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CALL FOR PAPERS

THE CANADIAN ARMY AND THE IMPLIMENTATION FORCE (IFOR) IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Launched in December 1995 in the wake of the Dayton Peace Accord, the agreement ending the Bosnian War, the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) had a one-year mandate to oversee the acceptance of the military aspects of the peace agreement. This included bringing about and maintaining an end to the hostilities, separating the armed forces of Bosnia's two newly created entities, transferring territory between the two entities according to the peace agreement, and moving the two parties' forces and heavy weapons into approved storage sites. As a primary actor in all efforts to enforce peace in the region since the beginning of the conflict, Canada's Army played an important role in achieving the objectives of this mission by mid-1996.

As the 10th anniversary of this mission nears, the Canadian Army Journal invites the submission of articles on the Canadian Army and IFOR for a special section to appear in Vol 9.2 (Summer 2006). Papers examining the mission from the Canadian perspective and with a particular emphasis on subjects such as mission command and control, operations, logistics and support, as well as overviews of the main Canadian units deployed to the mission are welcome.

The deadline for the submission of articles is 30 April 2006. Guidelines for submissions may be found at our website at www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/. Articles and supporting materials may be electronically submitted directly to the managing editor at Godefroy.AB@forces.gc.ca.

A PART OF OUR HERITAGE

OPERATION PANDA AND THE CANADIAN ARMY IN COLD WAR EUROPE[1]

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, Ph.D.

Soldiers of the 1st Canadian Rifle Battalion training near Hanover, June 1952

With the commencement of the Korean War in 1950, the maintenance of the Soviet forces at excessive levels and continued Soviet subversion against Western Europe, Canada's political leadership determined that totalitarianism was once again threatening Canadian interests and values, and that a strong visible commitment toward countering these ideologies was critical. In response to the situation, in November 1951, the Canadian Army's largest sustained overseas deployment began. OPERATION PANDA, or **P**acific **AND A**tlantic, was the first component of Canada's commitment to the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

As one of NATO's founding countries and with a political willingness to provide a considerable portion of the forces, Canada was in a dilemma. In 1950, the Canadian Army was already well below its approved interim establishment and an approved peacetime structure had yet to be promulgated. Existing regular regiments were committed to the defence of Canada (i.e. homeland security type duties), while the commitment in Korea was met not from the standing army, but by forming a temporary Canadian Army Special Force. The solution to meeting the new demands for both regions was to draw upon Militia units.

Beginning in May 1951, a massive recruitment drive commenced to sustain Canada's commitments to the United Nations (UN) and NATO. New units, such as the 1st Canadian Rifle Battalion, were formed, each drawing upon a number of militia units. For example, the brigade's three infantry battalions were each affiliated with five militia units from across Canada. Other arms included a tank squadron (equipped with the most modern tank available, the Centurion), an artillery regiment, field engineer squadron, signals, service corps and other support units. The brigade was assigned a front-line role within 1st British Corps, responsible for the defence of northern West Germany.

The 5,800 men of 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (CIBG), a total-force formation, disembarked from the *MV Fairsea* in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, in November 1951 and commenced moving to northern West Germany. More than 5,000 personnel of the Royal Canadian Air Force's No. 1 Air Division, equipped with over 220 Canadian-built aircraft, followed them.

27 CIBG was assigned a front line role alongside other NATO forces in order to deter the Soviet Union's interference with the recovery of Western Europe from the ravages of the Second World War. Recruited under the rubric, "Trained united strength is needed to prevent aggression," the soldiers of 27 Brigade represented a second major overseas deployment of Canadian troops in the space of one year.

The central role of the militia ended with the formalization of the Canadian Army structure in 1954, which included four brigade groups of regular troops, vice the single brigade formed in 1946. As a result, the regular troops of Canada's 1 CIBG replaced 27 Brigade in 1953. From then until 1958, the entire brigade rotated approximately every two years; thereafter, unit rotation became the norm. 2 CIBG rotated into Europe in 1955, followed by 4 CIBG in 1957, which eventually became 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG).

Due to reductions in the British Army, and new Canadian and NATO policies, the structure and capability of the brigade changed over the years. Initially, the combat power of the brigade increased, first with the assignment of a full regiment of Centurions, culminating in the 1960s with the delivery of four nuclear rocket launchers, representing one quarter of the nuclear capability of 1st British Corps.

A tank of Lord Stathcona's Horse rolling through the German Contryside

The composition and role of the brigade changed considerably in 1970 following controversial defence cuts and a realignment of Canada's defence priorities. 4 CMBG lost its nuclear means and its capability was significantly reduced. It was moved to southern West Germany and assigned less salient missions in support of either an American or German Corps.

In 1990, the Cold War officially ended placing the Canadian need to sustain both land and air forces in Europe into question. Although it was decided to disband 4 CMBG and many of its units, the Canadian presence in Europe was not totally withdrawn. Some organizations and units were repatriated to Canada, while the rest heralded Canada's new commitment to stability operations in the Balkans. In 1993, the final units and bases in Germany were closed.

Over 100,000 Canadian soldiers served with the Canadian NATO brigade from 1951 to 1993. Not all came back. It is estimated that some 250 Canadian Army personnel were lost, mainly during manoeuvres. During the Cold War, training exercises were not simply exercises; they were also an expression of preparedness and deterrence, meaning these soldiers fell in the preservation of peace. But unlike other protracted international deployments, no marker or memorial yet stands to commemorate their sacrifice.

Note

1. With thanks to Dr. Sean Maloney and Major John Grodzinski for compiling an earlier draft of this article.

EDITORIAL

Major Andrew B. Godefroy CD, Ph.D.

This issue marks the conclusion of my first year as Managing Editor of the Canadian Army Journal (CAJ). When I was asked to take on this responsibility 12 months ago, I jumped at the opportunity. I saw a challenge as well as a reward, and I looked forward to being involved with the professional journal of the institution I have served with for over 15 years.

A challenge it certainly was. When I arrived we were a few issues behind, the production system had some challenges, and our timeliness and exposure had waned. I lacked good publication material from across the Army, and it seemed that we had lost contact with many of the publishers who supported us with review copies of the latest books on military subjects. There was much work to be done, and after meeting with the CAJ team, we set about doing it. The journal needed champions and I intended to be one of them.

The first reward was the opportunity to work with a small but dedicated group who make the journal possible. The editors in chief, first Brigadier General Mike Ward and now Brigadier General Christopher Davis, along with the Senior Editor Lieutenant Colonel Ken Faulkner, embraced my vision for the CAJ and provided the leadership needed to take it to the next level. The Army Publishing Office (APO), led by Captain Helga Grodzinski, gave me unwavering support over the last year despite several staff turnovers and office relocations. They were always understanding when I pushed deadlines, tweaked final versions, and demanded ever increasing quality of the production of the journal. In particular I am most thankful to Sgt. Christina Tripp, MCpl Sandra Clarke, Mr. Robert Boyer, and Mrs Patricia Bridger for their dedication to making the journal a success this year.

The second reward was to witness the fruits of our labour. It was sometimes difficult to believe that the time had already passed, but I only had to look at the 26 articles, 32 book reviews, and dozens of other supporting entries buried within four blue Canadian Army Journal covers to remind me of where the effort went. Another success was the journal's website. Rebuilt earlier this year by Mr. Matt Perreault and Mrs. Christina Rodych, the CAJ website has had over 10,000 unique visitors since June of this year and averages nearly 300 unique hits per day. It is widely employed by both the Army and the Canadian Forces (CF) at large, and we have received compliments from our allies, the civilian academic community, as well as the general public on the quality and scope of the journal. Last year we had to request submissions of articles and books for review, but today we receive a new submission almost every day from soldiers and scholars, and publishers generously provide us with their latest publications on military subjects. I am personally very thankful for this positive increase in support, and will endeavour to continue making the Canadian Army Journal a well-respected professional peer review journal.

This issue addresses a variety of subjects related to the Army's social and intellectual capital in today's security environment. The first essay, by Mr. Vincent Curtis, is a sharp critique of the highly publicized American concept of Fourth Generation Warfare that has permeated into much of our Army's thinking this year about the environments in which we will operate in the near future. This is followed by a series of articles detailing specific issues, ranging from culture to education to training and procedures within a transformation context. The last article by Rick Bowes examines the efforts of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade in the First World War, and is accompanied by some never before published photographs of the soldiers who served within that organization. Thanks to him for making the effort to bring fresh images of the Army's history to light.

Finally, the call is still out for papers on the Canadian Army in IFOR, and I thank those of you who have already expressed an interest. Please help us make this a success by submitting articles and encouraging others to do so. I am especially interested in receiving articles of any length by NCMs who served on this tour.

It has been a tremendous first year for me as managing editor of the Canadian Army Journal. I am grateful to all of our authors and reviewers for supporting us, and look forward to next year and another series of engaging articles and commentary.

LAV III crossing a bridge during exercises at the Western Area Training Center

DIRECTORATE OF ARMY DOCTRINE UPDATE: NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL DEFENCE (NBCD) EVOLUTION

Major Murray Robertson

Definition

The term NBCD has gradually evolved into Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Defence (CBRN Def). NATO essentially defines CBRN Def as "the plans and activities intended to mitigate or neutralize adverse impacts on operations and personnel resulting from: the use or threatened use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons; the emergence of secondary hazards arising from counter-force targeting; or the release of Toxic Industrial Materials into the environment." The term CBRN recognizes the increased importance and threat of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs), either as deliberate attacks or releases due to accidents or deterioration in infrastructure. Typically TIMs, although at least as toxic as classical warfighting NBC agents, are undetectable using current CF standard detection equipment, and in many cases our standard gas mask does not provide protection against them.

Background

Very little emphasis has been placed on CBRN Def by the CF (and particularly the Army) since the end of the cold war. Most aspects of our CBRN Def capability have atrophied since then. The First Gulf War, with visions of SCUDS containing chemical and biological warheads changed all that for a while but gradually interest fell away again. Then 9/11 came and really changed everything. The contemporary operating environment (COE) for the CF has changed dramatically over the last five years. The CF experience in Afghanistan and other peace support missions, plus the American experience in Iraq have highlighted a new asymmetrical operating environment where non-state actors are major players. In addition to the threat of deliberate attack, the risk of accidental exposure from deteriorating infrastructure and targeting has now been better recognized. This environment, with no formal front lines and a difficult to identify enemy, typically has the following characteristics with regard to CBRN Def incidents. They are:

- more likely to occur (whether by deliberate attack or accidental release);
- typically smaller in scale; and
- potentially very complex in scope.

In the CF, there are three levels of CBRN Def. These are Integral Support (IS), Close Support (CS), and General Support (GS). They can be described as follows:



♦ IS includes the CBRN Def functions carried out by all members at the unit or sub-unit level that allow survival in a CBRN environment, and allow the organization in question to continue the mission. This includes the ability to use IPE, conduct immediate and operational decontamination, and the employment of the limited detection equipment available at that level, typically 3-way paper, NAVDs, 3 litre decontamination apparatus and use of the AROUSE rule.

♦ CS CBRN Def functions are carried out by the formation, unit, and sub-unit using the next level of equipment, and requiring a higher level of training, in order to restore or maintain the operational tempo of the organization. It includes use of Chemical Agent Monitors , M256 A1 Chemical Agent Detection kits, RDS-100 radiation detectors, and GID III Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors. It currently includes the CBRN recce capability of the Armoured Recce elements and when deployed for decontamination duties the CSS decontamination capability. While there should be a CS capability at every formation, this is currently dependent on equipment availability, training time and commitment.



♦ GS elements are the specialist CBRN Def assets held at the formation level. GS elements are designed, trained and deployed to provide CBRN Def advice and capability as their primary function. They include sophisticated detection and identification of agents including TIMs, and thorough decontamination. Currently the only CF GS CBRN Def element is the Joint NBCD Coy.

Possible Scenarios

The COE includes any number of possible CBRN Def scenarios ranging from outright deliberate attack to accidental discharge, to simple deterioration of infrastructure. Whether or not there is a deliberate attack intended, the toxic threat can be high. Possible threats (by no means a complete list) include such things as:

♦ limited chemical rocket attack on a CF static site;

♦ improvised chemical/biological/radiological hazard dispersal device placed near CF installation or convoy;

♦ discovery of a chemical lab or site by a Canadian or allied patrol;

♦ unshielded low level radiation sources present in a defunct factory or hospital;

♦ accidental spill of industrial chemicals in transit including tanker trucks;

♦ deliberate looting of factories, hospitals, etc. resulting in exposing toxic materials; and

♦ deterioration of infrastructure including ports and industrial storage sites.

Current Practice

Currently the LF practice is to spread CBRN Def assets and responsibilities among numerous organizations. No single organization or branch takes responsibility for all aspects of CBRN Def. All LF members are responsible for (and must be trained in) basic detection equipment, their own individual protection and immediate decontamination. In theory, CBRN recce is provided by Armoured Recce elements, thorough decontamination by CSS elements and the Engineers provide collective protection, water for decontamination and heavy equipment.

Nationally, the CF has only one fully dedicated CBRN Def element, the Joint NBCD Coy, with a total strength of about 100 all ranks (over the next few years the strength should grow to about 150). This company has very complicated and expensive detection and monitoring equipment that is capable of detecting and to some degree identifying most CBRN agents, including TIMs (full spectrum detection). It is also

equipped to protect itself from the toxic effects of TIMs as well as classic warfighting agents. However, although it is a highly capable element, the Joint NBC Coy is intended primarily for domestic use, and is not manned to allow it to provide an expeditionary capability beyond the initial rotation. Nor would its size (either current or planned expansion) allow for it to provide large scale CBRN Def elements in a national emergency.

Discussion

Whatever the current shortcomings in IS and CS CBRN Def assets, clearly the Army is currently ill-prepared to force generate and force employ an adequate GS CBRN Def capability to meet the potential demands of the COE on a sustained basis, including potential domestic requirements. The complexity of modern CBRN hazards and the increased likelihood of their occurrence (even if only accidentally released) require the

Army to build new GS CBRN Def specialist capabilities and to enhance and reinvigorate the Army's existing IS and CS CBRN Def capabilities. In addition to basic equipment like NAVDs and 3-way paper, all sub-units must be equipped with at least limited amounts of CS equipment such as CAMs, GID 3s, RDS-100s and M256A1 Chemical Agent detection kits, and must be capable of operating them without GS assistance. At the same time, Army GS capabilities (specifically high-end recce and surveillance, thorough decontamination and COLPRO) will be built to provide these specialist assets for expeditionary operations. While designed and built for international deployments, if required these GS elements will clearly be available for domestic operations as well.

While recognizing the need for GS CBRN Def elements, it is clear there are constraints in terms of financial resources, and far more importantly manpower within the Regular

Force. While this does not preclude forming Regular Force CBRN Def sub-units, it does make it less likely. As a result of these constraints, it is proposed that this CBRN Def GS capability be built primarily within the Army Reserves. In order to provide a sufficient force generation base it is further proposed that the Army build six sub-unit sized units across Canada, with at least one in every LF area. These Army reserve sub-units would be made up of a mix of part-time and full-time reservists. The preferred ratio has not been clearly identified to date, and will depend on the final readiness requirement, but will likely include up to 25% full time pers. These sub-units will be organized to provide scalable "building block" structures capable of providing any or all of the following assets on a sustained basis, for both expeditionary and if necessary, domestic, ops:

- CBRN Def Coordination Centre;
- CBRN Def Recce and Surveillance elements;
- CBRN Def Thorough Decontamination elements;
- CBRN Def Collective Protection Elements; and
- CBRN Def Company HQ.

CBRN sub-units will be built in section-sized building blocks that will allow sections, platoons, composite platoons or even complete CBRN Def Coys to be deployed on operations (either domestic or expeditionary) depending on the threat. This will also allow some CBRN Def GS capabilities in a multi-national environment to be provided by allies while other specific capabilities will be provided by Canada.

Sponsorship

One of the major issues with respect to our current CBRN Def organization is that by belonging to several branches, it in effect belongs to no one. Within DAD it is considered critical that CBRN Def be taken over and championed by one branch. This will allow for ownership, continuity, experience and improved capture of lessons learned. It is possible that individuals from several other branches could fill some of the positions but it is vital that one branch be responsible for all aspects of GS CBRN Def.

Conclusion

Canada can no longer treat CBRN Def as non-essential. The threat, either from deliberate attack, accidental release or a deteriorating infrastructure is a reality both abroad and domestically, and will likely increase. All members of the Canadian Army must increase their awareness and capability at all levels. All service members (and contractors deployed overseas) must have a higher level of knowledge of the threat, and be more capable of self-protection in all circumstances. Additionally, the Army must be able to generate highly capable CBRN Def specialist elements in response to the threat assessment, either at home or abroad. Development of these sub-units will achieve that.

DIRECTORATE OF ARMY TRAINING UPDATE: WHY BURDEN OURSELVES WITH STANDARDS?

Lieutenant-Colonel Roch Giguère, CD

Since arriving at DAT in 2004, I've heard variations on the above question a number of times. Sometimes they were said jokingly, but to my great surprise, some of the people making the comments were serious. The purpose of this article is, then, to present an update on the organization of standards within the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) and in particular, to demystify the role of the Command Chief Standards Officer (CCSO) and that of the standards community in the Army.

The Standards Community

First of all, it is important to note that the command standards community is made up of about 100 CF members (65 Regular Force members and 35 Reservists). However, the standards organization at LFDTS HQ consists solely of the author of this article, the Training Development Officer (TDO) of the command and a captain acting as coordinator, all three of whom report to the Director of Army Training (DAT). Fortunately, we can count on the cooperation of the two DAT 5 chief warrant officers, who also serve as Standards CWOs. In addition, a command standards organization representative (CSOR) with the rank of chief warrant officer is co-located in each LFA area training centre and reports directly to the CCSO. The rest of the command standards community structures belong to the various LFAs, training centres, and Reserve brigades.

The Role of CSORs

I think it is essential to briefly explain the raison d'être and role of CSORs. In the late 1990s, Army authorities were under external pressure to have an ombudsman's representative co-located at each training centre. This represented a considerable challenge, especially as the possibility was raised at the time that the position could be held by a civilian with a separate chain of command. In the end, it was decided instead to post a CF member with the rank of chief warrant officer in each LFA area, but reporting to the CCSO at LFDTS HQ Kingston. Their broad experience, credibility and networking abilities give these members all the tools they need to observe and analyze the conduct of courses and advise various participants involved in individual training. Their main role is to ensure that all candidates and instructors have access to the CSOR* to express their concerns freely and directly. Their mandate is to act independently of the chain of command as neutral and objective agents on training issues, and to provide candidates with the necessary information on the procedures to follow to obtain assistance or resolve a problem. Then they must make the appropriate recommendations at the lowest level of command capable of effecting the necessary changes. If the CSOR considers an inquiry is necessary and justified, he or she must refer the case to the appropriate authority. Lastly, while maintaining confidentiality, the CSOR must communicate his or her recommendations and/or opinions to the CCSO and the chain of command. As well as being the CCSO's main

* CSOR is also the acronym for the newly created Canadian Special Operations Regiment.

point of contact, the CSOR acts as the spark plug initiating the dispute resolution process when necessary.

The Command and Control Relationship

The command and control relationship between the various stakeholders in the standards community is not a simple one, and it differs depending on their roles. For example, CSORs, who are spread across the country in every LFA, are under the operational command of the CCSO in Kingston. Area Chief Standards Officers (ACSOs) report to their respective LFA commanders. The relationship between ACSOs and the CCSO is one of coordination and is based solely on the professionalism and good will of everyone involved. Lastly, standards personnel in training centres, Reserve brigades and the Combat Training Centre (CTC) report to their respective chains of command and have with no official link with ACSOs and the CCSO. Given that the CCSO's mandate is "To maintain oversight over individual training within the Army and to advise Comd LFDTS on issues relating to the implementation of the 'One Army, One Standard' concept," it is clear that the command relationship described above poses a significant challenge.

It is important to remember that the standards community as we know it today was established only at the beginning of this century and that we were neither familiar nor at ease with the concept. After a gestation period of almost five years, this organization has now reached a level of maturity sufficient to enable it to move toward a control model better adapted to current circumstances. However, we know that the LFAs must preserve their integral standards capability. The LFAs are our first-line clients, our raison d'être, and we must serve them to the best of our ability. For their part, standards personnel assigned to the CTC provide the expertise essential to maintaining standards in specific fields. And, lastly, training centres and brigades (Regular and Reserve) prepare soldiers to carry out their duties on operations. All these stakeholders have important roles to play, and all of them must be involved in establishing and applying standards. Can all these capabilities be centralized under a single authority without damaging existing relationships? Can a pyramidal command relationship of the kind we know so well be introduced in the standards community? Can we seriously exercise total control of this widely dispersed community from LFDTS HQ? The answer to these questions is "no". But is it possible to maintain some elements' command relationships while still establishing an operational control (OPCON) relationship? Can certain elements of the CCSO be centralized under OPCON without affecting the integral capabilities of the LFAs and formations? Possibly.

It is important to remember that the standards community as we know it today was established only at the beginning of this century and that we were neither familiar nor at ease with the concept

Standards Equals An Insurance Policy

Since the establishment of the standards section at LFDTS HQ, a closer relationship exists between various command standards levels. Standards personnel are increasingly visible, and their presence is steadily growing. Yet many people still see them as an obstacle or impediment to the accomplishment of their missions. During my visits across the country since July 2004, I have taken pains to demystify the role of standards personnel and to get the message across that, far from being a hindrance, standards personnel are an additional tool for helping course personnel accomplish

their tasks. Standards personnel are not the command "Gestapo." Our role is not to gleefully point out course personnel's errors or omissions; on the contrary, it is to identify weaknesses and propose solutions, while ensuring that this process has the least possible impact on the conduct of courses. I see the command standards community as an insurance policy or fire brigade for the Army. We all spend considerable sums on insurance, hoping we will never have to file a claim. Usually, municipal fire departments are set up in the hope that they will never be needed. How often do firefighters respond to false alarms without having to take action? The analogy holds where standards are concerned. Occasionally, complaints from candidates or instructors create a tempest in a teapot: great efforts are made to determine exactly what happened, and in the end, we find that the institution in question made the right decisions and responded well. I understand that this causes considerable frustration, but each time we respond to a "false alarm," I believe we have done our job and that we must make an extra effort to ensure that everything has been done in accordance with the standards. The cost of this "insurance" is negligible compared to the Army's total budget, and it increases our credibility in the eyes of the public and our future soldiers.

According to statistics compiled since 2004, the weaknesses identified are primarily related to the following factors:

♦ Inexperience of instructors or course personnel. It is not unusual for a newly graduated or promoted candidate to be used as an instructor. Despite their good intentions, these young soldiers often have difficulty delivering the course material in accordance with standards.

♦ Overconfidence on the part of some organizations or groups of instructors (the opposite of the preceding problem). After working in a particular field for a number of years, instructors may acquire bad habits and have difficulty adjusting to our 21st-century training philosophy.

♦ The operational and training tempo imposed on units for some years now tempt course personnel to cut corners in a bid to obtain similar results in less time. Candidates must absorb the material more rapidly, standards suffer, and the end product does not live up to expectations.

♦ The ever-increasing number of requests for exemptions of all kinds. This procedure should be used only in exceptional cases, but it has become the norm. It is rare to find courses that do not require exemptions in order to obtain the necessary personnel. Despite the good intentions of personnel selected in this way, the quality of training suffers.

Proposed Option

ACSOs are without a doubt the cornerstone of the standards organization. Without their constant support, it would be impossible for me to ensure overall visibility of Army standards. However, too often ACSOs are used for purposes other than standards. The situation is even more critical when ACSOs cannot do their standards work during the summer, the most important training period of the year. Without the constant presence of ACSOs, visit coordination is deficient, Area analysis is non-existent, and the CCSO's visibility is seriously diminished.

In order to deal with the problem without reducing this particular capability within the areas, I propose a relationship in which control is shared between LFAs and the command standards organization. That way, ACSOs can remain under operational command (OPCOMM) of the LFA while working under operational control (OPCON) of the CCSO (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Proposed Option

This proposal was submitted to the Army Training Council on 18 November 2005. After each area has had a chance to study the proposal and submit comments, a decision will be made in spring 2006 whether to maintain the status quo or move toward the shared control model. In the meantime, all comments, suggestions and opinions will be welcomed. It must be recognized that this is a compromise that does not completely address all concerns of the parties involved. However, this proposal will enable us to further strengthen the technical link between the CCSO and ACSOs. At the same time, the areas will retain operational control of ACSOs, but the CCSO will have sufficient control to fulfil the mandate of achieving overall visibility for Army standards.

Conclusion

Giant steps have been taken since the standards community was created within the Army. Standardization of basic DP1 and DP2 courses has been greatly improved. Cooperation and information exchange between the various levels are exemplary, despite the fact that the relationship is not official and that the people involved do not all report to a single, distinct chain of command. The credibility of standards personnel is growing with each passing year, and we are more and more favourably regarded by the training establishments. The proposed option, while strengthening the link between the CCSO and ACSOs, will further improve adherence to standards and help the chain of command properly manage the risks inherent in individual training.

DIRECTORATE OF LAND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS UPDATE: CRISIS IN ZEFRA

Colonel James B. Simms, CD

The Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) provides advice to the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) on the future security environment, the capabilities that will be required to operate in that environment, and alternative concepts and technologies to achieve the required capabilities. In meeting its mandate, the Directorate examines a wide range of issues covering the global and domestic environments, emerging technologies and allied and foreign force developments.

In 2003, DLSC published Future Force, a theoretical conceptual framework designed to assist the Army leadership and those staffs working on the Army of Tomorrow constructs. It describes the outlook and trends that reach out to 2025 and it provides recommendations to allow the Army to evolve to meet and conquer the challenges it will face in the future.

This year DLSC produced the first companion work to Future Force titled, Crisis in Zefra. Designed to provide an illustrated narrative for many of the concepts discussed in Future Force, Crisis in Zefra follows a well-established Canadian Army tradition of employing military fiction to describe and characterize the nature of what in only a few years in the future may become military fact.

Crisis in Zefra was constructed with the aim of introducing possible future systems of command and control, new technologies, and post-modern tactics, techniques, and procedures. At the same time, Crisis in Zefra may appear eerily familiar to some, and this was done intentionally to keep the story plausible while exploring the not yet possible. Most importantly, the story intends to introduce but one of many concepts of how Canada's Army may fight its future wars, with the hope that the reader will deconstruct, analyze, and debate the ideas presented here amongst your peers and also on line at the Crisis in Zefra website forum (www.army.forces.gc.ca/zefra/).

Much is said about Canadian Forces and Canadian Army transformation, but in order to remain relevant and successful, the Army must relentlessly explore new options. As the current and future security environment continues to evolve, it is our duty to ask, "what if?" as well as constantly explore alternative futures, any one of which might become a reality for us down the road.

THE THEORY OF FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

Mr. Vincent J. Curtis

All wisdom is not new wisdom
Winston S. Churchill


William S. Lind

In October, 1989, William S. Lind, et al[1] published in the *Marine Corps Gazette* a paper in which the authors attempted to discern the future of warfare. The authors looked for what they called "dialectically qualitative" changes in warfare, which, in turn, were driven by changes in technology and in ideas. Based upon the number of the dialectically qualitative changes they found. They called this future "Fourth Generation Warfare."

The purpose of this article is to explain and then critique the theories of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) elucidated by the two principal writers on the subject. A clear and sharp distinction must be kept in mind between a theory and war, which is the subject matter of the theory, and between acts of war and acts of ordinary politics.

Linds Theory of Fourth Generation Warfare

Lind opens his analysis with the assertion that modern war began at the end of the Thirty Years War. This major European war concluded in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. The army of Gustavus Adolphus was the most tactically advanced of the time having in that war decisively proved in battle its superiority to the Spanish square. Its decidedly linear battle formation proved to be more tactically flexible and to be able to generate more firepower than the Spanish battle formation. The Treaty of Westphalia is significant in history and to Lind's theory because it established the nation state as the principal actor in European continental, and eventually in world, politics.

Lind's theory defines first generation warfare (1GW) as one characterized by linearity, with militaries having a certain "order," and by the nation state holding a monopoly on the use of war to obtain political ends.

Lind declared second generation warfare (2GW) to have been ushered in by the French during the First World War. According to Lind, the French developed the method of fire and movement that was encapsulated in the slogan "Artillery conquers, infantry occupies." This generation of warfare is also characterized by linearity but differs from the first generation in the dispersion of the formations. In 2GW, infantry advance on the battlefield in small groups and by means of short rushes rather than continuously in a grand line, as is the case in 1GW. The armies of 2GW retain the military "order" of the first generation armies, and nation states retain their monopoly on war.

Lind asserted that third generation warfare (3GW) also had its genesis during the First World War, due to the Germans. The Germans developed the tactics of infiltration

that were used by the Storm Troopers in the offensive of 1918.[2] The role of the Storm Troopers was to be the first wave of attack. They were to infiltrate the enemy's entrenched position and cause it to collapse. Lind considers this to be the first example of manoeuvre warfare, which he had helped to popularize with a book he wrote only four years previously.[3] Manoeuvre warfare is Lind's 3GW, and is characterized by non-linearity and dispersion.

2GW, characterized by dispersion only, was driven by technological change, namely the development of the repeating rifle and smokeless powder. 3GW was driven by a change in ideas, namely that of non-linearity as well as dispersion.

On the basis of these trends, Lind attempted to project what a fourth generation of warfare would be like. He believed the trends towards dispersion and non-linearity would continue and that 4GW would be characterized by extreme non-linearity and extreme dispersion. This meant 4GW would be that conducted by small, armed bands operating throughout the entire theatre of war. In order to function, these bands would have to be lightly armed to be able to move quickly, and would have no centralized logistics, as that term would be understood by a 2GW/3GW army. Because they would lack centralized logistics these bands would have to live off the land to a large degree and would have find or improvise explosives in the area in which they operated. Mission command would have to carry over from 3GW in order to give a focus to the activities of these bands.

The operational aim of the military that employed 4GW would be to cause a collapse of the enemy's will to resist by means of numerous pinprick attacks. These attacks would not be primarily against the enemy's military but against the homeland of the enemy and against the enemy's culture. Because the aim is to cause a collapse of the will to resist within the leadership, or at least within the population of the enemy state, psychological warfare would play a major role in the effort. The enemy state's military would ideally be irrelevant to 4GW combatants. Because of the nature of the combat, 4GW could be undertaken by non-state actors, thereby ending the monopoly on warfare that nation states have had since the Treaty of Westphalia; and a military "order" would not be necessary in the force that employed it.

Since technology and ideas are the drivers of dialectically qualitative changes, Lind examined both possibilities in the context of the vision he had of 4GW operations. Lind speculated that if technology drives 4GW, it might see the rise of directed energy weapons, and the leaders of the state that employed 4GW as the operational means would have to be masters both of the art of war and of technology. Lind was pessimistic in 1989 about the ability of America to procure the hi-tech weapons suitable to fight a technology driven 4GW.

When he turned to a 4GW driven by ideas, he considered immediately the model of terrorism. Lind did not believe that terrorism per se represented 4GW, but did acknowledge that signs of it pointed to 4GW. For example, terrorist organizations exhibit some of the carry-overs from 3GW (i.e. manoeuvre warfare) such as mission command. Terrorists and guerrillas aim at collapsing the enemy by attacks in his rear, and in shifting the focus from a "front" to a "rear." Terrorist organizations exhibit the characteristics of 4GW when they strike directly at the enemy's homeland at civilian

targets, regarding the enemy's military as irrelevant to the effort. Terrorists use cheap weapons and they improvise explosives that are readily available in the host country. Terrorists have no culture of order, which Lind regards as an advantage in 4GW. Terrorist organizations are skilful in using the media to spread propaganda and transmit operational instructions.

The methods of narco-terrorists came close to meeting Lind's criteria for 4GW in that they attack the enemy's culture by subverting it with drugs and because modern militaries have little capability against narco-terrorist bands, according to Lind. Lind also speculated that terrorism aided by high technology and in the service of an ideology or religion would likely constitute 4GW because the aim of the terrorist operations would be directed against the culture of the enemy state. Lind declared that terrorists win a victory of sorts if we set aside some of our legal protections to gain greater security. Lind issued a dire warning to those who would ignore what he said,

> *Whoever is first to recognize, understand, and implement a generational change can gain a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophic defeat.*

A Superficial Dogmatism

Lind's theory is a rather typical example of philosophical system building. Philosophical system building begins by dogmatically laying down supposedly irrefutable propositions and from them rationally deducing the consequences. This process creates an intellectual edifice that has the appearance of intellectual respectability because the process superficially resembles the manner in which Euclidian geometry, mathematical physics, and other sciences are elucidated. Philosophical systems are dogmatic, rationalistic, and in varying degrees out of touch with common experience. A philosophical system offers no alternative except wholesale acceptance or rejection. The system constitutes a world of its own and has no commerce or conversation with anything outside of itself.[4]

Being a system, the reference "fourth generation warfare" constitutes not only the name of an operational method that it is characteristic of the system, but also an affirmation of the analysis which brought that term into existence

Being a system, the reference "fourth generation warfare" constitutes not only the name of an operational method that it is characteristic of the system, but also an affirmation of the analysis which brought that term into existence. One cannot say "fourth" and "generation" without implicitly affirming the existence of three previous generations and hence the theory by which the fourth generation was named.

Lind's elucidation is certainly dogmatic. Dating the beginning modern warfare as 1648 is contentious and completely arbitrary. The dialectical criteria of linearity and dispersion are likewise chosen arbitrarily out of a plethora of other criteria for classifying the advancement of warfare. The theory has no conversation with anything outside of itself. It ignores the theory of the "Three-Block War."[5] It appears unaware of important insights of Clausewitz and the work of Trevor N. DuPuy. It largely ignores the basic military concepts of offensive and defensive, and of strategy and tactics. The

selection of culture as an aim of fighting a war is not merely odd, it would imply a repeal of the principle that wars are undertaken to obtain political ends.

The concepts of symmetry and asymmetry are central to his theory, yet Lind fails to discuss 4GW in those terms. Lind fails to explain why, if a modern military is largely irrelevant to the conduct of 4GW, modern militaries should not be retained as they are and that nation states simply develop an entirely new special force with which to conduct 4GW. Lind's theory is guilty of illicitly comparing things of different genera. 1GW refers to warfare in which battle is fought in close-packed linear formations, but 2GW, 3GW, and 4GW refer to operational methods of attack. Lind's theory is empty on the subject of defence. The reason is simple. Defence in war is the saying of "this is ours and you can't have it." This mentality involves the drawing of lines (or circles).[6]

2RCHA standing by near Kabul Afghanistan

But linearity is characteristic of the obsolete, obtuse 1GW. 4GW is said to be an operational technique for attacking linear thinking, and it is self-contradictory to speak of defending in a non-linear way. Hence, 4GW can have no defence component.

Finally, 4GW theory is only about an operational method; 4GW is not a strategy or a war plan. The references to the nation state possessing since 1648 a monopoly over the use of war to attain political ends are both false and unnecessary. They are false, as partisan warfare has been known and written about since the time of Clausewitz. They are unnecessary, because an operational theory doesn't need to be developed on the basis that an alleged monopoly prohibits nation states from using it. Likewise, references to military "order" are unnecessary to develop a method of operational attack. Because Lind's theory is a dogmatically exposited system, one is left with the choice of accepting or rejecting the theory of 4GW in its entirety.

Lind and Dupuy

Five years before Lind wrote his paper announcing 4GW, Trevor N. DuPuy published a book entitled: *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*.[7] In it, DuPuy traces how

technological progress and innovative leadership affected the conduct of warfare from 2000 BC to the 1980s. Anticipating Lind, DuPuy concluded that the application of sound, imaginative thinking to existing weapons caused the great developments in military affairs and influenced international relations. DuPuy lists over two dozen radical innovations in ideas and technology that changed the conduct of warfare, seven of them in land warfare since the time of Frederick the Great.

DuPuy explained why he thought each change was significant to the conduct of warfare. Gustavus Adolphus married infantry and artillery in a flexible linear formation that defeated the Spanish square. Frederick the Great introduced the flintlock rifle and perfected gunpowder tactics. Then came the incomparable Napoleon Bonaparte and the revolution in warfare known as "the Nation in Arms." The industrial revolution brought about tremendous changes in the scope, quality, and quantity of manufactured goods, and thus enhanced the capacity for waging war. There is the development of the conidial bullet, the rifled barrel, and smokeless powder. There is the invention of the machine gun, barbed wire, and high explosives. There is the development of air power, nuclear weapons, and guided missiles. Subsequent to DuPuy's book there is the development of smart weapons, and the revolution in military affairs (RMA). DuPuy does not regard the development of guerrilla warfare as an advancement, or another generation, of warfare.

Trevor N. DuPuy is a well-known and highly published military writer. Significantly, Lind nowhere acknowledges ever having read the book, or exhibits a familiarity with its contents. Lind cannot acknowledge DuPuy's work if his system is to survive. Lind's method of dialectical qualitative analysis relies on a comparison of degrees of linearity or non-linearity, dispersion and order, culture, and the state. With these he is able to account for only three of the seven qualitative changes in warfare that DuPuy identifies since the artificial choice of 1648 as the beginning of modern warfare. Lind's theory regards Frederick the Great and Napoleon as being of no account in the development of warfare. Air power, the strategic bombing campaign, nuclear weapons, smart weapons and cruise missiles are of no account in the development of warfare from 1918 to 2005.

If Lind acknowledged DuPuy's work, which covers the same ground, Lind would have to reconcile his analysis and results with those of DuPuy, who wrote earlier. He would have to explain why DuPuy was wrong and he was right. He would have to spend too much time explaining why the next generation is the "fourth" rather than moving quickly into describing his vision of what the next generation would be like, which was the purpose of Lind's work. However, it is crucial that Lind does spend the time defending the validity of his analysis because it is based upon that analysis that he projects future trends. If the basis of the analysis is faulty, then the projection of the future that is the product of that analysis is unreliable. Failing to deal with DuPuy is simply another example of a dogmatic system failing to converse with anything outside of itself.

4GW and Air Power

A strategic air campaign and nuclear attack closely match the description of 4GW under the terms of Lind's "dialectical qualitative" analysis. The strategic bombing campaigns undertaken against Germany and Japan during World War II were non-linear in that they struck throughout the depth of the enemy's homeland. There were no

lines. The aircraft flew in small groups until they assembled quickly to attack the designated target, and then dispersed to return home. The flying aircraft of course had no logistical tail within the airspace of the enemy state. The aim of the air campaign was to collapse the capacity and the will of the enemy to resist. The air campaign destroyed many of the edifices of the enemy's culture. And an infantryman would notice immediately the relative lack of order and discipline within the ranks of the airmen.

An all out nuclear attack against an enemy state would be an even closer fit to Lind's criteria for a 4GW. In addition to meeting all the criteria that a strategic bombing campaign does, an all out nuclear attack would likely undermine the culture of the enemy state. The Black Death of the 14th century killed about a third of Europe's population, and the resulting scarcity of labour brought about the end of feudalism. A nuclear attack that killed between a third and a half of a country's population would likely profoundly change the culture of the population that survived. Lind's description of 4GW, in other words, cannot differentiate between guerrilla warfare and nuclear attack.

Generation or Style?

Of his "generations" then, the modern guerrilla warfare that is going on presently in Iraq and Afghanistan is certainly not the "fourth." But is the term "generations" proper to Lind's theory? The term "generation" suggests the evolution in descent or pedigree after the passage of time. Lind's second generation is development by the French of the tactics of "Artillery conquers, infantry occupies." This term, coined by J.F.C. Fuller, would refer to the method of attack of the French army after May 1917. Henri-Philippe Pétain took over command of the French armies on the Western Front from Robert Neville following the disastrous offensive of April 1917 and the subsequent mutiny. At the same time, and quite independently of the French, the Germans were casting about for new offensive tactics and settled upon the infiltration tactics that had been used experimentally by small groups since 1915.[8] Thus the French and the Germans came upon two different solutions to the same problem at about the same time independent of each other. There is no valid generational relationship between the two. One was not superseded by the other. One did not beget the other. Hence, 4GW is neither "fourth" nor a "generation" because 2GW did not give birth to 3GW, and it can hardly be said that manoeuvre warfare gave birth to guerrilla warfare or to terrorism. The term style is more correct than generation, but if Lind used style instead of generation, it would undermine the validity of his analysis that is based on perceived trends in linearity and dispersion.

Lind has to find fault with earlier methods or else there is no urgency to move the US military into the "next generation," which is his purpose

Lind is certainly harsh in his condemnation of the employment of "linearity." He regards linearity as a kind of obtuse affectation characteristic of weak-minded generals. His system will not allow him to admit that linearity can be militarily useful. It can simplify military matters considerably by being able to say, "this is our territory, there is the territory controlled by the enemy, and somewhere in between here and there is a boundary." Frederick the Great employed linearity. So did Napoleon. Robert E. Lee

and Von Moltke the Elder deployed troops in lines. It gave great comfort to the citizens of Paris during World War I to know that there was a line beyond which the Germans were not allowed to pass. Even guerrillas require safe areas.

Likewise, the method of "artillery conquers, infantry occupies" (or ACIO) still works wonderfully against an enemy strongpoint. The Americans employed superior firepower to splendid effect in the conquest of Fallujah in November 2004. The ACIO technique is not passé as Lind's theory asserts. It still has its tactical applications. But Lind has to find fault with earlier methods or else there is no urgency to move the US military into the "next generation," which is his purpose.

4GW and Asymmetry

Symmetry and asymmetry find no direct place within Lind's "generations" analysis. But it is there. Lind holds that 3GW is superior to 2GW and that 4GW will supersede 3GW. This means that a 2GW belligerent is at a distinct disadvantage, all other things being equal, to a 3GW opponent; likewise, a 2GW/3GW belligerent against a 4GW opponent. Consequently, Lind's position is that fighting 4GW asymmetrically places modern militaries at a disadvantage, and by his dire warning would imply that modern militaries have to become like 4GW opponents in their operations.

This would mean that modern militaries would have to give up centralized logistics, live off the land, improvise most of their more powerful weapons from locally available materials, operate greatly dispersed throughout the entirety of the theatre of operations, and conduct terrorist-like atrocities against the population with the operational aim of breaking the will of the enemy to resist and of subverting their culture. And of course, they would have to give up the notion of defending any place.

What 4GW Means

Lind's most famous description of 4GW is: "In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and *largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred* to the vanishing point." This description is pathetic. If 4GW is "largely undefined" then 4GW can mean practically anything—or nothing at all. Is it even warfare? A vanishing distinction between war and peace cries out for an explanation. What is this condition like? It is a theoretician's job to establish definitions and to draw distinctions. Lind's famous description amounts to an empty vessel that can be filled with nearly anything, and is. 4GW is not a generation, not a fourth, and one cannot stipulate that it is warfare. It is merely a buzzword.

Hammes's Theory of Fourth Generation Warfare

USMC Retd
Col Thomas X. Hammes

Thomas X. Hammes is another important writer on the subject of 4GW.[9] Hammes was not one of the original co-authors of Lind's 1989 paper. Hammes, however, adopts Lind's terminology and yet rejects Lind's "generational" analysis.

Hammes identifies Mao Tse Tung as the originator, and the communist guerrilla movement in China as a precursor, of 4GW. As experience was gained in guerrilla warfare in various conflicts throughout the 20th century the cumulative result was a new approach to war, according to Hammes. The Taliban in

Afghanistan and the insurgents in Iraq are simply the latest to use the approach that has been developing for decades. Hammes holds that the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union from 1980 to 1989 was another example of 4GW.

The key to understanding 4GW, according to Hammes, lies in his theory of messages. 4GW attempts to change the minds of policy makers directly, but not by the traditional method of destroying their enemy's armed forces. It is achieved by the sending of messages.

Policymakers and those who influence them receive messages tailored to achieve the basic purpose of war: change their political position on a matter of national interest. In Iraq and Afghanistan we see examples of the tailoring of messages: supporters are told they are defending the faith and their country against the invader; the uncommitted are told to stay out of the fight; and finally the invaders are told to withdraw or be faced with an endless, costly fight.

The guerrillas use materials available in the society to wreak destruction. Because the insurgents do not produce the materials they use, they do not need to protect core production assets, as a state would. Having nothing to defend and no supplies to transport, the guerrillas are free to focus on offensive operations. The guerrillas only have to move money and ideas.

Hammes declares 4GW to be a political rather than a military struggle

4GW of course involves bloodshed, and civilians tend to be the casualties. The guerrillas use international, transnational, national, and subnational networks to convey their political messages, according to Hammes. By threatening their vulnerabilities, the guerrillas cause these networks to pass threatening, intimidating messages that slow or paralyze international response. The operational aim of 4GW practitioners is to create political paralysis in the target country. Bloodshed is not always necessary to convey a paralyzing message. Hammes gives the examples of the Sandinistas sponsoring trips to congressional aides and mainline church groups and granting exclusive interviews to news networks to help convince them that the United States should favour the Sandinista movement. Washington lobbying groups could also be hired to convey a subversive message. The Internet is now also becoming a means of putting out an influential word.

The effective practitioner of 4GW, according to Hammes, first determines the message he wants to send, then chooses the network best suited to carry it, conducts the action that will cause the message to be sent, and then finally checks to see if the message is being received. Carefully targeted bombing attacks are often the action employed that causes the message to be sent. Immediate, high-impact messages are sent through visual media in the form of dramatic and bloody images. In the longer term, more thought provoking messages are sent through business, religious, economic, and artistic networks by means of guided tours of refugee camps, exclusive interviews with insurgent leaders, as well as by targeted kidnappings, beheadings, car bombings, and assassinations. Attacks against the United States homeland by means of WMDs would also be undertaken if such were feasible. The key message to be sent is that the resistance will be a long one. This is predicated on the assumption that the United States, the key opponent in a 4GW contest, lacks the patience to prevail in struggles lasting five years or more.

Hammes declares 4GW to be a political rather than a military struggle. The insurgents, by the exertion of superior political will, intend to defeat the superior powers. The kind of warfare employed by the insurgents is hard for nation states to defeat because the insurgency is organized to gain political success rather than gain military victories, he argues. Practitioners of 4GW are focused on changing the minds of decision makers and on breaking their political will. Hammes catalogues a long list of clever tactics by which insurgency movements have scored political, and a few tactical, points against conventional militaries.

Hammes opts to fight 4GW symmetrically. He declares that modern insurgencies are the only kind of war that the United States has lost, and lists Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia as examples. Insurgencies defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Russia is said to be bleeding in Chechnya. However, Hammes holds out hope that some insurgencies can be put down, and lists Malaya, Oman, and El Salvador as examples. He concludes that since the United States cannot force the insurgents to fight a short, high intensity, high technology war, it must learn to fight 4GW on its own terms.

Hammes offers advice on how the United States can prevail in a 4GW contest. He says the United States must be able to:

- train personnel in a genuine interagency environment;
- develop personnel through the equivalent of military joint tours;
- deploy interagency personnel from all segments of the U.S government overseas for much longer tours;
- operate interagency elements down to the tactical level;
- eliminate the detailed, bureaucratic processes that characterize peacetime actions; and
- develop procedures for fully integrating international organizations that are necessary to succeed against an adept, agile opponent.

