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The E-Fantry Warrior! The Evolution of the Queen of Battles in the Face of the 21st Century Challenges
Captain Eric Dion, CD, MBA

The Regimental System and Army Transformation: Getting Past the Story
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A Single Combat Branch?
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Comments on "A Single Combat Branch"
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Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Finding a Special Forces Capability for the Canadian Army
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Information Operations in Peace Support Operations
Captain Kevin Bondy, CD

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Part of Our Heritage	2
From the Managing Editor Welcome to the Canadian Army Journal <i>Major John R. Grodzinski, MA, CD</i>	3
Update from Director General Land Combat Development DGLCD <i>Brigadier-General Herb Petras, CD</i>	5
DAT Update: The Future of Competitions in the Army <i>Major G.P. Blackman, CD</i>	10
The E-Fantry Warrior! The Evolution of the Queen of Battles in the Face of the 21st Century Challenges <i>Captain Eric Dion, CD, MBA</i>	14
The Regimental System and Army Transformation: Getting Past the Story <i>Colonel Mike Capstick, CD</i>	24
A Single Combat Branch? <i>Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Banks, CD</i>	26
Comments on “A Single Combat Branch” <i>Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Bondy, CD</i>	34
Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Finding a Special Forces Capability for the Canadian Army <i>Major Tony Balasevicius, CD</i>	35
Information Operations in Peace Support Operations <i>Capitan Harry Bondy, CD</i>	51
Book Reviews	64
The Stand-Up Table	73

A PART OF OUR HERITAGE



THE FALAISE GAP: SIXTY YEARS ON

Continuing with the sixtieth anniversary commemoration of events in North-West Europe and Italy, the Canadian Army Journal recalls the phase of the Battle of Normandy officially known as "The advance beyond Falaise to close the gap," from 7 to 23 August 1944. Included are such battles, actions and engagements as Falaise, Falaise Road, Quesnay Wood, Clair Tizon, Jort, The Liaison, Chambois and St Lambert sur Dives. At the time, First Canadian Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, undertook its first major operations, with 1st British Corps and 2nd Canadian Corps, and a variety of British, Canadian and Polish divisions and other allied contingents under command. While victory in Normandy has since been debated by historians and those claiming to be historians, we recall the magnificent efforts of Canadian military personnel, whose efforts contributed to that victory.

The link up of Canadian, Polish and American forces at Chambois on 19 August 1944, effectively "closed" the Falaise Gap. As in Italy, Allied efforts to surround and destroy enemy forces were not completely effective and elements of the German Fifth Panzer Army and Seventh Army managed to escape. Nonetheless, between 19 and 23 August, First Canadian took 13,683 German prisoners of war, while in the Gap area itself, the Germans abandoned 3,043 tanks, guns and other vehicles. Not a bad for "warriors of the working day," as Shakespeare put it.

The images depict two types of soldiers that fought in this massive struggle. At left is a typically dressed member of an armoured regiment, wearing the "tank suit" introduced in July 1943, a protective garment for crews of armoured fighting vehicles. At the right is a sniper, in this case from The Calgary Highlanders, sporting dress to aid concealment, namely a disruptive pattern Denison Smock and a camouflage face veil, normally used to cover the head and face. His weapon is a Rifle No. 4 Mark 1 (T) with what appears to be a No. 32 type telescope. It was during the struggle for St Lambert sur Dives, on 18 August 1944, that Major David Currie of The South Alberta Regiment, the armoured reconnaissance regiment of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, won the Victoria Cross, for his leadership that brought the capture the village. (Both images by Ronald B. Volstad, courtesy of the Directorate of History and Heritage)

FROM THE MANAGING EDITOR

WELCOME TO THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL!!

Major John R. Grodzinski, Acting Managing Editor

While he only held the post of Managing Editor of *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin / The Canadian Army Journal* for one year, Lieutenant Colonel Shane Schreiber achieved much with this journal. Shane possesses a passion regarding his profession and an uncompromising desire to extend the boundaries of professional discourse. He actively solicited updates on doctrinal, training and other matters, while encouraging personnel throughout the Army to write articles, comment on questions and contribute to the health of the profession of arms. He is to be congratulated for his efforts.

Shane also improved the format of this journal and campaigned successfully for the adoption of a more appropriate name. The result of this determined effort was the adoption of a new title for *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, which with Vol 7 No. 1, became known as *The Canadian Army Journal*. In 1997, during the initial planning for *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, one of the names put forward was “The Canadian Army Journal,” originally used by a similar, albeit less open, publication that appeared between 1947 and 1965. The general perception was that putting the words “Canadian” and “Army” together could result in problems that, at the time, the senior leadership was not willing to fight. Many liked the spirit of the title, but they also feared its lack of legality. The resulting title, “The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin,” was a compromise that inadequately reflected the anticipated content and reflected perhaps too strongly our love affair with imprecise baffle-gab. Hence, the subtitle, “Canada’s Professional Journal on Army Issues,” was added precipitously in a bid to add some clarity. Fortunately, a change of thought has emerged and it is a pleasure to see that our professional journal now has a name that we can be proud of.

While Shane has moved on to become Chief of Staff of I Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, the new Managing Editor will be Major Ted Dillenburg. For a variety of reasons, Ted is unable to occupy the post until the fall, and in the interim, I will be filling in as acting Managing Editor. In many ways it’s nice to be back, albeit briefly, but it is good to know that another person, with solid experience in both operational and academic realms, is ready to take the reigns. I hope the Army is beginning to understand that to have a journal as good as this, it must invest not only money, but personnel as well.

ITS ABOUT CONTENT

While the new format and title of *The Canadian Army Journal* are welcome, the real success has been its content, the ideas and discussion it has presented. While some might enjoy flipping through the pages and note the quality of the layout or the images, one hopes—desperately in some cases—that it inspires a new group of authors to come forward, and, with apologies to grammarians, “go boldly where no” writer has gone before. We need your ideas and comments, so if you have been thinking about contributing, perhaps it is time to do so. Remember, be bold and question everything! Almost everything is changing in the Army, and much of that is not necessarily based on sound logic, so go for it!

A YEAR OF ANNIVERSARIES

This year marks the anniversary of many important events in Canadian history. While the focus has rested on the sixtieth anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy and subsequent operations in North-West Europe, little attention was paid to the “D Day Dodgers,” as Lady Astor deridingly called the Italian theatre soldiers. Sixty years ago last May and before the landings in Normandy, the first Canadian corps level operation of the Second World War was fought, when 1st Canadian Corps played a crucial role in the Eighth Army's push up the Liri Valley. The net result of Operation DIADEM was the fall of Rome on 4 June 1944 (albeit the real aim of the plan, the destruction of a German army, was lost to a variety of command decisions and inter-Allied haggling, much like events in Normandy), the first fascist capital to fall to the Allies. Among the first troops to enter the Italian capital were Canadians of the First Special Service Force. Later, in August 1944, the same corps fought what was likely the finest Canadian corps level operation of the war in the area of Rimini. Although there will be an official commemoration of the Italian campaign this fall, it will not have the same profile as the Normandy landings, so it is up to all of us to keep the memories of those who fell and the story of what they did alive.

For those who probe a bit deeper in our military heritage and army history, there are also another series of commemorative events that have received little or no attention in Canada. Since 1995, various activities around the world have marked “The Nelson Decade,” the 200th anniversary of events surrounding that great British admiral. While appearing initially uninteresting to Canadians, particularly since we binned most of our British heritage, students of warfare should pause and consider the important developments in warfare that occurred during this time. This was a period noteworthy for operations in a volatile, lethal and ambiguous security environment, where joint operations were conducted against symmetric and asymmetric foes, in a complex and changing political, diplomatic and social environment. Areas of operations were large, complex and unpredictable. At roughly the same time, between 1791 and 1802, a number of European powers threatened Canada and steps were taken to fortify the frontier, including the raising of several units in Lower Canada, Upper Canada and the Atlantic Provinces. The history of these Canadian units has been forgotten and, in some cases, officially abandoned. Why is that? The Nelson Decade ends in 2005, the 200th anniversary of Trafalgar, but other events will mark the bicentennial of the Napoleonic War and, beginning from 2012 to 2015, the bicentennial of the War of 1812, where Canadians fought on land and sea to protect their homeland and played a role in defeating several major foreign invasions. If we really believe in our history and heritage, then we should be more careful in what we remember and expand our view to encompass more than just our recent history.

Enjoy this issue of *The Canadian Army Journal*!

UPDATE FROM DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND COMBAT DEVELOPMENT (DGLCD)

Brigadier-General Herb Petras, CD

THE LAND FORCE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Combat Development is not a new term or activity in the Canadian Army, and there is a long and storied history of “combat development” activity that dates back to the First World War, and especially in the post—Second World War period.¹ In the “post—9-11” security environment, however, the Canadian Land Force finds itself transforming to meet a new set of conditions and threats, and therefore developing the capabilities to meet these requirements has taken on a new urgency. In the summer of 2003, Director General Land Combat Development (DGLCD) was stood up in Kingston, incorporating the Director of Army Doctrine (DAD), Director Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC), Director Land Personal Concepts and Policy (DLPCP) and a Land Operational Research (OR). DGLCD's role is to oversee and synchronize the capability development process for the Canadian Land Force, and assist in shaping the Interim Army, the Army of Tomorrow, and the Future Army.

Capability Development is defined as the overarching process by which a capability is conceived, designed and built.² The Capability Development Process should ensure a holistic approach and integrated implementation of any desired capability, including equipment, resources, doctrine and training. The objective of the Capability Development Process is the continuous improvement of the Land Force's capability to meet the Canadian Forces' (CF's) and Canada's

The objective of the Capability Development Process is the continuous improvement of the Land Force's capability

defence requirements in an efficient and effective manner so that the Land Force remains strategically relevant and tactically decisive. In the Canadian Land Force, the Assistant Chief of the Land Staff (Asst CLS) is responsible for Capability Development. He is assisted and advised by Director General Land Combat Development (DGLCD) who is responsible for oversight and co-ordination of the capability development process. Capability Development includes (but is not limited to) Force Development, which is the staff activity associated

with the introduction of a new capability or improvement of current military capability in response to the changing security environment, technical innovations, allied force development activities and/or resource considerations, end to end, from conceptualization to the fielding of a capability. The aim of the process is ensure that Army capabilities remain relevant, responsive and successful in meeting the CF's and Canada's defence requirements.

PROCESS PHASES

The Capability Development Process is comprised of four interrelated but distinct activities, which are laid out in Figure 1, The Capability Development Process. It must be emphasized that these four “Pillars” are not stovepipes, but rather bands in a spectrum, with lead agencies appointed in each area in order to discipline, capture, record, and create the information and documents necessary to guide the capability through to realization.

Each pillar should set the foundation and conditions for the subsequent activity. The lead agency for each pillar is at the top of the chart, but the lead agency cannot act or think in isolation, and must be in constant creative consultation with a myriad of other organizations throughout the Land Forces, CF, Department of National Defence (DND), OGD's, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and ABCA Allies, etc.

Capability Development Process




Figure 1: The Capability Development Process

CONCEIVE

The *Conceive* (Concept Development) function entails processes and procedures by which operating concepts for specific Force Planning Scenarios (FPS) are developed and transformed into capability requirements.³ DGLCD, specifically Director Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) is responsible for looking forward ten to twenty years and describing, in general terms, how future Land Forces should be prepared to fight and win in the future battlespace. It develops these future concepts in close conjunction with the CF future strategic force employment plans, such as the CF Strategic Operating Concept 2020 developed by Director General Strategic Plans (DGSP) in the DCDS or “joint” part of the CF/DND, as well as any future Land Force work done by ABCA or NATO working groups. Iterations of the draft concepts are presented from time to time at various fora in order to elicit feedback and ensure that they are sufficiently nested with other long-term prognostications and conceptual work. Once a concept is sufficiently mature, it will be presented to CLS as an “Operating Concept” for his approval.

Operating concepts will consist of a Force Employment (FE) concept which defines in general how we should build and fight the Army, and a force generating concept which will elaborate the principles and tenets to generate that capability. It is critical that operating concepts are conceived in a timely manner so as to allow for the long-term doctrine and equipment acquisition processes. Two types of products emerge from the *Conceive* phase of capability development:

- ◆ **Operating Concepts.** Operating concepts will consist of an FE concept that defines in general how we should employ an Army contingent for a specific FPS, and a force-generating concept that will elaborate the principles and tenets to generate that capability from the field force. It is critical that operating concepts are conceived in a manner that allows for the time required for to complete doctrine and equipment acquisition processes.

- ◆ **Capability Requirements.** These are the detailed statements of requirement and synopsis sheet (Identification) that will be used in the Design phase to manage the numerous

projects that together will field a specific capability envisioned in the operating concepts.

Approved operating concepts are outlined and communicated in the “Capability Development Plan,” and can form part of the Capability Development Record (CDR).⁴

Capabilities are conceptualized using the “Operational Functions” construct shown in Figure 2, which, in very general terms, categorize those functions necessary to accomplish any given mission. The Operational Functions are not discrete in theory or in practice, but rather recognize broad areas of capability with significant overlap. In short, the Operational Functions



Figure 2: The Five Operational Functions

are artificial intellectual constructs that help in the definition and analysis of military capabilities.

DESIGN

The *Design* (combat development) process translates capability requirements, as outlined in the *Capability Development Plan* into a validated design for the army force employment structures and supporting detailed concepts. The process begins once specific conceptual capability requirements are approved by the

CLS as recommended by the Combat Development Board (CD Board). DGLCD, specifically Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD), is responsible for transforming DLSC's theory into “buildable” structures. Design work will follow the estimate process as described earlier. Info briefs, course of action (COA) development and COA selection will be done through the ADP. COA are developed and validated through modeling (using FPS), war gaming and field trials. Four types of products emerge from the *Design* phase of Capability Development:

- ◆ Field force structures for Force Employment.
- ◆ Supporting sub-concepts for the Operational Functions.
- ◆ Early inputs to the Defence Management System, normally in the form of Statements of Requirement (SOR) to the Capability Initiatives Database.
- ◆ Ammended Capstone doctrine if required.

Again, DAD does not work in isolation, but consults a wide variety of subject matter experts (SMEs), including the CF “Centres of Excellence”, and NATO / ABCA forums. The intellectual effort of the Conceive and Design phase is captured in the Capability Development Record (CDR), described in the section that follows. Once a capability's design is approved by the CLS through the APB, it is forwarded to Director Land Strategic Plans (DLSP) and Director Land Requirements (DLR) as the primary actors in the “build” process.

BUILD

The *Build* (Force Development) process is where the theoretical constructs are made into physical reality by purchasing equipment, allocating PY's, and creating infrastructure. It is

defined as “the planning and conceptualization associated with the creation, maintenance, and adaptation of military capabilities in the face of changing security and resource circumstances.”¹⁵ This process is led by DLSP, assisted by DLR, DLCI, LFDTS, etc. During the Build Phase, the Army capability development process will need to be synchronized with CF and DND Force Development processes. Whereas concepts are conceived and developed through the use of the five “Operational Functions” paradigm, “Build” requirements are analyzed using the CF Capability Components commonly referred to as “**PRICIE**”: **P**ersonnel, **R**esearch and Development, **I**nfrastructure, **C**oncepts & Doctrine, **I**nformation Management and **E**quipment as defined in the capability-based planning process. The Build Phase synchronizes all Land Force Development activity and coordinates this activity within the larger CF and DND program (PRAS, SCIP, LTCPs). Rationalized Army priorities articulated within the CF/DND context will ultimately produce implementation plans that deliver Army capability requirements coordinated with both internal and external stakeholders. Some examples of output products include:

- ◆ Establishment and evolution of the Army Force Generation (FG) Concept.
- ◆ Production of Enabling Concepts (PRICIE) in support of the Army FG Concept.
- ◆ Detailed Inputs to the Defence Management System, to include but not limited to (The SCIP; the Capabilities Initiatives Database (CID); and LTCP's (Equipment; HR; Realty; Construction).
- ◆ Functional Plans including but not limited to: Personnel Strategies; an Individual training plan; an Operational Research plan; a collective training plan; a concept and doctrine development plan; an O & E Structures plan.
- ◆ SORD.

FIELDING

Integration of new capabilities into the Field Army will be scheduled through the Army Training Operations Forecast (ATOF). Detailed coordination of each Capability Component through the Land Force Development Working Group (LFDWG) reporting directly to the Army Program Board will ensure that second- and third-order effects are understood and that risk mitigation measures are implemented as needed. While out-year planning will ensure synchronization and coordination of the capability components, the force management function will be responsible for actual implementation as in-year initiatives.

THE CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT RECORD

The Capability Development Record (CDR) is an important component of the Capability Development Process (CDP). The CDR is the mechanism through which the Land Force initiates and tracks the development of new or improved capabilities. It is an electronic file that essentially collects all pertinent information on a capability, including presentations, staff papers, and briefings. Although the bulk of CDR's will be initiated by DGLCD, the whole idea of the CDR is to gather in the bright ideas from throughout the **entire Land Force**. Units or individuals who have experimented with a new piece of equipment or concept should submit a letter, staff paper, or briefing note to DGLCD for further consideration and addition to our ongoing Capability Development work. DGLCD then tracks and synchronizes all the capability development initiatives throughout the Land Force so that effort is not wasted, and as much possible experience and data can be collected and used.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH

As already outlined, DGLCD includes an Operational Research (OR) Team. Operational Research directly supports the Land Staff's strategic decision-making processes. OR studies

provide quantitative and qualitative insights into issues such as: (1) comparing the effectiveness of combat system or force structure alternatives; (2) validating operational or tactical doctrine; or (3) quantifying the risk of competing options. These studies—often produced using models and simulations—present advice regarding optimal resource allocation within the acquisition, force development and force employment domains. The OR staff dedicated to the Land environment are tasked through the Director OR (Maritime, Land, Air), and the program is coordinated through the Army Research Working Group (ARWG). Details of the ongoing program of work can be found at the ORD DWAN website: http://ord.mil.ca/default_e.asp#mission <http://ord.mil.ca/default_e.asp>.

Similarly, Defence Research and Development (R&D) Canada supports Land Force Command through the conduct of a program of applied research and development delivered through network of Defence R&D Centres, contractors and international partners. This research program has as its central aim to advise the CF on the impact and opportunities presented by developments in science and technology. The R&D centres represent a repository of expertise in various areas of defence science, such as biological and chemical defence, sensor systems, countermine technology, weapons and combat systems, energetic materials, command and control systems, soldier systems, and many other areas. The R&D staff dedicated to the Land environment can be tasked through the Director Science & Technology Land, and the program is coordinated through the ARWG. Details of the ongoing program of work can be found at the DRDC website: http://admst-002.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/adm-menu_e.html.

CONCLUSION

In summary, capability development is an overarching process that conceives, designs, builds, and manages a capability from conception (cradle) to disposal (grave). This activity is not new to the Canadian Army, but the current process has been modified to address the demands of an Army facing both a high operational tempo along with the increasing challenges of transformation. Given the holistic approach of the new capability development system, future concepts and the equipment, personnel, and infrastructure needed to create them, should be much more coherently developed and synchronized than they may have in the recent past.⁶ In short, the new capability development paradigm is all about making the Canadian Army a more intellectually agile institution that can rapidly and effectively adapt and prepare for the ever-changing demands of the future security environment.

ENDNOTES

1. "Combat development" is a more recent term for the intellectual activities that have developed the peculiar Canadian "Way of War" at the tactical level. Examples include Sir Arthur Currie's adoption of methods for the attack on Vimy Ridge based on his study of the Battle of Verdun, all the way to the development of the "Corps 86" and "Corps 96" doctrine by Force Mobile Command in the 1970's-90's. For a more detailed look, see Sean Maloney, *An Identifiable Cult: Combat Development in the Canadian Army* (Unpublished Monograph prepared for Director Land Strategic Concepts: Kingston, 2001). See also Maloney's articles "Global Mobile": Flexible Response, Peacekeeping and the Origins of Force Mobile Command, 1958-1964, and "Global Mobile II": The Development of Forces Mobile Command, 1965-1972, in *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Vol. 3 No. 1 (Fall 2000) pp. 20-34, and Vol 4. No. 2 (Summer 2001) pp. 7-23.
2. Proposed definition; definition not yet ratified by Army Terminology Board.
3. Definition approved by Army Terminology Board 10 Dec 2003.
4. For more info on the CDR, see Army Strategic Decision Making (ASDM) Chapter 6, available online at <http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/cls/d16604.asp>
5. Glossary for Strategic Capability Planning in the CF.
6. For critiques on this issue, see, for instance, Don Senft, "The Medium Gun System is Coming... Now What?" *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Fall 2003) pp. 26-32.

DIRECTORATE OF ARMY TRAINING UPDATE: THE FUTURE OF COMPETITIONS IN THE ARMY

Major G.P. Blackman, CD

The aim of this article is to provide the reader with a brief update on how the Army intends to evolve our participation in competitions.

In November 2001, the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) ordered a comprehensive review of all Army participation in competitions to be done. This review was to include all aspects of our participation in sports, military skills and marksmanship competitions, whether the event was an international competition, a national or CF-level event conducted by the CF or the Army, or competitions conducted or supported by the Army at the national, area or brigade levels. Between November 2001 and June 2002, Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) staff, in conjunction with CF, Land Force Command (LFC), Land Force Area (LFA) and brigade staffs conducted a detailed staff check in order to determine what competitions were occurring across the Army, what their aims were, who was involved in them and how much they cost.

In June 2002, Army Council was presented with the results of that review. The key recommendations made at the presentation were:

- ◆ No major changes required to the Army's participation in Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA) sports programs at the unit, base, regional, national and international levels.
- ◆ Further research required into the health of the LFC Biathlon program and investigation of potential overlap between LFC and CFPSA Biathlon programs.
- ◆ Move the Canadian Forces Small Arms Competition (CFSAC) sniper matches to the Canadian International Sniper Concentration (CISC) if feasible.
- ◆ Consider moving the conduct of Stage I of the Queen's Medal to Regular Force and Militia brigades as a formation-level competition if feasible.
- ◆ Exploit Alternate Service Delivery (ASD) of CFSAC using a combination of the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association (DCRA), Militia and/or civilian contracts.
- ◆ Link the Army Soldier's Cup to the US Army's Armed Forces Skill at Arms Meeting (AFSAM) and to the Australian Army Skill at Arms Meeting (AASAM).
- ◆ Introduce a formal marksmanship learning process into CFSAC.
- ◆ Consider developing a Canadian Army Patrol.
- ◆ Review our participation in the NATO Reserve Competition.
- ◆ Review our participation in the Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de la Réserve (CIOR).

the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) ordered a comprehensive review of all Army participation in competitions to be done

The CLS accepted the key recommendations of the presentation in principle but directed the Director of Army Training (DAT) to refine the recommendations based upon the principle that all competitions or competitive events conducted, sponsored or supported by the Army must meet most if not all of the following prioritized criteria:

- ◆ Competitions should relate directly to soldier skills.
- ◆ Team or individual performance should be measured against a recognized standard such as Battle Task Standards.
- ◆ Competitions should foster the widest possible participation across the Army and not generally be an activity undertaken only by an elite few.
- ◆ Participating in competitions, although subordinate to operational training, is an important way to complement that training by fostering morale, building team spirit and developing leaders. Competitions must be incorporated into the Land Force Command Strategic Operations and Resource Direction (SORD) and into LFDTS, LFA, brigade or unit plans as a regular activity, but they must not consume a disproportionate share of allocated resources.

