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THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL
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The Canadian Army Journal, a refereed forum of ideas and issues, is the official quarterly publication of Land Force Command. This periodical is dedicated to the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, as well as ideas, concepts, and opinions by all army personnel and those civilians with an interest in such matters. Articles on related subjects such as leadership, ethics, technology, and military history are also invited and presented. The Canadian Army Journal is central to the intellectual health of the Army and the production of valid future concepts, doctrine, and training policies. It serves as a vehicle for the continuing education and professional development of all ranks and personnel in the Army, as well as members from other environments, government agencies, and academia concerned with army, defence, and security affairs.

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Unsolicited article manuscripts, research notes, book reviews, and points of interest are welcome. Articles should be 5000-7000 words exclusive of endnotes, research notes 1500-2500 words exclusive of endnotes, book review essays and reviews 500-1000 words, and points of interest 1000 words or less. Articles may be submitted in either official language. Authors must include a brief biography. Authors must supply any supporting tables, charts, maps, and images, and these should not be embedded in the article text. Articles may be submitted via email or regular mail. All submissions are peer reviewed and the Editor will notify contributors on the status of their submission. Further details regarding author submission guidelines are available at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/.

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On the cover: The Honorable Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence, visits deployed troops at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan. Colonel Fred Lewis, Deputy Commander of the Canadian Task Force Afghanistan, welcomes Minister O'Connor upon his arrival. Also present are Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Kevin Patterson of the National Command Element, Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander CEFCOM, and CWO Daniel Dietrich of CEFCOM. Photo by Master Corporal Yves Gemus TFA OP ATHENA AR2006-G005-0006.

The crew of 29A from left to right in the front row, Master Corporal Randy Joy the Company Pronto, Corporal Pedro McKelvey the drive of 29A, Captain Max Michaud-Shields the Company second in command and on the back row Corporal Jonathan Caballero the gunner. Photo courtesy of Combat Camera AR2006-G007-0133.

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FROM THE EDITOR

Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, Ph.D.

This issue of *The Canadian Army Journal* will be the last instalment of Volume 9. As you may have noticed, production and delivery was a little behind this year, and we apologize for not being able to provide 4 full issues to our readership. As many of you know, however, the journal exists solely as the result of a dedicated volunteer staff that produces the periodical as their secondary and in some cases tertiary duty. The entire editorial board was consumed in working on the *Army of Tomorrow* project this year and unfortunately the journal suffered a bit. On behalf of the editorial board I apologize. Still, the journal is vital to the intellectual and professional evolution of the army, and we are pleased to have the opportunity to do it. Now with well over 15,000 readers of the online or hardcopy versions, the *CAJ*, as we affectionately call it in house, is rapidly becoming a centrepiece of army thinking and debate, as well as a strong vehicle with which to reach a wider audience. With each issue we attract more senior scholars both in and out of uniform, as well as more and more soldiers in operational postings and deployments writing about their experiences and valuable lessons learned. Volume 9 contained no less than 7 authors who were deployed or just returned from operations overseas, as well as contributions from four senior academics. Overall, the journal has come a long way in the last nine years, despite Dr. Jack Granatstein's prediction in 1998 that professional journals in the Canadian Forces had no hope of success[1]. We are very pleased to have proved him wrong. Volume 10 will see further improvements and refinements to the overall presentation of the journal. A new masthead is coming, as well as an improved layout that will include more research notes and book reviews. Full-length articles will be reduced from 7 to 5 per issue, but the quality will remain the same if not better still. The intent is to ensure that the *CAJ* remains a quarterly production, while leaving it the room for expansion again once the current operational tempo subsides a bit.

The effects of the current operating environment are beginning to show up in the general trend of articles received by the *CAJ*. More and more soldiers are writing about small wars, counterinsurgency and the role of intelligence, as well as the employment of forces in deployed operations. This trend is important to note for many reasons. First, it is a clear reflection of the impact Afghanistan is having on the Land Force as an institution. Second, it marks a renewal of interest in promulgating Canadian perspectives on land warfare and stability operations and brings the intellectual debate on these subjects into an open forum. Third, writing and publishing allows all soldiers from private to general to become directly engaged in the process. It may not be widely known that every article submitted to the CAJ is distributed across the Land Force concepts, doctrine, and training establishments where it is read, its merits considered and debated and, where and when applicable, its ideas are included somewhere in the capability development process. This ensures that voices are heard and that to some degree every soldier may contribute. It is reflective of a thinking army that takes its profession seriously and understands that debating the tough issues now may facilitate their development later on.

This issue leads of with an article on counterinsurgency by Colonel Fred Lewis, currently serving in Afghanistan. Two more articles examining the relationship of insurgency and intelligence follow it. Then we offer two historical analyses, one examining professional development and leadership and another on public affairs and

army culture. Finally, last issue I had mistakenly announced the publication of a note to file on IFOR, which now appears in this issue. These are followed by a number of book reviews and comments on issues of importance to the Land Force, making for a slightly slimmer but no less engaging issue of *The Canadian Army Journal*. With this issue wrapped up, we look forward to volume 10 and a new year.

Endnote

1. Jack L. Granatstein, *Military Education*, Address to the First Annual Graduate Student Symposium at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Ottawa, 13-14 November 1998. Accessed at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/1998/98granats.htm.

AR2006-G035-0057 Photo by: Master Corporal Yves Gemus Task Forces Afghanistan OP ATHENA Imagery Technician

Members of 2 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI) on a dismounted reconnaissance patrol near the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Zettlemeyer. This patrol is identifying possible new observation positions for the next night.

DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT—OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES



It is a regular practice amongst our ABCA (America, Britain, Canada, and Australia) allies to produce occasional papers series as part of an ongoing organizational best practice to promulgate academic and operational research and writing as well as encourage interest and debate on a wide range of topics of importance to the professional study of land operations and warfare. For example, the Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre publishes books, working papers, study papers, and occasional papers. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Combat Studies Institute publish both monographs and occasional papers. The British Army, meanwhile, employs the British Army Review and the Strategic and Combat Studies Institute occasional papers series to identify and develop conceptual and doctrinal ideas.

With the creation of Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) in 1997, a program of regular publishing was implemented that included the production of occasional papers and operational research reports. Between 1997 and 2003, DLSC published 18 occasional reports; however, the practice was discontinued as all available resources were focused towards the Army Futures project. From 2003 onwards, publications mainly consisted of monographs such as Future Force and Crisis in Zefra, whereas other study and discussion papers received only limited internal electronic distribution.

With the impending release of, Land Operations 2015: Adaptive Dispersed Operations - The Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow, there is little doubt that future army development will attract increased interest and attention from audiences both inside and external to the army. Though internal distribution of study papers, occasional papers, and notes is useful to the Director General Land Capability Development (DGLCD) for further development, limiting the debate and discussion to this audience fails to take advantage of the benefits that more formal publication provides.

Beginning in 2007 DGLCD will engage the wider community through the creation of an occasional paper series of unclassified studies aimed at bringing greater attention and debate to subjects of interest within the land force. The invitation to submit is open to all interested parties, and the papers can be of any length greater than 5000 words and can deal with any subject related to the history, evolution, conceptual design, doctrine, training, or operations of the army, as well as more general studies of the theory and application of land warfare.

Occasional papers provide an avenue for professional development and writing for the land force, as well as create indigenous material for use within the land force education and training systems. It will reduce our dependency on foreign literature to provide inspiration and example for future Canadian Army conceptual and doctrinal design. This is not to suggest that the army ignore foreign concepts and ideas, but rather be in a better position when juxtaposing them against Canadian ideas and within a Canadian context. Finally, publication of this type creates a permanent record for future organizations and developers to refer back to, reducing time spent searching for miscellaneous references, or worse, duplicating past efforts and wasting time and resources.

Further details as well as submission guidelines may found at the DGLCD website.

AR2006-G058-0038 Photo by: Master Corporal Yves Gemus Joint Task Force Afghanistan Roto 2 Imagery Technician

The Canadian ANTC Team is responsible of the collective part of the Afghan National Army. This training is conducted at Camp Alamo near Kabul.

THE ABILITY TO DO OLD THINGS IN NEW WAYS—COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND OPERATIONAL ART

Colonel Fred A. Lewis

By the summer of 2001, the Canadian Forces (CF) and most particularly the Army, had managed to adapt from the Cold War to complex peacekeeping. Recent peacekeeping proved to be challenging, but the missions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti had been successful. The attacks of 9/11 introduced a new type of conflict—one coined the Global War on Terrorism. As part of this, Operation *APOLLO* saw the Canadian Army conduct conventional warfighting operations for the first time since the Korean War. By any measure, this apparently out-of-character contribution took most observers by surprise. Subsequently, Canada seemed to return to what it was known for and used to, peace support operations. Canada's Operation ATHENA, at its height, contributed a brigade headquarters and a battle group to the NATO-sponsored International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Although many, including the Canadian public, did not recognize these latest operations in Afghanistan as anything different from our 1990s peace support operations, there was a more than subtle change—at least one side in the conflict recognized us as the enemy. This particular characteristic cannot exist in a peace operation. Arguably, our troops first approached the problem as we had in, say, Bosnia. However, it did not take long to recognize that with an identifiable enemy, our peace support doctrine was not up to accomplishing this particular mission. It was not just a

Combat Camera AR2006-G005-0002 29 Aug 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan

The Honourable Gordon O'Connor, Minister of National Defence, visits deployed troops at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan. Colonel Fred Lewis, Deputy Commander of the Canadian Task Force Afghanistan, welcomes Minister O'Connor upon his arrival.

Lewis, Colonel F. A., 'The Ability to do Old Things in New Ways—Counter-Insurgency and Operational Art' Canadian Army Journal Vol. 9.3 (Winter 2006), 6-23

case of passively supporting the fledgling Afghan government, but also of eliminating threats and more.

With this realization in mind, Canada announced in May 2005 that it was reaffirming its defence commitment to Afghanistan. The CF renewed its presence in Kabul (as part of ISAF), announced it would deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Kandahar (as part of the United States-led campaign against terrorism) and, as of February 2006, further increase its presence in the south of Afghanistan by deploying a brigade headquarters and a battle group to Kandahar.[1]

Media coverage seemed to confirm that peacekeeping in Afghanistan was about to change, stating that the type of operations that "Germany, France, Britain and other Europeans countries…said that they are strongly opposed [to]," would see Canada join the "American plan for NATO to become more involved in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan."[2] If there was any doubt about this commitment from a Canadian perspective, it was laid to rest when it was reported that Defence Minister Bill Graham would begin a cross-country tour to prepare Canadians for the "Forces' new mission in southern Afghanistan, where they are expected to engage insurgents."[3]

As predicted, Canada has deployed a "Canadian national joint package of fully integrated CF environmental elements that operates under a single Canadian operational commander … in command of a joint sector within a coalition operation."[4] Given the previous connection of this region to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it would be reasonable to expect Canadian operations is facing *the other side* in the War on Terrorism. This adversary will view us as the enemy. If we are to be successful in this environment we will need to conduct operations in a different way.

This article proposes that the contemporary enemy can be defeated through classical counter-insurgency doctrine and the application of operational art. The research first shows the enemy to simply be an evolved insurgent. Secondly, a review of previous counter-insurgency campaigns reveals best practices. Finally, operational art, as understood by the CF, is applied in order to develop a campaign model with which to guide counter-insurgency operations at the operational level. In this final step, potential Canadian operations in Afghanistan are used to illustrate, as the paper's title suggests, that "old things can be done in new ways."

The term "classical" counter-insurgency is used throughout the article to describe methods applied after the Second World War. Some authors refer to this as post-imperial era counter-insurgency. In any case, the three forms studied were coincident with the decline of major empires: French, British and Soviet.

It should be noted that the research was restricted to open source material to avoid classification issues. In addition, counter-insurgency was only considered from an expeditionary perspective; no consideration was given to conducting these types of operations in Canada.

The Evolved Insurgent

It has been fashionable since 11 September 2001, especially in the wake of the non-existant post-conflict phase in Iraq, to speak of a "new type of enemy." It is thought that the enemy has come up with a solution to high-tech professional Western militaries. In other words, they are having success where conventional regional powers, like Iraq and Serbia, did not. The approach is described as asymmetric. The enemy is no longer interested in matching our ships with ships, tanks with tanks and planes with planes.

For those who have seriously followed the debate on the way war might be heading, these are not new revelations. For example, ten years before 9/11, noted military

futurist, Martin van Creveld, in his book *The Transformation of War*, wrote that our enemies would be more adept at learning new styles of war and predicted that Western conventional militaries and their high-tech weapons would likely become irrelevant. He further suggested that all militaries would move towards guerrilla or irregular configurations.

Combat Camera AR2006-P005 0078 14 Sept 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan

At first light soldiers from Alpha Company (A Coy), 2PPCLI, conduct operations in the Panjwaii District of Kandahar Province as part of Operation MEDUSA.

> War will not be waged by armies but by groups who we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves. Their organizations are likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones, and be motivated less by "professionalism" than by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties.[5]

In some circles, that more formal title has been called the Fourth Generation Warrior. William Lind and others in their 1989 work, *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*,[6] describe the phenomenon of different generations of warfare. The first generation was characterized by Napoleon's mass armies, the second by the firepower of the First World War and the third the manoeuvre of World War II. They concluded by predicting that there would be a fourth generation.

The United States Marine Corps Colonel, Thomas Hammes, also took up the mantra of a developing Fourth Generation. As early as 1994, as a foreign student at the Canadian National Defence College, Hammes wrote a paper entitled The Evolution of War: A Fourth Generation.[7] Thus, before the attacks on New York and Washington, Hammes, like van Creveld, was suggesting that technological cyber war was not the most likely conflict we would face in the near to mid-term. By 2004, Hammes' thoughts had gelled to the point where he detailed them in the book *The Sling and the Stone*. The image invoked by the title is that David could indeed defeat Goliath. In this work, Hammes provides detail into this new asymmetric enemy through the study of Mao, Vietnam, the Sandinistas, the Intifadas, al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq. He describes Fourth Generation Warfare as:

> … [using] all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency.[8]

Hammes admits that Fourth Generation Warfare "is not new or surprising but has been evolving around the world over the last seven decades."[9] The enemy examines our entire society for vulnerabilities and coordinates a sophisticated campaign. To create the effect desired, he determines which networks are appropriate and the message that needs sending. Finally, he includes a feedback loop to make sure it was successful. Military action is tied to these messages with nothing off limits worldwide. The attacks on both the United Nations' headquarters in Iraq and on Spanish trains just prior to Spain's national elections in 2004 are two prime examples. Although this type of war

may appear like a sophisticated effects-based approach, in other ways it is elegantly simple. The Fourth Generation Warrior has no need for a military-industrial complex, using the likes of basic improvised explosives, ubiquitous computers and the Internet to move his ideas and money to achieve his effects.

British military doctrine describes an insurgency as "the actions of a minority group within a state, intent on forcing political change by means of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people to accept such a change."[10] Although the differences with Fourth Generation Warfare are evident just in this definition (i.e. within a state), the parallels are also striking. Certainly, there are new aspects. Suicide bombers and remotely controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are perhaps two of the most obvious lower level challenges that demand new tactics, techniques and procedures. Nonetheless, as Hammes admits, this new warrior is best approached as an evolved insurgent. This paper agrees with that assertion. With this in mind, it is logical to look to long-standing counter-insurgency doctrine for, if not a complete way to deal with these threats, at least a starting point.

Counter-Insurgency Doctrine

> … [those conducting] today's operations in South Vietnam—will find to their surprise that their various seemingly "new" counter-insurgency gambits, from strategic hamlets to large-scale pacification are mere rehashes of old tactics.[11]
>
> **Bernard B. Fall, 1963**

The amount of literature on counter-insurgency is overwhelming. It is doubly overwhelming to those in the profession of arms who focused on conventional warfighting during the Cold War. That said, there is a more limited core of scholarly works on the subject. As Bernard Fall's words above seem to indicate, it is worthwhile to look at the experience of those that have undertaken counter-insurgency operations both successfully and unsuccessfully in the past.

The French Way—Fight Fire with Fire

Immediately after the Second World War, the French attempted to re-establish their colonial empire. As Colonel Roger Trinquier was publishing what must be the seminal work on French counter-insurgency, *Modern Warfare*, the French had lost in Indochina and were losing in Algeria. As late as 2004, this book remained a primary source of study for US officers attending the Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth.[12] Trinquier's thesis of fighting fire with fire is one that does not sit well with many professional officers. Described in Bernard Fall's introduction to this book as a hard-bitten centurion, Colonel Trinquier had campaigned against enemies that no longer fought in any way that could be described as honourable. In essence, he suggested that the Law of Armed Conflict, emphasizing as it does, military necessity, humanity and chivalry[13], was an outmoded concept. He proposed, "in modern warfare, as in traditional wars of the past, it is absolutely essential to make use of all the weapons [and methods] the enemy employs. Not to do so would be absurd."[14]

Even though Trinquier has gone too far in his suggested solution he does offer a worthwhile model for defeating the insurgent. He suggests three principles:

- cutting off the guerrilla from the population that supports him;
- rendering guerrilla zones untenable; and
- coordinating the above actions over a wide area for an extended period of time.[15]

Combat Camera AR2006-P008 0019 16 Sept 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan Photo by: Sgt Lou Penney TFA OP ATHENA Imagery Technician

Canadian and American soldiers cross a ravine while providing heavy security for the visit of BGen David Fraser, Commander of Multi-National Brigade South during his tour of an area controlled by Canadian and other allied forces in the Panjwaii District west of Kandahar City.

