennonite, Salvation Army, Reformed, Christian and Missionary Alliance and other smaller groups.
4. Includes people born in Canada who have at least one parent born outside Canada.
5. Includes people born in Canada whose parents were both born in Canada.
6. This is the percentage of the population aged 20 to 59 of the opposite sex of the respondent in the same Census Metropolitan Area or Census Agglomeration that is in the same broad religious group as the respondent (co-religionist).

Source: Statistics Canada, Censuses of Population.

CST Table A.3 Predicted probability of a person in a couple being in an interreligious union

	Religious groups				
	Quebec Catholics	Catholics - rest of Canada	Protestant	Other[1]	No religion
	Predicted probability (%)				
Total	3	27	21	16	25
Gender					
Men	3	25	18*	13*	30*
Women	*3*	*29*	*25*	*20*	*20*
Age					
15-29	5	32	34	15	21
30-44	*5*	*28*	*29*	*15*	*24*
45-59	2*	27	24*	15	24
60+	3*	24*	12*	20	37*
Marital status					
Married	3	27	20	15	26
Common-law	5*	32*	32*	32*	23
Province of residence					
Atlantic provinces	...	23	16*	33*	37*
Quebec	...	...	25	17	33
Ontario	...	*26*	*22*	*15*	*27*
Prairie provinces	...	30	22	11*	29
British Columbia	...	38*	25	21*	19*
Parents were in interreligious union					
Yes	10*	39*	27*	23*	23
No	*3*	*26*	*20*	*15*	*26*
Religion of mother					
No religion	0	18*	31*	34	18*
Catholic	*3*	*29*	*17*	*36*	*31*
Protestant	4	16*	21*	22	27
Other Christian	40*	32	37*	9*	36
Other religion	9*	31	43*	18	36
Religion of respondent					
Mainline Protestant[2]	...	...	*22*	...	...
Convservative Protestant[3]	...	...	18*	...	...
Other Protestant	...	...	23	...	...
Orthodox Christian	...	...	...	44*	...
Christian n.i.e. (not included elsewhere)	...	...	...	18*	...
Muslim[4]	...	...	...	*10*	...
Jewish	...	...	...	7	...
Buddhist	...	...	...	26*	...
Hindu	...	...	...	9	...
Sikh	...	...	...	6	...
Other Eastern religions	...	...	...	24*	...
Religiosity					
Low (0-5)	4*	47*	31*	31*	...
Medium (6-10)	4*	35*	27*	25*	...
High (11-13)	*2*	*16*	*11*	*9*	...
Highest level of schooling					
Less than high school diploma	2*	23	20	9*	25
High school diploma or some postsecondary	*4*	*26*	*21*	*14*	*25*
College diploma or certificate	4	29	21	21*	31*
University degree	3	33*	23	19*	23

Table A.3 Predicted probability of a person in a couple being in an interreligious union (continued)

	Religious groups				
	Quebec Catholics	Catholics - rest of Canada	Protestant	Other[1]	No religion
	Predicted probability (%)				
Home language					
English only	*48*	*36*	*21*	*30*	*30*
French only	2*	2*	42*	26	25
Non-official language	22*	18*	29	8*	9*
English and French	11*	31	36*	36	29
English and non-official language(s)	28*	16*	20	9*	18*
French and non-official language(s)	15*	13	25	4*	39
Size of community in 2001					
Rural and small town Canada	5	28	16*	17	24
Under 25,000	0	17	20	15	27
25,000-249,999	1	28	20	16	23
250,000-999,999	5	26	22	18	21
1,000,000 and over	*4*	*28*	*24*	*15*	*29*

... not applicable

1. Includes Orthodox Christian, Christian n.i.e., Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Other Eastern religions and other religions.
2. Mainline Protestants (Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, United Church) are the reference group for Protestants.
3. Conservative Protestant includes Baptist, Pentecostal, Nazarene, Evangelical Free, Mennonite, Salvation Army, Reformed, Christian and Missionary Alliance and other smaller groups.
4. Muslim is the reference group for "Other religions".

* Statistically significant difference from reference category ($p < 0.05$).

Note: Reference groups are shown in italics.

Source: Statistics Canada, Ethnic Diversity Survey, 2002.

Junior comes back home: Trends and predictors of returning to the parental home

by Pascale Beaupré, Pierre Turcotte and Anne Milan

Boomerang *noun* (1) a curved flat hardwood projectile used by Australian Aborigines to kill prey, and often of a kind able to return in flight to the thrower. (2) a plan etc. that backfires. *intransitive verb* (1) act as a boomerang. (2) (of a plan etc.) backfire.[1]

Canadians with adult children may be familiar with both meanings of the word "boomerang." It describes the behaviour of young adults who, after living away from home for a time, return to live with their parents. Although many parents may be unprepared for this "blast from the past", an adult child returning home has become a fairly common, predictable event in family life.[2]

Leaving home is often a continuing process in which close ties with the family home are unravelled slowly rather than being cut quickly. Even though the child is living elsewhere, some level of dependence remains, whether it is emotional, financial or functional, or all three.[3] In this stage of what researchers have called "semi-autonomous living," the family home may provide a form of safety net for young adults and a refuge from financial or emotional difficulties.[4] Consequently, leaving may occur multiple times rather than just once.

Returning home is not usually characterized by tension and discord between the generations.[5] In fact, parents may appreciate having their adult child's companionship and help at home, although studies do find that parents' satisfaction is greater when their adult children are more independent, more mature, and give as well as receive support.[6]

However, a return home does interrupt each party's plans for the future, and neither parents nor children may know what is expected of them in their new roles. Returning home tends to increase parental responsibility, as mothers are left with additional care giving tasks such as cooking or doing laundry.[7] Sharing the house again can also produce difficulties caused by interpersonal conflicts or lack of social or practical support.[8]

This paper uses data from the 2001 General Social Survey to examine patterns in the frequency with which young people have returned home over the last few decades, their reasons for returning, and the socio-demographic and economic factors that influence this process.

Returning has become more common with each generation

Returning home in young adulthood has evolved from a relatively rare to a fairly common event. While a proportion of youngsters have always returned home after first striking out on their own, what we see from a life table analysis is that the tendency to return home at least once has risen in each generation, starting with the boomers. For example, among early Wave 1 Boomers (born 1947-51), the probability of returning home within five years of first leaving was less than 12% for men and 10% for women. In contrast, the probability for the later wave of Gen Xers (born 1972-76) was 32% for men and 28% for women. In other words, for both men and women, the likelihood of coming back home has nearly tripled. (Table A.1)

There are a number of factors that help explain this growing trend. These include the increasing acceptance of common-law relationships (since such unions are more likely to break up than marriages); the pursuit of higher education, which tends to leave young graduates with heavy student debts; financial difficulties; the reduced stigma attached to living with parents; wanting a standard of living impossible to afford on their own; the new and different roles of parents and children in families; and needing a parent's emotional support during the stressful transition to adulthood and independence.[9]

Factors that increase the risk of return are birth cohort...

Hazard model analysis allows us to estimate the probability that a young adult with certain characteristics will return home to their parents; when this probability is compared to that of a reference group, it produces a risk ratio that identifies whether the characteristic will increase or decrease the likelihood of a young adult moving back into the family home.

This method shows quite clearly that the boomerang phenomenon began with the female Wave 1 Boomers and accelerated among both sexes in the succeeding cohorts. Compared with women born during the Depression and Second World War (1932-46), and when all other variables in the model are controlled for, Wave 1 Boomer women had a 39% greater likelihood of returning home. By the time Generation X women (born 1967-76) had reached the fledgling stage, their chance of returning home was almost two-and-a-half times higher. Meanwhile, Gen X men's risk of coming back to their parents' home was over twice as high as that of men from the 1932-46 birth cohort.

...reason for going

The boomerang phenomenon partly reflects the changing reasons for leaving the parental home over recent generations. According to the 2001 GSS, getting married and having a job were the two main reasons why the War/Depression birth cohort left home for the first time; by the time Generation X was ready to go, being independent and going to school were

CST Demographic and socio-economic factors associated with home returning

	Men	Women
	Risk ratios	
Birth cohort		
War/Depression	*1.00*	*1.00*
Wave 1 Boomers	1.20	1.39*
Wave 2 Boomers	1.64*	1.82*
Generation X	2.07*	2.43*
Generation Y	2.81*	3.28*
Age when first left home		
15 to 17 years old	1.74*	2.08*
18 to 20 years old	1.42*	1.78*
21 years or older	*1.00*	*1.00*
Main reason for leaving		
Because of a job	*1.00*	*1.00*
To be independent	1.03	1.14
To attend school	1.32*	1.38*
To marry or live common-law	0.24*	0.29*
Other	1.04	1.32
Family structure while growing up		
Two-parent intact family	*1.00*	*1.00*
Step-parent	0.89	0.74*
Lone-parent	0.57*	0.77*
Other	0.43*	0.35*
Employment status of mother when respondent was age 15		
Mother worked	*1.00*	*1.00*
Did not work	0.85*	0.80*
Employment status of father when respondent was age 15		
Father worked	*1.00*	*1.00*
Did not work	1.07	0.61
Birth place of mother		
Mother born in Canada	*1.00*	*1.00*
Born outside Canada	0.97	0.83*
Religious attendance at age 15		
Weekly	*1.00*	*1.00*
Sometimes	1.19*	1.20*
Never	1.10	1.10
Region of residence at age 15		
Quebec	*1.00*	*1.00*
Atlantic	1.41*	1.54*
Ontario	1.49*	1.65*
Prairies	1.31*	1.58*
British Columbia	1.48*	1.42*
Outside of Canada	0.62*	0.84
Size of city where respondent lived at age 15		
Less than 5,000	0.74*	0.79
5,000 to 24,999	0.79*	0.92
25,000 to 99,999	0.84	1.23
100,000 to 999,999	0.96	1.40*
Lived in city of 1,000,000 or more	*1.00*	*1.00*
Level of schooling of respondent[1]		
Less than secondary	1.13	1.13
Had secondary diploma	*1.00*	*1.00*
Partial or completed postsecondary studies	0.80*	1.09
Employment status of respondent[1]		
Did not work	*1.00*	*1.00*
Did work	0.71*	0.94

1. These variables can change over time as the respondent ages; for example, an individual is more likely to have postsecondary education or employment at age 22 than at age 15.

* Statistically significant difference from reference group (shown in italics) at $p < 0.05$.

Note: Risk ratios over 1.0 indicate a higher risk associated with that characteristic, compared to the reference group (shown in italics); a risk ratio less than 1.0 indicates a lower risk, when all other variables in the model are controlled for.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2001.

the top-ranked reasons. And generally speaking, people who move out to attend school, live independently or because of work have a greater likelihood of returning home than those who leave to marry.[10]

A brief review of why adult children come back to their family home offers some insight into why their reason for going is a useful predictor of the likelihood that they will return. There are five main reasons why boomerang kids come home (respondents were permitted to give multiple answers). The most common is education-related: either it was the end of the school year (19%) or they had finished their program or quit school (8%). Another 25% returned the first time for financial reasons, while 12% said their job had ended. Just over one in ten (11%) came home with a broken heart, seeking their parents' sympathy at the end of a relationship.

Refining this idea further, the boomerang kids who most often returned for education-related reasons were those who had left to attend college or university; the large majority of those who returned because they got into financial difficulty were those who had moved out to be independent or to attend school; and those who came back because their job had ended had most often left in order to take the job.