Since that presentation in June 2002, the CLS decided to cancel the LFC Biathlon program, and CFSAC has subsequently dropped biathlon from the CF sports program. The CLS also directed, in line with the recommendations presented, that CFSAC and its related international competitions would be suspended until the overhaul of CFSAC was completed. CFSAC will return to active status in 2005, but it will be structured and resourced differently from the past in the following ways:

- ◆ The legacy CFSAC sniper matches will be conducted at CTC Gagetown immediately prior to the CISC. This modified competition will be known as the Canadian Forces Sniper Competition (CFSC) and be open to teams from the CF, RCMP, other domestic police forces and to international teams. The competition will remain the same as the legacy matches at CFSAC and award the same trophies as CFSAC used to. The primary focus of the event will continue to be upon the marksmanship aspects of sniping and be a separate but logical lead-in to the CISC, where the focus is much more upon the tactical aspects of sniping.
- ◆ LFAs will be tasked and resourced to conduct a LFA Small Arms Competition (LFASAC) annually prior to CFSAC. This task is flexible in that LFAs can conduct their LFASAC at any time during the year leading up to CFSAC (September to July) and can conduct their competition either at a central location or in several decentralized locations over the course of that period. The LFASAC will include Stage 1 of the Queen's Medal, but it will also allow LFAs to select the 16-member small arms teams that will represent the LFA at CFSAC. Each LFA will be funded by DAT to send one Regular Force and one Militia small arms team to CFSAC. CFSAC itself will be conducted in two distinct phases. The first phase will be for non-Army, international, RCMP and Canadian Ranger teams and consist of Stage 1 of the Queen's Medal. The second phase will include the LFA small arms teams and consist of Stage 2 of the Queen's Medal and individual and team competitions in rifle, light machine-gun (LMG), the C8 (or Personal Defence Weapon) and pistol.
- ◆ DAT will also provide the resources for each LFA to send a 16-member Army Canadian Ranger rifle team to CFSAC. These Canadian Ranger teams, armed with the .303 Lee Enfield

Rifle, will attend both phases of CFSAC and compete in the Queen's Medal and other rifle matches.

- ◆ DAT will exploit ASD of CFSAC using a combination of DCRA and/or civilian contracts in 2005 in order to reduce individual taskings for CFSAC staff down to an absolute minimum.
- ◆ CFSAC will continue to be used to select members of the CF Rifle Team that will compete in the British Army's Central Skill at Arms Meeting (CENTSAM) in Bisley, England.
- ◆ The Army will conduct the Army Soldier's Cup competition as a concurrent but separate activity at CFSAC. The winning Regular Force section and Militia fire group will represent the Canadian Army at AASAM in Australia, and the winning Militia section and Regular Force fire group will represent the Canadian Army at AFSAM in the USA.
- ◆ A formal marksmanship learning process will be imbedded into CFSAC. Firstly, specific CFSAC matches will continue to evolve to emphasize combat, vice purely marksmanship skills. Lessons learned from operational theatres such as close quarter instinctive shooting skills will be part of this evolution. Secondly, DAT will publish the key lessons about marksmanship and combat shooting learned at the LFSACs and at CFSAC each year. Finally, in order to encourage CFSAC veterans to pass their skills onto the next generation and in order to prevent CFSAC from becoming the purview of an elite few, there will be an individual lifetime limit of five placed upon competing at CFSAC. This limit will not bar CFSAC veterans from participating at CFSAC as non-competing Team Captains or Team Coaches—quite the opposite. The intent is to encourage CFSAC veterans to remain actively involved in passing their skills on by assisting in developing unit, brigade, LFA and CFSAC small arms teams. Selected Team Captains and Team Coaches at CFSAC will be asked to form the staff of the CENTSAM CF Rifle Team or the Army teams sent to AASAM and AFSAM.

The Canadian Army will continue to remain involved in the British Army's Exercise Cambrian Patrol. This event is open to all arms and services and consists of a challenging section patrol exercise conducted over some of the most inhospitable ground in the UK. The exercise is kept deliberately simple and tests the basic individual and team skills that are common to all soldiers. Teams do not compete against each other, but are scored against a set of fixed criteria. Certificates or medals are awarded based upon the score obtained by each team. The Canadian Army has been participating in the Cambrian Patrol for over two decades now, gaining a gold

Army competitions will continue to evolve over time

medal twice, and it has proven to be an excellent vehicle to develop those basic skills in our own soldiers. The only drawbacks to our participation in the Cambrian Patrol is that we get less team vacancies than are demanded by Canadian Army units and the cost of sending teams to the UK are quite high. With both the benefits and drawbacks of the Cambrian Patrol in mind, we intend to develop our own version of this exercise, to be called the Canadian Army Patrol Competition

(CAPC) in 2005. CAPC will be conducted by CTC Gagetown in the early fall and generally follow the same philosophy and format as the Cambrian Patrol. DAT will provide funding for each LFA to send one Regular Force and one Militia team to CAPC annually. Performance at CAPC will determine which Regular Force and which Militia team will be subsequently sponsored by DAT to go to the Cambrian Patrol.

There is still much more work to be done in determining our future in the NATO Reserve Competition and the CIOR. Both of these events are duplicated to a certain extent in other competitions. It may be better to reinforce other existing competitions or to develop new and more operationally relevant competitions by diverting the resources currently allocated for these competitions elsewhere.

In conclusion, Army competitions will continue to evolve over time, in line with the CLS's intent in this area. This article on where the Army is headed with competitions was intended to provide a brief update and to solicit your comments. Any suggestions or constructive criticism, which may be directed to DAT 3-6 (Infantry), would be most welcome.

THE E-FANTRY WARRIOR! THE EVOLUTION OF THE QUEEN OF BATTLES IN THE FACE OF 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES

Captain Eric Dion, CD, MBA

SCOPE

Napoleon himself referred to the Infantry as the force of the armies, as the queen of battles.¹ In fact, each member of the modern Canadian Army is first and foremost a soldier, a concept that refers to the force's universality of service, the fact that each soldier has, or should have, basic infantry abilities and capabilities. This is true, more than ever, in the face of asymmetric threats and in light of new multidimensional warfare.

These modern realities redefine the very nature of infantry, which has become nothing less than a specialist trade. No longer can we simply draft in masses of soldiers from the streets and mobilize them rapidly. The precision-guided munitions era has brought a military revolution. Moreover, political and societal expectations, fed by a voracious media, demand quick, sterile operations that inflict the minimum number of friendly, civilian and even enemy casualties. There is a growing expectation that operations can be accomplished in short order and with virtually zero tolerance for error.² In this new reality of highly political warfare, the infantry has literally become a key strategic stakeholder. How best can we leverage new and emerging technologies in the face of these modern challenges of warfare? How can we apply e-business concepts and best practices to augment the infantry's efficiency in operations? And how should the infantry best adapt to its new technological environment to ensure its future successes in the battlespace?

INTRODUCTION

There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order ... (because of) the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.

-Machiavelli, *The Prince*

Canadian Army Vision 2020 recognizes two operational imperatives: the first imperative is that our army, as an expeditionary force, must be capable of rapid strategic deployment and must possess the combat capabilities necessary to be tactically decisive in either View 1 or View 2 operations; the second imperative, underpinning the operational imperative, is our military ethos—the human qualities of professionalism (in the sense of belonging to the profession of arms), dedication and courage—which serve to define our army.³ In keeping with the vision of our army as being knowledge-based, command-centric and soldier-focused, we intend to present herein an evolutionary vision of the infantry, which, based on our soldiers, constitutes in essence our greatest weapon.⁴

STRATEGIC CORPORAL

The emerging digital firm requires a high level of information integration, and companies increasingly depend on an integrated infrastructure to remain efficient.⁵ If this proves true for the competitiveness of businesses, this high level of information integration would certainly apply to the efficiency of a modern and future army on the battlefield. Lifting the fog of war has always been a great concern for all military leaders in history, from Napoleon to Powell. Information integration, or the fusion of all information, has played a crucial role in modern campaigns, right down to the lowest level of the foot soldier of the infantry. Many now utilize the expression “strategic corporal”⁶ to relay the image that the soldier, with the proper access to information and access to modern and future technological weaponry, can and will certainly have in the future a great and greater impact on the outcome of battles, campaigns and wars at all levels, up to the strategic.

In war, Canadian soldiers have earned a reputation as courageous tough, and resourceful fighters. In peace support operations, Canadians are known for their compassion, objectivity and professional skill. During domestic operations, Canadian soldiers have responded to crisis with equal dedication and professionalism, gaining for themselves the respect and appreciation of our nation. This is a firm foundation for the future, and one that must be guarded with care and pride.⁷ In the face of what former Marine Corps commandant General Charles Krulak referred to as the “three-block war,”⁸ these qualities will be strategic imperatives. Indeed, faced with the modern challenges of warfare, our soldiers may very well be involved in combat operations, peace support operations and humanitarian operations all simultaneously and all taking place within three blocks.

There is a growing expectation that operations can be accomplished in short order and with virtually zero tolerance for error

SYSTEMS PLATFORM

The rise of precision-guided munitions, air power and highly mobile mechanized warfare seem to have diminished the importance of the foot soldier. Yet, the extinction of the infantry is nowhere in sight.⁹ Certain tasks still require intervention of the soldiers,¹⁰ and it has become more likely, in fact, in the face of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terrorism, that the foot soldier will continue to play a key role. As such, the Army has rightly started to think of the soldier as the smallest, most versatile systems platform, on whom to build information technology in order to leverage new technological weaponry. The Defence Research Establishment of Toronto¹¹ is working on the Canadian equivalent of the Warrior System. For its part, the US Army's Objective Force Warrior will have a vast array of new weapons available to bring into battle—that's bring, not carry, because most of these new weapons need not be carried at all.¹² For instance, the Objective Individual Combat Weapon program¹³ seeks to provide just such a capability by 2005.


In fact, this extended family of joint multi-weaponry would be virtually accessible to the soldiers on demand, through each warrior's e-fantry portal, making them significant force multipliers as modern combat systems platform. Although there may well be a need for exoskeletons to carry combat essentials, weapons and systems, it is in fact the virtual access to a multitude of other systems that would be the e-fantry's centre of gravity.

DIGITAL E-VOLUTION

In this sea of change, the Army will continue to embrace and foster mission command,¹⁴ thereby providing the freedom of thought and action to our soldiers for them to seize the initiative while clearly understanding higher intents. At present, our combat information systems, such as the Tactical Command, Control and Communications System (TCCCS), support tactical command, communication and control networks by providing commanders with better-than-ever access to information at the unit level and higher, along with the implementation of many other operational level systems, such as Canadian Forces Taskings, Plans and Operations (CFTPO) and Canadian Forces Supply System Update (CFSSU). Information overload, however, has already darkened the fog of war, and information fusion is a critical requirement. Digitization permits a network-enabled focus, allowing for a vast improvement in the decision-action cycle at all levels of command. Digitization will enable the automation of many processes and will allow a huge amount of data and information to be fed into the system and processed in a much timelier manner. The challenge of achieving such a level of sophistication becomes obvious as we begin to appreciate that every soldier is a potential sensor system.¹⁵ Thereby, each e-fantry warrior would become a system of systems, a combat platform in essence, virtually leveraging a whole e-force. In our digital evolution, knowledge rather than raw information would be passed on to soldiers at every level, employed in various numerous joint and asynchronous tasks. In time, the concept of data/information being sent simultaneously to several levels will be incorporated into our procedures. This is consistent with increasing horizontal integration across the force.¹⁶ Increasingly, as well, dependence on networks will make protection of the cybernetic domain one of critical importance.¹⁷ The crux of the issue will be to integrate seamlessly these platforms and systems into our way of fighting¹⁸ in order to leverage the e-fantry's adaptability and not to literally overload our soldiers and leaders with the information.

E-FANTRY WARRIOR

The e-fantry warrior would carry a multi-weapon platform, able to fire versatile intelligent munitions,¹⁹ as he would wear a high-performance nano-computer powered by fuel cells to integrate information from all five main combat functions at his task level, all the while employing multi-vision enhancements, network communications, command and weapons systems to allow him virtual access to a wide range of deployed battle-bots and combat systems awaiting support tasks to be prioritized and executed. As such, the e-fantry warrior could have



access to his teammates' data, to instantaneous intelligence from higher levels, to drones, unmanned battle-bots or systems able to fire directly, indirectly or even wage network-centric Ops. The rapid pace of evolution in many novelty fields of military technology—electric technologies, directed energy, computing technologies, micro-electro-mechanical systems and sensors, biotechnology and nano-technology, advanced materials, ergonomics interface, exoskeletons, robotics and automation²⁰—would all provide the technological means to make the e-fantry warrior the ideal and the most versatile combat platform. Recruiting, educating and retaining dedicated, high quality personnel must remain a top priority. Soldiers will require courage, stamina and intellectual ability to cope with the complexity and tempo of future ops.²¹ An integrated system of systems approach is being employed to support the US Army transformation to a soldier-centric force. The US Army Objective Force Warrior notional concepts seek to create a lightweight, overwhelmingly lethal, fully integrated individual combat system, including weapon, head-to-toe individual protection, netted communications, soldier-worn power sources and enhanced human performance.²²

E-FANTRY SYSTEMS

Horizontal e-business exchanges focus on specific functions that can be found in different industries.²³ As such, the redefinition of the combat functions of the Canadian Army into the main five functions—command, sense, act, shield and sustain²⁴—provides a common ground that will allow future horizontal exchanges between the different arms. E-business type applications would be made available to e-fantry warriors, giving them direct virtual access to command mission, guidance and plans, to a vast array of joint deployed sensors and intelligence, to a combat catalogue of weapon systems available and awaiting tasking, to self-diagnosis and self-healing tools for his system and to just in time supply systems. Milnet, for example, would be a secure intranet used for military strategic, operational and tactical purposes, which would allow layers of e-business type applications to run securely, providing military connectivity and global communications, enhancing coordination and collaboration and accelerating the distribution of information. The US Land Warrior²⁵ software subsystem addresses the soldier's core battlefield functions, display management and mission equipment and supply. The software subsystem includes tactical and mission support modules, maps and tactical overlays as well as the ability to capture and display video images. The system also contains a power management module. Land Warrior will be interoperable on the digital battlefield. Designers set up the system so it can be updated as technology improves. The modular architecture allows for direct insertion/replacement with technology upgrades. The software subsystem allows the soldier to tailor the display, menus and functional operation of his system to his own mission needs and preferences.²⁶ And this is only the tip of the iceberg: as new technologies become available and practical, especially nano technology, the concept of the US Objective Force Warrior will undergo major upgrades beyond 2010.²⁷

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Novel Electric Technologies

- Battlefield Power Generation
- Energy Storage
- Electric Propulsion Technology
- Electric Armaments Technology

Directed Energy

- Laser Directed Energy
- Radio Frequency Directed Energy

Computing Technologies

Computer Hardware
Data Processing, Artificial Intelligence and Software
Engineering
Communications Technology

Electronic and Information Warfare

Electronic Warfare Technologies
Information Warfare

Electronic Devices, Sensors and Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS)

Electronic Nanotechnology
Molecular Electronics
High Temperature Superconductivity

Biotechnology

Biomolecular Technology
Biocoupling and Bioelectronics

Advanced Materials and Smart Structures

Low Observable Materials
New and Unconventional Alloys
Polymers

Man-Machine Interface Precision Attack Weapons

Advanced Artillery
Guided Munitions

Robotics and Automation

Intelligent Machines: Unmanned Vehicles


E-FANTRY DOCTRINE

These developments have eroded the traditional, linear concept of the battlefield and given rise to an emerging operating environment: the multidimensional battle space.²⁸ Indeed, the future operating environment of the e-fantry will inherently be joint and multidimensional in nature. Therefore, as history has shown, we must consider that the most appropriate application of technology, through doctrine and not new technology per se, generates combat advantages.²⁹ In this very sense, through the advancement of joint, interagency, multinational and knowledge-based concepts and doctrine, the Canadian Forces will employ an agile, modular force to conduct integrated operations across the spectrum of conflict³⁰. In fact, thanks to its universality of service, the e-fantry warrior, being the most adaptable and versatile systems platform, could well be employed and easily deployed in joint operations on a ship as boarding party in the acting role, on an airplane as an interagency security guard in the protecting role, on a humanitarian convoy in the life sustaining role, on an unmanned ground recce drone in the detecting role, or even in an advanced mobile or virtual headquarters in the commanding role. Current research indicates that the productivity gains in the private sector are not so much attributable to technology but its integration with organization capital.³¹ Therefore, doctrine for employing such advanced e-fantry would have to be revolutionary in thought and in process,

revolving around the warrior's adaptability, sense of independence within a team, initiative, courage, stamina and its intellectual ability to cope with the complexity and tempo of future operations. Doctrine will also need to address complex terrains and three-block-wars,⁵ like urban areas, within rogue states or in contaminated environments, all of which also present specific challenges.³² Efficiency will also become an imperative.

SOCIO-ECONOMICS

This shifting trend may mean that the next revolution in the future of warfare will be a human revolution as much as a technological transformation and evolution. Future conflicts and precision-guided weapons won't require masses of soldiers to use them; instead, they'll require ability and expertise.³³ As Lord Robertson said, "We are short of money, so we must begin to think,³⁴" and we must think creatively outside the box. The modern economics of democracies make impressive cold-war era military budgets obsolete. Our army has become expert in doing more with less. In that very sense, although costly in the short and medium term, investing in the information and weapon technologies required to realize the e-fantry vision makes economic good sense in the long term, when we are less likely to see masses of armies than the virtual force multiplying capability of a few good troops, quality becoming the key factor over quantity. The CF will be required to make extremely difficult choices given the increasing costs of leading edge equipment. It will also become more difficult to compete with the private sector in attracting and retaining intelligent and skilled individuals,³⁵ although only a few good troops would ultimately comprise the whole e-fantry force. Recruiting masses, which is already a problem for most modern armies, would virtually become inexistent, while e-learning tools would be made available to develop and maintain abilities and expertise. Military non-core competencies such as supply chain management and garrison support systems would be part of the overall interagency support to the military, focusing for its part on its five core combat functions. How we define human society is also beginning to change, with the use of robotics for manual tasks and of computers for mental tasks.³⁶ As such, many see the human as the moderator and



final decision maker. This new reality will change the way we interact with technology and how we act within organizations. Cultural evolution will be key.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Although the military has been a centralized business for centuries, it is an interesting paradox to note that many academics, like MIT Professor Erick Brynjolfsson, postulate that the most efficient companies are characterized by teams and operations that are split into centralized and decentralized architectures.³⁷ Traditional boundaries between departments and visions can be an impediment to collaboration and relationship building. The digitally enabled enterprise must transform the way it conducts business on many levels to act rapidly and with precision.³⁸ In the practical sense, our mission command approach has indeed opened the door to a more decentralized form of military. It favors an entrepreneurial—and initiative-prone type of soldier, who rapidly understands where he/she fits in the big picture, based on sufficient tactical information,

The
e-fantry warrior would
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and who has a certain degree of independence based on timely intelligence and virtual access to weapon systems, while leaders maintain a clear vision of the overall strategic objectives. The e-fantry warrior would certainly need to have a good degree of independence in order to keep the initiative. Information would be filtered, as opposed to scaled down, to provide intelligence to his specific task level. Mastering the strategic art of war requires close, co-operative, interdepartmental relations and leaders, both military and civilian, with vision to see over and beyond the bureaucratic barriers. A self-sufficient force

package is the smallest self-sufficient tactical force package required to achieve a specific mission.³⁹ In the future, e-fantry battle-groups would have to be self-sufficient while having much more impact than their modern predecessors. They would have to be rethought of from the perspective that they could have as much power as modern armour and that they could leverage a whole e-force. In that sense, Force 2020 must be organized, resourced, equipped, trained to be strategically relevant, tactically deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable across the full spectrum⁴⁰ and also self-sufficient.

CULTURAL E-VOLUTION

Future conflict will be characterized by precision and lethality, by compression in time, by expansion in volume, by the dominance of knowledge, by simultaneously (asynchronous) rather than sequentially phased operations and by the very high likelihood of operations in urban terrain.⁴¹ All these characteristics not only make change management an obvious choice, but make it a strategic imperative to remain on the top of our game, in which second best has no place. As the Future Security Environment study has deduced, the Army must commit its resources toward revolutionary rather than evolutionary increases in capability.⁴² As such, the most likely threshold could very well be our organizational adaptability, in other words, our cultural evolution. The military has never been the business of individuals as troops were historically placed in harm's way. However, in light of today's civil society, individuals do indeed occupy a greater place than ever before. And society's expectation of surgical, almost bloodless military participation in conflicts does mean to a certain extent that fewer and fewer troops will be placed in harm's way in the future. In fact, technology might just be the answer, from grounded pilots flying drones miles away to tankers driving on simulators. In perspective, the e-fantry warrior would be the human legacy of foot soldiers, the sole human remaining in harm's way and, as such, the core values of military service would be the anchor of these few good

troops, all the while, supported hundred miles away by a dedicated 24/7 team of technical specialists of all trades, maintaining systems and providing the essential virtual leverage.

CONCLUSION

Technology predictions have ignored war's inherent uncertainty, Clausewitz's friction and fog of war, as well as the human dimension of determination, morale, fighting skill and leadership.⁴³ Terrorism and asymmetry today do indeed pose a credible problem to our assessment of future warfare and evolving trends. And although there certainly are risks in integrating new technologies and managing change, the risk of not doing so is, in fact, even greater, which would make our military obsolete, eventually rendering it strategically irrelevant. A critical factor will be the ability of our leaders and our soldiers to make the most effective use of the new technology⁴⁴ and to integrate the cultural mindset that is brought about with these new tools of the trade. In effect, the Army must consider the future tactical environment and the nature of combat in 2020 in order to select and integrate new capabilities within new doctrine and structure⁴⁵. What's unthinkable today might be ordinary tomorrow.⁴⁶ In the end, the infantry's adaptability



Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) ATD

<p>OBJECTIVE: Demonstrate OICW Operational Utility, Versatility, Technological Maturity & Lethality Through Scenario Driven Troop Testing, Simulation, and Land Warrior Soldier System Interfacing.</p> <p>JUSTIFICATION:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Probability of Incapacitation: >0.5 to 300m (Point Target) >0.2 to 300m (Defilade Target) • Decisively Violent and Suppressive Target Effects • New Ability to Defeat Defilade Targets; Increased Range • Army & Joint Service Small Arms Master Plans - Potential Replacement: M16A2 Rifle Family & M203 Grenade Launcher • MNS; ACAT III; MS Decision Authority-AMC Commander • DTO WE16; STO III.I.1/ATD; Joint Service Program <p>BATTLE LAB: DBS PM: PMSA Linkage</p>																																																																																																																																																	
<p>Schedule and Funding</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>FY</th> <th>94</th> <th>95</th> <th>96</th> <th>97</th> <th>98</th> <th>99</th> <th>00</th> <th>01</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Transition to 6.3</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Trade-Off Determination</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Contract Award</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Concept Design</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Down-Select (2)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Prototype Development</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Demo/Down-Select (1)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Live Fire Simulation/Battle Lab Expt</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>MS III</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOUT ACTD</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>To EMD/PM Small Arms</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(SK) PE/Proj: 62623A/AH21</td> <td></td> <td>2431</td> <td>620</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>PE/Proj: 63607A/D627</td> <td>1895</td> <td>4041</td> <td>3700</td> <td>4500</td> <td>3352</td> <td>5010</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>USMC PE633640</td> <td></td> <td>500</td> <td>800</td> <td>1200</td> <td>600</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Congressional Plus-Up</td> <td></td> <td>1786</td> <td>250</td> <td>3000</td> <td>(5500)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	FY	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	Transition to 6.3									Trade-Off Determination									Contract Award									Concept Design									Down-Select (2)									Prototype Development									Demo/Down-Select (1)									Live Fire Simulation/Battle Lab Expt									MS III									MOUT ACTD									To EMD/PM Small Arms									(SK) PE/Proj: 62623A/AH21		2431	620						PE/Proj: 63607A/D627	1895	4041	3700	4500	3352	5010			USMC PE633640		500	800	1200	600				Congressional Plus-Up		1786	250	3000	(5500)				<p>APPROACH:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DOD Technology Assessment/R&D Plan Formulation • Integrated Product & Process Development (IPPD) • Design & Demonstrate Integrated OICW Systems: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air Bursting Warheads, Lethal Mechanisms • Modular Optoelectronic Fire Control • Operational Utility & Technological Maturity • Simulation: Constructive/Virtual/Live Fire • Interface With FORCE XXI Land Warrior & MOUT ACTD • By-pass DEM/VAL, Transition Directly into EMD <p>APPLICATIONS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Objective Family of Small Arms (OFSA) • Land Warrior & FORCE XXI <p>POC: Mr. Matthew T. Zimmerman, OICW ATD Program Manager, DSN 880-7993; <zimmerman@pica.army.mil></p>
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has always been key to its efficiency in past battles, campaigns and wars, and in the future, this adaptability may well be the most sought after quality expected of e-fantry warriors. For the infantry to remain “in” the future and not become obsolete, we must face these challenges with open minds. We must think outside the box and come up with revolutionary new visions of how we intend to structure, integrate, train and win. In that very sense, the e-fantry vision is one based on the premise that our soldiers are our greatest weapon.