He admits that applying these three principles will not be easy, accepting that the insurgent will generally be better at moving about in the complex terrain of his choosing and will likely have the support of the population and thus better intelligence. Nonetheless, in combating these disadvantages, his best offering is a system of controlling and organizing the population. He puts particular detail to the idea of the expanding *tache d'huile* theory. As areas are occupied by the security forces, urban areas first, the populace is registered in great detail, organized into community hierarchies with very low-level civilian leaders (perhaps nothing more than the senior family member) and issued identify cards. This very detailed census kick started information gathering and went a significant way toward making up for the security forces' early disadvantage in intelligence.

Given that Trinquier states that the "*sine qua non* in *modern war* is the unconditional support of the population,"[16] it is worthwhile looking at the aspect of torture that is so often attributed him in a bit more detail. In *Modern War*, the message Trinquier sends is not completely clear. On the one hand, he states that the insurgent being interrogated "must face the suffering, and perhaps death,"[17] and then on the other, goes on to say that "interrogators must always strive not to injure the physical and moral integrity of individuals [as] science can easily place at the army's disposition the means for obtaining what is sought."[18] In the latter parts of his book, while describing how French forces should conduct insurgency rather than counter-insurgency, he is very clear in his support of brutal methods, encouraging that "a few well-calculated acts of sabotage and terrorism will compel any reluctant citizens to give the required cooperation."[19] Even in this, though, he suggested that this terrorism would be conducted not by French military but local host nation *maquis*. Therefore despite some conflicting messages, given Trinquier's unequivocal understanding of the importance of the unconditional support of the people, it is almost certain he understood that torture by security forces conducting *counter*-insurgency is not productive.

The British Way—A Struggle for People's Minds

If the French way of counter-insurgency straddled the line in terms of the Law of Armed Conflict, the British model proposed by Frank Kitson in his work *Bunch of Fives* was in no way ambiguous. Kitson was promoted General and rose to command the United Kingdom Land Forces during the period 1982-85. A prolific author on the subject of low intensity conflict, his study of counter-insurgency began after his experiences in Kenya, Malaya, Muscat and Cyprus. Kitson is not alone in his study of British counter-insurgency operations; another notable theorist is Major General Julian Paget. However, for the purpose of this article, Kitson's work is considered sufficiently representative.

Kitson begins by asserting that this form of war is a struggle for men's minds, stating that the insurgents' aim is to overthrow the government. To achieve this aim, the insurgent must rely for a considerable extent, on the people for money, shelter, food and information. While the insurgent uses political, psychological and economic persuasion, he still targets the population with violence and coercion. Terrorism is often his most potent weapon.[20]

Although Kitson admits that counter-insurgency campaigns will all be to a certain extent unique, he nonetheless provides a very clear four-sided "framework" to counter this type of threat:

- establish good coordinating machinery;
- create a political atmosphere in which government measures can be introduced with the maximum likelihood of success;
- establish an effective intelligence network at every level in order to conduct operations; and
- adhere steadfastly to the rule of law.[21]

In terms of the establishment of good coordinating machinery, Kitson emphasizes that this must be done from the national to the local level. Kitson suggests that this is achieved through a series of committees with members accepting some compromise to their normal powers. His second side of the framework would best be understood today as information operations, those actions taken to influence decision makers. In this, he is again returning to his assertion that counter-insurgency is a struggle for men's minds. Interestingly, in this area he seems to demonstrate effects based operations—something we think of as new. He warns that systems must be devised that ensure 'the effect [an initiative] will have on people's opinion and attitude is considered," "those involved in devising the government's campaign [are made] aware of possible public attitudes to their ideas, statements and actions," and "that policy making groups are briefed on the consequences of their plans."[22] The third side of the counter-insurgency frame is the development of an intelligence organization. This would seem obvious, but the need to have it expanded rapidly and then decentralized to the lowest levels, Kitson feels will challenge governments, which tend to control intelligence at the highest levels. The final side of Kitson's framework is that of the law. He seems to almost overemphasize this, perhaps a reaction to the earlier writings of proponents like Trinquier. He is adamant that everything done in counter-insurgency must be within the law. He does, however, expect that emergency measures may be enacted to remove some of the advantages the insurgents have under normal peacetime law. As a subset of this part of the frame, Kitson provides compelling argument for the humane treatment of prisoners. His logic is that "[the] key to the whole business lies in persuading the prisoner to change sides and all his treatment, including interrogation, should be carried out with this in mind."[23]

Kitson admits that there will be frustrations in working within his framework but warns that soldiers who attempt to revert to their military-only comfort zone will find that political and economic threads will weave through their campaign whether they like it or not. With this warning at the forefront, he does, however, provide advice on security operations, dividing the subject into the offence and defence. According to Kitson, the defence must focus on preventing the insurgents from disrupting the government programme, while the offence concentrates on rooting out the insurgents themselves; the two must always be balanced. He sees three primary defensive operations:

- guarding and protecting;
- crowd confrontation operations; and
- prevention of the insurgents gaining influence over the population.

In the first category of guarding and protecting, Kitson refers to vital points and persons, isolated villages, crops in the countryside and market areas in towns. He recognizes the significant numbers of soldiers that get drawn into these roles and emphasizes the need to raise auxiliary forces to take on these less skilled activities. With respect to the second defensive operation, it is interesting to note that during peacekeeping in the Balkans, Canadian forces also learned the importance of crowd confrontation operations in low intensity operations. Finally, in terms of reducing the insurgent's influence over the population, Kitson talks of the importance of close day-to-day contact between the soldiers and the people (i.e. patrolling), hearts and minds programmes, and civilian committees that parallel those networks normally set up by the insurgents themselves.

The greater part of Kitson's book *Bunch of Five* is devoted to offensive operations. Similar to Trinquier's census procedures, Kitson's best offerings are his techniques for identifying and neutralizing the insurgent. Because of the drain on troops necessary for defensive operations and the reality that the British would never have enjoyed the numbers of soldiers that, for example, the French had, Kitson had to devise a method that made offensive operations far more precise. Simply put, he focused all of his efforts into narrowing down the probability of where the insurgent would be so that the limited numbers of troops available could exploit this information. This was done primarily at the company level by:

- confirming information that was known;
- developing priority information requirements and doggedly trying to fill in the gaps; and
- acting against the insurgent only when operations had a high chance of success.[24]

Kitson was not a fan of "search and destroy," or more aptly, "hit and almost miss." Although the process sounds familiar to the professional now, the level at which it was conducted was, and probably remains, unusual. For the approach to be successful there had to be some acceptance of risk by superiors, access for the company commander to the previously discussed decentralized intelligence system and the keeping of the sub-unit in one area of operations for some time. The British way of counter-insurgency as described by Kitson was successful in Kenya, Malaya and Oman. Their experience in Afghanistan, which in the 1880s was known as the North-West Frontier, was not, however. This brings us to the Soviet way.

The Soviet Way—The Primacy of Political Goals

The Soviets conducted counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan during the period 1979 to 1989. Despite having significant doctrinal thought on the subject stretching back to at least the 1920s and their counter-insurgency campaign against Islamic Turkistan nomads known as *Basmachi*, the Soviets, as the British, did not fare well in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, as Dr. David Cox states in his 1991 doctoral dissertation, *Soviet Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Strategy in Afghanistan: an Operational Assessment of the Campaign*, "the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan was, paradoxically, a textbook case on how to conduct a counter-insurgency and how not to."[25]

Combat Camera AR2006-P009 0028 14 Sept 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan

Soldiers from Alpha Company (A Coy), 2PPCLI, conduct operations in the Panjwaii District of Kandahar Province as part of Operation MEDUSA. In these harsh conditions the threat of improvised explosive devices (IED), booby traps and small arms fire are a genuine concern.

As might be expected, Soviet doctrine on counter-insurgency is based on Marxist—Leninist theory. If one can get past this, there is much to be learned and, in fact, much in common with the previously described doctrines. The Soviet way can be summarized by three imperatives:

- unity of command or yedinonachaliye;
- safeguarding the administration while hunting down the rebels; and
- isolating the rebels from the population.[26]

These imperatives appear very similar to the doctrines used by the French and the British. Once again, we see unity of command extending beyond the military sphere with only one person in charge of the political, economic and military aspects of the counter-insurgency effort. The second imperative is self-explanatory and as with the British way, special emphasis is placed on establishing local militias that are strong enough to defeat any local threat. The final point, isolating the rebel from the population, is a common theme in both French and British practices.

The last imperative of isolating the insurgent deserves additional comment as the approach could be dismissed out of hand for its seeming brutality. In reality, the Soviet techniques could be quite sophisticated, utilizing both carrot and stick. They advocated five approaches:

- mass deportation;
- control of cities and a spreading out into the countryside;
- exploitation of divides within the community;
- infiltration into the insurgent organization; and
- the winning over of important groups in the society.[27]

Parts of the first two approaches would be difficult for any Western army to implement. Soviet doctrine encouraged mass deportation of populations that supported rebels, applying collective guilt. If the population could not be deported, then the establishment of concentration camps was prescribed. Interestingly, the British provided us the term *concentration camp* during the Boer War and also used an enlightened form of deportation during the 1950s Malayan Emergency. Although the Soviets could be extreme in their application of collective guilt, they still recognized that the "carrot' was important, stressing amnesty and indeed, privileged treatment for those who surrendered. The Soviets felt that it was easier to control urban rather than rural areas; this has likely reversed, given advances in surveillance technology. As part of the second approach, the Soviets advocated a scorched earth policy in the countryside where by the end of their decade in Afghanistan, there was not much left. The remaining three points are less contentious. Their doctrine suggested that any differences in the cultural, ethnic, religious or social makeup of the population be exploited. The recent U.S. Afghan campaign that utilized the Northern Alliance against the Taliban government would seem to demonstrate the efficacy of this. Infiltration of the insurgent organization with a view to acquiring information is a logical goal; interestingly, the Soviets were not only interested in information, but also sowing misinformation. Finally, they stressed the importance of winning over groups like the intelligentsia and religious or tribal leaders. In this latter area, particular emphasis was placed on the appropriate education of children.

The Soviets could not cause the culmination of the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan despite years of effort. Their army, designed as it was, for conventional operations against NATO, had a difficult time adapting. They experienced problems with leadership, training and equipment. By the late 1980s, the Soviet empire was on its last legs, with its form of communism bankrupt in all senses. Given the similarities of much of Soviet doctrine to other successful counter-insurgency efforts, one might ask if it would have been more successful had they been selling a better way of life to the Afghans.

The American Way—Not Attempted

The lack of U.S. success in Vietnam, even with considerable experience in so-called small wars by the U.S. Army and Marines during the early part of the last century, causes the author to shy away from any attempt to describe a U.S. classical model to combat insurgency. Even with such highly regarded doctrine manuals as the USMC *Small Wars Manual*, Dr Ian Beckett, a Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, described the U.S. early 20th century efforts as "rarely achieving long term stability" and leaving "a legacy of bitterness and anti-American sentiment among indigenous peoples who judged army and marine proconsular administration by its style and not its achievements."[28] Beckett goes on to suggest that even by the 1930s, "the

marine small wars techniques [showed] a reliance on firepower and technology rather than feet on the ground."[29]

What the Americans can provide us is a worthwhile segue into the relationship between operational art and counter-insurgency. In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army, after having won just about all their battles and engagements in Vietnam, lost the war. The disconnection between their army's tactical actions and their government's strategic direction was evident. Introspectively, U.S. officers looked to determine why they lost. A renaissance in military thinking occurred, introducing the operational level of war into American doctrine.[30] The conflict in Vietnam had been, in many respects, counter-insurgency and the U.S. Army looked in part to operational art to ensure future success.

Application of Operational Art

> "Given that the operational art originally sprang from the maneuver of large formations, it also remains to be seen whether it can be profitably applied by small armies in pursuit of strategic objectives. To attempt to relate the concept to everything from internal security to peacekeeping, drug wars, and more may only invite muddle."[31]

John English's words above question whether operational art can even be applied to insurgencies. Dr Bruce Menning takes a more positive stance when he suggests that we "seek to expand and refine the limits of operational art" and "refashion [it] to suit fresh circumstances and changed situations."[32] One simple example, already mentioned, is the requirement for security forces to be numerically much larger than the insurgents they are fighting, sometimes with as much as a 20:1 advantage. Western military contingents involved in these types of conflicts will tend to be manpower limited and, perhaps no nation more so than Canada. With William Lind's assertion that "excellence in the operational art more than … manoeuvre in tactical battle enabled a smaller force to defeat a large one" we can see that there may be considerable utility in applying this concept.

School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) graduate Lieutenant Colonel Howard Coombs adds more to the discussion of operational art's usefulness in situations other than conventional warfighting in his paper *Perspectives on Operational Thought*. He notes that Canadian officers commanding within coalitions at the operational level in the Persian Gulf, the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, all demonstrated the continued requirement to make the link between strategic direction and tactical action, understanding that the Canadian perception of operational art is not solely focused on the theatre-level manoeuvre and logistics of conventional warfighting.[33] He also remarked that in the 1990s, operational art was used by peace support operations staffs to dissect complex military problems and that campaign planning "became an effort to link the diverse efforts [of] … multiple organizations in a similar manner to which one would link engagements, battles and operations to attain the objective of a military campaign."[34]

Strategic Direction

Based on the preceding debate, it is reasonable to conclude that the Canadian military should, as it did with peace support operations, look to operational art as described in Canadian joint doctrine[35] to assist in solving the complex problem of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Although this paper focuses on the operational level, a quick review of the strategic level requirements is appropriate here. National strategy involves the application and coordination of all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, psychological, technological and military. Foreign Affairs

Combat Camera AR2006-P020-0001 14 Oct 2006 Kandahar, Afghanistan Photo by: Sgt Lou Penney TFA OP ATHENA Imagery Technician

Canadian soldiers from Charles Company, RCR, and soldiers from the Afghan National Army take cover while trying to maintain visual contact on four suspected Taliban insurgents who are possibly trying to set up an ambush.

Canada's website provides an indication of what our national strategic aim might be in Afghanistan by stating that Canada supports the establishment of a stable environment in which the people of Afghanistan can rebuild their country and their lives.[36]

Military strategy is a sub-set of national strategy and seeks to establish military strategic objectives, assigning operational level command, imposing limitations and allocating resources. Again, referring to the Internet for unclassified material, the

Department of National Defence's website outlines what might be construed as strategic military objectives for Operation *ARCHER*, the Canadian contribution to the U.S.—led campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan:

- reinforce the authority of the Afghan government in and around Kandahar;
- help stabilize and rebuild the region;
- help monitor security;
- promote Afghan government policies and priorities with local authorities; and
- facilitate security sector reforms.[37]

According to joint doctrine, these objectives, as well as the other components of military strategic direction, should be issued to the operational level commander in the form of a strategic directive. That same doctrine also suggests that there should only be a single strategic objective. Thus, although it is far from certain as to whether the above "tasks" frame some sort of military strategic directive, it serves to illustrate that direction from above may not be completely clear.

As of February 2006, Canada's Task Force Afghanistan commander is be both a tactical commander heading up a multinational brigade and an operational level commander as the senior Canadian National Commander. In this latter role the commander would be expected to translate Canadian strategic direction into operational and tactical action. In the Canadian military's understanding of operational art, there is no dependency on the size of the committed force but rather simply a focus on the link between the strategic and the tactical. This commander should rightly use operational art to design, plan and conduct a campaign to accomplish the strategic aim.

Mission Analysis and Military End State

This process of campaign planning begins with a mission analysis of the strategic direction. In this, the commander must ensure that goals are clear, risk is communicated and resources sufficient. If there is anything preventing the achievement of the strategic aim, it must be made known. Associated with mission analysis is the understanding of the criteria or conditions that would constitute military victory and subsequently conform to the government's view of success. This will be complex, as more than any other form of warfare, counter-insurgency is "an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological [and] military …"[38] In other words, although in conventional war military factors predominate, in counter-insurgency the achievement of a solely military end-state will not likely result in victory.

Once this *expanded understanding* of the military end-state is defined, the military objectives need to be identified. Traditional examples are the destruction of the enemy's air force, command and control capability, and logistics installations. Against a symmetrical or conventional foe, the identification of military objectives is relatively easy; what is important to you is generally important to him. Against the today's evolved insurgent employing asymmetric means, this is more difficult, if only because we are not used to it.

Even when only faced with the simpler traditional warfighting construct, the practitioner of operational art still uses concepts such as centre of gravity, decisive points and lines of operation to better understand the intricacies of campaign design, planning and conduct. This paper has looked at three forms of conducting classical counter-insurgency. In none of these cases was the current form of operational level doctrine understood. The authors did not refer to such things as centres of gravity or decisive

points. As stated earlier, modern operational art did not come into widespread use (and arguably not well understood use) until the late 1980s. Given that the Soviets had been studying and using operational art as early as the 1920s, there might have been an expectation that at least they would have adapted it to their counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. They did not, restricting it instead to conventional Front and Army level operations, emphasizing command and control and logistics at that level.[39]

Centre of Gravity

Canadian military doctrine defines the centre of gravity as that aspect of the enemy's total capability, which if attacked and eliminated or neutralized, will lead to his inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations. It is also often described as that characteristic, capability or location, from which enemy forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Centres of gravity exist for both enemy and friendly sides and at all three levels of war. The centres of gravity tend to be nested, meaning that the defeat of the operational centre of gravity will contribute to the fall of the enemy's strategic centre of gravity. The precept is that you attack the enemy's centre of gravity while protecting your own. Canadian doctrine describes the correct identification of the centre of gravity as the essence of operational art.