The hazard models confirm this link between the reason for the initial departure and a return home. Men and women who left to pursue their studies had a 32% and a 38% higher chance, respectively, of coming back home in comparison with those who moved out because of a job. On the other hand, men who left home to form a union were about 76% less likely to return, while women had a 71% lower risk, when all other variables in the model are controlled for. This confirms earlier research that has also found that departures for education- or employment-related reasons have higher probabilities of boomeranging than adult children who leave to form a relationship.[11] Leaving home to be independent is

CST Over the generations, the most common reasons for leaving home have changed*



* Respondents were able to give multiple answers.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2001

CST The main reasons for the initial departure from home were closely related to reasons for returning



Note: Totals do not sum to 100 because some samples were too small to provide a reliable estimate; also because respondents were permitted to give multiple answers.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2001.

not statistically significantly different than leaving because of a job, when all other variables in the model are taken into account.

...leaving before age 18

Young adults who first leave home as teenagers have a higher probability of returning to their parents' home. For those who left home between 15 and 17 years of age, men had a 74% greater likelihood and women over two times higher risk of return compared to those who waited until they were at least 21. The risk was lower among 18- to 20-year-olds leaving home for the first time. This result matches previous research which has found that boomerang kids tend to leave the parental nest at younger ages; moreover, the younger they are at their first departure, the more likely they are to boomerang multiple times.[12]

...occasionally attending religious services

Young adults who had sometimes gone to religious services at age 15 had a higher probability of coming back home. Compared to those who had gone to church, temple or mosque each week, the likelihood of returning was 19% greater for men and 20% greater for women who had attended services occasionally when they were teens.

Young adults who had never gone to religious services in their adolescence were neither more nor less likely to return to the nest than those who had gone every week.

...and growing up outside Quebec

Young adults who grew up in Quebec tend to be older than those in other provinces when they leave home,[13] but once they go, they are the least likely to return. Youngsters from Ontario and the West show the highest propensity to come back home. Men who spent their adolescence in Ontario (49%) or B.C. (48%) had the greatest likelihood of returning home compared to men

CST What you should know about this study

This study is based on data from the 2001 General Social Survey (GSS) on family history. The GSS interviewed 24,310 individuals aged 15 and over, living in private households in one of the 10 provinces. One extensive section of the survey collected data on the number of times respondents left the parental home and their age at the time of each of these events. Information about first and last departures from the parental home allows the transition to adult independence to be studied for several generations of Canadians. This study is based on individuals aged 15 to 69 in 2001.[1]

Five birth cohorts are examined, with the text mainly focusing on Wave 1 Boomers and Generation X:

Generation Y – born between 1977 and 1986, and 15 to 24 years old at the time of the survey;

Generation X – born 1967 to 1976, aged 25 to 34;

Wave 2 *Boomers* – born 1957 to 1966, aged 35 to 44;

Wave 1 *Boomers* – born 1947 to 1956, aged 45 to 54; and

War/Depression cohort – born between 1932 and 1946, and 55 to 69 years old at the time of the GSS.

The pattern of returning home after a person's first departure is analysed in two steps. First, life-tables are used to calculate the cumulative probabilities that highlight the differences in the intensity and timing of returning to the parental home by cohorts. Second, event history analysis is used to identify the demographic and socio-economic factors associated with returning home. These factors are presented as risk ratios.

Return: An adult child's return to live in the parental home after their first departure.

Boomerang: An adult child's return to the parental home after a period of living independently. Thus, *boomerang kid*.

Risk ratios: The estimated probability that compared with a reference individual, an individual with a certain characteristic will return to the parental home for the first time. This is expressed in the article as "a higher/lower probability compared with a reference person of the same age" or "a higher/lower likelihood of returning home than someone in the reference group.

The risk ratios were calculated with a proportional hazard model using the following explanatory variables: respondent's birth cohort; family environment when the respondent was age 15 (family composition, mother's and father's employment status, mother's birthplace, religious attendance); the geographic characteristics of the respondent's place of residence when he or she was 15 (region/province/foreign country, size of town/city); and the level of educational attainment the respondent had obtained by the time he or she left the parental home, and employment status. Separate models were run for men and women.

1. Based on respondents' interpretation and recollection of the age at which they left home and returned home.

raised in Quebec. Meanwhile, women who grew up in Ontario (65%) and the Prairies (58%) had much higher risks of return than young Québécoises, when all other variables in the model are controlled for.

It is not clear why there is such a difference in the home returning patterns of Quebecers and other young Canadian adults. Previous research suggests that Anglophones may be socialized to accept leaving home as a process that may also include returning home. In contrast, this same research also suggests that the social norms for Francophones seem to expect more autonomy and independence once the first launch from home is achieved. Perhaps young adults in Quebec delay leaving the family home until they are confident that a return will not be necessary.[14]

Factors that discourage a return to the nest are growing up in a small town or a foreign country…

Not surprisingly, having been raised in a small town of less than 5,000 people reduces the likelihood that a young adult will return home by 26% for men, compared to being brought up in a city of over one million people. Most probably, these youngsters felt that more education and employment opportunities awaited them in a large city.

Growing up in another country also reduced the likelihood that men would return to the parental home; their risk of coming back was 38% lower compared to young men raised in Quebec. For women, spending at least part of their own childhood abroad did not have an impact when other factors are taken into account. However, if their mother was born outside Canada, a woman's risk of moving back in with her parents was 17% lower than that for women with Canadian-born mothers. For men, their mother's country of birth did not play a role in the probability that they would return home after their initial departure.

…being raised in a non-traditional family

A non-traditional family structure deters returning home, perhaps because of the resources lacking in many lone-parent families or the tensions arising within a reconstituted family. Both situations affected the likelihood that young women would return home; if they had lived in either a lone-parent or a stepfamily, their chances of coming back were 23% and 26% lower, respectively, than if they had grown up with both biological parents. Men raised by a lone parent had a 43% lower risk of returning home compared to those who grew up in a two-parent intact household, but growing up in a stepfamily did not have a significant impact.

…having a higher level of education and a job

More educated men have reduced chances of returning to the parental home, when all other factors are controlled for. Compared to men who had left home with a high school diploma, men who had a partial or complete postsecondary education were 20% less likely to come back. As would be expected, men who were employed when they first moved out of the family nest were also less likely to return home (29% lower risk) than those who had not had a job at the time of their first departure. Young men with these resources – that is, education and a job – are better able to support themselves and therefore less reliant on the safety net of the family home.

In contrast, neither employment status nor education at the time she left home had a significant effect on the probability that a woman would return to her parents.

Whether or not their father had been employed during a young adult's childhood did not have a significant impact on their risk of returning home. However, both men and women had a reduced likelihood of coming home if their mother had not been in the workforce (15% and 20% lower, respectively), perhaps because they knew that fewer resources were available to help them. Indeed, previous research has noted the higher rates of return to more affluent families and suggested that coming back home may be an informal social safety net accessible to those who are already advantaged.[15]

Summary

This study has identified five socio-demographic factors that significantly affect the likelihood that a young adult will be a boomerang kid. These are: the generation into which he or she was born; the reason for leaving home; leaving home for the first time when still a teenager; occasionally attending religious services during adolescence; and growing up in a province other than Quebec.

Among the factors that reduce the risk of an adult child boomeranging are: being raised in a lone-parent or step-parent family; having a mother who did not work outside the home during the child's adolescence; and, for men, having a postsecondary education, a job and growing up in a very small town.

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CST Table A.1 Cumulative probabilities of first return to the parental home for male and female birth cohorts 1932-1976, Canada

	Generation, age in 2001 at time of the survey, year of birth								
	Generation X		Wave 2 Baby Boomers		Wave 1 Baby Boomers		War/ Depression cohort		
	25 to 29	30 to 34	35 to 39	40 to 44	45 to 49	50 to 54	55 to 59	60 to 64	65 to 69
Years elapsed since initial departure	1972 to 1976	1967 to 1971	1962 to 1966	1957 to 1961	1952 to 1956	1947 to 1951	1942 to 1946	1937 to 1941	1932 to 1936
Men					**Probabilities**				
0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1	7.3	5.3	3.8	4.0	4.9	3.7	2.0	2.1	2.5
2	16.3	12.6	9.3	11.5	11.4	8.0	5.5	4.1	5.8
3	21.9	17.5	13.3	15.5	13.4	10.0	6.8	5.9	7.0
4	27.7	20.3	14.8	17.4	15.4	11.2	8.6	6.8	7.2
5	32.1	22.7	16.6	18.6	16.3	11.8	9.7	7.5	8.7
6	33.5	23.8	18.6	19.7	17.0	12.3	10.4	8.2	9.1
7	34.1	24.4	19.2	20.1	17.3	12.6	10.5	8.3	9.4
8	35.0	25.8	19.8	20.4	17.6	13.0	10.7	8.6	9.4
9	35.9	26.0	20.2	20.5	17.7	13.5	10.9	8.6	9.5
10	37.1	26.4	20.5	20.5	17.7	13.6	10.9	8.6	9.5
Women					**Probabilities**				
0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1	7.9	6.2	4.7	4.8	3.2	2.2	1.5	1.0	1.4
2	16.5	12.7	11.3	9.2	6.8	5.4	3.7	3.7	3.2
3	20.6	17.2	15.7	12.2	11.0	7.6	5.6	5.2	4.5
4	24.4	19.9	17.9	13.5	12.6	8.9	7.0	6.2	4.7
5	27.6	21.5	19.5	14.7	13.1	10.1	7.8	6.5	4.7
6	29.1	23.3	20.2	15.7	13.3	10.6	8.3	6.8	4.9
7	30.6	23.8	21.1	16.2	13.6	10.8	8.6	7.0	5.0
8	32.4	24.6	21.4	16.4	13.9	11.1	8.9	7.4	5.0
9	34.0	25.2	21.6	17.2	14.3	11.4	8.9	7.4	5.1
10		25.7	22.1	17.5	14.6	11.5	8.9	7.6	5.1

Source: Statistics Canada, life tables created with the 2001 General Social Survey.

Like commuting? Workers' perceptions of their daily commute

by Martin Turcotte

For many people who work in a large urban area and have to cope with traffic congestion on a daily basis, commuting between home and work is far from a pleasant experience. It is no more appealing for those who have to stand crammed onto crowded buses for long journeys. In fact, it is generally assumed that for most workers, commuting is at best a necessary evil, at worst, a daily nightmare. But is that really the case?

The question bears asking since these assumptions are often based on anecdotes, sensational stories of "extreme commuters" or just our general impressions. This is understandable given that very few data were collected in the past to measure how much workers like (or dislike) commuting to work. The present study is intended to fill that information gap.

Specifically, it attempts to determine, using the latest data from the 2005 General Social Survey on time use, whether commuting is in fact an unpleasant experience for most workers. The main factors associated with a more or less pleasant commute are identified, focusing in particular on the mode of transportation used.

This article presents only information for "commuting workers", that is, people who made a round trip between their home and their place of work the day before the General Social Survey telephone interview. For convenience, they will simply be referred to as "workers".

A thousand good reasons to dislike commuting

According to the latest time use data, Canadian workers are spending more time travelling to and from work: 63 minutes in 2005 (or almost 12 full days for someone who works full time), compared with 54 minutes in 1992.[1] Increases in commuting times were observed for both drivers and public transportation users in almost every part of Canada. In the larger cities, particularly those experiencing rapid population growth such as Calgary, the increases were even larger. The overall conclusion from this study is that more and more workers are spending more and more time travelling to and from work.

It might be expected that dissatisfaction levels would be quite high and that most workers would regard commuting to work as a very unpleasant activity. And yet ...

Better to commute than to clean

Respondents to the 2005 General Social Survey (GSS) were asked to rate a set of activities (including "commuting to and from work") using a scale from "1" to "5" where "1" meant they disliked the activity a great deal and "5" meant they enjoyed it a great deal.