About the Author...

Captain Eric Dion is currently interim Officer Commanding, Administration Company with 2R22eR. He has deployed to four operations and has graduated from the command and staff college in June 2003. He has served on unit exchanges with US Special Forces and French commandos. He holds an MBA from l'école des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC) and is currently working on a second master's degree in Management and Defence Policy.

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THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM AND ARMY TRANSFORMATION: GETTING PAST THE STORY

Colonel Mike Capstick, CD

Editor's Note: Colonel Capstick was serving as Director Land Personnel Concepts and Policies (DLPCP) at the time that Lieutenant-Colonel Banks and Lieutenant-Colonel Bondy began their discourse over "The New Regimental System," and he graciously accepted an offer to pen an introduction to the second instalment of the debate. As he has noted, this is an emotive issue, which speaks to the core (and corps) of our Army. Reader participation in this important debate is highly encouraged.

Every organization needs a defining story or narrative to help shape its collective identity and the individual identities of its members. In Canada's Army most of this narrative centres on the Regimental System. In fact, a strong case can be made that the Regiment is the cornerstone of Canadian army culture, despite the fact that almost every soldier has a different understanding of what a Regiment is, what it does and why it's important. If an organization's culture can be described as "how we do things around here," the Canadian Regimental System becomes even more difficult to describe and categorize. Few soldiers would argue that Royals, Patricias, *Vingt-deuxieme*, Gunners, Dragoons, Strathconas and *Blindés* do things the same way. In essence, Canada's Army has never really defined what the central feature of our organizational culture is supposed to be.

The Army Strategy: Advancing with Purpose recognizes that the Regimental System is the central organizing feature of our army. At the same time, it also recognizes that the system itself has to adapt to the demands of 21st century combat and that it **must** contribute to Army unity and support the military ethos described in the recently issued *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. To accomplish this alignment, the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) has initiated a comprehensive study of the Regimental System. Starting with the Regular Force, this study is part of a larger effort that will consider all aspects of our current personnel and administrative policies. Armies are about soldiers. The Canadian soldier lives and fights in the Regimental System, and it is the duty of the Army leadership to make sure that it is strong enough to withstand the demands of combat in this new century. The aim is clear. As military professionals, we owe it to Canadians to provide them with an army that is ready to meet those demands.

Every soldier has a different understanding of what a Regiment is

This issue of the *Canadian Army Journal* includes a series of articles that hopefully will widen the discussion and engage all soldiers in the fundamental debate about the central organizing feature of the 21st century Canadian Army. The first, by Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Bondy of the Land Staff, offers a wide-ranging analysis of how the Regimental System could work in the context of a broader discussion of personnel strategy and leader development. It is, in fact, a fairly radical proposition that includes recommendations for an "all arms-all the time" Regimental System as well as massive changes to the selection, promotion and career development systems. The second, by Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Banks, PPCLI, offers an alternative view based on the

infantry battalion as the basic unit. Both of these articles will challenge your basic assumptions and will certainly raise any number of emotional issues. Both authors have done something that many are reluctant to do—they've put their views out front and are willing to risk the criticism that will certainly follow. If you wish to contribute to this debate, you are asked to do the same. Think about the issue, put your thoughts in writing and get your views into print. When you do this I ask that you put yourselves in Lieutenant-Colonel Bondy's and Lieutenant-Colonel Banks' shoes and avoid personal shots. All readers are also reminded that nothing in these articles is policy and that the Army leadership has not even been briefed on most of these ideas. Rather, these articles are an essential part of the intellectual conversation that we as an army need to have if we are to strengthen our operational capability.

The Regimental System has served Canada and its Army well. Self-examination is always uncomfortable. It also takes courage and determination. These articles and the Regimental System study explore our basic assumptions, question our underlying beliefs and may, perhaps, result in important changes. At the same time, the nature of warfare and the military profession have seen seismic shifts in the past decade. This stuff was a lot easier when we knew who the enemy was, where they were and how they would fight. Because the Regimental System is so fundamental to the way that the Canadian Army operates, and because it is the foundation of our very identity as soldiers, failure to scrutinize it would be an abrogation of our professional responsibilities to the Army and to Canada. Each and every soldier in Canada's Army has an investment in the Regimental System and the Army needs each of you to get your views on the table through the pages of your *Canadian Army Journal*.

A SINGLE COMBAT BRANCH?

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Banks, CD

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to outline a proposal for the formation of a single combat branch to replace our current four separate combat arms. This is an opinion piece rather than an academic work: it is really intended to stimulate thought and debate more than to provide conclusive answers. Accordingly, the bulk of the content is based on my own thoughts and interpretations with no pretence to detailed analysis.

ASSUMPTIONS

My assumptions are:

- ◆ the Canadian Army will persist in its current structure (i.e., light and lethal, highly mobile, no “heavy iron” and operations conducted at battle group (BG) i.e., tactically self-sufficient unit level and below instead of at formation level);
- ◆ the defence budget, or at least that part dedicated to the Army, will not increase significantly enough to offer purely monetary solutions to force structure issues;
- ◆ trends of “convergence” between existing arms will continue;
- ◆ our national demographic situation will remain similar, rendering access to large masses of recruits difficult, and
- ◆ technology will continue its trend toward producing greater lethality in systems that are lighter, more mobile and easier to train and use (although perhaps harder to repair) than legacy systems remaining today.

My argument is this: based on these assumptions, the Army should abandon the historical practice of maintaining separate combat arms branches and correspondingly “pure” units in favour of a single combat branch. This branch would focus on making best use of all available capabilities in order to produce the most flexible and combat-effective force possible, while capitalizing on our strengths of excellent human material, ability to absorb high tech and the development of increased lethality in lighter and more flexible systems that is occurring today. In my opinion, the current structure is wasteful, redundant and it fosters friction and tribalism, which we can ill afford in our small Army. I believe that the current structure is based on a model with deep historical and traditional roots but with questionable relevance for the future. The current version of it is, in my view, a set of opposing camps dug in determinedly around specific roles, or worse, around specific pieces of equipment. While such results might be tolerable in a much larger army with the financial, institutional and structural “fat” to absorb them, our Army no longer occupies any of those enviable positions.

the Army should
abandon the historical
practice of maintaining
separate combat arms

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The fact that we have four separate combat arms today is, in my view, really more a legacy of history than of any precise analytical process. The Canadian Army is not alone, of course: most armies, large and small, maintain similar distinctions (although not all group their engineers as a combat arm). If we look back into the distant past of our professional history, we see that the basis of most conventional armies was originally formed by some version of infantry, including missile-firing infantry such as archers and slingers. Over time, horsed cavalry joined their infantry brethren and, at times such as during the Middle Ages, threatened to eclipse them. For social and cultural reasons, as well as due to more practical issues such as relative speed of movement, etc., cavalry organizations remained rigidly separated from infantry. In due course, specialized heavy weapons systems appeared alongside the foot soldiers and horsemen. Initially provided to besiege fortified places, these systems eventually evolved into direct fire support systems for use against soldiers. Engineers, present throughout in one form or another, did much as they do today, albeit with muscle power instead of steam or diesel. Thus, by about the time of the Renaissance, the classic divisions that we recognize and perpetuate today had pretty much come into being.

As time went on and the spread of gunpowder systems increased both lethality and skill requirements, artillerymen and engineers began to occupy the status of practitioners of a sort of military version of “black arts.” The social division that set infantrymen and horsemen apart from each other was complemented by the development of these two newer arms, comprised of men were largely regarded as grubby-handed upstarts by their “betters.” This parochial process continued, more or less unabated, through the 19th century and into the 20th. All the while, tribalism as well as the need to defend and further one's own organization grew in strength and depth.

This growth manifested itself most strongly in resistance to changing technology that threatened organizational nature or existence. This was perhaps best epitomized by the widespread and stubborn refusal to realize that the day of horsed cavalry as a decisive arm had passed during First World War. Every major army persisted in maintaining some horsed cavalry in the post-First World War years. The Russians, for example, deployed horsed cavalry formations of corps size right through Second World War. By the end of Second World War, the four solitudes were well and truly entrenched, even though, ironically, it was that war which demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt that the arms were compelled to fight as combined teams.

At the same time that all of this parochial fence building was going on, however, there were constant examples of “combat function creep” between the traditional arms. An early example was the appearance of the dragoon: the mounted soldier who could charge on horseback or dismount to fight. Another was the migration of machine guns from the artillery to the infantry (and even to the cavalry in some armies). A third was the presence of direct fire “artillery” weapons, crewed by specially trained infantry soldiers, integral to the German infantry regiments of both World Wars. The tank itself provides yet another example. The concept of armoured fighting vehicles was brought to birth in the British forces first by the Royal Naval Air Service and in the French Army by the Artillery. I mention this “creep” to show that the potential has always existed for the blurring of the strict boundaries behind which our branches are today entrenched.

THE PRESENT

Having had a brief look at the past, I will now examine our present situation. My argument against a separate armour branch is that with the impending demise of the tank and the introduction of the mobile gun system (MGS), as well as with the emphasis on intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) as a multi-branch job, the armour branch will no longer provide any unique capability that has not previously existed, or could easily be developed, in the Infantry or, by extension, in the new combat branch. Direct-fire vehicle mounted weapon systems have been operated by our infantry at various times since Second World War, including heavy machine guns, tube and missile anti-armour systems of various types and, today, an automatic cannon. The new MGS is merely the latest iteration in this evolution. It is not a tank. The other traditional role of armour, that of longer-ranged recce tasks carried out by armoured vehicles, must be viewed in light of the fact that the operation of armoured recce vehicles in the infantry has strong precedent: the Universal Carrier, the Lynx and, today, the LAV Coyote. If Infantry recce organizations are using essentially the same platform as their cavalry friends, the difference between infantry armoured recce functions and cavalry armoured recce functions becomes one of training and employment not of any innate ability. Regrouping all LAV Coyote in armoured regiments is, in my opinion, job protection.

Regrouping all LAV Coyote in armoured regiments is, in my opinion, job protection

The move toward a fully integrated ISTAR capability further blurs the need for a separate branch just to do recce tasks. To be fair, the Armoured Corps has always displayed a much more logical and determined approach to vehicle crewing than the infantry has ever been able to do, despite being largely mechanized in the Regular Force since the 1970s. Arguably, the infantry is still struggling with this requirement. This attribute would be a valuable one for inclusion in the new combat branch, which would, of course, continue to contain armoured fighting vehicles of various sorts.

It is slightly more difficult to advance an argument against the preservation of a separate artillery branch. Fortunately, this argument has been greatly facilitated by the actions of the Royal Regiment itself over the last few years. For example, the argument that was advanced a few years ago that gunners should be able to deploy on international operations in an infantry role does not strengthen the need for artillery; it confirms the need for more Infantry.

Assigning an infantry weapon such as the mortar (and one that, even in considerably larger calibres, is still regarded in many armies as an infantry weapon) to the artillery is, like the Coyotes above, a measure of job protection. If Infantry soldiers can successfully operate indirect fire weapon systems from armoured platforms (Wolf), it begs the question of why a separate branch is required to do this. With the decision to eventually retire the M109, and with the increasing emphasis on precision lethality vs the smashing of grid squares, coupled with the greatly improved capability of the lighter indirect fire systems available today, there is no value added in having a separate branch just to deliver indirect fire. Fire planning and control skills have existed for years in infantry battalion mortar platoons, and, once again, the difference between a forward observation officer (FOO) and a mortar fire controller (MFC) is one of training and experience not of any divinely conferred superiority. I suggest that “massing of fires” in future will not be achieved by having “pure” artillery units but by digitally coordinating the systems integral to one or more manoeuvre units.

Lest I be accused of being too partisan on behalf of my own branch, I do not believe that the infantry can survive on the modern battlefield in its present state either. Shorn for institutional reasons of its integral indirect fire and light engineering capability as well as its armoured recce capability and its heavy anti-armour punch, uneasy with the awesome mantle of responsibility represented by the LAVIII, all the while struggling eternally with manning stability, the infantry no longer deploys battalions that represent the full suite of combat capabilities. We have collectively seen to that. At the same time, the infantry is the most fundamental part of any Army team: its skills sets are the broadest and the most needed in all types of operations. It is the most flexible and adaptive because it is not tied to any major systems (or, at least, it shouldn't be). Accordingly, I see the infantry as forming the conceptual basis for the combat branch. However, the new combat branch will not merely be "Infantry Plus."

The combat branch ...
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today

Finally, we must consider the people everybody loves: our Sappers. It was only after much thought that I decided to propose their integration into the combat branch. In the end, I have included them not so much because they are in any way deficient or irrelevant (quite the opposite...) but because they are presently considered to be a combat arm and because they share some skill sets with the infantry. As well, they bring vital skill sets of their own to the new combat branch.

To summarize, I do not believe that any of the traditional combat arms can survive any longer on their own as separate branches, nor should we seek this. Instead, given the constraints I have outlined above, we need to give ourselves much greater flexibility to use all of our human and technical resources to field the most effective and capable combat units that we can afford. Force structure, training and procurement must be based solely on what is best suited to achieve this objective, as opposed to meeting the agenda of any particular branch. I believe that this aim can best be achieved by forming a single combat branch, with the current historical branches represented inside it by MOCs or skill-set groupings as opposed to more formal structures. I will now try to sketch what this proposed combat branch would look like.

THE COMBAT BRANCH

The combat branch would be unashamedly based on the infantry, but it would not be identical to the infantry we know today. It would look more like a group of permanent BGs, each one bigger and with more combat power than a current Infantry battalion. How many of these units might exist and exactly how they may be configured and equipped are issues outside the scope of this article, although they clearly need to be addressed. In broad terms, I believe that each unit should contain the following elements:

- ◆ a command support element;
- ◆ several close combat sub-units, closely resembling the present Infantry;
- ◆ one or more subunits of heavy direct fire weapon systems;
- ◆ an indirect fire element (until the day technology brings us a weapon system that will do both the direct and indirect fire roles);

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- ◆ an air defence element (alternatively this might be dispersed among the other elements by means of man-portable air defence system [MANPADS] much as the Soviet motor rifle companies contained MANPADS);
 - ◆ a strong ISTAR capability, including an element dedicated to recce tasks but also involving the info gathering capabilities of all sub-units;
 - ◆ an engineering capability; and
 - ◆ a combat service support (CSS) element that can move and survive on a lethal and confused battlefield and can accept augmentation in a “plug and play” manner to increase self-sufficiency.

In other words, these elements comprise a permanent grouping designed to produce the most lethal, flexible and mobile tactical unit possible. I believe that some thinking in this direction has already taken place quite independent from my comments here.

LIGHT FORCES

While thinking this idea over, I wrestled with the idea of what to do with the evolving light force capability now represented in our three light infantry battalions. After some consideration, and particularly in view of ongoing discussions about an increased “SOC” flavour for these units, I believe that they should be preserved as light organizations but with most of the same capabilities resident in them as in the unit described above, albeit with lighter and more portable systems. These units, more so than the heavier configurations, would most closely resemble what we now call infantry.

TRAINING THE COMBAT BRANCH

Fundamental to the combat branch would be a common entry-level program for all recruits, officer and NCM alike. In my opinion, this program should start with the new recruit directly from the recruiting centre and focus immediately upon the production of the basic soldier, who will be known as the close combat soldier. There would be no pretense to produce a “CF purple” recruit, which, in my opinion, is an outdated and wasteful concept we can no longer afford. The end product of this entry-level training process would be a soldier who would very much resemble what we now call an infantryman, since these are the most fundamental skill sets required in all types of operations against most types of threats. As well as producing all of our soldiers and potential NCOs, it would ensure that all future officers have exactly the same grounding in basic combat skills as their soldiers. Much as the “crucible” approach to recruit training has done in the US Marines, I envision that the close combat soldier phase would also serve as a means of identifying natural combat leaders, who could then be earmarked for further leadership training and progression to NCO or officer ranks.

Following close combat soldier training, soldiers would then be streamed either to employment in one of the close combat elements or into further combat capability training. These would include:

- ◆ direct fire support soldier;
- ◆ indirect fire support soldier;

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- ◆ air defence soldier;
 - ◆ protection and mobility soldier (analogous to combat engineer); and
 - ◆ ISTAR soldier (the multi-disciplinary nature of ISTAR poses some challenges here).

Completion of these training modules would produce soldiers who could discharge those functions on the battlefield but who would retain the close combat capability and could cycle back through close combat elements as leaders at later points in their careers. As well, at approximately this point, officer candidates would be identified and moved to a combat branch officer training stream (more about that below). However, the search for suitable officer candidates would be ongoing rather than being limited to the entry level. In fact, our system approximates this concept now but perhaps in a less cohesive manner.

After having completed their initial specialty module, soldiers would be assigned to an appropriate element within the unit for initial employment. During this time, they could be selected for training on a tactical leadership course related to their specialty. These could include:

- ◆ direct fire support leader;
- ◆ indirect fire support leader;
- ◆ air defence leader;
- ◆ protection/mobility leader; and
- ◆ ISTAR leader.

While the focus of these courses would be to train the NCOs who would lead the basic teams within each element, junior officers could easily be assigned to attend them.

OFFICER TRAINING

Officers in the combat branch would be selected without exception from each recruit intake, although civilian applicants would be free to enter the Army with a view to commissioning. Their ability to function effectively as a soldier would be the gateway to further progression. While having the same basic skill grounding as their soldiers, and in some cases completing one or more specialty leader courses at later points, officers would be trained with a view to producing combat generalists who could comfortably and knowledgeably employ all the systems and capabilities in the unit to achieve victory but would not be “nuts and bolts” experts on any of them beyond basic skills. The combat branch officer would be much broader (although probably less deep) than most combat arms officers are now. At the same time as this broader focus would be instilled, officer training would place very heavy emphasis on leadership by example, on ethical and moral behaviour and on placing trust in subordinates. Post secondary education would remain a requirement for officers, although whether this would be a recruiting gateway or a form of professional development that would be offered after selection requires further thought.

Beyond the combat branch training profile, there will still be a need for officers to take command support training and other specialty courses that might be delivered by other parts of

the military. As well, I see it as crucial that we maintain a healthy rotation between service in tactical units, in HQs, in training centres and with the reserves. This system, already well established, is needed to keep all parts of the Army current and in touch with each other.

WARRANT OFFICERS

I envision an increase in responsibilities for our warrant officer ranks. While the traditional sergeant-major role is a very necessary one and must be preserved at all costs, I see that the WOs would almost completely take over the field of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) unique to each specialty. Arguably, we are pretty close to that now, but I suggest that except for the provision of oversight and the necessary command leadership, there would no longer be very much involvement by officers in developing most TTP. This is perhaps a radical idea, but it is intended to provide a necessary balance to the reorienting of officers to a broader, more generalist role. Somehow, that technical knowledge gap will have to be filled, and I believe that our WOs would easily be able to do it. Furthermore, we might consider (as other armies have before now) whether WOs might not actually be well suited to command sub-sub units in some of the specialties. Finally, some WOs would probably remain for longer periods in their sub-specialty streams than most officers ever would in order to build the experience base required to become the TTP experts.

THE COMBAT BRANCH IN THE LARGER ARMY

I have not touched on the issue of how we might generate the support soldiers and leaders for the combat branch units. Obviously, these people will be vital, especially as our technology level rises. My preference is that they be trained under a regime that stresses “soldier first.” I do

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not believe in the “purple support soldier” concept espoused under unification, despite the excellent efforts that individuals currently make to meet the demands that different operational environments present. If we have learned (actually, re-learned...) nothing else in the last few years of conflict, both as participants and as spectators, it is that the comfy, blinkered division into “combat zone” and “safe rear area” is dead. Our enemies will not check our MOCs before they attack.

Accordingly, everybody who serves in a combat branch unit will be able to fight. Suffice to say that at this point, I see both a separate support branch and an information systems branch contributing soldiers to the CSS and command support functions of the combat branch units.

The issue of the preservation and application of the regimental system in the regular Army has arisen throughout my thought process on this subject. While I believe that, on the whole, the regimental system has more good points than bad, I do not think that it should drive our organizational structure. The regimental system is a support to good leadership and unit cohesion not a substitute for them nor an end-state in itself. To a certain extent, the degree to which we could directly transfer our current system to the new combat branch would depend upon the size and shape of the units themselves. If there were to be a sufficient number to permit each new unit to preserve the heritage and lineage of an existing regular regiment, the transition would be much easier. If there is no such convenient correspondence, we will have to consider other options, ranging from total submergence of the old identities in a new common branch heritage through various permutations and combinations to the extreme of preserving only the

identities of one or two of the existing regiments. We could consider, for example, the approach taken by the post-Versailles German Reichsheer, which assigned the identities of former imperial regiments to be borne by sub-units in the new army. This turned out to be a rather cumbersome and unmanageable system, but it is an option. I do not pretend to have the answer here: I only raise it as a very important consideration.

THE ARMY RESERVE

In the last few years we have made huge strides in closing the gap of mutual hostility and mistrust that has traditionally separated the two components of our Army. This progress has been to the great benefit of the entire institution and should never be reversed. Accordingly, if the regular Army is to be reconfigured on the combat branch model, then corresponding changes must occur in the Army reserve. Given the historical (and not unfounded) mistrust of such change by the Army reserve, introducing this development into the Army reserve may be more challenging than it might be in the regular Army. Like all changes involving the reserve, it will have to be applied with good will, common sense and an informed patience if it is to be productive rather than divisive. Having said that, I believe that the Army reserve would want very much to be part of such a change, if only to avoid consignment to irrelevance.

CONCLUSION

I have tried in the preceding paragraphs to sketch the outline of a concept for how we might better structure our Army. I believe that our present structure is, at best, a legacy and, at worst, an albatross. If my assumptions hold true, then we can no longer afford the luxuries of inter-branch rivalry and “jobs for the boys” (or girls...). We have to be prepared to keep what remains of the strengths of our Army, while submerging and reducing the factors that pull us in different directions.