Analysis of Hammes' Theory

By his use of the term 4GW, Hammes identifies himself as a disciple of the Lind theory of the evolution of modern warfare. However, by specifying the guerrilla warfare of the 20th century starting with Mao Tse Tung in the 1920s as the genesis of 4GW, he contradicts Lind (and himself) and undercuts the theory of "generations"—and with it linearity and dispersion as valid analytical criteria. (If Mao is the genesis of 4GW, then 3GW is not.)

The 4GW School would appear to hold that 2GW, 3GW, and 4GW existed and developed simultaneously throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This proposition demolishes the notion that one generation evolved from another, and it is passing strange to say guerrilla warfare in China of the 1920s was the descendant of blitzkrieg. Hammes is probably unaware of the contradictory positions he holds on the origin of "Fourth Generation Warfare" as he nowhere tries to bring his theory of the origin of 4GW into harmony with that of Lind. Nor does Hammes anywhere explain why

guerrilla conflict represents an advancement in warfare. There is, in short, no value in thinking of terrorism and modern insurgency as "Fourth Generation" warfare.

The statement by Hammes that 4GW is a political rather than a military struggle would come as a terrible muddle to Clausewitz, who held that war was a continuation of politics by other means. It is politics that gives war its aim and shapes its conduct. Hammes probably means that politics is more important than combat in a guerrilla conflict, but 4GW is supposed to be an operational technique of war, not a technique of politics per se.

A description of current tactics used by terrorists and insurgents is useful information, but a catalogue of clever tactics and possible tactics by insurgents does not amount to a theory of warfare

The obvious questions that Hammes fails to address are: at what point is it beyond the proper competency of apolitical western militaries to engage in the politics of guerrilla war? At what point do the politicians who control western militaries step up and do their part in the political struggle?

In his theory concerning the importance of messages in 4GW, Hammes makes a crucial philosophical mistake. He makes the part equal or greater than the whole. If 4GW means anything, it means an operational technique. 4GW is not a strategy or a war plan. It means a kind of fighting. But fighting is not the only way in which a political actor like a state carries on the struggle towards the attainment of a national goal (or a guerrilla movement gaining political power). War is the continuation of politics by other means. War is only one way in which a political actor like a state conducts its politics. War is only one means by which a nation works its strategy.

In 1940, Winston Churchill certainly used the British forces to fight Hitler; but he also used personal charm, his formidable reputation in America, his speaking skills, national finances, as well as more traditional diplomacy to bring the United States onto the side of Great Britain.

But no one should confuse personal charm, speaking skills, and the skilful employment of a reputation as a kind of warfare.

Hammes plainly confounds the routine methods of diplomacy, politics, and propaganda with the operational technique of 4GW. Hammes assigns to an operational technique all the ways in which a political actor attains its national goal. This clearly is false. A part is not the whole. 4GW is one tool in the box; the Madison Avenue ad campaign is another tool in the box. Not everything a 4GW warrior does is 4GW.

Hammes starts his theory with Mao. Mao stressed the importance of orthodox forces in the attainment of victory in an insurgency and national liberation.[10] The third phase of the conflict was when guerrilla forces were strong enough to be converted into orthodox forces and defeat the enemy army in conventional battle. It was the loss of Dien Bien Phu that cost the French Vietnam.[11] The third phase was what was attempted in Vietnam in 1968, 1972, and finally in 1975. Mao deprecated the idea that guerrilla forces alone were capable of achieving victory. Hammes agrees with Mao on this point, and it remains an unresolved contradiction that Hammes expatiates at book length upon avoiding defeat in a kind of warfare that he admits cannot yield decisive results.

A description of current tactics used by terrorists and insurgents is useful information, but a catalogue of clever tactics and possible tactics by insurgents does not amount to a theory of warfare. The implication that the western world has to be prepared to defend against all clever tactics reveals another contradiction among the 4GW theorists. Building a defence against human ingenuity ought to be seen an example of fruitless, 1GW linear thinking. Trying to be strong everywhere is militarily unsound. A manoeuvrist can tell you that any defensive wall can be breached in time, and that true military wisdom lies in having strong, mobile reserves. A good general does not panic at the first setback. Warfare involves the taking as well as the striking of blows.

The value of Hammes' work is that it specifies guerrilla warfare as the fourth generation of warfare, which Lind refrained from doing. His lengthy discourse on the sending of messages does not properly pertain to an operational technique of warfare.

Is Wholesale Change Necessary?

Sgt Scott Bentley with Task Force Kabul confering with ANA platoon commanders

Both Hammes and Lind want the US military to prepare for 4GW. The question can now be put: disregarding all the errors of 4GW theory, is wholesale change necessary, and what guidance can 4GW theory offer?

Hammes's list of recommendations points to glaring weaknesses in the 4GW school of thought, and points to the uselessness of 4GW theory as guidance. In Hammes case, it is by no means clear what training people in the wonders of "interagency operations" will do to defend against guerrilla warfare. Lind offers no help at all in showing how modern militaries can adapt to 4GW methods, as he says they must. No advice is offered as to the tactical defensive in 4GW. Lind wants the United States military to fight 4GW symmetrically rather than asymmetrically, but Lind and Hammes expect the

United States to fight a 4GW conflict on the defensive, a style of warfare that has no defensive component. These theorists neglect altogether to explore the weaknesses of a 4GW antagonist against the offensive power of the United States.

Hammes, by his recommendation to create a new force of "interagency" warriors, should not be hostile to the conventional military being retained and a special 4GW force being developed.

The United States actually conducted offensive guerrilla-like operations in the Vietnam War. Special Forces led small elements into Laos and Cambodia to conduct operations against the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the United States also operated the Phoenix Program in South Vietnam, which conducted targeted kidnappings and assassinations against the Viet Cong infrastructure throughout the country.[12] These programs had to be conducted in secret because the political ramifications at home if such programs became known would have further undermined support for the war in Vietnam. Thus the United States has demonstrated already the capability of conducting guerrilla-like operations, and found that politically they can be counter-productive. And since politics is at least as important as combat operations in a guerrilla conflict, it is by no means conclusive that the United States and its allies ought to employ the operational method called 4GW in the pursuit of its national political goals.

The United States is therefore condemned to fight 4GW largely asymmetrically. But is this necessarily bad? It is generally agreed that that capitalizing on one's strengths and attacking the enemy's weakness is good strategy. The United States has tremendous strengths beginning with its economic power, technological innovation, and national unity. It has possibly the most capable and innovative command staff in military history. It would be a strategic mistake for the United States military to foreswear its strengths in order to fight a guerrilla band or an insurgency symmetrically. If it can identify an enemy weakness, the United States has the means to attack it. To reduce the United States military to a guerrilla force rabble would be to abjure one of America's greatest strengths.

If the United States has a weakness in conducting a war against an insurgency it is in the political sphere. Its military is not well adapted to waging an ordinary political campaign, and the United States itself is fearful of appearing to be an imperialist power. It requires a deft political hand to launch an invading army, aim at changing the political regime of a foreign country, induce an ancient people to love democracy and cherish the rule of law that have never known them in their history, and not be perceived an imperialist power. No operational technique can do that. The governance of Japan by General Douglas MacArthur is a shining demonstration that it can be done.

On the other hand, targeted assassinations and bombing atrocities perpetrated by the conquering power tend to run counter to the idea of a peaceful, orderly society that it is the ultimate aim of the invasion to create, although targeted violence sometimes can be useful to remove destructive elements and to demonstrate one's power from time to time. An insurgency starts with a political problem and ultimately has to be solved by political means.

Some political problems are intractable. The political situation in Northern Ireland is one example. Yugoslavia was another, until ethnic cleansing was allowed to run its

course. Thus it is safe to conclude that traditional western militaries as a whole need not, and almost certainly ought not, adopt terrorism as an offensive or a defensive means. Special Forces within the military can be and have been developed which employ the offensive methods of 4GW. But the operational method known as 4GW is the tool of the militarily weak.

Culture as an Objective of 4GW

Let us compare the successes and failures of western style warfare with those of 4GW antagonists in recent conflicts, with an eye to attacks on culture as a means of winning the conflict. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda launched a spectacular and devastating attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, great symbols of American power. It was by far the biggest terrorist attack in history, and cost the United States economy hundreds of billions of dollars. Yet, for all of that, it achieved nothing. The United States was stunned but not staggered. The attack was a strategic blunder of the same order as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Within months, the United States destroyed the Taliban government in Afghanistan and rounded up or killed about two-thirds of the leadership of al-Qaeda as it then existed. In addition, the Bush Administration was moved to settle accounts with the regime of Saddam Hussein, who represented at the time the successful defiance of American will. As of this writing, Afghanistan and Iraq are under new political management, and both are on the long road towards the establishment of a democratic state.

A little strategic, instead of operational, thinking and victory over terrorism is shown to be possible without having to fulminate over the "next generation" of warfare

The insurgencies in those countries might succeed in reversing the political progress those countries have made. To do so the insurgents would have to conceal the fact that their movements aim not at bettering the common good, but at the attainment of dictatorial power by a narrow interest group. The latter aim is not a winning political formula. The slogan of "eject the invader" is certainly appealing, but having done so, then what?

Lind makes much of an attack on culture as a distinguishing feature of 4GW. Is an attack on culture even possible? Is victory in such a thing possible? Culture is at once highly variable and quite fixed. Music is a feature of culture, and western countries over the last hundred years have seen classical orchestral music replaced by jazz, and jazz superseded by rock music. Thus culture is in one sense highly variable. Any change to this highly variable component can be claimed as a victory by an unscrupulous 4GW ideologue.

Culture is also quite fixed. Canada has been under cultural pressure from the United States since before the invention of radio and movies. Yet Canada still has the CBC, hockey, and 5% beer. Farther afield, the Soviet Union brutally subjected the Baltic States to Russification for 50 years, yet in 1991 Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania rose from the wreckage of the Soviet Empire. Farther east, Belarus, the Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, countries which were subject to the Russian empire for over a century, emerged in the 1990s. And on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, the State of Israel rose after nearly 2,000 years of Jewish dispersion.

Thus it would seem from these historical examples that efforts to change the fixed culture of a nation are fruitless. For a terrorist belligerent to attempt it from a position of weakness would invite the destructive wrath of the country it attacked. It proved unwise to attempt to convert the United States into an Islamic republic by means of a terrorist attack.

Early in the Civil War, General Ulysses S. Grant discovered that the enemy had their problems too, and if he focused on what he could do to them and not worry much about what they could do to him, he would be successful.[13] Lind needs to learn a lesson from General Grant. By dwelling entirely on the negative, and by failing to correlate ends and means, Lind and Hammes overrate the military power of 4GW antagonists. These are extremely weak, and because they fail to think strategically, Lind and Hammes are blind to them. Victory by a western power such as the United States over terrorism and insurgency is achieved through the strategic and political offensive. The strategic offensive aims at denying terrorists and insurgents safe havens and the assistance of sovereign governments. The political offensive aims at curing the injustice and the political problems, which support the insurgency. A little strategic, instead of operational, thinking and victory over terrorism is shown to be possible without having to fulminate over the "next generation" of warfare. Modern militaries are not irrelevant.

Conclusions

Based on all of the discussion and consideration above, this article can conclude the following points about the 4GW concept:

♦ "Fourth Generation Warfare" is the name of an operational technique that is said to be the successor to manoeuvre warfare.

♦ "Fourth Generation Warfare" is also the name of the philosophical system and analysis that gives the operational technique its name. To use the term is to affirm the analysis.

♦ "Fourth Generation Warfare" is a kind of philosophical system because it dogmatically lays down supposedly irrefutable premises and from them rationally deduces the consequences. The intellectual edifice thus created has the appearance of intellectual respectability because this process superficially resembles the manner in which Euclidian geometry, mathematical physics, and other sciences are elucidated.

♦ Because it is dogmatically elucidated, the truth and falsity of the real world are irrelevant. The real world is supposed to conform to it. The usefulness of 4GW as an analytical tool for military thinkers and planners is consequently non-existent. There is no value-added in thinking of modern terrorism as 4GW.

♦ 4GW theory has no conversation with anything outside of itself. It takes no notice of the work of Trevor N. DuPuy, which covers the same ground concerning the relationship of technology and ideas to the evolution of warfare from 2000 BC to 1980. It is unaware of time-proven insights of Clausewitz, of the difference between strategy and tactics, and between offence and defence. It can in no way be related to a competitive theory, the so-called "Three Block War."

♦ The term "Fourth Generation Warfare" is an uninformative slogan. What it is said to refer to is neither a generation nor the fourth of its kind. Its advocates are not

even prepared to stipulate that it is a kind of warfare distinct from the political campaign that would employ acts of terrorism. The terms 'insurgency in Iraq' and 'insurgency in Afghanistan' are more informative than the term 4GW. Those terms clearly distinguish between two different things, yet call attention to their similarity by putting them in the same genus (insurgency). 4GW does nothing of the sort. 4GW theory falsely connects things that are unrelated to each other.

♦ The description of 4GW by Lind is perfectly matched by a strategic air campaign such as that undertaken against Germany and Japan in World War II. This clearly is not what Lind or Hammes had in mind. It requires the 4GW school to make another dogmatic assertion to rule that air power and nuclear attack do not constitute 4GW.

♦ "Fourth Generation Warfare" as a school of thought can only be accepted or rejected wholesale.

♦ The operational methods of modern terrorism and insurgency are said to be 4GW. Some theorists require that operations characteristic of 4GW be undertaken by a non-state actor with the aim of attacking culture for it to be true 4GW. These same advocates then contradict themselves by warning that modern militaries—the agencies of nation states—need to adopt some of the methods of 4GW. A further contradiction: all modern guerrilla movements needed safe areas and the assistance of a foreign state to succeed, so it is debatable whether these movements can truly be described as "non-state" actors because they act as a surrogate for the state which helps them. Furthermore, as "non-state" and "culture" are terms of strategy, and 4GW is an operational technique and not a strategy, the requirement that 4GW be undertaken by a non-state actor against culture is invalid within the terms of the system.

♦ A method of defence by means of 4GW is a contradiction in terms. Defence, by its very nature, is the product of linear thinking, and 4GW is supposedly characterized by great non-linearity and great dispersion.

♦ It is a mistake that military thinkers can easily make to conceive a political campaign as a kind of warfare. One should not confuse the literal with the metaphorical. A political campaign is metaphorically likened to warfare in the sense that both involve struggle. But warfare involves bloodshed, and politics normally does not. Politics employs war and bloodshed when necessary through the strategy it adopts to attain the end in view.

♦ Because 4GW is an operational technique of war fighting, the methods of ordinary politics do not properly belong in the description of 4GW.

♦ Being "largely undefined", 4GW operational technique is an empty vessel that theorists can fill with practically anything.

♦ A catalogue of once successful tactics is useful information, but does not amount to a new theory of warfare. The facts are useful, but calling these facts 4GW, unconnected to a valid theory that binds them together, is a superfluous distraction.

♦ The fundamental errors of the 4GW school of thought are: that it is not the fourth generation of anything, and that it fails to make a clear and sharp distinction between methods of warfare and methods of politics.

♦ When a western country invades another with the aim of changing the political regime of the latter, the western country needs to appoint a political plenipotentiary to enact the settlement. The military commander can be a good choice because he has direct command over the coercive force on which the temporary regime will rely to enforce its will. How the plenipotentiary brings about peaceful settlement is not the proper subject of operational technique or a military ideology.

♦ The Three Block War concept is more descriptively accurate than the superficial and dogmatically elucidated 4GW system of thought.

♦ Victory by western powers over terrorism and insurgency lies in the strategic and political offensive. The political offensive aims at bringing about real political progress that enhances the common good in the conquered nation. Peace, order, and good government are the obvious political objectives to pursue. Victory will not be found in political passivity and through the strategic and tactical defensive.

About the Author…

Vincent J. Curtis, 51, is an officer in The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, an army reserve infantry unit based in Hamilton, ON. Having accumulated more than fourteen years total service in the reserves, he has held the positions of Platoon Commander, Company Second in Command, and Acting Company Commander. The highlight of his reserve career was, in the capacity of Senior Subaltern, receiving his regiment's new Queen's Colour from the hands of Her Majesty herself on October 10, 2002. In civilian life, Mr. Curtis holds a Master of Science degree in chemistry from the University of Waterloo and began his post university working career as a Research Scientist for the Ontario Research Foundation. After leaving ORF, he started a scientific consulting business and later a manufacturing business, which he still runs. A freelance writing career began in 1987, and Mr. Curtis has published articles on a wide variety of subjects in popular, technical, and academic journals and newspapers. His favorite subjects remain military and international affairs. Most recently, he was embedded as a freelance journalist with the British Forces in Basra and Baghdad, Iraq.

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EVOLUTION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

Captain Graham M. Longhurst

Canadian civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is currently evolving and endeavouring to define itself. The success of CIMIC cells attached to military operations over the past few years has necessitated the defining of policies and procedures for this burgeoning area within the military. With success comes an increasing scrutiny of how the business of CIMIC is being conducted and whether it is being conducted at the same professional level across the military. This article makes a number of recommendations and challenges those who read it to either agree or disagree with them. Either way, the resulting debate will hopefully create a better CIMIC organization overall, and encourage those working in the CIMIC field to influence the direction of its evolution within the Canadian Army.

Because CIMIC is still at an early (albeit rapidly changing) stage of evolution it is important to define a start state upon which improvements, conclusions and recommendations can be made. The Canadian military has been conducting CIMIC operations in some form since the First World War. In the past it mostly consisted of humanitarian assistance (HA) in the form of physical goods and taking care of the immediate needs of the civilian population such as drinking water, food, shelter and clothing. In addition to HA, small projects, such as playgrounds, which could be completed during a single tour or rotation (roto), were undertaken. Funding for those projects came from a variety of sources but quite often out of the pockets of the soldiers. CIMIC was considered a secondary duty, usually a volunteer or someone with previous experience. This type of approach has been relatively successful in the early stages of an operation. However, in a mature theatre of operations, a more sophisticated approach is required.

Over time, it was recognized that CIMIC could play an important role as a force multiplier. Canadian Forces (CF) members were given CIMIC as a primary duty and some even received training. In August 2000, The Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) issued an action directive that CIMIC become a reserve capability since it was recognized that reservists might have an inherent ability to interact with civilians. While CIMIC is not new, the overall approach is.

In Land Force Western Area (LFWA) as well as in the other areas, reservists with a wide variety of educational backgrounds, careers and personal experience were interviewed with the intention of bringing together a team that was greater than the sum of its parts.

CIMIC candidates embarked on a training regime to increase knowledge and abilities to deal with specific situations previous rotations had identified as "lessons learned." Candidates conducted training and completed courses on the following topics:

- negotiation;
- mediation;

- cultural awareness;
- sales;
- first aid instruction;
- project management;
- building analysis;
- time management;
- language training;
- media training;
- tactical command and control communications system (TCCCS); and
- a tactical CIMIC course at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC).

As well, a number of exercises were conducted in order to confirm skills developed during the courses and training:

- an exercise confirming written and assessment skills;
- an exercise confirming navigation, negotiation and cultural awareness skills; and
- an exercise, just prior to deployment, confirming everything from the initiation of area assessments to the project management processes and approval as well as interaction with local agencies.

The above training provided groundwork for success.

What is Modern CIMIC?

While it is important to understand how the modern CIMIC operator is preparing for their job, it is equally important to understand who is filling that role. As part of discovering modern CIMIC, another good question to be asked is, "What are the qualities of a good CIMIC operator?" Traits such as loyalty, honesty, ethicality, courage, diligence, fairness, responsibility, selflessness, maturity, dedication, affability, understanding, flexibility, resourcefulness, fitness, knowledge of military and civilian policies and procedures and decisiveness—all leap to mind. Combining the training and these desirable qualities with an array of personal experience creates the foundation for a CIMIC operator to thrive. Thus the modern CIMIC operator is trained to interact on a wide spectrum of initiatives and to use his or her experience to further Canada's goals.

We have defined the type of training and individual characteristics required to make a successful CIMIC operator, thus an outline of what that person does must follow. However, it is incredibly difficult to define exactly what CIMIC is and does because it varies from operation to operation and is dependent on the environment as well as on a person's style of handling situations. A vague textbook definition of CIMIC follows:

> *Civil-Military Cooperation is a military function that supports the commander's mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civilian actors in the commander's area of operation.*

CIMIC is a command function and responsibility. Unity of command for a military force is critical to achieve unity of purpose and of effort among all stakeholders and partners. There is an increasing number of non-military personnel, international organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies involved in operations, which fuels the problem of integrating and coordinating civil and military activities and efforts.

To ensure that, as an organization, we maintain our ability and relevance, we must periodically ask ourselves the questions, "What is the purpose of CIMIC?" or "Why do we need CIMIC?" The answer is—whenever a military deploys, whether it is for a peace support operation, humanitarian assistance or for war fighting, there is always the civil dimension to consider. It may be in the form of refugees, the local population, local officials, or workers from international organizations. CIMIC is a primary link between the military and these organizations. CIMIC works to coordinate and elicit cooperation from and with the civil dimension to help ensure the success of the mission.

Roles & Responsibilities

To further clarify modern CIMIC we need to ask an additional question, "What are the tasks of a CIMIC operator?" The assigned tasks depend on the stage of an operation and the direction detailed in the CIMIC annex to the operation order issued by the commander. In general, CIMIC operators liaise with the civil population, participate in planning, produce area assessments, and identify worthy projects that meet local needs as well as fit within Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and military guidelines. CIMIC must also be prepared to deal with issues regarding humanitarian assistance, civil infrastructure, civil administration, economic issues, commercial affairs, and cultural affairs.

If we break those tasks down, to provide further clarification we may ask the question, "What activities does CIMIC conduct?" Those activities include coordinating with civil authorities, civil agencies, allied and national or host nation military forces, international organizations and non-government organizations. Providing advice to the task force (TF) commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population can become an important activity, as can providing program planning and technical advice and assistance to civil authorities in fields of expertise commensurate with operational requirements. Further activities may include coordinating requirements for and assistance in acquiring local resources and facilities. One of the primary activities is to research, prepare and update area assessments and possibly economic assessments

CIMIC organization—The Building Blocks

With the majority of the CIMIC tasks and activities defined, it is prudent to discuss the size of CIMIC organization required to optimize the force multiplier effect. One of the key qualities of a CIMIC operator is flexibility; therefore, the organization itself should have a level of flexibility built into it. At a recent Army Reserve Regeneration Working Group, the directorate of CIMIC recommended the following CIMIC organization (diagram 1.1) as the building block for future deployments. This organization was proposed in order to maintain flexibility as well as provide a level of consistency for planning purposes.

The basic building block of a CIMIC organization is the CIMIC team. As outlined in diagram 1, it consists of three trained CIMIC operators and two CIMIC-familiarized drivers. It is important that the drivers become part of the CIMIC work-up training and are matched to their CIMIC operators because they fill multiple roles of security, driving, observation, and coordination of some of the CIMIC tasks.



Diagram 1

The headquarters cell collates and funnels timely and accurate information to the commander's staff for area awareness and decision making purposes. The major acts as the adviser to the commander on CIMIC issues as well as the senior liaison officer (acting on behalf of the commander) attending meetings between the military and civilian actors. The CIMIC operations officer runs the tactical CIMIC operation and is integrated into the operational planning process with the rest of the planning staff: operations (OPS), intelligence (INT), psychological operations (PSYOPS) and public affairs (PA). Coordinating CIMIC activities and summarizing the daily CIMIC situation reports are also time-consuming tasks for the operations officer.

The project cell becomes incredibly essential to the mix if the task force is provided with funding for community improvements projects (CIP). The project process from initiation to completion is time consuming and paper intensive to ensure all legal and financial criteria are achieved, thus the requirement for a dedicated cell.

The CIMIC organization is displayed at a strength of 21 members, which would take into consideration the size of the area of responsibility (AOR), population of the AOR and the number of subunits with the task force. The strength increases to 24 if there is a projects section requirement. Typically, each tactical CIMIC team is operational control (OPCON) to a subunit for administrative and logistical requirements.

Where Does CIMIC Fit In?

It has been said that he who has the knowledge has the power. A task force commander gathers knowledge and power by gaining information about the

environment in which the task force is operating. Guidance is issued for the collection of information in the form of an intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition reconnaissance (ISTAR) matrix through primary information requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs). CIMIC operates within a broad spectrum gathering information across the width and depth of the ISTAR matrix.

Much of the valuable information that is gathered by military members is through establishing relationships based on trust, respect and reciprocity. CIMIC plays a significant role, as much of the key information gathered is generated from CIMIC operators who create those valuable relationships with people. After ISTAR matrix information is processed, it then becomes intelligence, which can be used in the decision making process by command.



Diagram 2

CIMIC is a powerful tool for the commander in projecting his influence into the local environment. CIMIC may be used in a pre-emptive manner to influence or change behaviour in the moral or physical domain as shown in diagram 2. One avenue of approach is to send in the CIMIC operators to pass the commander's message or information to leaders of the local community. Messages being passed may be in the form of promised reward or punishment aimed at influencing behaviour. Quite often, the effects of the messages are based on established relationships, especially in the case of punishment. If the CIMIC operator had established a relationship where information is trusted and passed proactively, then the person receiving the message is more likely to react in a manner that is desired by the commander.

Relationship with Information Operations

CIMIC in its modern form has become a keystone of information operations (IO). The information operations atmosphere works most effectively and can improve the

probability of mission success through a synergy created between CIMIC, PSYOPS, INT, PA and OPS cells. It is essential that information be exchanged between these branches in an efficient manner in order to provide command with an accurate and timely picture of the constantly changing environment they are operating in. The force multiplier effect created through this synergy reduces the dependence on military force to achieve mission objectives, while minimizing interference (in hostile environments) and increasing cooperation (in neutral to supportive environments) by the local population with military operations.

It was pointed out to me that while it is imperative to have a synergy created by all cells operating under the IO umbrella, it is also important to understand that CIMIC is neither a sub-component of nor subordinate to IO, as CIMIC is an IO enabler. For CIMIC to operate effectively it must maintain its principle of transparency; meaning all information collected by CIMIC operators is obtained through open sources and observation. Any direct link or command relationship between IO cells may weaken CIMIC credibility and trust in the eyes of those with whom we interact.

All of the information discussed thus far defines the start state. In order to put forward relevant and achievable recommendations, we must use the valuable experience we have gained to date in the CIMIC evolution.

Bosnia Herzegovina

CIMIC was amongst the busiest elements within the battle group (BG) in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH). The amount of time spent on typical CIMIC tasks is broken down approximately as:

- 40% liaison and information gathering;
- 30% CIP and humanitarian assistance projects (HAP);
- 20% HA; and
- 10% miscellaneous activities that seem to come by the way of CIMIC

CIMIC provided the commanding officer (CO) with the capability to greatly influence the operational environment across a broad spectrum, at the community level through passage of information or by completing community improvement projects (CIP), as well at the family or individual level through HAP and HA activities.

By establishing close relationships with the key players in the AOR, the CIMIC operators were able to gather key pieces of the information puzzle that provided the BG with a picture of the environment it was operating in.

This information was used to assess where the BG could make the greatest positive impact given their resources. One area the Canadian BG gained a level of influence was through the allocated funds ($200,000 Canadian dollars (CAD)/260,000 convertible marka (Bosnian currency) (BAM) from CIDA).

It is significant to note that it was an extensive process undertaking these projects. It started at the information-gathering phase. The CIMIC operators went out to the local communities and asked what their priorities were for infrastructure. This was the important part, in order to obtain the support of the local population. Without this,

we were liable to repeat mistakes made in the past where, for example, schools were completely rebuilt and then no children ever attended them. The projects were filtered against the criteria laid out by CIDA and then prioritized for presentation for the commanding officers approval. The CIP funds were then allocated as far down the prioritized list of projects as possible. The projects had been put out to tender with a minimum of three project bids from independent contractors that had not yet been black listed for poor performance. The contractor with the most detailed bid, best reputation and most accurate pricing was allocated the projects. The CIMIC operator interacted with the contractor on a weekly basis as the projects took shape. This ensured that the details of the contract were being met. The CIMIC operators completed a detailed paperwork process to ensure that CIDA guidelines were maintained.

Canadian soldiers speak through an interpreter in Kljuc Bosnia Herzegovina

Upon completion of the project the CIMIC operator initiated a project opening or dedication. At this point, there was a significant amount of coordination between the information operations, intelligence, public affairs officer (PAO) and CIMIC cells at the staff level. This was necessary in order to ensure that the CO was fully informed. The PAO briefed the CO as to the media talking points, the information operations produced a targeting and tasking matrix from the information supplied by the CIMIC operators project/dedication paperwork, and the intelligence cell ensured that there would be no "grip and grins" with the local criminals. The result was a ceremony with a purpose—the furtherance of the BG CO's mission and goals.

The remaining portion of the CIDA funds or approximately 15,000 BAM, were allocated toward HAP. These projects allowed the officers commanding the sub-units as well as the individual soldier to have the opportunity to gain influence with families or individuals that could use help. HAP funds were used to provide approximately 30 projects to each sub-unit at a maximum cost of 500 BAM per project. Any soldier

could submit a CIMIC aid request, through the chain of command, to have access to HAP funds. HAP funds were used to purchase small items such as firewood, plastic sheeting for low expense winterization, candles, fencing, stoves, gravel, windup radios, and toilets. The items were priced out and then purchased by CIMIC members and given to the soldier for distribution to those who were in need.

CIMIC operators, as well as the soldiers, also had the ability to influence the hearts and minds of the population through the distribution of HA in the form of teddy bears and stuffed toys, linen and blankets, school supplies, winter mitts and toques, adult and children's clothing, winter coats, shoes and other small items directed at the well being of the individual or family. We found that the CIMIC drivers played an important role in matching up the requests for HA with the current inventory and ensuring its timely distribution for delivery. It was important that the person or soldier who filled out the aid request be the one to actually deliver the items so that the member felt like they actually helped someone. All of the HA was gathered through an organized donation program from the generosity of the Canadian public. Later in the tour, an additional 48 tri-walls of HA were flown from Canada and the distribution strategy was adjusted. To reduce dependence on SFOR and the Canadian battle group (CA BG), the majority of the remaining HA was distributed to local NGOs. Requests for HA to the CIMIC cell were then referred to the local NGOs.

Most military commanders would likely state that a safe and secure environment will always be the military's number one priority on a peace support operation

The CIMIC teams and headquarters cell achieved significant levels of success during rotations 11 and 12, and received recognition for their accomplishments. While the CIMIC cell was received with some initial reluctance on the part of the BG CO's, being imposed as an organization from outside, the CIMIC operators quickly proved their value and swayed the COs regarding their opinion as to the force multiplier effect.

Haiti

The most interesting aspect of the recent deployment to Haiti (Op HALO, then Op HAMLET) was the stand-up and deployment of the mission. The entire process, from the passing of the UN Security Council Resolution to the Canadian Forces (CF) actively participating in operations, took less than one month.

This quick timeline, while quite appropriate for the situation, created some challenges for CIMIC. For example, the operational planning process for the mission was abbreviated (almost non-existent). Despite the fact that several of Canada's national objectives for the mission seemed to directly involve CIMIC, our actual involvement in the planning process was minor. Other planning priorities such as logistic support, rules of engagement, length of the mission, accommodations, transport, area of operations, and virtually every other detail of a large-scale (by Canadian standards) operation overshadowed any CIMIC planning.

Most military commanders would likely state that a safe and secure environment will always be the military's number one priority on a peace support operation. Even

though CIMIC involvement in this mission appeared to be critical, there was some question at the outset as to when, where, and whether at all CIMIC personnel would be useful. Exacerbating the situation was uncertainty about whether CIMIC personnel should be attached to the tactical element (I Coy, 2 RCR) or retained at the National Command Element (NCE). The TF commander ultimately decided to retain CIMIC at the NCE.

Apparently it was communicated to the TF commander during the strategic reconnaissance that the American forces on the ground planned to have no CIMIC capability. I am uncertain as to whether there was any discussion of the relationship between CIMIC and Civil Affairs (the branch of the U.S. military that handles CIMIC) or if something as simple as a difference in terminology might have contributed to a significant miscommunication. The reality was that, once we arrived on the ground, it became apparent that the US Forces had brought a sizeable Civil Affairs element with them, consisting of two six-man Civil Affairs teams and a headquarters element, initially commanded by a major, and later by a lieutenant colonel. These teams operated out of the U.S. National Command, giving them the latitude to operate throughout Haiti.

The presence of such a large U.S. Civil Affairs component made it redundant for the Canadians to keep our CIMIC element at the NCE. Rather than improved latitude, we ended up having to coordinate all CIMIC activities through at least two other headquarters. If we were going to conduct CIMIC operations in the Canadian AOR, we had to clear through three separate headquarters.

Complicating this further was the fact that the Canadian (CA) CIMIC teams were housed with the National Support Element (NSE) due to a shortage of space at the NCE's location. This created yet another level of liaison that was required before any CIMIC activity could take place. Therefore, CIMIC personnel had to liaise with as many as four separate headquarters prior to conducting any activity. This was a considerable strain on resources that led to great frustration, and caused friction at one time or another between CIMIC and each of the other organizations.

Early in the mission, CIMIC established a priority of building a rapport with major NGOs and international organizations (including the UN) on the ground in Haiti. However, this was complicated by the fact that many UN agencies had removed their personnel due to security considerations. Once the area was secure, the UN agencies transitioned through a number of personnel changes, which complicated the exchange of information. A lack of a two-way flow of information from the UN made it exceedingly difficult to accomplish the UN's objectives.

The bulk of CA CIMIC activity throughout the operation consisted of small projects in the CA AOR. These small projects focussed on education, water, and sanitation. For the most part, they were band-aid style projects designed to assist schools and orphanages. The nature of these projects was due to two factors:

- CIMIC was given access to $50,000 in project money by the Canadian Embassy. Embassy staff informed CIMIC personnel that this money should be used in “small, community-based projects.”

- The mission was only supposed to have a 90-day mandate, which made the process of hiring contractors to undertake the work cumbersome and risky.

These two factors led to a situation in which TF personnel ended up doing much of the work for the projects. This became the greatest demand on CIMIC personnel's time. Unfortunately, it is debatable whether these projects accomplished much, either in the sense of support to the civil environment or support to the force.

CIMIC personnel did manage to conduct some liaison, identifying and dealing with some UN personnel, NGOs, and whatever local government personnel could be identified and located. There were varying degrees of success in conducting liaison, as there was a sense among those who had been in Haiti for some time that the military was not there to stay. This feeling was probably quite justified, as the Multinational Interim Force (U.S., Chile, France, and Canada) was in the country under such a limited mandate (90 days, with no certainty of what would come after) that it impeded attempts at relationship building with local or international actors.

Capt Shawn Courty CIMIC, a officer with 2RCR in Haiti on OP HALO

Approximately three months into the deployment, the UN (with Brazil being the major contributor) assumed command of the mission as U.S. forces departed. Canadian forces remained in Haiti for a further three months, moving from Port au Prince to Gonaives. With the move to Gonaives, the CIMIC team ended up under direct control (OPCON) to an infantry company (H Coy, 2 RCR, which replaced I Coy in June) on the ground. This change in arrangements appeared to be much more efficient. This allowed the CIMIC team to react quickly to the tactical situation on the ground, and to deal directly with the tactical headquarters responsible for the AOR in which they were operating. Increased support was made available to the CIMIC team, as H Coy recognized the force multiplying capability of CIMIC and worked to support them.

While it was considered a success for CIMIC to be included in this mission, there is little else in Op HALO[1] that should be considered successful from a CIMIC point of view. Perhaps the most significant achievement was for seven CIMIC-qualified reservists from across the county to be identified and processed through the Departure Assistance Group (DAG) in less than a week.

Afghanistan

Our mission during Op ATHENA Roto 2 was to support the commander's intent by creating an environment where the locals would tell ISAF/Canadian troops of any other military force activity in their area of operation, thus enhancing the force protection of the TF and the International Security And Assistance Force (ISAF). This was done through the building and continuation of trusting relationships with the local populace.

Methods of establishing these relationships were as follows:

♦ Regular meetings with mayors, police chiefs, governors, wakils (village representatives), villagers, school teachers, directors and students.

♦ Conducting small, quick, high impact projects that benefited the community such as road repairs, road construction and supplying schools with student and teachers desks.

♦ Donation of school supplies and medical supplies to the applicable institutions.

♦ Distribution of the *ISAF News* to the local villages and communities. (This was the first regular publication for many of the residents of Kabul. It was pro ISAF and a PSYOPS tool.)

The Kabul area of operation (AOO) consisted of the boundaries of the Kabul province. In this AOO, CA, German (GE), United Kingdom (UK), Belgium (BE), France (FR), and Italian (IT) forces each had a CIMIC detachment. These all varied in size between three to eight operators. Another CIMIC resource was the Finnish CIMIC unit (FINCIMIC); they were an ISAF resource vice a Kabul Multi-National Brigade (KMNB) resource. It should be mentioned that CA CIMIC was not a declared resource for KMNB to use. We were strictly a CA resource and were utilized for CA reasons. This being said, we assisted KMNB where we could and took over two police districts (PDs) as our "unofficial" AOO to help out the third battletroup (BG3) who were looking after the old CA AOO.

Each CIMIC detachment with the exception of FINCIMIC (ISAF resource) and CA CIMIC came under KMNB. Most of the detachments operated within the area assigned to their national country. FINCIMIC worked the entire area and overlapped with the other CIMIC teams. As a result, regular meetings were conducted for coordination of effort.

Kabul CIMIC teams worked well at the tactical level; coordination of effort between teams was conducted to ensure this. Strategic coordination was very poor; as a result there were was very little direction and communication between ISAF HQ and KMNB HQ on the CIMIC net.

Our CA CIMIC team consisted of six members—three operators and three drivers. The size was too small, we required one more operator as a minimum.

Other CIMIC responsibilities during our mission involved the following:

♦ following up on in-place CIDA projects;

- following up on legacy projects (construction of six wells) left over from Roto 1;
- executing new CIDA projects amounting to $17,000 CAD;
- developing protocols for how to spend money given to CIMIC in the form of a donation, as some of the donations came with spending restrictions and reporting requirements attached;
- conducting or coordinating projects which bore no cost other than the military time involved, for example, using military vehicles to deliver Non Government Organizations (NGO) Humanitarian Aid; and
- liaison, both military and civilian sources.

Over the seven months in Kabul, CA CIMIC was able to effectively support the commander's intent by enhancing the force protection of PDs 6 and 7. Thirty-five projects were started and completed; six legacy projects from Roto 1 were completed (all wells). The good relationship with the local Afghan people and authorities continued.

At the time in Afghanistan (AF), there was no significant CA Info Ops at the TF level; this has since changed. There was a public affairs office for the TF, but as we did not have a dedicated AOO, this was not an asset readily available to us.

CIMIC delivered a publication called the *ISAF News* that was published every two weeks. Printed in English and Dari, it contained stories telling the locals about what ISAF was doing as well as what was happening in and around the country. In this publication there was a section dedicated to CIMIC projects in the AOO. There was also a radio station that broadcast from KMNB throughout the city and was considered very successful. CA CIMIC was involved in a toy gun safety campaign to prevent the kids from pointing toy weapons at ISAF soldiers. This was done with the assistance of ISAF Info Ops with positive results.

The average Afghan citizen was worried about violence during the election and this feeling was exacerbated by the fact that some ISAF assets, specifically CIMIC, disappeared for two weeks

CIMIC continues to prove its value at the tactical level on operations. All future operations should continue to include a CIMIC component. CA CIMIC needs to come together; currently there is a gap or wall between the tactical teams and the strategic level. It is felt that advice given from the bottom up to strategic levels is not listened to. Further action is required to eliminate this division between both groups. CIMIC is a very effective tool; giving the commander the needed flexibility and visibility into the civil environment in which the TF operates. In AF, CIMIC enhanced the force protection of the CA TF and ISAF troops, allowing them to work undeterred during the mission.

Many people feel that CIMIC should not be doing any project work as this crosses the line between NGOs and the military. We felt that in Kabul, projects were essential tools in the CIMIC team's toolbox. It allowed us the flexibility to do something quickly with a high impact for the local community, therefore enhancing the force protection of the TF.

To simply go to meetings and try to build friendships without being able to help solve the issues results in the military being not in touch with the local environment. It generates distrust on the part of the locals and is no way to build a trusting relationship. Small gestures such as the donation of school desks to the local schools or the construction of a community well are inexpensive to implement and the results are very beneficial to the community and to the military force in terms of force protection.[2]

In September 2004, the CIMIC operators were advised that opposing military forces (OMF) had specifically targeted them. The threat was confirmed by the G2 and included specifics about how the detachment was operating and locations it had visited. This coincided with the period leading up to the AF presidential elections and an increase in attacks on ISAF targets was anticipated.

Winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan

The CIMIC detachment (Det) was assigned a security force comprising of a half section of infantry, with a vehicle, from B Company, 1 PPCLI, for each of its taskings. The section was responsible for the close protection of the operators and any other security matters. This arrangement worked very well and made each patrol a much harder target for opposing military forces. The one negative was that the security element was taken from the Force Protection Company, which was already heavily tasked and, it could be argued, undermanned. Having the additional CIMIC personnel could solve the problem of additional security. When required, CIMIC patrols could be combined to present a harder target than a two-vehicle patrol with only four personnel. This is predicated by the TF commander as to the level of threat and must be weighed against the risk.

The threat further increased just prior to the presidential election. It was anticipated that the threat level for CIMIC operations would remain prohibitively high for approximately two weeks. It was decided to cease CIMIC operations for the two-week period while attempting to continue CIMIC work by keeping in contact with key personnel by phone.

The average Afghan citizen was worried about violence during the election and this feeling was exacerbated by the fact that some ISAF assets, specifically CIMIC, disappeared for two weeks. It could be argued that ceasing CIMIC operations during a critical point such as the elections was counter to what they should be doing, and that in fact, CIMIC operations should have been stepped up to increase its presence in the community. To demonstrate to the local population that the environment is secure and stable, CIMIC cannot be viewed as hiding from a possible threat.

CIMIC detachments should be properly trained and have sufficient personnel to deal with an increased threat, thereby precluding the necessity to cease operations at any point.[3]

What Improvements Can Be Made?

With our start state defined and examples from three different operations, I feel safe in making a number of recommendations based on the experience LFWA CIMIC has gained over the past several years.

The first recommendation is to adopt the CIMIC team model, discussed earlier in this article, as a standard building block for deployment. The size of the CIMIC cell can increase relative to the size of the military deployment, AOR, population of AOR and number of sub-units in the organization.

One of the main arguments for adopting this model is to account for the loss of CIMIC operators during leave periods. A little over a month's worth of time during a six-month deployment is spent on leave, which means (depending on the size of the CIMIC cell) anywhere from a third to half of the organization is on leave. The first and last months of a rotation are usually leave-restricted, thus compounding the problem. In the three deployment examples discussed here, staffing problems due to leave where reported to be a significant issue. This CIMIC team model minimizes the effect of leave considerations, as there will always be a knowledgeable CIMIC operator to cover while the other is on leave.

An additional reason to adopt this model is flexibility. In a higher threat environment such as Afghanistan, this organization can work as a two-vehicle team (even with leave considerations), if necessary with security support. In a lower threat environment each operator may be assigned a specific area, thus increasing the span of coverage.

The second recommendation is that the tactical CIMIC teams must be attached directly to a subunit for logistical and support requirements during work-up training and deployment. CIMIC operators work most effectively when they are assigned an area corresponding to the AOR of the subunit to which they are attached. The CIMIC operator then interacts with all levels of NGOs, agencies and local authorities and then reports relevant information up the chain of command in a timely manner.

The main reason for this is have ready access to support requirements. It is key for the sub-units to know this requirement during their planning process. An additional reason is to avoid the multiple levels of command coordination as experienced in Afghanistan.

There has recently been significant hue and cry by civilian agencies operating alongside military organizations. They have accused the military of conducting CIMIC operations in order to manipulate the local population (i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq). The civilian organizations profess to be providing aid in an altruistic manner and not mixing human requirements with the mission. While there may be a grain of truth in this accusation, if one delves deeper into the reasons why the civilian organizations and military are where they are, then they seem to have significant common goals.

If CIMIC is conducted properly, as trained for by CIMIC operators, there should be little conflict between what the military and the civilian organizations are doing. In fact, quite often the two separate entities work closely together at the tactical level and don't trip on each other's toes. The only time conflict occurs is when organizations don't take the time to coordinate the distribution of limited resources. It could be argued that the causes of these conflicts are more as a result of poor training and/or personality conflicts between the organizations.

CIMIC, when conducted in an impartial, neutral and independent manner in the eyes of the national authorities and the local population, is a force multiplier, not only for the military but also for civilian organizations working toward common goals.

Therefore, a third recommendation is that any international organizations and NGOs that often work in conjunction with the military should be involved in relationship-building by participating in military exercises and attending CIMIC courses side by side with military members. The Pearson Peacekeeping Center has added significant value to their tactical CIMIC course by not only inviting international organizations and NGOs to participate, but foreign military personnel as well. Another recent example of these organizations beginning to build this working relationship was the Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, where they were discussing the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the militarization of humanitarian assistance.

Further to this recommendation, the organizations should be involved as early as possible in the planning process leading up to an operation in order to coordinate issues such as HA distribution, economy of effort, and mutual support.

Implementation of the third recommendation will take time, but the investment will significantly improve the force multiplier effect and the mission's possibility of success. It is a win-win situation for the military and civilian organizations operating in conjunction with each other.

A fourth recommendation is that the Army develop standard policies and procedures for HA. This could be an agreement with an aid agency to provide HA alongside the military. This would have the mutual benefit of getting us out of distributing food, shelter and necessity items, as well as providing security to the civilian organization operating in the area. It would also significantly reduce the haphazard nature of collection and distribution of HA that the Canadian military has undertaken to date.

A fifth recommendation is to establish a policy and procedures for HAP. A specific amount of funds should be set aside for HAP for each roto. Adopting an approach such

as this has many benefits for the military. As described in the Bosnia example, funds were set aside to purchase items from the local economy to help locals in need. This was done at the individual patrol level. The request was staffed up the chain of command by the patrol; funds were regulated, approved, the item purchased and dispersed by the CIMIC cell to the patrol for delivery. This allowed the patrols to influence their environment at the individual and family level. Adoption of this recommendation will also allow the military to get further away from the physical storage and logistical requirements of HA. HA is a large headache on all rotations as these items are bulky and expensive to transport. While Canadians can be relied upon for their generosity, it becomes difficult to transport the items from Canada to the AOO. Using the HAP funds approach has the added advantage of supporting the local economy, which is essential in many of the areas we operate in. Locals are much more motivated to improve their own situation if given an economic chance, rather than waiting to receive handouts from the military.

The sixth recommendation pertains to the TF commander's ability to influence the environment in which the TF is operating, and it is to establish policies and procedures for CIP. A standard agreement could be made with CIDA or the Canadian Embassy to provide each TF commander with funds to be used or not used on CIPs. As in the Bosnia example, these projects need to be recommended by the community and their involvement must remain throughout the process to ensure a beneficial effect as desired by the commander. These projects increase the level of neutral to positive opinions regarding military presence in its AOO. It is an essential tool for the commander to influence the environment and he must be given the discretion to spend these funds in an appropriate manner with the further ability to return the funds if they are not needed.

A dedicated CIMIC projects section within the headquarters would implement the project process and administration as described above in the TF CIMIC ORBAT recommendation.