Quite often in conventional warfighting typical strategic centres of gravity are capital cities while at the operational level, they are major military formations. Given the nature of the evolved terrorist, one must ask whether *typical* centres of gravity can be identified? At the strategic level, this paper's review of counter-insurgency practices indicated that loss of the legitimacy of the host nation government would cause defeat. The tasks given Canadian forces deployed to Afghanistan such as "reinforce the authority of the Afghan government" and "promote Afghan government polices"[40] seem to recognize the critical need to preserve the legitimacy of the host nation's government. When foreign nations are assisting a country against an insurgency, their own centres of gravity must also be considered. In any conflict in which vital national interests are not at stake, the will of its citizens is now generally accepted as the strategic centre of gravity. This was clearly evident in the US involvement in Vietnam. It would appear that both recent Canadian governments have taken this to heart with Liberal Government Defence Minister Graham's "fairly extensive speaking tour … to prepare Canadians for the likelihood of casualties,"[41] and more recently, frequently delivered, strong messages by Prime Minister Harper and other key ministers of the Conservative government emphasizing the importance of the Afghanistan mission. It is absolutely essential for any nation participating in a foreign counter-insurgency that the people of that nation understand why their country is involved.

The determination of the operational centre of gravity in counter-insurgency is less difficult. In conventional operations, a major enemy military formation is a typical operational level centre of gravity. In Operation DESERT STORM, just about every soldier, from private to general, knew that the Iraqi Republican Guard was the operational centre of gravity. In counter-insurgency, there are no such major military units. At first glance, the classical counter-insurgency doctrine suggests that the "unconditional support of the population" is the sine qua non.[42] Clearly, this is very important but equally memorable are the extraordinarily committed Chinese Malayan insurgents who spent literally a decade in the jungles without much support. Today's new-style insurgent needs even less support and is capable of executing an effects-based campaign with not much more than money, the Internet and locally available material. Perhaps the assertion that the *mujahidin* "would most likely [have] fought [the Soviets] to the last man"[43] is more instructive. The Fourth Generation Warrior, as some of his predecessors were, is committed to the point of fanaticism; the suicide bomber

being the definitive example. The most likely *typical* operational centre of gravity of the insurgent is his will to continue the fight. Indeed, this is strongly supported by Major General Julian Paget, when he states that destroying the insurgents' will to win is "one of the easiest and cheapest methods of winning the war."[44]

Before addressing the method needed to attack the enemy's operational centre of gravity, we must also look to identify our own. This is somewhat easier and relates back to the strategic centre of gravity already identified as the will of people of the contributing nation. The almost daily media tally of U.S. casualties in Iraq, or indeed, news of Canadian casualties in Afghanistan, provide the likely answer to our own operational centre of gravity. If too many body bags come home when the vital interests of a nation are not at stake, almost assuredly, the military as a whole will come home too. This is to a certain degree a new phenomenon, perhaps due to the fact that now nearly every contributing nation does so with professional and thus, volunteer armies. In the classical counter-insurgencies looked at earlier in the paper, large conscript armies were involved, and arguably there was a more stoic acceptance of casualties. Thus, the operational level commander must understand that if the forces are not to return home prematurely, casualties must be minimized. This should not be construed to mean adopting a "bunker mentality," as aggressive offensive measures maybe the best defence.

Decisive Points

Having identified likely centres of gravity based on the experiences of previous counter-insurgencies, the next step is to ask how these must either be attacked or defended. This is done through decisive points. Canadian joint doctrine defines decisive points as those events, the successful outcome of which are the preconditions to the defeat or neutralization of the enemy's centre of gravity. In short, they are vulnerabilities. Determining vulnerabilities is a considerably more tangible task than determining centres of gravity. Simply looking at what others did in those earlier counter-insurgencies can provide a good start. The more often something was done, the better the chances that these could be decisive points that will stand the test of time. These might almost be thought of as counter-insurgency best practices. In the following paragraphs, both offensive and defensive decisive points are derived directly from the previously reviewed French, British and Soviet styles; they are **bold** to assist the reader in their identification.

Although protecting our own vulnerabilities will not break the will of an insurgent, it will help to prevent our own culmination. Given the importance of support from home (arguably the strategic level centre of gravity), efforts must go into **sustaining our commitment**. This should involve a proactive public affairs programme that explains to our own citizens why we are involved. Essentially, every classical counter-insurgency effort started by first **establishing a firm base** and, in most cases, this was in the major population centres and then eventually expanding to smaller towns. Implicit in this is the requirement to **protect the host nation government**, including the capital and key installations (military camps, media, utilities, commercial enterprises and prominent people). In doing the above, it behooves the security forces to **develop that country's armed forces** and also, at lower levels, the local militias that would undertake less demanding guard duties. In both cases, the national security forces must become capable of independently beating the insurgents on the field of battle. It is important for the people threatened by the insurgency to participate in their own defence and it is vital that foreign militaries not be seen as occupiers.[45] At present, the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan appears to have addressed most of these decisive points. Our commitment to that country began in the capital, Kabul, protecting the new government and also included the training of the Afghan National Army at their National Training

Centre in Pol-e Charki.

Offensive action against the insurgents' decisive points over an extended timeframe will be the road to victory. A very high priority in all of the counter-insurgencies studied was the necessity of **isolating the insurgent from support of the population**. Methods ranged from mass deportations to the gentler *tache d'huile* technique whereby the government control of territory is slowly expanded. Regardless of the method used, the insurgent must be deprived of intelligence, funding, food and shelter. This separating of the insurgent from support must also include **sealing off external support**: borders cannot be porous. Given the previously mentioned information age insurgent's relatively modest needs and techniques, this will be difficult. Connected with isolating the insurgent, **the popularity of the rebels must also be reduced**. This will involve information operations and a responsive civic action or hearts and minds programme. The former must include developing a solid understanding of the aspirations of the people. The latter, in a failed or failing state, may mean starting almost from scratch, including financial assistance, food, schools, hospitals, road networks and commencing a sustainable economy. **Development**, including technical assistance, must get the people of the threatened country to help themselves. Most nations' militaries will not be capable of civic action on their own, and thus, this is at least part of the justification for Kitson's "coordinating machinery." This unified command and control was an imperative in all the counter-insurgencies studied. Best practices encourage the creation of committees composed of civil, police and military members from national to local level. Despite working as a committee, one member must be more equal. Not surprisingly, in books written by soldiers, it was their preference to be in the lead. In close support of these committees was the requirement for an **effective intelligence network**. This intelligence network needs to be considerably different from the highly centralized organizations characteristic of Cold War conventional warfighting. Decentralized low-level intelligence efforts (albeit supported by strategic level assets) that encourage even company commanders to do analysis were found to be the most effective. Involvement of the population and infiltration into the insurgent organization were equally instrumental in **seeking out and discriminately neutralizing the insurgent**. This final offensive decisive point was purposely left to the end to underline that there are no purely military battlefields in counter-insurgency. Although it is important to demonstrate that you can kill insurgents,[46] the minimum necessary application of force is best if the people are to be won over and the country worth living in after the conflict.

These offensive decisive points will be for the most part new to Canadian forces as they deploy to conduct operations in southern Afghanistan. Although Canadian troops undoubtedly employed intelligence effectively in Kabul-based ISAF operations, they will now have to be decentralized to the provincial and local levels. The Provincial Reconstruction Team will also likely have started a committee system to address both development and information operations but the military component will have to be strengthened. If classical counter-insurgency doctrine is to be followed, the military will have to begin isolating the insurgent from the population and killing him when he shows himself. Historically, these are massive undertakings. This is seen as perhaps the greatest challenge the Canadian military commander will have. This speaks to the absolute need to employ Afghan national forces in a guarding role and perhaps in attacking the asymmetric foe in asymmetric ways. One wonders what effect having the Canadian Muslim population fund (and making sure it is advertised) new mosques would have on a radicalized Islamic group like al Qaeda.

Lines of Operation

The final aspect of operational design that must be considered is the concept of Lines of Operation. Lines of operations are defined by Canadian joint doctrine as describing how military force is applied in time and space through decisive points on the path to the centre of gravity. This ensures actions are tackled in a logical progression and synchronized so as to overload an enemy. Given the multitude of decisive points that must be accomplished in counter-insurgency, this may provide some of the most intellectually difficult challenges for the military commander. The chance of success through a single military operational gambit is slim.[47] Instead, decisive points will need to be arranged in order to achieve the destruction of the insurgents' will to carry on.

Draft Canadian army counter-insurgency doctrine suggests four possible lines of operations: political, police, civilian and military.[48] Although a multi-agency approach is the right one to pursue, the above lines of operation help little in understanding why an approach is being followed, only who is doing it. With the advent of a non-linear and non-contiguous battle space (something that describes the counter-insurgency battlefield), military doctrine is transitioning from deep, close and rear operations to a sustain, shape and decisive paradigm.[49] This framework is far more descriptive, in that it explains why an approach is being pursued. Using these as three lines of operation, it is relatively simple to place the previously identified decisive points along them and even in a likely order. Figure 1 not only does this, but by also including all the previously described elements of operational design, produces an illustrative operational level counter-insurgency campaign plan model as promised at the beginning of this paper.



Figure 1: Illustrative Counter-insurgency Campaign Plan Model

Conclusions

This article began by suggesting that the so-called new style asymmetric enemy is not so new and could be defeated through the application of classical counter-insurgency doctrine and operational art. A brief look at this new enemy was conducted;

concluding that he was best considered an evolved insurgent. Certainly, he was recognized as having a number of new characteristics, but for the most part he is very similar to the insurgent seen throughout the last century. As has been the case since ancient times,[50] it was simply a case of the enemy realizing he could not win through conventional means and he "sought a different path,"[51] an asymmetric one.

A review of three styles of counter-insurgency, French, British and Soviet, was conducted with a view to extracting best practices. In order to develop a model that would be useful in the contemporary operating environment, these doctrines were merged with the Canadian understanding of operational art. This was illustrated by examples of what could be expected during Canadian military operations in Afghanistan. As research was limited to open source material, the resulting operational level campaign plan was only illustrative.

The findings of the author's relatively short period of research could hardly be described as an in-depth analysis. The study of counter-insurgency is a life-long pursuit. Further work is needed and the application of the true reality in Afghanistan is probably warranted. Nonetheless, even with the limited historical research done, and with some doubt as to the utility of operational art in other than conventional war, a logical campaign plan was deduced. The article confirms that like peace support operations in the 1990s, operational art can be usefully applied to counter-insurgency. It was in the end, a matter of doing old things in new ways.

About the Author ...

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INTELLIGENCE LESSONS AND THE EMERGING CANADIAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Captain H. Christian Breede

"…for if the instrument be insufficient, all our troubles will be spent in vain."

-Hegel, *The Logic*

In recent months, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has ventured out of the relatively secure and stable Kabul region. All 35 member nations are contributing soldiers in some capacity and Canada has had anywhere from 250 to 1,500 soldiers serving under ISAF at any one time since 2003.[1] As part of this expansion, the Canadian government decided to increase its commitment to ISAF and to Afghanistan.

Expanding upon its existing mission in Kabul, known as Operation ATHENA, Canadian soldiers are now operating in Kandahar, several hundred kilometres southwest. The new mission, called Operation ARCHER (Op ARCHER) has Canadian soldiers taking over operations from American forces. Having been hunting down Taliban insurgents in that area since 2001 as part of Op ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces are now starting to thin out, shifting their focus to their conflict in Iraq.[2] Although operations in Kabul were dangerous, it was limited to the immediate surroundings of that city. Op ARCHER now involves Canadians moving to areas not nearly as stable in order to secure the establishment of one of ten ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).[3] In short, Canadian soldiers are now involved in countering an ongoing Taliban-influenced insurgency in southern Afghanistan. Canada has committed to this operation for the foreseeable future with approximately 2500 Canadian soldiers participating and as such, counter-insurgency (COIN) operations are, like a trend in fashion, now *en vogue.*

A quick survey of current Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine reveals that the subject of COIN is barely mentioned in existing keystone documents, despite the direction Canadian soldiers are now heading. On August 23rd, 2005 the Director Army Doctrine (DAD) sent an email to the four Land Forces Area Headquarters. The email stated that although no formal doctrine exists in the CF for COIN operations, such doctrine is in development and in early to mid-2006, should be released.[4] In larger terms, COIN has been the subject of decades of study and is receiving increasing attention due to the ongoing American experience in South West Asia and the Middle East. That being said, many European nations, principally the United Kingdom and France, have significant COIN experience and have been involved such operations for decades.

Intelligence is a critical component in successful COIN operations. This article constructs a model and then assesses two COIN operations—the Algerian war for independence and the Malayan emergency. From this assessment, the importance of intelligence in these operations should become clear and some lessons learned will be derived and contrasted to the emerging Canadian doctrine on the subject.

In order to understand the influence that intelligence operations have on COIN, one must first understand the nature of insurgencies. Like recent literature on the subject of terrorism, exact definitions for guerrillas and insurgents vary from author to author and source to source. However, there is a clear distinction.[5] The only similarity between insurgencies and guerrilla wars are in the tactics used by the belligerents.[6]

Breede, Captain Christian H., 'Intelligence Lessons and The Emerging Canadian Counter-insurgency Doctrine' Canadian Army Journal Vol. 9.3 (Winter 2006), 24-40

Historically, guerrillas formed as a reaction to some external invasion and "… fought until they were exterminated or until the enemy withdrew. Possessed of no binding ideology except patriotism, they sought to expel the invaders rather than to change the political or social system…."[7] Insurgents, however, have a desire to "… gain control of a country from within and to reshape it in the image of some ideology."[8] At the risk of confusing the ends with the means, insurgents employ the tactics of guerrillas in their fight towards a greater end. Understanding the differences between insurgencies and guerrilla wars plays a key role in understanding how intelligence operations must function in a COIN environment. In an insurgency there is a greater political end sought by the belligerents, above and beyond the ousting of foreign or in some cases even domestic aggressors. Insurgencies are characterized by a desire to achieve some form of societal and political change. There is a grievance amongst the population and insurgencies form as a reaction to it.

The Lynn Counter-insurgency—Insurgency Model

In a recent issue of *Military Review*, John Lynn presented a model for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The model, reproduced as Figure 1,[9] shows the different components involved in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and how they relate to each other.



Figure 1: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Model

As can be seen in Figure 1, the model is based on a box representing the various societal elements of the affected nation. Within this box, the population is divided into those sympathetic to the government, those sympathetic to the insurgents, or those who are neutral. These divisions are based on the population's perception of the existence of legitimacy, security or a grievance. The population is grouped into pro-government, neutral or pro-insurgent. Those who support either the government or the insurgent leadership in turn support either the counter-insurgents or the insurgents. These actors conduct direct actions against each other with the help of various external (state or non-state) agents. Intelligence plays a prominent role in this model, as the population is the primary intelligence source for both the insurgents and counter-insurgents. Lynn further



Figure 2: Successful Insurgency Model

refines his model to illustrate both successful insurgencies and successful counterinsurgencies.

Figure 2 shows the factors at play in a successful insurgency while Figure 3 shows a successful counter-insurgency. In Figure 2, direct action by the insurgents targets the pro-government population and the government as well as the counter-insurgents. This action also serves to sever external support to the counter-insurgents. The counter-insurgents respond with ineffective or indiscriminate direct action, against not only the insurgents and their leadership, but also against the pro-insurgent population and the neutral population as a whole.

This unfocused use of force breaks the population's allegiance to and support for the government. That in turn erodes the intelligence gathering capabilities of the counter-insurgents, leading to even more indiscriminate direct actions. With each act, the pro-insurgent population grows at the expense of the pro-government population and the "… self-defeating cycle continues."[10] With no effort made by the government to address the grievances of the insurgents and their supporters throughout this process, the insurgents gain legitimacy and ultimately replace the existing government as the new legitimate authority.

In comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3, several differences emerge. First, government must make a real effort to address the grievances of the pro-insurgent population through the employment of psychological and civil-military cooperation operations. If successful, this action will begin to turn the neutral population toward the pro-government forces and may even shrink the pro-insurgent population base—affecting a form of isolation on the insurgents themselves. By increasing the pro-government population base and building trust in the neutral population, intelligence will begin to flow which will allow for the more focused use of forces against the insurgents. The focused use of force will continue to build the trust in the neutral population and may even undermine the insurgent cause. The pro-government population may expand further at

the expense of the pro-insurgent population, thus impacting directly upon their intelligence sources. In a successful counter-insurgency:

> The majority of the population must eventually come to see the insurgents as outsiders, as outlaws. The sea must dry up. When this happened during the Cold War insurgents in decline adopted tactics that only caused the population to resent them. Insurgents became a source of insecurity, not hope. Insurgents needed money, food and recruits, and if they did not secure them from willing supporters, they extorted them from the unwilling. They changed from noble to ignoble robbers.[11]



Figure 3: Successful Counterinsurgency Model

This model does much in terms of conceptualizing the nature of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies and it illustrates clearly the important role of intelligence. However, it is by no means the final word. Thomas Mockaitis offers another take on the problem of countering insurgencies.