In total, 12% of all workers who had travelled between home and work the previous day rated commuting as a "1", indicating that they disliked it a great deal, while another 18% gave it a "2", indicating that they disliked the activity but not a great deal. Despite all this, the percentage of workers who were negative about commuting to and from work (30%) was lower than the proportion of workers who said they liked it (38%). One out of six workers (16%) even said that they liked commuting *a great deal*.

These findings raise the question of whether commuting workers are people who are "positive" by nature and enjoy a wide variety of activities, including commuting to work. The 2005 Time Use Survey also collected information about respondents' views on a number of daily activities. That information indicates that for the majority of workers, commuting is not the most unpleasant activity in their lives. The proportion of workers who did not like cleaning the house, grocery shopping or other kinds of shopping was higher than the proportion of workers who did not like commuting to and from work.

A recent study in the United States also found that the proportion of workers who liked commuting was relatively high, or at least higher than the researchers had expected.[2] In that survey, 40% of workers reported that commuting between home and work was a transition that they

CST More workers prefer commuting to grocery shopping



Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2005.

found "useful". According to the authors, this somewhat unexpected result is attributable in part to the fact that for many workers, the time they spend commuting is one of the only times in the day they have to themselves. During their commute, workers have the opportunity to think about personal matters, listen to their favourite music, read a book if they take public transportation, talk on the phone, and so on.

Nevertheless, it is probably best not to exaggerate the significance of these findings; a larger proportion of workers like any number of activities (such as paid work and cooking) more than commuting.

Workers who use public transit like commuting less than those who drive their cars

While the data show that workers on the whole have a relatively positive attitude toward commuting, they conceal some important differences based on the mode of transportation, age group, place of residence, and so on. The various characteristics associated with a more positive or less positive opinion of commuting are presented in Table A.1.

This table shows that users of public transport are less likely to enjoy commuting than drivers. In 2005, only 23% of people who travelled between home and work on mass transit said they liked commuting, compared with 39% of drivers.

However, younger workers, those who live in large cities and those who spend more time travelling to and from work are less likely to enjoy commuting, all of which are characteristics typical of public transit riders. Public transport users are generally younger and much more likely to live in larger cities, spending a significantly longer time on commuting.[3]

This complex situation, in which a number of factors appear to interact with one another, raises the question of whether mass transit users are less likely to enjoy commuting because they also have other characteristics associated with a negative opinion; or because taking public transport is, regardless of these other factors, associated with a lower probability of liking the daily commute. To answer this question, a statistical analysis that takes all these characteristics into account simultaneously is needed. (See "What you should know about this study".)

The results for Model 1 show that the predicted probability that public transit users will like commuting is lower than the probability for drivers, even when the other factors are kept constant. Specifically, the predicted probability that a public transport user will like commuting is 28%, compared with 38% for a car driver.

However, Model 1 does not include the *duration* of the commute. A recent American study[4] indicates that trip duration is the factor that most influences the stress of commuters using a suburban train (the longer the commute, the greater the stress). What happens if time is kept constant, that is, if drivers and public transit riders with the same commute times are compared?

As was found in the American study of travel time and stress, adding the time factor in Model 2 (commute duration) eliminates the difference between drivers and public transportation users in their

CST Residents in the largest CMAs were the ones who liked commuting the least

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes
	Predicted probability (%)			
Mode of transportation used to get to work[1]				
Automobile (no public transportation)	*25*	*38*	*25*	*37*
Public transportation (no automobile)	34	28	n.s.	n.s.
Bimodal (public transport and automobile)	40	23	33	28
Walking	18	47	19	46
Cycling	13	57	12	59
Other	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
Commuting duration				
1-29 minutes	...	...	*19*	*46*
30-59 minutes	...	...	22	41
60-89 minutes	...	...	26	36
90-119 minutes	...	...	31	30
120 minutes and over	...	...	39	23
Distance from workplace				
1-4 kilometers	*14*	*55*	*16*	*51*
5-9 kilometers	19	45	21	42
10-14 kilometers	24	38	25	37
15-19 kilometers	30	31	31	31
20-24 kilometers	32	30	31	31
25-29 kilometers	32	30	29	32
30-34 kilometers	40	23	36	26
35-39 kilometers	41	23	35	27
40 kilometers or over	49	17	40	23

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes
	Predicted probability (%)			
Season in which the GSS survey took place				
Spring	26	37	n. s.	n. s.
Summer	*23*	*40*	*23*	*39*
Fall	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
Winter	29	33	28	33
Area of residence				
Toronto	27	35	26	36
Montréal	31	31	30	32
Vancouver	32	30	31	30
Ottawa–Gatineau	31	31	31	31
Calgary	34	28	34	28
Edmonton	30	32	29	32
CMA of 250,000 to 750,000 residents	27	36	26	35
CMA/CA of 100,000 to 249,999 residents	21	42	22	41
CA of 50,000 to 99,999 residents	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
Urban region of 49,999 residents or less	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
Strong MIZ	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
Rural area (moderate, weak or no influence MIZ)	*18*	*48*	*19*	*46*

... not applicable

1. The mode of transportation used to make the greatest part of the journey (based on time).

All predicted probabilities presented in this table were calculated from coefficients statistically significant at $p < 0,05$.

Municipalities (small towns, villages, etc.) not located within a CMA or a CA are classified based on the percentage of the population making the commute to a CMA or CA to go to work.

A municipality is categorized as a strong MIZ if 30% or more of its population commutes to a CMA/CA; moderate MIZ if the percentage is between 5% and 29%; weak MIZ if the percentage is between 0% and 5%; and no influence MIZ if no-one commutes to a CMA/CA.

CA : census agglomeration.

CMA : census metropolitan area.

MIZ : census metropolitan area and census agglomeration influenced zone.

n. s. : not statistically different from the reference category in italics.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2005.

attitudes toward commuting. When commute duration and all the other factors included in the analysis are kept constant, there is no statistically significant difference in liking and disliking the daily commute between users of public transport and drivers.

Hence, the results of the present study suggest that if the average travel time of public transport users was equal to that of car drivers (which it is not), their attitudes toward commuting could be similar (in contrast to the results shown in Table A.1 when the various factors that differentiate drivers from public transit users are not taken into account).

For workers who used both the automobile and public transportation to commute, the inclusion of travel time did not, however, eliminate the significant statistical correlation

observed. It would seem that, of all commuters, they are the ones for whom commuting is most unpleasant. The fact that the majority of them have to transfer, and therefore endure additional waits or the frustration of having missed a connection, may account for this persistent difference.

Cyclists are more likely to enjoy commuting

Very few workers travel to work by bicycle. According to 2001 Census data, about 1% of commuters rode a bicycle to work (the largest proportion was 4.9% in Victoria, British Columbia). Cyclists differ from other workers not only because of their small numbers, but also because they are much more likely to enjoy commuting to work. The predicted probability that a worker commuting to work by bicycle would like the activity was 59%, compared with only 37% for people who used their cars to get to work (Model 2). Workers who walked to work were also more likely to enjoy commuting, with a predicted probability of 46%.

Farther, longer ... and less enjoyable

Not surprisingly, duration is one of the factors that has the greatest impact on the probability of liking or disliking the commute to work. For commuters who spent two hours or more a day travelling between home and work, the predicted probability that they would like doing so was just 23%. In contrast, it was 46% for those whose commute time was less than 30 minutes.

Commute duration does not explain everything, though. Even when the effect of travel time is kept constant, the farther a worker lives from his place of work, the lower the probability that he will like commuting. Although some people are obliged to travel long distances to get to work, many others have chosen to live a considerable distance from work in order to have, for example, more space at a better price.[5] Although the location of their home stems from a deliberate choice, it does not alter the fact that those who take longer and travel greater distances to get to work are those who like commuting the least.

The inconveniences of urban life: living in a large city is associated with liking commuting less

In general, the residents of larger cities have to allow more time for commuting than do people who live in smaller centres. However, even when commute time is kept constant (along with the other factors included in the analysis), workers who live in larger cities remain less likely to enjoy commuting than workers who reside in smaller centres. For example, the predicted probability that residents of the census metropolitan area (CMA) of Calgary would not like commuting was 34%, compared with just 19% for workers living outside the urban area.

Some studies have shown that travel time has an even more negative effect for individuals when they have to commute on heavily congested roads.[6] In other words, 30 minutes of driving on a relatively uncongested road would cause significantly less dissatisfaction than 30 minutes in bumper-to-bumper traffic. The effects are even more negative when gridlock is unexpected.

In general, the larger a city is, the heavier the traffic.[7] As a result, workers in larger cities have a greater chance than others of commuting under more stressful conditions. This makes it easier to understand why workers who live in larger urban areas are less likely than other workers, given equal commuting distance and duration, to enjoy commuting.

Liking the job and being eager to get there

One correlation that catches attention exists between liking one's job and the probability of liking commuting. According to the statistical model, the predicted probability that a worker who likes his paid work a great deal would also like travelling to work was 64%, compared with only 10% for a worker who disliked her paid work a great deal. To our knowledge, this correlation, which is one of the strongest presented in this study,

CST What you should know about this study

The people selected for inclusion in this study were all those who travelled between home and work the day before the telephone interview for the 2005 General Social Survey (or two days before in some cases). For more details on the survey methodology, please see *The Time it Takes to Get to Work and Back*, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 89-622-XWE.

Analytic techniques and statistical models

The figures shown in the tables are predicted probabilities based on an ordered logit model. They represent the estimated probability that a "commuting worker" with a particular characteristic (e.g., driving his/her car to work) will like or dislike commuting, after all the other factors in the regression model have been taken into account, i.e., kept constant. The predicted probabilities were calculated by keeping all variables, except the variable of interest (e.g., driving), constant at their average value for the sample in question. To take into account the General Social Survey's complex sampling methods, bootstrap weights were used to estimate the standard errors of the regression models' beta coefficients.

has not been seen in any previous studies. This finding indicates that when a worker likes her job, she will more likely be anxious to get to work and may also be more likely to put up with some of the unpleasant aspects of commuting, such as road congestion.

Among the other characteristics associated with attitude to commuting are age and level of education (but not gender). On average, younger workers tend to like commuting less. This correlation between age and attitude to commuting may be due to generational differences between baby-boomers and their children. Another possibility is that younger workers tend to like commuting less because it takes up too much of the time they might otherwise spend with their family and friends.[8]

CST People who love commuting

In the Time Use Survey, respondents were asked to identify, among all the activities in which they participated during the day, the one they liked best. As surprising as it may seem, some people (about 3% of all workers) said that the time they spent commuting between home and work was their favourite activity of the day. Who are these "eccentric" people?

Further analysis revealed that one of the only characteristics separating those who loved commuting from other workers (apart from travel time) was bicycling to work. That is, 19% of workers who rode their bicycles to work reported that their commute was the most pleasant activity of their day; in contrast, this was true of just 2% of workers who drove to work.

CST Commuters who like their jobs are more likely to enjoy commuting

	Model 1[1]		Model 2	
	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes
	Predicted probability (%)			
Assessment of paid job				
Greatly dislikes	*64*	*10*	*64*	*10*
Dislikes	48	18	48	17
Neutral	39	24	38	24
Likes	25	37	25	37
Greatly likes	10	64	10	64
Sex				
Woman	*25*	*37*	*25*	*37*
Man	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
Age group				
15 to 24 years	*34*	*28*	*34*	*28*
25 to 34 years	26	36	26	36
35 to 44 years	26	37	25	37
45 to 54 years	22	42	21	42
55 years and over	21	43	21	43

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Likes or greatly likes
	Predicted probability (%)			
Language				
English	*26*	*37*	*26*	*36*
French	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
Highest level of schooling attained				
Less than secondary	*22*	*42*	*22*	*41*
Secondary diploma	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.
College or trade/ technical diploma	26	36	26	36
University degree	28	34	27	35
Immigrant status				
Born in Canada	26	36	26	36
Arrived before 1980	27	36	26	36
Arrived between 1980 and 2005	*21*	*43*	*20*	*43*
Main activity in previous 12 months				
Paid employment	*25*	*38*	*25*	*38*
Self employment	29	33	28	33
Other	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.	n. s.