The final recommendation is predictability with respect to size of a CIMIC ORBAT, length of training and rotation time commitment. This recommendation is of great consequence, due to the fact that CIMIC is now a reserve capability. If we are to get the best operators for the job, we need predictability regarding the expected size of the CIMIC ORBAT, and the length of time commitment. The best CIMIC operators come from a variety of backgrounds and tend to be successful in their civilian careers as well. In fact, many take a reduction in salary to participate on an overseas deployment, because they are motivated by what CIMIC does and the experience they will gain. Uncertainties in contracts and poor administration have lead to frustration and even some CIMIC operators deciding not to go on rotations. A measure of predictability is required in order to allow prospective CIMIC operators to plan and gain permission for a leave of absence from civilian occupations.

Conclusion

This paper has covered the evolution of CIMIC to date, defined our start state and made a number of recommendations based on current operational experience.

The challenge to those who read this paper is to either agree or disagree with these recommendations. The resulting debate will create a better CIMIC organization. I

would ask the civilians to help build the necessary relationships with the military so that we can better work together to achieve our common goals. I would ask the military members to use their influence to positively affect the direction of CIMIC.

Because Canadian CIMIC is in an early stage of evolution, it is hoped that those in the trenches will continue to influence the direction of this evolution.

About the Authur...

Graham M. Longhurst joined the Canadian Forces Reserve in 1992 as a private to help finance his way through university. In 2001, Graham was selected to become part of the newly stood up LFWA CIMIC organization. In 2002, Graham decided to advance his military career by putting in for a tour to Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). On deployment training with the 1 PPCLI Battle Group he participated in Operation GRIZZLY as a liaison officer to the local community for the HQ in the Kananaskis Valley. While deployed on the six-month tour he ran the CIMIC element for the battle group. Graham has served as the Alberta CIMIC team leader and is now filling the role of the G9 CIMIC operations officer for LFWA. He has also had a paper on his experience in BiH published in *The Bulletin Vol 10 No 1*"'Civil-Military Cooperation—The Inukshuk."

End Notes

1 Written by Capt Jason Watt, CIMIC Ops, Op HALO.
2 Written by Capt David Myles, CIMIC Detachment Commander, Op ATHENA Roto 2.
3 Written by Capt Brent Purcell, 2IC CIMIC, Op ATHENA Roto 2.

Gunners stand by their 105mm Howitzer waiting for a fire mission on a range near Kabul

EDUCATING OFFICERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CARD PUNCHING OR PROFESSION OF ARMS?

Major Simon Bernard

In 1967, following the unification of the three services and in response to the need to harmonize officer development, the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time, General J.V. Allard, ordered a study to review the career path of Regular Force officers, from selection and initial training to attainment of the highest rank. The purpose was to produce a development plan that would guarantee maximum efficiency by economizing on resources in the selection, training and education of the officer corps called upon to command and administer the Armed Forces.[1]

MGen R. Rowley and his team of 15 completed this three-volume study in 1969. One of the recommendations of the report, better known as the "Rowley Report", was that all officers obtain a university degree. Following the publication of numerous reports and studies in subsequent years[2], in March 1997, 28 years after the publication of the Rowley Report, the Honourable Doug Young, then Minister of Defence, demanded that in all cases, except for officers commissioned from the ranks, a university degree would be henceforth required.[3] Policies were developed to formalize the requirement that not only newly commissioned officers have a university degree but that, by 2020, all officers must obtain a bachelor's degree. Members with the rank of colonel or higher would in addition be required to hold a master's degree.[4] This requirement has been debated at length in recent years and I have no intention of reigniting the debate. The policy exists; it is our duty to follow it.

These policies are currently in force and many officers of all ranks are returning to school to meet this requirement and thereby have a "normal" career progression. There is no doubt that, as with our neighbours to the south, the requirement for a university degree has created a "card punching" approach in the Canadian Forces (CF). The CF could learn a lot from the Americans who, although often cited here as examples to follow, have made mistakes.

The Americans experienced a degree of infatuation for higher education in the 1970s. However, under pressure to obtain a degree, the quality of the education received left much to be desired and a "card punching" mentality set in.[5] Martin Van Creveld notes that the infatuation for higher education in the United States did more to satisfy the need to maintain the prestige of the officer corps and preparation for a second career than provided any significant intellectual development.

> Officers under pressure to punch their cards took easy courses at less competitive schools. These courses often produced mediocre results. Whatever the quality of the education provided, the net impact on the ability to fight and win wars was minimal.[6]

According to Martin Van Creveld, the current approach, in which officers are encouraged, if not obliged, to take advanced studies in a wide range of fields is

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pointless.[7] I would not go so far as to denounce the current approach, but I feel obliged to emphasize that the CF has missed a good opportunity to invest in members of the profession of arms. In the current world context, we need competent leaders in the field of science and the arts. The CF must change its approach toward bachelor's and master's degrees. The importance of education in preparing an army for an uncertain future becomes obvious when one realizes that its strength resides in the future and that the lever to activate it is the brain.[8]

If we want to be serious about the profession of arms, we must put in place programs that respond to the current environment and not allow our members to prepare their second careers at the expense, in terms of both money and time, of the CF. It would be absurd in the medical profession to accept a bachelor's degree in town planning; the same is true of our profession.

I shall start by defining professionalism and then discuss military professionalism. I will subsequently discuss the officer professional development process with regard to training, experience, professional education and personal development, paying special attention to education and suggesting an approach that would contribute to the profession of arms. This is a major challenge and this paper addresses the need to pay special attention to the profession of arms and the art of war for the 21st century.

The purpose of this work is to point out the mistake the we are on the verge of making and to recommend an approach that will contribute to and honour our profession, while avoiding the creation of a system of card punching and second career preparation. There have been many initiatives aimed at increasing the degree of professionalism. While tools are available to all members who wish to pursue graduate studies in a field related to the profession of arms, there is no pressure to encourage, or even require, studies in defence-related fields with a potential impact on the quality of our leaders at all levels. This paper is intended for politicians, members of the Armed Forces of all ranks and civilians in the Department of National Defence.

Professionalism

Although there are many definitions of professionalism, all are generally agreed on the fact that without higher education, practical experience and a sense of corporate responsibility, one cannot talk of a profession.[9] "Professional" is often used to mean the opposite of "amateur".[10] The professional is more aptly defined as someone who, in a societal context, provides a service that is essential to society. In this sense, he is an expert in his field, having acquired his knowledge through in-depth study and practical experience.[11] It is in the context of this requirement for expertise that the professional requires education since he must first obtain the abilities and knowledge needed to exercise the profession. Abilities and knowledge are obtained and maintained by an ongoing process of education and training.[12] Samuel Huntington describes two phases that a professional must follow: a general phase and a technical phase.

> The liberal education of the professional man is normally handled by the general educational institutions of society devoted to this purpose. The second phase or technical phase of professional education, on the other hand, is given in special institutions operated by or affiliated with the profession itself.[13]

The role of the Command and Staff College thus addresses the technical phase of professional development. The general phase is addressed by the many civilian universities and the Royal Military College at Kingston, which trains our leaders.

The Profession of Arms

The Officers' Professional Development Manual stipulates that officers in the CF are members of a profession that:

> performs a service to society, demands of its members that they possess absolute competence as a result of intensive preparation in the context of a program of education and training, obliges its members to assume a societal responsibility in respect of the standards and quality of the service rendered and provides the provider of services to his country with a feeling of satisfaction which is greater than that available for material considerations.[14]

The institution offers the sense of exclusivity and belonging to a dedicated group: "As a distinct group with unique, specific responsibilities towards the Nation, Canada's military sees itself, with reason, as a unique part of society"[15]. After all, no other profession can require the ultimate sacrifice to defend the national interest. The military profession is distinguished from the others by the fact that its soldiers solve problems and implement solutions in an environment that is, or may become, hostile, murderous and fatal.[16]

According to Samuel Huntington, the essential characteristic of military professionalism is the virtually exclusive control that armed forces exercise over the "management of violence".[17] In our own day, this approach might appear simplistic, given the complexity of operations and the many non-military tasks that are entrusted to the CF. The situation is such that the international community and the various organizations would not hesitate to blame the military forces involved for the failure of a major operation. For example, any failure of the Afghan elections, overseen by the United Nations, could have been blamed on NATO or Coalition forces, even though their role and support remained limited by the type of operation conducted by the key organizations.

On the battlefield, the expertise is the technical competence of the soldier: his ability to use his weapons and his equipment and to lead men in accordance with a sound tactical or strategic plan to defeat the enemy.[18] In peacetime, it is the soldier's ability to learn from the mistakes and successes of the past: by identifying the weapons and equipment that have potential for the future, by adapting them to a practical doctrine and, as far as possible, by measuring the changing capabilities of potential enemies.[19] We can say beyond a shadow of a doubt that in the current situation, this constitutes a major challenge. Let us take a look at the complex environment that characterises operations in the 21st century.

The Post-modern Period

In order to correctly identify the requirement in terms of education for our leaders, it is important to define the environment in which they will be called upon to command or perform. As Peter Foot describes, times have indeed changed since the end of the Cold War. In modern operations, the concepts of victory and deterrence are

combined, military skills can sometimes appear out of context, national concerns are distant, the legal, political and social context remains highly controversial, a tactical problem becomes strategic in an instant and the politicians maintain an ongoing interest in the conduct of operations.[20]

We are in what Charles C. Moskos, John Allan Williams and David R. Segal describe as the post-modern period. The modern period stretched from the *levée en masse* of the French Revolution in 1793 to the Second World War.[21] Advanced modern is the period of the Cold War in which we find conscription and a resurgence of military professionalism for officers with the coming of the academies and war colleges to replace the family and financial links which characterized the granting of commissions.[22]

The post-modern period sees five major organizational changes. The first is the interpenetrability [sic] of the civilian and military spheres at both the structural and cultural levels. The second is a reduction in the differences between the services based on branches, ranks and combat and support units. The third is a change in the use made of the military—from fighting wars to functions that might traditionally seem civilian in nature. The fourth change is that military forces are used more often in missions that are internationally authorized or at least legitimized by supranational entities. Finally, the internationalization of military forces themselves in the face of the emergence of organizations such as the Eurocorps and the combined divisions within NATO countries.[23]

Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the new world order has revolutionized the planet. We have lost the luxury of knowing our enemy—his doctrine, his techniques and procedures and our eventual battlefield. The ensuing worldwide disorder has appeared in the form of low or medium intensity ethnic or religious conflicts and worldwide terrorism. The reduction in wars between nations has given place to civil conflicts that have at times led to the fall of governments. The Gulf War and the

current war in Iraq are close to what we might characterize as conventional wars. However, the current stabilization phase shows us how unpredictable and complex the environment can become. The challenge for the Americans is a major one and an officer corps trained in the art of war and in related fields would be an asset.

The Afghan theatre, which is the one best known to the Canadian Forces, presents a unique degree of complexity. It contains a multitude of players ranging from a coalition force headed by American power, a NATO force comprising more than 28 members and non-members as well as the United Nations. We also have a stealthy, elusive enemy based in the local population using guerrilla tactics; myriad governmental and non-governmental organizations mixed with private companies of security providers and mercenaries; a culture very different from the one we know, where even death has a very different meaning from our own; a quasi-medieval system in which values are flouted by a culture of male domination, religious traditions, warlords and a local economy based on the production of opium on a worldwide scale. Then there is the complex environment that combines mountainous terrain, desert and a heavily populated urban area; levels of warfare that can blend in an instant; a role and increased responsibilities for our junior leaders at all levels; the use of new technologies, primarily sensor-based, which provide troops with data in virtually real time; newly-minted force multipliers such as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), military information teams and unparalleled civilian military cooperation (CIMIC). The times have definitely changed and the advent of this asymmetrical theatre has given a new dimension to the role and responsibilities of the military profession.

It is impossible to discuss military education without touching on the other pillars of officer professional development. In a report, Morton proposes a system of four pillars and four separate periods of development.[24] This model, which was adopted by the CF, underscores the preponderant role of training, operational and command experience, education and personal development.[25] In order to perceive the subject properly, it is important to examine these pillars and their contribution to preparing leaders at all levels. Before covering training, it is important to look at education.

Training

As Dr. Ronald Haycock differentiates them, training is "an anticipated response to an anticipated situation" while education is "a reasoned response to an unforeseeable situation".[26] LGen (retd) R. Morton emphasizes that every soldier needs training and education in accordance with their level of work, but in general terms, at the lower levels, training is the key to success and education remains secondary, while the reverse is true at higher ranks.[27] Training remains a tool essential to military performance but does not foster the development of the skills required for leadership, planning and decision-making.[28] Training, whether individual, collective or mission-specific, remains a key element of our operational preparation. Training cannot be dissociated from education; the two cannot be viewed in isolation, given that they are mutually complementary and reinforcing. I believe that training bridges the gap of experience at the lowest level and its relative importance decreases with rank (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Relative Importance of Areas of Development.

This table shows the author's view of the relative importance of the four pillars of officer professional development during the four periods of professional development.

There are those who believe that the quality of our officers has declined since the closure of the CF bases in Germany and the reduction in Canadian participation in the annual NATO exercises. I have no doubt that the training that occurred there was extremely beneficial, but times have changed and, now that we have lost the luxury of knowing our potential enemy, his tactics, techniques and procedures, we need innovative leaders with open minds who understand the complexity of the theatre. In order to maximize our return on investment, priority should be given to education.

The level of training of our forces is generally commensurate with the challenges that await us, despite the difficulty for some of our members and trades to think asymmetrically and our limited capability to operate in complex environments, be they urban, mountainous or desert. This topic could be dealt with in a separate paper, but I firmly believe that, in the current environment, the frequency of combined and/or inter-service exercises would greatly improve our capabilities and our interoperability in preparation for coalition operations, which are the most common these days.

Operational and Command Experience

In the military world, it is common to hear that one learns from experience. Most of the opponents of the policy of a graduate officer corps argued that such experience could be a substitute for a university degree. The belief that experience can compensate for an intellectual void no longer holds. The interpersonal, technical and cognitive skills required to confront the new changes have become too important for us to base the development of our leaders exclusively on experience and unstructured personal development.[29]

In addition, the opportunity to learn from one's own experience is not given to everyone. The turnover of personnel at all levels, and particularly at the officer level, means that very few have this opportunity. Many officers thus have to learn from the experience of others. Experience remains an asset in an officer's professional development and its relative importance has a tendency to increase with rank (see Figure 1). Experience undoubtedly adds a touch of realism needed to validate a

theory.[30] Without it, there can be no intuition; however, it cannot replace education, which remains the cornerstone on which the other pillars are built at the start and in the course of our careers.

Education

Unfortunately, no one can predict the future accurately. Accordingly, it is difficult to train or educate personnel with specific skills to meet the demands of 2020. But we can prepare them intellectually to deal with ambiguity and complexity.[31] Therein lies the real challenge of appropriately preparing the officer corps. The simple fact of requiring a degree at any price has created a climate of card punching and an approach in which some members see an opportunity to prepare for their second career rather than a commitment to the profession of arms. We must apply a degree of logic if we wish to have leaders capable of responding to the complex environment of the post-modern period. "An evolving world demands an evolving education."[32] The absence of a CF strategy on education has been noted in numerous recent reports.[33] This situation limits the participation of thinkers and clear direction in this area, thereby limiting the creation of an "intelligentsia" among our officers.

In February 2001, in Moscow, at a seminar on military reform, the following statement summarized the situation succinctly:

> We must produce officers, from platoon commander to Chief of Staff, who can deal with this recrudescence of operational and strategic complexity. They must be able to look at chaos from several new and different angles in order to identify the road to take and communicate and explain it in the form of orders, directives and policies. This new facet of modern military life is produced not only on the battlefield, but also in acquisition and budget management projects. There is nothing simpler. (Translation)[34]

Education thus makes it possible to prepare better for the complexity of the battlefield of the future and the challenges that await leaders at all levels. The former Chief of the Defence Staff, General Baril, emphasized that junior officers, from 2Lt to Captain, must have academic education to enhance their intellectual skills since, even at lower levels, they will have to manage complex situations that pose ethical and moral dilemmas.[35] We must produce competent leaders at all levels to confront the challenges that will be posed in future operations and conflicts. In order to perform well, officers must be trained and educated to master the art of war or related fields: a warning to adherents of the revolution in military affairs and to those who might be tempted to praise the new technologies for the potential advantage they can give us over a potential enemy. The advantage conferred by superior technology is an asset, but nothing can replace independent thought, analytical skills and the self-confidence that characterize a great leader and can be acquired only by extensive military education.[36] As Samuel Huntington observes, emphasis on technical problems constitutes an obstacle to professionalism.[37] The requirements in terms of knowledge for the next millennium have more to do with creative imagination than technical expertise.[38]

The Whiters report describes the key element of the profession of arms as the "ordered application" of force and emphasizes that, in order to achieve the required degree of expertise, a general liberal education, together with esoteric, even technical knowledge, are required. Liberal education is necessary to ensure that the

professional officer responds naturally to political and societal standards and objectives, including the ethics of the society he serves.[39]

A Canadian medic assists a local Afghan

As Randy J. Wakelam notes, the vision of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Staff College in the 1950s indicates the need to endorse a liberal education.

> The College does not try to train experts in a specific field, any more than it teaches easy, universally applicable doctrines. By offering its graduates an education that is as broad in scope as possible and by inculcating into them rigorous thought, it attempts instead to have them acquire a broad field of interest, an open mind, an ability to reason and an expanded vision of their service and their profession, on the strength of which they will be able to master the specific tasks that they will be called upon to perform in the positions they will occupy, whatever they are, and to take enlightened decisions in any situation.[40] (Translation)

The RCAF concepts remain relevant to the current discussion and merit special attention.

Even though our society increasingly recognizes the importance and the value of an arts degree in civilian corporations and registration for such programs increased by 35% at McGill University between 1996 and 2004[41], and while the United States, Latin America and other countries are experiencing an upsurge of interest in liberal military education, the Canadian Army acts on the premise that, while subjects like military geomatic engineering are part of military education, there is no place in it for anthropology or history.[42] The committee also emphasized the importance of including, in the study options available, the arts at the same level as science, technology and business administration.[43]

Officers must assimilate the skills that make possible critical evaluation and analysis so

that they will be able to deal with any problem. In sum, they must acquire the capacity to reason that is obtained through a general education, and that must constitute the basis for technical learning, which is equally necessary.[44] Dr Allan English admits that, while general training can constitute the basis for any officer, we have to consider those areas that are directly related to the conduct of war.[45]

We must thus also emphasize strategic studies, theory, history and military psychology. The study of military history should, as Liddell Hart emphasizes: "form the basis for a program of military education because of its practical value; it contributes to the mental development of the military leader while at the same time providing a breadth of experience that would be impossible for anyone to encounter in a single lifetime".[46] History, properly mastered, provides the procedure for developing understanding as well as a range of past experience that derives from this understanding.[47] In 1956, Colonel C. P. Stacey emphasized that military history is an essential part of the officer's education.[48] Moltke himself insisted that military men must study history … and military history is "the most effective means of teaching war during peace."[49]

As the American, LGen Cushman mentions, perspicacity stems from this openness to a variety of stimuli, intellectual curiosity, observation and reflection, constant evaluation and testing, conversation and discussion, from a review of hypotheses, from listening to others, from the study of history and from the indispensable ingredient of humility. Analysis, including system analysis, can contribute to, but can never be a substitute for perspicacity.[50]

Rowley admitted that some military, technical and professional knowledge is required below the rank of Major and that the need for intellectual capacities increases only beyond this rank.[51] I believe that the complexity of operations and the numerous technologies that we face require much more of today's soldiers. Any action at the tactical level can have repercussions at the operational and even the political level. The need for intellectual capacity thus applies to soldiers at all levels. We would do well to review the role of our non-commissioned officers, to whom we are entrusting greater responsibilities without, however, giving them the tools, namely the education, to develop their skills. This would allow them to fully take on their new role.

Without venturing into the debate on whether war is a science or an art, I firmly believe that some trades require one or the other by virtue of their functions. A combat engineer or a staff officer working in acquisition or research and development projects could need a degree in science, for example, but for the majority, we must rely on the profession of arms and the art of war.

BGen (retd) Ken C. Hague, the former Commandant of RMC Kingston, noted that the Canadian Forces need a policy on education that is balanced with career management, if we wish to achieve the objective of making senior and general officers more intellectual.[52] An overall review of the requirements of each trade, and of positions within the Forces is required. Just as in civilian life, some positions could require certain academic qualifications.

We will thus avoid becoming involved in the costly battle of the badges. I realize that there is much work to be done in this field, but it must be undertaken if we wish to take advantage of this unique opportunity to raise the profession of arms in Canada to levels never before achieved.

Personal Development

Any officer who is a member of the military profession must view personal development as an ongoing process. Many initiatives have been launched since the publication of a large number of reports on this subject. The new professional development program for officers will complement the development of our junior officers and represents a step in the right direction.

To complete Samuel Huntington's technical phase, the staff colleges fill a vital role. Recent changes, including the advent of two new courses for general officers and colonels, came into being in 1998, some 30 years after the Rowley report recommended their creation and after two subsequent studies confirmed this need.[53] The Advanced Military Studies Course covers the study of high-level military operations and the National Security Course deals with the national and international environment.[54] We have finally addressed the need that was apparent at the highest levels.

Canadian armoured vehicle park in Kabul, Afghanistan

Personal development is this continuous process, which must become routine for all members of the organization. Reading army bulletins on doctrine and training, participating in the debate on doctrine, awareness of modern technologies and their impact on future operations must become part of continuous learning. Just as doctors attend colloquia and seminars, we must engage in doctrinal and intellectual debate, not only in Kingston or Ottawa, but also on the bases, to enable officers at the tactical level, the operators, to participate and prepare themselves to rise to the challenges that await them. The learning organization is a fashionable term these days. If we are serious in what we advocate, we must seize every opportunity that offers itself and put in place the tools that will enable us all to become true professionals.

Patrolling the streets, and providing security and stability

The task of preparing for war and operations other than war remains the responsibility of the officer corps. It is incumbent upon commanders to create an atmosphere that is conducive to the professional development of their officers and NCOs. This investment will bring great benefits in the short, medium and long term.

Both in terms of the options open to the Forces, "sub-contracting" to civilian companies or the maximum use of its institutions, we must promote the necessary partnership between civilian academics and our management in order to identify accurately what Moskos describes as the now-grey area between civilian and military activities in the post-modern world.[55]

In order to stimulate thought and debate in a strongly hierarchical profession, which requires absolute obedience and loyalty in peace as in war, the proposed solution consists of withdrawing soldiers from their environment to entrust their career development to professional educators in the civilian world.[56] This permits soldiers to question, where necessary, the ideas and values inculcated in them since their basic training.

The current administrative programs, including the reimbursement of course costs, credit for military courses and professional development, as well as the establishment of distance learning sites on bases and on operations, have provided motivated personnel with the option of continuing their studies. The success of the program of studies on the conduct of war from the early stages clearly highlighted the interest in advanced studies that exists on the part of military personnel, as they prepare to study on a part-time basis. It showed that they were interested in the profession of arms, even without the policy as it is currently defined.[57]

The flexibility of programs must also be emphasized as a key element, given the limited number of full-time students, the tempo of operations in the CF and the workload incumbent on some positions, whether staff or command. Granting credits for completed military courses encourages candidates to apply, and must do justice to the training they receive.

Conclusion

For an organization that claims to want "intellectualism" from its leadership, the Canadian Forces will need to create an environment that encourages intellectual pursuits and will have to give recognition to those who want to combine their personal experience and abilities with academic training throughout their careers.[58] Initiating a review of the career management system based on occupational groups and positions, far from unleashing a battle of the badges, would be doing a service to our professions. The educational requirements for all military occupational groups demand in-depth study.



Although a number of recent technologies raise important doctrinal questions and adherents of the revolution in military affairs suggest that the fusion of information in quasi-real time and precision weapons will generate a never before achieved lethality,[59] Clausewitz would be careful to remind us that the latter affects the *grammar* of war and not its logic.[60] While technology remains important in the development of a military professionalism, technological development will be relatively easy compared to the adaptation of the organizations, doctrine, military education and training of our forces.[61]

Although I support the Department's initiative and believe in a graduate officer corps, I believe that the current approach does not advance the professionalism of the Canadian military. We would do better to promote the study of subjects related to the conduct of war and operations other than war rather than prepare our members for their second careers.

A system of education and professional development oriented towards the profession of arms will encourage the emergence of Canadian specialists. As Williamson Murray emphasizes, the greatest contribution that military culture has made to innovation was to allow officers to use their imagination.[62]

Producing an officer corps moulded in the art and science of war, capable of leading men effectively, is the real challenge we face.

> Regardless of the level to which an officer rises as a teacher or manager, his real role is to direct men. To be effective, he must study military history, work on resolving problems on topographical maps and Think War.[63]

In this quotation from Buddecke lies the raison d'être of the profession of arms. Foremost among the virtues of the officer are those of being a leader, who carries others along, inspires them and directs them. Professional and command experience is fundamental, but is not given to all. The training that we conduct is realistic and satisfies the "anticipated response" that we seek. The recent initiatives of the Department in the area of personal development are steps in the right direction, but we still have some way to go. The pillar of education seems to be missing from the roll call. Although the policy is clear and the programs currently in place address a need, we have just missed a golden opportunity to demonstrate our serious attitude toward the profession of arms. We owe it to our country, our Army and above all to those who carry out our plans and who do honour to our country on the world stage, our soldiers. An army's success depends much more on investment in the brains of its officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers than in the acquisition of new technologies.

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Helicopters with Op Halo in Haiti bring much needed supplies to local residents

THE DARK SIDE TO ELITES: ELITISM AS A CATALYST FOR DISOBEDIENCE

Colonel Bernd Horn, OMM, CD, Ph.D.

The concept of an elite has historically been distasteful to most western democratic societies. Most such societies pride themselves on being egalitarian and maintaining the unassailable and virtuous belief that all humankind is created equal. Elitism automatically destroys that illusion. The term alone conjures up notions of favoritism, privilege, superiority and standards that are unobtainable by the majority, which immediately creates angst amongst the non-elite.

The military institution parallels society's disdain for elites. Historically, elites have been universally despised within most military establishments. For example, Thomas Adams, a former Director of Intelligence and Special Operations at the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, revealed that "the US military, particularly the Army, has long distrusted the whole idea of elite units on the general principle that such organizations have no place in the armed forces of a democracy."[1] Martin Kitchen, a professor of history, explained, "the very mention of the idea of a military elite is enough to set the alarm bells ringing in sensitive democratic souls."[2]

In the military, elites are often seen as resource intensive and particularly divisive. Their privileged status, which includes special badges and dress, special equipment and training and streamlined access to the chain of command as well as special consideration and lavish resources, runs counter to a very hierarchical, traditional organization that prides itself on uniformity, standardization and rigid adherence to military norms, values and traditions. The greatest dissension over elites is their tendency to act as a law unto themselves, which actively fuels disobedience to lawful authority. Their demanding and rigorous selection standards, strenuous training, immense capability and privileged status normally creates and feeds a "cult of the elite" that is inwardly focused and which rejects those outside the group regardless of rank or position. Responsive only to their respective group, members of elites often disregard and flagrantly flaunt military conventions, rules and regulations because of their special membership. It is at these times that elitism shows its dark side—its capability of acting as a catalyst for disobedience to authority.

Before examining the issue of elites as a cause for disobedience, it is necessary to define what exactly constitutes an elite. The word is often used, or more accurately, misused by the press, public and the military itself. It is a term loaded with baggage, and often actually carries negative connotations. It is not hard to understand why. The concept of an "elite" invariably generates enmity. Respected military analyst and author Tom Clancy observed, "As always, those who dare rise above the crowd and distinguish themselves will spark envy and resentment."[3] Similarly, "elitism," acknowledged one former member of an elite unit, "is counter-productive, it alienates you from other people."[4]

Elites are often generally defined as "exclusive" and as "a class or group possessing wealth, power, and prestige."[5] The term usually refers to individuals and groups that are ranked in the upper levels in a stratification hierarchy and who normally possess greater power, influence, mobility, status and prestige than other individuals or groups ranked beneath them.[6] In its purest form the term elite translates into "the choice or most carefully selected part of a group."[7]

There are four traditional types of elite. The first is the aristocracy, or any other group enjoying particular hereditary privileges. The aristocracy is, in essence, an elite of birth. The second form is an elite of merit, which includes the intellectual elite (e.g. academic, medical, scientific), as well as a more contemporary rendition that includes sports and entertainment stars. In short, it is composed of people with outstanding merits and qualities. The third type is the functional elite composed of individuals who hold particular positions in society essential for its efficient and effective operation. This bureaucratic elite is made up of key civil servants and can include a military elite as well. The final type is the power elite. This grouping consists of the individuals who hold and wield political and/or economic power. This group has now grown to include the contemporary cultural elite, those members (often holding political and economic power as well) capable of influencing the terms of public debate on such topics as the environment or social issues.

Sociologists and political scientists have tended to define elites as a cohesive minority in any given group or society that holds the power of decision making

Regardless of the specific type of elite in question there are a number of common features that explain elitism's link to disobedience in the military context. Sociologists and political scientists have tended to define elites as a cohesive minority in any given group or society that holds the power of decision making. They further note that the chief strength of a given elite is its autonomy and cohesiveness, which are borne from an exclusiveness that is protected by rigorous entrance standards. Furthermore, they are extremely homogeneous and self-perpetuating.[8] In short, the term elite connotes a select minority within a group or society that holds special status and privilege. Traditionally, this has referred to those who held political, administrative and economic power within a society.[9] Simply put "elites are viewed as the 'decision-makers' of a society whose power is not subject to control by any other body in society."[10]

In addition, elites (or ruling minorities) are usually so constituted that the individuals who make them up are distinguished from the mass of the governed by qualities that give them a certain material, intellectual or even moral superiority; or else they are the heirs of individuals who possessed such qualities.[11] This includes for some the interpretation that elites can also be elite because they are the "sole source of values in the society or constitute the integrating force in the community without which it may fall apart."[12] Sociologist John Porter's 1965 study of Canadian elites, *The Vertical Mosaic*, revealed that in Canada the traditional political and economic elite represented less than 10 percent of the population and was almost exclusively white, English and protestant. Furthermore, he revealed that they attended the same schools, belonged to the same country clubs and sat on the same Boards of Executives for many

corporations and committees. Moreover, they socialized, married and did business largely within their own elite strata.

Although the central tenets of elitism, namely autonomy and exclusivity, have not changed, the make-up of elites in society has. The new elites are now defined as those who control the international flow of money and information, preside over philanthropic foundations and institutions of higher learning and manage the instruments of cultural production. Within this new elite, the term elite often simply means "highly successful."[13] The new elites are "far more cosmopolitan... restless and migratory, than their predecessors."[14]

This general overview on elites aside, historically the concept of a military elite, for sociologists and political scientists in any case, centred on the elite's impact on the politics of a society—for instance the Prussian military example and their role in the creation of the state and its caste-like structure.[15] Obviously, in the case of military elites the issue of elitism does not necessarily centre around cultural, economic or political power. Most often, it relates to the relationship of a given group within its own institution. However, the whole question of what is a military elite is not as clear as most think. The term is often misused by the press and public, as well as by military personnel because of a lack of understanding. Many different groups, such as submariners, Search and Rescue technicians, paratroopers, fighter pilots and even military police have been labelled elite, but in most cases the term is used incorrectly.

This is not surprising when one considers the myriad of concepts that exist to define the term military elite. For example, the famous writer James Jones believed that "an elite unit is only elite when the majority of its members consider themselves already dead."[16] Clearly, he was referring to elitism as a military "forlorn hope"—the force of last resort or only resort. This view was shared by an Algerian veteran of the French Foreign Legion who captured the sentiment of his peers. "We were the elite," he proclaimed, "because of our will to obey and fight and die."[17] This romantic image is often utilized by the media who feed the public a stereotypical Hollywood image of military elites that centres on the concept that "elite units require troopers who can

ignore pain and exhaustion, eat just about anything that grows or crawls, and fight on no matter what the danger."[18]

To others, military elitism is a question of command. French World War II General Ducournau insisted, "there are average soldiers commanded by elite leaders."[19] He defined elitism as a quality imposed from above springing from a small highly trained group of skilled officers. Similarly Eva Etzioni-Halevy in her study of Israeli forces defined the military elite as "the most senior officers, holding the rank of colonel and above."[20]

In an entirely different stream, Richard Szafranski, a military analyst with Toffler Associates, asserted that "elite means people and forces selected, organized, trained and equipped to rapidly adapt to, and even shape, changing or unforeseen circumstances."[21] His underlying belief centered on individuals and/or organizations of greater intellect, ability and power of decision making who were capable of exercising control over their own destiny.

On a completely divergent plane altogether, Roger Beaumont, author and former military policeman, characterizes military elites as those organizations that are relatively free from ordinary administration and discipline and where entry to these units is often through the survival of an ordeal or a "rite of passage" requiring tolerance of pain or danger and subsequent dedication to a hazardous role.[22] Similarly, French author Gilles Perrault insists that military elites are cults who possess special rites, a specialized language or vocabulary including passwords, their own apostles and martyrs and their own distinct uniform. In addition, he stipulates that elites have a simple and very defined view of the world—there are those who belong to the group and the rest who do not.[23]

Eliot Cohen developed specific criteria to define elite military units. "First," he stated, "a unit becomes elite when it is perpetually assigned special or unusual missions—in particular, missions that are, or seem to be, extremely hazardous." For this reason he insisted, "airborne units have long been considered elite since parachuting is a particularly dangerous way of going into battle." His second criterion is based on the premise that elite units conduct missions that "require only a few men who must meet high standards of training and physical toughness, particularly the latter." Finally, he argued, "an elite unit becomes elite only when it achieves a reputation—justified or not—for bravura and success."[24]

For strategist Colin Gray the designation "elite" pertains directly to the standard of selection and not to the activity that soldiers were selected to perform.[25] Conversely, military historian Douglas Porch utilized conventional measures of performance to determine elite status. As a result, he relied on such benchmarks as "battlefield achievement, military proficiency, or specialized military functions."[26] Similarly, Eric

Morris, another military historian, defined units as elite by virtue of the fact that "they were required to demonstrate a prowess and military skill of a higher standard than more conventional battalions."[27] This is the commonest of themes. Tom Clancy believed:

> it's not just the weapons you carry that matter, but also the skill, training and determination of the troopers . . . Elite is as elite does. Elite means that you train harder and do somewhat more dangerous things—which earns you the right to blouse your jump boots and strut a little more. . .[28]

In the same vein, military analyst and author Mark Lloyd considers military units elite by reason of superior training and equipment, or greater combat experience.[29] Similarly, David Miller argues that military elites "are selected and trained for a special role, for which conventional troops do not have either the special weapons or training needed [or]. . . are given a special designation earned by a particularly meritorious performance in battle and are then expected to set an example which other elements should follow."[30] Along this line, Clancy noted that military elites are "fit volunteers, trained to a razor's edge and beyond. . .."[31] For this reason, Major-General Robert Scales stated, "Elite soldiers who are carefully selected, trained and well led always perform to a higher standard."[32] Not surprisingly, the Ranger Creed contains the conceptual definition of a military elite based on the premise that "My country expects me to move farther, faster and fight harder than any other soldier."[33]

Yet, there are still other interpretations. Dennis Showalter, a professor of history, argues that military elites, already in World War II, achieved their status not on personnel selection but rather on functionalism "based on learned skills, [units] whose professionalism facilitated employing ways of war inapplicable to homogenized mass armies."[34] For this reason noted German military historian James Lucas believes that military elites were thus designated because they were "given the hardest military tasks to perform"[35]

From an altogether different point of view, Martin Kitchen believes that modern military elites are "classless, highly trained killers who have a wide popular appeal."[36] Numerous other military analysts, researchers and scholars have applied a comparable approach. Namely, the designation of elite was applied simply because individuals and

units were not representative of their conventional brethren by virtue of the quality or type of personnel, training or mission.[37] Quite simply, unique equalled elite.[38]

Clearly, perceptions of what constitutes a military elite are wide ranging. Often,the criteria are somewhat contrived and misleading. Simply put, being different and/or performing a unique task is far from being a de facto "elite." Therefore, for the purpose of this article, a military elite will be defined as an organization that bases its selection on rigorous screening processes that maintain extremely high standards of mental and physical ability and fitness, professional experience and skill levels, maturity and motivation. In addition, to be considered elite, the organization must also have assigned to it an exclusive and specific special mission or role (either conventional or unconventional or both) that is actually exercised. And finally, an elite entails a recognized reputation for excellence (based on the level of training, expertise and professionalism of the group or on its success in operations).

Considering these criteria, it becomes evident that not all units with 'unique characteristics' warrant elite status. For instance, they may demonstrate different skill sets than a conventional unit, however they do not necessarily represent an individual qualitative superiority over the latter.

Although elites are generally resisted in the military they do provide certain benefits. Firstly, they are extremely cohesive with an unquestioned solidarity between their members. Normally in elites, officers and men undergo identical training and are faced with the same tests of courage, endurance and strength. Generally, all members have passed the rigorous selection standards. Basically there are no shortcuts and no distinctions for anyone. For instance, in regard to paratroops, Colonel Peter Kenward, the last commander of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, recognized that "it is impossible to hide weakness in the Airborne."[39] As a result of the exacting standards that all must meet, as well as the shared hardships, a bond is created based on group identity, mutual respect and solidarity. Membership in the fraternity cannot be bestowed due to affluence, connections, or rank. It must be earned.

Despite the possible benefits that can be derived from elite units, they are generally resisted and historically most have faced bureaucratic hostility from the larger conventional institution they belonged to

This unique, shared experience builds group cohesion and solidarity. This is significant. Sociologists have argued that high standards and requirements to enter into a group result in a greater sense of commitment and value placed on membership to that group by successful candidates.[40] In simple terms, the greater the degree of challenge, hardship and danger, the greater the development of mutual respect and affiliation.[41] This has great impact. Samuel Stouffer's monumental study of battlefield behaviour, The American Soldier, indicated that 80 percent of respondents believed that a strong group integration was the main reason for stamina in combat. This study also observed that motivation is primarily dependent on group cohesion and that group cohesion in turn, is the decisive factor for combat efficiency. The steadfast self-confidence in

oneself and in one's fellow soldiers engenders a belief and philosophy that there is no mission that cannot be accomplished.[42] As such, elite units provide a very reliable and effective combat force regardless of the difficulty of the task.

Furthermore, elite units also provide a leadership nursery. Members have the opportunity to learn additional skills, particularly advanced leadership abilities due to their exposure to different training and operational experiences, as well as exposure to different, often more experienced, mature, highly skilled personnel. In the end, members can return to their former units and share the expertise and skills they have attained.

In addition, elite units are often a preferred testing ground for new tactics and

procedures. This is easily explained. Normally, elite units represent smaller, more experienced, and talented organizations. As such, it is easier to test new processes, tactics, equipment and techniques and then refine them prior to transferring skills to the wider organization.

Nonetheless, despite the possible benefits that can be derived from elite units, they are generally resisted and historically most have faced bureaucratic hostility from the larger conventional institution they belonged to. This reality is based on the detrimental impact that elite units have on the larger organization according to most military commanders. Firstly, elite units are seen as "skimming the cream" or taking the best individuals from conventional units leaving them with lesser leadership. "Almost invariably the men volunteering," explained historian Philip Warner, "are the most enterprising, energetic and least dispensable."[43] It was for this reason that Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, never agreed with Churchill's sponsorship of special elite type units. He felt that it was "a dangerous drain on the quality of an infantry battalion."[44] The legendary Field Marshal Viscount Slim was

in strong agreement. He noted that special units "were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement and not a little propaganda. . . The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially of the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d'élite could be expected to undertake them."[45]

Elite units are also seen as bad for morale of the larger institution. Military leadership consistently perceives only negative consequences of those who fail to pass the high standards normally imposed during selection to elite units. Alan Brooke and Slim were two commanders who were convinced that those rejected had their confidence undermined by failure.[46] Moreover, the nature of highly selective units creates an impression that everyone else is second-best.

This feeling that others are second best is more than just an impression. It is a widespread belief. "I was glad they [those not selected] left camp immediately and didn't say any awkward farewells," confessed one successful candidate. "They were social lepers and I didn't want to risk catching the infection they carried."[47] This attitude is a dangerous one. More importantly, it underlines the chasm that develops between those in the elite group and those external to it.

Furthermore, many commanders perceive elite units as resource intensive, if not an actual waste of men and material, when one considers the return on investment. Detractors argue that elites are "expensive, independent, arrogant, out of uniform, [operate] outside normal chains of command, and [are] too specialized for [their] own good."[48] Tom Clancy observed that elite "units and their men are frequently seen as 'sponges,' sucking up prized personnel and funds at the expense of 'regular' units."[49] Detractors of special or elite units often liken their efforts to "breaking windows by throwing guineas (gold coins) at them."[50]

However, the issue that generates the greatest amount of resistance and animosity, and which is the most relevant to the question of disobedience to lawful authority, is the issue of the "cult of the elite" mentality, specifically their arrogance and rejection of conventional military discipline, practice and protocol. It is this attitude, what some scholars, analysts and military personnel have described as the phenomena of elites being a "law unto themselves," that is the driving force of elitism actually feeding disobedience. The rejection of the authority or validity of anyone outside of the elite group, by members of that group, combined with their often times arrogant behaviour and flagrant flouting of military rules, regulations and protocol, generates an environment where only internal values, norms and rules are followed and those external to the group are often ignored. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that the elite leadership often ignores the non-adherence to regulations and non-conformist behaviour. Military analyst and author, Roger Beaumont, described elites as "virtually encapsulated delinquency."[51] In short, membership to an elite, more often than not, actively promotes disobedience to lawful authority.

This issue is probably the greatest seed of discontent with conventional military leaders

in regard to elites and a major reason for the resistance, animosity and active hostility of these conventional leaders. To those on the outside, units that do not fit the conventional mould, specifically those described as elite, special, or unique, are more often than not seen as rogue outfits and divisive in relation to the greater institution. Former Canadian lieutenant-colonel and current sociologist Charles Cotton, in his studies of military culture, noted that "their [elite] cohesive spirit is a threat to the chain of command and wider cohesion."[52]

This is often a result of the fact that the leadership and discipline are informal within elites and the normal protocol and emphasis placed on ceremony and deportment relaxed. Professor Eliot Cohen revealed, "an almost universally observed characteristic of elite units is their lack of formal discipline—and sometimes a lack of substantive discipline as well." His research determined that "elite units often disregard spit and polish or orders about saluting."[53]

He was not mistaken as is evidenced in the testimony of former members of a wide range of elite units. For instance, General De La Billiere recalled that as a junior officer in the British Special Air Service (SAS), "the men, for their part, never called me 'Sir' unless they wanted to be rude."[54] Historian Eric Morris noted, "the LRDG [Long Range Desert Group] and other like units did offer a means of escape from those petty tediums and irritants of everyday life in the British Army. Drills, guards, fatigues and inspections were almost totally absent."[55] Another military historian observed that "[mad Mike] Calvert, [Commander 2 SAS Brigade] like many fighting soldiers was not particularly concerned by the trivia of, for example, military appearance [since] uniformity and smartness have little bearing on a unit's ability to fight."[56] But, without a doubt this "trivial" aspect has an enormous impact on how the respective unit is perceived by others, namely outsiders.

This was not lost on the members of elite organizations. "We were already conspicuous by our lack of dress code," confessed one SAS non-commissioned officer (NCO), "the green army always dresses the same."[57] One neophyte American Special Forces soldier recalled his amazement on arriving at his new unit. "Sergeants Major are the walking, breathing embodiment of everything that's right in the US Army," he explained. Yet, his first glimpse of his new sergeant-major caught him unprepared. "This guy looked like Joe Shit the Ragman," he exclaimed. "His shirt was wide open and he wore no T-shirt. His dog-tags were gold plated. His hat was tipped up on the back of his head, and he wore a huge, elaborately curled and waxed handlebar moustache."[58]

The fact of the matter is that elite units realize that their lax discipline and dress codes irritate the conventional military. This is part of their appeal, as is their need to clearly differentiate themselves from the 'regular' military. This is also why it generates such enmity from the conventional hierarchy. Nonetheless, much of this dynamic is based on the type of individuals that actually join these units. David Stirling, the founder of the SAS, reflected that the "Originals" were not really "controllable" but rather "harnessable."[59] The Rangers were acknowledged to consist largely of "mavericks who couldn't make it in conventional units."[60] "Commanding the Rangers," explained William Darby, their first commanding officer, "was like driving a team of very high

spirited horses. No effort was needed to get them to go forward. The problem was to hold them in check."[61]

American Special Forces, "Green Berets," were later similarly described as those "who wanted to try something new and challenging, and who chafed at rigid discipline."[62] Furthermore, General De La Billiere observed that "most officers and men here do not really fit in normal units of the Army, and that's why they're here in the SAS, which is not like anything else in the Services."[63] He assumed that most of the volunteers, like himself, "were individualists who wanted to break away from the formal drill-machine discipline" which existed in the army as a whole.[64] This fits a similar pattern seen in other elites. According to General Peter Schoomaker, who joined Delta under its founding commander Colonel Charlie Beckwith, "Beckwith was looking for a bunch of bad cats who wanted to do something different."[65]

This element of self-selection, combined with the feeling of accomplishment as one of the few who has successfully passed selection, and the self-confidence born from challenging, difficult and hazardous training, creates an aura of invincibility and an intense loyalty to what is perceived as a very exclusive group. An intimate bond is further generated through shared hardship and danger. Members of these "special" groups frequently develop an outlook that treats those outside the club as inferior and unworthy of respect. "The more the group is centred on itself, thus increasing its cohesion," observed Professor Elmar Dinter, "the less it is interested in its environment." He argued that "an already existing behavioural pattern is thereby reinforced. . . What matters to the group is only what affects it directly." Dinter added, "the desire to distinguish the group from other groups is not restricted to insignia and ritualism, but leads, in addition, to a spiteful attitude towards others."[66] Often, this

sense of independence from the conventional army, as well as the lack of respect for traditional forms of discipline, spawn what some analysts describe as the emergence of units that are more akin to militant clans than military organizations.[67] Needless to say, this type of organization and institutional attitude is anathema to a military that prides itself on decorum, tradition and uniformity.

Not surprisingly, the arrogance and deliberate insubordination of individuals in elite units often fuels the fire. No image is more representative than the scene from *Black Hawk Down* when a captain gives direction to a group of senior NCOs. Upon completion, the group, less one, acknowledges the orders. The captain quickly confirms with the recalcitrant NCO if he understood the direction. The Delta Force sergeant replies nonchalantly, almost contemptuously, "yeah, I heard ya." This is a classic case of art reflecting reality. One operator laughingly described how he had failed to salute two "crap-hat"[regular army] captains. When brought to task for this clear omission of military protocol, he flippantly explained that he "couldn't because he was smoking and couldn't do two things at once."[68] This echoed the behaviour of paratroopers in the Canadian Special Service Force in the 1980s, who consistently refused to salute "LEG" officers and were not held accountable by their chain of command.[69]

Further examples of disobedience to authority generated from elitism are readily available. In another example, which is representative of numerous cases, a former support officer of an elite organization revealed that "assaulters would refuse to listen to others regardless of rank because 'you hadn't done selection.'"[70] Similarly, an executive assistant to a Sector Commander in Bosnia disclosed that "whenever they [members of elite units] didn't like what they were told they went in to see [circumvented the chain of command to see] the commander."[71]

The issue of circumventing or out rightly ignoring the chain of command is a bitter and long standing one. Most see it as one of the commonest examples of disobedience by elites. It also tends to raise the accusation that elites are in essence private armies that often tend to "become an object of suspicion to the public army."[72] This is often due to the fact that elite units value concrete action and have little patience for bureaucracy. Coupled with an "ends justifies the means" attitude, it is not surprising that conventional feathers are likely to get ruffled. "One danger of the private army," commented one senior officer, "is certainly that it gets into the habit of using wrong channels."[73] He was not wrong. Calvert conceded that "a private army. . . short-circuits command."[74] One need only listen to stories from the various operations that have been conducted in the recent past and those currently underway to realize this has not changed.