The Combined Model—Superimposing Lynn with Mockaitis' Principles

In 1988, Thomas Mockaitis submitted his doctoral dissertation to the history department at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His dissertation was on the subject of the British experience with COIN from 1919 to 1960. Two years later it was published. It has since been regarded as "… the most comprehensive account to have appeared on the subject…."[12]

Citing primarily the British success in Malaya, Mockaitis defines three principles for counter-insurgency operations. The first principle, one of moderation, is the suppression of the insurgency with minimum force.[13] Based on good intelligence, this is achieved by knowing when, where and against whom to strike, as opposed to simply subduing the general population.

The second principle is that of cooperation. At all levels, not just strategic but down to the tactical, that of sections patrolling the streets, the military and the local civilian



Figure 4: Lynn—Mockaitis Combined Model

authorities must communicate and work together. Not only does this aid in the provision of intelligence, but it is also a critical first step in addressing the grievances of the pro-insurgent population.[14]

The third principle is that of decentralisation. Having to "… dispense with conventional tactics…"[15] counter-insurgent forces must devolve responsibility to small units as they can act with a greater degree of tactical flexibility.

Using Lynn's model of a successful counter-insurgency, one can see how Mockaitis' three principles apply (Figure 4). By focusing force on only the insurgents and their leadership, the intelligence link between the neutral population and the counter-insurgents is maintained, thus allowing for a further focusing of the counter-insurgent's combat power. Applying the second principle, that of civil-military co-operation at all levels, amplifies Lynn's concept of addressing the grievances in order to undermine the insurgent's motives. By ensuring co-operation, grievances will naturally be addressed in some form and intelligence can begin to flow from even the once pro-insurgent population. Finally, with the asymmetric nature of insurgent tactics, small unit actions typify the response of the counter-insurgent in such situations.

Although Mockaitis' contribution draws from a limited, colonial view of COIN, his principles are still worth considering. By suppressing the insurgency with controlled, focused force, one is not hoping to sway the existing insurgents to the cause of the government; rather, it is in an effort to not turn any of the neutral population towards them. Granted, members of *Al Qaeda* in Iraq will not be impressed by an American soldier's restraint, however, a shop-keeper whose store was not peppered with 25 mm chain gun fire will likely not turn towards the insurgency either.

The Lynn—Mockaitis combined model illustrates the synergy between the strategic *de jure* power and the tactical *de facto* power required in defeating any insurgency. It is not enough to have the right to rule when that right is threatened. It must be supported by a tactical ability to rule. That synergy is enabled through intelligence.

In the following sections, two case studies are held against this combined model. The first case study illustrates how French actions in Algeria hindered intelligence gathering and ultimately led to the failure of the French government in that conflict. The

second case study examines the actions employed by British forces in Malaya that enabled intelligence gathering and led ultimately to success. At first glance, it may seem that one is comparing dissimilar topics, as both were very different situations. However, by using the combined model as a framework, valuable themes emerge that are common to both and, as such, common to any COIN operation that one may face. That these cases are different shows the very strength of the combined model.

Case Study—Algerian War of Independence

Dressed in khaki pants and leather jackets, several native Algerians began erecting an improvised roadblock of rock and stone along a small road through the narrow Tighanimine gorge. It was late in the evening, on the 31st of October 1954 and the course of Algerian revolutionary history was about to take a new path. As a bus approached and began to slow upon encountering the roadblock, the Algerians, now armed with sub-machine guns and rifles, emerged from the side of the dusty, uneven road and peered into the windows of the now halted bus. Seeing a young French couple, they boarded and removed them. The Monnerots, both teachers at a school in Tiffelfel,[16] were taken into a ditch beside the road and shot.[17]

This incident, along with almost seventy others signified the beginning of the *Front de Libération Nationale's* (FLN) campaign against French colonialism and became an eight-year insurgency that would see Algerian independence and the fall of the French Fourth Republic.[18]

Having a history of being conquered, Algeria was first colonized by the Phoenicians in the ninth century B.C. and then fell to Roman rule in the second century B.C. Nine hundred years later, Algeria was conquered by the Arabs who remained in power until the sixteenth century when power was placed in the hands of the Ottoman Empire. It was not until 1830 that Algeria became a French colony. When the revolution occurred in 1954, native Algerians had lived under foreign rule for almost eighteen hundred years.[19] Resentment of foreign occupation had festered for quite sometime indeed.

In the years immediately preceding the events of the 31st of October "… the majority of Algeria's nine and a half million Muslims were living in abject poverty, devoid of either dignity or hope."[20] An Algerian Muslim could look forward to earning $45 in a year.[21] When compared to the earning of their European counterparts in the same country, anywhere from $240 to $3 000 per year, coupled with the heavy-handed tactics of local law enforcement at the time, a revolt was a foregone conclusion.[22]

The initial French response to the events of that late fall evening were that this was but a small flash of protest. The Mendès-France government deployed three battalions of paratroopers, the first arriving within twenty-four hours.[23] Their mission was to reinforce the fifty thousand soldiers already stationed in the North African nation with the hopes that the *fellaghas*[24] would yield to the obvious superiority of the French forces.[25]

Six months after the Monnerots were shot, Jacques Soustelle, the new governor-general of Algeria, created the *Sections Administratives Spécialisées* (Special Administrative Sections [SAS]), which operated for the remainder of the conflict.[26] Considered the most successful of the French initiatives to build relationships between the military and the civilian population, it was still fraught with problems and "… ultimately failed in its task of converting the bulk of the population to the French cause."[27]

The SAS were intended to "… re-establish contact between the administration and the administered." In theory, the creation of the SAS addressed the principle of civil-military cooperation and, if successful could have undermined the insurgent's grievances

and encouraged the intelligence flow according to the combined model. However, the initiatives were not implemented properly.

Although Robert Lacoste replaced Soustelle and had a decidedly more heavy-handed view of how the insurgency should be solved, Lacoste remained a proponent of the service. As he was unable to staff the SAS with civil servants due to shortages of personnel, he began filling the positions with junior French army officers. In his directive to the new members of the SAS, he stated that "…the essential task of the SAS program was the winning over of the Algerian masses by persuasion, not by force."[28] Lacoste expected "… political and psychological work …" from his junior officers, not just "… purely operational activity."[29] Yet once implemented the program began to rely "… on people who too often replaced psychology with brutality."[30] Further exacerbating the failures of the SAS was the tendency for their agents to encourage French cultural values at the expense of the native Algerian mores and traditions.[31]

It was not until the 13th of May 1958, with the fall of the Mendès-France government and the subsequent dissolution of the Fourth Republic, that any of the Algerian grievances were even considered.[32] Even when Charles DeGaulle, now the first leader under France's latest constitution, began addressing the legitimate grievances, change was slow in coming and it was not until 1962 that Algeria was allowed to proclaim independence. As the combined model shows, such actions most likely broke the flow of intelligence and, through the violation of Mockaitis' principle of effective civil-military cooperation, prevented the information from getting from the sources to the Algerian and French governments.

With the exception of the three paratrooper battalions, the French forces in Algeria were mechanized and conducted their operations mounted, in large units. This tactic kept the soldiers safe in the short term,[33] but also kept them out of contact with the civilian population and hindered low-level intelligence gathering. The armoured columns, made up of tanks and armoured personnel carriers were only able to influence the main roads in the north of the country. A colonel, commanding a French armoured regiment in Algeria lamented, "… all I can do is hold the road …."[34] Another French official commented ironically that technology and mechanization had deteriorated the French army's ability to quell insurrections. Had the French had tanks in the 1830s, "…they wouldn't have gotten off the beach at Sidi-Ferruch!"[35] In place of the armoured regiments, the French needed horses and mules or at least helicopters. All were in short supply.[36]

Overall, the French army's response was "… largely ineffective in its efforts to stamp out the rebellion; it did not adapt … and had little contact with population."[37] Without contact with the population, something that small unit operations encourage, trust and relationships cannot be built and potential human intelligence sources are left unexploited.

One documented exception to this lack of decentralisation was with employment of aerial reconnaissance. The need to speed up the intelligence cycle in order to provide more relevant and timely information to the consumers who can then bring combat power to bear on the target was recognised early. In 1955, drawing on their experiences from the war in Indochina, the French Air Force pushed command of the tactical aviation groups (GATACs) to each regional Army corps within Algeria.[38] Despite the success enjoyed by the French Air Force, this was reconnaissance, not a replacement for sound, tactical human intelligence. Aerial reconnaissance cannot identify a local insurgent leader.[39] The innovation and decentralisation applied in the air did not translate onto the ground where it was sorely needed.[40]

A typical border fort in Sarawak. It has an observation tower, bunkers made of logs and sandbags linked by communication trenches, and a stepped walkway up the hill—essential in the muddy conditions created by tropical rainfall—made of cannibalized ammunition boxes. Note the tall poles supporting radio aerials, and the vegetation cleared away to provide good fields of fire.

This, Mockaitis' principle of small unit actions, was only followed sporadically in the Algerian example and as such, efforts against the insurgents, as noted above, were "…largely ineffective."[41] Applied to the combined model, the insurgents avoided the massed forces of the French army and continued with their attacks against the counter-insurgents and the pro-French population, thus further eroding intelligence gathering abilities.

The final and most widely accepted principle,—suppression with minimum force—was completely ignored throughout the Algerian war. Some debate does exist around this point, as Heggoy claims that French forces initially operated with restraint, with rules of engagement that allowed for the use of deadly force only once provoked.[42] However, it is noted elsewhere that "… the practice of torture was already endemic in North Africa …"[43] and that excessive use of force on the battlefield was just as much a problem.[44]

After almost three years of fighting and increases in French troop strength to over 400,000, the French government felt the end to the insurgency was no closer.[45] Although tactically successful, French forces had so far been unable to break the insurgency. In response to these tactical defeats, the FLN and its supporters shifted their focus to the cities, principally, the capital city of Algiers. Beginning in the fall of 1956, pro-government

and pro-FLN agents began a campaign of terrorism against each other, exploding bombs in markets, the Algerian quarter of the city known as the Casbah, and any other public place.[46] Finally, in January of 1957, Lacoste charged the French 10th Parachute Division, commanded by Major General Jacques Massu, with "… the maintenance of peace in the capital."[47] With that decree, the battle of Algiers had begun.

Massu immediately instituted a policy that depended on "… fear and duress …."[48] Torture quickly became accepted practice and was openly defended as a means of collecting intelligence.[49] Seen as expedient, torture and, in the language of the combined model, the dismissal of the principle of suppression with minimum force, proved otherwise. Debate in the literature exists over the tactical outcome of the Battle of Algiers,[50] however, the effects of the torture tactic on intelligence gathering are obvious and twofold. First, by imprisoning, torturing and killing thousands of Algerians, "Algerians swung to support the FLN …"[51]. Second, as David Sussman pointed out in his discussion on the merits of torture, quite often the intelligence produced by these means tends to be suspect. Sussman indicates, "Torture is a notoriously unreliable way of gathering intelligence."[52] Quite often the victim will say anything, simply to put an end to the suffering. Not only does torture turn the population against the perpetrating power, but also its product is suspect. Taking it one step further, the allegations of torture also eroded popular support for the counter-insurgency in Paris and were openly denounced by de Gaulle.[53]

In the case of the French experience in Algeria, the flow of intelligence from the population had been severed. The pro-insurgent population had grown and the intelligence "… death spiral …"[54] had begun. The failure of the French to apply the combined model through ineffective cooperation between civilian and military officials, limited decentralization of forces, and a complete disregard for the limits of force led to the intelligence gap. This gap, in no small part, caused the counter-insurgency to fail, brought down the French government and led to an attempted military coup in France.

Case Study—Malayan Emergency

On the western edge of the state of Pahang, along the boarder with Selangor in Malaya, sits the *Fraser's Hill Rest House*. British Army Captain Eric "Birdie" Smith decided to stop in and visit the rest house enroute to joining his battalion. It was Smith's first day in Malaya and he was part of the United Kingdom's initial response to the growing emergency in 1948. Having only heard that the Malayan Races' Liberation Army (MRLA) had been keeping the British forces in Malaya on their heels, he was about to see it first hand.[55]

Gunfire erupted, albeit faintly in the distance, and Smith got in his scout car and headed towards the sound of the firing. Upon rounding a corner, he saw the remnants of a three-vehicle convoy. The first vehicle, a jeep, was riddled with bullets. The driver, slumped at the wheel, was dead and so too were the two soldiers in the back. As Smith approached the two remaining vehicles, both trucks, his scout car came under small arms fire. A quick burst from his vehicle's machine gun silenced the hostility; Smith continued along the road. Scattered around the two trucks, lay several bodies, all of them of the MRLA. As he approached, two tired but grinning *Gurkha*[56] soldiers emerged from the cover of the wreckage, they having been the ones who repelled the MRLA attack, keeping the insurgents from retrieving any of the much-needed weapons from the dead and wounded.[57]

Occupying the southern half of the Malay Peninsula, Malaya now forms the western part of the modern Federation of Malaysia. A Hindu nation from the 9th to the 15th centuries, Malaya then became principally Islamic. During the periods of colonization,

first Portuguese, then Dutch and then finally British control befell the nation with the Malay states federating under British rule in 1896. The British sought the rubber plantations of Malaya and used immigrant labour from China to these ends.[58] With the introduction of migrant Chinese workers, society quickly stratified along ethnic lines. As the plantations and tin mines began to fail in the early part of the 20th century, many turned to communism after losing their jobs.[59]

In 1930, after almost a decade of discussion and experimentation, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was formed.[60] With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Japanese invaded and occupied Malaya, and the MCP began an active resistance to them, supported by the Malayan government and to some extent the British as well.[61]

However, soon the very forces that the British in Malaya encouraged would turn against them. By 1948, the mostly communist Chinese in Malaya numbered just over a third of the total population. With wage disparity and quality of life issues at the forefront of the grievances, communist Malays began revolting and the MCP was outlawed.[62] The MCP wanted an independent, communist nation. Although the English response was slow, by 1952 some twenty-three battalions totalling almost 40 000 soldiers were operating against the MRLA in an effort to quell the insurgency.[63] It lasted until 1960.

Initially, responses to attacks by the MRLA were in the form of a commander dispatching a battalion of soldiers.[64] Units of this size, numbering almost 1 000, would only arrive in time to clean up after the insurgents; burying the local police, putting out the fires and trying to account for the missing weapons. It was very quickly realized that a platoon, numbering only thirty, could respond faster and " … often [check] the attack."[65] Operations in Malaya belonged to platoon and section commanders. As this type of distributed operation became the norm, relationships with the local police and villagers developed and in keeping with the combined model, the intelligence flow increased.

As a corollary, this increased flow of intelligence along with the decentralized nature of small unit operations allowed for a tightening of the intelligence cycle. " … Young [platoon commanders] learned to react quickly and effectively…"[66] to a very fluid situation. As the combined model illustrates, by observing Mockaitis' principle of small unit actions, effective force was applied, relationships were built and intelligence was enabled.

It was referred to as *The Three Legged Stool*. Useless unless all three legs were present, this was the metaphor for the importance of the relationship between operations, intelligence and the civilian administration during the Malayan emergency. However, it took almost four years to develop. In general, this important three-way relationship was deficient and in particular, intelligence was seen as "… [Britain's] Achilles heel"[67] up until 1952.[68]

Initially, the Federation of Malaya's Criminal Investigation Department (CID) created a Special Branch (SB) that was responsible for the intelligence relating to the emergency. It failed to generate any useful information. It was undermanned with a staff of only twelve officers and forty-four inspectors and did not develop its staff in intelligence matters. However, with the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations in mid-1950, reforms were instituted.[69] First, Briggs set up a training system for the SB staff and he then set about to expand the SB. By the end of 1953, SB had 123 officers and 195 inspectors.[70] Finally, Briggs seconded military intelligence officers to SB as advisors[71] and re-established the Chinese Affairs Department, which specialized in bridging the gap between the government and the Chinese population.[72]

Briggs also conceived of the resettlement plan, which of late is being credited as the key to British success in Malaya.[73] The plan called for the construction of new villages, each one fortified and isolated. By controlling access and supplies to these settlements, the recruiting and supply bases of the insurgents was removed. Furthermore, and ensuring the new villages' security, intelligence could be more readily extracted, often without solicitation, let alone coercion. The policy proved to have "… spectacular results."[74] MRLA communications and supply lines were routinely targeted and cut off. Regardless of whether one believes it was the focus on addressing the grievances of the population or the population controls implemented by General Briggs, both of these efforts boosted the intelligence flow. It was the intelligence flow that allowed for the focused combat power that brought an end to the insurgency.

In 1952, General Sir Gerald Templer took over from Briggs as both Director of Operations and high commissioner.[75] With his arrival, he further tuned the civil-military relationship identified as one of Mockaitis' three principles. What he said in 1952 emasculated the insurgents. He stated the British aim was that of a stable and independent Malaya. Templer understood that the "… fighting of the war and the civil running of the country 'were completely and utterly interrelated.' He refused to allow a military takeover of what essentially remained a civil problem."[76] This understanding of the civil-military relationship permeated down to the tactical level. One unit in particular became quite successful:

> … due in no small part to the thinking of … Frank Kitson. Major Kitson [developed] ideas that were to have a considerable impact on army thinking: ' My actual contribution in Malaya was limited to sorting out a small terrorist remnant that was in the very small area in which I operated, but I tried to devise a system with my own company in Malaya for building up background information into contact information, using the Special Branch officers to get the background information that I needed to build up on and see if it worked … this idea that it is up to the commanders of conventional military forces to get and use information to get more information—and that I maintain, is what tactics are in the counter-insurgency situation.[77]

From the strategic level of Briggs with population controls and Templer addressing the legitimate grievances to Kitson building contacts at the tactical level, the concept of civil-military cooperation was pervasive in Malaya. This cooperation directly enhanced the ability of the British counter-insurgents to collect, analyse and act on intelligence. From the perspective of the combined model, the principle of civil-military cooperation at all levels addressed the grievances, enabled intelligence and prevented the unfocused use of force during the emergency.