1. Model 1 does not account for duration of commute.

n. s : not statistically different from the reference category in italics.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2005.

CST Other findings

Some additional statistical analyses performed are not presented in this article. One of them showed that public transit users were neither more nor less satisfied with their commutes, no matter which census metropolitan area (CMA) they lived in. In other words, public transport users in the CMA of Montréal (for example) were no more unhappy or less unhappy with their commutes than public transport users in Toronto, Vancouver or Ottawa (and vice versa).

Another analysis showed that bus riders (i.e., people who spent most of their commute on the bus) were no more likely to enjoy commuting than those who took the metro and/or the train to work. Unfortunately, it was not possible to separate suburban train passengers from metro riders.

In a third analysis, drivers who commuted alone were compared with people who car-pooled. The results showed that those who drove alone were neither more nor less likely to enjoy commuting than car-poolers.

There is also a slight difference based on workers' level of education. Workers who have a higher level of education are a little less likely to enjoy commuting than workers with less education. However, it is difficult to explain why this is so.

Conclusion

One of the important goals of urban transportation policies, common to the majority of developed countries, is to encourage greater use of public or "sustainable" modes of transportation and reduce dependence on the automobile, especially for solo commuting.[9] In this context, it makes sense to compare the public transit users' attitudes to commuting with car drivers' attitudes.

The results of this study show that in general, car drivers are more likely than mass transit riders to like travelling to and from work. However, the attitude difference between the two groups disappears when the fact that public transportation users have to spend more time commuting between home and work is taken into account; in other words, for equal commute times, drivers and public transport users are equally likely to enjoy commuting.

These results suggest that should commuting times of public transit riders be similar to those of drivers (i.e. shorter), drivers could be more attracted to public transportation. However, other factors affect the choice between public transport and the automobile. Among others, the comfort associated with each mode; access to subsidized parking at the workplace; cost differences; and easy access to public transit near one's residence.

In conclusion, the workers who are most likely to enjoy commuting are those who bicycle to work. There are only a few brave ones in the winter, but in the summer, they are probably the ones who best live up to the old saying about combining business with pleasure.

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Table A.1 Characteristics associated with liking the commute to get to work

	Dislikes or greatly dislikes	Neutral	Likes or greatly likes	Total
	%			
Mode of transportation used to get to work[1]				
Automobile (no public transportation)	29	33	39	100
Public transportation (no automobile)	47	30	23	100
Bimodal (public transportation and automobile)	58	22[E]	20[E]	100
Walking	19	20	61	100
Cycling	F	34	58	100
Other	37[E]	28[E]	35[E]	100
Area of residence				
Toronto	36	30	35	100
Montréal	35	28	37	100
Vancouver	34	37	29	100
Ottawa–Gatineau	36	31	33	100
Calgary	38	36	26	100
Edmonton	39	30	31	100
CMA of 250,000 to 750,000 residents	33	33	34	100
CMA/CA of 100,000 to 249,999 residents	25	33	42	100
CA of 50,000 to 99,999 residents	20	32	48	100
Urban region of 49,999 residents or less	20	30	49	100
Strong MIZ	24	32	44	100
Rural area (moderate, weak or no influence MIZ)	21	29	50	100
Commuting duration				
1-29 minutes	16	28	56	100
30-59 minutes	24	34	42	100
60-89 minutes	33	35	32	100
90-119 minutes	40	31	28	100
120 minutes and over	55	26	19	100
Distance from workplace				
1-4 kilometers	16	25	59	100
5-9 kilometers	22	33	45	100
10-14 kilometers	27	35	38	100
15-19 kilometers	32	38	29	100
20-24 kilometers	37	34	29	100
25-29 kilometers	35	40	25	100
30-34 kilometers	43	33	24	100
35-39 kilometers	51	26	23	100
40 kilometers or over	50	28	22	100
Season in which the GSS survey took place				
Spring	31	29	40	100
Summer	27	32	40	100
Fall	28	31	40	100
Winter	34	33	32	100
Sex				
Woman	29	32	39	100
Man	31	31	38	100
Age group				
15 to 24 years	36	31	33	100
25 to 34 years	33	33	35	100
35 to 44 years	30	32	38	100
45 to 54 years	26	32	43	100
55 years and over	27	28	45	100
Language				
English	31	32	37	100
French	28	28	44	100
Highest level of schooling attained				
Less than secondary	23	28	49	100
Secondary diploma	29	30	41	100
College or trade/technical diploma	30	32	38	100
University degree	34	34	32	100
Immigrant status				
Born in Canada	30	31	39	100
Arrived before 1980	33	31	37	100
Arrived between 1980 and 2005	27	36	37	100
Main activity in previous 12 months				
Paid employment	30	31	38	100
Self employment	28	32	40	100
Other	F	F	F	100
Assessment of paid job				
Greatly dislikes	62	19[E]	19[E]	100
Dislikes	56	26	18	100
Neutral	38	42	20	100
Likes	28	32	40	100
Greatly likes	16	22	62	100

[E] use with caution

F too unreliable to be published

1. The mode of transportation used to make the greatest part of the journey (based on time).

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, 2005.

Seniors' access to transportation

by Martin Turcotte

In today's society, it is more difficult for a person to be active and independent if their access to transportation is limited. To socialize, to acquire the basic necessities of life, to obtain other services or to go somewhere just for the fun of it – it is crucial to be able to get around. For the large majority of Canadians, this does not present a real problem. But for people who do not have a vehicle, or who live in areas badly served by public transit, getting around can severely limit their day-to-day living.

One might think that older people are more vulnerable than other Canadians to limits on their mobility. But to what extent is this really the case? And to what degree are seniors with limited access to transportation affected in their daily lives?

This article answers these questions and others using data from the 2005 General Social Survey (GSS) on time use. First, it presents information about access to transportation by different age groups; then, it discusses the impact of having either more or less access to transportation on seniors' activities and quality of life. Finally, the article examines the characteristics of those seniors who are most likely to have limited access to transportation, and are thus most likely to face restrictions in their everyday activities.

The great majority of adults and seniors have access to private or public transport

In 2005, 98% of men aged 65 to 74 and 95% of women the same age had access either to a vehicle owned by someone in their household or to public transit. These percentages declined among people in older age groups. Nevertheless, even among seniors aged 85 and over, 86% had access either to a household vehicle or to mass transit.

Larger differences appear when examining the proportion of individuals who have, at a minimum, access to a vehicle belonging to themselves or to a member of their household. Although mass transit is a perfectly satisfactory option for many people (especially for those who live in the downtown neighbourhoods of big cities), access to a private household vehicle makes less routine travel easier, during an emergency for example. In 2005, 80% of seniors had access to a household vehicle, compared with 91% of 55- to 64-year-olds. (See "What you should know about this study" for a definition of the concepts relating to access to a household vehicle.)

Men are much more likely to have access to a household vehicle as drivers

The split between the different age groups is even larger in terms of access to a household vehicle as a *driver*. Indeed, 71% of people aged 65 and over were able to take the wheel of a vehicle owned by the household, compared with 88% of those aged 55 to 64. The discrepancy between senior men and women was particularly large in older age groups. For example, among 75- to 84-year-olds, 83% of men had vehicle access as a driver, in contrast to only 45% of women. Among those 85 and older, the proportion of men able to drive a household vehicle was twice as high, at 66% versus 33% of women.

These differences between the sexes are not really surprising because senior men are much more likely to own a valid driver's licence than women. There are also proportionally fewer men than women who have never driven a car in their lives. This gap will narrow over time, however, as the baby boomers enter their later years.[1] Indeed, almost as many women as men Boomers are car-drivers or car-owners. According to some researchers, this generation of women will cause a considerable rise in automobile use among seniors as they age over the coming years.[2]

Is better access to transport linked to a more active life?

Almost all seniors have "theoretical" access to transportation, whether it is their own vehicle, public transport or the help of a friend or family member. Despite this, a person's level of mobility – that is, their ability to get up and go where they want when they want – can vary considerably from

one person to another. Obviously, a senior who owns a car and a driver's licence, or who has the financial means to use a taxi to run his errands, can travel about much more easily than an older person who must rely on her son or daughter to take her shopping.

The 2005 GSS on time use can shine new light on the possible consequences of having more or less access to transportation, particularly with respect to leading an active life. More specifically, it can help to ascertain whether seniors who have better transportation options are more likely to leave their house on a given day, and whether they are more likely to engage in volunteer activities.

Seniors without access to a car or public transport are less likely to go out

Many authors and specialists in the field of gerontology maintain that access to transport is essential to the quality of life of seniors, contributing substantially (among other things) to their level of independence and their freedom to go out whenever it suits them.[3]

There is a multitude of reasons to leave the house on any given day: to go shopping, to get to an appointment, to travel to work, to take part in leisure activities or organized sports. Is a senior's level of access to transportation associated with their chances of going out and, implicitly, with the likelihood they will have done one or another of these activities?

To answer this question, a statistical analysis was performed. In addition to access to transport, the analytical model took account of a number of different factors that can also influence the probability of spending all day at home, including age, sex, health status, the presence or absence of limitations affecting a person's activities in relation to transportation or leisure, and so on.

To conduct the analysis, seniors were divided into four groups according to their level of access to transportation: 1) owned a vehicle and a valid driver's licence (71% of seniors); 2) did not have a valid driver's licence but did have access to a household vehicle as a passenger (9%); 3) did not have access to a vehicle but did have access to public transit (14%); 4) had access to neither a household vehicle nor public transit (6% of seniors).

The results of the statistical model clearly show that when a person has access to neither public transport nor a household vehicle, they have a higher probability of not leaving the house during the reference day. Keeping all other factors in the model constant, the predicted probability that people with limited access to transportation would stay at home was 49%.

In contrast, seniors with a valid driver's licence and a car were the most likely to have gone out at least once: the predicted probability that they would have spent the day at home was only 19%.

Seniors who were able to use a car as *passengers*, as well as those with public transit available, lay between these extremes. They shared a 32% predicted probability of having been at home all day, always holding all other factors in the model constant.[4]

These results do not mean that people without a driver's licence or access to public transit are more likely to stay at home only because they are limited by inadequate access to transportation and have no other choice. Other factors not included in the analysis can also have an impact. It is possible, for example, that some

CST Most seniors have access to some means of transportation

Age	Access to a household vehicle or public transportation			Access to a household vehicle (with or without a driver's licence)			Access to a household vehicle, with a valid licence		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
					%				
25 to 34	98	99	97	85	87	83	82	85	79
35 to 44	98	98	98	89	92	87	86	90	82
45 to 54	98	98	98	90	92	87	87	91	84
55 to 64	98	98	97	91	94	89	88	94	83
65 to 74	96	98	95	87	93	83	80	90	70
75 to 84	93	97	90	72	88	62	61	83	45
85 and over	86	91	82	53	68	44	46	66	33
65 and over	94	97	92	80	89	72	71	86	58

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey on time use, 2005.