In the end, the arrogance and aloofness that is bred from a cult of elitism that is often endemic within groups that are specially selected develops and nurtures an "in-group" mentality that is dangerously inwardly focused. They trust only themselves, that is those who have passed the rigorous selection standards and tests. Anthropologist Donna Winslow confirmed the negative aspects that often arise from an emphasis on the exclusivity of this "warrior cult." It nurtures an unassailable belief, she insisted that "only those who have done it know, or can be trusted, or more dangerously yet, can

give direction."[75] Alan Bell, formerly of the SAS, confessed that we "tended to have an arrogance that we knew it all, did it all, and had nothing to learn." Moreover, he acknowledged that they would work only with Delta Force or SEAL Team Six—no one else. "We figured," he confessed, "it wasn't worth our time."[76]

And so, it becomes clearly evident that elitism, whether real or imagined by its members, actively contributes towards disobedience to lawful command. Elites tend to define conformance in a different way, that is to say, in consonance with their own particular culture and standards of discipline and obedience. When this reality is combined with their overt rejection of conventional military conventions, practices and protocol, which is quite often sanctioned by their command element, it creates an almost de facto disobedience to authority.

About the Author ...

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Endnotes

1. Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 9-10
2. Martin Kitchen, "Elites in Military History," in *Elite Formations in War and Peace*, eds. A. Hamish Ion , and Keith Neilson (Wesport: Praeger, 1996), 8. Brigadier-General (retired) R.G. Theriault astutely noted that in Canadian society it is not a good thing to produce a group who is favoured above others. Interview with author, 28 April 1998.
3. Tom Clancy, *Special Forces* (New York: A Berkley Book, 2001), 3.
4. Andy McNab, *Immediate Action* (London: Bantam Press, 1995), 381.
5. Katherine Barber, ed., *The Canadian Oxford Dictionary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
6. http://www.webref.org/sociology/e/elites.htm, accessed 18 April 2001.
7. Kitchen, 7.
8. See John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic—An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1965), 27 & 207; Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 4; Geraint Parry, *Political Elites* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 30-32; Sylvie Guillaume, ed., *Les élites fins de siècles — XIX-XX® siècles* (Editions de la Maison des Sciences de L'Homme D'Aquitaine, 1992), 27; and M.S. Whittington and Glen Williams, eds., *Canadian Politics in the 1990s* (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990), 182.
9. Hervé Bentégeant, *Les nouveaux rois de France ou la trahison des Ééites* (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 1998), 19.
10. Parry, 13. This includes leadership positions of special interest groups. Those who lead such organizations are often designated as "elites" as differentiated by the "non-decision making" mass of their members. Leo V. Panitch, "Elites, Classes, and Power in Canada," in *Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 3rd edition*, ed. Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams (Scarborough, ON: Nelson Canada, 1990), 182
11. Moshe M. Czudnowski, ed., *Political Elites and Social Change—Studies of Elite Roles and Attitudes* (Northern Illinois University Press, 1983), 221.
12. Parry, 13.
13. Reg Jennings, Charles Cox and C.L Cooper, *Business Elites: The Psychology of Entrepreneurs and Intrapreneur* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 10.
14. Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 3, 5, 25-26. See also Guillaume, 112-113. In accordance with this study, an elite must fulfill two conditions. First, it must be recognized by the respective "local society" as an elite (by definition the author states that the elite is of small composition). This aspect is symbolic in nature. The second requirement is that the elite have control and power over the cultural infrastructure of the society.
15. Parry, 75-76.
16. Douglas Porch, "The French Foreign Legion: The Mystique of Elitism," eds. A. Hamish Ion , and Keith Neilson (Wesport: Praeger, 1996), 131.

17. Ibid., 126.
18. Steve Payne, "Hell is for Heroes," *The Ottawa Sunday Sun*, 19 March 1995, 6.
19. Porch, 118.
20. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 22, No. 3, Spring 1996, 401.
21. Richard Szafranski, "Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill," in *In Athena's Camp*, ed. (New York: Rand, 1999), 408.
22. Roger A. Beaumont, *Military Elites* (London: Robert Hale and Company, 1974), 2-3.
23. Gilles Perrault, *Les Parachutistes* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1961), 42.
24. Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 17.
25. Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 158. The question of selection is an important one. Using Special Operations Forces, which are universally seen as elite, as an example their selection/status is based on a three tier basis. For instance, "Tier One" SOF consists of primarily "Black Ops," or counter terrorism. Normally, only 10-15 percent of those attempting selection are successful. What makes this number so impressive is that a large percentage of those trying are already second or third tier SOF members. Organizations that fall into this category include the US 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment—Delta, the German *Grenzschutzgruppe*-9 (GSG 9), and the Canadian Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2). "Tier Two" SOF reflects those organizations that have a selection pass rate of between 20-30 percent. They are normally entrusted with high value tasks such as Strategic Reconnaissance and Unconventional Warfare. Some examples include the American Special Forces (also referred to as Green Berets), the American SEALs, and the British, Australian and New Zealand SAS. "Tier Three" consists of those units, such as the American Rangers and the British Royal Marine Commandos that have a selection success rate of 40-45 percent, and whose primary mission is Direct Action. See Colonel C.A. Beckwith, Delta Force (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1985), 123 & 137; Interview with Major Anthony Balasevicius; Leroy Thompson, *The Rescuers. The World's Top Anti-Terrorist Units* (London: A David & Charles Military Book, 1986), 127-128; General Ulrich Wegener, Presentation to the RMC Special Operations Symposium, 5 October 2000; Judith E. Brooks and Michelle M. Zazanis, "Enhancing U.S. Army Special Forces: Research and Applications," ARI Special Report 33, October 1997, 8; General H.H. Shelton, "Quality People: Selecting and Developing Members of U.S. SOF," *Special Warfare*, Vol 11, No. 2, Spring 1998, 3; Commander Thomas Dietz, CO Seal Team 5, Presentation to the RMC Special Operations Symposium, 5 October 2000; Leary, 265; and Colonel Bill Kidd, "Ranger Training Brigade," *US Army Infantry Center Infantry Senior Leader Newsletter*, February 2003, 8-9.
26. Porch, 117.
27. Eric Morris, *Churchill's Private Armies* (London: Hutchinson, 1986), xiii. See also David Chandler, "Indispensable Role of Elite Forces," *Military History Quarterly*, Vol 15, No. 3, Spring 2003, 77-78.
28. Tom Clancy, *Airborne* (New York: Berkley Books, 1997), xviii.
29. Mark Lloyd, *Special Forces—The Changing Face of Warfare* (New York: Arms and Armour, 1995), 11.
30. David Miller, *Special Forces* (London: Salamander Books, 2001), 15. Similarly, author Duncan Anderson defined military elites as "a relatively small highly trained force specializing in extremely hazardous operations, often of a militarily non-conventional nature." Duncan Anderson, *Military Elites* (London: Bison Books Ltd., 1994), 7.
31. Tom Clancy, with General Fred Franks, *Into the Storm. A Study in Command* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), 119.
32. Major-General (retd) Robert H. Scales Jr., *Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America's Military* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003), 69.
33. Matt Labash, "The New Army," *The Weekly Standard*, Vol 6, No. 31, 30 April 2001.
34. Dennis Showalter, "German Army Elites in World Wars I and II," in *Elite Formations in War and Peace*, eds. A. Hamish Ion , and Keith Neilson (Wesport: Praeger, 1996), 152.
35. James Lucas, *Storming Eagles. German Airborne Forces in World War II* (London: Cassel & Co., 2001), 14.
36. Kitchen, 26.
37. See D.R. Segal, Jesse Harris, J.M. Rothberg, and D.H. Marlowe, "Paratroopers as Peacekeepers," *Armed Forces and Society*, Volume 10, No. 4, Summer 1984, 489; and Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia. A Socio-cultural Inquiry* (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997), 128-138. Gideon Aran stated, "Jumping can be viewed as a test which allows those who pass it to join an exclusive club, to be initiated into an elite group." Gideon Aran , "Parachuting," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 80, No. 1, 150.
38. This emphasis on discernable differences between the 'special' units and their 'conventional' brethren became the core of the Canadian military's understanding of elite. Many senior commanders defined and treated the Canadian paratroopers as elite, at least prior to the Somalia debacle, based on the higher levels of fitness, distinctive uniform and the parachuting requirement. Colonel Painchaud, a former Airborne Regimental Commander, was representative of many when he explained, "the airborne soldier is the elite of the Canadian Army. He must be in top shape compared to any other soldier, in physical fitness and shooting and weapon handling." Dick Brown, "Hanging Tough," *Quest*, May 1978, 12. See also Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Information Legacy. A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry* (Hereafter *Information Legacy*). [CD-ROM], 1998, Hearing Transcripts, Vol 36, 22 January 1996, testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Morneault, 6898.
39. Interview with author, 4 October 1996. One sergeant-major of the British 2nd Parachute Regiment stated that in airborne units the officers and men rely on one another. He explained, "a special bond was created because of the fact that the men knew that the officers, like them, endured the same difficult training prior to arriving at Regiment." Rory

Bridson, *The Making of a Para* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1989), 81. Major-General Newman declared, "There's a close bond between the airborne soldier and his officer, because each knows the other has passed the jump test. And they continue to do so together. Each believes the other will be a good man to have around when things get sweaty." Major-General A.S. Newman, *What Are Generals Made Of?* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987), 193.
40. E. Aronson and J. Mills, "The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1957, 157-158. Elliot Aronson of Stanford University and Judson Mills of the U.S. Army Leadership and Human Research Unit established this in their 1959 laboratory experiments. They stated, "Subjects who underwent a severe initiation perceived the group as being significantly more attractive than those who underwent a mild or no initiation." See also R.B. Cialdini, R.B. *Influence. Science & Practise, 3rd ed.* (Arizona: Harper Collins, 1993), 70 & 74; and Major James McCollum, "The Airborne Mystique," *Military Review*, Vol 56, No. 11, November 1976, 16.
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42. Elmar Dinter, *Hero or Coward* (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 41; and Anthony Kellet, *Combat Motivation* (Boston: Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 45-46.
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45. Field Marshall Sir William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1956), 547.
46. Slim, 546 and Morris, *Churchill's Private Army*, 243.
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48. Adams, 162.
49. Clancy, *Special Forces*, 3-4.
50. Cohen, 61.
51. Beaumont, *Military Elites*, 192.
52. Charles A. Cotton, "Military Mystique," (Source Canadian Airborne Forces Museum files-no publication material available.)
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55. Eric Morris, *Guerillas in Uniform* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 15.
56. Weale, 154.
57. Cameron Spence, *All Necessary Measures* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 43.
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60. Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1983), 14; and Charles W. Sasser, *Raider* (New York: St. Martins, 2002), 186.
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63. De La Billiere, 236.
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65. Greg Jaffe, "A Maverick's Plan to Revamp Army is Taking Shape," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 December 2003.
66. Dinter, 70.
67. John Talbot, "The Myth and Reality of the Paratrooper in the Algerian War," *Armed Forces and Society*, November 1976, 75; Cohen, 69; and Winslow, 135-141.
68. Spence, 43.
69. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonels Watkin and Peter Bradley, 4 June 1998 and 15 September 1997 respectively. The derogatory term 'LEG' originates from World War II. Regular infantry wore canvas 'leggings' as part of their uniform. The 'elite' paratroopers were spared this ordeal. They were issued with high cut 'jump boots' into which the uniform trouser could be tucked. Needless to say, the paratroopers quickly christened their brethren with the contemptuous label of 'LEGs.' A more contemporary version translates the meaning to 'Lacking Enough Guts.' This is not surprisingly a peacetime mutation. Beyond the obvious that 'leggings' are no longer worn, the act of parachuting is seen as a test of individual courage. It has taken on an importance of far greater proportion than it did during the war. Since virtually all infanteers saw combat, and those in the regular line infantry for longer periods than the airborne units, the question of individual courage was rather moot.
70. Interview with a confidential source, September 2002.
71. Interviews with confidential sources, 25 October 2002.
72. Colonel J.W. Hackett, "The Employment of Special Forces," *RUSI*, Vol 97, No. 585, February 1952, 35.
73. Ibid., 39.
74. Ibid., 39. Examples of this are legendary. For instance, Prime Minister Winston Churchill took great interest in the development of the commandos and he supported other similar aggressive, unorthodox type units. General George Marshall personally pushed his subordinates to support the establishment of the American Rangers, and his political master, President Franklin D. Roosevelt allowed the director of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to maintain a direct

pipeline to the White House. Later, President John F. Kennedy heaped lavish attention on the American Special Forces much to the chagrin of his conventional chiefs of staff and recently, it has been Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld who has personally ensured that American SOF received starring roles in US operations, as well as hefty increases in manpower and budgets. Examples of SOF operators running operations in complete isolation, if not contempt of local command arrangements are also numerous. One need only speak with individuals in leadership positions in areas of operations such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Afghanistan, to name a few, to hear anecdotal stories of using the "wrong channels."

75. Winslow, 126-133.

76. Allan Bell, formerly of 22 SAS, Presentation to the RMC Special Operations Symposium, 5 October 2000 and WS 586 class, 19 March 2004.

MWO Lizotte of 2 RCHA instructs Afghan soldiers on the 82mm mortar

TRANSFORMING LAND FORCE LIGHT ENGINEERING IN CANADIAN DOCTRINE

Captain Maxime Messier

The face of the world is constantly changing, yet the future of democratic societies is no more secure than it has been in the past. Conflicts emerging around the globe threaten the foundations of freedom and the world economy. The dimensions of modern conflict lead us to a different view of future conflicts, and the army must be ready to fight and win in the battlespace of the 21st century.

Napoleon once said ,"An army should have but a single line of operations which it should carefully preserve."[1] Unfortunately, land warfare is no longer linear and the armies of the future must be capable of undertaking a wide range of concurrent operations in austere conditions and in potentially hostile environments[2]. The War on Terrorism and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are contemporary examples illustrating how today's reality is not that of the past, and what the future may look like.

The army is undergoing a process of transformation so it may respond to the new nature of conflicts. The need for an effective light force capability is one of the important elements in this development, and a certain number of general staff activities in this regard are currently under way. Combat engineer support is essential for all phases of war and the ability of combat engineer regiments to provide close engineering support to a light force must be given careful consideration. The purpose of this article is to show the necessity of having a light engineering capability and to identify the characteristics required to support a light force.

The Security Environment of the Future

In order to discuss the necessity of a light combat force within the army, it is important to identify the various components of the security environment of the future. The dimensions of modern conflicts, future threats and risks of conflict are the main elements that will define the security environment in 2020. A common view of future conflicts will make it possible to identify the types of operations that the Land Force will have to conduct as well as the importance of having a light force capability to respond in such conflicts.

Carl von Clausewitz once wrote that "the further we go back, the less useful becomes military history."[3] The battle space has become multi-dimensional, and combat must be prosecuted in and from the air, land, sea, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Information superiority, defined as "the ability to enter into the decisional cycle of the enemy"[4], has become an essential element of victory.

According to the new *Force Employment Concept for the Army*, "failed states will continue to flounder in anarchy and violence fuelled by conflict based on ethnicity,

Messier, Captain Maxime, 'Transforming the Land Force Light Engineering in Canadian Doctrine' Canadian Army Journal Vol. 8.4 (Winter 2005), 80-86

nationalism and religious fundamentalism."[5] According to the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, "rogue states are unwilling or unable to abide by international law. […] Increased global dependencies and the availability of Weapons of Mass Destruction make rogue states increasingly dangerous to regional stability and the international community."[6] This new form of global instability opens the door to involvement by non-state actors who would be at a disadvantage in conventional warfare. Furthermore, urban operations will be characterized by the "three-block war" concept, where soldiers will be called upon to provide humanitarian aid, participate in peacekeeping/reinforcement operations and lead combat operations within the same area of operations.[7] One need only think of Somalia, Iraq and, of course, the War on Terrorism.

According to the Directorate of Land Doctrine, "asymmetry is acting, organizing and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action."[8] Those who use asymmetric strategies will try to take advantage of complex terrain—urban, forested, jungle and mountainous terrain—to minimize the impact of the mechanized superiority of conventional Western armies. Canada needs to have a light force that can fight on the same terrain as its enemies. Given that our future adversaries are quite likely to use explosive devices, anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines and booby traps and will try to contaminate water sources[9], our light forces will need Engineer support capable of countering these threats.

When we look ahead to the evolving future security environment, participation in conflicts characterized by the use of asymmetrical tactics by non-state actors is the most probable and the most dangerous threat for Canada. The army must prepare a light force that is able to deploy rapidly and fight effectively in the same places as the enemy. Without a doubt, the support of combat engineers is essential to this light force, and this aspect will be discussed later on in this paper.

Army Transformation

The future security environment and the most recent conflicts in which the Canadian Forces have participated have pushed the Army to transform itself. The Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) ordered, "using progressive doctrine, realistic training and leading-edge technologies, the army will be a knowledge-based and command-centric institution **capable of continuous adaptation and task tailoring across the spectrum of conflict**."[10] Concurrently, the "army must be able to provide expeditionary forces of value to a joint force and coalition partners. **[…] These expeditionary forces must be rapidly deployable, modern, interoperable and sustainable**."[11]

In this new concept of employment, "Canadian battle groups will be task-tailored to meet specific operational necessities."[12] The battle group will be structured in a modular fashion (for example, two motorized infantry sub-units, one light infantry sub-unit and one combat engineer squadron) to accomplish the mission, and it will be based on one of the army's 12 battalion headquarters organizations.[13]

Following an analysis of the future security environment and the CLS's strategic orientation, there is no doubt that the army must acquire a light force capability,

supported by combat engineers, which could be deployed rapidly, fight for several days with limited logistic support, master operations in complex terrain and offer the flexibility to expand our ability to conduct special operations.

The Transformation of Combat Engineering

According to the Army Engineer Campaign Plan, the operational centre of gravity for army engineers is its "operational importance" within the spectrum of military activities. "The marginalization of the Engineer Branch's capabilities" could seriously threaten its contribution to operations. Director Engineer (D Engr) therefore adopted a campaign plan whose specific goals included the following:

- promote light engineer training at the squadron level;
- acquire light engineer equipment;
- add a field squadron in each regiment.[14]

With the loss of pioneers in infantry battalions in the upcoming elimination of armoured regiments' assault troops in 2005[15], it will be more difficult for combat engineer regiments (CERs) to adequately support the 12 battle groups, since the army has only nine sub-units capable of providing combat engineer support. Because close combat engineer support for manoeuvre elements has become essential for meeting mobility, counter-mobility and protection requirements of modern conflicts, the combat engineer branch has neither the equipment, the capability, or the doctrine required to support a light force. Based on the experience of 1 Canadian Engineer Regiment's 12 Squadron in support of 3 Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry during Operation APOLLO and in exercises, 12 Squadron has been trying to adapt to light engineer tasks, but has found the experience quite difficult due to the constant lack of resources in this area.[16] The CERs will thus have to transform in order to be able to operate jointly with and in close support of forces deployed on all types of terrain and all operations.

Light Forces

It is debatable whether Canada has always had this capability. In reality, the Land Staff has always regarded Canadian infantry regiments' third battalions as mechanized units without vehicles[17]. As part of the Army Transformation process, the Land Staff is currently working toward the development of a light force, and it was decided that no Canadian definition of light forces would be promulgated before their establishment. The only consensus on the subject was that "dismounted infantry from LAVs is not a light force. Light forces need training, equipment and special capabilities that are not found in infantry battalions."[18]

American Definition of Light Forces. "[…] [Light forces] add a new dimension to strategic mobility. […] These forces can rapidly project to either reinforce forward-deployed forces or to satisfy contingencies in regions of the world that lack a developed structure. Their deployability enables them to arrive in a crisis area even before the conflict begins, often precluding the later necessity for a larger force. When properly task-organized, augmented and deployed, [light forces] can fight anytime, anywhere, and against any enemy. […] Light forces are offensively oriented units."[19]

Capabilities under Consideration by Canadian Light Infantry

According to a draft task for Canadian light infantry prepared for Army Transformation, light infantry should have the following capabilities:

- "deploy rapidly to conduct operations on all types of terrain and in any weather conditions with optimized capability for dismounted operations in complex terrain;
- infiltrate and extract from a zone of operation and conduct an assault on an objective by air, land or sea.;
- conduct shock troop operations including raids, operations to recover equipment and personnel and interdiction of key terrain;
- conduct special light infantry operations including the seizing and securing of a landing strip, communication centres, command posts and important bridges; and other operations supporting special forces, e.g. evacuation of Canadians fleeing from foreign countries;
- conduct long- and short-term reconnaissance of objectives selected by the unit or in support of other elements, e.g. special forces;
- operate up to three days without reinforcement and for longer periods if provided/parachuted in necessary equipment."[20]

An analysis of these probable light infantry tasks allows us to make the following simple deductions concerning the light forces:

- they will operate mainly on foot, having little organic transportation capabilities;
- they will become masters of complex terrain (jungle, mountainous, arctic, urban);
- they will require special skills (e.g. mountain master, basic and advanced parachuting courses, pathfinder, jungle courses) and in greater numbers than is currently the case in infantry units;
- their capabilities will enable them to operate and reinforce special force units (e.g. JTF 2);
- they will need to have superior physical and mental capabilities enabling them to act in a decentralized manner and to use their initiative to accomplish the mission; and
- their survival in areas of operations will largely depend on their mastery of fieldcraft.

Development of the Canadian Light Engineer Capability

Developing this new capability first and foremost requires acceptance and understanding of the two following premises:

- A light force is not a dismounted force.
- A light force requires special training, equipment and capabilities.

The first important observation is that the current structure of Canadian field engineer squadrons, usually comprising two field troops and equipped with LAV IIIs and M113A3s, cannot provide light battalions with the appropriate combat engineering support. Field squadrons are currently experiencing difficulty combining training on vehicles, mechanized tactics and engineer tasks. The likely addition to the field squadrons' tasks of engineering support to a light force will greatly impact upon the operational efficiency of these squadrons. This inability to provide close support to light forces will hinder the army engineer branch and will lead to the "marginalization of the Engineer Branch's capabilities".

American light engineer doctrine stipulates, "To support the combined arms team, light engineer companies must be the most physically fit, the most disciplined and the most aggressive unit that undergoes demanding training."[21] The Canadian combat engineer squadron supporting two light battalions will also need to have the same mobility capabilities (airborne, airmobile, amphibious), as well as special skills (e.g. mountain master, pathfinder) and will have to acquire the same level of fieldcraft expertise. Without these prerequisites, the task of supporting light forces will be difficult, if not impossible.

The secondary role of combat engineers is to fight as infantry.[22] Light combat engineers will have to train to acquire a skill level similar to that of light infantry soldiers to carry out their engineer tasks. Although light engineer missions will be similar to those to be assigned to light battalions (e.g. destroy, seize, deny)[23], light combat engineers will have greater destruction, technical reconnaissance, emplacement and obstacle clearing capabilities than light infantry, thus greatly increasing commanders' flexibility.

To ensure effective deployment of engineer resources, current engineer doctrine puts emphasis on "centralized coordination—decentralized execution"[24]. A deployed engineer element must have a command post capable of planning and executing current and future operations in support of light forces. Thus, the smallest deployable combat engineer element is the squadron. Of course, light combat engineering's capability must therefore be developed from the level of a squadron[25] whose command post would have the same mobility, communications and planning capabilities as the unit being supported.

On the whole, this analysis shows that CERs need a squadron-based light engineer capability. This light engineer squadron should have an organic capability to parachute or transport by air personnel and equipment. The focus of training should be on arms fire, demolition, light infantry techniques, "field-expedient engineering tasks"[26] and survivability tasks (for supporting deployed troops) such as:

- breaching obstacles to achieve surprise;
- conducting an assault through an obstacle;
- clearing and building landing zones and resupply points;
- clearing debris and/or mines from runways;
- making road craters and constructing quick obstacles making maximum use of the terrain;

- destroying bridges;
- completing engineer reconnaissance of obstacles and for subsequent operations;
- placing protective and/or tactical obstacles such as barbed-wire fences and minefields (conventional and dispersible);
- supplying drinking water;
- acquiring engineer intelligence; and
- reinforcing positions in complex terrain.[27]

Light engineer operations will focus on mobility and counter-mobility operations, but light engineers will need to have more in-depth general engineer knowledge to remain flexible enough to be used in the entire spectrum of operations (e.g. domestic and peacekeeping/reinforcement and war). The light engineers will have to become masters in the use of resources available on the ground to accomplish the mission.[28] The survivability and general engineering support that a light engineer squadron will be able to offer other manoeuvre elements will be limited and will essentially have to rely on other regiment and division engineer resources. Its deployability, its expertise in taking advantage of the terrain to support the mission, its ability to function in a mission-oriented command context, and its thorough understanding of special operations and complex terrain will make the light engineer squadron the essential element in operations in complex terrain and built-up areas despite its lack of mobility once deployed and its lack of organic resources.

Conclusion

The future security environment is evolving and our forces must be ready to fight in theatres of operations with complex terrain and built-up areas. A light force, master of these types of operations, will be critical in the army's response to new conflicts.

The army is facing up to this new reality. To compensate for the loss of pioneers and assault troops, the need to acquire the same number of engineer squadron headquarters capable of supporting the 12 battle groups and the growing necessity of operating in complex terrain, CERs will have to acquire a light engineer force the size of a squadron with the same mobility, command, control and planning characteristics to provide the engineer support required to win and maintain the initiative. The D Engr strategic goals of adding one field squadron per regiment, and promoting training and the acquisition of equipment for light engineer tasks are a step in the right direction to avoid the “marginalization of the Engineer Branch's capabilities” and preserve “the operational importance” of army engineering so dearly won. Nevertheless, the example of US doctrine on light engineering and Canadian staff work on a light force clearly indicate that CERs will have to transform themselves to efficiently support light infantry battalions.

About the Author ...

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TRAINING FOR "UN"CONVENTIONAL WARFARE FACING THE CHALLENGES OF SOLDIERING IN AFGHANISTAN

Sergeant Thomas N. Krasnuik

What was once termed "unconventional" warfare is more commonly becoming the conventional fight of the 21st century. The Army must seriously question if its soldiers are being prepared for this new paradigm. The current publication of the Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle does not cover circumstances that combat troops are facing across the globe. Implementation of a new publication providing tactical information on insurgency, counter-insurgency, small unit operations, and force protection measures is vital to the success of future missions. In order to properly prepare our soldiers for the new generation of war, referred to in American academic literature as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)[1], infantry section and platoon tactics must be based on the current operational environment. It is imperative that we practice mounted and dismounted patrolling techniques against a guerrilla force in an urban environment, and rugged terrain operations. Our current doctrine is oriented to gaining superiority on a Cold War battlefield. The current face of battle demands a new skill set, one that will often revolve around operating against insurgent opponents in primarily urban and other built up areas.

As we trained to gain dominance in Western Europe, we have to be prepared to dominate our opponents in a new generation of warfare. Our probable tasks are far more varied and complex. Combat operations now not only include simply the attack and defence, but also cordon and search, arrest operations, stability and reconstruction, civil-military coordination, and psychological operations. The exploitation of air mobility, psychological operations, interagency co-operation, and increased education to gather human intelligence are essential to compliment bullets and grenades in achieving victory. Patrolling will be the dominant vehicle in future operations. Our doctrine, planning, tactics, training, and procedures (TTPs) must reflect this. Current infantry doctrine does not fully allow the rifleman to prepare for the unconventional war he or she now often faces.

Army Doctrine and Training

For our soldiers to properly prepare for an immediate threat from unconventional forces, they must be properly trained in both mounted and dismounted patrolling operations. Threat analysis and force protection is dealt with very differently when operating on the unconventional battlefield. During this type of patrolling operation, the section often operates on its own, with little to no support, requiring detailed TTPs for survival. Once engaged in a mission, the section commander cannot expect constant assistance and must make timely and accurate decisions as the situation evolves. Close air support and indirect fire support techniques must be rehearsed thoroughly. Contact drills must be designed to effectively suppress and destroy enemy forces, and to get into depth quickly in order to kill or capture the fleeing enemy, as

the enemy may not stay and fight. The rifle section requires a modified Order of Battle (ORBAT), organized in such a manner as to facilitate the best possible use of all weapons and equipment. A suitable example is the ORBAT taught during the Urban Operations Instructor Course, which comprises a support group (2 x C9 section light machine guns [LMGs]) and a section assault group.

Operational Lessons

During Operation HARPOON in Afghanistan in 2002, section LMGs were often grouped together during the dismounted advance. Use of the terrain to take advantage of the LMG's characteristics enabled section commanders to provide intimate support up to platoon level and ensured that the section never moved without a "foot on the ground". Grouping the section into assault and support elements for this type of mission also assists the section commander in exploiting enemy objectives under protection of an intimate firebase. An organized section level support group also provides the platoon second in command a direct fire asset and flexibility to use up to 3 x LMG group, at a moment's notice. During mounted patrolling operations, whether for intelligence gathering, force presence or Civilian Military cooperation (CIMIC); vehicles and communications provide our lifeline to completion of the mission. While the mission will determine section organization and layout, some fundamentals must be adhered to.

Supporting a large coalition-based operation not only forced us to be stretched quite thin in manpower and resources, but also put our soldiers in several combat situations that they had not traditionally trained for

On Operation Enduring Freedom, as a part of Task Force Rakkassan, many important lessons were learned in regards to mounted patrolling. The vehicle should be used as a firebase, and will be equipped with an appropriate suppressing weapon. Contact drills must be established to ensure all patrol members know exactly what to do in any possible situation. This drill is especially important when in urban areas, where the Light Utility Vehicle Wheeled (LUVW) and Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV III) are particularly vulnerable to anti-armour weapons, off-route mines and roadside or culvert improvised explosive devices. All members must rehearse the procedures for calling for close air support (CAS) or indirect fire. The patrol commander must plan to keep the vehicle always in sight, and have contingency plans to fall back on for worst-case scenarios. If the vehicle is disabled, and enemy forces must be neutralized at section level, the vehicle can still be used as a firebase and the remainder of the section as an assault force. Light machine guns can still be used and can be sited so as to be mutually supported by the vehicle, providing local security as the assault force neutralizes the enemy. The combat estimate must be well thought out to avoid collateral damage and to take all possible courses of action into account.

Supporting a large coalition-based operation not only forced us to be stretched quite thin in manpower and resources, but also put our soldiers in several combat situations that they had not traditionally trained for. Some of these scenarios include defence of a Forward Area Re-fuelling Point (FARP)—for CAS use, securing landing zones, or defence of sensitive sites in preparation for demolition. The first concern about

defending a FARP is that the section or platoon tasked with the mission must be prepared to work alone with few supplies for extended periods of time. A large number of high volume weapons must be attached or integrated, so that a small force can exploit the enemy at long range through the use of superior firepower and technology. The theory of 360-degree defence must be mastered at section and platoon level, remembering that the primary mission is supporting the aircraft that is being re-fuelled. Ideally, a large but mutually supporting perimeter must be established and maintained. Communications with airmobile call signs must be taken into consideration, and the defence should be pushed far enough out to protect re-fuelling trucks from rocket attack.

Another common section or platoon task during unconventional operations is securing a sensitive site for specialists to exploit. Working hand-in-hand with other government agencies (OGA), engineers, Special Forces teams, intelligence specialists, bomb damage assessment teams, and demolition teams became a joint venture between light infantry forces and these specialists. How do we plan to protect these specialists and enable them to complete their mission? In order to help these specialists, a commander must not only know his part in the mission, but also understand the demographics, political leanings and feelings of local populace very well. What will an untrained soldier do when a local with an AK-47 slung over his shoulder wants to talk? Will he act with detachment and professionalism to try to gather intelligence, or will he mistakenly engage in self-defence? All soldiers and leaders must train to support these types of special operations so that the mission is accomplished as smoothly as possible.

During the operation in Tora Bora, my section provided local security for US Special Forces, OGA and engineers to gather intelligence and exploit sensitive sites. I was tasked with a patrol that was conducting a bomb damage assessment of a ridgeline. My patrol was made up of four men and a mission specialist. We had to be prepared for any eventuality, from calling in CAS, to measuring and assessing damage of coalition bombing. We found a gravesite and the mission specialist wanted to exploit it and take a sample. We, of course, provided security. Local Anti-Taliban forces showed up as the grave was being exhumed. Because of our understanding of operating with these forces and proper briefings from US Special Forces and OGA, there were no problems with the local forces. Canadian soldiers queried them for advice on how to respectfully re-inter the remains, and they worked with us to complete this task. Gaining trust and using local forces to help ensured that the mission was correctly executed and that the greatest amount of intelligence was gathered, while maintaining force protection principles. In return for our kindness, they informed us about the status of the bodies in the grave, saying that the soldiers were Chechnya freedom fighters. By remaining respectful of local culture, and including the local forces in our plan, we were able to collect valuable intelligence, saving both time and space for future operations.

Understanding local culture was imperative for gaining trust, respect, and credibility. T.E. Lawrence's classic novel, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, was an excellent source of information and inspiration for dealing specifically with earning the trust and respect of local forces by understanding their culture. Lawrence's book, which recorded his experiences with the Arab revolt of 1916-18, has recently become mandatory priority reading for commanders in the US Army. As Lawrence noted, “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it

perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is."[2] This and many other observations carried relevance for our own work.

In this new generation of warfare, the section and platoon has to face an unconventional enemy that poses several challenges. Operating in both rugged mountainous and urban environments, the section must be prepared to defend itself for short periods of time, and be able to fight in any direction at a moment's notice. During Operation HARPOON in Afghanistan, local insurgents often launched attacks from behind American forces. This was a prominent tactic also employed against US forces in Iraq. Insurgents allowed our forces to clear through an area, especially when mounted in armoured vehicles, only to launch attacks later from routes and ground already proven "cleared" by our own troops.

On the unconventional battlefield, our soldiers do not always know the direction of the enemy assault or the defensive orientation posture, and we must orient ourselves to protect down to the smallest element from all directions. This is one of the key principles of operating in an asymmetric environment. Following these lessons, many elements of the 3 PPCLI BG adopted the SOP, down to section level, of implementing rear security during all operations. Advancing over rugged terrain with limited visibility between platoons and sections, rear security was employed to avoid unnecessary casualties from an attack from the rear. How many times have you stood in the support base of a traditional raid or hasty attack, and noticed that there isn't anybody looking to the rear?

Under the old procedures it often occurred that not even a single soldier considered this threat. Yet, it is very easy for even a few guerrilla fighters to engage the whole of the support group or assault sections and inflict severe casualties upon the platoon in only a short amount of time. Rear security in our Army doctrine was almost taken for granted. During a standard advance to contact (manoeuvre to strike), we have a tendency to notionally appoint rear security to the depth section or platoon. Hard combat training for CSS units, even infantry battalion A-echelon groupings, is almost non-existent. On the unconventional battlefield, survivability is greatly reduced if we do not implement aggressive all-round force protection measures. Unconventional forces will not attack from the front. They will apply an economy of force mentality, in order to inflict maximum casualties with minimal planning and effort; and in the manner of the best manoeuvre commander, the enemy will not attack our surface strengths, rather, they will exploit our gaps.

A simple method of countering this technique during light infantry and dismounted patrolling, is the hasty ambush. By using a simple "fish hook" drill, we can increase our survivability, and ambush enemy forces planning an attack from the rear. In Afghanistan, and throughout my career, I have always made use of the "fish hook" drill prior to halting. This ensures that if enemy or friendly forces are following my patrol, I will know who they are prior to making a linear engagement. This method works well in both summer and winter operations, and I have seen it work excellently up to platoon level during Operation APOLLO.

When conducting airmobile operations in an unconventional environment, specific operating procedures must be established to ensure our superior firepower and ISTAR equipment assists in avoiding canalization onto obvious Landing Zones (LZs), whereby, due to enemy activity, we begin to adhere to the enemy's plans rather thane following our own TTPs. During Operation Anaconda, US forces attempted to insert into Objective WHALE by landing in a valley. When underestimating the effects of enemy rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars caused US forces to suffer several casualties, they immediately changed their operating procedures for LZs. By landing in lower terrain features, or in defilade, they had thought that their insertion would be covered, but rather it had the negative effect of canalizing friendly forces and trapping them in the low ground. Unable to fight uphill, and under heavy fire from enemy mortars and RPGs, US Forces withdrew, and the mission was aborted. The US changed the coalition SOPs immediately following this incident. Dominating the LZ on a mountaintop or plateau with close air support and massive air interdiction from CAS sorties, up to a week prior to insertion enabled coalition aircraft to land "high", and if the LZ was compromised, attack "low". Upon changing procedures to landing high and attacking low, the LZ could immediately form a support base from which forces could be ready to fight. In this way, the fight would be downhill, dominating the high ground and exploiting our superior firepower. Changing doctrine from a covered LZ to one that dominates the high ground not only saves lives but also makes use of the overwhelming firepower that coalition forces bring to the modern battlefield. This approach assists not only by maximizing force protection but also by giving confidence to the indigenous military forces we may be assisting.

As full spectrum operations continue to evolve, humanitarian and psychological operations will form the basis of trust and intelligence gathering from both insurgents and non-combatants

Another extremely important lesson learned in Afghanistan was that of the need to crack down on local warlords by putting a stop to enemy distribution lines. This requirement will be a key to success in future operations. In order to maintain the element of surprise and to use speed and shock to our advantage, airmobile checkpoints (vehicle and personnel) and airmobile ambush and cut-off teams should be incorporated into the counter-insurgency toolbox. By using airmobile assets to set down checkpoints anywhere in our area of operations on a moment's notice, intelligence (direct sources) and weapons can be seized without warning. With limited areas to hide from coalition forces, the enemy can become confused and frustrated; eventually they may cease their delivery methods. This approach is currently in practice by US forces, and was used on operations in Kosovo by Canadian Forces (CF).

As full spectrum operations continue to evolve, humanitarian and psychological operations will form the basis of trust and intelligence gathering from both insurgents and non-combatants. Locals and indigenous forces must be told that there is an "end state". They will want to know: Is it to end all operations, and allow for the beginning of a new life? How do they fit in the picture? How do coalition forces fit in the picture? When will humanitarian operations begin? Only when they have the answers to these questions, and when the aid and clear direction begin, will locals be able to trust and

provide intelligence to friendly forces. In this way, we hope that if a drug lord threatens a local farmer, that farmer will not be afraid of us, but provide our forces with information required to paint the picture of what is really happening in the country. This is the beginning of a long-term relationship based on trust and providing reconstruction to the country.

Being involved in coalition-based, large-scale operations involving unfamiliar assets, such as CAS, Canadian soldiers often found themselves exposed to the assets/SOPs of other countries, without the prior knowledge or experience to take advantage of them. It is imperative that we train our soldiers to use these assets, so that their mission can be accomplished in such a way as to maximize force protection, and put the best possible weight of fire down on the enemy prior to the final engagement. Understanding how CAS operates and how CAS pilots see us from the air, will make it easier for commanders at all levels to implement call for fire formats, without the danger of fratricide or a breach in rules of engagement. During Operation TORI, in Afghanistan, CAS was used by a Canadian direct fire support (DFS) patrol as a show of force. Many locals had crowded a Canadian Iltis, and without delay, a US Apache was dispatched to help the situation, with the immediate effect of immediately dispersing the crowd. We must continue to exploit our superiority in weaponry and technology, as our enemies tend to fear the unknown. If we train without CAS assets exclusively because we do not have them, our soldiers will not be able to use them when they are most needed. At the same time, however, we must guard against relying too heavily upon any technology, for fear of creating an unnatural dependency and departure from basic soldier skills. This one of the key arguments Colonel Hammes applies in *The Sling and the Stone*.

Knowledge of language and religion is very important on the modern battlefield when operating amongst foreign cultures. Unfortunately, it is not emphasized enough during theatre-specific mission training (TSMT) to be effective, and there is a general over-reliance upon local translators or specialists. A score or set of language testing should be developed to ensure that all soldiers are prepared for any given mission. Further, this training should not be exclusive to TSMT, but must be an ongoing part of routine training within all infantry units. Language training should be prioritized and focussed with other core skills during downtime between operational tasks. In this way, a knowledge base will exist within units prior to operational tasks even being assigned. Having the advantage of understanding the local language or dialects in a foreign country not only assists in intelligence collection, but also contributes to toward the longer-term goals of winning hearts and minds. The soldier armed with these linguistic skills possesses the distinct advantage of the ability to conduct assisted evasion, or working with local forces.

Conclusion

So what specific skill sets and training do we require to set the conditions for success in this new generation of warfare? We need to have a publication that details a new set of Battle Task Standards, and once the final product is implemented it needs to be tested at CMTC. As a minimum, the publication should cover mounted and dismounted patrolling in complex terrain, especially rugged and mountainous terrain and urban environments. Section organization and SOP's must be established for

sensitive site exploitation, raids, hasty attacks, defending key or sensitive sites, such as FARPs, and Airmobile Operations. The basis of this new pamphlet should be counter insurgency and counter guerrilla operations at section and platoon level. It is necessary for this new pamphlet to cover human intelligence/ psychological operations (PsyOps) in the unconventional environment and the use of CAS/ calls for fire. Our future leaders need to be tested in real world scenarios before deploying on operations, focussing on the section level, vice brigade, which does not always pertain to the diverse operations of 4GW. In an unconventional environment, the enemy is all around us and must be neutralized and dealt with by like forces who remain undetected, use psychological operations and aggressive patrolling to kill, capture or convert the enemy into freedom fighters for their own country.

In conclusion, the CF must begin to train now for the war of the future: an unconventional war that has already become the conventional. Current doctrine prepares the Army for wars of the past. Both current SOPs and TTPs are designed to face threats that no longer exist and present procedures that could be deadly if used in this "New Generation of Warfare", 4GW. It is time to sit down and think about what we have to do in order to prepare our soldiers for success on the modern battlefield. We must start with a comprehensive publication on unconventional warfare, battle task standards and regular language training at the unit. Once the publication is in place and new standards implemented, they must be incorporated into leadership courses and to our deployment level of capability (DLOC) training.

Success in any future 4GW deployment starts now. We can learn from both the successes and the mistakes and from the valuable lessons learned from our US and British military allies, as well as from our own past. We must not stumble along as in previous decades, preparing for deployments to Croatia by conducting advance to contact against former Warsaw Pact forces. Today's enemy is highly motivated and ready to die for their cause without question. We must be ready and willing to meet this threat head-on-to dominate it, to destroy it or turn it against the new enemy.

About the Author …

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Endnotes

1. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004).
2. T.E. Lawrence, "Twenty-Seven Articles," *Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917.

THE CANADIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE: WAITING FOR THE "G"[1]

Lieutenant-Colonel (Retd) Richard L. Bowes, CD

Myth is defined as the embodiment of popular ideas on natural or social phenomena.[2] In common parlance, a myth is an "old wives tale," a generally accepted belief unsubstantiated by fact.[3] The study of history is, in some ways, the study of myth and can be viewed as the way in which we see the events of the past and thereby understand them, and also the means by which we seek to justify the present. Therefore, as James Sadkovich cogently asserts, in the study of history:

> Certain interpretations are thus preferred to others, certain data rejected or ignored because inimical to the received interpretations, and new interpretations of hallowed myths less than welcome. History is therefore also inherently and unavoidably reactionary, and the dialectic of history continually pits the determined iconoclast against the established idolaters in a struggle to rewrite past realities and recast current illusions.[4]

Canadian cavalry await order to advance

War and legend, as John Terraine recognizes, are inseparable.[5] The First World War (1914-18) and, in particular, the story of the British struggle on the Western Front has not been spared a certain share of mythic interpretation over the past eight decades. In his recently published work entitled *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War*, Jonathan F. Vance writes that in the context of the First World War, the word myth "seems to capture the combination of invention, truth, and half-truth"[6] that has characterized the collective memory of the war. Writing in a similar vein in the editorial introduction to his recent publication entitled *The First World War and British Military History*, Brian Bond declares that:

> The First World War, with its terrible attritional character and acutely disappointing consequences, has thrown a long shadow over subsequent decades. For the reading and reflective British public it has been simultaneously fascinating and repellent; much further away than the Second World War yet harder to come to terms with as history; a no man's land in the historical landscape….Thus, seventy-two years [since the time of writing] after the war ended it seems appropriate to attempt an objective historiographical survey without the need for what one contributor has termed "bunking" and "de-bunking."[7]

Bunking and de-bunking the many myths surrounding the First World War have been the main objectives of much of the historiography of the war; an historical dialectic, to borrow from Sadkovich. Popular myths that have become the objects of exploration in recent decades have been those to do with the perceived incompetence and cold-heartedness of many of the British commanders in general, and Field Marshal Douglas Haig in particular. Similarly, the popular image of the British offensives of 1916-17 is one of futility and wastefulness feeding into the myth that the "Western" strategy of the war—the recognition that the Western Front was the key front and that Germany could only be defeated through a drawn out attritional confrontation on this front—could have been avoided if only Allied policy makers had seen the utility and efficacy of the indirect approach of striking Germany on her strategic flank through the Balkans, the Baltic, or the Levant. While it is not the aim of this article to support or deny any of these myths, they are, nonetheless, illustrative of the dialectic that surrounds the historical interpretation of the British struggle on the Western Front during the First World War.

Part of this dialectic concerns the role of the British cavalry on the Western Front and the myth that the cavalry, throughout the many campaigns and actions fought by the British on the Western Front, was an obsolete, anachronistic arm of the British Army that contributed very little, if anything at all, to the eventual victory in 1918. The popular image, indeed, the popular myth about the cavalry that has been handed down through the decades is one of a useless, pampered body of men sitting in comfort, waiting well behind the front line, while the poor bloody infantry were carrying on the good fight at the front.[8] The Marquess of Anglesey has made great strides in dispelling this myth in his eight-volume history of the British cavalry.[9] A reading of Anglesey leads one to conclude that there is no disputing the fact that the cavalry rarely sat idly by while the other arms of the British Army were engaged in operations at the front. When not employed as cavalry, the various regiments and formations of the Cavalry Corps were employed in the line as infantry, in the rear area as pioneers constructing reserve trench works and supply routes, or were committed to training for the "culminating moment of truth that never came—'the ride for the G.'"[10] The 'G' stood for gap and referred to the long-anticipated gap in the enemy line for which the cavalry waited and trained to pass through in order to execute the exploitation phase, the culminating phase, of an offensive. This phase of an offensive was also referred to as the *breakthrough* and remained the primary responsibility of the cavalry to carry out.[11] And this is where the shroud of myth still remains.