Now in the opposite direction of Lynn's *death spiral*, the increased intelligence flow enables Mockaitis' final principle of suppression with minimum force. Asprey points out that in Malaya "… patience had to replace impetuosity."[78] In building his three principles of COIN operations, Mockaitis describes how the British government handled one particular deviation from the minimum use of force.

Early in 1952, a patrol of Royal Marines came across an MRLA insurgent—known colloquially as a Communist Terrorist (CT)[79]—and killed him. All patrols had been instructed to positively identify each CT killed or captured and this one was no exception. Having no camera, the Marines had to return with the body of the CT. The patrol had suffered casualties, losing their officer and had several wounded soldiers to carry back to the patrol base. The decision was made to decapitate the corpse and return with only the head of the CT. Shortly thereafter, a photo of smiling Marines holding the head

appeared on the cover of the *Daily Worker*, outraging millions both at home in England and in Malaya and was seen as "… a reprehensible act."[80] Although the expediency of the decapitation in this case for the purposes of identification was acknowledged by the First Lord of the Admiralty to Cabinet, the practice was condemned as "… the political odium which it involved outweighed any military gain."[81]

In his assessment of British COIN operations in Kenya, Cyprus and Malaya, Kitson holds that "… the use of force against terrorists must be carefully worked out in conjunction with measures designed to mitigate any unfavourable impact which it may have on the people's attitudes, but it cannot be avoided altogether."[82] Closely linked with the principle of small unit actions, Malaya was a war of patrols, a battle for the junior leaders of the British army to fight and win. "Random shelling of open areas or suspected guerrilla areas …"[83] was useless. Intelligence was needed to find and kill the insurgents and this was achieved by getting local community leaders "… to cooperate with the soldiers and to promote the flow of information to them."[84] Imprecise engagements would only alienate the population and turn them towards the insurgents.

As the French experience in Algeria showed, nothing alienates a population more effectively than allegations of torture;[85] the British in Malaya understood this. Commander of the newly formed 22 Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, Colonel Michael Calvert was enjoying a pint at the officer's mess when a visiting police officer began offering his advice on the subject of getting CTs to talk. The guest began espousing the virtues of burning prisoners with cigarettes " … and other unpleasantness"[86] and Calvert replied simply "Is that what you think?"[87]

"Yes, that's the answer,"[88] replied the visitor. With that, Calvert literally threw him out of the bar. He then turned and asked those around him why he had done that. After several failed attempts on their part, he explained:

> … we picked up a Korean who had been reporting our positions to the Japanese. I said to him, "What would the Japanese have done to you if you'd been helping us against them?" And he said, "They would have killed me." So I said to him, "And what do you expect we shall do?" "Well I suppose you will kill me." I said "That's where you're wrong, because in the British Empire we don't need to behave like that and we don't behave like that. You have been misguided in helping the Japanese and I am going to set you free, so long as you promise not to help the Japanese any more."[89]

Calvert then expanded that, had he shot the Korean, his family and friends would have grown to hate the English. Having spared him, they would be grateful. The 22 SAS Regiment's Intelligence Officer concluded, "… wars don't end just when the shooting stops. The results of war go on for generations."[90]

Perhaps seen as somewhat idealistic, the story recounted above is not without merits. The British in Malaya made extensive use of what they called surrendered enemy personnel (SEPs). These captured CTs, instead of being tortured, executed or simply imprisoned, were offered substantial financial rewards in exchange for information leading to the capture of other CTs or the successful interception of insurgent supplies. By publicizing their willingness to reward SEPs, the British were able to further increase the flow of intelligence from now not only the neutral and pro-government populations, but also the once pro-insurgent population as well.91

Intelligence is not gained by indiscriminate acts of violence or torture. To ignore this, as the combined model illustrates, turns the population away, hampers the flow of intelligence and perpetuates the aptly named "death spiral." Success in Malaya came

from the recognition that small unit patrols are more effective than battalion-sized deliberate attacks. It came from the understanding that cooperation between both civilian agencies and the military must occur at all levels. Finally, it was achieved by suppressing the insurgency with focused, minimal force. This kept the insurgents checked, but also encouraged the population to speak out against those that were eroding their security and well-being.

Lessons from the Case Studies

As the name implies, case studies are unique examples and some of what has been presented above may be unique to those operations. Each situation will be different. However, the combined model simply needs to be applied creatively to fit the situation. What is universal is the relationship between the application of the combined model and its effect on intelligence. This model, when applied, is cyclical as success reinforced success in Malaya and failure reinforced failure in Algeria.

What is immutable is that if force is applied indiscriminately, gathering intelligence becomes proportionately harder, thus resulting in further indiscriminate application. If the grievances of the pro-insurgent population are not addressed in some way through civil-military cooperation, intelligence is difficult to gather. If small units do not operate with some degree of autonomy, gathering and developing their own intelligence thereby tightening the intelligence cycle, insurgents will escape decisive engagement.

In examining these case studies, and this falls in line with Mockaitis' thinking,[92] the key principle appears to be that of limiting the use of force. Where the French in Algeria clearly disregarded this principle with disastrous results, the British in Malaya observed this principle and as such were able to quell the insurgency.

One may question the utility in focusing effort on addressing grievances of the pro-insurgent population in contemporary examples. Clearly, the anarchy that reigns in the streets of Baghdad appears to have no end state other than the ousting of western *infidels*. Members of al-Jamaa Brigades are clearly not impressed by the restraint shown by soldiers in Tikrit. However, this may be changing too.

With the elections having just finished in Iraq, some Sunni and Shia insurgents groups are hinting at wanting to talk, in an effort to bring about an end to the violence and see the western soldiers leave.[93] That being said, the end is far from being in sight as it is estimated that some seventy-four different insurgent groups are operating in Iraq.[94] Just as Arafat had difficulty reigning in the various Palestinian groups, any interlocutor in Iraq faces the same challenges. That all being said, there seems to be a glimmer of hope in the otherwise ugly situation in Iraq today. The need remains to be willing to negotiate, and in so doing, addressing some of the grievances in that struggling state.

The Combined Model and the Emerging Canadian Doctrine

With this understanding of an effective counter-insurgency model, does Canadian doctrine follow this thinking? Will Canadian doctrine abide by the principle of civil-military cooperation at all levels, the primacy of small unit operations and suppression with minimum force? Will the doctrine target the insurgents, address the grievances and build relationships with the population? Will the doctrine recognize and enable the effective flow of intelligence at all levels? In the course of developing Canadian COIN doctrine, American, Canadian and other allied militaries examined a host of existing doctrine; all agreed that the United Kingdom's answer was best.[95] In September of 2005

a draft of the tentatively titled *Counter-insurgency Manual* was circulated for comment.[96] For the most part, the emerging Canadian doctrine follows the combined model.

The manual expands Mockaitis' three principles to nine. However, after some examination, the principles are broadly grouped into either Mockaitis' principle of civil-military cooperation at all levels or the principle of suppression with minimum force. What is not addressed is the importance of small unit operations.[97] The United States Marine Corps has recently developed this principle through what they have termed "Distributed Operations."[98] Based on platoon-sized elements, the concept calls for these elements to operate at distances in excess of several hundred kilometres from their higher headquarters.[99] Although not entirely foreign to Canadian doctrine,[100] this is a concept that must be articulated in the emerging Canadian COIN doctrine.

The *COIN Manual* emphasizes the need for the counter-insurgents to continually undermine the insurgents and their base of support through offering a "… legal, viable alternative to the insurgency…."[101] This too is in keeping with the combined model and echoes much of the British experience in Malaya.

Given the importance of intelligence in COIN operations, it is not surprising that the *COIN Manual* devotes a chapter to this topic. However, one of the key conclusions that come from the combined model, and one advocated by Kitson himself, is not indicated in the *COIN Manual*. Intelligence must be devolved in order to remain relevant. As the second case study illustrated through Kitson's account of his days as a company commander in Malaya, small unit commanders must be able to establish and develop their own contacts, building a relationship in order to produce actionable intelligence. This concept is not readily apparent in the draft *COIN Manual*.

Insurgencies and the subsequent need to counter them are not new to the broader spectrum of conflict. This form of low intensity conflict has kept militaries around the world gainfully employed since the time of the Hittites. Yet it seems to be new to Canada as it has been only recently that attempts to formalize a doctrine addressing this pervasive form of conflict has occurred.

Insurgencies are complex, and each one is unique to a certain extent. Would the British have been successful if they found themselves in Algeria instead of Malaya? Would the French have failed to the extent that they did in Algeria had they been operating in Malaya? What is clear is the need for a sound understanding of the insurgent-counter-insurgent dynamic and important enabling role intelligence plays. The combined model is indeed a sufficient instrument and that the troubles spent were not in vain at all.

About the Author …

Captain Christian H. Breede graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada in 2002 with a first class honours undergraduate degree in Politics and Economics. Upon commissioning, he was posted to 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, where he served as a Platoon Commander for two years. In March of 2004, he deployed to Haiti as part of Operation HALO as a duty officer in the NCE and liaison officer to the US Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Capt. Breede has also served as the Intelligence Officer, Technical Adjutant and as a rifle company LAV Captain in 2nd Battalion. In March 2006, Capt. Breede worked as the Operations Officer for the Tactics School and in January 2007 returned to Battalion duty as the Rear Party Adjutant for the 2nd Battalion Battle Group now serving in Afghanistan. Captain Breede is currently completing a Masters degree in International Relations as the University of New Brunswick.

Endnotes

1. "NATO in Afghanistan" www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/ accessed on 19 Nov 05.
2. McCaffrey Barry R. "Afghans have voted for change, but it will come only if the U.S. stays the course" *Armed Forces Journal* (November 2005) pp. 16-19. This article asserts that American involvement in Afghanistan will continue, but only in a leadership role and at the strategic level. The U.S. is looking to NATO, and NATO is preparing for the eventual expansion of ISAF to include the entire country of Afghanistan.
3. See Vance Serchuk "Innovative teams are building goodwill at the grass-roots level" *Armed Forces Journal* (November 2005) p. 23-24 for a more thorough explanation of a PRT's role and composition in Afghanistan.
4. From an interview conducted with Major (CA) David Lambert. Director Army Doctrine 4-2, Director General Land Combat Development in November 2005 and *Interim Doctrine for Stability Ops and Urban Patrolling TTPs*. Email sent 22 August 2005.
5. Mockaitis, Thomas R. *British Counter-insurgency, 1919-60* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1990), p. 1-16.
6. The particular tactics employed by guerrillas and insurgents has not changed significantly since the first recorded guerrilla action in the Hittite parchment *Anastas*. Even Mao Tse-tung's work is simply Sun Tzu restated. For a summary of the insurgent's history, see Beckett, Ian F.W. *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*. London: Routledge, 2001.
7. Mockaitis. p. 2.
8. Ibid, p. 3.
9. Lynn, John A. "Patterns of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency." *Military Review*, (July-August 2005), p. 23.
10. Ibid, p. 25.
11. Ibid, p. 27.
12. Popplewell, Richard. "Lacking Intelligence: Some Reflections of Recent Approaches to British Counter-insurgency, 1900-1960." *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 336.
13. Mockaitis, Thomas R. *British Counter-insurgency*, 1919-60 (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1990), p. 13.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid, p. 14.
16. Horne, Alistair. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. p. 91.
17. The story of the Monnerots is infamous for its tragedy as both were considered liberal in their views towards Algeria and came to the country to address the rampant illiteracy plaguing the country. Exactly what happened that night it somewhat vague and accounts conflict. In Heggoy, A Andrew. *Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in Algeria*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. p. 68. it appears that only Guy, the husband, was deliberately shot and his wife only accidentally. In Horne, it is retold that both were accidentally shot as the real target, a local Algerian government sympathizer was the real target. Either way, the incident characterizes the indiscriminate and tragic nature of the Algerian war.
18. Lenman, Bruce P. *Chambers Dictionary of World History*. (Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap Ltd, 1993) p. 27.
19. *Oxford Reference Encyclopaedia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 38.
20. Asprey, Robert B. *War in the Shadows: A Guerrilla History Volume II* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc, 1975) p. 999.
21. Ibid.
22. Heggoy. p. 71.
23. Ibid, p. 77.
24. The term used for the insurgents in Algeria, meaning "bandit". Asprey. Op Cit. p. 1001
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid, p. 1002.
27. Ibid, p. 1017.
28. Heggoy. p. 189.
29. Ibid, p. 189
30. Asprey. p. 1018.
31. Ibid.
32. Horne, p. 313-314.
33. If an occupying force simply patrols main roads, mounted and at high-speed security is eroded in the long term. Although the soldiers on such patrols are safe during the patrol, unless they dismount and patrol on foot, into the neighbourhoods and communicate with the local population, they will be unable to establish an effective security presence and the overall situation will deteriorate.
34. Horne, p. 100.
35. Ibid. The town of Sidi-Ferruch sits on the Mediterranean ocean in Algeria and was the site of the initial French invasion in 1830 ordered by Charles X. From www.linternaute.com/histoire/motcle/1633/a/1/1/sidi_ferruch.shtml accessed on 20 November 2005.
36. Ibid.
37. Heggoy. p. 83
38. Alexander, Martin S. and J.F.V. Keiger (eds). *France and the Algerian War 1954-62*. London: Frank Cass, 2002. p. 67-9.
39. At least not in the 1950s as it is arguably possible in 2005.
40. Frank Kitson developed this concept of low-level source development in his *Bunch of Five*. London: Faber and Faber,

1977 and it will be expanded upon in subsequent sections.
41. Heggoy. p. 83.
42. Ibid, p. 79.
43. Merom, Gil. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 111.
44. Ibid.
45. Later research would show that this was an issue of perception as those in the FLN felt that after de Gaulle took power in France, the revolution would end and they would have to live with France's terms. This actually had the benefit of addressing some of the Algerian's legitimate grievances after all. Horne, p. 315.
46. Heggoy. p. 232-3.
47. Ibid, p. 233.
48. Ibid, p. 1011.
49. Ibid and Heggoy, p. 236.
50. Asprey (p. 1012-3) contends that although the French affected losses against the FLN, the FLN was not eliminated as claimed by Heggoy (p. 235). However, both authors agree on the strategic impact of the battle, regardless of the combat effectiveness of the FLN afterwards.
51. Heggoy. p. 244.
52. Sussman, David. "What's Wrong with Torture?" *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 2005 (Vol. 33. No.1) p. 12.
53. Horne, p 339.
54. Lynn. p. 25.
55. Allen, Charles. *The Savage Wars of Peace*. London: Michael Joseph, 1990. p. 4.
56. Originally of Nepalese decent, the British Army maintains three battalions of the *Royal Gurkha Rifles* as part of their *Brigade of Gurkhas*. Gurkhas have reputation for being fierce soldiers in combat and continue to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq. From www.army.mod.uk/brigade_of_gurkhas/.
57. Ibid. p. 5.
58. *Oxford Reference Encyclopaedia*. p. 858.
59. Kitson, Frank. p 70-1.
60. Short, Anthony. *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1946—60*. London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1975. p. 20.
61. Ibid, p. 21-25.
62. Ibid, p. 28-30.
63. Kitson, p. 76.
64. Asprey. p. 865.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. p. 866.
67. Briggs, Lieutenant General Sir Harold. As quoted in Stewart, Brian. "Winning in Malaya: An Intelligence Success Story." *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1999), pp. 269.
68. Ibid and Hack, Karl. "British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya." *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 128.
69. Stewart. p. 269.
70. Hack.p. 128.
71. Stewart. p. 269
72. Ibid. pp. 270.
73. Hack. p. 124. However, some debate exists on the exact success of this policy. In Carruthers, Susan L. *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgencie, 1944—1960*. London: Leicester University Press, 1995, p. 91 it is suggested that initially, the creation of these new villages actually led to increased resentment. It took sometime before the resettlement had the desired effect. It was by no means the only factor that led to success in Malaya.
74. Asprey. p. 870.
75. Ibid. p. 867.
76. Ibid, p. 869.
77. Allen. p 45-6.
78. Asprey. p. 872.
79. From the outset, there was considerable debate in London on how exactly to refer to the MRLA. From 1948 to 1952, for arguably dubious reasons, the term "bandit" was used in place of "enemy" or "insurgent". It was not until 1952 and the appointment of Templer that the term "Communist Terrorist" was coined and authorized to refer to the MRLA members. For more on this semantic debate, see Carruthers, Susan L. Op. 85.
80. Mockaitis. p. 53.
81. Ibid.
82. Kitson. p. 283.
83. Asprey. p. 871.
84. From Major-General Richard Clutterbuck, veteran of the Malayan campaign as quoted in Asprey. p. 871.
85. Not to mention the effect such allegations have had on current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
86. Allen. p. 52.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.

89. As told by John Woodhouse, Intelligence Officer for 22 SAS, in Allen. Op cit.
90. Ibid.
91. Carruthers, Susan L. p. 89.
92. Mockaitis. p. vii. Four out of the seven sections in Mockaitis' work deal explicitly with the use of force.
93. "Are any of them ready to talk? The Economist, (December 3rd—9th, 2005) p. 43.
94. Ibid, p. 44.
95. From an interview with Major David Lambert, DAD 4-2 on 10th November, 2005.
96. From a note to file, dated September 6th, 2005 entitled "Covering note for Draft COIN Manual—Sep 05" released on behalf of the Director Army Doctrine, Kingston Ontario.
97. Recalling Mockaitis' three principles, the COIN Manual cites the following nine principles instead:
    a. Primacy of political goals;
    b. Coordination between all civilian agencies;
    c. Understand the insurgency environment;
    d. Exploit intelligence;
    e. Isolate insurgents from physical and moral support;
    f. Limit the use of force;
    g. Neutralize the insurgent;
    h. Commit to the long term COIN operation, and
    i. Conduct long term post-insurgency planning.