CST What you should know about this study

Definition of concepts and variables

Access to a household vehicle and access to a household vehicle as a driver

These categories were created by combining respondents' responses to three different questions in the General Social Survey 2005 on time use.

- Do you have a valid driver's licence?
- Do you or does any member of your household lease or own a vehicle (includes a car, van, jeep or truck)?
- Do you have this car or truck at your disposal all the time, most of the time, rarely or never?

For purposes of this study, only people who had the household vehicle(s) at their disposal all the time or most of the time were considered to have access to a vehicle.

People who had a driver's licence and used the vehicle either mostly as a driver or as both a driver and a passenger (with a driver's licence) were considered to have access to a household vehicle as a *driver*.

Access to public transportation

Respondents in households whose members did not have a vehicle and respondents who did not have access to a household vehicle (as a driver or passenger) were asked the following question to determine whether they had access to public transportation:

- Is public transportation, for example, bus, rapid transit or subway, available to you?

People who did not leave their residence the previous day

In the 2005 General Social Survey, respondents were asked what activities they engaged in the day before the telephone interview (as well as where these activities had taken place). This made it possible to distinguish between people who did not go out and people who went out at least once (for any reason). It should be noted that doing yard work outside one's house, for example, is not considered leaving one's residence.

Mobility

In this article, mobility refers to people's ability to go where they want when they want. It refers exclusively to travel outside the home. This concept has nothing to do with the kind of mobility that involves moving to a new house or changing place of residence.

Methodology and statistical models

The predicted probabilities shown in the table were calculated using two logistical regressions. They represent the estimated probability that a senior with a particular characteristic (for example, having a vehicle and a driver's licence) remained at home the whole day (or did volunteer work) after all the other factors in the regression model were controlled for, i.e., held constant at the average value for the sample in question.

Additional statistical analyses, which included other variables, were also performed. They showed that there was no statistically significant relationship between the season and the probability of not having gone out the previous day; in other words, the probability of going out at least once during the day was just as high in winter as in summer. Urban or rural residence was also included in these supplementary analyses, but once again, no statistically significant relationship was found. This does not mean, though, that seniors in rural areas are less vulnerable (the charts in the article show the opposite) but rather that the critical factor is access to a vehicle or to public transportation, and not area of residence as such.

people do not have a driver's licence because they do not need one or because they are homebodies by nature.

That being said, it is likely that the difficulty faced by seniors without access to a car or public transit is an important reason why they had a greater tendency to remain at home. For them, having transport available could be limited to asking relatives for help getting from one place to another. As suggested by certain studies based on focus group discussions, seniors who must rely on relatives to drive them often limit their travel as much as possible for fear of being a nuisance to their family.[5]

Seniors with university degrees are least likely to stay at home

Other factors are also associated with the probability of not leaving the house on the reference day. Firstly, older seniors were more likely than their younger counterparts to have spent the whole day at home; this is not very surprising since levels of activity generally fall with age.

Secondly, seniors were less likely to have left the house the day before if their ability to travel or take part in leisure activities was *often* limited due to a physical condition, a mental state or a health problem: the predicted probability that they had stayed at home the previous day was 36%, compared with 21% for those whose

CST Seniors with a driver's licence are more likely to have done volunteer work the previous year

	Predicted probability…	
	of not having left the house the previous day	of having done volunteer work last year
	%	
Access to transportation		
Has a driver's licence and a vehicle	*19*	*32*
Has a vehicle but no licence	32	15
Access to public transportation	32	21
No access to transportation	49	17
Sex		
Male	n. s.	23
Female	*24*	*31*
Age		
65-74	*19*	*27*
75-84	28	n. s.
85+	35	n. s.
Perceived health		
Excellent or very good	n. s.	n. s.
Good, fair or poor	*22*	*27*
Activity limitations for transportation or leisure		
Yes, often	36	18
Yes, sometimes	n. s.	n. s.
No	*21*	*29*
Living arrangements		
Lives alone	*21*	*28*
Lives with spouse only	n. s.	n. s.
Lives with spouse and other people	36	n. s.
Other arrangement	n. s.	n. s.

	Predicted probability…	
	of not having left the house the previous day	of having done volunteer work last year
	%	
Total number of people considered close		
0 to 4	*27*	*16*
5 to 9	n. s.	n. s.
10 to 20	n. s.	34
More than 20	21	40
Highest level of education		
Did not graduate from high school	*28*	*20*
High school graduation	n. s.	n. s.
College or trade school diploma	n. s.	30
University degree	14	47
Household income		
Less than $20,000	*26*	*27*
$20,000 - $39,999	n. s.	n. s.
$40,000 or more	n. s.	n. s.
Owns residence		
Yes	26	n. s.
No	*15*	*26*
Born in Canada		
Yes	n. s.	n. s.
No	*23*	*22*
Region of residence		
Atlantic	n. s.	n. s.
Quebec	n. s.	n. s.
Ontario	*22*	*30*
Prairies	n. s.	n. s.
British Columbia	n. s.	n. s.

n. s. : Difference is not statistically significant relative to the reference category in italics.
Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey on time use, 2005.

activities were not curtailed (always keeping constant the other factors in the analysis including, among others, the respondent's age). Other studies have also shown this association between the existence of physical limitations and the reduction in the amount of travel undertaken.[6]

Thirdly, seniors with the largest social networks (they considered themselves close to 20 or more people) did not remain at home as much as those whose networks were small (less than five people). This connection is understandable since one of the main reasons older people go out is to visit close friends or family and to take part in social activities (compared to younger Canadians, who most often leave the house to travel to work and back).[7]

Finally, the probability of being at home the whole day differs between seniors with a university degree and those without a high school diploma. Seniors who held degrees were only half as likely to have spent the reference day around the house than seniors who had not completed a high school education (predicted probabilities of 14% and 28%, respectively). On the whole, seniors having a higher level of education are more inclined to be active in the labour market, to do volunteer work, to be members of an organization or to participate in other ways in civic activities.[8] All of these activities generally require that a person be somewhere other than home, which probably explains in part the difference observed between seniors depending on their educational attainment.

Some authors have hypothesized that the more active lifestyle enjoyed by the baby boomers (travel, leisure, golf, and so on), in conjunction with their greater reliance on the automobile, will contribute significantly to seniors' mobility in the future.[9] Given this fact, it is likely that the coming years will see an increase in the share of vehicle pollution attributable to older people being out and about.[10]

Seniors with a car and a driver's licence are most likely to have done volunteer work

To maintain an active life, as well as to "get involved" and help members of their community, many older people do volunteer work. While the proportion of seniors who volunteer is basically the same as that in other age groups, the average number of hours they devote is greater.[11] One of the conditions necessary for participating in voluntary activities is the ability to get easily to the location where those activities are taking place. Does having better access to transportation encourage seniors to volunteer?

According to the results of a statistical analysis that examined volunteer work as a function of the level of access to transportation, it seems that the answer is yes. Indeed, when holding constant the effect of other factors in the model, the predicted probability that an older person with a household vehicle and a driver's licence had done volunteer work in the preceding year was 32%. In contrast, the probability was 17% for those with neither a car nor public transit, and 15% for those with access to a vehicle but only as a passenger.

To our knowledge, no previous study has empirically demonstrated this association between seniors' access to a vehicle and a driver's licence, on one hand, and the probability of volunteering on the other.[12] What does it mean? One possible explanation is that certain volunteer activities, for example helping other seniors complete certain household tasks or deliver groceries, effectively demand a driver's licence. More generally, it is simply easier to get to volunteer activities if a person has a car than if they have to depend on public transit or on a household member to drive them there.

Seniors living in rural areas are most likely to have limited access to transportation

As shown by this study, people whose mobility is limited, and particularly those who have access to neither a household vehicle nor public transit, are less likely to have left their house during the reference day or to have done volunteer work in the previous year. One would expect that their restricted access to transportation would affect many aspects of their lives; for example, seniors would presumably find it more difficult to get to a doctor's appointment, to visit family members, to participate in various social activities and so on.

CST Women and seniors with lower incomes are more likely to be disadvantaged with respect to access to transportation



Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey on time use, 2005.

It thus becomes important to develop a profile of those seniors who are the most (and the least) likely to have limited access to transportation.

Not surprisingly, certain socio-economic characteristics are strongly associated with the probability that a senior lacks sufficient access to transportation. Seniors with household incomes under $20,000 were particularly vulnerable to belonging to this group (13%). In contrast, close to 90% of seniors living in households with incomes over $40,000 owned a vehicle and had access to it as a driver; almost no senior in this income category struggled with inadequate transportation. The same was observed among those with a high level of educational attainment. Also, women and seniors aged 85 and over were much more likely to be limited in their ability to "get around town" than men and 65- to 74-year-olds.

Having access to a household vehicle as a driver does not differ much between regions of the country. The most marked disparity was found between the Atlantic Provinces, where 9% of seniors did not have access to a household vehicle or to public transit, and British Columbia, where only 3% of seniors reported that their mobility was severely limited.

The splits between rural and urban areas are, however, more pronounced. Compared with seniors living in urban areas (especially those in the most densely populated neighbourhoods of census metropolitan areas), seniors in rural areas are much less likely to have access to public transport. While proportionally more rural seniors owned a vehicle and were able to drive it, they more often found themselves in a vulnerable position regarding mobility. According to some authors, this situation would suggest that older persons living in rural areas without a car are particularly at risk for social isolation, as well as difficulty in accessing community and medical services.[13]

Summary

The majority of studies that address the issue of transportation in the senior population concern themselves with questions of safety, for example the risk of road accidents and the risks of injury or death.[14] Other analyses try to develop appropriate policies to limit the driving of seniors considered "at risk", without creating more age discrimination.[15] Still other researchers, concerned about the increasing dependence of older people on the automobile, have wondered about the environmental consequences of seniors' driving habits.[16]

The approach adopted in this study is different. Analysis of the data from the 2005 GSS has demonstrated (among other things) that when seniors have inadequate access to means of transportation, it can translate into negative consequences for their daily lives, among others a lesser probability of getting out of the house on a given day and a lesser probability of having done volunteer work in the preceding year.

This study has also shown that older people who are completely deprived of transportation constitute

CST Residents of rural areas are more likely to have a driver's licence, but also to have limited access to transportation



1. Based on the number of residents per square kilometre in the census tract. A low- or medium-density census tract has a population of less than 3,600 per square kilometre. About two-thirds of the elderly population live in low- or medium-density districts.

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey on time use, 2005.

CST People who live alone are particularly affected by limited access to transportation

One of the things that contribute to the well-being of seniors, aside from their health, their independence and their financial security, is the opportunity to socialize and have meaningful contact with others. The risk of isolation is probably greater for those who live alone than for those who live with their spouse or other people. And the risk of social isolation is probably even higher when access to transportation is limited, which may make it more difficult to visit friends or take part in social activities.[1]

The data from the General Social Survey on time use provide some support for this idea. Sixty-one percent of seniors who lived alone but had a vehicle engaged in some kind of social activity on the reference day (e.g., visiting someone else's home, having a visitor at their home, or going to a restaurant with another person). In contrast, only 47% of those who only had access to public transportation and 42% of those who had no access to a vehicle or to public transportation had engaged in that kind of social activity.

More generally, the proportion of people who had no access to a vehicle or public transportation and spent the whole of the previous day alone was higher than the proportion of people who had a driver's licence. People who have more limited access to transportation may have a lower tendency to want many social relationships than those who have a licence.

Nevertheless, it is quite plausible to conclude that many seniors were limited in their social activities because of their problem with access to transportation. The difference in social activity between seniors who lived alone and had access to a private vehicle and other seniors remained significant, even when other factors in a statistical model were controlled for (results not presented here), such as size of social network, age, income, education and limitations on activities related to leisure and travel.