It is within the context of this myth that the actions and role of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade (CCB) at Cambrai in November 1917 and at Amiens in August 1918, as a

subordinate formation to the British Cavalry Corps, is situated and best understood. In essence, this article is a discussion of the concept of mobility on the Western Front from the standpoint of the British cavalry in general, and the Canadian cavalry in particular. Indeed, it is posited that within the context of the British efforts to achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front, the British Cavalry Corps was not an obsolete formation of the British Army. In fact, the cavalry was a vital component of achieving a breakthrough because it was, despite its technological limitations, the only truly mobile arm, and that the cavalry could not achieve a breakthrough because of factors or conditions beyond its control. What conditions were required by which the cavalry might be able to breakthrough into open country and achieve a major success, and were these conditions met? For the most part, these conditions were not met. While British contemporary offensive doctrine recognized the necessity for the exploitation phase in order to clinch an overwhelming victory over the enemy, comparatively little attention was paid by the commanders of the time as to how to achieve a *breakthrough* and conduct the exploitation phase of the offensive. As will be seen, the 'riddle of the trenches' became the overarching concern of the entire British command on the Western Front. All their intellectual energies went into *breaking into* the German line. Consequently, very little notice was given to examining how to achieve and sustain a breakthrough and, subsequently, to conduct the exploitation phase of the offensive. In other words, little attention was given to defining and establishing the conditions necessary for the achievement and sustainment of the breakthrough.

An examination of the operations of the Canadian cavalry then serves as an illustration of this theme. Moreover, the operations of the cavalry demonstrated that the cavalry's sense of mobility was as vital a necessity in the British Army of the period as the cavalry's *means* of mobility were *becoming* obsolete. Indeed, the cavalry was really the **only** arm with a sense of mobility and that the cavalry's lack of success had as much to do with the inability of commanders, staffs, and the other arms of the British Army to rapidly adapt and take advantage of the fleeting opportunities for mobile warfare, as it had to do with the physical/battlefield limitations of the mounted arm itself. More than any other arm, the cavalry became caught between the proverbial rock of the human-centric 19th century philosophy of war, and the hard place of the technology-centric 20th century philosophy of war. What, then, were the conditions by which the cavalry would be able to breakthrough the enemy lines and achieve operational success?

The first condition had to do with the reliance of mobile warfare on a sense of tempo to achieve the expected results against the enemy. Tempo consists of three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution, and the speed of transition from one activity to another. In a theoretical analysis of the dynamics of land warfare, Richard Simpkin has defined tempo as simply the "operational rate of advance."[12] The key to tempo is the ability for a force to react to changing situations, and to execute tactical and operational situations faster than the enemy. In many offensives launched by the British, this ability was sorely absent at all levels throughout the command structure of the army. In many instances, initial success was squandered by the British on the Western Front because of an inability to rapidly reinforce success, and to rapidly adjust their forces to the changing circumstances of the battle in less time than it took for the Germans to react to the British success and redeploy reserves to cover the gaps in their line. However, in order to sustain a high tempo, not only did commanders at the lower levels have to

have an ability to take initiative, but also they had to have a full understanding of the plans and capabilities of the other arms on the battlefield. Moreover, command relationships among the various arms and formations had to be simple and well understood. This was very often not the case. Without an understanding of supporting arm or higher level plans, it was impossible for a commander to make quick changes to his own plans, to recommend changes to higher plans, or to execute those plans with any degree of confidence even if he had the delegated authority to do so. Therefore, tempo relied on a related number of conditions; namely, a decentralized command philosophy, staff and all-arms coordination, and communications.

The opportunities on the Western Front for mobile warfare occurred only rarely. However, when they did occur, the British Army lacked a decentralized philosophy of command that allowed commanders at lower levels to exercise initiative and take advantage of the gap(s) created in the enemy line by exploiting and by reinforcing success. Too often these opportunities were missed because of a slavish adherence to pre-determined tables and schemes of advance, so much so that when opportunities for independent action presented themselves, commanders lacked the delegated authority and the sense of initiative to take advantage of them. Indeed, in the British Army, combat was seen as a structured phenomenon with the key requirement for success being order and detailed planning. Therefore, efforts to decentralize decision-making authority were accordingly resisted.[13]

Lieutenant Harcus Strachan, VC

With respect to the requirement for staff and all-arms coordination, and certainly all-arms mechanized doctrine and capabilities, one of the persistent themes in much of the historiography of the British effort on the Western Front is the assessment that the British Army could not return to a state of mobile warfare because of the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the cavalry to the conditions of modern warfare. To be sure, the cavalry severely lacked the protection, firepower, and tactical mobility that would allow it to operate freely on the battlefield. However, it is also an immutable truth about the Western Front that the other arms on the battlefield, in particular the infantry and, later, the Tank Corps, when employed in isolation, also suffered the same fate. After all, it was not until the offensives of 1917 that the British Army had begun to employ any semblance of all-arms doctrine. Therefore, for the commanders and staffs at division, corps, and army levels, the battlefields of the Western Front had demonstrated that the key to success, the key to unlocking the deadlock of trench

warfare, was the combination of maximum firepower with maximum mobility. Tactically, this meant all-arms doctrine, and, in particular, the integration of tanks and artillery with the infantry advance. For commanders and staffs, it meant the plans for the attack and subsequent breakthrough had to be underpinned by a level of coordination between formations and arms that had heretofore been unheard of in modern warfare.

Undoubtedly the first half of the equation (firepower) had been achieved by the spring of 1918 with the synchronization of the infantry advance with the improvements in predicted artillery fire planning. However, the second half of the equation (mobility) had only been partly achieved. The advent of the tank on the battlefield had brought a certain amount of mostly local and tactical mobility, but had yet to be combined with

Soldiers of the Fort Garry Horse, France, 1914

an ability to provide tactical mobility to the infantry and the artillery. The mechanized combat team of the mid-twentieth century was still too far off in the future. Certainly, the advances in tank-infantry cooperation that were witnessed during this period were instrumental in allowing the British to *break in* to the enemy lines, but were not instrumental in allowing them to *break through* and exploit their success. The only arm that was still capable of achieving and sustaining this type of mobility was the cavalry. However, because cavalry operations had not achieved the same level of coordination with the operations of the other arms on the battlefield as had been achieved with the infantry-tanks-artillery formula, then the best the British Army could hope for in their offensives on the Western Front was to achieve great success at breaking into the enemy defences, but never any success at breaking through them and exploiting into the German rear areas.

Finally, the last condition that had to be met in order to achieve an acceptable degree of tempo was the possession of a robust, flexible, and reliable communications system

between commands. The ability to rapidly adjust plans, to take advantage of fleeting opportunities for success, and to rapidly coordinate the actions of all arms on the battlefield, required a similarly rapid and robust communications that quickly disseminates data and message traffic. With wireless communication systems in only the earliest stages of development, systems relying primarily on line became the predominate means of exchanging message traffic on the Western Front. While this may have been an adequate system for the conduct of operations in static positional warfare, it was inadequate for the exigencies of mobile warfare and created a situation where commanders no longer had voice control over their forces.[14] Lack of voice control impeded commanders in taking immediate advantage of opportunities for breakthrough on the battlefield. Commanders at all levels were used to the decision-action cycles associated with positional warfare, where information was transmitted over static, well-established line systems and command decisions were made centrally based on pre-determined schemes of advance and timetables. When the conduct of offensives evolved into more fluid situations where information was sketchy, and where the conduct of the advance came to be more and more dependent upon the initiative, decisions and actions of lower level commanders, the contemporary means of communication could not cope. This lack of a reliable and robust communications capability between commands created a tactical difficulty with dire consequences for the chances of success for cavalry operations.

The original strength of the British cavalry in the fall of 1914 consisted of five three-regiment brigades. The CCB was not part of this original formation. The story of the CCB dates from December, 1914 when it was placed under command of Brigadier-General J.E.B. Seely, an experienced British yeomanry officer who had been forced to resign in May 1914 as Secretary of State for War under the Asquith government over the Curragh Incident.[15] Seely continued to command the brigade until Brigadier-General R.W. Paterson succeeded him in May 1918. The CCB originally consisted of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), Lord Strathcona's Horse (LSH), King Edward's Horse (an imperial unit), and the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA). All of these units arrived separately in England in 1914 as part of the first Canadian contingent, but deployed to France as a distinct, albeit dismounted, formation in April 1915 just in time to join the fighting at Festubert, later serving in the trenches as infantry in the Givenchy sector. Indeed, throughout the whole of 1915, the cavalry (now the Cavalry Corps consisting of up to five divisions) was never employed as such, although, as discussed in the context of the CCB, it was kept employed in the line as infantry or in the rear areas as pioneers, with only occasional opportunities for mounted patrols. During the course of 1915, the British offensives at Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, and Loos were conducted without the hope of a breakthrough, for just as in the pre-war years, the advent and employment of firepower technology to the battlefield had rendered the defensive the superior mode of warfare. As a result, the cavalry were largely uninvolved in these operations except as infantry reinforcement.[16] The CCB continued to serve with distinction in the line as infantry until the end of January 1916 at which time the brigade was reconstituted as a cavalry force eventually as part of the British 5th Cavalry Division, now part of the British Cavalry Corps.[17]

During the Somme offensives of the latter half of 1916, the brigade remained in reserve as part of 5th Cavalry Division, but really saw their first actions as a mounted force in

early 1917 during the German retirement in the Somme area to the newly constructed Hindenburg Line. During the course of the retirement, various cavalry formations were tasked with pursuit and, as such, many gallant actions by a number of regiments and squadrons were recorded. As exciting and as hopeful as these actions might have been, they were hardly the opportunity for a breakthrough the British had been looking for. The next opportunity did not occur until November of the same year.[18] However, it was during these engagements that Lieutenant F.M.W. Harvey of the LSH won the Victoria Cross for rushing a machine gun emplacement and capturing it, thereby saving the lives of many under his command. While the brigade's actions at Cambrai in November of the same year will be covered later, the brigade also distinguished itself in the face of the Ludendorff offensives of March 1918. Because of its superior mobility, the CCB proved its worth as mounted infantry by being able to stay ahead of the advancing German infantry columns, and because of its firepower, albeit limited, by being able to effectively delay the advancing columns. In fact, the CCB is credited with stopping the advance of the German army into Amiens on March 31st at Rifle and Moreuil Woods.[19] The brigade's series of attacks at Moreuil and Rifle Woods in front of Amiens was a key tactical action that served to retain the city of Amiens in allied hands and help stem the German onslaught. It was also in the latter actions that Lieutenant G.M. Flowerdew of the LSH won the Victoria Cross by leading his squadron in a mounted attack around the flank of Moreuil Wood.[20]

While the actions of the CCB at Amiens on August 8th 1918 will be covered later, Amiens, nonetheless, represents the last opportunity for the British Army to achieve a breakthrough. For reasons that will be discussed later, the cavalry were, again, unable to exploit the success of the initial assault and, therefore, unable to achieve a breakthrough.

Finally, a mention should be made of the CCB's actions in the remaining days of the war. After Amiens, the brigade did not go into action again until October 9th when it was ordered to advance to Maretz and seize the high ground northwest of Le Cateau. Meeting very little resistance, and consolidating itself on this position during the evening of the 9th, the brigade pushed on the next day into Le Cateau, Montay and Neuvilly-Inchy. The brigade's last actions prior to November 11th saw them advancing and clearing six more French villages in the same region, capturing approximately 400 prisoners, several artillery pieces and approximately 100 machine guns.[21]

The secret to success on the Western Front was found to be a mastery of low level infantry tactics, the successful pioneering of tank-infantry cooperation, the solving of some of the many problems associated with sustaining artillery support throughout the depth of the assault and, above all, the resurrection of the tactical principle of surprise.[22] But this formula for success was a formula for the break-in only and was not a formula for the achievement of a successful *breakthrough*. Accordingly, British assaults ended up more as "bite and hold" attacks—attacks designed for breaking-in to the enemy lines and for capturing local objectives—rather than as the precursor to an attempt at a breakthrough and, subsequently, a reinstatement of open or mobile warfare.

Despite the success of the formula, a successful breakthrough was never achieved on the Western Front, and neither was there a restoration of open or mobile warfare. In

analyzing this very problem, the 'Lessons of the Great War Committee'—set up in 1932 by order of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Lord Milne, and under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Kirke—reported that in the future, tactical breakthroughs would only be achieved by relying on a combination of rapid mobility, a properly worked out fire plan, and the use of fog, smoke, or darkness to conceal the attackers. Training manuals and methods during the war and up to the early 1930's laid too much emphasis on the break-in phase and did not point clearly to the need for a separate force of all-arms to be on-hand to convert the break-in into a breakthrough.[23] But even by the end of 1918, a separate force of all-arms, especially one based on the tank, was not possible. During 1916-18, the tanks were never anything more than mobile direct fire support to the infantry for the break-in battle

A Canadian trooper examines the rifle of a dead German soldier, near Amiens, 1918

with only a little greater speed than the dismounted infantry, and considerably less staying power.[24] According to Griffith, "in the tactical conditions of the Great War the tank could sometimes knock out enemy machine guns or other strong points; but in this its record was probably no better than the infantry's own methods of pill-box-busting using Lewis guns, rifle-grenades or mortars."[25] John Terraine echoes this point: "all tanks were clumsy, slow vulnerable weapons. The maximum (road) speed of a 1918 Mark V (the basic British heavy tank) was 4.6 mph; the Medium Mark A ('Whippet') had a road speed of 8.3 mph. Across a cratered battlefield, either was lucky to exceed 1.5 to 2 mph."[26] Yet J.F.C. Fuller and the "mechanical" school had a vision beyond that of the tank's contemporary limitations. Fuller would have agreed with the Kirke committee in its recommendation for a separate all-arms force, based on the tank, designed to conduct the breakthrough. During the war, Fuller had submitted just such a plan, called Plan 1919, which foresaw the requirement for an all-arms mechanized force centred on the tank as a separate force capable of breaking through the enemy's defences, penetrating deep into the enemy's rear areas and cutting off his communications. However, the armistice prevented Plan 1919 from

being fully realized. The state of technology had not yet been able to produce a tank with the speed and the reliability required. Moreover, the called-for accompanying mechanized infantry, artillery, and engineer machines were yet to be designed, trialed, and produced. Indeed, Plan 1919, as A.J. Smithers attests, was a success when it was finally tried; but by then it was Plan 1940 and it was written in German.[27] If the breakthrough could not be achieved by technology, then what was the solution?

The answer to this question, of course, was the cavalry, and it was for this reason that Haig retained it. To Haig, the decisive assault was only the third phase of the offensive. Moreover, if the assault could succeed in opening up a gap in the enemy's trench systems so fast that not even his fastest moving reserves would have time to plug it, then the cavalry could pass through the gap and exploit into the enemy's logistic rear and cut off his communications. This alluring possibility was always high in Haig's mind and was the reason he retained a cavalry capability throughout the entire war.[28] Indeed, it is from this starting point that the cavalry went on to pioneer automatic rifles, battlefield wireless, and the development of early all-arms doctrine with motor machine guns and tanks.[29]

German prisoners being escorted to the rear by Canadian cavalry troops, August 1918

The cavalry, therefore, during the war was the only arm capable of sustaining a truly mobile breakthrough.[30] More to the point, Terraine has recognized that the situation with respect to the inability to achieve a breakthrough during the war represented a unique situation in the history of warfare given the ascendancy of the defensive over the offensive: the hiatus of the mobile arm. In other words, the horsed cavalry was close to becoming obsolete yet the antidote, the fully mechanized all-arms force as represented by Fuller's Plan 1919, had yet to be developed. To illustrate this situation, Griffith refers to the memoirs of Brigadier W.D. Croft who, throughout three years

service with the 9th (Scottish) Division could point to at least three occasions when his troops had opened up a promising gap which he believed the cavalry could have broken through if only they had been close at hand.[31] Similarly, Major W.H. Watson, a member of the Tank Corps at Cambrai, believed the cavalry could have captured Bourlon Wood on November 20, 1917.[32] To both of these officers, the cavalry was certainly not an obsolete arm. Yet, if the cavalry, despite its limitations, was still the only arm capable of sustaining a breakthrough, then why could it not achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front?

Cambrai, November 20, 1917

On October 24th, 1917, the Central Powers, having reinforced the Italian Front with a further six German divisions, launched a strong offensive across the upper Isonzo river in northern Italy. Using gas shells against which Italian respirators were useless, General Otto von Below's Fourteenth Army crushed the Italian defences in a brilliantly conducted battle near the town of Caporetto. With his defences collapsing, the Italian commander, General Cadorna, ordered a retreat to the Tagliamento River forty miles to the rear. However, the rapid German pursuit forced the Italians back to the Piave River—Mount Grappa—Adige, approximately eighty miles from the Isonzo. The alarming reports of the Caporetto disaster brought the Italians help in the form of French and British reinforcements (six and five divisions respectively) between November 10th and December 12th. Although the Allied divisions did not arrive in time to halt the German advance, the presence of these divisions was instrumental in preventing the military and political collapse of Italy.[33]

It was against the background of imminent Italian collapse, coupled with the failed French Nivelle offensives of the previous April/May and the exhaustive British offensives in Flanders, which had culminated with the capture of Passchendaele on November 6th, that the offensive at Cambrai was authorized. On the eve of the battle on November 19th, Haig is reported to have given his final and conclusive reason for launching the attack against the German defences at Cambrai: success would greatly help the situation in Italy.[34] In contrast, Haig's official reason was that since the enemy, in order to maintain its defences in the Ypres sector, had been "obliged to reduce the garrison of certain other parts of his line," then a sudden attack "at a point where he did not expect it might attain a considerable local success."[35] According to Anglesey, Haig was looking for a comparatively modest operation that would restore British prestige and strike a theatrical blow against Germany before the winter had set in.[36] To achieve his aim, Haig needed an offensive plan that would be guaranteed to succeed. For this plan he looked to III Army.

The possibility of developing operations in the Cambrai sector had been considered in April 1917, when Haig had ordered IV and V Armies to prepare plans for an attack in that sector. The subsequent relief of those armies by III Army had transferred responsibility for such a plan to the commander of III Army, General Sir Julian Byng.[37] The plan remained in relative dormancy during the prolonged offensive in Flanders over the summer and early fall of 1917. However, for precisely the reasons explained above, Haig gave approval to Byng in mid-October to proceed in earnest with the plan. Accordingly, Haig gave orders for the necessary troops to be made available to Byng for the operation and set the date for the attack as November 20th.[38]



In fact, planning for such an offensive began as early as late August with proposals from Elles and Fuller, both of whom were eager to see the tank operating in its own right as an essential factor in the offensive. Both were convinced that this could not happen in Flanders where shell craters filled with water and broken drainage ditches converted flat land into swamp. On August 4th, Fuller submitted a plan to Elles consisting of a raid

on a big scale of the hit-and-run variety in the area of Banteux-Crèvecoeur-Marcoing-Ribécourt. The tanks, supported by low-flying aircraft, were to effect surprise by crashing through the German wire and trenches. Fuller's plan was forwarded to III Army on August 5th.[39]

The General Officer Commanding (GOC) IV Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Louis Woolcombe, subsequently forwarded a similar plan to III Army on August 23rd. Woolcombe's plan aimed at conducting a surprise attack as a diversion from the slow and costly operations in Flanders. To achieve surprise, Woolcombe envisioned that reliance be placed upon survey methods of gun-laying instead of allowing preliminary registration, and that tanks should create passages through the wire for the sudden assault by the infantry. Moreover, Woolcombe recommended that an officer of the Tank Corps be sent to reconnoitre the IV Corps front and approve the suitability for tank action. Accordingly, Brigadier-General Elles visited IV Corps and suggested that the scope of the attack might be enlarged. Byng agreed and anticipated that a successful tank action could be followed up by a large-scale cavalry action to conduct a breakthrough to the northeast past Cambrai and to cut deeply into the German lines of communication.[40]

Accordingly, a plan along these lines was forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief who was favourably impressed. However, the plan lay dormant during September, as there were not enough troops available while the Flanders offensives were continuing. However, when October came, a decision on the date of the Cambrai offensive could no longer be delayed. On October 15th, Haig approved Byng's plan and arranged for an extra four divisions, three tank brigades, and the Cavalry Corps (consisting of five cavalry divisions and under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir C.T. McM. Kavanagh) to be placed at his immediate disposal for training.[41]

On October 26th, Byng held a conference of his corps commanders and their staffs at III Army headquarters where the plan was confided to them. The terrain in the Cambrai sector was well suited to the proposed type of operation because the ground had not been mashed into swampland by massive artillery fire. Being largely hard, undulating terrain, it was ideal tank and cavalry country. The Hindenburg Line here, as elsewhere, was very formidable. It consisted of two systems between 500 yards and a mile apart, each with its front and support trenches. The barbed wire obstacles were fifty yards wide while the trenches were fifteen feet wide at the top and ten feet deep. The tanks would have no difficulty in flattening the wire, but for the trenches they would need to carry fascines that they would drop into the trenches in order to cross them.[42]

Byng's plan was bold. If fully successful, it would see the rupture of the German Hindenburg Line from St. Quentin, seventeen miles south of Cambrai, to the canalized Sensée River, five miles to the north of the city. It was Byng's intention to gain possession of the area lying between the Canal du Nord and the St. Quentin Canal, bounded to the north by the Sensée.[43] To accomplish this, III Army orders for Operation 'GY', as the operation was codenamed, saw III Corps right (Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney) and IV Corps left conducting the main breaking in attack supported by over 300 tanks, and by supporting attacks by VI, VII, and XVII Corps. V Corps was left in reserve. With the break-in thus made, the Cavalry Corps was to

break through and seize Cambrai, Bourlon Wood and the passages over the Sensée River, and to cut off the troops holding the German front line between Havrincourt and the river.[44] Hence, Byng planned to conduct his offensive in three stages:

♦ The infantry attack on the German organized lines, including the capture of the crossings over the Canal de l'Escaut [St. Quentin Canal] at Masnières and Marcoing, and of the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line east of those places.

♦ The advance of the cavalry to isolate Cambrai, and to seize the crossings over the Sensée River, and of IV Corps to capture Bourlon Wood.

♦ The clearing of Cambrai and of the quadrilateral Canal de l'Escaut—Sensée River—Canal du Nord, and the overthrow of the German divisions thus cut off.[45]

Specific instructions to III Corps detailed the requirement to "secure the passages over the Canal de l'Escaut at Masnières and Marcoing, and the Masnières—Beaurevoir line to the east thereof, in order to open a gap for the Cavalry to pass through."[46] IV Corps' main task was to push forward advanced guards of all-arms to capture Bourlon Wood on Z Day. Finally, V Corps, as reserve, was given the task of advancing north and northeast in order to exploit success as far as the Sensée River, and to push forward across the river to gain and hold the heights north of the river.[47]

With respect to the Cavalry Corps, the tasks allotted by III Army for Z Day were as follows:

First—To surround and isolate Cambrai, occupying the main points of tactical importance, blocking all exits from the town and destroying means of communication.

Secondly—To secure the crossings on the River Sensée between Paillencourt and Palluel (inclusive).

Thirdly—To secure the flank of the forces engaged in clearing up the quadrilateral Canal de l'Escaut—Sensée River—Canal du Nord, and the advance North and North-east of V Corps.[48]

From the five divisions of the Cavalry Corps, some re-grouping took place. 1st Cavalry Division was placed under command of IV Corps, while the Lucknow Brigade from 4th Cavalry Division was attached to III Corps. The Cavalry Corps plan for the remaining formations was to have the 5th and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, in that order, carry out the advance behind III Corps and conduct the initial breakthrough over the Canal de l'Escaut and then to sweep round to the east and the north of Cambrai. The 3rd Cavalry Division and the two remaining brigades of the 4th would remain in reserve.[49] Most importantly, it was Kavanagh's responsibility to pass his leading divisions—5th (to which the CCB belonged) and 2nd—through on Z Day as soon as the infantry of III Corps had secured the crossings at Masnières and Marcoing, and have ensured the possibility of passing over the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line, which could happen at any time after zero hour (6:20 AM) plus four and a half hours. To achieve this, Kavanagh had to maintain "the closest touch" with the progress of the infantry attack by all means at his disposal.[50] To clear lanes through the wire, the Cavalry Corps was also allotted twelve wire-pulling tanks.[51]

The final, key element of the plan, of course, was surprise. Byng's order of November 17th stated that the "element of surprise [was] the key note of the operations of the III and IV Army Corps." Moreover, the order went on to state that if surprise was attained and the German lines were over-run, "a unique opportunity for the Cavalry [sic] action becomes possible. This action may have a most far reaching effect, not only on the local situation, but on the course of the war."[52] Surprise was now possible because the large number of Mark IV tanks would be able to crush the wire obstacles and overcome the immediate defences rather than relying on a preliminary bombardment to do the same thing. Furthermore, the artillery was now able to do counter-battery and suppression work, and was able to fire standing and lifting barrages without previous registration, thanks to the development of field survey and calibration techniques since the fall of 1917. The aim of artillery fire had shifted from destruction to neutralization, meaning, as well, that the ground would not be rendered impassable for tanks and cavalry.[53]

Therefore, all preparations prior to the battle were made with secrecy in mind. III Army arranged for many false rumours to be spread in Amiens and similar locations. It was fortunate that with the logistic, tank, cavalry, and troop build-up that the weather remained dull and misty, helping to screen preparations and movements in the rear area. Signal communications needed to be extended and improved but, for reasons of security, the digging of trenches for buried cable was prohibited. Therefore, an armoured cable system was devised that would simply be laid on the ground as brigades and divisions moved forward. To maintain communications with the cavalry advance, wireless, despatch riders, visual-signalling systems, and pigeons were to be used. A cable would be quickly laid to Marcoing where an advanced signal report centre was to be established with Cavalry Corps headquarters.[54]

The roads Metz-Trescault-Ribécourt, Gouzeaucourt-Villers Plouich, and Gouzeaucourt-la Vacquerie were reserved for the cavalry advance and were to be improved as far forward as possible without attracting hostile attention.[55] The concentration areas for the divisions of the Cavalry Corps were east, south, and west of Péronne with the nearest, that of 5th Cavalry Division, in and around Tincourt about ten miles from the front line at Villers Plouich.[56] The advance of the cavalry commenced at 12:50 a.m. on the morning of November 20th when the 5th Cavalry Division departed Tincourt, followed by the movements of the 2nd, 4th, and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. By 8:00 a.m., all cavalry divisions had completed their moves to their forward assembly areas in the area of Fins without incident. Fins was approximately six miles from the front line.[57]

At 6:20 a.m., the tanks and infantry of III and IV Corps advanced on a front approximately six miles wide. In the III Corps sector, the 12th Division (Major-General A.B. Scott) formed the right, the 20th Division (Major-General W.D. Smith) the centre, and the 6th Division (Major-General T.O. Marsden) the left. All three divisions secured their objectives rapidly, though the 12th had severe fighting at Lateau Wood. Most importantly, by 11:00 a.m., the 20th Division had passed through the Hindenburg front system and was fast approaching their next objectives at Masnières and Marcoing with a view to securing the crossings over the St. Quentin Canal (Canal de l'Escaut). In the IV Corps sector the 51st Division (Major-General G.M. Harper) met up with considerable resistance in front of Flesquières and by nightfall on the 20th had

Horses resting in squadron lines. Note that many troopers stayed with their horses as much as possible

established a hasty defence in this area. Elsewhere in the IV Corps sector, 62nd (Major-General W.P. Braithwaite) Division had succeeded by 10:30 a.m. in capturing its second objective, the Hindenburg front system in its sector to the point where it crossed the Canal du Nord. Finally, to 62nd Division's left came the 36th (Ulster) Division (Major-General O.S.W. Nugent) west of the Canal du Nord. By 11:20 a.m., this division had reached its second objective in the Hindenburg front system.

Thus, by 11:30 a.m., except at Flesquières, III and IV Corps had captured the outpost and battle zones of the Hindenburg Line on nearly the whole of their frontage. Heavy loss had been inflicted on the Germans in this sector. However, passage of information had become very slow by this point in the battle, largely because visual signalling was next to impossible owing to the fog and mist, and much wire had either been cut or was yet to be laid to forward headquarters. The leading brigade (the CCB commanded by Brigadier-General Seely) of the 5th Cavalry Division was waiting south-west at Gouzeaucourt when, at 11:40 a.m., the division received orders from the Cavalry Corps to advance and to keep in touch with the infantry to the front. The order added that the situation at Masnières and Marcoing was unclear.[58]

At 10:15 a.m. the III Corps reserve, 29th Division (Major-General Sir B. de Lisle) was given the order to advance, pass through 6th and 20th Divisions, and cross the canal capturing Masnières and Marcoing, the canal crossings, and the portion of the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line in this sector. All three brigades (86th, 87th, and 88th) of the division were sent forward without a single battalion kept in reserve, for it was felt by de Lisle that the enemy was on the run and would not be able to put up any organized opposition. By pressing hard, de Lisle expected that neither passage of the canal nor the occupation of the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line would offer any serious difficulty.[59]

Thus, 88th Brigade moved on Masnières by way of la Vacquerie. Encountering opposition from within and around Masnières, the brigade managed to form a small bridgehead of two companies (from 4/Worcestershire) on the far side of the canal, capturing the main bridge over the canal. At about 12:40 p.m., a tank in support of the Worcestershires attempted to cross the main bridge, causing the bridge to collapse and leaving the tank jammed between its two broken ends. There were no other bridges in the immediate vicinity of the bridge by which a tank could cross and the infantry in the bridgehead were now being subjected to heavy fire.

Meanwhile, thanks to the work of the wire-cutting tanks and the Cavalry Track Battalion, the lead elements of the CCB had reached the southern outskirts of Masnières by 1:39 p.m. and Seely had gone forward to liaise with the infantry of 20th and 29th Divisions. At 2:00 p.m., Seely met with the commander of 88th Brigade (Brigadier-General H. Nelson) who erroneously told Seely that his supporting tanks had actually crossed the canal and that his battalions were now arriving at their objectives in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line. On hearing this news, Seely ordered his lead regiment, the Fort Garry Horse (FGH) (Lieutenant-Colonel Paterson), to continue the advance. Following close on the heels of the lead battalions of 88th Brigade, the Canadian cavalry entered the village of Masnières at 2:15 p.m. only to discover that the main bridge was broken and that the enemy beyond the bridge was maintaining a heavy resistance. However, 300 yards southeast of the main bridge, 2/Hampshire had discovered a lock in the canal over which the battalion was now passing. The Garrys moved to the lock and, after a passage for horses was constructed with the assistance of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade Machine Gun Squadron and some local inhabitants, the cavalry, with B Squadron leading, began to cross at 3:30 p.m. Half an hour later, B Squadron was assembled on the far side of the canal and the advance to the ridge east of Rumilly began.[60]

Meanwhile, 88th Brigade's efforts to consolidate its foothold on the east side of the canal, and to capture its portion of the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line, were running into difficulty due to the lack of artillery support and the inability to pass tanks over the canal.[61] By 10:00 p.m., 88th Brigade had the equivalent of two battalions of infantry across the canal but without the support of artillery and tanks they could not achieve their objectives. Consequently, they had little choice during the evening of November 20th/21st but to consolidate their positions and prepare for a renewed effort in the morning.[62]

B Squadron of the FGH, throughout the early evening, continued with its advance toward Rumilly. At the time the squadron was crossing the canal, Major-General W.H. Greenly (GOC 2nd Cavalry Division) had met up with Seely and Nelson at Masnières and concluded that there was not sufficient daylight left to enable the cavalry to reach their objectives and so carry out the original plan of conducting the initial breakthrough over the canal and then sweeping round to the east and the north of Cambrai.[63] Greenly, therefore, ordered Seely to halt his crossing of the canal, to assist 88th Brigade with holding Masnières, and to recall any troops that had crossed the canal already. This direction did not reach Paterson until well after B Squadron had crossed and was out of contact with the rest of the regiment.[64] Consequently, B Squadron, now out of touch and under the leadership of Lieutenant H. Strachan (the squadron commander was killed soon after the crossing), pushed on, overrunning a German artillery battery

and dispersing parties of disorganized German infantry. Realizing that his numbers were dwindling and that the rest of the regiment and brigade were not following up behind him, Strachan led his men back on foot over the canal in the early hours of November 21st.[65] What is of interest in the B Squadron action is that the neutralization of the German battery and the subsequent dispersing of German infantry seem to have resulted in the creation of a gap in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line. Strachan's own account suggests that the line in this location was nothing more than a series of 'split-locked' (dummy) trenches with practically no wire in front. However, there were a few concrete pillboxes with machine guns firing from them.[66] To Strachan, it was clear that the German units around him were in a sorry state and had no more fight left in

Giving way to the future of 'cavalry' a Motorized Machine Gun Brigade car advances during August 1918

them: "As far as I could see, there were uniformed parties of them [Germans], and none of them had any weapons and we were in a cavalryman's paradise."[67] Indeed, Strachan's commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Paterson, a few years after the war became convinced that had the rest of the CCB followed up behind B Squadron, the outcome of the British offensive on that day could have concluded as an even greater success perhaps with a breakthrough having been achieved through the German rear:

There has never been the slightest doubt in my mind that, had the leading squadron [B Squadron] been supported with vigour, the whole operation on that side of Cambrai would have been carried out as planned. In fact, a year later, when I had the opportunity of questioning the civilians in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, I was

informed that the Germans were in confusion even that far back, stating that the British Cavalry were through.[68]

The situation during the night of November 20th/21st was such that the right flank of III Corps was held by the 12th and 20th Divisions and extended from the front line north-east of Gonnelieu along the Bonavis ridge and down to the canal de l'Escaut at Crèvecoeur. Beyond the canal the 29th Division had troops on the eastern side of the canal in the vicinity of Masnières where fighting continued for most of the night. However, nowhere had a firm footing been established in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line. Marcoing, Noyelles, and Nine Wood had been captured by 29th Division. Holding the left of III Corps, 6th Division had forward posts on Premy Chapel ridge and was in contact with the right of IV Corps, the 51st Division, which was still in the front trench position at Flesquières. From there the line ran north where 62nd Division faced eastward through Graincourt to the Bapaume-Cambrai road. Left of the 62nd Division were the 36th and finally the 56th Divisions, which were making contact with the original British line at Boursies.[69] During the evening, the 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions remained in locations in and around Masnières and Marcoing. When the situation in front permitted, they were to move forward and carry on with their original tasks.[70]

The British attack on November 20th was a complete surprise for the Germans. The Cambrai sector was held by troops of the German Second Army (General von der Marwitz). From a point a mile north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road to Havrincourt, the 20th Landwehr Division (Lieutenant-General F. von Hanstein) held the line. From Havrincourt to la Vacquerie stood the 54th Division (Lieutenant-General F. von Watter). Both divisions belonged to XIII Corps and were supported by three howitzer and six gun batteries. In addition, as of November 19th, the 107th Division (Major-General Havenstein) had begun arriving in Cambrai as relief for the 20th Landwehr Division.[71] German accounts speak of the feeling of helplessness that possessed their infantry when faced with the onslaught of tanks and infantry against which they did not know how to fight. As the morning wore on, the situation grew worse for the Germans who were forced to contemplate the destruction of the crossings over the canal and an extensive withdrawal. In fact, eastward from Masnières to Crèvecoeur, a gap a mile wide, the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line was not occupied at all during the morning. During the afternoon, the infantry of the 107th Division was hurried forward and managed to disperse its battalions to reinforcing positions stretching from Flesquières opposing 51st Division, to, on the left, positions manning the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line (three battalions) between Masnières and Crèvecoeur (in front of 29th Division).[72] Obviously, it was troops from the German 107th Division that the 29th Division encountered in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line later in the afternoon of the 20th, and that B Squadron, FGH, encountered northeast of Masnières. Other German formations and units at rest in other parts of the German rear area around Cambrai were also brought forward on the day, but none actually came into action on the 20th. Inexplicably, according to the German accounts, the British momentum began to slacken on the afternoon of the 20th, and had come to a complete stand still by nightfall.[73]

Haig visited Byng at III Army headquarters at Albert at 4:30 p.m. on the 20th. Reports now showed that the way for the cavalry advance, the creation of a gap in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line, was not yet achieved, nor was it to be without

considerable fighting on the 21st. Haig approved of Byng's determination to make another push in the morning. Accordingly, Byng's intention was to make the Bourlon ridge his main objective, but an effort was also to be made to secure the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line from Marcoing to Crèvecoeur in order for the cavalry to get through. The former task was given to IV Corps while the latter was obviously delegated to III Corps. Subsequent tasks for both corps and the Cavalry Corps were in keeping with the original orders of November 13th.[74]

In none of the corps was it easy to prepare for operations the next morning. Communications were unreliable, and the darkness, rain, and mud made movement and coordination slow and difficult. Consequently, the renewed attack by III Corps could not be launched until 11:00 a.m., while the attacks in the IV Corps went on earlier but in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion. Moreover, III Corp's plans were disrupted by a German counter-attack at 10:00 a.m. against 88th Brigade. Although the attack was beaten off, it left 88th Brigade in no condition to take part in the combined 29th and 20th Divisions' assault at 11:00 a.m. Attacks and counter-attacks continued for the remainder of the day. Throughout the day, the 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions remained in their positions in and around Marcoing and Masnières, ready to exploit through the gap in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line if the infantry could create it. However, the opportunity never came on the 21st. In fact, from about 2:30 p.m. on, it was clear that the enemy had pushed forward reinforcements into the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line and that the opportunity for the cavalry exploitation east of Cambrai would not appear.[75] The Germans, in fact, during the evening of November 20th/21st had succeeded in pushing forward considerable reinforcements. During the morning, a large portion of the German 214th Division had arrived from Douai, and at noon an infantry regiment and an artillery regiment had arrived from the German 30th Division. By early evening, both these divisions were in the line along side the 107th Division, and remnants of the 20th Landwehr Division and the 54th Division.[76] The German line was now too strong for the British to penetrate, yet the British would continue trying for another week.

According to the Canadian Official History, from the second day onward, the battle deteriorated into a race with German reinforcements, which were hurrying in from the Fourth Army in Flanders. The British attack reached its limit of success on the 23rd with the capture of Bourlon Wood. But the impetus and the opportunity for a breakthrough were now lost. Some historians have argued that the chances for a breakthrough were lost by the early evening of the 20th once German reinforcements had been deployed in front of III and IV Corps, and it was at this time, they argue, that the offensive should have been called off.[77] Yet III and IV Corps, reverting to traditional infantry-artillery methods of attack, continued to deplete their strength in piecemeal attacks over the next few days. Consequently, on the 27th, the Germans were able to re-take Bourlon Wood, and on the 30th the German Second Army launched a powerful counter-attack that succeeded in driving the British III Army back nearly three miles. The fighting in this sector of the front died out with the onset of winter and heavy snowstorms during the first week of December.[78]

The success won by the III Army on the morning of November 20th was no doubt the fruit of a tactical formula for the attack that had finally been found. The British Army had now found a way of solving the problem of crossing the fire-swept zone. Fuller

describes the formula for success: "In this battle no preliminary artillery bombardment was employed. Instead, grouped in threes, tanks operated like a chain of mobile armoured batteries in advance of the infantry."[79] Indeed, the new tactics lent support to the achievement of surprise against the Germans on November 20th. However, the formula for success only achieved half a result for it allowed the III Army on this occasion only to break into the German defences. In other words, the surprise tank-infantry assault supported by the predicted barrage and bombardment was a powerful formula for breaking into the enemy defences, but breaking through was something else again. It was a 'bite and hold' methodology. The tanks of the period lacked the speed and the mobility to achieve the breakthrough. Indeed, by the end of Z Day, most of the over 300 tanks that had been amassed for the assault were broken down, destroyed, or lost. Only a cavalry force operating in cooperation with and supported by the other arms could achieve the breakthrough. Unfortunately, at Cambrai the level of coordination required for this had not been achieved. In the words of the British Official History, "the technical efficiency, boldness and foresight which distinguished the Third Army's preparations for the surprise assault by tanks and infantry upon the Hindenburg defences found no counter-part in the measures taken to exploit the success."[80]

General R.W. Patterson

As the Germans found by the afternoon of the 20th, the tempo of the assault had considerably slackened, and was non-existent by nightfall. Consequently, the battle had now become a race against time with the British struggling to exploit their success before the Germans could bring in reserves to thwart the British drive. Let us now examine why the tempo of the British assault could not be maintained throughout the entire day of the 20th.

The British Official History states that III Army was obliged to strike a balance between the forces required for the initial assault; for the break-in, and those required for the breakthrough and exploitation. Fuller states further that "although this battle showed that a true solution of the stalemate had been discovered, lack of reserves led to tactical failure."[81] Besides the cavalry, the only troops in reserve were those of V Corps. However, during the morning of the 20th, V Corps remained in its assembly area twenty miles to the rear due to the crowding in the forward areas with artillery, cavalry, etc. Given, then, that the only real reserves at hand during the morning of the 20th were the cavalry divisions, in particular, 1st Cavalry Division under command of IV

Corps for the capture of Bourlon Wood, and 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions following up behind III Corps, the British Official History makes the obvious point that perhaps too much was expected of the lead divisions of III and IV Corps. For in order for the cavalry to breakthrough, especially in the III Corps sector, it meant that the final objectives for the corps had to be the capturing of the Hindenburg support system: the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line.[82]

In the III Corps sector where the CCB was operating, the Canal de l'Escaut, backed by the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line, formed a considerable obstacle to the advance of III Corps and the subsequent breakthrough by the cavalry. III Army and III Corps relied on the swift advance by the tanks to capture the crossings at Masnières and Marcoing intact. However, the resistance offered by the Germans in this sector, even before reinforced by elements of the 107th Division in the afternoon, was such that when III Corps committed the 29th Division to battle in the early afternoon of the 20th, it could not fully secure the crossings over the canal nor create the gap in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line required for the cavalry breakthrough. Yet the 29th Division might have had the chance to do so had its all arms coordination been better. The headquarters of the 29th Division had remained near Gouzencourt, nearly six miles in the rear, too far way to maintain command and control of subsequent operations given the communications problems that were experienced in the afternoon.[83] Moreover, most of the tanks in the vicinity of the canal, and much of the infantry, were not under 29th Division command, while the division's allotment of artillery, as described, was unable to provide the requisite support needed to achieve its objectives.[84]

The actions of B Squadron, the FGH, on the day are illustrative of the fact that the opportunity for a breakthrough indeed existed during the morning and early afternoon of November 20th and that the Canadian cavalry's role in conducting the breakthrough was viable. However, the tempo of the initially successful III Army attack could not be maintained, primarily because of a general lack of staff planning at Army, Corps, and Divisional levels, and because of a lack of all-arms coordination beyond that established for the initial assault; but not because the cavalry, in and of itself, could not carry out this role as has often been deduced to be the case.[85] The lack of staff and all-arms coordination was hampered by poor communications, especially as the day wore on, and the Signal Service was forced to temporarily lay more and more surface line, which was prone to damage by the advancing infantry and tanks. Byng's failure to have V Corps closer to III and IV Corps, ready to exploit the success of the leading corps, or at least to reinforce the leading corps, contributed greatly to the inability of the leading corps in sustaining their momentum and in attaining their objectives. Moreover, reliance on the uncoordinated and poorly supported efforts of the already depleted reserve brigades of the 51st and 62nd Divisions, in concert with 1st Cavalry Division, to capture Bourlon ridge, and the badly coordinated efforts of 29th Division to capture and secure the crossings over the Canal de l'Escaut, was overly ambitious. Clearly, Byng had underestimated the weight of effort required to achieve the break-in and, subsequently, to sustain a breakthrough. Consequently, tempo was lost during the afternoon of the 20th despite the opportunity for a breakthrough that persisted for most of the day.

The cavalry of the 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions, especially the Canadians of the FGH, given their own efforts to stay in contact with the advancing infantry, were ready and

able to break through a gap in the Masnières-Beaurevoir Line if one had been created. In theory, it is fair to say that the cavalry could have achieved a breakthrough during the morning if only the above conditions had been more suitably met. However, the question as to how long the cavalry could have sustained a breakthrough, and how far it could have advanced into the German rear area is another question, the answer to which would be speculative and outside the scope of this article. Unfortunately, the cavalry was afforded no other opportunities of this magnitude during the remainder of the Cambrai offensive and would have to wait until the next August when, at Amiens, the mounted arm would be mated with a later version of the tank and would come closer to achieving its first breakthrough on the Western Front.

Amiens—August 8, 1918

Commencing on March 21st, 1918, Ludendorff launched a series of offensives on the Western Front designed to deal, once and for all, a decisive blow against the Western allies. Indeed, the situation became so critical for the Allies during the ensuing week that at a hastily convened meeting on March 26th between French and British political and military leaders, General Foch was given command of all Allied forces in order to achieve unity of command so that the Allies could continue to hold back the German onslaught. Eventually, German logistical problems as well as Allied resistance halted the German drive just in front of Amiens. With the offensive against the British effectively blunted, Ludendorff launched a second offensive further south against the French on May 27th. With the aid of some newly arrived American divisions, Foch's French armies along the Marne were able to stem the German advance and by mid-July the German campaigns in both sectors, having exhausted their reserves of men and material, had all but petered out. By mid-July, the German offensives on the Western Front had been stopped.