With the exception of f) and g), which address the use of force, the rest of the principles address the nature of civil-military cooperation. This list does not address the need for small unit operations. The list was adapted from B-GL-323-004/FP-003, *Draft COIN Manual*. September 2005, Chapter 3.
98. Lowe, Christian. "Can DO: Distributed operations taps big potential in the Marine Corps' small units." *Armed Forces Journal*. (September 2005), p. 32-35.
99. Ibid. p 32.
100. Previous operations in the Balkans and more recently in Haiti have seen this concept used effectively. In the Balkans, "Platoon Houses" would be established, operating independently and for several weeks at a time. During operations in Haiti in 2004, Platoon-sized elements would be dispatched to smaller villages, several hundred kilometres from the main camp. These patrols would operate for several days and then return to the base camp.
101. B-GL-323-004/FP-003, *Draft COIN Manual*. September 2005, Chapter 3.

FROM ETHOS TO CULTURE: SHAPING THE FUTURE OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE

Captain Andrew J. Duncan

The emergence of a more fluid security environment has created many challenges for the Intelligence Corps and Branches of many countries. New threats can emerge quickly, leading to a requirement for intelligence personnel to be more dynamic with regards to their ability to analyze and interpret complex situations. In recognition of this trend, evolving doctrinal concepts such as "intelligence-driven operations" now place a heavier burden on intelligence officers and operators to learn and understand potential enemies than in previous periods. Meanwhile, the evolving emphasis on the non-physical planes of conflict has added new demands on intelligence personnel to support information operations. These developments have been accompanied by an explosion in the ability to process and distribute information through the use of computer networks, leading to an "information age" that not only benefits the transformation of information into intelligence, but also creates numerous management challenges.

Army Intelligence within the Canadian Forces therefore, must rise to these challenges, whilst maintaining operational commitments and contributing to the profession of arms as a whole. However, an additional challenge presents itself. There still exists within the Army a lack of awareness regarding the role of Army Intelligence and the intelligence function in general, despite the recent positive comments of general officers.

The challenges to Army Intelligence create two requirements. First, Army Intelligence must shape its own internal culture in order to adapt to the changing security environment. In the long term, this will better position Army Intelligence to fulfil its role and to provide effective support to operations. Second, Army Intelligence must shape the way in which it is perceived by the Army as a whole. This will benefit the Army by generating awareness of intelligence capabilities and setting the conditions for improved operational effectiveness.

The aim of this essay is to suggest some ways in which key stakeholders in the management of the Army's intelligence capability can positively shape the culture of both Army Intelligence personnel, and the wider culture of the Army. This aim will be achieved through a number of suggested actions that are linked to a proposed Army Intelligence ethos and that are designed to have an impact both internal and external to the Army Intelligence community.

Ethos and Culture: From the Ideal to the Practical in the Army and Army Intelligence

The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1987) defines "ethos" as "characteristic spirit and beliefs of community, system, literary work or person". Ethos is thus the intellectual ideal of what a particular institution or community ought to be. The reality, referred to as "culture," is defined as "a particular form, stage or type of intellectual development." The relationship between ethos and culture is similar to the distinction between the verbs "ought" and "is." Ethos represents an ideal or belief, whereas culture represents a reality. Ethos, while theoretical, is a critical unifying factor within the profession of arms as it links the profession's expertise, responsibilities and identity into one cohesive whole through the culture it influences.

Because ethos plays a critical role, it is important to occasionally examine a profession's ethos to determine whether it is effectively shaping culture to meet current and future challenges. For intelligence officers and operators within Army Intelligence, the need is particularly acute. Human relationship and link-analysis products are becoming just as important as properly marked maps for operations. New operators within the battlespace such as civilian-military co-operation (CIMIC) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) both use and contribute to products. Information systems provide a breadth of information that was not available to Cold War operators and analysts. These and many other challenges demand a re-examination of both the ethos of Army Intelligence personnel and that of their non-intelligence peers who are involved in the intelligence function.

Army Intelligence must examine its ethos and define the ideal that it wishes to achieve. This, of course, must occur within the context of the greater Army ethos, as well as that expressed by the branch. Once this ethos is established, practical goals that are in line with that ethos need to be chosen in order to replicate that ethos within the culture of the Army and Army Intelligence. These practical goals may be either within Army Intelligence in order to address internal cultural issues or external to it in order to alter the perception of the Army as a whole.

The Canadian Forces and Army Ethos

The Canadian Forces (CF) military ethos is presented in *Duty with Honour*. Ethos consists of a series of components: beliefs and expectations, Canadian values and core Canadian military values. Each of these components will be discussed briefly.

The fundamental beliefs and expectations underlying military service include acceptance of unlimited liability, fighting spirit, discipline and teamwork. Through acceptance of unlimited liability, CF members accept and understand that they are subject to being lawfully ordered into harm's way under conditions that could lead to the loss of their lives. To this is added fighting spirit, which imparts to individuals the moral, physical, and intellectual qualities necessary to operate in conditions of extreme danger and hardship, and approach assigned missions with the confidence and tenacity required to succeed. Discipline too, plays a major role, instilling self-assurance, resiliency and self-control in the face of adversity. Finally, teamwork permits military members and units to prevail in the most complex and dangerous situations.[1]

The legitimacy of the CF as a profession within Canadian society relies on its acceptance of the same values and beliefs of the society it defends. This acceptance is limited only by functional requirements. Acceptance of Canadian values means that the CF and its members must respect the rights and freedoms of all Canadians, the democratic principles upon which Canada's parliamentary democracy is based, the belief in peace, order and good government, the dignity of persons, and obedience to and support of lawful authorities.[2]

Last but not least, the Canadian military values, as learned through history and experience, provide CF members with the values required to conduct operations up to and including warfighting. There are four recognized values. Duty, the first and foremost, motivates individuals and units to push for the highest standard of performance. Duty is followed by a reciprocal loyalty based on mutual trust, both vertically and across the chain of command. Integrity is stressed, and is defined as a principled approach to meeting obligations while being responsible and accountable for actions. Finally, courage remains a distinctly personal quality that allows a person to perform the "right" action, regardless of the cost of the action in terms of physical difficulty, risk, advancement or popularity.[3]

Together, these components form the military ethos of the CF and set the context for the Army's expression of its ethos in *Canada's Army*. While *Canada's Army* is an older document than *Duty with Honour*, and was perhaps the basis for many of the ideas contained therein, it still clarifies the Army ethos within the context of the CF. The Army ethos is based on four precepts, similar to the CF's Canadian military values. Duty and integrity are both stressed, along with discipline (which appears as a fundamental in the CF's ethos structure). However, the Army adds honour as a precept:

> "…loyal to unit and faithful to comrades; granting quarter to an opponent and respecting fully the law of armed conflict, including treating surrendered enemy and non-combatants humanely and protecting them from harm; adhering to professional values and upholding the traditions of the service; and displaying gallantry, courtesy, dignity, and chivalry in one's everyday actions and conduct."[4]

The Army further amplifies its precepts with "Military Virtues" including truth, duty, loyalty, sacrifice, trust, competence, initiative, good example and ability to inspire. Canada's Army defines these individually held virtues as being essential to sustaining the Army ethos. They are manifested in various ways throughout the Army[5]

Any definition of Army Intelligence ethos must fall within the established ethos "frameworks" of the CF and the Army. Because the CF and Army ethos are fairly broad, it is helpful to further narrow the focus by briefly examining the Army Intelligence mission and vision, as well as the cultural goals of Directorate Land Force Readiness 2 (DLFR 2). The Army Intelligence mission, as described in a presentation given to the Intelligence Branch Senate, is:

> "To support all Land Forces activities; in particular, Force Generation, with timely and actionable intelligence, in order to contribute to CF mission success."

The same presentation described the vision of what Army Intelligence wished to become as:

> "A mature, capability-based and sustainable army intelligence structure, relying on trained and motivated professional operators (both regular and reserve), capable of providing relevant and timely actionable intelligence in support of Land Forces activities at every level."[6]

Further into the presentation, DLFR 2 identifies the following cultural issues facing Army Intelligence:

- the requirement to develop a better sense of unity within Army Intelligence;
- the requirement to increase Army awareness of intelligence capabilities and limitations;
- the need for Army Intelligence to adjust to the ever-changing circumstances quickly and efficiently; and
- an overall need for all members of the Land Forces to be integrated and educated within the operational functions of Sense (commander driving intelligence, every soldier is a sensor, intelligence training to land forces, etc).[7]

Implied by these issues is some direction as to the form that Army Intelligence ethos must take, taking into account the internal Army intelligence community and the external Army audience.

The Army Intelligence Ethos

A proposed Army Intelligence ethos can best be expressed in two parts. The first, which is termed the "Fundamental Requirements of Army Intelligence," outlines what

history has taught are the characteristics required of a successful military intelligence organization. In some ways these are identical to the principles governing the function, organization and operation of the combat intelligence system as outlined in B-GL-357-001/FP-001 *Intelligence Field Manual*. However, this document focuses more on the "spirit" within which the function and its personnel must operate in order to thrive. The second part, termed "The Values of Military Intelligence Professionals," outlines specific personal values that must be held by Army Intelligence personnel in order to properly practice the intelligence function. The fundamental requirements of Army Intelligence are as follows:

Objectivity. In order to provide an accurate understanding of the environment and the enemy to commanders and their staff, personnel performing the intelligence function must maintain as objective a viewpoint as possible. Although it is tempting to tailor the interpretation of information to a commander's viewpoint, doing so invariably results in failure. Intelligence personnel must base assessments on hard interpretation of the facts. Effort must be made to avoid employing any heuristics that may taint the end product. It is acknowledged that it is impossible to eliminate all bias, but safeguards can be taken to minimize them.

Credibility. Anyone can make an assessment. News agencies, with the thinnest of information, do it all the time. What differentiates Army Intelligence from press corps reports is credibility and trust. This credibility is comprised of three components: the intellectual quality of Army Intelligence products, the relevance of these products, and the shared identity of Army Intelligence personnel with the "consumer." Soldiers have a tendency to trust other soldiers because they adhere to common understandings and values. Shortcomings in any of these three components of can lead to a lack of credibility that has an impact upon the effectiveness of the intelligence.

Responsiveness. Army Intelligence must be proactive in anticipating a commander's requirements. When urgent requirements arise, intelligence personnel must do their utmost to fulfil that requirement and support operators. Intelligence must be predictive, rather than reactive.

Flexibility. Army intelligence personnel can be called upon to operate in varying conditions across the entire spectrum of conflict. They may be called upon to generate products that may vary greatly from one mission to the next. Intelligence personnel, therefore, require a great degree of mental flexibility and adaptability.

Timeliness. In warfare, time is critical. This is especially true in asymmetric warfare where adversaries are nimble and difficult to pinpoint. In order to be effective, Army Intelligence must be able to provide products containing the right information at the right time so that operators can effectively consider and act on it.

Accessibility. Information and intelligence must be made available in formats useful to their users. Intelligence is of no value if it is not disseminated or if it is inaccessible to those who require it.

The values required by military intelligence professionals are as follows:

Core Canadian Forces and Army Values. Army Intelligence professionals are soldiers first, intelligence operators/officers second. The credibility of intelligence personnel is built not only through the quality of work they produce, but also on the respect they have earned as soldiers from their peers within the CF and Army. Fit to fight, proficient in field craft and weapons handling, familiar with the operations planning process (OPP), and thoroughly indoctrinated into the CF/Army ethos and culture, the intelligence professional is linked with his/her users, further building credibility and familiarity.

Disciplined Intellectual Curiosity. Army Intelligence personnel must demonstrate a keen desire to learn about their environment and to understand adversaries. This curiosity must be tempered with the realization that not everything can be learned, and that because of this, curiosity has to be focused on issues that support commanders.

Responsibility. Army intelligence personnel must accept responsibility for the quality and timeliness of their work. They must be accountable for their work as well. Acceptance of responsibility builds trust in intelligence products and is essential for an effective relationship between Army Intelligence and the rest of the Army.

Objectivity and Honesty. At a personal level, intelligence personnel must try to maintain a degree of objectivity in relation to their analysis. Adversaries must be evaluated with biases and heuristics kept in mind.

From Ethos to Culture: Shaping the Future of Army Intelligence

Given this blueprint of an Army Intelligence ethos, concrete actions can be generated to shape Army Intelligence culture towards its ideal expression. To this end, the practical steps recommended below are divided into categories based on the fundamental requirements and the values required by Army Intelligence professionals.

Credibility, Core Canadian Forces and Army Values

As noted earlier, Army Intelligence operators and officers are soldiers and officers first, intelligence professionals second. That the "purple" nature of the intelligence branch may have blurred this distinction in the eyes of some is an unfortunate development. The increasing importance of intelligence products at the lowest levels of command, brought on by the reality of the "strategic corporal," means that gaining the trust of even the lowest-ranking members of the CF/Army is paramount. While quality products do generate some credibility, credibility amongst soldiers is generally earned through constant contact during training and by sharing common hardships. This is especially true at the junior NCM and officer levels, where contact with Intelligence personnel is normally buffered by the chain of command. Furthermore, the changing nature of the battlespace demands that intelligence personnel, along with other combat support personnel, must be prepared to fight at a moment's notice alongside combat arms soldiers. Taking concrete steps to reinforce the concept of "soldiers first," therefore, represents a dual benefit: it reinforces the basic soldiering skills needed on the battlefields of today while building the credibility of the branch amongst the combat arms leaders of tomorrow. The following actions are therefore recommended:

Establish Strict Selection Criteria into the Army DEU of the Intelligence Branch. Selection into the Army DEU of the Intelligence Branch should emphasize the values required by military professionals. Selection must never be compromised to meet recruiting or branch growth quotas. This applies for both officers and NCMs. As they currently stand, the standards for the "ideal" officer voluntary or compulsory occupation transfer or component transfer applicant consist of an undergraduate degree, average leadership abilities and three years service with operational experience. These criteria for an "ideal" candidate describe what really appears to be an "average" officer in the CF, not the type of officer who upon transfer would advance the credibility of Army Intelligence and the Intelligence Branch. Army Intelligence and the Intelligence Branch should not merely be satisfied with "average" NCMs and officers in its ranks, but only with the best of those who demonstrate the values required by intelligence personnel. Selection standards should be tailored accordingly, stressing above-average performance in all aspects of an applicant's career.

Establish Intelligence Officer and Operator Positions at Combat Training Centre (CTC) Gagetown and the Land Force Area Training Centres. Exposing junior officers and soldiers early in their training to Army intelligence personnel will make them more aware of the intelligence function, and perhaps make the intelligence occupation more attractive to potential candidates. Rotating junior captains through CAP teaching positions will reinforce to members of the Army Intelligence community the need to maintain their soldiering and leadership skills, shattering the stereotype of the "fat intelligence captain." It will also boost the familiarity of junior officers with the intelligence function by providing them with an early exposure to members of the Army Intelligence community. Similarly, exposing young soldiers to fit, keen intelligence operators in leadership positions will improve their familiarity with the intelligence function, while providing selected intelligence operators with a unique opportunity to strengthen their leadership and soldiering skills. Initially, these postings should be restricted to former combat arms officers and operators, as their prior trade experiences will provide them with credibility when approaching their instructional duties.

Maximize Attendance on the Tactical Intelligence Operator's Course (TIOC). This course is an excellent venue through which to familiarize combat arms personnel with intelligence products and to orient them to CF intelligence doctrine. At least one soldier per infantry company or armoured squadron should attend this course in order to provide OCs with a limited organic intelligence capability. Furthermore, senior NCOs and junior officers should also be offered this course in order to provide battle group COs with a larger pool of personnel with formal intelligence training.

Establish Regular Contributions to Service Journals. Curiosity exists within the Army as to other cultures, viewpoints, etc. A regular article in the *Canadian Army Journal* focusing on intelligence issues, potential adversaries and ongoing conflicts could be used to raise the profile of the branch, as well as to familiarize the Army with issues of importance.

Establish Regular Force Intelligence Units within the Army. Within the Canadian Army, intelligence is mainly viewed as a staff function. This led to the deactivation of the regular force intelligence company, and the establishment of a weak intelligence "technical" chain within the Army. Unfortunately, these decisions have had profound effects. The lack of a robust centralized "technical" command and control chain for Army Intelligence has led to inefficiencies in managing overseas deployments, while the absence of a Regular Force intelligence company denied Army Intelligence opportunities to develop and experiment with new ideas and concepts. Establishing a centralized organization with its own authority would help rationalize the intelligence resources across the Army, while the activation of a dedicated intelligence company would provide Army Intelligence with a "centre of excellence" that could also provide a pool of deployable intelligence personnel in addition to those earmarked under the managed readiness plan.

Load Intelligence Personnel on the Combat Arms ATOC and PLQ. Currently, Intelligence Officers attend the combat service support (CSS) version of the ATOC, while operators attend the CSS version of PLQ. Since the combat arms are the primary consumer of intelligence products, intelligence officers and NCMs should be exposed to combat situations in a training environment as much as possible in order to build credibility and an understanding of the pressures combat arms personnel face.