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a minority of the senior population. Moreover, there are indications that seniors' vulnerability to transportation problems will diminish considerably as the baby boom enters its golden years. Indeed, the members of this generation have higher incomes and are more likely than the current generation of seniors (men as well as women) to have had access (and to continue to have access) to a private vehicle. Consequently, it is probable that seniors' use of transportation will change considerably with a new generation of older people.

Before the baby boom generation reaches its 65th year, though, one must nevertheless remember that some people, among them women and people aged 85 and over living in rural areas, are particularly vulnerable to having limited mobility. As has been seen in this study, restricted access can have a concrete impact on their quality of life and their ability to live an active life.

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Social indicators

	1971	1981	1991	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Population										
Population of Canada, in thousands										
Canada	21,962	24,820	28,031	30,404	30,689	31,021	31,373	31,669	31,974	32,271
Population by province, in thousands										
Newfoundland and Labrador	531	575	580	533	528	522	519	518	517	516
Prince Edward Island	113	124	130	136	136	137	137	137	138	138
Nova Scotia	797	855	915	934	934	932	935	936	938	938
New Brunswick	642	706	746	751	751	750	750	751	752	752
Quebec	6,137	6,548	7,065	7,323	7,357	7,397	7,446	7,494	7,548	7,598
Ontario	7,849	8,811	10,428	11,506	11,685	11,898	12,102	12,260	12,407	12,541
Manitoba	999	1,036	1,110	1,142	1,147	1,151	1,156	1,162	1,170	1,178
Saskatchewan	932	976	1,003	1,015	1,008	1,000	996	995	994	994
Alberta	1,666	2,294	2,593	2,953	3,005	3,057	3,116	3,160	3,205	3,257
British Columbia	2,240	2,824	3,373	4,011	4,039	4,078	4,115	4,155	4,202	4,255
Yukon Territory	19	24	29	31	30	30	30	31	31	31
Northwest Territories	..	..	39	41	40	41	41	42	43	43
Nunavut	..	..	22	27	28	28	29	29	30	30
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	36	48	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Population by age groups, in thousands										
0 to 7 years	3,160	2,875	3,122	3,042	2,990	2,948	2,904	2,853	2,815	2,793
8 to 17 years	4,610	4,039	3,815	4,116	4,148	4,174	4,186	4,185	4,182	4,175
18 to 29 years	4,448	5,716	5,376	4,962	4,987	5,033	5,111	5,184	5,256	5,301
30 to 44 years	3,913	5,123	7,057	7,565	7,543	7,532	7,503	7,446	7,390	7,336
45 to 64 years	4,068	4,690	5,444	6,933	7,168	7,411	7,675	7,934	8,189	8,447
65 to 74 years	1,088	1,487	1,923	2,135	2,146	2,161	2,175	2,191	2,216	2,236
75 years and over	636	827	1,199	1,526	1,576	1,626	1,675	1,724	1,767	1,812
Dependency ratio[1] expressed as percentage										
Age group 0 to 17 years	62.5	44.5	38.8	36.8	36.2	35.7	34.9	34.2	33.6	33.0
Age group 65 years and over	14.2	15.3	18.0	19.5	19.6	19.6	19.7	19.8	19.9	20.0

	1981	1991	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Components of population change, in thousands									
Births	372	403	338	337	327	328	331	336	338
Deaths	171	192	218	217	219	220	225	231	235
Immigrants	127	221	173	206	253	256	199	239	245
Emigrants	45	44	48	48	48	39	35	36	36

	1991	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Population for largest census metropolitan areas, in thousands								
Montréal	3,291	3,438	3,471	3,507	3,547	3,579	3,610	3,636
Toronto	4,030	4,646	4,747	4,884	5,020	5,117	5,214	5,304
Vancouver	1,647	2,013	2,040	2,076	2,111	2,142	2,174	2,208
Ottawa–Gatineau	961	1,057	1,078	1,103	1,119	1,132	1,141	1,149

.. not available for a specific reference period

1. The ratio of the combined young (aged 0 to 18) and senior (aged 65 and over) populations to the working population (aged 18 to 64).

Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 051-0001, 051-0004, 051-0011, 051-0013 and 051-0034.

Social indicators (continued)

	1981	1991	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Interprovincial net migrants									
Newfoundland and Labrador	-4,243	-711	-5,695	-4,263	-4,493	-3,352	-1,683	-2,027	-1,875
Prince Edward Island	-1,046	-544	193	104	165	62	165	144	-222
Nova Scotia	-3,345	573	201	-270	-2,077	-898	510	-772	-473
New Brunswick	-4,975	928	-1,244	-1,183	-1,530	-1,218	-843	-760	-1,650
Quebec	-23,476	-13,093	-13,065	-12,146	-9,442	-4,350	-1,829	-822	-2,332
Ontario	-33,932	-10,947	16,706	22,369	18,623	5,354	637	-6,935	-8,375
Manitoba	-8,847	-7,687	-2,113	-3,456	-4,323	-4,344	-2,875	-2,565	-3,832
Saskatchewan	-3,604	-11,783	-4,333	-7,947	-8,410	-8,820	-5,141	-4,521	-4,583
Alberta	45,991	8,647	25,191	22,674	20,457	26,235	11,903	10,606	16,615
British Columbia	39,008	34,108	-14,484	-14,610	-8,286	-8,556	-1,037	7,865	7,456
Yukon Territory	-1,283	477	-747	-691	-572	-221	149	27	-6
Northwest Territories	..	..	-555	-651	-160	84	242	-105	-427
Nunavut	..	..	-55	70	48	24	-198	-135	-296
Northwest Territories including Nunavut	-248	32	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

	1976	1981	1989	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Labour force										
Labour force										
Labour force, in thousands	10,491.30	12,235.80	14,057.00	15,588.30	15,847.00	16,109.80	16,579.30	16,958.50	17,182.30	17,343.00
Total employed, in thousands	9,747.50	11,305.00	12,996.20	14,406.70	14,764.20	14,946.20	15,310.40	15,672.30	15,947.00	16,170.00
Labour force participation rate, in percent										
Men - Age 15 and over	77.7	78.4	76.8	72.4	72.4	72.3	73.0	73.4	73.2	72.8
15 to 24 years	68.9	73.6	73.8	65.3	65.9	66.1	67.8	68.3	67.8	66.1
25 to 54 years	94.5	94.6	93.5	91.1	91.0	91.1	91.5	91.6	91.6	91.5
55 years and over	47.2	44.3	37.4	33.2	33.3	33.6	35.6	37.6	38.4	39.1
Women - Age 15 and over	45.7	52.0	58.1	58.9	59.4	59.7	60.9	61.9	62.0	61.8
15 to 24 years	58.2	64.8	68.5	61.5	62.8	63.2	65.3	66.5	66.2	65.8
25 to 54 years	52.3	62.6	74.4	78.2	78.5	79.1	80.4	81.1	81.5	81.1
55 years and over	17.7	17.6	16.8	18.1	19.0	19.4	20.9	23.2	24.1	24.9
Unemployment rate, in percent										
15 years and over	7.1	7.6	7.5	7.6	6.8	7.2	7.7	7.6	7.2	6.8
15 to 24 years	12.4	12.8	10.9	14.0	12.7	12.9	13.6	13.6	13.4	12.4
25 to 54 years	5.3	6.0	6.8	6.4	5.8	6.2	6.6	6.5	6.0	5.8
55 years and over	3.9	4.2	5.7	5.5	5.1	5.5	5.8	5.9	5.6	5.1
Percentage of workers in service-producing sector[1]										
Total	65.4	67.3	70.6	74.0	74.1	74.7	74.7	75.0	75.0	75.2
Men	55.8	56.8	59.6	63.4	63.3	63.9	63.8	64.1	64	64.1
Women	81.8	82.7	84.6	86.5	86.8	87.3	87.1	87.4	87.4	87.8
15 to 24 years	69.4	71.0	76.5	80.2	80.2	81.5	81.4	81.8	81.4	81.6
25 to 54 years	63.9	66.3	69.5	73.3	73.2	73.5	73.5	73.5	73.6	74.0
55 years and over	64.6	64.2	66.6	70.3	71.9	73.2	73.1	74.5	74.9	74.4

.. not available for a specific reference period

1. Service-producing sector includes wholesale and retail trade; transportation and distribution; finance, insurance, real estate and leasing; professional, scientific and technical services; business services; food, accommodation and other services; information, cultural and recreation services; education, health care and social services; and public administration.

Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 051-0018 and Labour Statistics Division.

Social indicators (continued)

	1976	1981	1989	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Percentage of workers employed part-time										
Total	12.5	14.8	16.6	18.4	18.1	18.1	18.8	18.9	18.5	18.3
Men	5.9	7.2	8.7	10.3	10.3	10.5	11.0	11.1	10.9	10.8
Women	23.6	26.1	26.7	27.9	27.2	27.0	27.7	27.9	27.2	26.8
15 to 24 years	21.1	24.9	34.5	44.1	43.6	43.4	44.9	45.1	44.7	44.6
25 to 54 years	8.8	10.7	11.3	12.6	12.2	12.3	12.5	12.5	12.1	12.0
55 years and over	13.3	15.3	20.0	21.9	21.9	21.1	22.6	22.9	22.5	21.9
Percentage of workers self-employed										
Total	12.2	12.6	13.9	16.9	16.1	15.2	15.1	15.3	15.4	15.5
Men	14.2	15.1	17.0	20.3	19.3	18.7	18.3	18.8	19.0	19.1
Women	8.6	8.9	9.8	12.9	12.3	11.2	11.4	11.3	11.2	11.4
15 to 24 years	5.7	5.7	5.5	6.5	5.1	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.1	4.0
25 to 54 years	13.3	13.9	14.4	16.7	16.2	15.4	15.1	15.2	15.2	15.4
55 years and over	20.3	20.8	26.8	34.0	31.8	30.1	29.8	29.7	29.5	28.8

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Percentage of employees in temporary jobs[2]							
Total	12.0	12.5	12.8	12.9	12.4	12.8	13.2
Men	11.5	11.8	12.0	12.3	12.0	12.0	12.5
Women	12.5	13.2	13.7	13.6	12.9	13.5	13.9
15 to 24 years	28.1	29.1	30.1	29.6	28.3	29.3	29.9
25 to 54 years	8.6	8.8	8.9	9.2	8.8	9.0	9.3
55 years and over	9.5	10.6	10.7	10.8	10.9	10.6	11.7
Percentage of unionized[3] employees							
Total	32.3	32.4	32.3	32.2	32.2	31.7	32,0
Men	33.2	33.2	33.0	32.4	32.7	31.7	32.1
Women	31.3	31.4	31.6	32,0	31.8	31.7	32.0
15 to 24 years	13.5	14.3	15.2	15.4	15.4	14.8	15.8
25 to 54 years	36.1	36.1	35.8	35.8	35.5	35.0	35.1
55 years and over	36.5	36.8	37.1	36.1	38.0	37.2	37.5

2. Temporary jobs include seasonal jobs, term or contract jobs, casual jobs and other temporary jobs of an unspecified nature.
3. Includes employees who are unionized or non-unionized but are covered by a collective agreement.

Source: Statistics Canada, Labour Statistics Division.