On July 24th, Foch conferred with the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, including Haig, at Melun, twenty-five miles southeast of Paris. For the first time since March, with the recent addition of new American divisions to the overall Allied order of battle, and the depleted condition of the German forces, the Allies enjoyed an overall superiority in the west. The moment, therefore, had come to assume the initiative in the west by returning to the offensive. Accordingly, Foch proposed three limited offensives to free essential communications, to be followed by two more to liberate the northern coal-mining area and clear the Germans from the vicinity of Calais and Dunkirk.[86] Foch further added that should these offensives achieve their intended aims not too late in the year, the Allies could then "look forward to an offensive to be launched at the end of the summer or during the autumn of such importance as will increase our advantages and leave no respite for the enemy."[87]

The first of the planned offensives was a continuation of the limited attacks taking place and was aimed at pushing the enemy farther back from the Paris-Toul-Avricourt railway. The second offensive, originally scheduled for August 10th but later changed to the 8th, was to be launched by the British from the Amiens area and was aimed at removing the threat posed by the German salient formed in the Montdidier-Moreuil area to the Paris-Amiens railway.[88] The choice of Amiens was vital given the importance of the rail marshalling yards in Amiens to this sector of the Allied front and to the French economy in this region.[89] The third offensive, to be launched by the

French and Americans in the St. Mihiel salient, was aimed at freeing the eastern portion of the Paris-Avricourt railway. Foch was adamant that three offensives, plus the two in the north to be conducted by the Belgians, should follow each other closely so as to overwhelm the Germans and disorganize their use of reserves.[90]

On July 28th Foch issued his formal orders to Haig for the Amiens operation. The offensive, which was to be "pushed as far as possible in the direction of Roye,"[91] was to be carried out by the British IV Army, still under Rawlinson, and the French I Army (General Debeney), which was placed under Haig's command on the same day. Accordingly, Haig issued his formal orders on the 29th. In his orders to Rawlinson and Debeney, Haig made it clear that the object of the upcoming offensive was to disengage Amiens and the Paris-Amiens railway.[92] Furthermore, he stated that the line Méricourt-Harbonnières-Caix-Quesnel-Hangest would be seized as quickly as possible and organized for defence. Once this line had been consolidated, British IV Army was to, "keeping their left flank on the Somme, …press the enemy in the direction of Chaulnes," while at the same time, the French I Army was to press the enemy in the direction of Roye.[93] In order to enable IV Army (which already consisted of the Australian Corps [Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash] and III Corps [Lieutenant-General Sir R.H.K. Butler]) to achieve his objectives, Haig allotted the Canadian Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir A.W. Currie) consisting of four divisions, the 1st Australian Division (then re-grouped under British command elsewhere on the front), and the Cavalry Corps (Kavanagh) consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. Finally, Haig was adamant that, just as at Cambrai, it was of first importance that secrecy should be observed and that the operation would be carried out as a surprise.[94]

On July 31st, Rawlinson issued his orders in which he directed that the III, Canadian, Australian, and Cavalry Corps would carry out the attack. Also allotted to IV Army were five tank brigades from the Tank Corps, which Rawlinson dispersed under



command of each of his corps including the 3rd Tank Brigade to the Cavalry Corps. The 9th Tank Brigade was held in general army reserve.[95] Rawlinson's scheme of attack built upon the lessons of Cambrai. Besides the utilization of surprise as a fundamental operating principle, Rawlinson had as early as July 17th submitted his concept of operations to Haig for approval. In it, Rawlinson aimed to avoid the situation as had occurred at Cambrai in which the divisions detailed to capture the first objectives were also involved in the capture of the second and subsequent objectives as had been the case in, for example, the IV Corps sector. By the end of the day on November 20th, 1917, the troops who had conducted the initial assault were exhausted, depleted, and disorganized. Therefore, Rawlinson aimed to avoid this situation by a concept of operations, which saw a leapfrogging of fresh brigades onto successive objectives, thereby retaining the tempo of the advance. As well, Rawlinson envisioned the extensive use of tanks (twelve battalions consisting of 552 tanks) in capturing all the tactical objectives. In essence, with the exception discussed above, the battle tactics were those of Cambrai. At one hour before Zero Hour (set at 4:20 a.m.) the tanks were to move forward to the start line under an aircraft noise barrage whence they were to lead the infantry forward under a creeping barrage delivered by one-third of the IV Army's guns. The other two-thirds were to conduct counter-bombardment missions against the enemy artillery, but without any preliminary registration.[96]

Rawlinson's scheme also included an extensive role for the cavalry. At a conference at IV Army headquarters on August 5th, Rawlinson spelled out his objectives. The first objective was to disengage Amiens and the Paris-Amiens railway by seizing the German defensive line Hangest-Harbonières, otherwise known as the Outer Amiens Defence Line. The second objective was to push forward in the direction of the Royes-Chaulnes line "with the least possible delay." To achieve the latter meant creating a gap in the first objective, passing through the cavalry, and exploiting as far as the Royes-Chaulnes line. In fact, it would be the achievement of a breakthrough.[97] Rawlinson further directed that:

> The cavalry must be ready to take advantage of any opening [gap] which may occur and to pass anywhere between the AMIENS-ROYE road and the River SOMME. For this purpose it is necessary that a body of Cavalry should be placed under the command not only of the Canadian Corps but of the Australian Corps as well. Cavalry patrols are to keep in touch with the progress of the Infantry and no opportunity allowed to slip of passing the Cavalry through. If Cavalry are placed under the orders of Corps Commanders in the first place, these Corps Commanders will have an interest in seeing that the Cavalry is given every opportunity of pushing through. There must be no fixed points of passage, but a complete readiness along the whole front of the British attack South of the SOMME to seize any opportunity that presents itself.[98]

Fuller is credited with suggesting to Rawlinson that, should the Germans manage to withdraw some of their guns and infantry before the attacking forces could get forward to capture or neutralize them, the cavalry must have more firepower in order to be able to pass through the gap and exploit. Thus, Fuller proposed that the new light tank (the Whippet) be used in conjunction with the cavalry to speed and protect the advance to the line Roye-Chaulnes, the second objective.[99] Rawlinson agreed and on August 4th at Cavalry Corps headquarters explained his plans for the cavalry. The 3rd

Cavalry Division (Major-General A.E.W. Harman) was to be placed under command of the Canadian Corps and would have a battalion of Whippets attached. When 3rd Cavalry Division had passed through the Canadian Corps, once the latter had captured its objectives on the German defensive line Hangest-Harbonières, it was to revert to under the command of the Cavalry Corps for the subsequent breakthrough and exploitation toward the line Roye-Chaulnes, with the idea of cutting the enemy's communications and easing the situation in front of the French in the south. The same held true for 1st Cavalry Division (Major-General R.L. Mullens), also allotted a battalion of Whippets, which was placed under command of the Australian Corps. The 2nd Cavalry Division (Major-General T.T. Pitman) remained under command of the Cavalry Corps and would act as the Cavalry Corps reserve.[100]

In preparation for the offensive and yet giving the impression to the Germans that French forces were being redeployed elsewhere on the front, at the beginning of

Sir Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence, at the front

August the IV Army's boundary with the French I Army was moved 7000 yards south to the Amiens-Roye road. The change in boundary was accomplished during the first week of August without the deployment of any new formations into the line. To the Germans, this apparent stretching of the Allied front indicated a weakening of the Allied line and, therefore, aided in the achievement of surprise on August 8th. In reality, the Australians were screening the movements of the Canadian and Cavalry Corps in the rear, as well as the necessary logistic and artillery concentrations. The relief in place of the southern portion of the Australian sector to the Canadians occurred during the evening of August 6th-7th. Thus, the order of battle on the evening of August 7th-8th

was from right to left, two French corps between the Avre River and the Amiens-Roye road, the Canadian Corps between the road and the Amiens-Chaulnes railway, the Australian Corps between the railway and the Somme, and the III Corps between the Somme and the Ancre.[101]

For ease of control and reference, the Outer Amiens Defence Line was now nicknamed the Blue Dotted Line, with intermediate objectives between it and the start line designated as, from west to east, the Green and Red Lines, to be used as control features for the forward leapfrogging of assault brigades and divisions.[102]

To the Canadian and Australian Corps fell the burden of the main blow for IV Army. Currie's plan was to capture the Red Line with, from right to left, his 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Canadian Divisions. Once the Red Line was captured, the plan was to pass through the 3rd Cavalry Division to the Blue Line. The 4th Canadian Division, passing from Corps reserve and following up behind 3rd Canadian Division on the right, would also pass through the Red Line and would follow up the cavalry and assist them in the capture of the Blue Line if the need should arise. Finally, in order to protect the right flank of the cavalry, and also to keep in touch with the French south of the Amiens-Roye road, Currie created the "Canadian Independent Force"—composed of the 1st and 2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigades, some Lewis gun detachments, and some trench mortars mounted on trucks—which was commanded by Brigadier-General Brutinel. It was to secure the Amiens-Roye road between the Red and Blue Lines.[103] It should be noted here that Currie and Brutinel intended to use the Independent Force as a highly mobile formation capable of seizing and holding key terrain in advance of the infantry, or as a means of dominating key terrain with firepower until the infantry could take it. Although, as Shane Schreiber points out, these Canadian experiments put the Canadian Corps on the leading edge of developing doctrine for what would later be called mechanized warfare, they were relatively primitive in their application.[104] Like the tanks of the day, mechanized solutions to the problem of overcoming the riddle of the trenches were solely aimed at supporting the infantry in breaking into the enemy trench lines. Experiments like the Independent Force, despite the vision of Fuller's Plan 1919, were not seen as an alternative to cavalry in its role as the arm of exploitation.

The plan of attack for the Australians saw Monash leading with right to left, the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions, which would capture the Green line. The plan was then for the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions to pass through and capture the Red and Blue Lines and to support the exploitation by the 1st Cavalry Division through the Blue Line toward the Royes-Chaulnes Line. The 1st Australian Division would remain in Corps reserve for the offensive.[105] The ground over which the battle was fought to the east of Amiens and to the south of the Somme was, as at Cambrai, well suited to tanks and cavalry. The soil was hard and there was relatively little damage from shell craters and entrenchments. In addition, except for the Luce River running across the Canadian axis of advance, there were few natural obstacles to mobility. Also, the general lie of the land favoured a surprise attack with many covered approaches to the British lines.[106] The three divisions of the Cavalry Corps—with their attached Whippet tank battalions—that had been bivouacked in the Somme valley between Flixecourt and Amiens, began their approach marches to their assembly areas during the evening of August 6th/7th and arrived in location just west of Amiens by the morning. During the evening of the 7th/8th, they moved forward again through the town of Amiens to their

forward assembly areas in the rear of the Canadian and Australian Corps in the fork between the Amiens-Roye and Villers-Bretonneux roads. One subaltern of the RCD described the ride through Amiens:

> We reached the suburbs of Amiens and it seemed like getting back home again to be riding down in familiar streets. In the early summer of 1917 when we were in the line in front of St. Quentin, and around Ascension Wood, the bloods of the regiment often made the citizens of Amiens and the 'regulars' at Charlie's bar realize that they were in town. Now, however, all was changed. The town was deserted and the streets echoed the sounds of the horse's feet as if we were in a vast tunnel. The bosche with his long range guns and aircraft had made the town a very undesirable place to live in.[107]

In particular, the CCB arrived in the early morning hours of the 8th in an assembly area approximately 12 miles northeast of Boves.[108] In addition, during the evening of the 7th/8th, special cavalry tracks were constructed by the Cavalry Corps engineers, assisted by an American engineer battalion, leading from the forward assembly areas to the front line so that the cavalry would not interfere with the forward movement of guns and infantry reserves the next day.[109]

The front on which the British IV Army was going to attack coincided almost exactly with that of the German Second Army (General von der Marwitz), which formed the left wing of Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group of Armies. The Second Army consisted of ten divisions in the front line and four in reserve. In addition, Second Army's boundary with the German Eighteenth Army (General Hutier[110]) on the left ran northeastward across the Amiens-Roye road, thereby putting an additional two reserve divisions in the vicinity of the Allied objectives. On a recent inspection of Second Army's front, Ludendorff had noted that although the defences were satisfactory, they had fallen behind those of Eighteenth Army in the construction of field works. However, the defences were organized in depth, as was the German norm for this period in the war, and artillery was plentiful.[111]

The taking over of a wider portion of the front by the Australians was observed by the Germans, but as the whole of the British IV Army was widened by this redeployment, the deduction was made that an imminent offensive was unlikely and that the British were holding fresh divisions in reserve for a renewed offensive in Flanders. Because the Royal Flying Corps had been successful in driving away German attempts at aerial observation into the British rear areas, the Germans were able to detect only one indication of an impending Allied offensive; noise caused by the transport of supplies and munitions, and the unconfirmed reports of tank noises. However, no measures for defence against tanks were ordered throughout Second Army during the first week of August.[112] Of interest is the "Summary of Information" submitted to Rupprecht on August 6th reporting "about a hundred tanks observed on the road Ailly-Morisel [Moreuil]," and again nothing was done; not even a request from Second Army, as one German staff officer later commented, to "keep a sharp look-out."[113] Consequently, surprise was complete on August 8th for the Allies.

The evening of August 7th/8th was moonless and fine but at 3:00 a.m. a ground mist began to rise that grew to impede visibility by Zero Hour at 4:20 a.m. Exactly at 4:20 a.m., approximately 2000 guns opened up. The front German lines and most of their

artillery were neutralized. The creeping barrage fell 200 yards ahead of the advancing infantry and tanks of the III, Australian, and Canadian Corps and moved forward at a rate of 100 yards every three minutes. South of the Somme, especially in the Australian and Canadian sectors, the surprise was complete. The advance was led forward by a line of skirmishers intended to work as 'beaters' pointing out hostile points to the following tanks and infantry. Following the skirmishers at 150 yards came the first wave of tanks, followed by infantry columns rapidly crossed the 500 yards of No Man's Land and the first line of enemy resistance was immediately overcome.[114]

To the south of the Australians and Canadians, the French IX and XXXI Corps advancing between the Avre and the Amiens-Roye road were late in starting but the Germans, nonetheless, were surprised by this extension of the battlefront. By 9:30 a.m., Moreuil was occupied. Then, after a three and one half-hour preliminary bombardment, the French infantry, with very little tank support, commenced their second advance of the day. By 9:00 p.m., the French corps had taken Mézières and Fresnoy, but had yet to take Le Quesnel.[115] To the north of the Australians and Canadians, the British III Corps advance did not proceed as planned, as surprise and shock was hard to achieve given that the Germans had attacked in this sector, which not only upset the III Corps preparation for the 8th, but also reinforced the German positions and preparations in front of III Corps and thereby prevented surprise from being achieved in the III Corps sector.[116] However, surprise was definitely achieved on the Australian Corps battlefront to the south of the Somme with 5th Australian Division having reached the Blue Line by 11:30 p.m.[117]

At 12:30 p.m., Rawlinson, having received the news that the cavalry was on the Blue Line in both the Australian and Canadian sectors, informed the Cavalry Corps that its formations were not to stop on the Blue Line but were to push on toward the Chaulnes-Roye Line in accordance with the IV Army plan. Cavalry Corps headquarters passed these instructions on to 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, but the message was not received at 1st Cavalry Division until 4:15 p.m., owing to the rapid advance of the divisional headquarters and the difficulties in maintaining communications despite the use of wireless. Meanwhile, Mullens in the afternoon decided to use the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and ordered it to advance southwards to Caix where it was to turn east, cross the Blue Line, and push patrols towards Vrély and Rosières. These patrols, as well as patrols from 9th Cavalry Brigade, met resistance in this region at around 2:00 p.m. and reported that both villages were strongly held. At this point, Mullens ordered the 1st Cavalry Brigade back into reserve and, once relieved by the infantry, the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigades were also ordered to retire at 7:30 p.m.[118]

By the early afternoon of the 8th, the Australian Corps had reached all the objectives assigned it except on the extreme left flank due to the enemy fire from north of the Somme, and on the extreme right flank where the Canadian Corps had not yet reached its final objectives on its left flank. Also, by this time the lead cavalry formations and regiments of 1st Cavalry Division had pushed forward patrols with a view to fully achieving a breakthrough on the Blue Line (the Outer Amiens Defence Line) and continuing the exploitation toward the line Chaulnes-Roye as per the IV Army plan, and as Rawlinson had so ordered again during the afternoon. Why, then, was the forward momentum stalled at this point? In essence, Monash had stopped. Indeed, for the remainder of the afternoon of the 8th, except for some small actions on

the extreme left flank of 4th Australian Division, the Australian Corps concentrated on consolidating their gains "in almost unbroken quiet on the whole Australian front…[while] most of the Australian front-line posts dug, slept, or discussed the marvels of the day."[119] In fact, in the early afternoon, patrols and Royal Flying Corps reports noted that the German activity in front of the Australian line was light with little movement. Moreover, a patrol of armoured cars had advanced eastward down the Roman road past the Blue Line toward Rainecourt, operating in enemy territory for a couple of hours, and reported very little enemy activity.[120]

However, by the late afternoon, the situation had changed, in that at 4:20 p.m. considerable forces of infantry were reported rushing up to the front along the roads through Rouvroy, Vrély, and Rosières. As the Australian Official History points out:

> Thus, if Monash, when at 11:30 he heard of the penetration of the armoured cars, had thought of continuing the advance on a divisional front astride of the Roman road, he must have known by 6 o'clock that within three hours of its appearance the opportunity had vanished. No order that he could have given on hearing of it could have reached the troops in time. The villages could have been captured only by instant action of the commanders on the spot, possibly without previous reference even to divisional headquarters….It is doubtful if the granting of such freedom to subordinates was ever contemplated by Rawlinson or Monash in devising or carrying out this day's plan.[121]

Surprise was also achieved on the Canadian Corps battlefront to the south of the Amiens-Chaulnes railway and north of the Amiens-Roye road. Soon after Zero Hour the leading brigades of the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Canadian Divisions occupied the Green Line at 7:45 a.m. and the Red Line between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. Upon consolidation on the Red Line, the 4th Canadian Division passed through the 3rd Canadian Division at 12:40 p.m. Preceding the division was the cavalry of the 3rd Cavalry Division supported by two companies of Whippet tanks.[122] Led by the CCB (now commanded by Brigadier-General R.W. Paterson) and followed by the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General A. Burt), the 3rd Cavalry Division had crossed the Luce at Iquancourt and had passed through the 3rd Canadian Division on the Red Line at 10:25 a.m.[123] The 7th and Canadian Cavalry Brigades commenced their advance to the Blue line at approximately 11:00 a.m. The CCB rode forward with the LSH on the right, the RCD on the left, and the FGH in reserve. The Strathcona's reached the Amiens-Roye road on the right where they met up with Brutinel's Independent Force. With the Whippets leading, they then pushed on over the road to Fresnoy-en-Chaussée where they captured 125 prisoners.[124] On the left, the RCD supported by eight Whippets were held up northwest of Beaucourt Village and Wood. Eventually, the Dragoons and FGH captured Beaucourt Village where they captured 300 prisoners, but found it impossible to advance east of it due to fire from the wood. Will Bird watched the unfolding scene as an infantryman back on the Red Line:

> The mounted men dashed into the wood, directly at the waiting gunners. Killing began as if it were a grand movie scene….The Maxims opened fire and men and horses rolled among the shrubbery or fell in the open. I saw an officer rise in his stirrups and strike a Hun across the neck with his sword so that the German's head lolled oddly on his left shoulder as he fell…..Several Huns were trodden to earth under the hoofs of the horses, which swept in on them like a

> stampede. It was whirlwind fighting, so fast and furious that the machine guns did not take half the toll we expected. One crew alone survived the cavalry charge. A [Whippet] tank headed straight for them. The Germans fired frantically, and we saw one of them on the tank slide to the ground, but the tank went on and over gun and crew, so quickly that not a German escaped.[125]

Despite the gallant action of the RCD and FGH, Beaucourt Wood remained in German hands until later in the afternoon when the infantry of 4th Canadian Division were brought up and cleared the wood at 4:30 p.m.[126] While the RCD and FGH were fighting in and around Beaucourt, the LSH broke into a gallop and bypassed the village to the south and captured 40 prisoners in the act of withdrawing. Two troops of the LSH then crossed into the French sector to capture Fresnoy-en-Chausée while Major Torrance led the main body of the regiment in an advance on a small wood in front of Le Quesnel. The Strathconas charged the wood but could not capture it. Meanwhile, the two troops advancing on Fresnoy-en-Chausée occupied the village and captured 125 prisoners. However, later in the afternoon, reinforcements from the German 1st Reserve Division succeeded in mounting a counter-attack against the Canadian cavalry and re-occupied the village. Fresnoy-en-Chausée then became an enfilade position that persisted to stall the continued advance of 4th Canadian and 42nd French Divisions for the remainder of the day and onto the 9th.[127] Gregory Blaxland describes the afternoon for the CCB:

> On the [Canadian Corps] right Brutinel's Independent Force of motorized machine-gunners and cyclists had come roaring up the Roye road and taken up position to protect the right flank and help the French forward. Across the downs to their left the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, of Harman's 3rd Cavalry Division, were trotting past corpse-strewn gun lines, disabled tanks and their own waving infantry, and behind them came the 4th Canadian Division, marching along in extended formation to come through and take the final objective over from the cavalry, seven miles beyond the bridge over the Luce. The cavalrymen cantered on past the forward line into glorious open country, with Whippet tanks following, outpaced. Squadrons fanned out and one clattered into the village of Beaucourt to catch 300 Germans in the act of marching off, but horses and men were sent reeling by hot fire when they tried to advance beyond the village. It came from Beaucourt Wood, two miles short of the final objective, and there were found to be too many field guns for the cavalry and light tanks to quell on their own.[128]

The fighting in and around Beaucourt constituted the main actions and engagements of the CCB on August 8th. In the meantime, the 7th Cavalry Brigade had advanced from the Luce valley with the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons on the right, the 7th Dragoon Guards left, and the 17th Lancers in reserve. Encountering the same resistance as the Canadians had from Beaucourt Wood, Burt ordered his regiments to change their axes of advance toward the stretch of open ground between Beaucourt and Cayeux Woods. The 7th Dragoon Guards captured Cayeux Wood by charging the feature and taking many casualties. By 2:35 p.m. the 7th Cavalry Brigade had succeeded in occupying a portion of the Blue Line in the Canadian Corps sector.[129] However, in doing so cooperation between the cavalry and the Whippets began to break down. As the Inniskillings and the Dragoon Guards advanced over the rolling terrain, the Whippets,

with a maximum speed of only 7 miles per hour, failed to keep up with the cavalry. The same was true with the Whippets accompanying the CCB. Had they been able to keep up with the cavalry, the Whippets would have been able to provide the much-needed covering fire in order to allow the cavalry to advance. Conversely, when under fire and forced to dismount, the cavalry were unable to follow the Whippets. Consequently, the cavalry-tank combination proved unable to sustain the breakthrough and exploitation. However, as Anglesey points out, the Whippet was a very new weapon, which had only been in action twice before Amiens but never in cooperation with the cavalry. Moreover, there had virtually been no cooperative training between the two arms prior to the offensive because there had not been enough time.[130]

As discussed, the 4th Canadian Division had begun passing through the 3rd Canadian Division at 12:40 p.m. About a mile east of the Red Line, the leading battalions of the 11th Brigade made contact with the elements of the CCB in the vicinity of Beaucourt. The attack on Beaucourt Wood now began in earnest with the 11th Brigade, supported by Mark V tanks, achieving success at about 4:30 p.m. Accordingly, as night fell, the brigade was digging in front of Le Quesnel, just short of the Blue Line.[131] This was the only portion of the Canadian objectives on the Blue Line that were not captured that day. To 11th Brigade's left, 12th Brigade advanced between Cayeux and Beaucourt Woods and met up with the rear elements of the 7th Cavalry Brigade between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. and took over the positions held by the 7th Cavalry Brigade in the Blue Line at about 6:00 p.m. Thus, by nightfall the Canadian Corps had succeeded in capturing the Blue Line in its sector.[132]

With the arrival of the 7th Cavalry Brigade on the Blue Line by mid-afternoon, the question arises as to why the cavalry did not continue the advance east in accordance with IV Army orders. The quick answer is that the cavalry could not continue the advance until the infantry on the Blue Line relieved them. This did not occur, as discussed, until the late afternoon. At this hour, Currie was not sure if he was to continue the advance further east or consolidate on the Blue Line for the night and prepare to resume the advance the next day. Confirmation of Rawlinson's intentions for the next phase of the battle did not reach Currie until just before midnight[133] well after Kavanagh had withdrawn the cavalry to the rear.[134] In addition, Currie had expected to receive under command the British 32nd Division to help him continue the advance the next day and Currie's staff had written the division into the Corps plan for the 9th.[135] However, at 9:55 p.m., August 8th, Currie was informed that although his corps would continue to attack the next day, it would not receive the 32nd Division under command. This change in IV Army plans now caused considerable difficulty for Currie for plans had to be changed and new orders sent all while the Corps and divisional headquarters were on the move through the night. In fact, the new orders did not reach the divisions until approximately 3:00 a.m. on the 9th. Consequently, due to the requirement to pass the new orders down the chain of command within each division, the Zero Hour for the next day was repeatedly postponed to the point where individual brigades jumped off independently of flanking brigades and without coordinated artillery or tank support in many cases.[136] Of course the continuing delays on the part of the Canadians meant that the Australians to the north also had to delay their advance.[137] The consequence was that brigades advanced anywhere between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. on the 9th, which meant that the fighting during the day for IV

Army was of a very uncoordinated nature. Moreover, the Germans had now had the chance to move reserves in throughout the night creating a much more difficult situation for the attackers than what had been the case 24 hours earlier when surprise had been complete almost everywhere. Although the British were able to advance the battlefront to the line Rouvroy-Méharicourt-Framerville-Méricourt-Dernancourt, the tempo was such that the opportunity for a breakthrough never appeared during the day. Indeed, by the 10th it was clear to Rawlinson and Haig that along the whole of the IV Army front the momentum of the offensive had died out. Accordingly, on the 11th, offensive operations were cancelled by IV Army headquarters, and on the 12th the Cavalry Corps was withdrawn into reserve.[138]

By the end of the day on the 8th, although IV Army's operations had yet to switch toward continuing the advance to the second objective: the line Royes-Chaulnes, the enemy nonetheless had suffered its greatest defeat since the beginning of the war. From north to south the German line had been thrown back as much as eight miles and, except on the extreme left flank of the Australian Corps and the extreme right flank of the Canadian Corps, IV Army was now in possession of the Blue Dotted Line, the Outer Amiens Defence Line.[139] Ludendorff wrote of the day: "August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war.…Everything I had feared, and of which I had so often given warning, had here, in one place, become a reality."[140] Without a doubt, August 8th had been a harrowing day for the Germans. The total loss to the German Second Army was 650 to 700 officers and 26,000 to 27,000 other ranks. In effect, the German 13th, 41st, 117th, and 225th Divisions had effectively ceased to exist by mid-morning. In the German Second Army sector, only six divisions were within striking distance of the battlefront during the day. However, only three were engaged during the day: the 119th, which was east and south of Roye; the 1st Reserve, which was astride the Amiens-Roye road between Roye and Le Quesnel; and the 109th, which was extended in an area stretching from Harbonnières to six miles eastward. It is of interest that not until 2:00 p.m. had the first units of the 119th Division taken up positions in front of the Australians and Canadians at Vrély and Varvillers. It was elements of this division that 1st Cavalry Division and Royal Flying Corps patrols had contacted in the later afternoon. The 1st Reserve Division was assembled at about 8:30 a.m. and was ordered forward to the area of Le Quesnel and Beaucourt at 9:46 a.m., arriving and deploying in the area between 10:15 and 10:30 a.m. It was elements of this division (and remnants of the routed divisions) that the Canadian and 7th Cavalry Brigades, and later the 4th Canadian Division, encountered in their advance to the Blue Line in the late morning and early afternoon. Finally, the 109th Division, being closest to the battlefront, was able to assemble its troops fairly quickly and was deployed to the north of the 119th Division in front of the Australians by the early afternoon.[141]

Clearly, the German defences in the late morning and early afternoon were only being knitted together haphazardly. A window of opportunity had been created for a few hours on the 8th during which a breakthrough could have been achieved and a drive by the cavalry made to the line Royes-Chaulnes. However, by the evening of August 8th/9th, the Germans had consolidated a line of defence to the east of the Blue Line with the three divisions already mentioned plus an additional three that had moved in during the evening. Rawlinson's major-general, General Staff (MGGS) Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery, has stated that by the end of the day on the 8th, "the situation

on the Fourth Army front was most satisfactory."[142] In terms of the ground captured, and the number of enemy formations that had been destroyed, this is a true statement. However, in terms of the overall IV Army plan and the requirement to exploit beyond the Blue Line to the line Royes-Chaulnes, much had yet to be done and all depended on maintaining a higher level of tempo in the advance than that of the Germans in bringing up their reinforcements to the front. However, by this time, the tempo had been lost on both the Australian and Canadian fronts. In particular, on the Canadian front, the opportunity for a breakthrough was less apparent but nevertheless real when the 7th Cavalry Brigade arrived on the Blue Line in the mid-afternoon. However, due to the late arrival of the relieving Canadian infantry, the confusion created by communications problems, and the changing of orders throughout the evening of the 8th/9th, and the growing German strength during the same evening, the opportunity for a breakthrough was quickly lost.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the aim of this article has been to dispel the myth surrounding the perceived inability of the British cavalry to achieve a breakthrough on the Western front from 1915 to 1918. Through an examination of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade's operations and actions during the Cambrai and Amiens offensives, it has been demonstrated that within the context of the British efforts to achieve a breakthrough, the cavalry was not an obsolete arm of the British Army. By contrast, at least in intent, the cavalry was a vital component toward achieving a breakthrough because it was, despite its technological limitations, the only truly mobile arm. However, the cavalry could not achieve a breakthrough because of factors or conditions beyond its control. These conditions had to do with the requirement to maintain a high degree of tempo throughout the whole of an offensive. The maintenance of a high degree of tempo was necessary in order to be able to create the gap in the enemy's defences, and then break the cavalry through in order to conduct the exploitation phase deep in the enemy's rear, all in less time than it took the enemy to bring up his reserves. Tempo during the offensive depended on a decentralized command philosophy, on staff coordination, on all-arms cooperation, and on reliable communications. Unfortunately, in all the offensives launched by the British on the Western Front during the war, these conditions were never fully met.

To be sure, the British Army, at least by the time of the Cambrai offensive in 1917, and certainly by the time of the Amiens offensive in 1918, had solved the problem of overcoming the defence and of crossing the fire-swept zone. The British had perfected the infantry-artillery attack supported by tanks and aircraft, and utilizing the principle of surprise in order to break in to the enemy's defences. The secret to the British success on the Western Front eventually was found to be a mastery of low level infantry tactics, the successful pioneering of tank-infantry cooperation, the solution of some of the many problems associated with sustaining artillery support throughout the depth of the assault, and, above all, the resurrection of the tactical principle of surprise. In other words, they had perfected the 'bite and hold' attack in order to break in to the enemy's defences. But at the end of the war, the British had yet to come to grips with the breakthrough. The tank of the time, as has been demonstrated, was not the answer. The cavalry was really the **only** arm with the sense and means of mobility to achieve and sustain a breakthrough, should it have occurred. The cavalry's lack of

success, therefore, was not a consequence of the capabilities and limitations of the arm itself, but rather of the inability of commanders, staffs, and the other arms of the British Army to rapidly adapt and take advantage of the fleeting opportunities for mobile warfare. The reason they could not achieve and sustain a breakthrough was not because the cavalry was obsolete, but because the conditions necessary for the maintenance of a high degree of tempo were never fully realized in any of the offensives.

About the Author …

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Endnotes

1. This article is based on the author's unpublished thesis, "Waiting For the "G"; A Re-evaluation Of The Role Of The British Cavalry On The Western Front, 1915-18," (Royal Military College of Canada, 2000).
2. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* (London: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 670.
3. David Adams Leeming, *The World of Myth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 3.
4. James J. Sadkovich, "Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 24, pp. 27-61.
5. John Terraine, *The Smoke and the Fire* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), p. 17.
6. Jonathan F. Vance, *Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), p. 8.
7. Brian Bond, ed., *The First World War and British Military History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 1, in speaking of Alex Danchev's article in the same publication entitled *'Bunking' and Debunking: The Controversies of the 1960s*.
8. See the Preface to The Marquess of Anglesey's, *A History of the British Cavalry*, Vol. 8 (London, Leo Cooper, 1997), pp. xix-xxiii. See also Vol. 4 (published in 1986), which covers the period 1899-1914 but deals primarily with the British cavalry in the Boer War, the lessons learned from that conflict, and the developments in the British cavalry in the inter-war years 1903-14.
9. Ibid. Volume 8 is specifically a narrative of the operations of the various regiments and formations that made up the British Cavalry Corps on the Western Front 1915-18.
10. Ibid., pp. xix-xxiii. Although the preface states this fact in very general detail, the body of the work illustrates the fact to a degree that can hardly be disputed.
11. In Field-Marshal Haig's final dispatch, dated 21 March 1919, was a concise description of how he had conducted operations throughout the war. He claimed that the four and a half years in Belgium and France had been a continuous campaign that had been fought according to four distinct phases: the manoeuvre for position; the preparation or wearing-out battle of varying duration; the decisive attack; and, finally, the cavalry exploitation. See Keith Simpson, "The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig," in Bond, *The First World War and British Military History*, p. 144. For the purposes of this article and to simplify terminology, this phase of the offensive will simply be referred to as the breakthrough.
12. Richard Simpkin, *Race to the Swift* (London: Brassey's, 1985), p. 106.
13. Martin Samuels, *Command or Control?; Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 283-4. See also Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York, Penguin, 1999), p. 309.
14. John Terraine, *White Heat: the New Warfare 1914-1918* (London, 1982), p. 148. See also Major R.N. Bryson, "The Once and Future Army," *British Army Review*, No. 120 (December 1998).
15. Stephen Badsey, "Cavalry and the Development of Breakthrough Doctrine," in Paddy Griffith, ed., *British Fighting Methods in the Great War*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 149.
16. Anglesey, Vol. 8, pp. 19-20.
17. *Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1918* (London: 1919), pp. 333-44.
18. See Anglesey, Vol. 8, pp. 65-89.
19. See *Report of the Ministry*, p. 336, and Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army (COH)* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962), pp. 369-71
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Griffith, p. 10.

23. Quoted in French, "Sir James Edmonds," p. 85. See also Major-General J. Kennedy, *Report on Operations on the Western Front*, Appendix II to *Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War (The Kirke Report)*, (London: The War Office, 1932), PRO WO33/1297, re-printed in a special edition of *British Army Review*, April 2001.
24. Griffith, p. 162. The original concept for the tank had its genesis with Colonel Ernest D. Swinton, a British infantry officer who conceived of a machine gun destroyer propelled by gasoline engines. The first British prototype, dubbed "Little Willie," was successfully demonstrated in December 1915 but the first combat model was the Mark I "Mother," which saw action in limited numbers at the Somme in September, 1916. The first successful tank attack came at Cambrai in November, 1917 where 371 of the improved Mark IVs were employed in a place with hard chalky ground and without the normal artillery preliminary bombardment that had so impeded mobility for tanks, infantry, and cavalry alike in the past. Tanks were again used in great numbers and successfully at Amiens, August 8-12, 1918. By war's end even the most advanced tanks, the "Whippet" and the Medium B and Cs were still not much faster than the accompanying infantry and were still chronically prone to break down after a day's operation. See also Smithers, pp. 228-31.
25. Griffith, p. 162.
26. Terraine, *Smoke and Fire*, p. 149.
27. Smithers, p. 231. See also R.M.F. Crutwell, *A History of the Great War, 1914-1918*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1936), p. 547.
28. Griffith, p. 32. For a discussion on the resistance Haig met from both political and military quarters on his decision to retain the cavalry, and the actions he took to retain the cavalry, see Anglesey, Vol. 8, pp. 20, 37-9, and 163-6.
29. In making this point Paddy Griffith refers to the paper written by HQ 3rd Cavalry Division and circulated by GHQ 24 August, 1916, (UK Public Records Office, WO 158 186, Document 293). See Griffith, p. 161.
30. Griffith, p. 161.
31. W.D. Croft, *Three Years with the Ninth (Scottish) Division* (London: Murray, 1919), p. 59, quoted in Griffith, p. 161.
32. See F. Mitchell, Tank Warfare: The Story of the Tanks in the Great War, (London: Nelson, n.d.), pp. 249, 251, quoted in Griffith, p. 161.
33. COH, p. 331, and Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, *Official History of the War, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1917,(BOH)*, Vol. 3 (London, HMSO, 1948), p. 15.
34. Brigadier-General J. Charteris, *Field-Marshal Earl Haig* (1929), p. 270, quoted in Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 101.
35. Haig's 'Cambrai Despatch' dated December 25, 1917 and re-produced in J.H. Boraston, ed., *Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915—April 1919)*, (1919), p. 130.
36. Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 101.
37. III Army at this time consisted of III, IV, VI, VII, and XVII Corps.
38. COH, p. 333.
39. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 6.
40. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
41. Ibid., pp. 7-9.
42. Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 104.
43. COH, p. 333.
44. "The Third Army Plan, 13th Nov. 1917," re-produced as Appendix 1 to BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 306.
45. Ibid., p. 306.
46. Ibid., p. 307.
47. Ibid., p. 308.
48. "Third Army Instructions to Cavalry Corps, 13th Nov. 1917," re-produced as Appendix 2 to BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 309.
49. Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 108.
50. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 309.
51. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 310. The Cavalry Corps had also formed from 4th Cavalry Division the Cavalry Track Battalion composed of 500 dismounted Indian NCOs and sowars and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Bell, its job was to, in concert with the twelve wire-pulling tanks, follow closely behind the advancing infantry, tear away the wire, bridge or level trenches and shell holes, and thus carve a track through the German lines to the point where the cavalry could operate freely. The Cavalry Track Battalion trained daily for three weeks prior to Z Day. See Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 113.
52. "Third Army Order for Operation G.Y.," No. G.S. 56/154 dated 17th November, 1917, NAC, RG9, III, C2, Vol. 3984, Folder 5, File 1.
53. Travers, *How the War was Won*, p. 20.
54. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, pp. 37-9.
55. Ibid., p. 39.
56. Ibid., p. 44.
57. Ibid., p. 46. See also Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 111.
58. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, pp. 50-63. See also Major-General T.T. Pitman, "The Part Played by the British Cavalry in the Surprise Attack on Cambrai, 1917," *The Cavalry Journal*, Vol. XIII, July 1923, pp. 240-3.
59. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 67.
60. Ibid., pp. 69-70, and Pitman, pp. 244-5.
61. The XV Brigade R.H.A. which was in direct support to 88th Brigade had found its passage down the road from la Vacquerie blocked by broken down and ditched tanks. The lead batteries did not reach their forward positions until late on the afternoon of the 20th, and even then communications could not be established with 88th Brigade. See BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 72, Note 2.

62. Ibid., p. 89.
63. J.E.B. Seely, *Adventure* (London: William Heinemann, 1930), p. 275.
64. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, pp. 70-1, and Pitman, p. 245. Greenly had previously arranged with Major-General H.J.M. MacAndrew (GOC 5th Cavalry Division) that if the necessity arose, he would take the Canadian Cavalry Brigade under his command. Both cavalry divisions were using both routes of advance: Masnières and Marcoing. See also letter Paterson to Seely, November 22nd, 1917, NAC, RG 9, Vol. 3999, File 4.
65. COH, p. 336. See also Strachan's own account of the action in Major H. Strachan, "A Squadron On Its Own," *The Cavalry Journal*, Vol. XVII, 1927, pp. 240-51, and "Narrative of Operations—Canadian Cavalry Brigade, November 20th—22nd," NAC, RG 9, D1, Vol. 4681, Folder 23, File 17.
66. Strachan, p. 245.
67. Verbal account of B Squadron's actions delivered by Colonel Strachan to the regular regiment in Calgary in 1967. Reproduced in G.T. Service and J.K. Marteinson, eds., *The Gate: A History of The Fort Garry Horse* (Calgary: Commercial Printers, 1971), p. 219.
68. Brigadier-General Paterson, *The Cavalry Journal*, Vol. XIII, (1923), p. 465.
69. Ibid., p. 89.
70. Pitman, p. 247. See also "Narrative of Operations—Canadian Cavalry Brigade, November 20th—22nd."
71. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, pp. 47-9.
72. Ibid., pp. 98-100.
73. Ibid., p. 99.
74. Ibid., p. 91.
75. Ibid., pp. 101-18, and Pitman, p. 248.
76. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, pp. 118-9.
77. See, for example, Tim Travers, *How the War was Won*, pp. 26-7.
78. COH, p. 337.
79. Fuller, *Decisive Battles*, p. 368.
80. BOH, 1917, Vol. 3, p. 278.
81. Fuller, *Decisive Battles*, p. 368.
82. Ibid., p. 279.
83. Along the routes used by the follow-up divisions, the tanks, and the cavalry, signallers on the morning of the 20th had hastily laid line to keep in communications with the lead formations in the assault. Where the lines crossed the routes, the signallers had elevated the cables with poles, which evidently were not high enough to clear supply tanks or tanks loaded with fascines. Consequently, the tanks severed the lines at these junctions. Moreover, poor coordination on the part of the Signal Service with the cavalry and the tanks led to the mounted arms not using the appointed crossing points and severing the lines in many locations during the afternoon of November 20th and the evening of November 20th/21st. See Priestley, pp. 233-8.
84. Ibid., p. 283.
85. See, for example, Johnson, p. 204, and Winter, pp. 116-7. See also Badsey, p. 159.
86. COH, p. 386.
87. "Memorandum by General Foch read at the Conference held by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, 24th, July, 1918," re-produced as Appendix XX to BOH, 1918, Vol. 3.
88. COH, p. 386.
89. Brown, p. 197.
90. COH, p. 386, and BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, pp. 2-4.
91. BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, p. 3.
92. "G.H.Q. Operation Order of the 29th July, 1918, OAD 900/3," reproduced as Appendix II to BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, pp. 524-5.
93. Ibid., p. 524.
94. Ibid., p. 524.
95. "Fourth Army Operation Order of 31st July 1918," re-produced as Appendix III to BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, p. 525.
96. Prior and Wilson, p. 303-6. See also C.E.W. Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18*, (AOH) (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1942), pp. 490-3, and Fuller, *Decisive Battles*, p. 375..
97. "Record of a conference held at 10 a.m. August 5th, 1918 at Fourth Army Headquarters," NAC, RG 9, III, D-2, Vol. 4798, File 106.
98. Ibid. This direction was also repeated the next day on August 6th with the promulgation of a supplementary IV Army Operation Order that is re-produced as Appendix IX to BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, pp. 574-5.
99. Prior and Wilson, p. 307.
100. Anglesey, Vol. 8, pp. 228-9, and Lieutenant-Colonel T. Preston, "The Cavalry in France, August-November, 1918, Part I," *The Cavalry Journal*, Vol. XXIV (January to October 1934), pp. 171-3.
101. COH, pp. 389-91.
102. COH, p. 395.
103. COH, pp. 396-8, and Lieutenant-General Sir A.W. Currie, *Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918* (Ottawa: Department of Militia and Defence, 1919), pp. 34-7. See also "L.C. Instructions," NAC, RG 9, III, D2, Vol. 4789, File 7. L.C. stood for Llandovery Castle after a Canadian Hospital Ship that had recently been sunk by a German U-Boat.

104. Schreiber, p. 36.
105. BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, p. 61.
106. Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 223.
107. Quoted in Brereton Greenhouse, *Dragoon: The Centennial History of The Royal Canadian Dragoons 1883-1983*, (Ottawa: Campbell Corporation, 1983), p. 232.
108. Captain S.H. Williams, *Stand To Your Horses; Through the First Great War with the Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.)* (Altona, Manitoba: D.W. Friesen and Sons, 1961), p. 239.
109. Ibid., p. 227, and Preston, pp. 172-3.
110. Interestingly enough this is the same General Hutier ("the apostle of the surprise attack") whose army, during the Ludendorff offensive in March 1918, advanced without check and succeeded in crushing the British V Army taking 50,000 prisoners and driving a wedge between the British and French forces. See English, p. 22 and Dr. Laszlo M. Alfoldi, "The Hutier Legend," *Parameters*, 5 (1976).
111. COH, pp. 394-5.
112. BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, p. 37.
113. Ibid., p. 37.
114. AOH, Vol. VI, pp. 529-30.
115. Fuller, *Decisive Battles*, p. 377.
116. Ibid., p. 154.
117. BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, pp. 61-71.
118. Lieutenant-Colonel T. Preston, "The Cavalry in France, August-November, 1918, Part II," *The Cavalry Journal*, Vol. XXIV (January to October 1934), pp. 345-6, and "Narrative of Operations, Cavalry Corps, August 8th—12th, 1918," NAC, RG 9, III, C2, Vol. 3999, Cavalry Corps File.
119. Ibid., p. 602.
120. Ibid., p. 603. See also Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 244.
121. AOH, Vol. VI, p. 604.
122. COH, pp. 398-404.
123. "Narrative of Operations, Canadian Cavalry Brigade—August 8th to August 11th, 1918," NAC, RG 9, III, C2, Vol. 3984.
124. Preston, Part I, p. 176.
125. Will R. Bird, *Ghosts Have Warm Hands* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1968), p. 147.
126. Ibid., p. 176, Anglesey, Vol. 8, pp. 231-2, and "Narrative of Operations, Canadian Cavalry Brigade."
127. James McWilliams and R. James Steel, *Amiens* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), p. 163.
128. Gregory Blaxland, Amiens 1918,(London: Frederick Muller, 1968), pp. 178-9.
129. "Narrative of Operations, Cavalry Corps"
130. Anglesey, Vol. 8, p. 234. See also Greenhous, p. 233.
131. COH, p. 405.
132. COH, p. 406.
133. AOH, Vol. VI, p. 618.
134. 3rd Cavalry Division was relieved by the infantry of 4th Canadian Division at 5:30 PM at which time Kavanagh ordered Harman to withdraw his division and prepare for operations the next day. See "Narrative of Operations, Cavalry Corps."
135. This intention was confirmed at the IV Army Commander's conference on August 5th. See Schreiber, p. 51.
136. Schreiber, pp. 51-3.
137. AOH, Vol. VI, pp. 620-1.
138. Fuller, *Decisive Battles*, pp. 381-3. See also Blaxland, p. 189.
139. COH, p. 407.
140. General Erich Ludendorff, *My War Memories 1914-18*, Vol. II (London: Hutchinson, 1920), p. 679, quoted in COH, pp. 407-8.
141. BOH, 1918, Vol. 4, pp. 88-92.
142. Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery, *The Story of the Fourth Army in the Battles of the Hundred Days, August 8th to November 11th 1918* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), p. 51

NOTE TO FILE—A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS CONCEPT

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, Ph.D.

Attempts to characterize and define the current and emerging operating environment have led to a deluge of new concepts, doctrines and practices. For example, we now witness regular reference to descriptors such as "three block war (3BW)," "fourth generation warfare (4GW)," "Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)," "stability and reconstruction operations (SRO)" and "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Operations" just to name a few. One of the most recent concepts to join this list is a United States Marine Corps (USMC) initiative known as Distributed Operations (DO).[1]



Distributed Operations is described as "an operating approach that will create an advantage over an adversary through the deliberate use of separated and coordinated, interdependent, tactical actions enabled by increased access to functional support, as well as by enhanced combat capabilities at the small unit level. The essence of this concept lies in the capacity for coordinated action by dispersed units, throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace, ordered and connected within an operational design focused on a common aim."[2]

According to the USMC document, Distributed Operations constitutes a form of manoeuvre warfare, where small, highly capable units spread across a large area of operations employing close combat support will be able to effectively shape the battlespace. Further, the DO concept supports the continuing trend toward the decentralization of authority to lower level tactical decision makers, empowering them to act with increasing speed and personal initiative while still successfully executing the commander's overall mission intent.

As a "new" concept, Distributed Operations draws heavily on historical precedents. The USMC publication acknowledges three 20th century examples of DO-the Russo-Finn War (1939-1940), Chindit Operations in Burma (1942-1945) and the U.S. Combined Action Program in Vietnam (1965-1971). Though each of these may be described as an example of DO, the concept itself is easily identified in many other other historical examples.

One may find some of the basic tenets of the Distributed Operations concept in the thinking and writings of Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Berhard von Moltke (1800-1891), who wrote a number of works that suggested that military strategy had to be understood as a system of options since only the beginning of any military operation was predictable and therefore could be planned for. He felt that the role of commanders was to prepare for all possible outcomes since "war is a matter of expedience" and "no battle plan survives contact with the enemy." He advocated in

Sir Henry Evelyn Wood VC, GCB, GCMG (1838-1919)

various ways the decentralization of tactical command and control, and practiced this method of command and control during the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). Historians have suggested that Moltke's willingness to change his plans to conform to events and his willingness to allow his subordinates considerable leeway in the execution of his orders were the essential ingredients of his success during those campaigns.