If this letter has raised more questions than it has provided answers to, that is good. As I stated at the outset, my hope is to offer my own opinions and interpretation as provocation for further discussion. I expect that the champions of the current structure will respond by pointing out the weaknesses of my concept as well as my probable mental weaknesses in broaching the idea. On the other hand, I hope that some readers may take the idea to heart and think more objective and freely about the future of ground combat in our Army and about how we might best marshal our limited resources to produce the most flexible and lethal force possible.

COMMENTS ON “A SINGLE COMBAT BRANCH” BY LCOL DAVE BANKS

Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Bondy, CD

I agree with Lieutenant Colonel Dave Banks, CD that the current Army's branch-pure regimental force structure is “a legacy of history,” not the result of “any precise analytic process,” and a “wasteful”, “redundant” cause of “friction and tribalism.” I also agree that Western warfare has settled on combined arms since Second World War and that contemporary doctrine and equipment are making the convergence of combat functions more and more urgent. Finally, I agree that the “comfy, blinkered division into ‘combat zone’ and ‘safe rear area’ is dead so that the concept of ‘soldier first’ has never been more important.”

I can only encourage the author to push his argument to its logical conclusion. Why does he not want to include all members of the manoeuvre unit to be deployed in theatre into a single unit that includes the support and information systems branches? Also, if combat functions converging and equipment systems are more polyvalent, why continue with MOCs or functional specialized branches? If friction, tribalism, and no safe communication zone are problems, why perpetuate divisions between support soldiers and combat soldiers, among centrally controlled MOCs, and among competing legacies tied to existing regiments?

There is also a danger of changing too slowly or too quickly

It may be that Lieutenant Colonel Dave Banks, CD proposed combat branch is itself a legacy of modern management science and old fashion tribalism. His combat, logistics, and communication branches and a multitude of MOCs remain faithful to the old, industrial age division of labour. Why does he focus so much of his attention on force structure and technology to the exclusion of personnel strategies and cultural intangibles? Why does he focus only on “combat”, “victory”, and “lethality” to the exclusion of the equally important but less glorious issues of transitioning from invasion to occupation, providing humanitarian assistance, and other functions clearly in the Post-Cold War Army's professional jurisdiction?

There is also a danger of changing too slowly or too quickly. In my opinion, the incremental, limited change recommend by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Banks, CD is too slow and insufficient. A reshuffled combat branch with a slightly broadened tribalism will not provide the focus and flexibility the Army needs in the Post-Cold War environment. Indeed, if the Army does not change both its structure and personnel strategy quickly and decisively, there may be no change at all—but rather, a gradual decline into irrelevancy.

About the Author...

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PUTTING A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: FINDING A SPECIAL FORCES CAPABILITY FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY

Major Tony Balasevicius, CD

Since their inception during the early stages of the Second World War, modern special operation forces (SOF)¹ have steadily grown and evolved into a key element of a nation's military inventory. In the post Cold War period, they have proven to be particularly popular with the political leadership because of their small footprint, low visibility and ability to accomplish a myriad of sensitive missions. As a result, they eliminate the need for larger national commitments, thus reducing the risk of heavy casualties or adverse political fall-out.

The utility of SOF has especially been recognized in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack against the United States. The trend since then has been to enhance the capabilities and extend the employment of SOF. Evidence suggests that the employment of these soldiers will likely continue to grow in the coming years. For example, since 11 September 2001, SOF have played key roles in recent operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines. These well-publicized examples of SOF missions are only a small part of the ongoing and increasing SOF commitment by Western states.² This heavy operational tempo is not surprising given the range of their capabilities, which include long-range reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines to counter terrorism and the training of foreign military forces.

Most modern militaries now have some type of SOF capability. According to Robin Neillands, author of *In the Combat Zone: Special Forces Since 1945*, over 287 SOF units worldwide are operating within 66 nations or states.³ It is not surprising, therefore, that the Canadian Army is looking at developing an SOF capability as part of its force development review. One option under consideration is the formation of a direct action (DA) organization based on the American Ranger unit.

As with any option, the potential of creating a Ranger type unit demands some form of critical analysis to answer key questions like, how would such a capability enhance Canada's ability to respond to the various SOF contingencies? And would the formation of such a unit enhance Canadian capabilities and meet strategic goals? Although the American Rangers are an outstanding light infantry force with a successful record, the reality is that despite being part of America's Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the capability is at best borderline SOF. From their inception, the Rangers have been organized, trained and equipped for a very narrow spectrum of operations. More importantly, their structure and tasks give the adoption of a similar capability by Canada limited utility. Given the complexity of the subject, this article will focus on the Ranger concept as an SOF capability and consider its historical development and employment to determine their strengths and limitations based on operational experience. Finally, it will assess the utility of a Ranger type unit within the Canadian context.

As in any doctrinal construct, nations characterize special operations in different ways, however, for the purpose of this paper, special operations (SO) will be defined in accordance with American doctrine and will focus primarily on American SOF models as the Rangers developed

within this context. According to US joint special operations doctrine, SOF operations are those

operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.⁴

SOF units are organized and trained in nine principal mission areas,⁵ which include counter proliferation (CP), counter terrorism (CT), foreign internal defence (FID), special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), unconventional warfare (UW) and information operations (IO).⁶ In addition to these nine principal missions, there are also a number of other tasks, commonly referred to as “collateral activities,” that have been carried out by SOF and are the result of their unique skills and training. They include coalition support, combat search and rescue (CSAR), counter drug (CD) activities, humanitarian demining (HD), humanitarian assistance (HA), security assistance (SA) and special activities.

Interestingly, many of these missions, both primary and collateral, have not necessarily resulted from operational circumstances. According to Thomas K. Adams, author of *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, “This list is a hodgepodge of conventional, unconventional and just plain odd missions, some of which are actually subsets of others. The list results in part from a general willingness at the command levels of the SOF community to accept almost any mission as one in which SOF can succeed.”⁷ Adams goes on to say, “There is an idea that, by accepting many missions, SOF demonstrates its fitness and remains competitive with other organizations in the struggle for a share of the diminishing military budget. This leads to the inclusion of things, which clearly is [sic] and ought to be conventional.”⁸

The nine principal missions and seven collateral activities have evolved from three core missions, which have, with some exceptions, developed from the capabilities established to meet specific operational requirements during the Second World War. The three core missions are direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and unconventional warfare (UW). The reason that these three missions are highlighted is that modern SOF units are generally organized, equipped and trained to be proficient in one of these areas. Residual capabilities developed during training will allow some overlap, but it is important to understand that there is a limit on how much an SOF unit can do within the spectrum of the core missions. For example, DA missions can be broken down into large-scale actions carried out by units such as the British Army Commandos and American Rangers or small-scale operations carried out by a more surgical strike from smaller forces such as the Special Air Service (SAS). UW can likewise be broken down into missions undertaken by larger forces such as the former Office of Strategic Services (OSS), operational groups (OGs) and the current American Special Forces⁹ or by smaller liaison teams similar to the Second World War concept of Jedburgh teams employed by the Allies.¹⁰ Because the requirements of each core task are extremely specialized in terms of their organization, training and equipment, SOF units tend to specialize in large-scale DA, small-

SOF Tasks and Capabilities




Figure 1 Types of SOF units based on mission requirements

clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities or modes of employment” nor is there “independence from friendly support.”¹³

In fact, since the inception of the large-scale DA units during the early stages of the Second World War, this capability has moved away from the purview of SOF into the domain of conventional forces. Unfortunately, military institutions created these units with the mistaken idea that they can provide an SOF capability that can also be used for other, conventional tasks. This lack of understanding of SOF in general and of the large-scale DA capability in particular often leads to misemployment because military commanders do not understand the limitations of these forces.¹⁴ The concern of misemployment is extremely relevant today as SOF are in high demand and the option to provide a quick fix with a hybrid capability such as the Rangers is a tempting one. Rangers are highly trained light infantry that have developed a very specialized mission capability that fits within the context of the American Army's total spectrum dominance very well. When used within this limited context, such a capability can produce outstanding results. However, with few exceptions, the opportunities to employ these large DA forces in appropriate operations are limited.

The development of a large-scale DA capability had its genesis in the creation of the British Commandos during the Second World War. One of the first SOF units to be formed by the Allies, the Commandos were conceived as “mobile and hard-hitting light troops that could raid or operate behind an enemy's lines.”¹⁵ Some thirty Commandos were eventually formed, and they were initially trained and equipped to conduct offensive operations against the German defences along the French coast. These operations were designed as classic DA missions consisting of “short-duration strikes and other...offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel.”¹⁶

The training programme developed for units to carry out these specialized missions emphasized the development of the individual soldier. The focus was on physical fitness, weapons (both their own and the enemy's), demolitions, orienteering, close quarter combat, silent killing, signalling, survival skills, amphibious and cliff assault and vehicle operation. All training was

scale DA and SR¹¹ or UW. In the case of the Rangers, their specialization is generally limited to large-scale DA missions.¹²

The main problem with units specializing in large-scale DA missions is that they tend to compete with conventional military forces that are also capable of conducting the same operations, e.g., raiding. As a result, it is difficult to assert that these large-scale DA units meet the criteria of “employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.” In addition, they do not carry out their operations “using covert,

extremely demanding and realistic, often employing real ammunition.¹⁷ The creation of the Commandos was significant because other British SOF organizations that appeared during the war, such as the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Service (SBS), owe their origins in one way or another to the Commandos. In addition, the Jedburgh teams received a portion of their training from Commando instructors, while other Allied units such as the First Special Service Force (FSSF) and the OSS operational groups used variations of the Commando program for their training. British experience in this regard was so influential that the Americans decided to have the first group of Rangers attend the British Commando course at Achnacarry Castle, Scotland.

The modern American Rangers were formed on 1 June 1942, when General George Marshall, Chief of Staff, directed the creation of an American commando organization. Marshall wanted a cadre of personnel with battle experience, which could be shared throughout the Army. To this end he ordered the activation of the 1st Ranger Battalion on 19 June 1942, at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland.¹⁸ In order to gain experience, it was expected that the Rangers would operate with the British Commandos. This meant that although the Rangers were equipped as an American infantry unit, they would be given additional "special equipment for amphibious landings and night attacks that included such things as collapsible rubber dinghies and life-preserver vests."¹⁹ They also had engineering resources such as demolition equipment and camouflage nets.²⁰ As Commando training and operations also included individuals with special qualifications such as demolition experts, mechanics, truck and tractor drivers and maintenance personnel, the composition of the Ranger unit reflected those additional positions.

Notwithstanding the excellent training and calibre of personnel, the light scales of equipment posed a constant problem for the Rangers during subsequent operations.²¹ While light holdings of equipment enhanced mobility, firepower was correspondingly reduced. This problem was not serious if engagements were short, however, if operations were prolonged or the unit was used as conventional infantry, limited firepower proved a major disadvantage. Ironically, this trend continued throughout the war and, as time went on, "the more the Rangers were used as conventional infantry, the more firepower they needed; and the more firepower they got, the more likely it became that the headquarters that controlled them would use them conventionally."²²

This problem was highlighted during the North Africa campaign. During November 1942, in the opening stages of Operation TORCH, the Rangers were given an appropriate DA mission to conduct a surprise night landing north of Arzew, Algeria (French North Africa), where they successfully neutralized the port's main coastal defences and captured its docks. After this operation, the Rangers were assigned to the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center (ITC) as demonstration and experimental troops.²³ Even commanders who understand the concept and potential of such large-scale DA forces employed the Rangers' in conventional infantry missions. During the latter stages of North Africa campaign, the Rangers "spent almost four times as many days in conventional combat than they did in Ranger operations and spent most of their time on non-combat duties."²⁴

The reason they spent most of their time on non-combat duties was that the Rangers, with their special training and capabilities, were being held back for employment on appropriate high value operations such as the destruction of key enemy installations. As a rule, they were not employed in the line as often as conventional units, and this created the perception that such

forces were a drain on the manpower pool and did not contribute significantly to the war effort, a yardstick generally measured by the number of successful combat actions a unit engaged in. It was further believed that such capabilities did nothing that could not be done by well-trained infantry.²⁵ This logic belies the reality of the situation: these types of large DA forces are, in fact, well-trained infantry troops. Unfortunately, it is generally forgotten that, during times of conflict, the training of every infantry unit in a large army to the necessary high standard to conduct these missions is impossible.²⁶

Nevertheless, a significant quandary associated with keeping highly trained DA troops in reserve is the temptation to use them to fix problems more suited to conventional troops. When this occurs, higher casualty rates result as these units are neither structured nor equipped to endure prolonged periods of combat. A good example of such mis-employment is provided by the destruction of the Ranger Battalions at Anzio:

A botched infiltration mission on the Anzio beachhead in early 1944 completed the destruction of Darby's Rangers... When the two battalions began their infiltration on the night of 29-30 January, the enemy quickly detected them and by dawn had surrounded them with infantry and armour just outside Cisterna. In a desperate attempt to rescue the isolated units, the 4th Ranger Battalion repeatedly attacked the German lines throughout the morning but succeeded in losing half of its combat strength in the futile effort. About noon, the remnants of the 1st and 3rd surrendered. Only eight men escaped to American lines.²⁷

Attrition suffered during conventional operations also depleted the First Special Service Force (FSSF) during their operations in Italy. In 1942, the British were examining the creation of a mobile Commando force equipped with light over-snow vehicles for use against German facilities in Norway. After several high-level discussions, the Americans and Canadians agreed to provide volunteers for a unit to carry out these missions.²⁸ The FSSF never carried out its original operational mission and was instead sent to Italy, where it was, for the most part, used as conventional infantry.²⁹ After two months of intensive conventional fighting in the Italian mountains, the FSSF was reduced from its original strength of 1,800 to 400 combat-effective soldiers,³⁰ a loss that proved difficult to replace. The Americans tried to solve the reinforcement problem by drawing replacements from the general infantry pool,³¹ while Canadian reinforcements, had "three weeks training in US weapons and drill and Special Forces tactics."³² Heavy casualties, such as those suffered by the FSSF, have a tendency to create instability and undermine the effectiveness of these types of units. The loss of a significant number of highly trained soldiers and a lack of similarly trained replacements will quickly turn these units into nothing more than conventional infantry organizations. Such was the case with the FSSF. For when it was pulled from the line, it required an extended period of reconstitution, during which time, extensive training was needed in an effort to bring the reinforcements up to the necessary qualifications.

When conducted properly, large-scale DA operations can achieve good results. During the American assault at Omaha Beach on 6 June 1944, elements of the 2nd Ranger Battalion scaled the 100-foot cliff at Pointe du Hoc and seized German artillery pieces threatening American troops landing on the beach. Despite high casualties, the 2nd Ranger Battalion successfully held off a number of determined German counterattacks and retained the position.

However, the most interesting Ranger operation of the Second World War was conducted by the 6th Ranger Battalion,³³ which was reinforced by members of the Alamo Scouts³⁴ and Filipino

guerrillas, to rescue 511 Allied prisoners from a Japanese POW camp near Cabanatuan in the Philippines.³⁵ As the American Sixth Army entered central Luzon, 6th Ranger Battalion began examining options for the liberation of the POWs. The preparatory planning was quite detailed and involved the use of extensive map and ground reconnaissance as well as aerial photographs. Once there was sufficient intelligence to confirm the location of the POWs, the mission was confirmed and detailed planning commenced. Everyone involved became completely familiar with all aspects of the plan, including “the routes to the objective, the rendezvous points and the layout of the objective.”³⁶ In the end, the operation proved an overwhelming success and an example of what large DA forces can do when properly employed and given adequate time and resources for a specific mission:

At a cost of two Rangers killed, the 6th Ranger Battalion (-), reinforced by Alamo Scouts and Filipino guerrillas, liberated 511 American and Allied POWs and killed or wounded an estimated 523 Japanese. The principles and techniques [utilized in the planning of the operation] were important because they contributed to the Rangers' undetected approach to the objective, their gaining complete surprise over the Japanese, their smooth assault on the compound, and their successful liberation of the prisoners.³⁷

The 6th Ranger Battalion did not take part in any major operations after Cabanatuan. Their activities in the Philippines were limited to providing security for Sixth Army headquarters, conducting reconnaissance patrols, searching for Japanese stragglers and eliminating small pockets of enemy resistance.³⁸

Like most specialized units created during the Second World War, the Rangers were deactivated in 1945. The operations at Arzew, Pointe du Hoc and Cabanatuan proved that such a capability was certainly feasible and, if employed properly, could have a significant impact on general operations. However, despite a few exceptions, the reality was that the Rangers were misemployed more often than not and used largely as highly trained assault infantry—a fate similar to the British Commandos. A general perception was created within the Allied command that the limited opportunities where these forces could be employed did not justify the personnel and training committed to them.

The Commandos were originally raised as highly trained, flexible raiders with a range of individual skill sets. But as time passed, their role narrowed so that by the time of Operation OVERLORD in 1944, they had effectively become specialists in amphibious assault.³⁹ This evolution came about because of the significant limitations of naval lift. The British discovered that even organizing a small force comprising 300 soldiers required a great deal of specialized shipping. In addition, these light forces needed significant naval gunfire and air support to have any chance of success.⁴⁰ In the end, limited employment opportunities and the level of support and protection required forced the large-scale DA unit to evolve away from the realm of the SOF and into the sphere of highly trained infantry where the Marines, airborne and other such light forces now tend to operate.⁴¹

After the Second World War, the concept of employing Rangers as a large-scale DA force re-emerged very slowly and did not fully rematerialize until the early 1970s. In August 1950, 15 Ranger companies were activated during the Korean conflict. Between December 1950 and August 1951, seven companies saw action in Korea, where they were assigned to various infantry units. Their primary tasks were to scout ahead of the main body, patrol enemy positions, conduct raids behind enemy lines and carry out ambushes.⁴²

However, after Korea, the Rangers were again disbanded only to be reactivated in the late 1960s, during the Vietnam War. The missions they carried out there were similar to those that they had performed in Korea. Employing detachments through to company-size elements, they worked directly for division and corps headquarters to provide a small DA and SR capability. They performed typical operations such as patrols, reconnaissance, raids and scouting missions as well as conducting prisoner snatches, bomb damage assessment and wiretap missions.⁴³ The Rangers also undertook a new type of mission, known as long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs), using 6- and 12-man teams, which often remained behind enemy lines for weeks, conducting raids, ambushes and calling in naval gunfire and air strikes on enemy positions. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the independent Ranger companies were formed into battalions, where they once again became a quick reaction light-infantry force designed to carry out larger DA missions.⁴⁴

The renaissance of a large-scale DA capability continued through the post-Vietnam era. In 1980, the Rangers took on a new role when C Company, 1st Battalion 75th Infantry (Ranger) was ordered to support Operation EAGLE CLAW, the mission to rescue the American hostages held in Iran. The mission was primarily an SOF operation; however, the Rangers were assigned to provide security for some of the support elements while the assault forces carried out the rescue.⁴⁵

This operation was not the last time the Rangers would be used to provide support to SOF. In October 1983, the Rangers took on the task of airfield seizure when they led the assault during Operation URGENT FURY, the invasion of Grenada, by jumping into and capturing the Point Salinas airstrip, paving the way for the 82nd Airborne Division.⁴⁶ Six years later, in Panama, during Operation JUST CAUSE, the Rangers were again used to secure the main airfield, at Tocumen, where they were reinforced by the 82nd Airborne Division. The Rangers also neutralized an enemy company based at Rio Hato Military Airfield and General Noriega's fortified beach house.⁴⁷ The 1990-1991 Gulf War witnessed A and B Company of the 1st Ranger Battalion supporting the allied mission to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces. The Rangers carried out a number of raids and also conducted reconnaissance patrols into Kuwait to collect information for the assault forces.⁴⁸ In Somalia, the trend of employing small sized Rangers elements to beef up special forces continued. Rangers from B Company, 3rd Ranger Battalion provided backup support to SOF from Delta Force in a series of operations to capture key leaders of a clan disrupting the United Nation's mission in the region.

Employing Rangers in support of the SOF continued into the new millennium. The Rangers assisted Northern Alliance forces that were being supervised by special forces during the opening stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (2001-), which was focused on destroying the Al Qaeda network and removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. The Rangers went into action on October 19th, when a company was parachuted into a small enemy command and control compound outside Khandahar and onto a separate airfield in Southern Afghanistan. During the raids, the Rangers destroyed several weapons caches and gathered intelligence. In addition to the raids, Rangers searched cave complexes and provided SOF with a rapid reaction force capability.

The operations carried out during the 1980s and 1990s fit the current concept of Ranger employment envisioned by the American military. Today's Rangers are tasked "to plan and conduct special military operations...that may support conventional military operations or they

may be performed independently when conventional forces cannot be used....”⁴⁹ The Rangers are also expected to conduct what the Americans term “strike operations,” which are defined as raids, interdiction and recovery operations.⁵⁰ These strike operations are conducted at the operational level of war as part of the Army's Air Land Battle, they are integrated into an overall campaign plan designed to destroy, delay and disorganize the enemy, and they are intended to divert the enemy's operational forces and power to their own rear area security tasks. Strike missions are also intended to create a suitable environment to exploit the capabilities and impacts of SOF. In addition, Rangers are expected to conduct special light infantry operations, including “many of the light infantry missions assigned to airborne, air assault, or light infantry battalions and brigades.”⁵¹ In effect, a Ranger unit provides the same capabilities as these other light infantry units.

The Ranger's evolution from highly trained, flexible raiders with a range of individual skill sets for very specific missions in the Second World War to highly trained light infantry with broader missions is not difficult to understand. The limited opportunities where mission-specific forces could be employed, even during periods of international conflict such as world war, did not justify the expense of keeping them. In attempting to rationalize their relevance in a highly competitive niche, the Rangers have moved into the realm of conventional forces highlighting a more general-purpose capability, while attempting to stake a claim as the best unit to support SOF. Assuming they are the best to do all these tasks, there is still the problem of a lack of employment opportunities: American Rangers have been employed on three declassified operations in support of SOF and two DA missions over the last thirty years.⁵²

Having examined the evolution of the American Rangers, the question must then be asked, would the creation of a Ranger capability be a suitable option for Canada? To find the answer we must first look at what capabilities the Canadian Forces (CF) anticipates needing in the coming years. According to *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, the CF “must evolve to meet the challenges of the future.” To do this the CF must “position the force structure...to provide Canada with modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations.” More importantly, “the force structure must be viable, achievable and affordable.”⁵³

Within the limitations of it being viable, achievable and affordable, a Ranger capability is certainly possible. Rangers are highly trained light forces that can quickly be task-tailored and are globally deployable. The organization and training of such a force would take time but would likely present little difficulty for the Canadian Army.⁵⁴ The basic elements of Ranger training are currently provided to a select number of soldiers through the Patrol Pathfinder Course, which is run by the Canadian Parachute Centre in Trenton, Ontario.⁵⁵ This course could be easily modified to meet the requirements of a Ranger unit. Furthermore, the Army already has a substantial light force capability (albeit lacking in coherent doctrine) with its light infantry battalions (LIBs), one of which could form the basis of a Ranger unit. For a moderate level of additional money, the conversion of a unit to this role could be completed without significant modifications to the LIB's basic structure and would thus give the Army a quick reaction capability to conduct strike missions and carry out the special light infantry operations.