Objectivity and Disciplined Intellectual Curiosity

Both as a fundamental of intelligence and as a value (along with honesty), objectivity by personnel conducting intelligence analysis is absolutely essential to giving

AS2006-0419a.jpg 10 May 2006 KANDAHAR PROVINCE, Afghanistan Photo by Sergeant Dennis Power, Army News

Intelligence reports of suspicious activity prompt vehicle searches along a road frequently used by Taliban insurgents

commanders accurate assessments. Many military disasters could have been averted had intelligence personnel been objective in their analysis. Conditions must therefore be set to foster objectivity while maintaining a sense of responsibility as well. Furthermore, intellectual pursuits that may strengthen needed skills within Army intelligence and the branch should be encouraged, as they will result in better informed products and advice. To this end:

Establish a Linguist and Cultural Advisor Career Stream for NCMs. A great barrier to objectivity exists. It is based on the cultural restrictions that come with a lack of knowledge of foreign languages. Recent experiences overseas have demonstrated that the ad hoc approach to producing native linguists and cultural advisors (many of whom are civilians), while successful, does not generate the corporate knowledge of a theatre and culture that could be beneficial elsewhere. Establishment of a linguist stream of native and trained linguists, similar to that used by the UK's Intelligence Corps, would provide the CF with an invaluable resource that could enhance its analytical abilities. These linguists would also be trained as intelligence operators, allowing them to be employed outside of their specific language speciality when their services are not in high demand. Those who opt for this career stream should be considered for specialist pay given the high operational tempo they may encounter and their unique skills.[8]

Establish Third Language Training Programs. While not all Army intelligence personnel may have the potential for advanced linguistic training, part-time training in select languages and cultures should be made available to foster a better understanding of theatres and the cultures of potential adversaries. This offer should be extended to members of other arms and branches, as basic language skills amongst soldiers will help undermine certain psyops messages used by adversaries. Intelligence personnel weak in an official language but strong in a third language of interest may perhaps be

given additional points towards promotion in consideration of his/her unique linguistic ability.

Enhance Advanced Education Opportunities for NCMs. Post-graduate education is available to officers through competition. However, full-time subsidized undergraduate and graduate education opportunities for NCMs normally involve commissioning from the ranks. Given that senior intelligence NCOs are employed as tactical analysts in complex situations, it is time that fully subsidized, full-time undergraduate and graduate opportunities be made available to senior NCOs who desire to remain employed as such. While an undergraduate education may not be entirely necessary for most experienced operators to perform their tasks, formal undergraduate education does assist in promoting critical thinking skills and provides selected NCMs with a unique challenge they can pursue. NCMs with degrees should have their accomplishments recognized with increased opportunities for challenging postings and promotion.

Establish Long-Term Intelligence Positions in Theatres. True familiarity with a theatre can only be established through a prolonged exposure to it. During the colonial period, British, French and Dutch colonial officers essentially lived for years in their respective colonies. As a result, they developed a profound understanding of tribal, religious and political dynamics that they then manipulated in order to achieve their agendas. The advent of air travel transformed this situation, and now most armies have 6-12 month rotations in theatre. While the move to shorter rotations has beneficial effects on morale, especially for married personnel, the typical rotation period is not sufficient for the acquisition of that same level of knowledge. Given that most theatres will be culturally dissimilar to Canada's western liberal culture, some analyst positions should be considered for terms of 12-18 months. Tasking single personnel without children to these positions, as well as using enhanced leave plans, could mitigate the risk of "burn-out" amongst officers and NCMs tasked to these positions. This would provide commanders and their staffs with a human resource very familiar with the intricacies of a theatre and create theatre subject matter experts who can be used later within CDI.

Responsibility, Flexibility, Timeliness and Accessibility

The ability to produce varied products quickly and to disseminate them to those who need them is the hallmark of an efficient intelligence system. Like the OODA loop, the intelligence cycle must be as "tight" as possible to establish a condition of information superiority for the commander. This is especially true in the new threat environment, where non-state actors, tribal affiliations, family ties, criminal syndicates and other networks may render the situation incredibly complex. In order to ensure Army Intelligence can remain flexible, timely and accessible in this new environment, Army Intelligence and the Intelligence branch should:

Establish Army-Level Exchange Programs with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and AUS/US/UK/NZ Partners. All Army intelligence personnel should be exposed to agencies in the PSEPC portfolio at some point in their career in order to leverage their experiences in security intelligence, some of which are relevant to potential threats that may be faced by CF personnel overseas. Global terrorist organizations are present within Canada, and conduct money-laundering or psychological operations on Canadian soil. Gaining familiarity with these operations within Canada, while maintaining a distinct separation from CSIS and the RCMP, may translate into a better understanding of adversaries abroad. Any exchange program put into place could employ employment safeguards to

ensure a separation of defence and security interests is maintained. Furthermore, Canadian personnel are rarely deployed without traditional alliance partners: namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Given the close relationship Canada has with these partners and the close integration of their intelligence systems, exchange positions should be established with a view to familiarizing Canadian officers with their national systems.

Establish One Collation System. Collation forms the backbone of the intelligence function. However, complaints are often voiced about how ASICs employ systems that are either "inconvenient" or deviate from established systems used in training. One collation standard must be established with an effective search tool, or else opportunities for leading action may be missed. Establishment of a standard will be difficult considering rapid advances in technology and the individual preferences of collators. However, the end state of one systematic approach to the categorization of data needs to be achieved in order to keep the intelligence function timely and flexible. From a cultural perspective, the importance of one collation system should be reinforced at all levels and stressed on a level approaching that of weapon drills.

Establish One Army Intelligence Career Model. Currently, junior intelligence officers and NCMs within the Army DEU graduating BIOC and QL5A can end up in postings as varied as the CLS staff, the Watch at NDCC, CDI or a brigade. Some officers and NCMs therefore, receive an early indoctrination into the intelligence function within the Army, while others do not. It is essential for the career development of Army Intelligence personnel that they receive experience in an Army environment as early as possible in their careers when they are still impressionable. Establishment of enough positions within brigades and/or a dedicated Army Intelligence would provide Army Intelligence personnel with a standardized first posting. Subsequent postings can be either Army or Joint, depending on the requirements of the Intelligence Branch.

Establish Non-Intelligence Positions in ASCs. All too often, intelligence personnel are accused of "hiding behind the green door." Posting non-intelligence specialists with an intelligence background into ASCs may provide a new perspective on how to best disseminate products. This is best done at the corporal level soon after the Tactical Intelligence Operations Course in order to familiarize the soldier with what products can be made available, as well as what information is of importance. Upon return to his regular unit, the soldier would then be able to better serve the battalion or company. This would be especially useful for CSOR or battalions deployed in dispersed locations where the intelligence advice of the S2 may not be immediately available.

Reconsider Intelligence Training within Army Career Courses. At every career course attended by Army officers, the value of intelligence should be stressed. Currently, the Army Operations Course at Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFCSC) stresses the IPB process. Not only should IPB be examined, but also other aspects of the intelligence function should be emphasized. Different intelligence products, disciplines, and capabilities should be examined in order to familiarize future staff planners as to the value of intelligence. Intelligence training emphasizing more than just IPB should also be included on the Combat Team Commander's Course, as well as the Commanding Officer's Course.

Miscellaneous Ideas

Establish the Cypress Green Beret for Army Intelligence Personnel. One finding in *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century* is that soldiers value identity. Soldiers take a great deal of pride in identifying themselves with particular groups: their Branch/Corps, Regiments, Company, etc. Some of these

identities are often based on accomplishment of a challenging training regimen and/or acceptance of increased personal risk.[9] This tribalism within the Canadian Army finds expression in cap badges, collar dogs, brigade patches, parachutist wings, diver's dolphins, coloured berets and other symbols.

Traditionally, most of the identities prized by military members have involved physical fitness and bravery. The maroon beret and wings of the paratrooper, for example, are earned by participating in a physically demanding course that culminates in overcoming the fear of falling and heights. It is becoming apparent in the 21st century that within warfare, physical fitness and bravery are not enough to win. They must be married to cunning, knowledge, and wisdom in order to set the conditions for success, especially within the non-physical battlespace. Few distinguishing symbols, however, are rewarded for excelling in these areas.

Soldiers within the Intelligence trade are selected for their ability to direct, collect, process and disseminate information. These skills require a mental capacity for absorbing and sifting through large amounts of information. Soldiers are then required to link these bits of data and information together into a comprehensive product or picture for a commander by relying on their military experience from their prior trade. They must be relied upon to present their findings in a frank manner, even when they contradict the beliefs of the commander or his staff. On top of all this, the soldier's knowledge of friendly forces and soldiering skills need to be of a high standard in order to maintain his credibility amongst peers. All this must be accomplished within the stress of combat. This is a challenge faced by few other trades within the Army, and one that should be acknowledged with a unique symbol beyond that of a cap badge.

It is therefore proposed that members of Army Intelligence be entitled to wear a cypress green beret similar to those worn by the Intelligence Corps in the British Army, in order to recognize the unique skills they possess. This entitlement would begin after an appropriate training benchmark is achieved, such as the QL 5A or the BIOC. This would generate esprit de corps, raise the profile of army intelligence within the army and recognize the role of intelligence personnel as practitioners of a core competency within information operations. This entitlement would be subject to common sense restrictions. When deployed overseas, for example, CF green berets would be worn along with Canada flashes for OPSEC reasons.

Hold Annual Army Intelligence Development Seminars. Currently the branch lacks an advanced officer's intelligence course for senior captains and junior majors. In this respect the branch is unique, as almost every other occupation in the CF has some form of advanced occupational training. As an interim measure, DLFR 2 is organizing a professional development seminar to be held in the Ottawa area for senior captains and junior majors. This seminar should become a regular occurrence even if an advanced intelligence officer course is established at CFSMI, as an Army-focused professional development event incorporating leadership, doctrine, and OPP training. Senior NCOs and non-intelligence personnel should also be invited.

Cultural Shifts and Realistic Expectations

Each of the actions recommended above is designed to address specific fundamentals or values that intelligence personnel require in order to gain the credibility needed to provide the impartial advice to commanders and their staffs. Transforming culture, however, is not instantaneous. The advantages of implementing a specific recommendation may not be felt for years, and measuring the effectiveness of each recommendation can only be accomplished using subjective means. The high

expectations of stakeholders should therefore be tempered with patience and a willingness to accept ambiguity.

To this challenge are added many more. Army Intelligence lacks the funding and manpower for some of the ideas outlined above. However, any rapid expansion of Army intelligence personnel prior to implementation of cultural reforms threatens to slow the pace of reform as new personnel adopt old attitudes. A balance must therefore be struck between the implementation of any cultural changes and expansion. Jurisdiction provides another challenge. DLFR 2 alone can implement some recommendations within the Army, while others may require the agreement of other organizations within the Army or CF. Other recommendations will need the full approval of the Intelligence Branch and perhaps the other environments. This may particularly be difficult as the Navy and Air Force have different approaches and attitudes towards intelligence and may not perceive the requirement for transformation, especially where funding within the branch may be concerned. Should any of the above recommendations be adopted by Army Intelligence, an analysis should occur as to the relevant stakeholders that will need to be consulted.

Conclusion

Army Intelligence is at a turning point. With the renewed emphasis on the function by commanders, it is essential that the branch identify those values and functional requirements that will make Army Intelligence grow into an organization that best serves commanders, the CF and Canada. This ethos should then be actualized in culture through a series of actions linked to the component parts of that ethos in a manner respecting the constraints imposed by funding and personnel issues, the Army, the Intelligence Branch and the CF. The recommendations proposed in this paper do just that, outlining ideas designed to integrate Army Intelligence even further into the Army ethos while cultivating the unique characteristics required of intelligence personnel. Ultimately, the leadership of the Army and of the Intelligence Branch must set the standard for the evolution of Army Intelligence, and support any endeavours, be they named above or not, through to their completion.

About the Author ...

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Endnotes

1. Canadian Defence Academy. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada: 2003) pp 26-27.
2. *Ibid*, pp 28-29.
3. *Ibid*, pp 30-31.
4. *Canada's Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee* (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada: 1998) pp. 34-35.
5. *Ibid*, p. 37.
6. LCol J.D Villeneuve. PowerPoint Presentation to Intelligence Branch Senate, 20 June 2006.
7. *Ibid*.
8. Col P. Taillon, interview by author, 4 Aug 06, Privy Council Office Ottawa, handwritten notes.
9. Director General Land Capability Development. *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century* (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005) p. 59.

A CASE STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: MCNAUGHTON'S PREPARATION FOR HIGH COMMAND DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Captain John N. Rickard

I am sure we have made in this, the most important of all choices, the right one.

Mackenzie King on McNaughton to command
1st Canadian Division.

Andrew McNaughton played a crucial role in the development of the Canadian Army during World War II. In late 1939 he took the 1st Canadian Infantry Division overseas. By mid-1940 he had been promoted to lieutenant-general and given command of the British VII Corps, which on Christmas Day that year was re-designated the Canadian Corps. McNaughton supervised the expansion of the Canadian Active Service Force (CASF) from a fledgling organization in 1939 to the powerfully organized First Canadian Army in April 1942. He took part in the abortive attempt to re-establish the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France after Dunkirk in June 1940 and authorized the raid on Dieppe in August 1942 and the deployment of Canadian formations to Sicily in July 1943.

Courtesy of Canadian Archives C-018223

General Sir Allan Brooke visiting Canadian Troops, July 1940

McNaughton was removed from command of First Canadian Army six months before the cross-channel invasion by the quartet of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir Alan F. Brooke; the Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, Lieutenant General Bernard Paget; the Canadian Minister of National Defence, James Layton Ralston; and the Canadian Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Lieutenant General Kenneth Stuart. Their actions were partly guided by a fundamental lack of faith in McNaughton's ability to lead First Canadian Army in actual operations; they questioned

his professionalism. This paper examines McNaughton's preparation for high command during the interwar years.

McNaughton was a brilliant scientist with a graduate degree in engineering from McGill University. He exploited his scientific expertise throughout World War I to increase the effectiveness of Canadian artillery. His work as a counter-battery officer has been characterized as "superior" even by his critics and General Sir Arthur Currie is supposed to have declared that McNaughton was not just the greatest gunner in the empire, but in the whole world.[1] When the war ended he was thirty-two and anticipated resuming his scientific studies and pursuing a promising engineering career. His post-war academic plans were derailed, however, when Currie, the newly appointed Inspector-General of the Militia Forces of Canada, made a personal appeal for him to stay in the army. Currie wanted McNaughton to serve on the Otter Committee, a body charged with incorporating the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) units into the post-war militia. This was unfortunate, for while other future World War II commanders such as George S. Patton, Jr. were investigating (at least for a while) the role of tanks, McNaughton was essentially involved in retrenchment.[2]

After serving on the Otter Committee, McNaughton began a meteoric rise to the top of the military profession in Canada. Historians have generally paid little attention to the fact that he rose far too quickly in the inter-war army. By January 1920 he was appointed to the Permanent Force as the Director of Military Training and Staff Duties in Ottawa. He held the ranks brevet lieutenant colonel, temporary colonel and acting brigadier-general. By way of comparison, Brooke, the CIGS, only rose to the equivalent position in the British Army in 1936, but had the substantive rank of major general.[3] In 1920 Bernard L. Montgomery had been reduced in rank to brevet-major, while Patton, a colonel in World War I, experienced the same setback and only made lieutenant colonel again in March 1934 after nearly fourteen years as a major.

On his climb to the top McNaughton was afforded various opportunities for professional development. In 1921 Currie, long since convinced of McNaughton's bright future, sent him off to the Staff College at Camberley, following Brooke who had attended in 1919 and Montgomery in 1920. Camberley was founded in 1858 to address the lamentable performance of British commanders and staff officers in the Crimean War. Since Britain did not establish a regular General Staff along German lines until 1906, the 'brain' of the army was to be found at Camberley.[4] Brian Horrocks, commander of XXX Corps, called the Staff College "the seat of all military knowledge" while Oliver Leese, commander of Eighth Army in Italy after Montgomery's departure, reflected that it taught one "how to work."[5] Through the use of lectures, sand tables exercises, tactical exercises without troops (TEWT) and syndicate discussions, Camberley trained officers to fill appointments up to the rank of Brigade Major or equivalent.

Although Montgomery could not even recall if he had done well at Camberley, Brooke had impressed the Directing Staff, and so did McNaughton as a member of the senior division.[6] The Commandant, Major-General Hastings Anderson, concluded that although much of what McNaughton had learned at the college "was new to him," he nevertheless "has more than held his own." He possessed a "wide general knowledge, and brings a highly trained, scientific mind to bear on all military problems." As a scientific gunner, he was simply "outstanding" and possessed "good tactical ability." His "immense" powers of concentration and "great strength" of character were also duly noted. Anderson ultimately thought him capable of "great efficiency as a Commander or Staff Officer under conditions of modern war."[7] There is little reason to question this fine assessment. The simple fact of the matter is, however, that McNaughton never had the opportunity to practice and expand upon the valuable lessons he undoubtedly learned at Camberley in an operational field environment in Canada between the wars. The same

Courtesy of Canadian Archives

Prime Minister W.L. MacKenzie King and Lieutenant General A.G.L. McNaughton

was not true for Brooke and Montgomery.