Other examples may be found in the way British, Belgian, and German forces garrisoned their colonies in Africa during the late nineteenth century. The British Army in particular was engaged in a seemingly endless series of small and medium wars, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. They often gained the advantage over their adversary through the deliberate use of separated and coordinated, interdependent, tactical actions enabled by functional support (e.g. the river boat, voyageur and wagon train), and enhanced combat capabilities (e.g. the Gardner, Nordenfeldt, and Gatling Guns) at the small unit level. The capacity for coordinated action by dispersed units across the depth of the battlespace was achieved through the employment of the heliograph, the rider and the telegraph that allowed a commander to issue orders and keep his units connected and focused on a common aim. For an example of how British Victorian era commanders thought about and employed DO-like concepts one might examine the careers of two senior officers in particular. The first is Field Marshal Sir Henry Evelyn Wood VC, GCB, GCMG (1838-1919), a dynamic tactician and commander who served in the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, the Ashanti War, the Anglo-Zulu War, the First Anglo-Boer War, Egypt and the Nile. The second is Colonel Charles E. Callwell, who produced the well-known book, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, in the 1890s.

With a plethora of historical evidence identifying prior examples of the DO concept, one is left still to consider what exactly is new about Distributed Operations. Is it simply the latest mutated fruit to fall off of the 4GW tree or is it some new articulation in broad terms of the application of military art and science within a newly defined set of parameters? At first assessment, this is perhaps a new concept for the USMC, but it would not seem new to those forces (including, perhaps, the Canadian Army), which for reasons of economy or circumstance had little choice but to adopt this method of tactical employment.

The Distributed Operations concept also arrives at a time when other recently emerging American strategic theories and concepts are coming under increasing scrutiny. Notable among the targets is 4GW, which some scholars have criticized as "an empty theory" that "has several fundamental flaws that need to be exposed before they can cause harm to U.S. operational and strategic thinking".[3] Will the DO concept suffer the same deconstruction once it is more thoroughly analyzed? It will be interesting to observe its evolution and application within U.S. doctrine and operations over the coming months.

— BOOK REVIEWS —

NO ONE CAN STOP THE RAIN: A CHRONICLE OF TWO FOREIGN AID WORKERS DURING THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

Karin Moorhouse and Wei Cheng. Toronto: Insomniac Press, 2005.
ISBN 1-894663-90-X. 288 pages.

A CRUEL PARADISE: JOURNALS OF AN INTERNATIONAL RELIEF WORKER

Leanne Olson. Toronto: Insomniac Press, 1999. ISBN 1-895837-82-0. 252 pages.

Reviewed by Mr. Roy Thomas, MSC, CD

Doctors without Borders (MSF) have become a symbol for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) providing humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the MSF received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1999 for its tremendous efforts around the world.

As the Canadian military moves towards incorporation of the Three Block War into training scenarios, the MSF has begun to appear as part of this process. The MSF was part of Exercise VIRTUAL RAM in Edmonton in January 2005 and is again featured in the newest version of the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College's Exercise FINAL DRIVE, unveiled in June 2005.

While raising awareness, these exercises bring no real contact with MSF people who often put their medical practice or career on hold to dedicate months to service in some of the most conflict ridden and heavily mined areas of the world. Fortunately, a Canadian small press has published two books over the last few years that go a long way towards bringing what MSF does into a better light.

No one Can Stop the Rain is the latest of the Toronto based Insomniac Press's offerings. A doctor, Wie Cheng, and a Nestle marketing executive, Karin Moorhouse, share with the reader their thoughts as they worked in Kuito, Angola during 2000-2001. Written originally as e-mails for friends and relatives, the collection of anecdotes brings together two perspectives of life on the front-line of a large humanitarian relief organization.

As sort of an after action report, the epilogue and "whatever happened to…" permits the readers to judge for themselves whether this duo made a difference. Black and white photos complement the text. This book continues an Insomniac tradition that started with *Cruel Paradise* in 1999.

Leanne Olson, the author of *A Cruel Paradise*, is a former Winnipeg nurse who published an expansion of her personal journal about her experiences during the 1990s in Liberia, the Congo, Burundi, Albania, Bosnia and Angola. Her account is much more intense. As she states in her introduction, "Nobody ever comes away from a war unchanged." Her story illustrates the truth of that statement.

Olson faced death during her journeys several times. Moreover, the opportunity to be traumatised was ever present. In one of the most gripping passages in her book she

describes being one of the first foreigners on the scene of a massacre at Mokoto.

Both books are very readable although the content is often "not before dinner" reading. For the military reader who wishes insight into the people who populate the MSF label of preparatory exercises, these two books offer an introduction to individuals that they might meet at the "coal face" where humanitarian aid is being delivered alongside security.

QUEBEC 1759: THE BATTLE THAT WON CANADA

Reid, Stuart. Osprey Campaign No 121. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003. 96 pages. $30.95 CAN

QUEBEC 1775: THE AMERICAN INVASION OF CANADA

Morrissey, Brendan. Osprey Campaign No 128. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003. 96 pages. $30.95 CAN

Reviewed by Mr. Robert L. Boyer, MA





Osprey's *Campaign* series is one of the most attractive publications offered by the UK publisher. At a relatively low page count (96 pages per book) the series aims to offer the essentials of "strategies, tactics and battle experience of opposing armies" in the context of a specific campaign. The breadth of the offerings is impressive, starting in the ancient world with *Qadesh, 1300 BC* to the more contemporary *The Yom Kippur War, 1973* (volumes 1 and 2), and every historical period in between, for a total of 160 titles. Each *Campaign* title is lavishly illustrated with maps, photos, prints and drawings. For example, *Quebec 1775: The American Invasion of Canada* contains 72 black and white, and 29 colour illustrations. The end result is a pleasing visual experience.

Both authors of the titles under review come from non-academic backgrounds and are not professional historians. According to the synopsis sheets included with the books,

Mr. Reid has long been interested in military history and works as a military consultant for film productions, while Mr. Morrissey is a lawyer by trade and works as a PR consultant for and writer about the defence industry. Between them, they have authored 22 Osprey titles, mostly on 18th century warfare. Illustrations found in both publications are the work of artists Gerry Embleton (*Quebec 1759*) and Adam Hook (*Quebec 1775*). Mr. Embleton has also co-authored an Osprey title in the Men-at-Arms series.

The two books being reviewed here are structured along similar lines. A short introduction to the campaign background and a chronology is followed by a presentation of the opposing commanders, armies and plans. The bulk of the page count is devoted to detailed descriptions of the actual campaign and battles. In both books, the reader finds a plethora of period illustrations of the various commanders, regimental flags, uniforms and accoutrements, as well as bird's-eye view maps of the various battles. Each book is concluded by a short chapter titled "Aftermath" and comments on the state of the battlefields today. Lastly, a short bibliography for further readings is provided.

One must stress that Osprey publications are essentially primers. This is clearly demonstrated by the "Introduction" in both books. For example, the author of *Quebec 1759* fails to put the campaign in the overall context of the Seven Years' War. In fact, the larger European conflict is not mentioned anywhere in the text. The narrative is exclusively concerned with the North American theatre. Similarily, in *Quebec 1775*, the causes of the American War of Independence are given scant coverage in a short section which confines itself to describing the opposition to taxation and the *mécontentement* of American colonies to British rule. Perhaps, the aim of the *Campaign* series is not to dwell overly on political causes of the conflicts in order to emphasize the operations and tactics of the military events being discussed, but some additional background placing the campaign within a greater framework would have been welcomed, especially in a primer.

In both books the sections dealing with the opposing commanders also suffer from scant treatment. Each author lists the principal commanders, with accompanying drawing or painting when available, and briefly offers in a short discussion a description of the individual. Invariably, these discussions pertain to the personality traits of the individual (for example, Wolfe is "ambitious and difficult to deal with", while Montcalm is "arrogant, dashing, and impatient"), his political and military appointments and units served with, while neglecting to provide any details regarding actual military experience. For example, in *Quebec 1759*, no details are given about the previous military careers of the French commanders Lévis and de Bougainville. Unfortunately, this type of omission is common to both titles. This reviewer would have welcomed more information related to real battle and campaign experience, and on levels of training and competence possessed by each commander.

Following and closing the "setting the scene" segment, we find the opposing armies and plans. Each author offers a detailed description of the forces available to each commander with diagrams, pictures and period drawings to facilitate visualization. Specific numbers are provided for each type of troops, for example, how many regiments of regulars, militia and others, as well as the general purpose and duties of

the troops. However, no overall table showing the total order of battle is given. Some comments on the quality of the troops are provided but sparingly and not in every case. In *Quebec 1775*, although Morrissey indicates that Benedict Arnold's American Continentals were meant to be the equivalent of British regular soldiers, he offers very few details on the actual quality of the former. One is left to conclude that with their limited enlistment period, ad hoc force structures and composition (the majority were volunteers and militia with a few veterans of the French-Indian War), the Continentals of 1775 were probably not equivalent to British regulars. Although both authors have followed the same structure until this point, the opposing plans are addressed in different ways. Reid provides an excellent description of the unique strategic problems facing Wolfe and Montcalm, thus providing the reader with a good starting point to understand how the campaign unfolded. In contrast, Morrissey blends the problems facing Arnold and Carleton within his examination of the actual campaign, which lets the reader discover the strategic problems and decision-making as the narrative unfolds.

As stated previously, the actual examination of the military events of each campaign comprises the bulk of both publications (*Quebec 1759*—58 pages, *Quebec 1775*—56 pages). Readers who enjoy operational history, supplemented by many colourful maps and battle diagrams will find much value in these books. Each major engagement is given a full colour two-page spread side view of the terrain, troop deployments and movements depicting the various phases of the battles. At the strategic level, colour maps show the movements of forces across the campaign theatres. As mentioned earlier, this makes for a very pleasing visual experience. But, what about the actual campaign narratives? Do they convey the "strategies, tactics and battle experience of opposing armies"? In *Quebec 1759*, Morrissey presents the reader with a lopsided narrative, heavily weighted in favour of the British perspective. There is a distinct lack of balance in the overall "telling of the story". The campaign leading to, and the battle on the Plains of Abraham are discussed almost exclusively from the British point of view. In fact, discussion of Wolfe's thoughts and actions dominate the narrative to the point where the French view, particularly Montcalm's, is strangely absent from the narrative. The reader gets no sense of what Montcalm felt or thought facing Wolfe's forces, beyond what is given in the description of his strategic problem. Thus, the campaign narrative feels incomplete and would have greatly benefited from a more in-depth treatment of Montcalm. Albeit a one-sided affair, the author does make good use of primary source documents, especially in using excerpts of the actual orders given by Wolfe, and using Wolfe's private journal to illustrate his relationship with his subordinate commanders, Monckton, Murray and Townshend.

In *Quebec 1775*, Morrissey offers a more balanced narrative. The story alternates between the various American commanders (mostly Arnold) and the British commanders (mostly Carleton), thus providing the reader with a good sense of the action as the narrative unfolds. His descriptions are at times very vivid, showing the hardships and hazards of campaigning in North America in the 18th century. The tale of Arnold's march north through Maine is depicted graphically and shows the slow disintegration of his force due to starvation, diesease, weather and terrain. As with *Quebec 1759*, the reader is treated to excellent side-view, two-page spreads of the siege of St Johns (St-Jean, QC) and the attack and siege of Quebec City. After the

American retreat from Quebec City, the campaign is concluded by a naval engagement on Lake Champlain—the battle of Valcour Island—with related maps. This battle is notable since some of the smaller vessels involved were commanded by army officers.

The "Aftermath" sections provide no real surprises, as each author closes with descriptions of the obligatory treaties, what happened to major participants and the general state of affairs after the end of the hostilities. The battlefield visitor/tourist contemplating a visit to Quebec City or the Lake Champlain region will certainly be able to make good use of the section, well supplemented by modern photographs, describing the current-day condition of the battlefields. Lastly, the bibliographies provide a good starting point for further reading. The bibliography found in *Quebec 1775* is organised thematically, thus directing the reader to specific areas of interest.

Overall, *Quebec 1775* is more satisfying as a campaign study, due mostly to a more balanced narrative. *Quebec 1759* offers an interesting, but overwhelmingly British, view of that campaign and should therefore be approached somewhat more critically. Both publications shine by the extensive use of excellent visual material, and would be worthy additions to any reference bookshelves.

THE WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Bernard Ireland. South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 2004. ISBN 1-84415-047-X. Cloth, 224 pages.

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Williams, MSM, CD

Given the topicality of expeditionary operations, Bernard Ireland provides an excellent backgrounder on historical combined operations or 'joint operations,' in today's vernacular, with all of the associated long distance logistic and command and control problems/challenges. Besides the potential comparisons to today's overseas missions, the book provides a comprehensive summary of the much-overlooked period up to 1943 in the Mediterranean theatre. The author's citing of the importance of this theatre, in particular, after the invasion of Abyssinia in May 1936 and the Spanish Civil War provides an interesting and lesser-known view of just how important it was. The author returns to this theme often, his mantra being how the strategic value of the Mediterranean was often misunderstood.

This entire volume offers a chronological description of the 1940 to 1943 period, with chapters covering decisive periods. Ireland is critical but objective when he cites how wholly unprepared for full-scale hostilities the UK actually was, lacking any particular focus, a danger for any country then and now. The book is replete with examples of political interference from Churchill, often citing lesser-known examples from this era and theatre. Compounding the problem of achieving military success in the Mediterranean was the rivalry and competition for resources amongst commanders, particularly during the darker days of the Battle of Britain and its immediate aftermath.

Chapter 5 on "Peripheral Activities" details many of the daring exploits seldom covered, including the sinking of the HMS *York* in Suda Bay (Crete) on 26 March 1941 by Italian explosive motorboats. Many of these lesser-known vignettes provide fascinating reading and offer direction for further reading or research. The Battle of

Matapan, which resulted in the destruction of three Italian cruisers and two destroyers, is but one of many detailed.

Insight into the mind of the enemy is provided by Rommel's observation that a British Army cannot be trapped in large numbers as long as it has access to the sea; this after the evacuation at Dunkerque in 1940 and Operation DEMON, the evacuation of the Greek mainland in April 1941.

Sea engagements are very well covered and in a fashion that explains their impact on the Mediterranean theatre without bogging the reader down with superfluous details and requiring a watch-ticket to understand. The sinking of the HMS *Ark Royal* is one of the more notable losses covered. The author succeeds very well at detailing the ebb and flow of both Allied and Axis fortunes during both the land and sea campaigns, without losing the reader in a excessive detail.

The arrival of Montgomery is dealt with in a fashion that deals more with the problems he encounters and at times causes than with his personality. While the Battles of Alamein are covered, the difficulties encountered with amphibious landings are highlighted with fresh insight. The lack of amphibious lift, and perhaps more importantly experience with amphibious operations is detailed, with credit for the successful landings at Safi, Oran and Algiers accorded to the minimal French resistance encountered and good luck.

Chapter 10 provides an excellent summary of French military activity, explaining the politically sensitive issue of the day of the French cease-fire versus surrender and the scuttling of the French fleet at Toulon.

A poignant reminder of the consequences of unrestricted warfare is brought home by the description of the Italian ship *Scilla* being sunk with 800 British prisoners of war (POWs) on board, of which a mere two-dozen survived. Ireland uses this as a reminder to the reader of the gravity of full-scale warfare.

By way of conclusion, the author highlights the perhaps longer-term effect of the removal of the AFRIKAKORPS from the German order of battle. Ireland also seeks to emphasize and re-emphasize the myriad realistic problems inherent in expeditionary operations caused by overextended lines of communications, unclear objectives, lack of resources and political interference. These are the classic factors, some not quantifiable, that while perhaps ensuring the success of a staff college estimate and/or campaign plan, can doom a real life campaign plan to failure. This compact book is recommended to those engaged in campaign planning for expeditionary operations.

AND THEN THEY STARTED SHOOTING: GROWING UP IN WARTIME BOSNIA

Lynne Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
ISBN 0-674-01561-4. Hardcover, 336 pages.

Reviewed by Captain J.K. Vintar, CD, MA

Increased attention and focus on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in recent years has led many to believe that the results of traumatic events will manifest themselves, to a greater or lesser extent, throughout one's life.



And Then They Started Shooting explores these concerns. The work is the result of interviews and research conducted by child psychologist Lynne Jones among Bosniac and Bosnian Serb youth during and after the Bosnian war. Not wanting to limit herself to researching one side of the conflict, Jones chose two primary venues for her research: Gorazde, now in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Foca, now in the Republika Srpska. Information was collected through questionnaires and interviews.

The growth of print and tele-journalism has provided visions of children in war-ravaged countries, which evoke strong and lasting emotions. Suffering, displacement, loss, and separation from families are even more poignant when we see the innocent affected by war. One would reasonably expect similar results from studies of adults to hold true for children suffering from the effects of war—flashbacks, nightmares, and feelings of horror, insecurity, and fear would persist long after the conflict.

This book focuses on the traumatic psychological effects of war on children two years after the conflict in the Balkans. The findings are noteworthy. The author discovered that, in fact, children's ability to cope is greater than expected, and that the majority of these children emerged from the war free from ill effects.

The first section of the book is devoted to the telling of the war from the childrens' perspective. The children describe the war and its affect on them and their families in their own (translated) words. A representative sample of eight children and their families was selected from over forty interviewed. These are stories of losing friends and family, of being displaced, and of understanding that something overpowering was happening but not knowing what, how, or why. Told in a child's words, these descriptions are stark and moving. So many of the children's accounts and emotions are similar that names, places, and ethnicity eventually lose consequence, and blur into a single representative child.

The second chapter considers the children's understanding of the war, and it is here that one expects that the children would try to make sense of what happened to their homes, friends, families, and, in fact, their whole society, either through their parents' or relatives' explanations or through the media. Instead we read that there is indifference in the children's words; the children appear disconnected from the process of understanding the events that surrounded them. In Balkan society, where significant emphasis is put on family, there is surprisingly little dialogue between parents and children on this issue. Silence, or an aversion to upsetting either the parents or the

children by reminiscing about these events, seems to be the norm. The children's main sources of information were from either eavesdropping on family conversations or listening to the media.

Yet the polarization of institutions such as the media and education after the war resulted in the children's ignorance about the realities of their own country. As an example, many of the children believed they lived in two distinct countries, Republika Srpska or the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than one country with two distinct entities. This schism was also seen in the confusion that existed among the children about the different sides in the war, where one might hate the "Turks" or the "Chetniks" as a group, but still miss their former friends of the "other" ethnicity. That being said, the social and political complexities in modern Bosnia and Herzegovina are generally complex and baffling to many adults.

Finally, Jones explores the children's well being. She begins the third part of the book with a study of PTSD, and is critical of the PTSD check-box mentality where "if you have symptoms A, B, and C you have PTSD." Jones notes that although the children's responses to tragic events manifested itself in nightmares, feelings of fear and helplessness, or an inability to concentrate, these are understandable reactions. The responses and feelings are not atypical.

Finding meaning in and comprehending what happened after years of war would appear a natural means towards closure. Instead, Jones found that children who did not seek answers and who remained remote were more likely to feel "well" psychologically. This led me to wonder what a study of the participants, ten years from now, would reveal.

The work is interesting and informative overall, but at one point Jones strays from the focus on children and makes what to my mind is a controversial statement regarding the social-historical history of Bosnia. She emphasizes that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a mixed community where people from different ethnic and religious background coexisted happily and where a majority of children did not know their ethnic origin, nor could they identify the differences between Serbs, Muslims and Croats. There is an almost unanimous sentiment amongst the Serb and Muslim families interviewed that everything was fine before the war, and they recall the past with some nostalgia. Jones states:

> *In any careful reading of history, Bosnia is notable for the half-millennium in which four different faiths (Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, and Jew) lived together remarkably free from violence. The conflicts that had occurred prior to the most recent war were no more frequent than those between other European nations, and were largely instigated by outsiders...This war, far from arising out of ancient animosities, actually created them. (Pg. 80)*

This statement ignores the historical realities of the region. Whether under Tito, the Karageorgevic dynasty, Austro-Hungarian rule, or the Ottomans, a strong, centralized government (with tight controls over freedom of speech, assembly, etc), and an efficient internal security organization, ensured that the conditions for a violent rise in

ethno-religious tensions did not exist. Ancient animosities existed, but were not allowed to fall into chaos until this control wavered after the death of Tito.

For those in the CF who have served in the Balkans, a work of this nature is groundbreaking, informative, and pivotal in our understanding of the effects of war on children. It broadens our traditional focus in the Balkans of mitigating the physical hardships through donations of clothes or money, or through building and repairing schools. It is an interesting read.

CENTURY OF SERVICE: THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH ALBERTA LIGHT HORSE

Donald E. Graves, (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2005), 488 pages, hardcover, $69.95, ISBN 1-896941-43-5.

Reviewed by Ms. Brandey Barton

Alberta raised numerous regiments for military service in its relatively short existence, but to date there has yet to be a comprehensive or detailed record of its most senior unit. In his book, *Century of Service: The History of the South Alberta Light Horse*, Donald Graves provides a detailed chronological history of the province's senior militia regiment, which was raised for service on 3 July 1905, just as Alberta joined the Confederation.

This book begins by discussing the South Alberta Light Horse Regiment (SALH) as it is today and provides details about a training exercise in August 2004. Graves then takes the reader back in time by discussing events in Alberta such as the Northwest Rebellion, which lead to the creation of the 15th Light Horse in 1905, and how members of the Northwest Mounted Police (NWMP) would later become part of the Regiment. Other predecessor units of the SALH discussed in the book include the 31st Canadian Infantry Battalion, the 19th Alberta Dragoons Service Squadron, the Canadian Corps Cavalry Regiment, and the Canadian Light Horse during the Great War, and the 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment [SAR]) and 13th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, during the Second World War. All of this is accompanied by an extensive collection of photographs, maps and diagrams, bringing the development of the regiment to life in the eyes of the reader. The numerous photographs, including many present day ones, are certainly among the highlights of *Century of Service*.

Upon picking up a copy of *Century of Service*, readers who know of Graves' previous projects may immediately find it familiar for a number of reasons. This history has a similar format to Graves' *South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War*, which was published in 1998. The layout is quite similar, from the chapter arrangement to the inclusion of an interesting colour photograph album. In his introduction to *Century of Service*, Graves acknowledges that he was at first hesitant to undertake this project when approached by the regiment in late 2003. Although the regiment wanted their history documented in time for its centennial, Graves' hesitation to accept the commission stemmed from a concern that he had already detailed much of their history in *South Albertas*.

The chapters on the First World War discuss the experiences of the Alberta units throughout the war, including the recruitment process in Alberta, training and equipment issues, the battles in which the units participated, the use of cavalry, and the treatment of casualties on the Western Front. *Century of Service* then tells the story of the Alberta units in the context of the rest of the war, and while necessary for a complete understanding, readers might feel as though they are reading another survey history of the Great War. One of the more interesting elements of the Great War chapters, however, is the numerous personal stories of different soldiers. Among those whom the reader meets are Lance-Corporal Donald Fraser and Trooper George Hambley, the latter of which disapproved of the behaviour of his Canadian Light Horse comrades, especially their fraternization with European women. The inclusion of excerpts from the personal diaries of these men and others provides a useful insight into what war was like for the men of the Alberta units.

Before discussing the Second World War, *Century of Service*, looks at the activities of the regiment during the interwar period. Of particular interest is a series of excerpts of letters written between Corporal Robert Clipperton and his wife, Corporal Myrtle Clipperton, while he was serving with the SAR and she was with the Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC). This allows the reader to once again view the war through the eyes of individuals involved, making it much more personal. The section about the Second World War follows a similar pattern to the First World War chapters in the discussion of recruitment, training, life at the front, and specific operations in which the SAR and 13th Field Regiment were involved.

There are three additional chapters and an epilogue that discuss the activities of the regiment between 1946 and 2005. These chapters highlight the restructuring of the regiment and adoption of the name "South Alberta Light Horse" in 1954 by an order signed by the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton. Graves discusses how the adoption of the SALH name was controversial in Alberta and that proponents in Medicine Hat of the retention of the name South Alberta Regiment were particularly disappointed at its loss. Consistent with the rest of the work, these chapters contain the accounts of individual members of the regiment, giving the story a more personal feel. Century of Service ends as it begins, with a description of an August 2004 Light Horse training exercise at Wainwright, Alberta, thus bringing the story full circle.

What the title of this work does not suggest, however, is that *Century of Service* is also intended to commemorate the centennial of the province of Alberta, which came into existence on 5 July 1905. Although it is stated on one of the first pages of the book that the work is intended to commemorate both centennials, this detail is hidden from the title. That this work also commemorates the centennial of Alberta is important to keep in mind while reading *Century of Service*, as there are a number of chapters that deal strictly with life in Alberta during both the war years and the interwar years. These additional chapters come as a bit of a surprise, as one is not necessarily expecting to read about unemployment in Alberta in the 1930s in a regimental history. The sections commemorating the centennial of Alberta might have been better served in a separate book with *Century of Service* strictly focused on the history of the SALH. *Century of Service* attempts to cover a broad slice of history. The result is that many sections leave the reader feeling less than satisfied with the depth of the narrative, despite the fact that *Century of Service* is over 400 pages long.

Overall, *Century of Service: The History of the South Alberta Light Horse* is a regimental history of which members can be proud. The Honour Roll listed in the appendix is a fitting tribute to the men who served as part of the unit, and a useful place to start for family members who want to learn more about the South Alberta Light Horse.

WAR IN THE WILD EAST: THE GERMAN ARMY AND SOVIET PARTISIANS

By Dr Ben Shepherd Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004 300 pages, $29.95 USD

Reviewed by Sergeant Gary I.H. Kett



Ben Shepherd has joined a small but increasing number of historians, such as Omer Bartov and Matthew Cooper, who have examined the disturbing conduct of the German Army on the Eastern Front during the Second World War.[1] He has looked beyond the traditional compartmentalization of German wartime atrocities, in which blame is usually placed solely upon the Schutzstaffel (SS), and argues that the German Army was not only complaisant, but actively encouraged the murders, wanton destruction, and brutality associated with the anti-partisan campaign in Russia. Shepard argues that ordinary German soldiers, due to a combination of conditioning and situational factors, carried out such horrendous behaviour.

As an integral part of his argument, Shepherd focuses on the conduct of German rear line Security Divisions, which operated behind the three German Army Groups. This is perhaps an unfair comparison to the Wehrmacht since Security Divisions were composed of soldiers who were unfit for frontline duty due to age, physical disability, and even lack of competence. These units were also very poorly trained, and lacked the resources to accomplish their anti-partisan tasks. As such, it could be argued that they are as unlikely to be representative of the Wehrmacht, as the other extreme often examined, the SS. Perhaps a better case could have been built around examining front line Wehrmacht units, such as the 15th Motorized Regiment, that committed atrocities during the Polish Campaign, and then examine their subsequent behaviour in Russia.[2]

Out of the five Security Divisions behind Army Group Centre, he singles out the 221st. He does not clearly elucidate as to why he chose this particular Division over the others, some of which apparently acted even more harshly against the Russian population. However, it could be simply that information pertaining to the actions of

this Division is more abundant. He does mention that records pertaining to any of the Security Divisions after 1943 are almost impossible to locate.

Shepherd does a fairly good job of pointing out the many factors that contributed to motivating these rear line soldiers to act so ruthlessly against the partisans, their supporters, and also the innocent bystanders who were caught between the two opponents. These include such factors as Nazi ideology, an anti-Slavic tradition, limited resources, environmental conditions, vast operational areas, and the brutality conducted by the partisans themselves. He also looks at how decrees such as Hitler's infamous "Commissar Order" and similar directions from higher German army headquarters basically gave German troops a sense of legality in carrying out brutal actions.[3] In this way, the release of moral restraint was initiated at the highest levels, which once it permeated downwards to the troops, set the stage for numerous atrocities. This is demonstrated in Shepherd's examination of how the personalities of both operational and tactical level officers influenced the degree of brutality that their units inflicted.[4]

As with almost any book, there is always something that could have been done to make it a crisper product. Although perhaps a personal pet peeve, I have always felt that photographs in a book should directly relate to the subject as much as possible. In this case, of the sixteen photographs found in the centre of the book, only two relate directly to the 221st Division, both being pictures of two of the Divisional Commanders.

Considering the evidence demonstrating the vast number of cameras carried by German troops at the time, it is hard to believe that more photos related to the 221st are unavailable. The remainder of the pictures appear to be generic anti-partisan photos, which fail to really provide a sense of the brutality, or provide any additional visual information to aid the reader.[5]

Another area that could have been of greater use to the reader was the endnotes. Shepherd does an exceptional task in listing his sources, of which the overall majority are primary. However, there were several statements in the book that should have been blessed with some additional supportive information that could have been made available in the endnotes. As one example, Shepherd states that " the level of killing would certainly fit Luftwaffe field Divisions usual reputation in anti-partisan warfare", yet his note to this statement does little to assist the reader as to where such a reputation was derived.[6]

On another note, Shepherd makes use of two appendices that deal with the operations conducted by the 221st and the numbers of slain partisans. This helps the reader comprehend the magnitude of the actions carried out by the 221st Division. For those militarily inclined readers, an additional appendix outlining the composition of either the 221st or even a generic Security Division may have been beneficial.[7] Such an outline could have also shown the reader that the Division was not only composed of Germans, but had at least a battalion of Russian/Ukrainian troops along with an entire regiment of French soldiers.[8]

As seen in other books dealing with atrocities on the Eastern Front, Shepherd uses the ratio of the number of German losses verses the number of Russians killed as an indication of the measure and depth of the atrocities apparently carried out by German troops. However, one should be careful when using such an equation, as a case could be made concerning the insurgency in Iraq, in which substantial numbers of Iraqi insurgents have perished compared with the relatively small number of the Coalition Forces. In Iraq, it is clear that organization, technology, and superior training were the main factors, rather than any likelihood of atrocities being carried out by Coalition Soldiers. On the other hand, when the Germans killed hundreds of people and only accounted for several weapons, there is little doubt that many innocents were slain.

Overall, Ben Shepherd's book is a useful addition to the reading list of any student of the history of the Second World War. German rear line security units are often overshadowed by the more attractive panzer and motorized Divisions that continue to fascinate readers of the Eastern Front conflict. However, what is even more important is that books like Shepherd's show what can happen when leaders allow their soldiers to act without moral restraint. In the case of Germany, the state itself supported unrestrained violence against those to whom it felt it was racially superior. Later in the war, we see Russian troops given a green light to rape and murder their way through Germany. In more modern times, the Mai Lai massacre in Vietnam has demonstrated that this lack of restraint could occur at any level by any nation, and even the murder of Shidane Arone in Somalia shows that a failure to restrain soldiers by their leaders can occur in the Canadian Forces.

Endnotes

1. Omer Bartov. *The Eastern Front 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare* (Macmillan / St. Martin's, 1985/86); 2nd ed. (Palgrave / St. Martin's, 2001). And, Matthew Cooper. The phantom war: The German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944 (Macdonald and Janes, 1979).
2. The most obvious example is the infamous actions of the 15th Motorized Regiment (29th Motorized Division) and its murder of 300 Polish POW's near Ciepielow in September 1939. Alexander B. Rossino. Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology and Atrocity. (University Press of Kansas, Kansas: 2003), p. 182-185.
3. The Commissar Order directed that all captured Soviet Commissars were to be excluded from combatant status, which would offer them protection as a POW under the Hague Regulations of 1907. Instead they were to be immediately executed upon capture.
4. Of two commanders of the 221st Division, one was pro Nazi with a strong anti-Slavic inclination that led to greater harshness towards the population, while the other lacked both traits and reduced the level of brutality by the Division. However, both officers still allowed their soldiers to carry out harsh actions, which would have been considered criminal by the Hague Regulations of 1907. For an excellent account of German rear line security read Theo Schulte. The German Army and Nazi Polices in Occupied Russia. (St Martins Press, New York: 1989).
5. For a very disturbing, yet enlightening photographic collection concerning German Army brutality, examine the Hamburg Institute. The German Army and Genocide: Crimes Against War Prisoners, Jews, and Other Civilians, 1939-1944. Published by the New Press, (New York: 1999).
6. Ben Shepherd. War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Parisians. (Harvard University Press, London: 2004), p. 221.
7. An orbat of a German Security Division can be found at http://orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/011_germany/41_organ_army/41_div_sicher.html
8. According to Shepherd's book, both Eastern Battalion 604 and the 638th French Volunteer Regiment were under the direction of the 221st. It is not clear if these units were an integral part of the 221st Division. However, the division appears to have had operational and tactical control over them. Shepard, p. 200-201. Furthermore, Grenkevich mentions a Ukrainian company as part of the Division's 230th Battalion. Shepherd, p. 88.

HALF-HEARTED ENEMIES: NOVA SCOTIA, NEW ENGLAND AND THE WAR OF 1812

John Boileau, (Halifax: Formac Publishing Company, 2005), 176 pages, softcover, illustrated, bibliography, index, $19.95, ISBN 0-88780-657-0.

Reviewed by Major John R. Grodzinski, CD

The War of 1812 is a fascinating conflict. Fought between June 1812 and the spring of 1815, it was the last war between the United States and Great Britain. The 1814 Treaty of Ghent resolved none of its causes, leading many to believe that the "Second American War" (the first being the American War of Independence) would be followed by a third, and a massive fortifications project was undertaken in Canada in anticipation of that event. The War of 1812 was not limited to a series of skirmishes along the frontier of the interior, but included operations from the area of modern Sault Ste Marie to the eastern seaboard of the United States from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico. Naval engagements occurred on the Great Lakes, the Upper St Lawrence River, Lake Champlain, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Caribbean Sea. It was a significant and complex war that is often lost in the shadow of the struggle against Napoleon, but it is witnessing increased popular and academic interest.

Half-Hearted Enemies focuses on an important, albeit secondary theatre of war, promising to examine Nova Scotia and its "ambiguous wartime" relationship with the New England states. It promises, at least according to the jacket notes, a "new perspective on a key period." Unfortunately, it never really gets there and treads into waters that have limited relation to the overall topic. The book is, in effect, a series of essays rather than an overview of a region during wartime.

John Boileau retired as a colonel, having served throughout Canada, the United States, West Germany (as it was then called), Cyprus, and Great Britain. He commanded Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) in the late 1980s (and this reviewer's first commanding officer) and later served with the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London). An avid history buff, Boileau has, since retirement, taken to writing, producing a history of Canadian hydrofoils and several articles, and served as consulting editor for *A Century of Service: Canada's Armed Forces from the Boer War to East Timor*, by Jim Lotz. This is his first book on the War of 1812.

In 1812, Nova Scotia was a separate colony within British North America that with Cape Breton, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, formed Atlantic Command, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir John Coape Sherbrooke. Halifax was home of the North American Squadron of the Royal Navy. Considered largely a backwater before the war, the North American squadron rapidly grew in strength and prominence and established the blockade of the American coast in 1812. The British Castine Expedition, which culminated in the occupation of a portion of Maine, was launched from Halifax, while the remains of Major-General Robert Ross, who led British troops into Washington and who was killed in September 1814, rest there. Nova Scotia was also base for a large privateer fleet that, on the one hand, seriously damaged the American economy, while continuing trade and smuggling with the United States. Indeed, despite the state of war, the frontier, like that on the Upper St. Lawrence, remained open to social and economic "intercourse" (using the terminology

of the time) that was only interrupted when a local commander actively sought to end it. Lieutenant John Coteur, later of the 104th Foot, observed this first hand noting, "how uncomfortably like civil war it seemed."[1] One might indeed think the local populations did not fully support the war, hence the title.

The chapters examine five single-ship engagements fought in the Atlantic, the privateer war, American prisoners held on Prison Island near Halifax, the burning of Washington, and the fate of Black refugees. These military, economic and social themes could have supported the thesis, but lose focus in their presentation. For example, an entire chapter is devoted to British operations in the Chesapeake, the occupation and burning of Washington, and the battle of Baltimore. Why cover this in such detail? Simply to highlight that the remains of the British land force commander, General Ross, rest in Halifax? He and his brigade came from Europe, while the naval vessels were from the Inshore Squadron, based in Bermuda. Its' commander, Rear Admiral George Cockburn, suggested Ross make a dash for Washington and then enthusiastically pushed for the city to be torched, but what is the relevance of this to the relations between Nova Scotia and New England? Certainly, Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane, commanding at Halifax, had his hand in the devastating raids conducted along the American coast, but this becomes lost by focusing on movements and tactics? Why not discuss the raids Cochrane ordered on New England that were supported by the provinces' governor, Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke? Nothing is said of Cochrane's cancellation of the licences that had made possible a lucrative coastal trade between New England, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

This problem continues with the discussion of the high seas war. Following an overview of naval events from 1793 to 1812, the focus remains on the action, noting American naval strength lay in "the three 44 gun super-frigates … as strong as British ships of the line and faster than any British 38 gun vessel," that seriously challenged the Royal Navy (p. 30). American frigates proved more heavily gunned than their nominal rating would suggest, but the lesson of the naval war on the high seas, and the effect on the region in particular, is missed. The Americans achieved several spectacular single-ship victories, but the British later gave as good as they got. Although the Royal Navy and the United States Navy had some 26 encounters on the high seas, they proved a draw. The spectacular events surrounding these duels are overshadowed the fact that the frigate war had little strategic importance. The real American success, at least according to Mahan, lay in the Americans forcing the Halifax squadron to concentrate, thus delaying the implementation of the blockade of the American coast in the early months of the war. The weakness of the blockade continued through 1812 and into 1813, with, one might assume, implications on Nova Scotia—New England relations. But this is not discussed.

While these criticisms may not be appropriate for what is purportedly a popular history, they demonstrate the difficulties and dangers of this genre. Historians are often criticized for dry, academic prose and for repeating one another. While certain historians have a knack for turning a phrase that is so good that it must be quoted, over time their work can become less reliable or even dated. This is not their fault, just the reality that historical knowledge advances and that more sources are studied or re-examined in an effort to confirm earlier conclusions. Secondary sources are therefore a reflection of the state of the literature at a particular time, and relying upon them

without a solid understanding of the literature, can be dangerous. Furthermore, while popular authors may be able to craft a readable, even exciting tale, they often achieve this by ensuring the facts do not get in the way of a good story. Having said that, there are popular authors who are capable of writing superb pieces of work.

While it is evident that Boileau made a careful read of his sources, *Half-Hearted Enemies* does not present the story of Nova Scotia and New England during the War of 1812. Rather, it presents a series of vignettes dealing with various aspects of the war. Their merit to the book lays with the examination of the prison on Melville Island and the fate of Black refugees that arrived in Nova Scotia. There is little said about New England or the manifestation of opposition to the war, while the Hartford Convention, which threatened secession of the New England states, is not even mentioned. The result is six chapters that give glimpses of the War of 1812 from the perspective of Nova Scotia and does not, as the publisher states on the jacket notes, offer "a new perspective on a key period in Canadian British and U.S. history."

Endnote

1. Donald E. Graves, ed. *Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Memoir of Lieutenant John le Coteur, 104th Foot* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993) p. 136.

NOT A GOOD DAY TO DIE—THE UNTOLD STORY OF OPERATION ANACONDA

Naylor Sean, (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), 445 pages.

Reviewed by Major Les Mader, CD



Having read a description that stated, "Sean Naylor tells the story the Pentagon does not want you to know," I feared that an effort so described would be a trashy, scandal-seeking tome. Instead, I found this book to be an interesting and informative story about a flawed operational planning process and near-disasters on the ground.

Sean Naylor is a journalist for the US Army's *Army Times* and has covered six wars/conflicts, including both the Soviet and American efforts in Afghanistan. He reinforces his eyewitness insights with interviews with 192 named individuals, including a former Secretary of the US Army and four-star generals.

The book is written in four parts supported by eight short sections. The first part, *IPB*, (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) overviews how the "Rumfeldian way of war"

worked so brilliantly in the initial defeat of the Taliban-Al Qaida (TAQ) in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. The failed offensive against hard-core Al Qaida fighters at Tora Bora in late 2001 is then used to bring out the limitations of this approach. Interwoven with this story is that of the slow, painful introduction of a US Army conventional force, built around a mixture of units and headquarters from two divisions, into what had been (from a US viewpoint) essentially an unconventional war.

The third narrative thread found in this part of the book describes how US unconventional forces determined that a TAQ force survived in the Shahikot Valley and sought a way to destroy it. Finding this enemy was not an easy task; convincing the US leadership that it was there was no easier. The final thread is the series of errors made during the planning process for the resultant *Operation Anaconda* that would likely have earned a failing grade at staff college.

Part two of the book, *Reaction to Contact*, describes how these errors led to the coalition forces attacking a larger TAQ force than was foreseen—deployed where it was not expected—and having to change their plans. A level of coalition air support that was far less than intended made addressing the problems encountered more onerous. Luckily, for the assaulting battalions a few US Army attack helicopters were available as direct fire support, TAQ shooting does not seem to have been very good, and US body armour reduced fatal casualties. *Reaction to Contact* is written using eyewitness accounts that are good storytelling, but which can leave the reader without the overall context for the situation on the ground.

Part three, *Takur Ghar*, highlights many of the weaknesses of the "Rumsfeldian way of war." It describes, at times in minute detail, a minor action in which US special operations forces landed unescorted Chinook medium transport helicopters three times on the same TAQ defensive position—the last in daylight!

The final and shortest part of the book, *Winding Down*, describes the final moves in the battle. It highlights the failure of *Operation Anaconda* to destroy the TAQ force in the Shahikot Valley.

While pleased with the book, I found the extensive use of personal and task force names to be a shortcoming. Although the book's dramatis personae helped keep straight the references to individuals, such as "Slab," "Speedy" and another 30 key players, no such handy reference is provided for the 11 task forces mentioned. This barrage of names makes the book harder to read, yet gives the reader some sense for how the participants might become confused during the planning and execution of the operation.

A second weakness is the illustrations used. A number of photographs are provided, some of which help the reader understand the story. The few maps included are very useful to this understanding, but are unattractive, black and white renditions that require close attention in order to draw out their information.

A third weakness is the nagging sense that the use of the eyewitness storytelling approach may have led the author to become biased in how he portrayed some participants. The book has an air of being written in terms of heroes and villains. Thus, while some people's failings (e.g., an unwounded lieutenant throwing away his weapon

and running for a MEDEVAC helicopter, panicked Afghan forces, and a micromanaging USAF general spreading confusion) are highlighted, I was not sure that all parts of the US forces were subjected to the same ruthless exposure of the truth.

Finally, as a member of the Canadian Forces, I was disappointed by the way that the participating allied forces are unfortunately marginalized. The contribution of the multinational Task Force K-Bar is covered by comments that it "… was a joke … a bigger pain in the butt to work with (than the Australians), and they were nowhere near as effective …" (p. 158). More poignantly, 3 PPCLI's contribution to the operation and the larger campaign is covered even less, being mentioned only in passing and not even appearing in the index.

While not perfect, I found the book to be a very useful reference to the largest conventional battle fought by the US in Afghanistan. It provides valuable insights into some of the types of operations that will be present in fourth generation warfare. It also contains very clear tactical lessons for those designing and equipping forces for future operations, while bringing out the strengths and weaknesses of the "Rumsfeldian way of war." I would particularly recommend it to persons who are interested in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, members of 3 PPCLI's mission there in 2002, and to those charged with developing our army's future capabilities.

COMMANDER OF ALL LINCOLN'S ARMIES: A LIFE OF GENERAL HENRY W. HALLECK

John F. Marszalek. Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2004. Hardcover, 324 pages.

Reviewed By Major A.B. Godefroy CD, Ph.D.



Given the considerable scholarly attention already attributed to the study of the United States Civil War (1861-1865), it came as quite a surprise to learn that a complete biography of the Union's top soldier for most of that war had yet to be written. In his recent publication, *Commander of All Lincoln's Armies: A Life of Henry W. Halleck*, Professor John F. Marszalek, the W.L. Giles Distinguished Professor Emeritus of History at Mississippi State University, has delivered the full story of Major General Halleck's life, from his humble agricultural beginnings through to his last breath as a soldier. What the reader is presented with is a richly detailed and engrossing story of one of America's most notable and influential soldiers of the nineteenth century.

Henry Wager Halleck was born into a farming family in New York in January 1814. Caring little for agriculture and even less for a stubborn yet

hardworking father, he escaped the drudgery of tilling and plowing thanks to an understanding relative who encouraged young Henry's inclination for learning. After passing through a few colleges he later entered West Point in 1835. There, Halleck displayed a considerable aptitude for soldiering and passed out of the military academy near the top of his class with a commission in the United States (U.S.) Army Corps of Engineers.

Halleck left West Point in 1840 to spend the next six years as a military engineer working on a variety of fortifications in New York Harbour, as well as for the National Engineer Board in Washington, DC. He reported to Congress regularly on the status of the nation's national defence and traveled to France to investigate state-of-the-art fortifications there. During his voyage to France, he became friends with a fellow passenger, General Henri Gratien Bertrand, himself a famous military engineer who had served under Napoleon. Bertrand took a great liking to the young Halleck, and introduced him to other senior French military generals including Marshall Soult, then War Secretary for King Louis Philippe. This introduction proved very beneficial to Halleck, as Marshall Soult gave him full authority to travel freely throughout all military fortifications and schools in France. The knowledge he gained prompted him to examine the military art more thoroughly at home, and the consequences of this shaped much of his future military career.

In 1845 Halleck wrote and published an article on the predominance of engineers in Napoleon's army. He had written on military matters previously, but this piece was very well received and prompted an invitation to present a series of lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston. Known for its presentations by leading American scholars of the day, the Lowell Institute's invitation was serious recognition of Halleck's increasing reputation for military scholarship. Over the next several weeks he gave twelve lectures on military theory, strategy, and tactics, which were later published as a single volume. The book, *Elements of Military Art and Science*, examined strategy and tactics in considerable depth. His ideas, well considered though not entirely original, fell somewhere between those of two of his contemporaries, Antoine Henri Jomini and Dennis Hart Mahan. Nevertheless, the book was tremendously successful in the United States, becoming required reading for many U.S. Army officers and earning Halleck a considerable amount of notoriety and fame. For many years, Halleck's publication was considered the book on military theory and strategy in America's fledgling military, and its tenets survived both him and the army in which it was conceived.

The following year Halleck was sent to California where he served briefly in the war with Mexico. Though he longed for combat (and an opportunity to put his theories into practice), his experience during the war left him dissatisfied, and the monotonous garrison duty which followed afterwards prompted him to leave military service all together. He became a lawyer in San Francisco, where he was able to employ his language skills and knowledge of land claims to great profit. His knowledge later brought him further responsibility, and Halleck became one of the leading architects in the creation of the state of California. During this period he also continued to write and publish, as well as retain a passing interest in military affairs. His prior experience made him an obvious choice to lead militia and reserves, and Halleck found himself slowly returning to military service at the end of the 1850s.

With the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States, Henry Halleck returned to active military duty. His concern for the state of California and its preparedness for war prompted him to rejoin the army, where his reputation and previous involvement in the state's evolution earned him the appointment of major general and command of California militia's second division. Having left the army as a major, this was quite the promotion, but 'qualified' officers, especially those educated at West Point, were a scarcity in the West. Yet Halleck's tour in California was short. Within months his reputation earned him an invitation to Washington, where upon the recommendation of General Winfield Scott he was made a major general in the regular army and became Chief of Staff (COS).