The significant limitation would be providing sufficient manpower. Specifically, will there be reasonable opportunity to employ the unit and can the manpower requirements needed to

maintain the capability be sustained without jeopardizing efficiency? For Canada, limited employment opportunities must be a major consideration when developing future capabilities. Given the small size and extremely demanding operational tempo currently being experienced by the Canadian Army, it is difficult to see how a Ranger unit of 600 soldiers could be exempt from other missions such as peacekeeping. In recent operations, the American Rangers have been used primarily in airfield seizure and providing backup for SOF operations. In the British Army, however, conventional airborne forces have performed these same missions with very little difficulty. For example, during a hostage-taking situation in Sierra Leone, a force of about 150 British paratroopers, aided by members of the SAS, freed 11 British hostages. British paratroopers are also capable of conducting conventional missions such as peacekeeping and other conventional light infantry tasks. Although Canada does not maintain an airborne unit, each LIB has a parachute company.⁵⁶ It is possible—given proper training, the necessary resources and a specific mandate—that the LIBs could carry out many of the Ranger's tasks, including support to SOF. The added benefit to such an option would be the ability to rotate the task, something that could not be done with a single-unit capability.

Another problem related to having a Ranger type unit is that, in order to be effective, such units must remain in a constant state of high readiness for quick operational deployments. In order to be operationally ready for rapid deployment, the Army would have to keep such a unit free of routine taskings so that the unit could focus on training and other high readiness requirements. This is something the Army has not done well in the past. The former Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was Canada's high readiness unit and, as such, was expected to deploy outside the country within 72 hours. However, after the unit's move to Petawawa from Edmonton in the late 1970s, the CAR was given a large share of the Army's individual taskings and was also deployed on UN peacekeeping missions like any other conventional unit. This was done because the Army was in need of the additional resources in order to function. More importantly, the Army realized that even if it could maintain the CAR's high operational readiness posture, there was still the problem of aircraft availability to move the unit. As was seen with the deployment of the PPCLI Battalion Group to Afghanistan, the ability of the Army to rapidly deploy units not only depends on the high operational readiness of the organization, it also depends on how quickly aircraft can be made available to move the unit. Even if the Army can provide the manpower and make it available for rapid deployment, the capability to have airlift on standby to move high readiness units in the timeframes necessary does not currently exist within the CF and would need to be addressed.

Once deployed, the basic problem facing the employment of a Canadian Ranger unit would be its limited tactical mobility, especially in the area of ground transport, which would make it unsuitable for any type of extended employment. Interestingly, many nations are currently looking at options to increase the tactical mobility of their light infantry forces in order to make them more relevant to today's battlefield.⁵⁷ Recent experience with the LIBs in Afghanistan, much like the American Rangers in North Africa and Italy, has shown that significant augmentation is needed if light forces are to provide a relevant contribution to operational requirements or, at least, when tactical mobility is necessary.

This problem was clearly evident with the employment of the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (3 RCR) LIBs in Afghanistan. The unit had to be augmented with no less than two light armoured vehicle (LAV) companies from 1 RCR in order to properly carry out its missions.⁵⁸ The outstanding success, in Afghanistan, of the PPCLI Battalion Group, based on an LIB would

have been much more difficult without extensive aviation support from the Americans. A Ranger unit lacks transport; if used outside the very specific mission spectrum it was designed for, it would face the same tactical mobility and force protection problems.

The issue of equipment and its impact on employment was a constant problem for the former CAR. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, who served in the CAR and who is author of *Bastard Sons, An Examination of Canada's Airborne Experience 1942-1995*, "Even though the Airborne Regiment was designated the national UN stand-by force, with the exception of its deployment to Cyprus in 1974, it was never used as such. It was also labelled as the nation's strategic reserve, but its light scales of equipment, particularly its shortage of vehicles, caused many to dismiss it as unemployable for anything other than a domestic context."⁵⁹ Horn goes on to say, "Time after time, when the CAR received a mission it meant stripping equipment from conventional units. Each effort only reinforced the accusation that the Regiment was an anachronism and a parasite that sapped the declining resources of the remainder of the Army."⁶⁰

Sapping the Army's declining personal resources will be another major problem of this capability. Ranger units rely on effective leadership, the best soldiers an army can provide and a very high level of training to operate effectively. A Ranger capability would demand the best soldiers in the Army. More importantly, it would likely have to recycle these soldiers back to their parent units on a regular basis. One of the biggest problems faced by the CAR was its ability to attract and keep quality leaders and soldiers. To put this problem into better perspective, approximately 70 percent of soldiers who attend a jump course will be successful; only about 50 percent of the soldiers attempting a Ranger Course will pass.⁶¹ If the Army had trouble maintaining the CAR using the 70 percent who were successful on a jump course, it will have more difficulty maintaining a unit of similar size to the CAR,⁶² which has more specialized abilities and capabilities but will accept only the top 50 percent of those who volunteer for the training.

Interestingly, none of these difficulties have not been acknowledged in *Future Force*, the Canadian Army's blueprint for future capabilities. Although the document does recognize many of the limitations currently facing the Army, it does not take into consideration our experience with maintaining a large, quick reaction capability. As for specialized abilities and capabilities, the document states, "Although the requirement for multi-purpose forces will continue to exist within the context of the army's mandated tasks, specialization will be increasingly required to meet the growing plethora of national security risks."⁶³ It goes on to say, "In light of future threats, economic constraints, and political realities, the Army will have to enhance, evolve and refine its SOF capability."⁶⁴ In fact, the document provides an option for a SOF organization in the future and recommends a DA unit similar in concept to a Ranger capability as part of the structure.

The difficulty with this option is that it attempts to cut and paste a model from another army, which does not fit into the limited resource realities faced by the Canadian Army. The ability to have a number of SOF capabilities, each with its own selection, training and support capability requirements, is a luxury few nations can afford, and Canada is not one of them. If the Army is going to develop specialization in key areas, it must create an organization that can fit national requirements. Such capabilities must be selective and provide the best value for the resources expended or, as is often stated, "the biggest bang for the buck."

Within the current strategic environment, the use of SOF by nations such as the United States has been extremely successful because they are highly trained, have a small footprint, are low

visibility and can accomplish a myriad of sensitive missions. Rangers do not operate within this SOF spectrum. They are not equipped, trained or organized to generate missions such as long range, long duration reconnaissance, they have limited surveillance capabilities, nor are they capable of operating for extended periods without support-attributes that distinguish SOF organizations from conventional forces. Attempting to employ such a unit for SOF missions would be a mistake.

Canada cannot have capabilities that cover the full spectrum of SOF missions and must explore options that give her the most flexibility regarding employment within this restraint. An SOF capability along the lines of the British SAS or American SF would be a more salient contribution to our coalition partners than a DA unit and would require fewer soldiers.⁶⁵ Based on the model outlined in Figure 1, the option that provides the most flexibility, and therefore the most potential for employment, is the SAS, small-scale DA, S/R capability. Additionally, this type of unit can quickly be trained to provide liaison functions similar to the Jedburgh teams for UW missions should it be desirable.

In summary, many of the strengths and weaknesses that resided in the original large unit DA capabilities such as the British Commandos are present in the modern American Rangers and would be intrinsic to any capability the Canadian Army developed. That being said, no military capability is perfect as each has its own particular strengths and weaknesses. The question that must be asked is whether those strengths and weaknesses can fit into the specific strategic requirements of Canada. If the Canadian Army is looking for an SOF capability, the Ranger model is unsuitable. Rangers are not equipped, trained or organized to provide any type of SOF capability that Canada would need. They conduct operations in a very narrow spectrum of tasks and suffer from the limitations associated with a light infantry.

Despite some spectacular mission successes, specialized DA units, such as the Rangers, have not fared well historically. This is due largely to their limited scope for employment and the substantial support necessary to allow them to carry out operations. In recent operations, the Rangers have been used primarily in airfield seizure tasks and for providing backup to SOF operations. From a Canadian perspective, creating a unit specifically to support SOF operations or to develop a very specific DA capability is wasteful. The British Army's airborne forces have adequately carried out the same tasks. In this regard, Canada would be much better served with an SOF capability modeled on the American Special Forces (UW) or the British SAS (SR/small DA) capabilities. These SOF units have a significant operational impact, and their relative scarcity keep them in high demand. Such units demand greater effort in personnel selection and training, but they are within the Army's ability to generate. More importantly, they would do a better job than a Ranger unit in providing Canada with the relevant capability it is seeking.

About the Author...

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ENDNOTES

1. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, United States, *Annual Report to the President and Congress, 1998*, April 1998, available at <<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/index.html>>. Special operations forces (SOF) are specialized military units designed to deal with a variety of situations. According to the report, "They offer a range of options to decision makers confronting crises and conflicts below the threshold of war, such as terrorism, insurgency, and sabotage. Second, they are force multipliers for major conflicts, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.S. military effort. Finally, they are the forces of choice in situations requiring regional orientation and cultural and political sensitivity, including military-to-military contacts and noncombatant missions like humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and peacekeeping operations."
2. In their book, *No Room for Error: The Covert Operations of America's Special Tactics Units from Iran to Afghanistan*, John T. Carney and Benjamin F. Schemmer state: "Between October 1, 2000, and September 30, 2001...Special Operations Forces deployed to 146 countries or foreign territories with an average of 4,938 personnel deployed each week—while also conducting 132 Joint Combined Exchange events in 50 countries, 137 counterdrug missions in 23 countries, and humanitarian demining missions in 19 countries. That represents a 43 percent in-crease [sic] in country deployments in the ten years since Desert Storm, a 57 percent increase in the number of missions undertaken, and a 139 percent increase in the number of Special Operations Command personnel serving abroad in any given week—all with essentially the same number of people." From John T. Carney and Benjamin F. Schemmer, *No Room for Error: The Covert Operations of America's Special Tactics Units from Iran to Afghanistan* (New York, Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 23.
3. Robin Neillands, *In the Combat Zone: Special Forces Since 1945* (London: Orion, 1977), p. 320.
4. United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-05—Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington: 17 December 2003), p. I-1. Most allied countries, including Canada, have largely accepted this definition.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.* In May 2003, changes to the SOF principal missions and collateral activities were made. Specifically, "principal missions" are now referred to as "core tasks." These include unconventional warfare (UW) foreign internal defense (FID) direct action (DA) special reconnaissance (SR) counterterrorism (CT) counterproliferation of WMD (CP) psychological operations (PsyOp) information operations (IO) and civil affairs operations (CAO). In addition, the Americans no longer work in terms of collateral activities. Notwithstanding this change, the Americans believe SOF may be assigned one or more of these former 'collateral missions' as an embedded task. For the purposes of this paper I have remained with published unclassified material. The definition of the key task include special reconnaissance (SR)—conduct reconnaissance and surveillance actions to obtain or verify information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning characteristics of a particular area. Direct action (DA)—conduct short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. Unconventional warfare (UW)—organize, train, equip, advise, and assist indigenous and surrogate forces in military and paramilitary operations normally of long duration. Information operations (IO)—achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.
7. Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), p. 303. Eric Morris states much the same thing in his book, *Guerillas in Uniform*: "Guerrilla units (Special Forces), once created, were desperately afraid of being left on the shelf. This made them vulnerable to a form of moral blackmail, which meant they took on tasks and missions, which they were singularly ill-equipped to handle. This was frequently the case with the Middle East Commandos, roundly abused and misused by generals who could not, or wilfully chose not to understand their tactical role." Eric Morris, *Guerillas in Uniform* (London: Hutchinson, 1989).
8. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
9. Office of Strategic Services' (OSS) was the forerunner of the CIA, 1942-1945. Operational groups (OG) were used when missions required a more robust capability than the Jedburgh teams had. They were similar in organization to the current American Special Forces A Team.
10. Jedburgh teams were trained to parachute into France in the summer of 1944 to support the Normandy landings. Jedburghs joined the French Resistance organizations fighting against the Germans. Each team consisted of two officers and an enlisted radio operator.
11. From the Allied perspective, the concept of SR was developed by the Long Range Desert Group (L.R.D.G.) in North Africa. Concerned about the vast unprotected desert flank west and south of Cairo, Major Bagnold proposed the establishment of a small organization equipped with desert-worthy vehicles to travel deep behind enemy lines for extended periods and observe traffic along

the coastal road in northern Libya and Egypt and, if the opportunity presented itself, to attack remote desert outposts and airfields. The proposal was eventually accepted, and the L.R.D.G. was born. Arguably, the concept of modern patrolling in order to carry out DA or SR derived from the British experience during the Malaya campaign. The experience had a significant impact on how the British trained the reactivated SAS, and many armies used the SAS model to develop their capabilities. Many SOF capabilities use patrolling as a basis for SOF operations.

12. Adams, pp. 17-18.

13. The belief, that large-scale DA units are not the sole domain of SOF forces is echoed by Mark Lloyd, author of *Special Forces: The Changing Face of Warfare*. Lloyd categorizes elite forces by saying: "During the second half of the twentieth century elite units have become more specialist-and secretive-to meet the demands of the increasingly sophisticated modern battlefield. They have also divided: into so-called special forces units capable of operating in any theatre in the world: special purpose forces designed and trained for a single type of warfare; and units of special designation (a peculiarly wartime phenomenon) trained and equipped for a single operation. Many of the world's most famous elite forces are in fact special purpose, selected and trained for a specific type of warfare. These are the paratroopers, rangers, marines and commandos of all the major armed forces and the conscripted elements of the former-Soviet Spetsnaz. They are shock troops in the finest traditions of the historical elite. Unlike true Special Forces however, they are not trained to live off the land for long periods, and would expect to be relieved by conventional forces relatively quickly." Mark Lloyd, *Special Forces: The Changing Face of Warfare* (New York: Arms and Armour Press, 1996), p. 11.

14. Michael J. King, *Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in Second World War* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1985). Introduction.

15. Wikipedia Encyclopaedia online. British commandos. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Commandos#Formation> accessed 15 February 2004.

16. Joint Pub 3-05, p. II-11.

17. Peter Young, *The First Commando Raids: History of the Second World War Series* (BCE Publishing Ltd, First Edition 1966), pp. 1-4.

18. According to Charles Messenger, author of *The Commandos 1940-1946*, "While in very early days, emphasis was on the Commando operating as an individual, it was quickly realized that unless the necessary self- and corporate discipline was instilled, he would be of little value. The same went for basic military skills, and it was competence in these, which gave the Commando his inherent flexibility. Thus, apart from his specialist roles, he could fight just as well as an ordinary infantryman, as Crete, Tunisia, Normandy and Hill 170 showed. What marked him as different from the ordinary soldier was that he had to be physically fitter; capable of operating both as part of a large body and on his own and have a greater versatility of skills." Messenger uses the definition of the post-war Royal Marine pamphlet on Commando training to define the qualities of a Commando, which he indicates states that "Commandos are highly skilled infantryman who must be expert in his own branch of infantry work. In addition he must: (a) be able to move fast across any country and be independent of roads; (b) be very happy to fight at night; (c) be ready to work in small parties or on his own; (d) be able to land on coasts impracticable to normal infantry and follow up climbing leaders in cliff assaults." Messenger goes on to say that The pamphlet recognized, however, that more important than anything else was the incalculable of the right psychological attitude. This is called 'the Commando spirit' which was made up of: (a) determination; (b) enthusiasm and cheerfulness, especially under bad conditions; (c) comradeship; (d) individual initiative and self-reliance. Charles Messenger, *The Commandos 1940-1946* (London: William Kimber, 1985), pp. 410-411.

18. William O. Darby with William H. Baumer, *Darby's Rangers: We Lead the Way* (United States: Random House, Inc. 1980), pp. 28-29.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

20. *Ibid.*

21. King, *Rangers*. "Each platoon was authorized one officer and twenty-five enlisted men and was composed of a platoon headquarters and two sections. The platoon headquarters was authorized a platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, one messenger armed with a submachine gun, and one sniper/grenadier armed with a Springfield 1903 rifle. Each section was authorized a section leader, an assistant section leader, two scouts, one BAR-man, one assistant BAR-man, and five riflemen. All men in a section were armed with M-1 rifles except one of the scouts, who carried a submachine gun, and the BAR-man. Each section had, in addition, one .30-caliber M1919A4 machine gun that was held in a pool at battalion headquarters."

22. *Ibid.* The Rangers' transformation from a light force designed to conduct "special operations" into a much heavier unit capable of undertaking more conventional combat operations started prior to their first operation.

23. Darby and Baumer, p. 66.

24. King, *Rangers*.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Brigadier Mike Calvert, the former commander of the wartime SAS was more direct. In his report on the SAS value of the SAS after the war, he stated that, "Volunteer units such as SAS attract officers and men who have initiative, resourcefulness, independence of spirit, and confidence in themselves. In a regular unit there are far less opportunities of making use of these assets and, in fact, in many formations they are a liability, as this individualistic attitude upsets the smooth working of a team. This is especially true in European warfare where the individual must subordinate his natural initiative so that he fits into a part of the machine." Anthony Kemp, *The SAS at War, 1941-1945* (London: John Murray, 1991), Appendix D, p. 294.

27. David Hogan Jr., *U.S. Army Special Operations in Second World War* (Washington, D.C: CMH Publication 70-42, Department of the Army, 1992), p. 23.

28. Kenn Finlayson and C.H. Briscoe, "Case Studies in the Selection and Assessment: The First Special Service Force, Merrill's Marauders and the OSS OGS," *Special Warfare Magazine* (Fall 2000), p. 22.

29. Interestingly, the 1st Special Service Force (FSSF) suffered the same lift capability problem that was to plague the Commandos.

The main objective of the FSSF training program during the winter of 1942-3 was to prepare for an operational deployment into Norway to sabotage Norwegian power installations. However, an alternative plan for the mission had to be developed because the planners of the mission encountered difficulty finding the number of aircraft needed to move the unit and its equipment. As a result, the unit was chosen to lead the assault on Kiska Island during the Aleutians campaign and moved to Fort Bradford to carry out amphibious training (information was taken from the Department of National Defence. Report NO 5, 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion, Historical Section, p. 13.)

30. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report NO 5, 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion* (National Defence Historical Section), pp. 10-12.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

33. The 6th Ranger Battalion was created from the 98th Field Artillery Battalion in September 1944. The men went through a very strenuous training program that was similar to what Darby's Rangers had undergone in Scotland. The unit entered combat in the Philippines, where it "successfully landed on the islands of Dinagat, Guian, and Homonhan on 17 October 1944, three days before the main American invasion, and destroyed radio facilities and other Japanese positions guarding the entrance to Leyte Gulf." During these operations the unit received information that POWs were being held in the area of Cabanatuan.

34. Faced with a need for reliable information in the dense jungles of the theatre, the Sixth Army activated the Alamo Scouts in November 1943. The purpose of this unit was to obtain strategic intelligence and to perform other covert operations.

35. United States, Department of the Army, *FM 78-5 Ranger Operations*, 9 June 1987, Chapter 4, available at: <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/70-42/70-424.html>.

36. King. The plan also detailed that the Alamo Scouts would provide surveillance on the objective. Teams "would head out prior to the operation, link up with the guerrillas where they would be joined by native guides, and then go to a position north of the objective. They would contact local guerrillas in the area and keep the compound under surveillance to determine the number of Japanese troops, who the guards were, and what the guards' routines were." The information would then be forwarded to the Rangers once they arrived in the area.

37. *Ibid.* The "Army weekly G2 report described it as 'an almost perfect example of prior reconnaissance and planning...' It was further held up as demonstrating 'what patrols can accomplish in enemy territory by following the basic principles of scouting and patrolling, sneaking and peeping, [the] use of concealment, reconnaissance of routes, from photographs and maps prior to the actual operation ... and the coordination of all arms in the accomplishment of a mission.'"

38. *History of the Rangers*, available at: <<http://www.grunts.net/army/rangers.html>>

39. Adrain Weale, *Secret Warfare: Special Operations Forces from the Great Game to the SAS* (London: Hodder Headline PLC, 1998), p. 76.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 76. David Stirling, founder of the SAS, believed that Commando raids such as those that had conducted on German positions along the coast of Cyrenaica, in North Africa, were of little value. He felt that such operations were also extremely inefficient and argued that forces being launched from naval vessels required almost a third of the force to first established and then defend the beachhead. He also argued that even if initial surprise could be achieved the action would result in a fighting withdrawal and heavy casualties. Stirling concluded that at best these were expensive ventures, which placed heavy demands on both manpower and resources delivered only a temporary inconvenience to the enemy. More importantly, these large-scale direct action operations had become well known to the Germans who had constructed defensive positions to mitigate the threat. Stirling reasoned that if a small force could overcome the difficulties of moving over the vast desert areas to the south it would be possible to infiltrate a force behind enemy lines and quickly move them out again. Alan Hoe and Eric Morris, *RE-Enter the SAS: The Special Air Service and the Malayan Emergency* (London, Leo Cooper, 1994), pp. 2-3.

41. It is important to note that these limitations are structural in nature and will remain with these types of units into the future. The ability to quickly deploy very light SP units is only advantageous if the mission is important, deployment is of short duration, and tactical mobility is not an issue. Longer deployments and/or the need for greater tactical mobility will negate any advantages this capability offers and is one reason these units disappeared after of the Second World War.

42. *FM 78-5 Ranger Operations*, Appendix F, Ranger History.

43. *Ibid.*

44. History of the Rangers.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*

47. Tom Clancy and Carl Stiner, *Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces* (New York: Penguin Putnam 2002), pp. 322-324 (see pp. 352-361 also).

48. *Ibid.*

49. *FM 78-5 Ranger Operations*, Chapter 5. It should be noted that these are task provided by the American Army and not what is necessarily expected from SOCOM.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.* Rangers have some inherent limitations as well. According to American doctrine, these include a "limited capability against armoured or motorized units in open terrain, no organic transportation, a limited sustained combat capability due to the shortage of organic combat support and combat service support elements, limited organic air defence weapons, limited organic indirect fire support, no casualty evacuation capability, and significant reconstitution and retraining is needed to replace combat losses."

52. This figure does not include the Gulf War 1990-1991 or Haiti 1994.

53. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, Ottawa, June 1999,

p. 6.

54. Soldiers must complete the following physical fitness standards if they wish to become a Ranger: (1) score 80 points for each Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) event and do six chin-ups; (2) pass the ranger swimming test; (3) complete an 8-kilometre run in 40 minutes; (4) complete a 12-kilometre road march in three hours (with rucksack, helmet, and weapon); (5) meet the Army height and weight standards. If a soldier is selected, he then attends a three-week Ranger indoctrination program. This is also physically demanding and is designed to indoctrinate and teach basic skills and techniques used by the Ranger units. Training includes: daily physical training, Ranger history test, map reading, APFT, airborne operation, ranger standards, day and night land navigation, 5-mile run combative knots, combat water survival test, 6-, 8- and 10-mile road marches, driver training (DDC Card), fast rope training and combat lifesaver certification. The program identifies and eliminates applicants who do not show dedication, motivation, physical fitness and emotional stability. A similar program is given to officers and NCOs who want to join the unit and has a leadership focus.

55. The Ranger leadership course, commonly referred to as The Ranger Course, must be completed if the soldier wants to become a leader in the Ranger regiment. This course is 56 days long and very similar in concept to the original Commando course with heavy emphasis on patrolling. The training is a very physically demanding and teaches platoon and section commander procedures, operation orders and small unit patrol actions.

56. This organization is very similar to the Ranger battalions. Each unit has a parachute company.

57. According to Dr Roger Thornhill in an article published in the March/April 2003 edition of *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, "In 1999/2000 the RAND Corporation produced a study on the effectiveness of the US Army's rapid airmobile divisions (using the 82nd and the 101st divisions as case studies). It found that these land force formations were too light and in essence could only be employed as a speed hump to a determined military advance, such as that of Iraq invading Kuwait in 1990/91. The report suggested a number of ways to bolster the airborne divisions using technology..."