Social indicators (continued)

	1981	1989	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Income									
Average market income,[1] 2004 constant dollars									
Economic families, two persons or more[2]	60,000	63,100	58,900	63,500	66,400	67,000	66,900	66,300	68,100
Unattached individuals[3]	24,700	24,600	20,800	23,700	23,800	24,500	25,000	25,800	25,800
Average total income[4] of persons who are income recipients, including transfer payments, 2004 constant dollars									
All age groups	30,200	31,500	29,500	31,300	32,100	32,600	32,500	32,400	33,000
Under 20 years	8,200	7,700	5,700	6,300	6,200	6,800	6,000	6,300	6,300
20 to 24 years	22,700	20,500	13 200	14 800	15,300	15,700	15,500	15,000	15,200
25 to 34 years	34,600	33,100	29,400	30,900	32,100	32,700	33,300	32,100	33,200
35 to 44 years	41,200	41,900	36,300	40,400	41,000	41,700	40,400	40,900	40,800
45 to 54 years	40,200	41,300	40,600	41,000	43,100	42,300	43,000	43,000	44,600
55 to 64 years	33,200	33,500	30,800	32,400	33,000	34,500	34,900	35,100	35,100
65 years and over	20,000	23,600	24,000	24,600	24,700	25,100	25,600	25,600	26,200
Average total income by family type, including transfer payments, 2004 constant dollars									
Economic families, two persons or more	65,100	70,000	67,200	71,200	73,800	75,000	74,800	74,300	76,100
Unattached individuals	28,800	29,700	26,900	29,300	29,300	30,100	30,700	31,300	31,200
Average after-tax income for economic families of two persons of more, 2004 constant dollars									
All quintiles	55,100	56,500	53,900	57,400	59,200	61,500	61,600	61,100	62,700
Lowest quintile	20,400	21,700	18,900	20,500	20,500	22,000	21,500	21,800	22,300
Second quintile	37,900	38,500	34,100	36,800	37,200	38,600	38,500	38,400	39,100
Third quintile	51,100	51,500	47,500	50,500	51,400	53,300	53,300	53,300	54,200
Fourth quintile	65,500	66,600	63,700	67,500	69,000	71,200	71,800	71,300	72,700
Highest quintile	100,500	104,100	105,400	111,600	117,800	122,700	122,800	120,800	125,000
Percentage distribution of husband-wife families by earnings characteristics[5]									
All husband-wife families	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total dual-earner families	55.4	62.6	60.8	62.1	63.0	63.7	63.6	64.3	64.8
Dual-earner families, wife earned more than husband	8.9	11.8	15.7	15.4	16.3	16.3	16.8	18.0	18.0
Total single-earner families	33.7	23.0	23.3	22	22.1	21.5	22.0	21.6	21.3
Single-earner families, wife sole earner	2.5	3.4	5.0	5.2	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.0
Neither spouse had earnings	10.9	14.4	15.9	15.9	14.9	14.7	14.4	14.1	13.9
Female-to-male earnings ratio,[5] in percent									
Full-year full-time workers	63.5	65.8	68.3	68.4	70.6	69.9	70.2	70.2	69.9
Prevalence of low income after tax, in percent, based on 1992 low income cut-offs									
All persons	11.6	10.2	15.3	13.0	12.5	11.2	11.6	11.6	11.2
Persons under 18 years	12.4	11.7	17.8	14.4	13.8	12.1	12.2	12.5	12.8
Persons 18 to 64 years	9.9	9.4	15.5	13.4	12.9	11.7	12.1	12.2	11.7
Persons 65 years and over	21.0	11.3	9.1	7.8	7.6	6.7	7.6	6.8	5.6
Males, 65 years and over	14.2	6.1	5.6	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.9	4.4	3.5
Females, 65 years and over	26.3	15.1	11.8	10.3	10.0	8.3	9.7	8.7	7.3

1. Market income is the sum of earnings (from employment and net self-employment), net investment income, private retirement income and "Other income". It is equivalent to total income minus government transfers.
2. An economic family is a group of two or more persons who live in the same dwelling and are related to each other by blood, marriage, common law or adoption.
3. An unattached individual is a person living either alone or with others to whom he or she is unrelated, such as roommates or lodgers.
4. Total income equals market income plus government transfers (including Old Age Security pension and Guaranteed Income Supplement, benefits from Canada or Quebec Pension Plan, benefits from Employment Insurance, social assistance payments, Canada Child Tax benefits, workers' compensation, GST and HST credits and government transfers).
5. Includes earnings from both paid employment (wages and salaries) and self-employment.

Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 202-0102, 202-0105, 202-0202, 202-0403, 202-0407, 202-0701 and 202-0802.

Social indicators (continued)

	1981	1989	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Prevalence of low income after tax, in percent, by family type, based on 1992 low income cut-offs[6]									
All family units	16.2	14.1	20.0	17.5	16.8	15.5	15.5	15.6	15.2
Economic families, two persons or more	8.9	7.5	11.5	9.5	9.0	7.9	8.6	8.5	7.8
Elderly families	9.4	3.7	3.9	2.9	3.1	2.5	2.9	2.7	2.1
Non-elderly families	8.8	8.2	12.7	10.6	10.0	8.8	9.5	9.5	8.8
Two-parent families with children	7.2	6.3	10.3	8.1	8.3	6.9	6.5	6.7	6.7
Lone-parent families	41.0	38.9	45.4	36.1	32.3	30.1	34.2	34.0	31.7
Male lone-parent families	11.6	11.7	21.4	18.1	12.3	12.3	12.2	12.8	14.2
Female lone-parent families	46.0	42.5	49.3	39.4	36.3	33.8	39.4	38.8	35.6
Unattached individuals	35.5	28.9	37.9	34.0	32.9	30.8	29.5	29.6	29.6
Elderly males	39.0	18.8	17.2	17.2	17.6	16.8	15.9	14.7	11.6
Elderly females	53.5	31.9	23.7	22.3	21.6	18.6	20.7	18.9	17.0
Non-elderly males	24.8	24.9	39.8	35.4	32.1	30.3	29.0	30.7	31.5
Non-elderly females	35.5	34.1	49.5	43.4	44.3	42.1	39.0	38.0	38.4
After-tax income distribution, share of after-tax income in percent, for all family units, economic families and unattached individuals									
All quintiles	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Lowest quintile	5.3	5.6	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8
Second quintile	11.9	11.6	10.8	10.9	10.7	10.7	10.7	10.7	10.7
Third quintile	18.1	17.6	16.7	16.7	16.5	16.4	16.4	16.5	16.4
Fourth quintile	24.9	24.5	24.5	24.3	24.2	24	24.0	24.1	24.0
Highest quintile	39.8	40.6	43.2	43.3	44.0	44.0	43.9	43.7	44.0
Gini coefficient[7] of after-tax income									
All family units, economic families and unattached individuals	0.348	0.351	0.385	0.386	0.392	0.392	0.391	0.389	0.393

	1981	1991	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Health								
Fertility rate								
Per woman	1.65	1.7	1.55	1.49	1.51	1.5	1.53	1.53

	1981	1991	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Infants									
Birth weight less than 2,500 grams	21,219	22,315	20,060	18,970	18,242	18,432	..	18,800	19,560
Proportion of low birth weight births	5.9	5.5	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.5	..	5.7	5.9
Total infant deaths, age at time of death, under 1 year	3,562	2,573	1,928	1,776	1,737	1,739	1,762	1,762	1,765
Mortality rate per 1,000 live births	9.6	6.4	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.4	5.4	5.3

	1991	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Life expectancy in years								
Males at birth	72.1	74.6	75.7	76.2	76.7	77.0	77.2	77.4
Females at birth	79.3	80.9	81.3	81.7	81.9	82.1	82.1	82.4
Males at age 65	14.7	15.8	16.2	16.4	16.8	17.1	17.2	17.4
Females at age 65	19.2	19.9	20.0	20.2	20.4	20.6	20.6	20.8

.. not available for a specific reference period

6. Low income cut-offs conveys the income level at which a family may be in straitened circumstances because it is likely to spend 20 percentage points more of its income than the average family of similar size on food, shelter and clothing.
7. The Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality in income distribution. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (equal distribution of income across the population) to 1 (one person or household has all the income). The higher the Gini coefficient the more unequal the distribution of income is. A difference of .01 or more between two Gini coefficients is considered statistically significant.

Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 102-0506, 102-0511, 102-4005, 102-4505, 202-0701, 202-0705 and 202-0804.

Social indicators (continued)

	1981	1991	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Selected causes of death for men, per 100,000 males,[1]								
Cancer	239.0	247.5	230.7	228.9	225.3	223.8	220.5	215.3
– Lung	73.2	78.8	69.9	70.3	64.3	64.6	64.5	62.7
– Colorectal	29.2	25.1	23.5	24.1	24.0	22.8	24.1	23.0
– Prostate	27.1	31.2	28.4	26.7	26.7	26.6	25.2	24.1
Heart disease	380.1	263.7	231.8	220.8	202.9	189.7	183.1	178.9
Cerebrovascular disease	81.1	55.8	52.4	47.3	46.4	44.6	43.7	41.6
Selected causes of death for women, per 100,000 females[1]								
Cancer	148.8	153.7	149.1	149.4	149.4	147.6	149.3	148.1
– Lung	17.9	29.5	32.3	34.8	34.4	34.4	35.3	35.4
– Colorectal	21.6	16.8	15.2	15.2	15.1	14.9	15.2	14.6
– Breast	30.1	30.1	27.4	25.2	25	24.9	24.4	24.1
Heart disease	202.7	147.6	130.2	121.1	113.4	107.6	104.6	98.2
Cerebrovascular disease	67.4	46.3	44.2	40	38.8	37.1	36.3	34.7

	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Body Mass Index, BMI,[2] male								
Underweight, BMI under 18.5	0.9	1.3	..	1.3	..	1.2	..	1.1
Normal weight, BMI 18.5 to 24.9	41.2	39.6	..	43.8	..	41.2	..	40.5
Overweight, BMI 25.0 to 29.9	43.6	44.1	..	39.0	..	41.0	..	40.9
Obese, BMI 30.0 or higher	12.7	14.5	..	15.3	..	15.9	..	16.8
Body Mass Index, BMI,[2] female								
Underweight, BMI under 18.5	3.7	3.2	..	4.5	..	4.1	..	4.3
Normal weight, BMI 18.5 to 24.9	55.3	54.4	..	53.0	..	52.1	..	51.8
Overweight, BMI 25.0 to 29.9	25.2	26.3	..	25.9	..	25.7	..	26.1
Obese, BMI 30.0 or higher	11.2	13.8	..	13.7	..	13.9	..	14.2

	1981	1991	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Percentage of smokers									
Male	43.7	32.2	27.3	25.8	23.9	23.0	23.3	22.0	22.0
Female	32.2	29.7	23.3	23.1	19.6	20.0	18.5	17.0	16.0
Percentage of smokers by age groups									
15 to 19 years	43.4	22.6	27.7	25.3	22.5	22.0	18.3	18.4	18.0
20 to 24 years	48.6	39.7	35.4	32.3	32.1	31.0	30.5	27.8	26.0
25 to 44 years	42.1	35.8	29.9	29.6	25.0	24.0	25.4	24.8	23.4
45 to 64 years	37.4	30.1	21.9	20.6	19.7	..	..	17.4	17.3
65 years and over	18.9	16.0	11.8	13.4	10.8	..	..	7.3	6.7

	1981	1991	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Suicide rate per 100,000 population								
Male	21.3	21.6	19.6	21.7	18.4	18.6	18.4	18.5
Female	6.8	5.3	5.1	5.6	5.2	5.2	5.0	5.4

.. not available for specific reference period

1. Significant disruption of some mortality trends was caused by the implementation of ICD-10 as the Canadian mortality classification standard, effective in 2000. The impact of the implementation of ICD-10 on Canadian mortality trends is assessed in Health Statistics Division's ICD-9 and ICD-10 comparability study.
2. Body mass index, BMI, is calculated by dividing the respondent's body weight in kilograms, by their height in metres squared.

Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 102-0026, 102-0126, 103-0004, 105-4009, the 1981 data for percentage of smokers derived from Smoking Behaviour of Canadians supplements to the Labour Force Survey, 1991 data from General Social Suvey, 1996 data National Population Health Survey and 1999 to 2003 data from Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Survey.

Social indicators (continued)

	1981	1991	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Suicide rate per 100,000 population by age groups								
1 to 14 years	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.5
15 to 19 years	12.7	13.8	12.9	12.1	10.7	9.8	10.1	10.2
20 to 24 years	19.6	18.2	14.5	15.0	15.3	14.0	12.9	14.0
25 to 44 years	17.4	18.1	15.8	18.8	15.9	15.7	15.0	15.0
45 to 64 years	20.1	16.2	16.5	17.2	15.2	17.0	16.4	16.9
65 years and over	18.3	14.2	12.4	12.7	10.4	10.1	10.8	10.9

	1980	1990	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Number of offences											
Total, Criminal Code, excluding traffic	2,045,398	2,627,197	2,534,766	2,461,156	2,356,831	2,352,768	2,374,811	2,417,444	2,579,172	2,610,971	2,504,559
Total, crimes of violence	155,863	269,507	296,890	296,166	291,327	302,098	305,186	303,946	305,667	302,147	304,274
Homicide	592	660	586	558	538	546	553	582	549	624	658
Assault, levels 1 to 3	..	190,337	222,397	223,926	221,348	233,719	236,957	235,710	236,802	234,259	234,729
Robbery	24,581	28,109	29,587	28,963	28,740	27,037	27,284	26,662	28,437	27,495	28,669
Total, property crimes	1,334,619	1,554,348	1,459,536	1,377,901	1,299,981	1,252,387	1,241,936	1,246,481	1,305,229	1,269,999	1,206,142
Breaking and entering	349,694	379,364	373,316	350,774	318,054	293,357	279,461	275,573	284,925	275,869	259,521
Theft, motor vehicles	93,928	114,082	177,130	165,920	161,388	160,315	168,595	161,912	174,208	169,977	160,100
Total, drugs	74,196	60,645	66,593	70,921	80,142	88,091	89,395	92,781	86,791	97,630	92,255
Other Criminal Code[1]	554,916	803,342	778,340	787,089	765,523	798,283	827,689	867,017	968,276	1,038,825	994,143
Criminal Code, traffic[2]	..	227,201	155,228	141,153	117,650	112,445	120,234	117,571	117,119	120,637	118,738
Rate per 100,000 population											
Total, Criminal Code, excluding traffic	8,343	9,484	8,475	8,161	7,752	7,666	7,655	7,706	8,144	8,165	7,761
Total, crimes of violence	636	973	993	982	958	984	984	969	965	945	943
Homicide	2.4	2.4	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.0
Assault, levels 1 to 3	..	687	744	743	728	762	764	751	748	733	727
Robbery	100	101	99	96	95	88	88	85	90	86	89
Total, property crimes	5,444	5,611	4,880	4,569	4,276	4,081	4,004	3,973	4,121	3,971	3,737
Breaking and entering	1,426	1,370	1,248	1,163	1,046	956	901	878	900	863	804
Theft, motor vehicles	383	412	592	550	531	522	543	516	550	531	496
Total, drugs	303	219	223	235	264	287	288	296	274	305	286
Other Criminal Code[1]	2,263	2,900	2,603	2,610	2,518	2,601	2,668	2,764	3,058	3,249	3,080
Criminal Code, traffic[2]	..	820	519	468	387	366	388	375	370	377	368

.. not available for specific reference period
1. Other Criminal Code includes offences such as prostitution, gambling, possession of offensive weapon, missing court date, etc.
2. Criminal Code traffic includes offences such as dangerous operation of a vehicle, impaired driving, etc.
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 252-0013, Suicide data from Health Statistics Division.

Social indicators (continued)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Adult prison court sentences							
Total offences							
Percentage sentenced cases resulting in prison term	43.2	44.3	43.4	42.9	42.1	41.5	41.3
Average length of sentence in months	4.3	4.6	4.3	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.8
Total Criminal Code							
Percentage sentenced cases resulting in prison term	43.1	44.2	43.4	43	42.3	41.7	41.3
Average length of sentence in months	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.0	3.8	3.7
Crimes against the person							
Percentage sentenced cases resulting in prison term	33.0	33.5	32.5	32.1	31.5	30.6	30.0
Average length of sentence in months	7.3	7.8	7.6	7.5	7.8	7.2	7.3
Homicide							
Percentage sentenced cases resulting in prison term	76.8	82.9	86.4	85.5	87.1	90.8	83.3
Average length of sentence in months	124.7	114.2	122.1	136.1	130	145.5	135.3
Crimes against property							
Percentage sentenced cases resulting in prison term	40.3	42.3	41.3	40.4	40.5	40.5	40.2
Average length of sentence in months	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.4	3.9	3.8	3.7
Criminal Code traffic							
Percentage sentenced cases resulting in prison term	52.4	55.7	54.8	54.1	52.7	52	51.4
Average length of sentence in months	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5

	1976	1981	1989	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Economy										
Important rates										
Prime lending rate	10.0	19.3	13.3	5.0	7.3	5.8	4.2	4.7	4.0	4.4
Conventional 5-year mortgage rate	11.8	18.4	12.1	7.1	8.4	7.4	7.0	6.4	6.2	6.0
Exchange rate, in U.S. dollars	0.986	1.199	1.184	1.385	1.485	1.549	1.57	1.401	1.301	1.211
Personal savings rate[1]	13.7	17.4	13.0	4.9	4.7	5.2	3.4	2.4	1.4	-0.2
Real Gross Domestic Product, expenditure-based; chained 1997 dollars at market prices										
Billion dollars	508	600	764	883	1,021	1,039	1,071	1,092	1,124	1,157
Annual percentage change	5.2	3.5	2.6	4.2	5.2	1.8	3.1	2.0	2.9	2.9
Per capita, in thousand dollars	21.7	24.2	28	29.5	33.3	33.5	34.1	34.5	35.2	35.9

1. Ratio of personal savings to personal disposable income (persons and unincoporated businesses).
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 176-0043, 176-0064, 380-0002 and 380-0004.

Social indicators (continued)

	1976	1981	1989	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Consumers										
Consumer spending[2], annual percentage change	5.1	1.2	3.4	4.6	4.0	2.3	3.7	3.1	3.4	4.0
Consumer spending[2] per capita, in thousand dollars	13.2	13.9	16.1	17.1	18.5	18.7	19.1	19.6	20.0	20.6
Consumer Price Index, all items, 1992=100	37.1	58.9	89.0	107.6	113.5	116.4	119.0	122.3	124.6	127.3
Annual percentage change in all items Consumer Price Index	7.5	12.4	5.0	1.6	2.7	2.6	2.2	2.8	1.9	2.2
Total consumer bankruptcies	10.0	23.0	29.2	85.3	75.1	79.5	78.2	84.3	84.4	84.6
New housing starts, in thousands	..	178.2	215.2	148.2	152.9	163.1	205.3	219.5	232.7	224.3
New Housing Price Index, 1997=100	..	71.9	106.8	100.0	104.1	107.0	111.3	116.7	123.2	129.4
New motor vehicle sales, in units, 1997=100	90.7	83.6	104.2	100.0	111.5	112.2	121.7	114.2	110.6	114.5
Household borrowing[3], in billion dollars	17.4	15.3	39.8	32.4	40.0	41.6	48.4	55.2	56.9	62.8
Annual percentage change in wages, salaries and supplementary labour income in Gross Domestic Product	15.7	15.3	7.8	5.7	8.4	4.5	4.0	4.2	4.2	5.4
Corporate finances										
Corporate[4] surplus, net lending, in billion dollars	-3.9	-22.9	-14.7	-5.9	11.1	31.3	47.1	57.5	72.9	80.6
Operating profit, in billion dollars	..	..	101.1	118.1	165.1	143.1	145.8	161.0	193.6	217
Ratio of profit margin[5]	..	..	7.7	6.6	7.5	6.2	6.2	6.7	7.7	8.2
Ratio of return on equity[6]	..	..	11.5	10.9	10.9	7.4	5.7	9.4	10.6	11.0
Government accounts										
Revenue, in billion dollars	74.8	142.9	271.3	388.1	468.7	467.4	471.7	493.8	521.8	558.8
Expenditures, in billion dollars	77.0	147.4	292.7	386.8	433.9	455.5	465.6	486.0	502.1	524.1
Surplus, in billion dollars	-2.1	-4.5	-21.4	1.3	34.8	11.9	6.0	7.8	19.6	34.6

	1976	1981	1989	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Net international investment position										
Billion dollars	-61.3	-135.7	-232.1	-290.2	-243.7	-208.8	-203.4	-206.9	-206.2	-181.1
Liabilities as a percentage of Real Gross Domestic Product	12.1	22.6	30.4	32.9	25.1	20.5	19.6	19.3	18.9	16.1

	1976	1981	1989	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Balance of international payments										
Current account, in billion dollars	-7.5	-15.0	-25.8	-11.4	29.3	25.1	21.1	18.4	28.8	30.2

				1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
National net worth[7], unadjusted										
Billion dollars				2,720	3,286	3,523	3,701	3,875	4,151	4,371
Per capita, in thousand dollars				90.9	107.0	113.4	117.9	122.3	129.8	135.3

.. not available for a specific reference period
2. Personal expenditure on consumer goods and services in chained 1997 dollars.
3. Persons and unincorporated businesses.
4. Corporations and government business enterprises.
5. Ratio of operating profit to operating revenue.
6. Ratio of profit before extraordinary gains to total equity.
7. The sum of non-financial assets minus net foreign debt.

Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, tables 027-0007, 079-0001, 177-0001, 187-0002, 326-0002, 327-0005, 376-0005, 376-0037, 378-0002, 378-0008, 380-0002, 380-0005, 380-0007 and 380-0016.

Lesson plan

Suggestions for using *Canadian Social Trends* in the classroom

"When is junior moving out? Transitions from the parental home to independence" and "Junior comes back home: Trends and predictors of returning to the parental home"

Objective

- To define the process of transition to adulthood in today's society

Curriculum areas: social studies, family studies, life skills

Classroom instructions

1. Read the two articles "When is junior moving out?" (August 2006 on-line) and "Junior comes back home" (October 2006 on-line). Summarize the factors that contribute to leaving the parental home and those that contribute to returning. Identify any other factors that you think affect the timing of a young person's departure from home and/or their return home.
2. The two articles show that leaving home and becoming an independent adult is taking longer than it did 30 years ago. What are some of the effects of a "failure to launch" on the individual family? On society as a whole?
3. Sociologists and demographers have been talking about "delayed adulthood" for several decades. Generally speaking, "delayed adulthood" means that, compared to their parents, today's young people are waiting till they are older before starting a career, getting married, buying a home, having children, and so on. However, some researchers think that it is time to expand the definition of adulthood to include goals in addition to family formation. Discuss how to define an "adult" and identify the qualities you would associate with such a person. Given this new "adult", how would you now define the steps in the progression from adolescence to adulthood?
4. The government is worried about the economic impact of "delayed adulthood" and has set up a task force to find out why young people are taking longer to establish themselves in their own independent households. You have been asked to address the task force and present your ideas for solving the problem. What kinds of policies or programs would you propose to the government? How would you measure the impact of your program?

Using other resources

See Teacher Resources by Subject at www.statcan.ca/english/edu/teachers.htm

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