Halleck's tenure first as COS and then subsequently as Commander of the Union Army is well covered in other Civil War literature, but Marszalek's examination of his earlier life puts it perhaps, for the first time, into a much more coherent and comprehensive context. Students of the Civil War know well that Halleck is often portrayed as one who was indecisive and ineffective, unable to command and, as some have argued, unwilling to accept the responsibilities that came with his post. Though Marszalek's study does not detract from this general description, he explores the psychology of Halleck's behaviour much more deeply and with greater empathy than other historians. A man of great yet often restrictive precision, Halleck would be today described as an officer who suffered from decision paralysis. He had a poor ability to grasp the fluid realities of warfare in an age of limited communications, and his demand for specific details and actions by the army obstructed him from executing proper mission command. Worse, despite his considerable knowledge and aptitude for the theories of warfare, he appeared incapable of applying strategy, issuing orders to his commanders, or removing them from command when they disobeyed his instructions. As a soldier, Halleck enjoyed considerable promise and success, but as a commander, Marszalek confirms that Halleck was a failure.

Overall, the book has considerable merit. Aside from being a solid biography of a soldier, it explores the complicated issue of command during the mid nineteenth century and provides a useful insight into American military leadership through the eyes of one of its most influential soldiers. It also highlights the overall state of the American Army during the period both before and after the Civil War, and this in itself is important. From a Canadian perspective, historians tend to criticize the state of Canada's Army during the latter half of the nineteenth century, despite the fact that it was still in its infancy. It is nothing if not refreshing to observe that the United States Army, nearing its hundredth birthday in the 1870s, was in a state very similar to that of the Canadian Army both prior to and after the Civil War.

John Marszalek is to be commended for his efforts on completing this biography, and he has made a valuable contribution to the study of soldiers and the profession of arms. This book is recommended to those interested both in the US Civil War and army leadership studies.

THE STAND-UP TABLE

Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal

Defeat and the Afghan War: Social Capital and the Fragility of Operational Effectiveness

Major R.J. Walker, CD, Ph.D., Army Ethics Officer, writes …

Litany of Defeat

The Canadian Army has embarked on a sea change era of growth, operational focus, Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) purchases, and a committed application to combat unseen since Korea. Under the aegis of a complex matrix of international understandings, Canada has adopted a *jus ad bellum* status as a belligerent in Afghanistan. Based on this just-war assumption, Canadian soldiers are being asked to conduct jus in bello operations that will result inherently in death and injury. (See Editorial note)

The Army Strategy, *Advancing with Purpose* presents the image of corporate homogeneity in its cry of "One Army, One Team, One Voice." Similarly, the recent spate of "Soldier First" posters and supporting rhetoric could lead one to assume that the Army's culture is robust enough to withstand the unforeseen threats to unit cohesion imposed by the ethical and tactical uncertainties of a "no duff" shooting war.

In the scramble to prepare for that reality, the priority of effort for professional officers is to address shortfalls in combat power in the belief that combat power is the critical determinant in the calculus of victory over defeat. Recent history indicates otherwise. The common linkage between the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the ignominious Canadian and U.S. retreat from Somalia was that in spite of overwhelming combat power, defeat was a direct result of a collapse of *Social Capital*. Or, as in the specific case of the American cultural meltdown in Vietnam, as noted in *Crisis in Command*: The disintegration of the Army, together with the dissolution of its primary-group cohesion, is directly related to the loss of officer professionalism expressed in the increasingly pervasive phenomenon of "managerial careerism".[1]

Similarly, the inherent fragility of combat effectiveness, potentially leading to operational or tactical paralysis, may manifest should internal conditions within Army culture falter, or should the political or social support of the "home front" collapse. For example, little Western attention was paid to the protests generated by the Committee of Soviet Mothers in support of their abused conscript sons within the vaunted the Red Army. Fueled by the spirit of *Glasnost* and the mounting death toll, it was the political impact of the Soviet Mothers movement that eventually shattered the culture of the Soviet Army both at home and on operations, and effectively harried the Soviet government into a strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Therefore, neither the U.S. nor Soviet strategic defeats had any causal link to the shortage of combat power or hardware.

On the peacekeeping front, we may be guilty of glossing over the failings in our existent culture and of the ethically challenged officer corps, which, from 1979 to 1993, crafted

the motorcycle-gang alienation, ethos perversion, and moral collapse of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). Politicians may have killed the CAR, but the Army built it. The Somalia tragedy was no isolated aberration; it was the symptomatic result of an isolated sub-culture in crisis. More recently, the challenges to PPCLI leadership, as revealed by the *Sharpe Inquiry* on matters dealing with the alleged poisoning of Warrant Officer Matt Stopford, serve as an equally sobering testament to the stressors that an operational theatre can impose on group cohesion. Again, combat power was neither the mission critical imperative nor the endgame determinant.

The lesson to be learned is that our force commitment to Afghanistan comprises a vastly greater vulnerability than a lack of *Structural Capital* consisting of: weapon systems, logistic support, infrastructure, or a force generation model. As identified by Jan and Schmidtchen, the combat effectiveness of *Structural Capital* is underpinned by *Intellectual Capital*, consisting of: force employment concept, doctrine, core competencies, skills and experience, and career structures and employment systems. Both of which, then being fully dependent on *Social Capital*, or the human element, anchored by: reputation, identity, relationships, organizational climate and leadership, the "psychological" contract between the soldier and the state, and ultimately the state of Army culture itself.[2] As the litany of defeat lays bare, we ignore our *Intellectual* and *Social Capital* at our peril—for the resulting Vietcong, muhajadin and Somali warlord victories have simply confirmed to the Jihadist or insurgent that *Social Capital* is the Achilles' heal of military superpowers and their middle power allies.

A Primer on the "Capability Iceberg"



Figure 1

As can be readily appreciated at Figure-1, Canadian UOR focus remains fixed on the *Structural Capital* issues identified above the Iceberg waterline and ignores, assumes, or takes for granted the cultural health of the Iceberg's ballast hidden from view. Since all three component capabilities are mission critical, the reader need only rotate the

image in Figure-1 a quarter-turn clockwise to expose the true nature of the multi-component profile being committed to the Afghan theatre of operations.[3]

Though Canadianized, these capability components are as equally vulnerable in Afghanistan as U.S. and U.K. force packages are in Iraq. Jihadists and insurgents are acutely aware of these component vulnerabilities and will avoid decisive engagement by our *Structural Capital* in favour of eroding our politico-military resolve through evermore-ruthless assaults on our *Social Capital*.

This should be a cause of concern; for every Army survey and related CF surveys reflect a progressive diminution of soldier faith in both senior military and political leadership. Neither agency is perceived as representing the best interests or welfare of the soldier. Or, as corroborated by Brigadier-General (retired) G.E. Sharpe in the *Croatian Inquiry*: "Military personnel in general understand their obligation to their personnel. Indeed, an important leadership principle is that the welfare of your personnel is second only to the success of the mission. However, it is easy to lose sight of that truism in the machinations of National Defence Headquarters and often the potential legal and medical risks assume greater significance to the bureaucracy than the welfare of the troops."[4]

To that, BGen Sharpe may have also included political and social risk factors. For, as the friendly-fire deaths of our PPCLI soldiers and the catharsis of nation grief indicated, Canadian society is clearly risk-averse. It is therefore likely that only a moderate casualty count or body-bag quotient will be required before a challenge to the political



Figure 2

will and public support for combat operations is raised. Rhetorical question: if the nature of JTF2 operations was not classified but was made public knowledge, would the majority of Canadians continue to support our combat operations in Afghanistan?

Of perhaps greater concern is that soldier cynicism may prove the "psychological" contract, between the soldier and the state, chimerical. As the DGLCD publication, *Canada's Soldiers*: indicates, assumptions about levels of trust within Army culture may prove problematic.[5] To offer just two examples; we are going into combat operations with a force wherein almost one third (30%) of all Army members agreed or strongly agreed that "a civilian-style union or some other type of professional organization was a good idea" (see Figure-2). While not a majority across the ranks, it is sobering to appreciate that a significant portion of our soldiers expressed support for the idea of some kind of professional association, as a mechanism for voice outside of the chain of command, to speak on behalf of the soldier.[6]



Figure 3

Of greater import to the question of combat effectiveness, is the soldiers' perception of leadership (Figure-3). "While positive about immediate leadership, soldiers are negative about senior leadership. Predictably, attitudes towards senior Army leadership improve as rank increases to the point that senior officers are positive about more senior leaders, but barely so." Similarly, varying degrees of decidedly negative responses where received by all ranks to questions such as: "Someone has to die before our [senior] leaders notice that something needs to be fixed."[7] Obviously, a negative state of mind not best suited for the immediacy of combat operations.

Correspondingly, the Army and CF survey results appear to be linked to the common theme that shortfalls in senior leadership may be the result of the civilianization of the officer corps, and a Departmental career management system which supplants leadership (unrecognized and unrewarded) with a corporate management ethos. The end product conceivably being a Canadian version of what *Crisis in Command* diagnosed earlier as, …the loss of officer professionalism expressed in the increasing pervasive phenomena of "managerial careerism".

The Fragility of Combat Effectiveness

Any inherent weakness in our *Social Capital* has the potential to degrade our combat effectiveness. Similarly, training systems within our *Intellectual Capital*, which aim "to qualify" candidates and not train for war, will be equally tested by the stressors of combat operations. The incongruence of "limited war" and conventionally trained soldiers adapting on the fly to the asymmetrical and psychological demands of an

insurgency, while pitted against a "total war" Jihadist, buoyed by Allah's promise of virgins and armed with an incalculable ruthlessness, will serve to define our combat effectiveness. While our soldiers will be directed to seek out and destroy, within a sphere of ethical and cultural uncertainty, the insurgent's *Structural Capital*; he, on the other hand, may have already determined that attacking our *Social Capital* provides for a far more lucrative and war-winning strategy.

For examples of how this *Social Capital* phenomena has affected U.S. and U.K. forces in Iraq see: Dexter Filkins, "The Fall of the Warrior King." *New York Times* (October 23, 2005) [http://www.veteransforcommonsense.org/index.cfm?Page=Article&ID=5199] and Michael Smith, "Iraq Battle Stress Worse Than WWII". *The Sunday Times* (November 06, 2005) [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1859664,00.html]

Editorial Note: *Jus ad bellum* (Latin for "Law to War") are criteria that are to be consulted before engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is justifiable. *Jus in bello* (or justice in war) serves as guideline for fighting "morally" once war has begun. *Just-war* theory sets forth a morally justifiable framework for warfare, rejects the notion that "anything goes" during times of war, and allows a Canadian soldier to justify to his mother what he has done on behalf of his fellow citizens. Jihadists ascribe to no such precepts. For access to the Army Ethics Programme (AEP) or the AEP HELPLINE see:

[http://www.armee.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/5_10_10.asp]

Endnotes

1. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978): 31.
2. Nick Jans with David Schmidtchen, *The Real C-Cubed: Culture, Careers and Climate and How They Affect Military Capability* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2002):11
3. Ibid., 11.
4. BGen (retired) G.E. Sharpe, *The Sand Beneath Our Feet: The Changing Mandate in the Croatian Inquiry* (Ottawa: J and L Consultants—Board of Inquiry—Potential Exposure to Canadian Forces Personnel to Contaminated Environment—Croatia 1993-1995, dated August 1999): 14.
5. DGLCD (LPCP), *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century*—The Major Findings of the Army Climate & Culture Survey and The Army Socio-cultural Survey (Ottawa: Army Publishing Office-Kingston, 2005)
6. Ibid., 39-40.
7. Ibid., 39.

TIME AGAIN FOR LOCAL INFANTRY REGIMENTS?

Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Williams, Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Center, writes…

At a time when overseas deployments, recruiting and retention of the Canadian Forces are all being given much coverage in the newspapers and tabloids and air time on at least local TV networks, while concurrently the CF, in particular the Army, is being transformed and made more expeditionary, I would like to re-examine the issue of recruiting for local infantry units.

I propose to use an example the North Nova Scotia Highlanders (NNS Highrs), including an historical precedent. I will examine the pros and cons of such a recruiting strategy, including retention, while highlighting the percentage of today's Infantry from "down east" to underline the possibilities. It is a fairly commonly held view that a large percentage of the infantry is from "Down East". The reality is that 5.03% of all infantry recruited since 01 Feb 02 were recruited in Nova Scotia (NS)[1], with a 2001 census

having NS representing 3.02% of the Canadian population[2]. So maybe there is some truth to this perception?

It is not my aim in this comment to get bogged down in any one-sided debate as to why civilians join the Army or wish to fight and in so doing carry out the role of the infantry, that of "closing with and destroying the enemy". I will leave that to such military academics as retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, author of *On Killing*. Further, I do not claim to have all the facts at hand. My aim is to generate debate on an issue at a time when we need to recruit and retain more soldiers.

In today's CF, a recruit joining the Infantry may not actually meet someone from his prospective future regiment unless by chance during recruit training or until he arrives at what were once called Battle Schools. Through no fault of the CF Recruiting Group (CFRG), all trades and/or regiments are not, nor are they going to be, represented at any particular recruiting centre. Local recruiting would allow the potential recruit to meet members of the unit; perhaps he already knows friends who are serving. Although this also occurs in the current CF recruiting system, it is less likely, for when a recruit leaves Pictou, N.S.; he might not ever run into a fellow Pictonian in his new regiment. The ability to talk face to face with a peer already living the life of an infantryman before actually signing on the dotted line to serve Queen and Country should allow the right decision to be made, thereby potentially aiding in longer-term retention. There is also the fact of recruiters knowing the families and communities, something although difficult to quantify as to recruiting and retention, should not be discounted.

Pride in their unit is something that all soldiers should, with the right leadership, training and esprit, develop over time. Joining the unit that Dad joined or Grandpa fought in during a previous war already implies a certain allegiance and pride that can be quite daunting and emotionally run quite deep prior to enlistment. In growing up, the potential soldier is already being conditioned to realize what "The Regiment" has meant to his family members, whether in stories, family lore or family tragedies. This loyalty could well be the deciding factor between quitting during training or staying the course, so as not to let the regiment down. Assimilation into the army lifestyle and way of doing business should also be made less painful if not easier, based on familiarity,

When a unit deploys on an overseas mission, the local Military Family Resource Centre (MFRC), rear party and a whole host of well-intentioned support personnel provide moral, spiritual, and counselling services, to name but a few, to immediate families while their spouses are deployed. The community rallies for its "adopted" soldiers, but what about the parents and extended families? They are often the orphans. They may only meet the unit support personnel in the worst circumstances imaginable, the loss of their soldier son or daughter. Even then, the well-intentioned bearers of bad news and escorts to the earthly remains, though colleagues and friends of the deceased or wounded, will likely be complete strangers to the family. The local community supporting its regiment and looking after its soldiers' families can only make the deployments easier to deal with and losses easier to bear, if that is ever possible, when the town knows that one of theirs is coming home as when the regiment returns home after its tour is complete.

Soldiers leave the army for a variety of reasons. Some miss their home, some for family pressures, some for the simple reason that is wasn't what they expected. Being nearer to home support and being part of the local community pride could well have a positive effect on retention. The trend of decreasing populations in certain areas where soldiers leave when they join the army but never come back when they retire could actually be reversed or halted. Though not a consideration for the military, this demographic and geographic factor might have appeal for any government wishing to stop the tide of increasing urbanization.

In the high stakes of war, peacemaking and peace enforcement, though Canadians might not want to think about or admit it, some soldiers are going to pay the supreme sacrifice or come home badly maimed or wounded, necessitating reinforcements. A twinning with local militia units such as occurred in the Second World War when the NNS Highrs was composed of companies from the Pictou Highrs, the NNS Highrs, the Cape Breton Highlanders (CBH) and the PEI Highrs, allowed community spirit to be fostered at the Company level and local reinforcements when possible. This followed the World War I tradition of the 85th Battalion (NS Highrs) Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), which formed its Companies and drew its replacements primarily from the 185th Bn (Cape Breton), 193rd Battalion, 219th Battalion and later on the 246th Battalion, all Nova Scotian Units, at a time when casualties were very high. The twinning of militia units with regular force units, similar to the British Territorial Army (TA) second volunteer (V) battalions of regular force line battalions could be used as a model.

So if all this has made sense so far, why aren't we recruiting for local infantry units? For one thing, the infrastructure to support a fully manned unit in garrison and its associated training areas could be seen as prohibitive, in cases where it doesn't currently exist. This should be less of a factor when the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) becomes operational in Wainwright, where training equipment sets could be permanently based.

Is such an idea politically saleable? In times of heavy losses during the First World War it became a policy that brigades were composed of infantry battalions from various parts of Canada. Although it was ostensibly to provide the cross-Dominion Canada look, the reality was that a decimated brigade from any one part of Canada was unacceptable to politicians, who would have to face constituents and explain why all "their" boys were being slaughtered. With a downsized army, the UK is currently moving towards the creation of big regiments, although they still recruit locally and retain historical antecedents and accoutrements.

So what should we in the CF do? The numbers of recruits currently coming in the door and staying in the ranks is not going to make expansion of the regular army by 2008 a task done easily, nor quickly, to say nothing about retention. So perhaps it is time to re-examine the raising and manning of local Infantry regiments? Dare we bring back the NS Highlanders to regular force the Order of Battle *Siol na Fear Fearail* (A Breed of Manly Men)?

This comment is submitted in dedication to the late Capt Guy E. Mercer (North Nova Scotia Highlanders) who served his country faithfully in the Second Word War, and as part of the Army of Occupation in 1946. His granddaughter, LS Sarah Mercer, a member of my unit (CFJIC) will be serving in Afghanistan in early 2006 as part of Canada's contribution to ISAF.

Captain Guy E. Mercer
North Nova Scotia Highlanders

Endnotes

1. Recruiting information provided by Director Human Resources Information Management (DHRIM) in response to author query.
2. Census information taken from Teaching and Learning About Canada Website http://www.canadainfolink.ca/charttwo.htm

COUNTERING THE MINE THREAT IN HELICOPTER OPERATIONS: THE ROTO 14 SOLUTION IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

Captain Andrew James Hewitt of 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron writes …

The first threat that comes to mind when discussing Bosnia-Herzegovina is that of land mines—a hidden menace to anyone working in the region. Canadian troops deployed on Operation PALLADIUM in support of Security Force (SFOR), are very familiar with the land mine danger. The aircrew of the Roto 14 Helicopter Detachment (Hel Det) stationed in Velika Kledusa are no exception. In Canada, helicopters can land almost anywhere and provide direct support to the Army. In Bosnia, however, helicopters must land at cleared and secure Helicopter Landing Sites (HLS) where the mine threat has been removed. This restricts the Hel Det's ability to provide support to the Army if its location requires the helicopter to land outside of an HLS. Thus, operations such as troop insertion/extraction cannot be executed. This paper aims to show that by being fully aware of the mine risk and its implications, Roto 14 leadership was able to

develop a procedure to land outside HLSs and execute it to support SFOR. To accomplish this, the mine risk will be further examined as well as the procedure used to overcome this threat. Present day examples will show how this procedure is used in a dangerous environment and the resulting impact on SFOR operations.

The United Nations (UN) estimates 670 000 mines and unexploded ordnance were dispersed throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) during the heinous 1992-95 Balkans conflict. Today, an approximate 10 000 clearance sites stretched over 2100 km2 remain. Bosnia-Herzegovina has implemented a "2010 Strategy" that calls for clearing 243 km^2 of "priority suspect area."[1] Despite the ambitious nature of this program to attack the mine threat, local inhabitants and SFOR forces will be at risk for the foreseeable future. In 2003 alone, 23 perished and 31 were injured in 54 mine incidents.[2] Figure A is a current mine map of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Highlighted in the northwest corner of the country is the operating base for the Hel Det, Velika Kledusa. The nation is composed of two entities, the Bosnian Federation (West) and the Republic Srpska (East). The division between the two is marked by the dotted line from the northwest to the southeast corner of the country and is referred to as the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. This line is the most heavily mined part of the country.

The mine threat is a factor in almost every action taken by SFOR forces. Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines are both dangerous to the helicopter. Because the helicopter fuselage is composed of lightweight materials, both the aircraft and the aircrew would potentially be disabled by a direct mine strike. The Hel Det has therefore incorporated several practices to reduce exposure to the risk. In addition to using HLS, practices aimed at reducing the mine risk include minimizing hover and low-level flight profiles over mined areas, and requiring that emergencies must be deemed critical before the helicopter is brought to ground. In the past, these restrictions limited the helicopter primarily to conducting day and night reconnaissance, transport, command and liaison, and resupply missions. Tasks such as



Figure A. Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Courtesy of MCpl Golden and the Canadian NSE MAT cell, Velika Kledusa.

troop insertion/extractions, vehicle checkpoints, or simply landing where the supported unit requires a helicopter were not possible.

Canadian tactical helicopters, CH-146 Griffons, have been operating in BiH since Roto 3 in 1998. During this period, the Explosives and Ordnance Detonation (EOD) component of SFOR has been able to compile a database of the known mine fields in BiH. Although the data is considered only 60% accurate, certain areas can be designated with high confidence as being low or high risk. With this information, Hel Det Operations (Ops) has put in place a procedure for assessment of the risk of a potential landing site and allowing aircraft on a mission the flexibility to land outside an HLS[3] "on the fly".

The EOD assessment alone is not enough for the helicopter to land in Bosnia. The aircrew must use their mine awareness training to determine a low risk Landing Zone (LZ). Paved roads and asphalt parking lots, for example, provide good areas for landing because mines cannot easily be emplaced under these surfaces. In addition to looking for a good surface to use, aircrew are trained to look for evidence of recent use. A ploughed field or a schoolyard with children playing on it is a strong indicator that the area is clear of mines. Conversely, overgrown fields, areas surrounded by levelled buildings and destroyed vehicles, and the absence of recent activity are indicators of a poor landing site. By combining the EOD risk assessment with this situational awareness, the aircrew makes the decision to land. Ideally, once the decision to land has been made then nearby troops would be used to secure the perimeter. Regardless of whether troops are available, the helicopter can land at the desired location and assist the Army in their task.

A key to the functionality of this procedure is communication. The request for a landing site assessment must pass through Hel Det Ops, on to Task Force Headquarters (NW) G3 Aviation cell in Banja Luka, then to the EOD section and back through the communication line to the AC while maintaining 100% accuracy. This must be done in a timely fashion; anything longer than 5 to 15 minutes is not practical due to the fuel and flight time restraints placed on aviation.

Roto 14 implemented this procedure on several occasions. A simple example was demonstrated by the Commander's Multinational Task Force (MNTF)(NW) helicopter crew. While flying with some other VIPs the decision was made by the Commander to land at a town site that didn't have an HLS and meet someone face to face. The Aircraft Captain selected a football field in the town and forwarded the location and description to Hel Det Ops. Within five minutes a green light for a Low Risk/High Confidence Area was returned to the helicopter and the aircraft landed. A similar situation took place during a mission near the city of Mrkonjic Grad. The mayor and local leaders were flying aboard a Griffon and wanted to see the damage inflicted to a washed out road in town. Once again, the Aircraft Captain informed Ops of the situation and landed at a hard packed road. The helicopter's flexibility contributed to the Canadian and SFOR image with the local inhabitants.

When included in the planning process, the ability to quickly set up Temporary (Temp) HLS greatly augments the Griffon's capability to support the land force. Two major

Weapon Harvest Operations: Op ARBALEST and Op GUISARME took advantage of the Temp HLS procedure. Hel Det's role in Op ARBALEST was to support British troops, the Prince of Wales Own, stationed in Banja Luka. The two tasks of note for the Hel Det were Eagle aviation based vehicle checkpoints (VCP), and over-watch of existing check points. The Eagle VCP would insert a checkpoint team anywhere in the area of operations on short notice. Whereas a conventional check point can be observed being set up and then bypassed, an Eagle VCP can be set up unexpectedly yielding a much more effective and versatile method of conducting check points. In order to set up this capability, areas where the land force may want to call in an Eagle VCP were identified on the map. Then reconnaissance elements and the aviation Liaison Officer (LO) were able to investigate these spots to determine their usefulness. On average, 2 out of 3 possible landing sites were deemed usable. Armed with these new Temp HLS, the Griffon crews were given the green light to execute the Eagle VCPs. The Eagle VCP was favourably viewed as an effective alternative to the traditional VCP.

The second task, over-watch, demands the Griffon crew fly overhead of a checkpoint or search site to aid the troops on the ground and detect persons fleeing the scene. On one over-watch an EOD team was required to clear a house so ground troops could search it. The Temp HLS procedure allowed the over watch Griffon to fly the team in by air in lieu of ground transport. Thus, the task was greatly expedited.

Operation GUISARME was a similar harvest operation that took the Temp HLS procedure to the next level. Three companies (coys), two British and one Dutch, were tasked to conduct a weapons harvest over a 2 500 km^2 area northwest of Sarajevo. Aviation assets were essential for such a vast area to be covered by 3 companies. Starting with a similar map recce approach, potential landing sites were identified and then over flown well in advance of the operation to ascertain an overall description of the area, obstacles, best approach heading, and confidence for mines. Sappers from 12 RBC Recce Squadron were then able to further examine areas deemed high risk to see if they could be made suitable for landing. 1 in 3 of such "high risk" sites was deemed usable. The aviation detachment commander was then able to give his crews data sheets for the Temp HLS that were on par with those used for permanent HLSs. As GUISARME progressed, a Temp HLS could be generated in this fashion within 24 hrs and inserted seamlessly into the planning cycle. Both British and Dutch coys took full advantage of the Temp HLS made possible by Recce Sqn to have Hel Det fly in their VCPs and troops.

As the concept of risk is discussed, one must eventually consider the possibility of a helicopter striking a mine. Thus far, this has not happened during Canadian tactical helicopter operations. For the purpose of comparison, one may examine a different peril that has threatened and struck helicopters: wire strikes. The wire hazard in Bosnia is sinister because maps may not have up to date wire information and because of the unsystematic nature through which wires hang throughout the landscape. Strict procedures are put in place to mitigate the risk of a wire strike: map wire recces are carried out, altitude limits are put in place, and techniques for over flying wires are implemented. Yet despite these precautions, wire strikes occur.

	Crash	Serious Damage	Minor/No Damage	Near Miss
Fatalities				
Injury				
No Injury			10	4

Table A. Wirestrike occurrences in 1 Wing, 1994—Jul 2004.

Table A highlights wire strike statistics for the past ten years in 1 Wing. None resulted in any serious damage or casualties. These results are fortuitous; striking high-tension wires, having the rotor head caught in a wire, and numerous other scenarios will yield a fatal crash. Nevertheless, for tactical aviation helicopters to be effective they must continue to operate in the low level (50–250 feet above ground) and tactical (15–50 feet above ground) environment. Air Force leadership knows these facts and accepts their risks. Lessons are learned and preventative techniques have been established, yet the wire risk is ever present.

This premise can be related back to the mine threat in BiH. For Griffons to use the Temp HLS procedure they will be forever operating within the confines of the mine threat. A high level of vigilance must be maintained at all times. The Temp HLS procedure makes best use of existing information and includes the airmanship and situational awareness of the aircrew. However, risk can never be 100% eliminated. Whether through an error in existing mine field information, judgement, communication, or just poor luck the possibility exists for a helicopter mine strike. Unlike a wire strike however, a mine event would most certainly be disastrous. The future of the Temp HLS procedure and any resultant investigation from such an event would be speculative. That task would fall to the leadership.

The mine risk in Bosnia is prevalent throughout the spectrum of Canadian Forces (CF) operations for Op PALLADIUM. As stated, BiH is world renowned for its vast and dangerous minefields. With a thorough understanding of this threat based upon years of experience in the region, the leadership of Roto 14 have indeed increased their flexibility to support SFOR land forces in BiH by overcoming the restriction of landing outside permanent HLS. The Temp HLS procedure is based upon a sound EOD database, seamless communication through Ops and Headquarters, and the decision-making skills of the aircraft captain. The procedure allows tasks such as Eagle VCPs, troop insertions, and establishment of LZs outside of an HLS. SFOR land forces have well exploited this newfound advantage in order to accomplish missions. This ability does not come without a cost, as the helicopter crews must operate in the mine threat environment. Though the procedure is well thought-out, sound, and effective, it must be properly adhered to in order to be safe. The aircraft captain has the final say on whether he lands his aircraft, but the leadership is ultimately responsible for the design and implementation of this procedure.

The author wishes to thank Lieutenant Colonel D.J.G. Peace, Captain S. Carius and Captain C. Hill, Captain J.R. Tuckett, Captain J. Wedman, and Capt C Wetyk, all members of Hel Det Roto 14, for their comments and observations on this subject. Further reading on mines in Bosnia and Herzegovina may be found at the Electronic Mine Information Network website (http://www.mineaction.org/countries).

Notes

1. "Bosnia and Herzegovina" *The Electronic Mine Information Network.* Site created and maintained by the United Nations. (2 Jun 2004). <http://www.mineaction.org/countries>
2. "Bosnia and Herzegovina."
3. SO2 G3 Avn. MNTF (NW) SOI 3013 (1 Jun 04) para 19.
4. Hill C. E-mail. (4 Aug 04)

A RESPONSE TO "WHO WILL GUARD THE GUARDIANS"

Mr. Fred Cameron, Army Operational Research Team Kingston, writes …

Major L.R. Mader has raised concerns that staff in Kingston engaged in operational research and experimentation for the Army's force-development process could be influenced by biases absorbed from project sponsors (*Canadian Army Journal*, 8.3, Fall, 2005, pp. 138-140). I share Maj Mader's concern that we must be wary of unhealthy biases that could creep into studies when analysts and their sponsors are in close proximity. However, I believe he is misdirected in the solutions he offers. I contend that in addition to the Alternative A and Alternative B proposed by Maj Mader, there is an Alternative C that trumps A and B.

Start by considering many of the historical rewards of close proximity between analysts and their military counterparts. During the First World War, the Canadian Corps was renowned for its spirit of innovation. One of the most notable examples is the detection, location and engagement of targets for counter-battery fire as described by AGL McNaughton in "Counterbattery Work" (*Canadian Defence Quarterly*, July, 1926). Although the term "operational research" was not coined until 1938, this application of science and engineering to sound ranging and flash spotting in 1914-18 certainly established the spirit of this emerging discipline.

There was an operational research section attached to 21 Army Group in 1944 whose contributions are detailed in the recent book *Montgomery's Scientists*, edited by Terry Copp (Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2000). Indicative of their desire to be in close proximity to the action, one member of this section landed in Normandy on 6 June 1944. Until the end of the war the operational research section worked closely with front-line troops—often arriving to analyze bomb-damaged areas just hours after they had been seized. Operational research teams in the Department of National Defence (DND) inherited this esteemed legacy and, since 1945 have continued to provide appropriate analyses for the Army.

Next, consider how relevance and timeliness can be improved. An excellent example is the one that triggered Maj Mader's submission to the CAJ. In the summer of 2005 five of the military positions in the Research War Game Team in Ottawa were transferred to the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS). Within LFDTS, the positions have been put under the Directorate of Land Synthetic Environments (DLSE) where they comprise five of the seven military positions in the Army Experimentation Centre (AEC). The Commander of LFDTS, as steward of the AEC resources, wants those resources to be applied effectively to issues of army transformation.

In Kingston, the AEC staff work very closely with the staff of the Director General Land Capability Development (DGLCD) since army experiments are largely intended to illuminate the conception and design of the Army of Tomorrow and the Future Army, the essence of force development for the Army. (In general, the terms "force development" and "capability development" are interchangeable.) The AEC, although not part of DGLCD's staff, is collocated with the Directorate of Army Doctrine and the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts—two very significant parts of DGLCD's staff. So the staff under DGLCD will be insistent in getting studies that meet their requirements for relevance and timeliness. With two important directorates sharing the same building with the AEC, close contact should be maintained, providing considerable support to these objectives.

Finally, consider the multiplicity of senior leaders who are now scrutinizing the Army's force-development analysis process. In the past there was one chain of command responsible for maintaining the quality of operational research advice to the Army: through the Director General Operational Research (DGOR), a civilian reporting to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS). If DGOR felt that biases—inadvertent or deliberate—were adversely affecting operational research advice, the alert could be raised on a military chain of command outside of the Army. The DGOR position is practically that of independent auditor responsible for the maintenance of scientific integrity. As well, DGOR could also go to DCDS if there were other impediments to high-quality analytical advice. Examples of factors that might be of concern include: insufficient resources, inadequate training of analysts, and friction between civilians and military personnel. In general, these were never major problems, but, had they arisen, the safety valve was available for DGOR to go to very senior military leaders.

Titles have changed with some recent reorganization. DGOR has become the Director General of the Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (DG CORA), part of Defence Research and Development Canada. With the impending demise of the DCDS position and organization, the link to a senior military officer will probably develop through a firmer relationship between DG CORA and the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. However, for scientific and administrative matters, DG CORA reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Science and Technology, the Department's chief scientist.

Also outside of the Army chain of command there is a new element joining the mix through the Chief of Defence Staff's transformation initiatives. One component of these is a new position: Chief of Force Development (CFD), of which the details are still being resolved. Nevertheless, it is clear that future studies and analyses that emerge from DGLCD's staff will be dissected in considerable detail by the CFD staff. If proposed capabilities are the result of some biases infiltrating into the Army's capability-development process they will be found out, and the Army's process is likely to be discredited as a consequence. The details of relationship between DGLCD and CFD are not yet complete, but the Army's capability-development process will certainly not be permitted to operate in isolation from or in contradiction with its Canadian Forces' counterparts.

So now there are multiple chains of command that govern the small pool of people engaged in Army force-development studies. The two Army general officers concerned can evaluate the contributions of the experimentation community within their context: largely an issue of meeting the Army's need for studies that are practical and significant. Although they are not scientists, the two incumbent officers certainly have appropriate practical knowledge and leadership skills needed to assess the quality of operational research advice the Army receives. If biases influence a result, scrutiny by these officers will provide the earliest opportunity for detection. If scientific ethics have been compromised and neither of these general officers has detected any problems, the opportunity for recourse to DG CORA remains. Ultimately, where Army studies and analyses are clearly contravening initiatives coming from the Chief of Defence Staff, the new position of CFD will arbitrate. These four individuals can each deal from different perspectives with biases that might taint the experimentation process. And, of course, they can tackle the many other insidious factors that may misdirect the experimentation effort.

I propose Alternative C, in which the modelling and simulation capability (formerly provided by the Research War Game Team [RWGT]) stays where it is under Commander, LFDTS and the OR team in Kingston stays where it is under DGLCD. As in Maj Mader's alternatives, OR teams in Ottawa and Kingston should certainly collaborate on studies where it is fitting, and should critique each others' methods as and when appropriate—with DG CORA as the ultimate judge of "appropriateness". On behalf of the Army, the Commander of LFDTS will be accountable in the Army chain of command to see that the DLSE simulation capability (the capability formerly provided by RWGT) is employed in analytical studies so that results are relevant and timely, and unbiased. DGLCD will be accountable, also in the Army chain of command, for the overall studies of the future capabilities of the Army. If the modelling and simulation support to these studies is inadequate in any way, including succumbing to biases generated by his own staff, DGLCD should appeal first to the Commander of LFDTS, and ultimately to the Chief of the Land Staff. As has been the case for nearly a decade, there will be an appeal mechanism to DG CORA (currently by DGLCD) for any deficiencies in the quality of the operational research provided to the Kingston component of the Land Staff. Also, outside the Army chain of command, CFD will determine if proposals from the Army's capability development process are consistent with Canadian Forces' initiatives; if they are deficient for any reason, including biases inside the Land Staff, CFD can appeal to CDS. My Alternative C corresponds to a new status quo, one that has unfolded since Maj Mader submitted his original article. Whether this is by good fortune or from anticipating the same biases that concern Maj Mader, I cannot say.

Maj Mader's warning alone may well increase the sensitivity to biases in future analytical studies in Kingston; for this he should be given due credit. However, I believe that Alternative C will ensure that any significant biases will be detected and confronted in any case. I hope, that as results emerge from the re-organized experimentation resources, Maj Mader will grow more confident that the biases about which he feels so apprehensive are being addressed.

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR (CBRN) THREATS ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

Captain Christopher Lynam, CD, recently serving on Operation ATHENA, writes ….

Know your enemy and yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.
—Sun Tzu

The Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway System in 1995, the Anthrax attacks in the U.S. in 2001, the discovery of Ricin agent and its production facilities in France and the U.K. in 2003/04 and the foiling of a major attack involving chemical agents in Jordon in 2004 have all clearly demonstrated the global threat of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. In short, CBRN terrorism can be defined as the use of weaponized, or non-weaponized chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials by terrorists to cause harm. Since September 11, 2001, the threat of CBRN terrorism been highlighted as a result of several high-profile terrorist attacks that used CBRN weapons and authorities uncovering numerous terrorist plots involving CBRN materials. CBRN terrorism is not only a homeland threat. Military forces also face the threat of CBRN terrorism as they deploy on international operations in support of the war on terrorism in such as regions as Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

Shortly following the deployment of the Canadian military to Afghanistan, non-specific threat information of Opposing Military Forces (OMF) planning to use CBRN agents in Afghanistan was received. There were also several incidents involving the discovery of unknown or suspicious substances. One incident of note involved the discovery of explosives combined with a suspicious substance that was determined to be a tear-gas-type agent. These types of incidents are characteristic of the CBRN terrorist threat faced by military forces on many international operations.

The aim of this note is to examine how to address the threat of CBRN terrorism in a theatre of operations and the lessons that can be learned from these experiences. The paper will first look at the shift in the NBC or CBRN threat paradigm from one involving the traditional military employment of CBRN weapons to one involving their use by terrorists. It will examine how the Canadian military in Afghanistan assessed the methods and impacts of CBRN terrorism and implemented measures to address this asymmetric threat. Finally, it will look at lessons learned and recommendations for future international operations.

A Paradigm Shift to the CBRN Threat

In addition to the threat of nuclear weapons used against North America, the traditional or 'Cold War' CBRN threat involved NATO military forces adopting defensive measures against the wide-scale use of NBC weapons by Warsaw Pact forces, on the European continent. This approach focussed on avoiding hazards, but also on formations being able to continue operations in a contaminated environment. It was characterized by the potential delivery of NBC agents by aircraft, air delivered or rocket/artillery munitions.

Although both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces possessed significant agent quantities, there was restraint on their use for fear of retaliation, and that a tactical level attack with NBC weapons might escalate to the wider use of nuclear weapons by either or

both sides with strategic consequence. This so called "mutually assured destruction" was evident during the first Persian Gulf War (1990-91) where Saddam Hussein's threats to use chemical and/or biological weapons on advancing Allied forces were countered by U.S. and allied statements that they would consider using nuclear weapons if CW/BW agents were used.[1] The doctrine and training of many military forces was focussed on managing this 'Cold War' NBC threat.

The events of September 11th and the Anthrax attacks of Autumn 2001, however, marked a drastic shift in the CBRN threat paradigm. The threat of terrorists using CBRN weapons to do harm became a widespread international fear. Although the threat of a CBRN attack by terrorists had existed prior to 9/11, it was given new attention as a result of the biological attacks in the U.S and the numerous 'white powder' incidents throughout 2001 and 2002. These incidents coupled with evidence that Al Qaeda had spent considerable resources to produce and acquire CBRN weapons further highlighted the threat.[2] In North America, significant effort was directed at addressing the domestic threat of CBRN terrorism, including new funding for civilian authorities and military forces to enhance preparedness and response capabilities. As the Canadian Forces contribute to the war on terrorism and deploy on international operations they also face the threat of CBRN terrorism.

Assessing the means of CBRN Terrorist Attack

The most common CBRN terrorist threat and the most common, or possible, means of employment of CBRN weapons that were encountered in a theatre of operations and that will need to be addressed are:

- the use of Improvised Dispersion Devices (IDD)-a chemical or biological agent combined with an improvised explosive device;
- Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD)-a radiological source combined with an explosive source to become a 'dirty bomb';
- contamination of food and water sources using CBRN materials;
- infiltration through postal systems and through building ventilation systems;
- use of aerosols or improvised dispersion systems (e.g. pesticide delivery equipment) to disperse a chemical or biological agent;
- attack on a vehicle, container or facility containing hazardous materials to cause a harmful release; and
- placing of a radioactive source in a highly trafficked urban area.

Using these most common delivery means as assumptions, a scenario-based approach to capability-based planning proved to be the most effective and quickest means to be prepared against these possible threats. Based on five specific scenarios, a contingency plan was developed that took a unique approach to CBRN Defence.[3] Rather than approaching the threat from a traditional defence concept, the plan incorporated the four main principles of the emergency management spectrum: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

Mitigation is defined as sustained actions to reduce or eliminate the long-term impacts and risks associated with the threat. These actions are usually taken well in advance, to reduce the occurrence, or avert or diminish the impact of an incident. To mitigate the possibility of a CBRN incident, the contingency plan was connected to other theatre plans and operations that focussed on actions such as disrupting or dislocating possible Opposing Military Forces (OMF), or OMF actions against military forces in Afghanistan (e.g. reconnaissance and surveillance of possible attack locations).

Preparedness can be defined as developing effective policies, procedures and plans for how best to manage an emergency. The contingency plan contained a series of preparedness actions and assigned tasks to units in relation to an elevation of the threat level. For example, this included the creation of a dedicated CBRN response unit and directives for individual and collective training with allied units depending on the threat level.

Response can be defined as actions taken immediately before, during or directly after an emergency. In this regard, the plan contained a series of assigned tasks in the event of an actual incident. It was built on the assumption that our military forces would provide an initial response, but would request assistance from dedicated CBRN assets from Allied units. These actions were also incorporated with other Theatre plans and Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) (e.g. actions Duty Officers in the Tactical Operation Centre take in the event of an incident). The response was closely linked to the actions of our Quick Reaction Force, which was prepared to enter into clean, or contaminated sites.

Recovery can be defined as efforts taken to repair and restore capabilities/facilities/operations after an emergency. The plan also contained actions to allow our forces to recover from the incident and continue with operations. These actions would include assistance from Allied Forces, or surge forces from Canada.

Need for CBRN Terrorist-threat based training

Fortunately, the response portion of the Contingency Plan did not need to be implemented. Preparedness actions were implemented across the theatre of operations with units developing their own TTPs and conducting monthly refresher training during rotation. While most CBRN publications do examine aspects of the terrorist threat, individual training resources do not effectively reflect the CBRN terrorist threat. For example, the current Biological/Chemical Survival Rule that uses the acronym AROUSE does not adequately cover the possible indicators of CBRN Terrorism. A modified acronym for a CBRN Terrorist threat environment could be POETS (P: Packages that are suspicious are found, O: Odours, Liquids or solids that are suspicious are detected, E: Effects on your body or others are noticed, T: Toxic industrial chemicals/biologicals/radiologicals/materials are present, or suspected, S: smoke or mist from an unknown source is present in your area).

In addition to individual preparedness training, aspects of the contingency plan were exercised during a Multi-National CBRN exercise held at Camp Julien in May 2005. Participants included Canadian personnel, Kabul Multi-National Brigade representatives and Italian and German CBRN units. The exercise validated the Contingency Plan and identified issues to be addressed to improve interoperability with our Allies. Exercises of this nature should be conducted by every force in theatre.

Lessons Learned

Through the development of the Contingency Plan, it was learned that addressing CBRN terrorism on international operations is much more complex than managing the traditional military NBC threat. Developing adequate force protection measures to manage the threat is challenging and must be weighed with other demands on resources. The deterrent or "mutually assured destruction" concept that existed in the old paradigm no longer applies to terrorists who do not fear retaliation. It was also realized that an actual CBRN attack did not need to be launched to affect operations. It was assessed that in most scenarios, a hoax attack similar to a "white powder" incident could be nearly as effective, placing a burden on resources and effecting operations.

Addressing the CBRN threat also has to be approached within the "Three Block War" concept that the majority of military forces will likely face on most operations in the future. For example, the close location of large numbers of non-combatants in a threat or contaminated area may not have been a central issue for NBC operations in the old paradigm. Within the new concept, CBRN defence planners face the challenge of where to set up decontamination facilities so that the process does not harm non-combatants or that contaminated effluent will not adversely effect the environment. These issues were examined when developing the Task Force's CBRN Contingency Plan. Indeed, decontamination site planning proved challenging when considering the number of nearby inhabitants, and the possible impacts on local civilians and the environment. Another factor/limitation to be overcome was the point that Camp Julien could become contaminated and, how, if at all, camp support services could continue to operate.

Another planning consideration is the need to assist non-combatants that may be the target of the attack, or effected by a terrorist attack. This is especially important given the limited emergency services that exist in most developing countries. As well, consideration must be given to what actions will be taken with contractors on the battlefield in these situations.

There are significant implications as a result of the paradigm shift that once focussed on continuance of operations (but willing to accept casualties) in a contaminated environment to one that now stresses force protection and hazard avoidance. This is particularly true in peace support operations where commanders (and their subordinates) are directed to avoid all CBRN hazards except in extreme situations. This factor must be part of the planning process and clearly has an impact on operations.

Finally, the threat of non-weaponized hazardous materials to military forces is more prevalent, and should not be discounted. These materials can be detrimental to individuals' health and the environment, but can also be used as improvised weapons by terrorists. These threats include toxic industrial materials/chemicals/biologicals and low level radiation and the facilities, vehicles and containers that may contain them. All plans must address these hazards as well.

Conclusion

CBRN doctrine has been revised in recent years by a number of nations to be more inclusive of the asymmetric threats and CBRN weapons or threats posed by terrorists. Since 9/11, there have also been large advances in domestic preparedness around the world. Yet despite these advances, military doctrine and training to address the threat of CBRN terrorism on international operations needs to be further developed by Allies together. Given the number of non-state actors that currently, or could possess CBRN weapons, it can be fairly assumed that this threat will remain for the foreseeable future.

SHOWING SUPPORT FOR THE TROOPS …

Michelle Fowler of the Laurier Center for Military and Strategic Studies writes …

Further to the open letter written by Mrs. Wendy Sullivan-Brown of Toronto in the Fall 2005 issue of the *Canadian Army Journal*, I too would like to voice the absolute frustration our family has felt in trying to support members of the Canadian Forces serving overseas.

We have supported American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003. In our case we use a program called www.anysoldier.com. Soldiers enroll their names with the site saying they are willing to put their names forward to receive packages on behalf of a larger group of soldiers. One anysoldier.com contact may be able to reach anywhere from 4 to 50 people; all together the site has approximately 3800 contacts who are able to distribute letters and care packages to thousands of soldiers in harm's way. The program is not about sending stuff, it is about showing support. There is no expectation that soldiers will respond; their gift to us is their service. Whether or not a soldier chooses to respond in a letter or via a post on the website is up to the soldier, as it is understood that the soldier's time is at a premium. The soldier does, however, list what his unit needs or desires (beef jerky, baby wipes, magazines, CDs/DVDs etc.) but the most requested item is simply letters of support.

In order for our family to support a Canadian soldier we need to send a postcard to "any soldier" and hope that a soldier gets our card and then the onus is on that soldier to write back saying they would like a care package. This creates an awkward situation and also puts an expectation on the soldier to respond.

The other important thing about these types of programs, and the powers that be should take note: it brings attention to the military in a very positive way. As the mother of three young kids who are growing up in a place where it is possible to live your whole life and never see a soldier, it draws attention to the level of service and sacrifice our soldiers make. Our monthly trips to Buffalo to send off a care package have become family tradition. The kids draw pictures and help pick out magazines and movies. The kids are learning about the military in a very tangible way. Knowing that somebody else's mom or dad is far away and in danger brings home to them the sacrifices others make for their safety and security. Freedom is not free and my kids understand that because they are so involved in supporting the American troops. I would hazard a guess that if more Canadian families outside of military communities could be involved in a tangible way in supporting morale, the CF might just have a larger recruitment pool in 15 years.