58. The problem is not confined to the LIBs. This is indeed a much wider problem. Most missions currently being undertaken by the Army require significant augmentation to fill both soldiers and equipment.

59. Bernd Horn, *Bastard Sons, An Examination of Canada's Airborne Experience 1942-1995* (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), pp. 265-266.

60. Ibid.

61. Although it should be noted that the Ranger course is a leadership course, and not all Rangers are required to attend it, anyone wishing to remain with the Ranger battalions for any period of time must pass the course.

62. This figure is based on a Ranger unit of about 600 soldiers. If the unit is going to be larger, the problem increases.

63. Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston: Army Publishing Office, 2004), pp. 172-176.

64. Ibid.

65. According to unclassified sources, the success rate for SAS/American SF after selection and training is about 24%. America's Delta Force has about 10-12% success rate, which we can assume is about the same for JTF 2. This means the Army has a potential to pick the difference between the 12 and 24% depending how selection is organized to create a green capability. This could provide a force of about 120 to 150 operators and would be far less than 600-700 needed for a Ranger capability.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Captain K.A. Barry

INTRODUCTION

Information operations (Info Ops) are not new and have been executed throughout the history of warfare, although their synchronization and coordination with operations on the physical plane are relatively recent.¹ Information operations are the coordinated actions on the moral plane of elements such as intelligence, psychological operations (Psy Ops), operational security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and public affairs. In early 2002, the First Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (1PPCLI BG) in Edmonton had received its warning order for a deployment to the Former Yugoslavia. Preparations and planning, as well as the theatre and mission-specific training, began in earnest. The 1PPCLI BG operation order stated that Info Ops must form an essential part of planning and be a component of all operations.² Similarly, Land Force Doctrine states that Info Ops is an essential combat function that must be integrated with the remainder of the combat functions

Info Ops, must be used in accordance with the principles of war

to maximize combat power.³ Info Ops are not novel; they are something that the Canadian Forces (CF) has always undertaken. What is innovative is the emphasis on the integration of these elements to maximize combat power. Canada's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a long-standing one: the CF has been

committed to operations in the Former Yugoslavia, in one form or another, for more than ten years. Bosnia has become a mature theatre that presents its own challenges to commanders at all levels. Info Ops, like any asset available to a commander, must be used in accordance with the principles of war. They must be employed aggressively during peace support operations in accordance with the manoeuvrist approach; the adoption of a reactionary posture is a recipe for failure. A successful commander will ensure that for every action taken by his force on the physical plane, there is an equal supporting action on the moral plane. This purpose of this paper is to examine how Info Ops can best be used to support the commander's intent in peace support operations, as demonstrated by the 1PPCLI Battle Group experience on Operation PALLADIUM Rotation (ROTO) II.

INFO OPS PREPARATIONS

MISSION ANALYSIS

The detail put into the Operational Planning Process prior to the start of the deployment sets the conditions for the effective use of Info Ops and ensured the successful attainment of the end-state. As with any operation, commanders at all levels must begin with their mission analysis, and Info Ops are no different. Info Ops are one of the six combat functions of which the principal objective is to give the advantage to the commander's decision action cycle.⁴ The challenges for commanders specific to Info Ops are the provision of identifying, conceiving and

communicating the unit's purpose.⁵ In peace support operations in Bosnia, there was an absence of a credible military threat. The peace imposed by the Dayton Accord has successfully held, the reduction in strength of the Entity Armed Forces had occurred, and their weapons and ammunition were stored in cantonment sites. The threat was defined as any threat to the maintenance of the safe and secure environment of which there were many. Organized crime, the black and grey market economy, human smuggling, endemic unemployment coupled with an unwieldy and inefficient system of government were but a few of the challenges to be faced. Using Info Ops to win the support of the local populace was vital and the CO knew he wanted to achieve information dominance to ensure this. The mission was "to secure the Battle Group Area of Operations [AO] as a safe environment in order to assist in setting the conditions for a self-sustaining peace in BiH."⁶ To accomplish this mission, the CO's intent was articulated as offensive operations on the physical and moral planes. An aggressive intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) plan, coupled with pre-emptive strikes against threats to the "Safe and Secure Environment," would serve to accomplish this on the physical plane for the short and mid-term. The intention of the use of Offensive Info Ops was to influence the behavior of the local populace over the medium to long-term. The importance of seeking further guidance from the CO cannot be overestimated. For example, prior to the departure of the battle group from Edmonton, the CO articulated his desire to use his civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) platoon and their extensive training and expertise, not just as liaison officers (LOs), but also for their project management skills. His intent to use these projects as a means to influence the local populace and change their behavior was clearly emphasized. From his intent, the mission analysis proceeded and the plan was developed. This became the Info Ops Annex to the Op Order and was written to be the all-encompassing, definitive document for the IPPCLI Battle Group. The course of action (COA) adopted incorporated three Info Ops plans. Two were easily defined as the short-term plan, which was support to focused ops, and the medium-term plan, which was defined by its duration, namely the length of the ROTO. The long-term plan was to support civil reconciliation between ethnicities. The battle group would encourage stability and reforms that would lead to national unity by developing faith in common institutions. The key to the long-term plan was the establishment of a mechanism to further the intent. The detail put into the planning process ensured the mechanism to further the long-term plan was successfully established.

ORGANIZATION AND TASKS

The organization and subsequent tasks of the Info Ops section was well constructed and complementary in order to meet the demands of peace support operations.⁷ The Scheme of Manoeuvre directed that Info Ops were to be closely planned and coordinated to integrate intelligence, CIMIC, public affairs and Psy Ops seamlessly. The S3, within his overall staff responsibility of integrating Info Ops into operations, designated one officer to be responsible for all Info Ops actions.⁸ The S3 Info Ops had a number of functions including the responsibility for coordinating the overall Info Ops effort, establishing Info Ops priorities and coordinating the planning and execution of Info Ops.⁹ To facilitate integration, the S3 Info Ops and S2 were collocated and worked closely together in Ops. The S3 Info Ops directed the public affairs officer and the S3 Psy Ops. This relationship allowed the maximum effect of the public affairs officer's technical skills to support battle group operations directly, and acted as a force multiplier for those operations. By employing the public affairs officer within the Info Ops coordination concept, the public affairs function was able to gain maximum momentum through a

well-synchronized plan in all battle group operations. The battle group public affairs officer was embedded in the Info Ops section and worked closely with the S3 Psy Ops. The credibility of the battle group was dependent on the consistency of its messages. Since Psy Ops employed only cohesive, “white” Psy Ops based on truth, and public affairs dealt only in facts, there were no conflicts and each cell complemented the other. This organization was an effective grouping and the tasks relevant with the CO's intent. Their actions were closely coordinated and since all three were part of the Ops cell, their situational awareness was heightened.

TRAINING

Training for the staff consisted of the United Kingdom (UK) Military Psychological Operations Course for the S3 Psy Ops in Chicksands, UK, while the public affairs officer was already trained and skilled in public affairs. The S3 Info Ops was constrained by having no staff training, but received a two-day course in Info Ops at Camp Butmir in Sarajevo upon arrival in theatre. The Info Ops courses offered by the US in Norfolk Virginia and at the NATO school in Oberammergau, GE, would be of great benefit for future deployments. Sub-units had a Psy Ops radio show course taught at Multi-National Division (South West) (MND[SW]) HQ, but this was only made available to a handful of soldiers. The division later taught a day-long course to twenty five troops that was very well received. The course itself was geared more to the theoretical aspects of Psy Ops rather than practical applications. Since one of the most effective

The Info Ops plan had to be flexible and open to refinement to remain relevant

means of delivery of “talking points” to the local populace is the soldier on the ground, effort expended on training these soldiers was viewed as a positive investment. A soldier who is aware of the themes and talking points that his chain of command has made a priority for the various target groups will pass them on to the people with whom he comes in contact during the conduct of patrols. Any act of good will on the part of our soldiers to the locals becomes an opportunity for the

passing of these messages and a means of effecting societal change in the long term. It was considered important enough to expand the training and add further classes to the curriculum. Added to the course was further emphasis on means of delivery of themes and messages of the standing Info Ops campaigns in manners such as the battle group radio shows, Psy Ops in schools and the movie nights campaigns. Future peace support operations would find it worthwhile to train all soldiers in some aspect of projecting battle group themes and messages. The 2 PPCLI Battle Group during ROTO 12 expanded and improved the course and taught several serials to both NCOs and troops of the battle group. While the efforts of the course staff, instructors and candidates were certainly worthwhile, it would be far more efficient for a CF training plan to be developed for each operation. The course training plan could then be task-tailored to match each battle group commander's intent as well as to take into account refinements required for maturing theatres.

INFO OPS-CONCEPT OF OPS

REFINEMENT AND REFOCUSING

The Info Ops plan had to be flexible and open to refinement to remain relevant. As the battle group's situational awareness increased, so too did the Info Ops plan focus its efforts both in application and direction. At the mid-point of the ROTO, the CO developed the “King

Pyramid” (Figure 1) to more clearly show his focused intent. The pyramid detailed SFOR areas of influence and interest as foundations for the development of desired effects. The peak of the pyramid was the goal of a self-sustaining peace. From the pyramid evolved the lines of attack (Figure 2). Four lines of attack were chosen for the battle group's focus, which came from the levels of the pyramid that were within the SFOR area of influence and interest. Each of the lines had several goals, providing the refined guidance to the sub-units. The battle group lines of attack for the Canadian AO equated to the SFOR Multi-Year Road Map for all of BiH. The Multi-Year Road Map was designed with the international community (IC) as a means of addressing which IC organization would take the lead in development for each category. The Multi-Year Road Map was a timeline between the implementation of the Dayton Accord and the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), and the future when Bosnia would be fully integrated member of the community of nations. Between the two were pillars, “normalcy indicators,”




Figure 1: The “King Pyramid”.




Figure 2: Lines of Attack

used to measure progress for each of the categories. The synchronization between the battle group lines of attack and the SFOR Multi-Year Road Map ensured the higher commander's intent was met.

In accordance with the refinement and refocusing of the Info Ops plan, public affairs was used in a far more aggressive and, therefore, more effective fashion. The public affairs officer embarked on an ambitious plan to conduct seminars and conferences with the local media. The plan was to assist the local media in developing western standards of reporting. The goals were reduction of ethnic bias, speculation and disinformation that impeded the local populace's faith in public institutions. Psychological operations focused on the development of civil reconciliation and inter-ethnic cooperation. In addition to the regular radio shows from both the brigade station, radio “Oksigen,” and the five battle group stations, Psy Ops in Schools was implemented in two additional campaigns: Soldiers teaching English in schools, and a pen pal program with Canadian schoolchildren.

This refinement and refocusing ensured economy of effort in the direction of Info Ops in that quiet, stable opstinas were identified for reduced battle group presence. The

Glamoc Opstina in Canton 10 was identified as an area that required greater focus for concerns, including inter-ethnic tolerance, economic development and assistance in stabilizing the community. Economic development was a priority line of attack especially after Lord Paddy Ashdown's warning, in his capacity of the High Representative (OHR).¹⁰ Economic stability would help to achieve national stability. SFOR had developed a number of Info Ops standing

operations and campaigns to further the various aspects of civil reconciliation and ethnic tolerance. The S3 Info Ops produced battle group Info Ops Targeting and Tasking Matrices to support the SFOR standing operations and campaigns effectively shown in Figure 3—“Info Ops

3000-2(S3 Info Ops)

DATED 26 JAN 03

INFORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING AND TASKING MATRIX TO SUPPORT DPRE RETURNS AND INTER-ETHNIC TOLERANCE

DECIDE		DETECT & DELIVER			ASSESS	
TGT SET	TARGETS	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	EFFECTS	END STATE/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Community Leaders IC	Federation Civil Servants, Mayors, Elected Officials, NGOs	Comm OP, Sub-Unit OC's/PI Comds, CIMC LO's	BILATS, Media Events	During Scheduled/ Unscheduled Meetings,	ENCOURAGE INFLUENCE INFORM	PURPOSE: To maintain the momentum of DPRE returns and to promote attitudinal change in those areas where there is obstructionism and intolerance. To persuade community leaders to support DPRE returns and to promote inter-ethnic tolerance. ASSESSMENT: A reduction in the amount of incidents related to ethnic violence, as well as a reduction in the reports of obstructionism by government institutions to the re-settlement process. Also, there will be a greater willingness on the part of LP and municipalities to deal with transgressions of this sort.
		Soldiers	BILATS, Opportunities during HFO's and OP HARVESTs	During Media Events		
		PAffO	RADIO MEDIA TV	Press Releases, PSA, Media Events		

DECIDE		DETECT & DELIVER			ASSESS	
TGT SET	TARGETS	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	EFFECTS	END STATE/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Local Populace	Local Populace	Psy Ops	RADIO, MEDIA, POSTERS, HANDBILLS, PSYOPS IN SCHOOLS	Broadcast on Radio programs, Posters and Handbills, possible Mostovi article highlighting communities that are welcoming	INFLUENCE INFORM ENCOURAGE	PURPOSE: To maintain the momentum of DPRE returns and to promote attitudinal change in those areas where there is obstructionism and intolerance. To persuade the locals that supporting DPRE returns is mandatory and of benefit to them. Also, to promote inter-ethnic tolerance. ASSESSMENT: A reduction in the amount of incidents related to ethnic violence and in the reports of obstructionism by locals to the re-settlement process.
		PAffO	TV MEDIA RADIO	PSA, possible news articles		
Canadian Public	Canadian Public, CIDA	PAffO	News Articles	Articles to follow particularly successful campaign	INFORM	PURPOSE: To inform the Canadian public of the work undertaken by the IFFCLIBS in general in facilitating the DPRE process, as well as in reducing the levels of inter-ethnic violence. ASSESSMENT: Canadian public is informed of particularly successful campaigns through media articles and activities.

Execution Instructions: The Engagement Matrix is a tasking document. The actions listed on the matrix are to be executed by the date listed in the matrix. The tasked person/organisation meets with the audience to achieve the listed effect. After the action is complete, the person/organisation tasked in the ASSET column reports the results of the engagement to S3 Info Ops.

- **DECIDE:** The person or population group to be engaged.
- **DETECT & DELIVER:**
 - Asset - The person or organisation tasked to engage the designated audience.
 - How - The means to be used to engage the audience.
 - When - The time by which the engagement must be conducted.
 - Effect - The effect of the engagement on the audience.
- **ASSESS:**
 - Purpose - The reason for the engagement.
 - Assessment - The criteria by which the effectiveness of the engagement is assessed.

Effects:

- **INFORM** - Provide information (to counter misinformation).
- **INFLUENCE** - Change perceptions and attitudes.
- **WARN** - Provide notice of intent (to prevent a specific action).
- **CO-OPT** - Gain co-operation.
- **DISRUPT** - To temporarily interrupt the flow of information.
- **ISOLATE** - Minimise power or influence.
- **ENCOURAGE** - Inspire to act in a particular manner.

MOE Instructions: Persons or organisations tasked to conduct an information operation action report the results to S3 Info Ops. Required information includes: **Did the action occur, what was the effect, what was the audience's reaction, and what was the end result.**

<p>Messages: The following messages are talking points to be delivered to the designated audience.</p> <p>(NATO/SFOR UNCLASS)</p> <p>Theme: To maintain the momentum of DPRE returns and to promote attitudinal change in those areas where there is obstructionism and intolerance. To persuade community leaders to support DPRE returns and to promote inter-ethnic tolerance. To be highlighted are locals and law enforcement agencies who have been actively helping in this process.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. While our first and principal imperative is to maintain a safe and secure environment for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 1 PPCLI Battle Group is also committed to supporting the international community in DPRE returns. 2. The OHR and the UNHCR have the lead for supervising returns. Their plan is phased and orderly. 3. SFOR assists in monitoring the return of DPRES through a census programme and, most importantly, by providing a safe and secure environment. 4. As Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to move forward after the war and DPRES return home, tolerance and community are extremely important to help in the rebuilding process. 5. The 1 PPCLI Battle Group has witnessed tremendous acts of community since arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina last September. We have witnessed communities coming together to rebuild schools, repair sewage systems, and clean-up municipal centres. These projects cannot be achieved alone. <p>Theme: To persuade the locals that supporting DPRE returns is mandatory and of benefit to them. Also, to promote inter-ethnic tolerance. It sends a positive message about the stability of the community and may encourage multi-ethnic cooperation and tolerance. To be highlighted are locals who have been actively helping in this process.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SFOR applies their mission of maintaining a safe and secure environment across all Bosnia and Herzegovina, but gives special attention to those areas that experience ethnic tension that sometimes occurs when citizens seek to return to their pre-war homes and property. 2. We realize that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina need to remain confident about their future security if they continue to build new public institutions, invest for economic progress, and pursue a democratic way of life. 3. SFOR has supported initiatives and projects that encourage ethnic tolerance including the annual film festival in Sarajevo. 4. The OHR and the UNHCR have the lead for supervising returns. Their plan is phased and orderly. 5. SFOR assists in monitoring the return of DPRES through a census programme and, most importantly, by providing a safe and secure environment.
<p>Messages: The following messages are talking points to be delivered to the designated audience.</p> <p>(NATO/SFOR UNCLASS)</p> <p>Theme: To inform the Canadian Public of the work undertaken by the 1PPCLI BG in Bosnia in supporting DPRE returns and in discouraging the levels of inter-ethnic violence.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The 1 PPCLI Battle Group's mission is to ensure a safe and secure environment. This is achieved through a number of operations including monitoring the return of DPRES. 2. The 1 PPCLI BG assists the international community in the return of DPRES through a census programme to draw comparison between the population before and after the war. 3. The 1 PPCLI Battle Group's mission of ensuring a safe and secure environment encourages the return of DPRES, since they feel less threatened to return home.

Figure 3: Info Ops Targeting and Tasking Matrix to Support DPRE Returns and Inter-Ethnic Tolerance.

Targeting and Tasking Matrix to Support DPRE Returns and Inter-Ethnic Tolerance". The matrices made use of an artillery term known as D3A meaning to decide, detect, deliver and assess.¹¹ The Target Set was a general grouping while the targets were narrowed from within that grouping. Within the Detect and Deliver, the assets to be used were articulated. These assets ranged from the battle group commanding officer or sub-unit OCs to the soldiers themselves. How the assets were to be used ranged from bilateral discussions (BiLats) to opportunities during normal framework operations (NFOs). When the messages were to be delivered was specified as during scheduled or unscheduled meetings, essentially as the opportunity arose. The effects desired of the targets was also noted, the assessment noted the desired endstate, purpose and measures of effectiveness of the campaign. The themes and talking points for the soldiers to make during NFOs were highlighted in this matrix.

In this way operations on the physical plane were supported and enhanced by Info Ops in the moral domain. The soldiers were pushing battle group messages at the same time as they were pulling information. The refinement and refocusing of the plan ensured the economy of effort and the flexibility of the battle group operations in the Canadian AO.

COORDINATION

Coordination and meetings were vital to the effective execution of Info Ops. Info Ops was an essential part of planning and was a component of all operations. The CO's morning brief was held daily. During the morning brief, all group principals-including the S3 Info Ops, S3 Psy Ops and public affairs officer-reported on their actions and activities over the past 24 hours.

Immediately following the CO's morning brief, the S3 Ops chaired an informal coordination conference at the situational map board for all group principals. This provided the opportunity to address the details of the day's operations. CO's weekly O groups also afforded an opportunity to receive more specific direction and to pass on directly to the sub-unit OCs upcoming campaigns and actions. The weekly Ops and Training conferences had, on average, the first half-hour dedicated to Info Ops. All sub-unit Ops Os who attended were made the single point of contact for all Info Ops points and initiatives including public affairs and Psy Ops. Focused Ops and CIMIC projects had two types of conferences, the Info Ops Working Group (IOWG), and Info Ops Targeting Group (IOTG). During all conferences and meetings, it was an absolute requirement to have the intelligence officer present as the situational awareness of the S2 section proved invaluable. He was also the interface with the electronic warfare troop under command of the division (later renamed Multi-National Brigade Northwest). The S2 PIRs were also disseminated to the sub-units. The PIRs became information requirements and questions for the soldiers as they conducted normal framework operations in the form of patrols. The S3 Info Ops, with input from the S3 Psy Ops and public affairs officer, produced the Info Ops Targeting and Tasking Matrices for the SFOR standing operations and campaigns. These matrices encompassed the themes and talking points for the soldiers to make to the local populace during NFOs. Close planning and coordination served to integrate operations effectively on the physical plane with Info Ops in the moral domain.

OP KERBEROS

With any media event, timeliness with the release of information is imperative

One of the largest operations during Op PALLADIUM, Rotation (ROTO) 11 was reactionary in its approach to Info Ops and as a result, interfered with its effective application by the battle group. For Info Ops, the principle of war of "offensive action," as well as the mindset required for the successful use of the fundamentals of manoeuvre warfare was lost. This became evident from the start as the brigade did not want to inform the

local populace of the upcoming activities and also wished to keep the issuance of information to the local media held at the highest levels. Op KERBEROS was the Multi-National Brigade (North West) (MNB(NW)) name for Exercise JOINT RESOLVE XXVIII and was the major test of the Info Ops mechanism for the brigade. From the outset the brigade adopted a reactionary posture for Info Ops, essentially relinquishing the initiative. The G9 PInfo (Public Information Officer [Public Affairs]) was to be the sole point of contact for media queries at brigade and the IPPCLI Battle Group Public Affairs Officer was to be the sole battle group spokesman. This was significant as it meant that technically, not even the commanding officer, much less a platoon commander suddenly finding himself in front of a news camera, was authorized to speak to local media. The themes and talking points provided by the brigade were limited to referring to SFOR movement of troops and equipment and generic methods of operations as a reassurance of a commitment to a safe and secure environment. There was no reference to focused operations such as a cordon and search. Furthermore, the talking points provided little direction to the troops on the ground should they be involved in a confrontation. The reactionary line taken by brigade did not serve well as sensationalist (and false) allegations by local media in the Republic Serpska that the multi-national support unit, a unit of the Italian Carabinieri, had beaten people¹² got into print before SFOR could get its version of events out. This is significant as quite often the story that gets out first is the one that is remembered, and in Bosnia, the one that can raise ethnic tension. With any media event, timeliness with the




Figure 4: CO's Concept of Operations.

release of information is imperative. The brigade's reactive approach stymied the battle group's public affairs plan, which stipulated openness and transparency with the local populace within the area of operations. The brigade's desire for close control ill-suited the battle group and significantly reduced the effect of its Info Ops. In essence, it prevented the battle group from acting as it did ordinarily, being open and transparent within the confines of operational security. Specifically, in things as simple as comprehensive media lines for soldiers and commanders, and pre-emptive news releases in support of focused operations as required. This was not

in keeping with the aggressive and proactive approach to Info Ops used by the battle group up to that point. It is vital to retain the initiative as the principal objective of Info Ops is to gain information dominance and then retain the information advantage.¹³ The CO's concept of operations, shown in Figure 4, was in keeping with the manoeuvrist approach to strike on both the physical and moral planes to achieve effects-based targeting.

The battle group eventually received permission to send out press releases after focused operations. This allowed the expansion of soldier lines to include the additional talking points on law and order and the safe and secure environment, that had been successfully used by the battle group to that point. Of the Principles of War, offensive action for Info Ops was not utilized. The initiative was not only not maintained, it was never seized. One might argue that in an undisciplined, not-yet westernized media in Bosnia, the desire to be proactive could be counterproductive. The seizing of the initiative by a commander requires audacity and inevitably, the requirement to take risks. Only through offensive action¹⁴ on the physical plane and on the moral domain with info ops, can the enemy be defeated, in this case the threat to the maintenance of the safe and secure environment. By adopting a reactive posture, the brigade suffered a series of negative articles of deliberate or active disinformation. The management of perceptions is an important, continuous process for which a pre-emptive press release or article may have addressed.

SANSKI MOST- A CASE STUDY

A case study in the successful, integrated application of Info Ops by the IPPCLI Battle Group will be examined in detail at this point. The CIMIC platoon had focused on Sanski Most as a good location to fulfill the CO's intent for his project plan to influence and encourage the local populace. The Krajiska Radost Kindergarten Water Project was a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded project to bring water to a local school. It was chosen for not only the communities mix of ethnicities, but also because the local populace had been active in raising money to support its reconstruction. The S3 Info Ops received the Initial Project Notification, produced by CIMIC. A draft Info Ops Targeting and Tasking Matrix was developed

DATED 16 JAN 03

INFORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING AND TASKING MATRIX TO SUPPORT OP SNARE

DECIDE Note: Tgt Set and Targets are classified NATO/SFOR CONFIDENTIAL		DETECT & DELIVER Note: Asset, How, When and Effects are classified NATO/SFOR CONFIDENTIAL				ASSESS Note: Purpose is Unclassified, Assessment is classified NATO/SFOR CONFIDENTIAL
TGT SET	TARGETS	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	EFFECTS	END STATE/MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
Local Populace	Local Populace	Comd Element	Speaking at ceremony, with Local Populace and Media	Ceremony	INFLUENCE INFORM ENCOURAGE	<p>PURPOSE: To provide information that IPPCLI BG, MNB(NW) and SFOR will not tolerate acts like the car explosion in Sanski Most. Weapons and explosives are a direct threat to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment. IPPCLI BG, MNB(NW) and SFOR supports law enforcement and the primacy of the rule of law. Residents of Sanski Most are encouraged to turn in illegal weapons and to report any illegal activity to their local police or the nearest SFOR camp.</p> <p>ASSESSMENT: Local populace is informed and influenced of the dangers, illegality and reasons for OP SNARE and encouraged to report illegal activity.</p>
		Soldiers	Speaking with Local Populace	VCP's		
		Psy Ops	Handbills Radio	17,18 Jan		
		PAffO	Reactive only. Press release after Op	When Required. Press Release after Op	INFLUENCE INFORM ENCOURAGE	

(Execution Instructions, Effects and MOE Instructions are classified NATO/SFOR CONFIDENTIAL)

Execution Instructions: The Engagement Matrix is a tasking document. The actions listed on the matrix are to be executed by the date listed in the matrix. The tasked person/organization meets with the audience to achieve the listed effect. After the action is complete, the person/organization tasked in the ASSESS column reports the results of the engagement to S3 Info Ops.

- **DECIDE:** The person or population group to be engaged.
- **DETECT & DELIVER:**
 - Asset - The person or organization tasked to engage the designated audience.
 - How - The means to be used to engage the audience.
 - When - The time by which the engagement must be conducted.
 - Effect - The effect of the engagement on the audience.
- **ASSESS:**
 - Purpose - The reason for the engagement.
 - Assessment - The criteria by which the effectiveness of the engagement is assessed.

Effects:

- **INFORM** - Provide information (to counter misinformation).
- **INFLUENCE** - Change perceptions and attitudes.
- **WARN** - Provide notice of intent (to prevent a specific action).
- **CO-OPT** - Gain co-operation.
- **DISRUPT** - To temporarily interrupt the flow of information.
- **ISOLATE** - Minimise power or influence.
- **ENCOURAGE** - Inspire to act in a particular manner.

MOE Instructions: Persons or organizations tasked to conduct an information operation action report the results to S3 Info Ops. Required information includes: Did the action occur, what was the effect, what was the audience's reaction, and what was the end result.

(Theme and Talking Points are NATO/SFOR Unclass) Messages: The following messages are talking points to be delivered to the designated audience. The overall public affairs approach will be reactive. However, as opportunities present themselves either through VCP's, or at the ceremony, soldiers may consider using the following points to highlight SFOR's concern. These talking points are provided as basic information for conversation.

Theme: To provide information that IPPCLI BG, MNB(NW) and SFOR will not tolerate acts like the car explosion in Sanski Most. Weapons and explosives are a direct threat to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment. IPPCLI BG, MNB(NW) and SFOR supports law enforcement and the primacy of the rule of law. Residents of Sanski Most are encouraged to turn in illegal weapons and to report any illegal activity to their local police or the nearest SFOR camp. For local government and police officials:

1. Local government and police forces are responsible for the enforcement of the laws.
2. Police officials need to investigate criminal acts that they witness or are reported to them.
3. Police need to protect the identity of informers.
4. The community is served through protection of all citizens from acts that threaten their lives.
5. For local government and police officials, they must actively ensure the safety and security of all citizens.

For every citizen:

7. Call your local police department if you know of illegal acts or intent in your community.
8. Turn in weapons and ammunition to SFOR.
9. Protection of your community is every individual's responsibility.
10. Inform SFOR if you have any information regarding weapons or ammunition caches.
11. Those who report these incidents will not have their identities made public.
12. VCPs are in place to check all vehicles moving in and out of Sanski Most to assist the LP in maintaining public safety.
13. IPPCLI BG and SFOR will not tolerate illegal acts and any threat to the rule of law.

Figure 5: Info Ops Targeting and Tasking Matrix—Op SNARE

in order to coordinate Info Ops activities and maximize the effect of the project opening in the community.

The Info Ops Working Group was convened to discuss all facets of the project and gain input from the various group principals. The list of attendees of the opening ceremony was checked by the S2 to ensure the commanding officer was not photographed with any known war criminal or suspected local crime lord. This vetting of attendees was decided early on as a prudent measure to prevent the possible loss of credibility of SFOR and the resultant bad press that could negate the hard-won credibility of the IPPCLI Battle Group. The Info Ops targeting group was treated as a final confirmation of the target groups and assets to be used.

During the planning process, an improvised explosive device detonated in a car owned by a bar owner in Sanski Most 14 January 2003, three days before the kindergarten opening. The battle

ZAUSTAVLJENI STE OD STRANE SFOR-A

U cilju pružanja bezbjednog i sigurnog okruženja
vaše vozilo se provjerava radi posjedovanja ilegalnog oružja.

Ukoliko dobrovoljno predate oružje sada,
protiv vas se neće podnijeti krivična prijava.

Vaša suradnja će doprinijeti sigurnijem okruženju u vašoj zajednici.

**Molimo vas da budete strpljivi i dozvolite pripadnicima SFOR-a da
obave svoju dužnost.**

Cijenimo vašu suradnju.

Figure 6: Handbill

events set the wheels in motion for Op SNARE, a focused operation meant to send a message to several target groups at the same time.

Since the maintenance of the safe and secure environment was a joint function of the nascent and emerging local authorities and SFOR, these events suggested that the local police required moral and physical reinforcement. The battle group was best equipped to impress upon the local populace SFOR's commitment to security and public order and the resolve to reinforce the rule of law. The course of action chosen to accomplish this aim was by a focused operation conducting a series of vehicle checkpoints on the periphery of Sanski Most. A draft matrix was quickly created and an Info Ops Working Group was convened. The matrix was discussed and preparations commenced



Figure 7: VCP Poster

YOU HAVE BEEN STOPPED BY SFOR

*In order to provide a safe and secure environment,
your vehicle is being checked for illegal weapons.*

*You will not be punished if you voluntarily turn in your weapons at
this time.*

Your cooperation will ensure the safety of your community.

**Please be patient and allow SFOR soldiers to carry out their
duty.**

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Figure 8: Handbill English Translation

executing the focused op was briefed on the Op SNARE Matrix, the themes and talking points as well as instructions on the use of the products provided. The sub-unit OC was briefed prior to his orders so all soldiers were aware of the intent and what was required of them. The public affairs officer prepared news articles that were to be released to the Bosnian media, in the Federation and Republic Serpska, after the conclusion of Op SNARE. This enabled the battle group to reduce the likelihood of increased tensions at the vehicle check points (VCPs). The operation was concluded without incident. The VCPs confiscated no weapons, there was no "body count" as a tangible measure of success, and the VCPs were collapsed later in the day.

The measures of effectiveness of the Op SNARE were determined by the fact that the local populace was informed of the VCPs, but only after the operation had been launched ensuring OPSEC. A number of people communicated to the soldiers that they believed the operation was in response to the car bomb. The news release had mentioned that a child had been also been in the car, luckily unhurt in the explosion. This fact made it difficult for the local populace not to be on the side of upholding the rule of law. The people were understandably impatient with the delay, but understood the law and order message that was the CO's intent. Even though no weapons were found, the operation was considered successful because the effects had been to inform, influence and encourage the various targets that had been engaged. The close cooperation received from the local police and the positive response of the local population was considered to be the successful measure of effectiveness of Op SNARE.

The CIMIC project opening went well, the CO used the opportunity to pass on the themes and messages to the community, and a grateful town received a new kindergarten. The preparation of an additional Info Ops Targeting and Tasking Matrix to support the operation had the command element well prepared for the media that were already at the kindergarten opening. The soldiers were well prepared with the law and order themes and talking points to be used at the VCPs to defuse any rising tempers.

With respect to changing the deep-set hatreds of the local populace, the assessment is difficult since measures of effectiveness are long term, a single tour will have difficulty in determining long-term change.

LESSONS LEARNED

The CO's endstate for Info Ops was achieved. It called for the establishment of a successful mechanism for short-term Info Ops, in this case in support of focused operations such as Op SNARE. Because of the mature nature of the theatre, and the fact that most undertakings deal

immediately. The public affairs officer prepared a public service announcement that would be released only after Op SNARE began to ensure operational security was not compromised, as well as a press release after the operation. The S3 Psy Ops immediately prepared handbills and posters (Figures 6, 7 and 8) for each checkpoint as well as radio announcements for the battle group Psy Ops radio shows as well as the brigade radio station, radio "Oksigen." The sub-unit OC tasked with

with long-term change, it can be difficult to judge the effectiveness of any given campaign. Some products, such as the posters and handbills for vehicle checkpoints, had a relatively immediate impact in that they helped to calm people waiting to go through the checkpoints. Psy Ops contributed to operations by providing another effects-based system that was employed by the CO when striking out on the moral plane, as his intent was to change behavior. Public affairs contributed to operations, in this case by informing the local populace and preventing misinformation. The resulting peaceful reaction by the local populace was considered a positive measure of effectiveness for focused ops in the short term.

CIMIC played a key role in the medium term Info Ops plan. Their training as liaison officers, coupled with their skills in project management, served to create outstanding opportunities during project openings. Public affairs was able to build bridges with the local media by inviting them to attend. The resultant positive media coverage served the battle group in good stead as the public affairs officer became a trusted, credible information source. The public affairs officer was able to pre-empt misinformation by this trust and by the goodwill generated by the seminars and conferences with the local media. The developing western standards of reporting served to reduce the ethnic bias, speculation and disinformation that characterized their earlier reporting. The number of incorrect and inflammatory articles appearing in the local press in the Canadian battle group area of operations dropped to almost nil. Psy Ops was able to exploit the success of the project openings by making mention of local Bosnians, who had been actively assisting in rebuilding their communities. The successful achievement of the endstate called for the establishment of a long-term Info Ops plan to support civil reconciliation, encourage stability and reforms that lead to national unity by generating faith in common institutions. The measures of effectiveness of the long term Info Ops plan, would manifest themselves over the course of years by the slow change of attitudes as well as behaviors. One way in which this can be measured is by the advancement of the normalcy indicators of the SFOR Multi Year Road Map. Other ways are survey results such as the Omnibus survey (Aug 02),¹⁵ since surveys provide effective measures of attitudinal change.

The public affairs officer was able to pre-empt misinformation

The I PPCLI Battle Group was fortunate in seeing some of these changes in attitudes. As already mentioned, the enthusiasm of children for the Psy Ops in schools campaigns such as the Pen Pal and English in schools programs highlighted their success. It is indisputable that the future of Bosnia lies with the children as they are the future leaders. Public affairs contributed to the changes in attitudes by training and encouraging the development of the local press to western standards of reporting. The “fifth estate” is a powerful social regulator and their impartiality is seen to be indicative of the local populace developing faith in their institutions. With the number of soldiers on the ground decreasing, the importance of a proactive Info Ops campaign, supported by aggressive use of public affairs became increasingly important.

National unity for Bosnia will be an elusive goal at best and the development of faith in common institutions will be an intermediate milestone. The initial goal of beginning civil reconciliation was seen in a very positive example in Glamoc, one of the most war-ravaged areas in Canton 10, in two instances. The establishment of a grassroots humanitarian assistance board of religious leaders by all three ethnicities was the first.¹⁶ The second was the development of a highly successful weekly movie night¹⁷ for the children of the community, which provided an opportunity to begin civil reconciliation with the youth. This was expanded by the cleaning and

repair of the local community center by over a hundred members of the community of all ethnicities and ages. Even more promising are the future plans of the municipality for further renovations and expansions. It is this example that can be said to be burgeoning evidence of the successful establishment of a long term Info Ops plan.

CONCLUSION

Info Ops in the evolving and maturing theatre that is Bosnia, must itself change or become ineffective. The current trend for Canada's commitment to Bosnia is to continue with force reductions. With these reductions is an increased requirement for a compensatory increase in the numbers of CIMIC personnel to further efforts at nation building with the IC until Bosnians take the lead. This has already started with the reduction of the battle group presence in the quieter opstinas. With this, the desire is communicated to the IC that it is vital to transcend to other realms of endeavor and to head off the upcoming financial crisis mentioned by the OHR, by focusing on economic development. Economic development is important in order to retain relevance to the local populace. If this is not accomplished, the effort expended by SFOR, the money invested by the IC and risks taken will be for naught. Commanders at all levels must be aware that these recommendations can be applied to other theatres as they evolve and mature.

About the Author...

Captain Kevin Barry enrolled in the CF in 1986 and joined 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry as a private. He has served in 2 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, A Coy (Para) and C Coy 3PPCLI. His operational experience includes tours in Cyprus, two UNPROFOR tours in the former Yugoslavia and one with SFOR in Bosnia. Commissioned from the ranks when he was a sergeant in 1999, he has since served in IPPCLI as a platoon commander, LAV captain and, in ROTO II, as the S3 Info Ops. Captain Barry is currently 2IC C Coy in IPPCLI.

ENDNOTES

1. B-GL-300-005/FP-001 *Land Force Information Operations*, p2.
2. 1PPCLI BG OP ORDER.
3. *Land Force Information Operations*, piii.
4. *Land Force Information Operations*.
5. FM 100-6 Information Operations (US Army).
6. 1PPCLI BG OP ORDER.
7. B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Land Force Command*, p 2-18.
8. FM 100-6 Information Operations (US Army).
9. IO 210 Joint Doctrine for IO (US Army).
10. Lord Ashdown warned in November of 2002 that the Bosnian economy was headed for ruin as expenditures far exceeded the budget. The expected reduction of aid funding would lead to financial crisis without the immediate imposition of a Value Added Tax (VAT) to goods and services.
11. B-GL-371-002/FP-001 *Field Artillery Vol 2, Duties of the Battery Commander and the Observer*.
12. 21 Feb 03- Allegations by the RS press were made that an Italian Carabinieri MSU had beaten a Serbian civilian.
13. FM 100-6 Information Operations (US Army).
14. B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Land Force Command*.
15. Mereco Index Bosnia Omnibus Survey, August 2002.
16. Initiated by the CIMIC LO for Glamoc, November 2002.
17. Initiated by 6PI C Coy Gp and the CIMIC LO for Glamoc.

— BOOK REVIEWS —

THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE. SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER

by Max Boot, Basic Books, 2002, 352 pages.

Reviewed by Sergeant Arthur Majoor

“The conduct of small wars is in fact in certain respect an art in itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which permit comparisons to be established.”¹

Imagine a tiny military establishment ignored by the public and mistrusted by the government of the day. Small numbers of troops, armed with inadequate and outdated weapons are sent around the globe to carry out seemingly impossible missions to suppress banditry and rebuild failed states in support of the national interest. The Canadian Forces of the 1990s? Maybe, but Max Boot's latest work shows that this was the foundation of American military history and might, and that small wars have been the other “American Way of War” since the early years of the Republic. From Thomas Jefferson's dispatch of the infant US Navy and local mercenaries under the direction of American adventurer William Eaton against the Barbary pirates between 1801 and 1805 to the deployment of US Special Forces operators and American air power in support of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the 2002 campaign against terrorism, American small wars share a common heritage.

Max Boot's history of America's small wars is not a complete accounting of all small military actions from the founding of the Republic (notably bypassing the “Indian Wars” of the late 1800s), nor does it explore the roots of small wars in the colonial past, but the scale and scope of the incidents that Max Boot does examine gives the reader an overview of American small wars theory and practice.

Boot divides the narrative into three periods. The first section, titled “Commercial Power,” covers the early years of the Republic to 1898, where the primary interest of the United States was to open and maintain overseas markets. The primary instrument to enforce the rule of law and protect American citizens and property was the U.S. Navy and Marines, following enterprising Yankee traders around the world. “Congress maintained only a small navy whose peacetime mission was to police the world, enforcing Western standards of behavior, protecting U.S. commerce, and serving as a general adjunct to U.S. diplomacy.”² Where interests converged, the U.S. Navy worked as a junior partner to the Royal Navy, most notably in suppressing piracy and the slave trade. The argument that “trade follows the flag” is effectively reversed by the actions chronicled in this section, since the U.S. Navy had little interest in or ability to subdue foreign powers but did have the ability to mount punitive or protective missions for American traders and missionaries who had gotten in over their heads in less developed parts of the world. If our future is to fight in “small wars,” perhaps we can be better prepared by making a close examination of Canadian commercial interests. These may reveal

potential flashpoints, dangers and enemy forces that threaten Canadian citizens, in situations where we may have to operate without the assistance of our allies.

The second section, titled "Great Power," covers the period from 1898 to America's entry into the Second World War. This is the period of America's ascent as an Imperial power. As the United States grew in population and economic and military power, an increasing number of factors drove the use of small military expeditions to support American interests abroad. In the Philippines, the Americans waged a war of territorial annexation, while in China, American forces worked to maintain the "open door policy," maintaining free trade for all in the Chinese market. In the Caribbean, the United States used military forces to prevent European powers from threatening American strategic interests (primarily the Panama Canal), protecting American business interests, and for the idealistic purpose of providing better governments for the peoples of the region. Other interventions in the first quarter of the twentieth century included attempts to destroy the Bolshevik revolution, and the long watch in China protecting American interests against European Imperialists, Chinese warlords and ultimately against the predation of Imperial Japan.

The mixture of motivations leads to a more difficult assessment of the use of military power in the American interest. In the short term, such interventions were almost always successful. The Americans undertook several interventions and long-term occupations of Cuba, Hispaniola (Haiti and the Dominican Republic) and Nicaragua to cover the approaches to the Panama Canal. Roughly 3000 Marines were able to occupy and subdue the entire island of Hispaniola, establish an efficient customs and taxation system, build roads and schools, raise and train gendarmeries and so on, for periods between 1915 and the final withdrawal from Haiti in 1934. During this period, stability was ensured and European powers were firmly excluded from Hispaniola and the Caribbean basin. Once the Americans were gone, the local elites ignored the maintenance of public finances and infrastructure, and the nations reverted to the states of squalor and decay that we are familiar with today. A small intervention in the Mexican port of Veracruz had a similar ending: the American Navy and Marines took the city, and the Army administered it between April and November 1914, fixing infrastructure, enforcing sanitation and cracking down on crime. While the aim of the expedition was achieved (the Mexican dictator Huerta resigned), once the Americans left, residents threw garbage in the streets again, and vultures soon returned to prey on the dead.

Max Boot demonstrates the limits of the effectiveness of military interventions throughout this period. The Marines could indeed "kick in the door," and even run small countries for a while, but the creation of lasting institutions and permanent change seems to be beyond the abilities of the military even after long term occupations and vigorous "civic action" programs. This should not surprise the student of military history, since the Hellenistic empire of Alexander the Great disintegrated after his death, and even hundreds of years of occupation by the Roman Legions did little to pacify the fringes of the Empire (instead giving the barbarian hordes a glimpse of the riches available beyond the frontier). Canadian troops performed peacekeeping duties in Cyprus for more than 25 years, yet the island is still divided with no political solution in sight. Eight years after the United States intervened to stop the civil wars in former Yugoslavia, the situation there is still fragile and unstable, with fighting resuming in Kosovo at the time of this writing. Canada's commitment to Afghanistan might last many decades, without creating the conditions for a lasting peace. How to establish stable long-term institutions is an important question for the future, for if the military cannot create the conditions for a lasting

peace, then peacekeeping and peace support operations are doomed to failure once the intervening forces withdraw.

On the other hand, the Americans learned hard lessons and used their knowledge to carry out missions with a mixture of bluffing, civic action and sometimes combat. We read how American officers used a mixture of local intelligence and guile to track down guerrilla leaders in places like the Philippines, where “Fighting Fred” Funston and four of his officers were escorted as “prisoners” by local scouts to the headquarters of Emilio Aguinaldo, capturing the stunned guerrilla leader before any effective resistance could be mounted.³ The Marines were the most innovative and flexible force throughout this period, practicing aggressive long range patrolling (“Chesty” Puller’s Company M spent 20 days a month in the field, often patrolling 30 miles a day⁴), pioneering the use of close air support (including supply and medical evacuation missions) and even performing the first organized dive-bombing raid in history on July 16 1927.⁵ (This is also the period in which the Marines developed amphibious assault doctrine and invented amphibious equipment to implement the doctrine. The Pacific campaign of World War Two would not have been possible without this work.) The Army was also using the lessons of small wars to transform itself into a modern fighting force during this time, with General Pershing experimenting with the use of aircraft and mechanized transport in the pursuit of Pancho Villa in the 1911 Punitive Expedition. The primary lesson throughout is that the troops on the ground quickly learn to identify problems and implement solutions without a vast headquarters and support apparatus.

“The Small Wars Manual” codified the lessons learned during a half century of small wars.⁶ The Small Wars Manual moves from the political and theoretical to the intensely practical, including a chapter on the proper method of packing a mule.⁷ “As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.”⁸ Most Canadian operations taken since 1990 have been of this sort, with service members being dispatched by executive decision without Parliamentary debate. Lessons learned on various operations in such diverse locations as Bosnia, Haiti and Afghanistan should be leading to re-evaluations and recasting of everything from training to unit ORBATs to kit lists.

The final section, “Superpower,” covers the period from 1941 to today. A generation of military leaders taking their lessons from the Second World War and Korea forgot the lessons of the small wars. These large-scale conventional wars had the clear aim to “defeat and [destroy] the hostile forces.”⁹ Small wars, in contrast have ambiguous missions: “to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas where the interests of the United States have been placed in jeopardy.”¹⁰ This “large war” mentality coloured the American strategy during the Viet Nam war, leading to a costly military stalemate and eventual American withdrawal from South Viet Nam. The Marines, as usual, looked back to the use of small wars methods, and *Boot* shows the reader examples of how even small applications of these methods could have disproportionate results. The Combined Action Program, adopted by the Marines in 1965, combined a Marine rifle squad with a platoon of local militia to protect a local village. This small force combined civic action with intensive patrolling to reduce the influence of the “popular forces” (Viet Cong) and eventually drive them out of the area. The Army, in contrast, preferred battalion sized “search and destroy” missions, which either

expended energy by pointlessly chasing the elusive enemy through the jungles, or antagonized the civilian population with the indiscriminate use of firepower against suspected enemy positions.

The result of the stalemate in Viet Nam was the complete aversion to small wars by most of the American military establishment. The force structure was reorganized and reoriented more firmly towards “large wars,” with heavy mechanized forces (represented by such machines as the M-1 tank, M-2 IFV and Apache attack helicopter) taking centre stage, while specialty skills such as Military Police, civil affairs and psychological warfare were largely done by reservists. The end result was a powerful but unwieldy force that required months to assemble in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Powell doctrine, calling for overwhelming forces to be committed for a clear objective in the national interest, hampered thinking about the uses of American military power in situations short of total war.

After difficult interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, the US Army began the process of transformation, working towards “medium” brigades which can deploy anywhere in the world in 96 hours. The Air force organized “Air Expeditionary Wings,” and the Navy began moving from an exclusively large platform “blue water” force towards a littoral “brown water” force. Interestingly enough, the U.S. Marines still have the best grasp of small wars principles, perhaps because Marines focus on “people, not weapons systems.”¹¹ The best example of the differences between the services was the mission to Somalia. Marines took charge of their areas of Somalia, using classic small war techniques of patrolling aggressively and overawing the local warlords with displays of armed might. The sheer numbers of Marines provided many “eyes on” the AOR to discover what was going on and provided opportunities to interact with the locals (although with uncertain results). When the Marines left, the warlords became aggressive again, and while the superior training and doctrine of the American Rangers led to a lop sided outcome in the “Battle of Mogadishu,” the spilling of American blood for no clear purpose alienated the American public and was a factor in the withdrawal. In Iraq, the Americans are using a combination of small war and large war principles against the various assailants with mixed success. The very visible large war forces are under scrutiny by both the media and the insurgent forces. American large war forces suffer the bulk of the attacks. How well the small wars forces are doing is debatable, but the capture of the Ba'athist leadership figures is certainly a result of the successful use of small wars principles.

For the Canadian reader, the book provides a thought-provoking look into the other “American Way of War”. A review of the small wars of the past provides insight into the conditions the Americans now face in the globe-spanning “War on Terror.” Many of the proven techniques of the past will be resurrected in a modern form to pacify territories which shelter the terrorists and their sympathisers. For the Canadian reader the lessons are also clear. As junior partners in the Western Alliance, we will be in the same position as the U.S. Navy was in the 1800s, assisting a much larger and more powerful partner where our interests are aligned and forced to go it alone when they are not.

Our forces may end up following Canadian citizens and commercial interests into lawless and undeveloped parts of the world. (think of Talisman Oil's foray into southern Sudan). In order to carry out peace support operations to successful conclusions, Canadian service members will have to experiment with doctrine and equipment on the ground in order to undertake more intensive and dangerous missions. Governments will have to accept high-risk activities to

capture or eliminate warlords, crime bosses and war criminals and allow the military to take over and run local governments to accomplish mission objectives in the short term. The long-term problem of creating lasting structures for peaceful and stable governments and institutions has so far resisted “military” solutions, but this problem must be solved in order to achieve long-term success. Finally, a military force organized to deal with small wars will be much different than the Cold War structures designed for major combat operations in the European theatre. Everything from doctrine, force structures and equipment needs to be closely examined. As well, the type of soldier who thrives on small wars is far different from the citizen armies who follow the call to arms in a large-scale conflict, meaning recruiting and training will also have to change. As Max Boot so perceptively points out,

*Reservists and citizen soldiers stand ready, in every free nation, to stand to the colors and die in holocaust, the big war. Reservists and citizen soldiers remain utterly reluctant to stand and die in anything less. . . . The man who will go where his colors go, without asking, who will fight a phantom foe in jungle and mountain range, without counting, and who will suffer and die in the midst of incredible hardship, without complaint, is still what he always has been, from Imperial Rome to sceptered Britain to democratic America. He is the stuff of which legions are made.*¹²

For the small wars of the future, Max Boot's book is an interesting and informative primer.

ENDNOTES

1. C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice*, 1906, quoted in the front piece of *The Savage Wars of Peace*.
2. Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (Basic Books, 2002), pg. 55.
3. Boot, pp., 117-119.
4. Boot, p., 246.
5. Boot, pp., 237-238.
6. Reprinted as *Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps 1940* (Sunflower University Press, 1996).
7. Boot, p., 284.
8. *Small Wars Manual*, quoted in Boot, p., 284.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Boot, p., 334.
12. T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, 1963, reissued by Brassey's, 2000, quoted in the front piece of *The Savage Wars of Peace*.

HOOK-UP! THE CANADIAN AIRBORNE COMPENDIUM

by Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski (St. Catherine's: Vanwell Publishing, 2004). Softcover: ISBN 1-55125-071-3.

Reviewed by Major Shane Schreiber.

Compendium: A short, complete summary; an abstract.

-American Heritage Dictionary, 4th Edition.

At last—a book that lives up to its title. This new release from the Canadian publishing house Vanwell is best described by its sub-title, “a summary of major airborne activities, exercises, and operations, 1940-2000.” Its authors, Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski, are certainly experts

in the field in both practical and academic terms. Horn, who recently completed his doctoral degree at the Royal Military College, served in the Canadian Airborne Regiment and was Commanding Officer of the First Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, while Wyczinski has worked with the associations of both the Airborne Regiment and First Canadian Parachute Battalion as their archivist and “unofficial” historian. They have also recently collaborated on a trio of narrative and pictorial histories on Canada's airborne soldiers, and *Hook-Up!* is no doubt a reflection of the fruit of their labours from those endeavours. The work they have produced is a comprehensive and chronological account of their subject that should be of particular interest to hard core airborne enthusiasts and serious military historians alike.

Hook-Up! opens with short essays on the history of airborne forces in Canada and an examination of what the authors claim is the unique “airborne mystique.” These are interesting overviews, but the meat of the book is contained in the copious and detailed summary of Canadian airborne (meaning parachute and glider borne forces) activities since 1940. The summary is, in reality, a long timeline with bullets of information that succinctly outline the activity or operation. While this synopsis provides a quick and ready reference for historians, what seems to be lacking is any comment or analysis of the major trends in Canadian airborne forces and their place in the broader institutional and historical context. Nevertheless, even the most critical will be impressed with the surprising amount of detail that Horn and Wyczinski have included, and those who have served in one of Canada's airborne units should not be surprised to see some familiar names, including their own. Clearly, the sometimes jarringly direct and succinct approach was deliberately adopted, and it proves to be highly effective. The “just the facts, ma'am” approach to history taken by *Hook-Up!* makes this work more a source book for serious students in this field than an informal read for general military history buffs.

The Canadian airborne timeline is followed by another chronology, this one focused on the worldwide use of airborne forces. In fact, Vanwell claims that this is “the only complete summary of international airborne operations from 1929 to 2001 in existence.” Again, this part is short, sharp and to the point—analysis and commentary is kept to a minimum. The listings do not cover the Soviet and Warsaw Pact airborne experience to the same depth that they do Western armies, but perhaps not enough research material is available yet. One is particularly impressed with the breadth of research, which seems exhaustive. This reader would have found it more useful to blend the two timelines in order to put the Canadian experience within the broader context, but for those who want a ready reference guide rather than a narrative, the separation of the two may prove to be of increased utility.

The final section of the book includes a glossary (useful for navigating the unique airborne vernacular that may be unfamiliar to even the most experienced researcher) and an excellent and comprehensive bibliography on the Canadian airborne experience. The listing for Horn's own works covers almost two pages, but pains were taken to include even the most obscure references, and the “Selected Bibliography” alone is worth the cost of the book for academic researchers.

In short, *Hook-Up!* is an excellent source book and research tool that is long on facts and short on superfluous words. It is an outstanding reference work for those doing research in the field of Canadian military history and is a “must have” for serious students of Canadian airborne and parachute forces.

THE GLENGARRY LIGHT INFANTRY, 1812—1816

Winston Johnston, Charlottetown: Benson Publishing, 1998. ISBN 0-9730501-0-1. 363 p, with eight appendices, bibliography, index, maps and illustrations, \$25.00 (Canadian).

Reviewed by Major John R. Grodzinski, CD

Perhaps there can be no military scene more fit for the pencil than a body of light infantry awaiting an attack. The variety of attitudes necessary to obtain cover—the breathless silence—the men attentive by eye and ear—every glance (furtively lowered) directed to the point—some kneeling—some lying down and some standing straight behind a tree—the officer with his silver whistle in hand ready to give the signal to commence firing, and the bugle boy looking earnestly in his officer's face waiting for the next order...

-Surgeon William Dunlop on light infantry in the 1814 Niagara Campaign.

The militia and embodied regiments raised in Canada during the War of 1812 are among the least understood forces in this war. Their story has not been aided by the efforts of several professional historians forgetful of the fact that the writing history demands primary source research and not the repetition of work by earlier historians. While this review does not intend to recount the history or structure of the Canadian soldiers during the War of 1812, readers of this journal may be surprised to learn that between 1812 and 1816, six Canadian regiments' subject to the War Office were raised in Upper and Lower Canada and the Maritimes. Five of these gained coveted positions on the Army List, albeit their seniority after the Garrison and Royal Veteran battalions was not a reflection of their record. Their status equated to that of "regular" troops and whose performance during the war was, in a word, superb. It is amazing that any lineage or battle honours these units might bestow to units currently on the order of battle were made null by an administrative decision in the Army Historical Section in the 1960s. To some functionary's mind, this period was not "Canadian." Why do history and heritage have to be so complex and subject to politics?

Like so many amateur historians, Dr Johnston has a passion for history that has driven his lifelong interest in his subject. While his research was conducted over most of his adult life, Johnston chose early retirement from a successful career as a research scientist with Agriculture Canada to complete this book. In his search for primary documentation, the author combed archives in Canada and the United Kingdom making this the best-researched unit history for this conflict. Numerous documents are reproduced throughout the text, while the sources of the other data are furnished in the endnotes. For those interested in genealogy, the list of officers and non-commissioned personnel provides a gold mine of information.

The Glengarry Light Infantry was formed just before the War of 1812 began, to strengthen the British forces then stationed in the Canadas. Although authorized as a line battalion, it received training as light infantry, employing tactics and wearing dress different to that of the red-coated line regiments. Its primary weapon was the smooth-bored India Pattern Musket, sporting one unique difference: affixed sights, a feature not normally available with the Brown Bess. During the smoothbore era, the effects of fire—considerable smoke—made observation difficult and aimed fire virtually impossible after the first round. Consequently, smooth bore weapons were not produced with sights (although some units did modify their weapons) and aiming was not

part of the drill when firing - indeed the last word of command before firing was not "aim", but "present," upon which a soldier "levelled" his weapon at the target area based on the probable range. Since light infantry employed greater dispersion, the obscuration encountered by the tightly packed line companies after fire was less severe and increased the possibility and need for aimed fire. Several of the coveted Baker Rifles, the primary rifled weapon of the British Army normally reserved for rifle regiments, may also have been issued to the Glengarrys (p. 58). Light infantry also demanded other skills of their soldiers, particularly as individual initiative was very important.

The Glengarrys were to be attired in Highland dress and recruited exclusively from Glengarry County in Upper Canada. However, as war seemed more probable, these plans were changed. Raised to battalion status as a fencible regiment of the regular British Army, the unit was designated as the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencible Regiment, or more popularly as the Glengarry Light Infantry, or simply, the Glengarrys. Highland dress was discarded and recruitment expanded to a far larger geographic area, now including Glengarry County, Montreal and the Eastern District of Upper Canada to all of Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.

Between 1812 and 1816, when the regiment was disbanded, some 1,400 men served in the ranks of the Glengarrys; of these, one-third became casualties. As period casualty reports were notorious for being incomplete, the author estimates that at least 53 died from battle injuries, a further 165 wounded in action, 140 lost to disease and another 48 captured and 17 missing in action. Of those soldiers whose origin is known (about 50%), the majority came from Lower Canada, while the number of foreign born personnel reflects percentages found in other British regiments, with Englishmen, Irish and Scots and others born in the United States, Italy, Ireland, German, Poland and at least a dozen other countries. Many of its officers and non-commissioned officers came with experience from campaigns in Europe and elsewhere.

The Glengarrys participated in many of the major actions in the northern theatre of operations including Ogdensburg, York, Fort George, the raid on Sackets Harbor, Lundy's Lane, Fort Eire and Cook's Mills. Individual officers and soldiers also participated in other actions.

One of the more interesting campaigns in which the Glengarrys participated was the 1814 Niagara, during which they were often employed as screening or reconnaissance troops for the British Right Division. This intensive 125-day campaign included several major battles, minor actions and a siege that tested the fighting skill and administrative machinery of both opponents. At this time, the American fielded what were probably their best regular troops of the war. The most famous action therein was the Battle of Lundy's Lane fought on 25 July 1814. At the time, the Glengarrys had a strength of 376 officers. At one point, they manoeuvred at a right angle to the British line to engage the American troops in the flank. When Lieutenant-General Drummond, commanding the forces in Upper Canada, ordered a realignment of the line, poor light conditions and identification problems due to their green uniforms, resulted in the Glengarrys coming under fire from the 103rd and 104th Regiments-ironically, the latter regiment had also been recruited in Canada.

American troops respected the Glengarrys' fighting skill and as one American at Lundy's Lane observed, the Glengarrys were "scattered according to the practice of irregular warfare, taking ev'ry advantage of which the open nature of the ground would admit" (p. 148). The book also

includes a good account of the rarely recounted action at Cook's Mills, which proved to be the last major engagement by the Glengarrys. Shortly thereafter, General Drummond concluded the unit was worn out and ordered it into winter quarters at Kingston, and early in the new year, the war ended.

The author has written a superlative study of a fine Canadian unit. As with any good work, his research has overturned several popular myths regarding the Glengarry Light Infantry and the war itself. The research is impeccable and the writing is generally good. The only complaint this reviewer has is that while a great deal of data is presented, the narrative lacks analysis. For example, it would have been worthwhile to offer a comparison of the Glengarrys with units raised in Canada or British units. While some might argue this is beyond the scope of a regimental history, it would provide greater context, an important consideration in historical study. Nonetheless, this is an outstanding work that should find its way into personal and institutional libraries. Hopefully, *The Glengarry Light Infantry, 1812 - 1816* will spur a number of other regimental histories of this period.

Major John R. Grodzinski is a student of the War of 1812 and recently completed an MA thesis examining the Upper St Lawrence River as a theatre of war. He often conducts battlefield tours to War of 1812 sites in Canada and the United States.

THE STAND-UP TABLE

Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal

THE FUTURE BATTLE GROUP IN OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Vincent J. Curtis writes ...

I read the Sherrard article, "The Future Battle Group in Operations" (Vol 6, No. 3), and thought your comment that the piece might lack eloquence was too kind. It reads like a cut-and-paste of the latest military fashions. Unfortunately, these fashions don't hang together well, and when assembled in one article amount to a mass of incoherent chop-logic. It is worse than trying to read Hegel, for Hegel, as a system builder, was at least internally consistent. This article is not internally consistent. For example, after explaining why asymmetric threats and urban growth have made old ideas of force-on-force in the field obsolete (despite the Gulf War of 2003!), we get the doctrinal treatment of manoeuvre warfare. Manoeuvre warfare applies to large armies with room to manoeuvre, and the article (on battalion sized operations) begins by saying these are, or will soon be, obsolete. The army adopted manoeuvre warfare not because we will ever be able to engage in it but to justify the adoption of mission command as a style of management. We could do just as well not to talk about manoeuvre warfare at all, and just adopt mission command, which capitalizes on our educational and training strengths outright. Pushing the authority to act down the chain of command is simply our way of management because that style makes best use of the material Canada gives to its army. No further justification is needed, and all this manoeuvre warfare hand-waving is rendered completely unnecessary.

The next mass of chop-logic is in the sections on principles of war and operational functions. We are assured that "from the principles of war one can develop critical functions that are necessary to take a manoeuvrist approach to operations. These operational (vice critical) functions are..." But nowhere are we enlightened as to how one does move from the principles to the operational functions. As presented, we see two lists of words that are supposed to be related to one another, but a crucial explanation of how and why is not given. Nor can a coherent explanation be given because the two lists of words are terms from two different philosophical systems that talk about different things. In the body of the work subsequently, these lists of words serve no didactic function, and therefore, are a distraction. (In addition, nowhere is it said why a manoeuvrist approach is the be-all. If these operational functions are genuine, then surely, some approach other than manoeuvrist also can be developed from them. The principles of war are said to apply whatever one's doctrine is.)

The ambiguousness in the use of the word *operation* is apparent from the terms operational functions and operations of war. Again, these are terms from two philosophical systems developed at different times for different purposes but that live on together, side by side, as a kind of intellectual legacy. There is nothing wrong with either one of them, except that putting them together impairs a coherent interpretation of the material. Call it operational overload.

The last section on roles, tasks, and employment of arms is mind-numbing. We have a chart with the headings role, tasks and tactical employment, and, by God, we are going to fill that chart with abstractions and copulatives. Hardly a concrete term or action verb to be found, but no hoary platitude will be distained!

Something crucial was missed under infantry, my favourite arm, and that is infiltration. (Light infantry is the one thing we can do well, because equipment costs are so low.) In today's tactical environment, light infantry moves and attacks at night, and it observes, rests and defends by day. Because the most sensitive spot of an enemy formation is unlikely to be the front line, it is necessary that light infantry be trained to infiltrate the enemy formation by night in order to strike with concentrated force against enemy weak points in their rear. Artillery parks, HQs, supply depots, bridges, etc. are examples of these kinds of targets of attack. By day, light infantry hides and provides close-in and unseen protection of our own sensitive weapon systems and locales. The day of the light infantry advance to contact is over.

In a book on operations of a battle-group we should ask: is it necessary to load up the reader with a mass of irrelevant material on the dimensions of modern war, the threats of asymmetry (which a battle group is not designed to combat directly) and a world terrain analysis? What is the writer trying to convince us of? If the material of the introduction is not used or referred to in the body of the work, that material may be irrelevant and therefore distracting to the meat of the book. A discussion of the big picture belongs in a book that says how we are going to handle the big picture—that is in division or possibly bde gp ops. It is only where the big picture directly impinges on the lower level we are talking about, i.e., battalion ops, does it make sense to talk about the big picture. I suppose what I'm saying is that our humble army should stick to the simple, the concrete and the direct. Never mind manoeuvre warfare, let's embrace the KISS principle.

ON ARMY TRANSFORMATION

Major L.R. Mader, CD writes ...

In an article in *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Vol 6 No. 3, the Chief of the Land Staff described his vision of how the transformed Canadian Army will function ("Army Transformation: Punching Above Our Weight"). The article goes beyond "hot-button" equipment issues such as the Mobile Gun System (MGS) to speak of how the Army will be trained and prepared for operations. The vision described is that of an army that has regained some predictability in how it operates and makes it clear that life in the Army will be very different from what we have known in the past.

The vision also makes it clear how much tight funding envelopes, a high operational tempo and limited equipment resources are driving our actions as an institution. This is evidenced by the decision to stockpile equipment where it is expected to be needed rather than to move it there (at the cost of \$7M for a brigade exercise in 2003). This stockpiling will pre-position the equipment for essentially two Coyote squadrons, two LAV III infantry battalions, two light infantry battalions and supporting elements in Wainwright and Montréal/overseas (half in each location). In their garrison locations, soldiers will only be able to count on "the equivalent of a company of vehicles for each unit."

This pre-positioning approach should regularize somewhat the turmoil that units have known over the past fifteen years, but is accompanied by some real problems that must be considered. I would like to mention six such problems briefly.

The first problem is that separating soldiers permanently from their equipment will break their pride of ownership link to that equipment. It will become nothing more than a resource to be used (and used up) and then fobbed-off on the next temporary user. Units will become equipment renters rather than equipment owners. The potential consequences of this change in attitude are obvious and could lead to a serious degradation in the condition of our equipment fleets. Such a degradation can only be avoided by implementing an extensive and (likely at times confrontational) sign-over and inspection process. Every unit and higher training event will begin and end with a concentrated and lengthy QM activity where one side is often convinced that the equipment it is receiving has not been as well maintained as what it handed over. This activity will cut into the time available for training.

The second problem is that the stockpiling approach is not without cost. Equipment parked and left unused degrades with time. Thus, the stored equipment will require a caretaker/maintenance staff and special storage facilities and regime. In effect, we will be incurring a new cost by paying someone to maintain and exercise equipment because its users cannot. The second part of the cost of this approach is the loss of expertise in doing major equipment moves. If we never do such moves during training we will have a reduced ability to do them during operations. This will probably lead to inefficiencies and additional cost as we improvise such moves in a hurry to respond to a crisis. It is to be hoped that the detailed cost benefit analysis supporting this decision identified significant savings that justify these costs.

The third problem is that the Army's operational flexibility will be reduced. A large portion of our equipment will be overseas or in storage or maintenance facilities separated from its users. Therefore, any unexpected event at home, beyond a normal domestic operation, will start with a massive (and probably improvised) gathering up and signing out of basic unit equipment. We will also face real problems the day an international situation calls for two deployed mechanized battalions (as did Croatia and Bosnia for three years) when we have assumed that only one mechanized battalion will be needed overseas.

The fourth problem is an indirect effect of the placement of so much of our equipment in stockpiles. By doing this we could be seen as “proving” that units do not need their own equipment. This “proof” could then be used by some future decision-makers to challenge the quantities of equipment that the Army tries to purchase. Very often, capital projects can have trouble now convincing some mid- and higher-level NDHQ staff of why equipment needs to be bought at all, let alone in the quantities proposed. Already, new equipment is frequently purchased in smaller quantities than what is being replaced. Our stockpiling concept could be perverted in the future to show that Canada only needs three to four battlegroups worth of mechanized equipment—one set for Wainwright, one for overseas use and the rest to be split among the three brigades for garrison training. Having established this new lower (and less expensive) standard of four mechanized battlegroup sets, it will be harder to argue why we cannot be “fiscally responsible” and make do with *even less* equipment in the next procurement cycle.

The fifth problem is summarized by the incongruity of our army—which claims to emphasize the use of advanced technology—parking much of its key equipment. As a consequence of the decision to stockpile, a large number of the soldiers in our “high-tech army” will use their principal mission equipment as only an occasional part of their normal workday instead of its use being an integral part of what they do. In effect, on a day-to-day basis, our mechanized forces

will be primarily *dismounted*. For infantry units this may not be a complete disaster as many basic infantry skills are learnt and can be practised on foot. The effect of stockpiling on equipment-oriented units, armour, artillery and engineer in particular, however, will be very serious. While simulations can address some of the training shortfall, they can only practise so much. In fact, the improper use of simulation can teach bad lessons that may only come out during a real operation.

The sixth problem is that this “dismounting” of a large number of our equipment-oriented units also raises a question about their perceived deterrence/coalition contribution capability. One has to wonder whether units that are incomplete, not ready to deploy and lacking in much of their mission equipment will provide a desirable public image of us to our friends and potential adversaries. We may be seen as having only a hollow army. Any such lack of credibility could undermine Canada's ability to respond to a future crisis.

In summary, it seems to me that resource limits are changing how we operate as an army by forcing us to try to get by with less equipment than needed. I believe that lowering the bar on how much equipment is essential to the Army risks creating new problems in the future and hamstringing those who follow us. These consequences can only be avoided or minimized if we are very careful now to explain our concerns and provide clear caveats to our acceptance of unpalatable solutions.