Soon after his time at Staff College, Brooke began a three year posting to the General Staff of the 50th Northumbrian Division (Territorial Army) while Montgomery went directly to Ireland as Brigade Major of the 17th Infantry Brigade in Cork, where he fought Sinn Fein for almost eighteen months.[8] McNaughton, however, returned to his duties as Director of Military Training and Staff Duties in 1922 and the next year, only *two years* removed from Camberley, became Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS) with the rank of brigadier general.

McNaughton's grooming for further advancement was helped along by Major-General James H. MacBrien, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), who considered McNaughton the best of the army's younger breed of officers.[9] MacBrien sent him off to the newly established Imperial Defence College (IDC) in January 1927 where his classmates were Brooke, Claude Auchinleck and other future World War II senior commanders. The commandant was Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, the famous historian and naval theorist, and the Chief Instructor was Major-General John Dill, a future field marshal, CIGS and member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

While Camberley prepared officers to function on higher staffs, the IDC was created to give senior officers an opportunity to explore the larger issues of war and imperial defence policy. Comprising just thirty students in the Senior Division, it was an intimate club where personal and professional ties were established. Like the U.S. Army War College, it also represented that last critical prerequisite for high command. The IDC curriculum was varied and McNaughton had the opportunity to present papers on imperial issues. He performed at a high level and drew considerable praise from Richmond for leaving "no stone unturned to add to his knowledge of the military problems of the Empire."[10] The students also visited industrial plants and defence establishments. McNaughton briefly visited the Tank and Track Transport Experimental Establishment at Farnborough, but unfortunately never recorded any opinion of what he saw. Between terms he observed Edmund Ironside, another future World War II CIGS, manoeuvre his 2nd Division near Thame. This was the first time McNaughton had seen a division in the field since 1918.

After successful completion of the IDC in 1928 McNaughton briefly commanded Military District No. 11 in Victoria before being promoted to major-general at the age of forty-one and ascending to CGS over several senior officers in January 1929 to become the professional head of the Canadian Army. That same year, Brooke was a new brigadier commanding the School of Artillery at Larkhill and only rose to CIGS in December 1941 with the rank of full general after having commanded a brigade, division

and corps. Forty-nine-year old General Douglas MacArthur, a divisional commander in World War I, was still another year away from becoming US Army Chief of Staff. The slow process of promotion usually associated with the inter-war American, British and Canadian armies simply did not apply to McNaughton. Jack Granatstein has suggested that his "phenomenal rise" had been achieved on "ability alone."[11] Yet, it was a theoretical ability unverified by the successive and incrementally difficult command of units and formations.

Courtesy of Canadian Archives C-018250

General Gamelin the Allied Commander-in-Chief who attended the Supreme War Council, visits Canadian Troops in the Aldershot Distirct

As CGS McNaughton went to great lengths to get more funding for the air force (until 1935 part of the army) at the expense of the navy. He also waged an ultimately fruitless battle to focus all departmental power in the hands of the CGS, believing, like MacBrien had, that the army alone, by virtue of its dominant position within the Canadian military establishment, should speak for all three services. MacBrien's vision of a unified voice in the department faded in 1927 when his successor, Major General H.C. Thacker, voluntarily surrendered any claim to army primacy. McNaughton, loyal to MacBrien and many of his ideas, never forgave Thacker for willingly undermining the position of CGS.[12]

While this organizational power struggle over the role of the CGS played out, McNaughton also convinced Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in October 1932 that the army could establish unemployment relief camps to ease the suffering of able-bodied, single men left homeless and unemployed by the Great Depression. McNaughton's motives were commendable, but the project diverted resources away from the army. As John A. English rightly concluded, the scheme, which quickly proved to be a political liability for Bennett, represented an "unprofessional focus."[13]

Despite being sidetracked by the unemployment relief camps, McNaughton did succeed in making the army more expeditionary-minded. He waged a passionate battle to dismantle Defence Scheme No. 1, which included a fifteen-division militia to defend

	Staff College, Camberley	Quetta	Imperial Defence College	
+Wavell, Archibald	1909-10		------	------
+Dill, John**	1913		------	------
#Ironside, Edmund	1913-14		------	------
#Alan F. Brooke, **	1919		------	1927
+O'Connor, Richard*	1919		------	1935
+Pearkes, George R.	**1919**		------	**1937**
+Gort, John*	1919/20		------	-----
+Wilson, Henry Maitland*	1919		------	------
+Montgomery, Bernard*	1920		------	------
+Paget, Bernard	1920		------	
#McNaughton, A.G.L.	**1921**		------	**1927**
#Crerar, H.D.G.	**1923**		------	**1934**
+Percival, Arthur*	1923-24		------	1935
++Pope, Maurice	**1924-25**		------	------
+Sansom, E.W.	**1925**		------	------
+Alexander, Harold	1926		------	1930
+Slim, William*	------		1926	1937
+Auchinleck, Claude	------		1920	1927
#Cunningham, Alan	1925		------	1937
+Leese, Oliver*	1927-28		------	------
++Stuart, Kenneth	**1927**		------	------
+Dempsey, M.C.	1927		------	
^McCreery, Richard	1928		------	------
^Foster, Harry	**1928**		------	------
++Burns, E.L.M.	**1928-29**		------	**1938-1939**
+Ritchie, Neil	1929		------	------
+Salmon, H.L.	**1931**		------	------
+Horrocks, Brian*	1931-32		------	------
++Stein, C.R.S.	**1932-33**		------	------
+Vokes, Chris	**1934-35**		------	------
+Keller, Rod	**1936**		------	------
#Simonds, Guy G.	**1936-37**		------	------
+Foulkes, Charles	**1937**		------	------
+Hoffmeister, B.M.	------		------	------
^Foster, Harry	**1939**		------	------

* Indicates later position as Directing Staff at Camberley or Imperial Defence College.
** Indicates Directing Staff at both
# Artllery
^ Cavalry
+ Infantry
++ Engineer
Bold indicates those relieved of army command during World War II.

Table 1: Advanced Training of British and Canadian Senior Officers, 1919-1939

	Bn	Reg	Bde	Div	Corps
Alan F. Brooke	------	------	1934	1937	1939
Alexander, Harold	1922	1927	1934	1938	1940
Anderson, Kenneth	1929	------	1937	1940	1941
Auchinleck, Claude	1929	------	1933	------	1940
Bradley, Omar N.	------	------	------	1942	1943
Crerar, Harry D.G.	------	------	------	1943	1943
Cunningham, Alan G.	------	------	1937	1938	1941
Dempsey, Miles C.	1938	------	1939	1941	1943
Eisenhower, Dwight D.	1940	------	1919	------	------
Gort, John S.V.		------	------	1930	------
Hodges, Courtney	------	------	------	------	------
Ironside, William E.	------	------	------	1926	------
Leese, Oliver	1936	------	------	1941	1942
McCreery, Richard	------	1935	1940	1940	1943
McNaughton, Andrew	------	------	------	1939	1940
Montgomery, Bernard	1931	------	1937	1938	1940
Paget, Bernard C.T.	------	------	1936-37	1940	------
Patch, Alexander M.	------	1942	------	1942	1942
Patton Jr., George S.	1920	1938	1919/1940	1941	1942
Ritchie, Neil	1938	------	------	1940	------
Slim, William J.	1938	------	1939	1941	1942
Simpson, William H.	------	1925	------	1941	1942
Wavell, Archibald	------	------	1930	1935	1938
Wilson, Henry Maitland	1927	------	1936	1937	1939

Bold indicates those relieved of army command during World War II.

Table 2: McNaughton's Relative Inter-War Command Experience

against an American invasion. Colonel James Sutherland "Buster" Brown, the Director of Military Operations & Intelligence (DMO&I), was the principal architect of the scheme. Although McNaughton had actually favoured it at one time, the unilateral British decision to dismantle Royal Navy facilities in the Caribbean and at Halifax in October 1929 convinced him that defending against an American invasion without British help was impossible.[14]

Courtesy of Canadian Archives PA-034134

General Sir Alan Brooke, C.-in-C., Home Forces, visits the VII Corps. [Major General G.G.] Simonds on extreme right and Lt. Gen. McNaughton with the Commander VII Coorps in the centre, August 1940

When McNaughton became CGS he prioritized Defence Scheme No. 3, a plan to send an expeditionary force to aid Britain in time of war, much to the distaste of Brown. In December 1932 McNaughton informed the CIGS, General Sir George Milne, that "the most serious or important issue for which we ... require to be organized concerns itself with the mobilization and dispatch of a Canadian Expeditionary Force to take part in an Empire War of first magnitude."[15] McNaughton was right about the need for an expeditionary capability, but he gave far less attention to how this expeditionary force would fight after it had been raised and dispatched across the ocean.

McNaughton remained CGS for seven years, for the most part during the Depression, and in that time he failed to prepare the army for modern war. When he departed in 1935 he summed up his acute failure in a memorandum entitled "The Defence of Canada: A Review of the Present Situation" and observed that the state of modern equipment should be viewed "only with the greatest concern."[16] Here was a great irony, for he had always been wary of pushing the government too hard in fear of losing what the army did have. In 1921 he stated that he was "no advocate of extensive re-equipment at present. We would have no money left over if we did for training," a position he was to reiterate eight years later.[17] Moreover, he admitted in the same memorandum that his estimates submitted while CGS had been based on the "Ten Year Rule," a planning assumption in effect in the War Office since 1919 and attributed to Winston Churchill, which stated that there would be no major war for ten years.

Courtesy of Canadian Archives PA-034159

Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O, Winter 1939-1940

Ultimately, the rule was placed on a rolling basis. Using the rule as his own yard-stick, McNaughton sought only those funds that were "immediately necessary to the maintenance and training of cadre forces."[18]

That more aggressive lobbying for additional funding by McNaughton would have borne fruit with the government was in no sense a certainty. MacArthur, no shrinking violet, struggled for five years to get more funds for the American army while serving as Army Chief of Staff but failed miserably. He reflected, "I stormed, begged, ranted, and roared; I almost licked the boots of certain gentlemen to get funds for motorization and mechanization and air power." In every year that he served in the army's top position, however, he had to watch funding for his service drop.[19] Attempts were made to rectify the Canadian equipment situation with the approach of war by McNaughton's successors, Major Generals E.C. Ashton and T.V. Anderson, but the end-state was, as Desmond Morton concluded, "a Canadian army that, taken all in all, was worse in 1939 than it had been in 1914. Imagine that."[20]

McNaughton was also well aware that during his watch as CGS the Permanent Force never conducted collective training in the field. It would not do so until 1938, just a year before it went to war. The British Army, on the other hand, managed to get to the field for collective exercises every year throughout the 1930s.[21] For a professional army to refrain from collective training for almost a full decade was unacceptable under any circumstances. It is hard to dispute Stephen Harris' claim that the army was "never so poorly equipped" or "so starved of funds", that it could not at least practice "that body of fundamental professional knowledge applicable or adaptable to most battlefields even during the hostile environment of the inter-war years."[22] The German Army was starved of funds and equipment throughout the 1920s but tested tank tactics, as Heinz Guderian recalled, with canvas dummies "pushed about by men on foot." Major E.L.M. Burns, a future Canadian corps commander during the war, urged the same sort of experimental expediency in a 1935 article entitled "A Step Towards Modernization." He suggested using automobiles, visible "at the door of any armoury on training nights," to practice manoeuvres "without impossible expense."[23]

Had McNaughton, with his inventive genius, made a conscious decision to experiment with combined-arms exercises, even on a rudimentary level, he would have rendered great service to the army and sharpened his own professional skills. It is readily conceded that he was not operating in a political environment favourable to the military in general. Military budgets were at subsistence levels and would only shrink during the Depression. Moreover, the very size of the country worked against any efforts to bring units together for combined-arms training. That he chose to commit his great intellectual ability to the political infighting inherent in the position of CGS for the purposes of 'holding the fort' is, in this wide context, understandable, but only to a point.

According to James Eayrs, McNaughton expended such a disproportionate amount of time and energy on political battles because the backward Canadian military of the 1930s offered few challenges for his great intellect.[24] Yet, as the professional head of the army he demonstrated little enthusiasm for the challenge of training it. Most critically, he showed almost no interest in mastering the art and science of command at a level beyond that which he had achieved in World War I. Perhaps he considered the

possibility of commanding again unlikely given his senior position, but hubris also surely played a part. Eayrs added that as CGS, "there was no one to match his qualifications or to rival his reputation … His grasp of military matters in their widest sense was sure" and he had "perfect confidence in his own abilities."[25] McNaughton's abilities, scientifically based and entrenched by his gunnery successes in World War I, incontrovertibly shaped his entire approach to 'professionalism' during the inter-war years.

McNaughton's faith in science was most evident in "The Military Engineer and Canadian Defence," an article that he published in the *Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ)* in 1932.

> The whole question of the right forces to maintain, *like many engineering problems* [emphasis added], is a question of proper balance between conflicting factors. ... It is our business as soldiers to know all there is to know about the quantity and quality of our materials of construction—animate as well as inanimate—about the facilities existing and required for training or manufacture; we must appreciate what we can do in a given time starting from a given level of organization; we must be prepared to estimate and advise on the risks to be run.

McNaughton concluded that Canada had to base its defence organization not on an appreciation of the doctrine needed to fight a future opponent, but "on the resources naturally available in the country, either in men or material." If and when a new war erupted, he wanted Canada to be faced by a problem of "adaption rather than creation … quality is far more important than quantity."[26] This suggests the duality of his 'professionalism'—military and scientific—and a reason for his failure to act imaginatively before the war.

McNaughton took care to note in one article that "our people took naturally to gunnery" during World War I and deduced that it should not be any different with mechanized warfare. "[W]hen the time comes for us to mechanize," he pronounced in 1921, "we will find that we have great natural advantages to our credit" because the nation's youth "are used to handling machinery of all kinds."[27] It is not known if he ever read J.F.C. Fuller's 1919 Gold Prize Essay on technology and the future battlefield, but Fuller's advocacy of a future army "led by scientists and fought by mechanics" would have struck a powerful chord with McNaughton.[28]

Indeed, it seems that to McNaughton war was primarily a function of organization and physics. His extensive experience coordinating the Canadian Corps' counter-battery and heavy artillery assets influenced him to the point where he believed victory was achievable through simple mathematical calculation. His inter-war writings in the *CDQ* make this abundantly clear. In "The Development of Artillery in the Great War" he stated, "I know of no organization [Canadian Corps] in the history of War which was able to produce such a high ratio of shell to troops, nor any in which the price paid for victory was lower in personnel." The same theme echoed in "The Capture of Valenciennes" where he boasted of the weight of shell "exceeding by several hundreds of tons that fired by the Germans at Jutland" which ultimately secured victory and spared men's lives.[29]

McNaughton remained committed to the 'weight of shell' doctrine quite simply because it had worked exceptionally well when the enemy never moved and there was plenty of time to prepare massive artillery strikes. His genius for positional artillery warfare may have been of great value in Normandy in 1944, when the fighting degenerated into a virtual stalemate somewhat reminiscent of the trenches. But manoeuvre presented entirely different problems with increased degrees of complexity. McNaughton did not give any serious indication during the inter-war period that he had successfully made the mental leap from a gunner's perspective to visualizing how armoured units would actually move, attack and defend and co-operate with the other

Courtesy of Canadian Archives PA-132648

Lt. Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton

arms at the tactical and operational level. In this he was not alone. Stephen Harris has made the case that the mainstay of inter-war education at RMC was engineering, and that most Canadian officers thought as McNaughton did.[30]

Although his direct experience with tanks was limited during World War I, McNaughton most certainly would have discerned that it was the Australians and Canadians who enjoyed the greatest successes with tanks in 1918.[31] The 4th Tank Brigade was attached to the Canadian Corps for the battle of Amiens and proved effective in overcoming machine-gun positions. Yet Shane Schreiber has suggested that McNaughton ignored Currie's "consistent efforts to incorporate movement and surprise in his attacks, and his repeated experiments with mechanized forces."[32] McNaughton may have been influenced by the blatantly obvious fact that at Amiens eighty of the Brigade's ninety-nine tanks were lost to gunfire trying to lead the advance and were then forced to follow the infantry.[33] Logically, McNaughton could have deduced that the tank never superseded the infantry - artillery team, the real backbone of the offence during the war.

Like McNaughton, Brooke clung to the belief in the primacy of artillery well into the inter-war period. He was definitely not considered a tank prophet and, according to David Fraser, had voiced doubts about tanks as late as 1935. By 1937 he was still considered "very much the distinguished artilleryman" known for well-organized barrages and for advocating infantry-support tanks. So traditional were Brooke's views on armoured warfare that B.H. Liddell Hart, the famous British military theorist, tried to block his promotion to command the Mobile Division.[34] McNaughton never really voiced any detailed or innovative perspective on tanks either. In his profile of contemporary military thought contained in the *CDQ* James H. Lutz offhandedly mentioned McNaughton's name once and not in the context of mechanization, focusing instead on the contributions of Frank Worthington, Kenneth Stuart, E.L.M. Burns and Guy Simonds. McNaughton discussed various issues in the journal but tanks were not one of them.[35]

While McNaughton published articles on such subjects as air survey and the workings of the Department of National Defence, Montgomery was attempting to work out the actual role of armour in a future war. In "The Major Tactics of the Encounter Battle," published in *The Army Quarterly* in 1938, Montgomery described the importance of ground, the type of operational instructions required for mechanized warfare and how divisional commanders should relay orders. He addressed the critical issue of road moves in time and space and he argued that armoured divisions should not be strung out but concentrated for heavy blows.[36] The *CDQ* published a similar article by Montgomery entitled, "The Problem of the Encounter Battle as Affected by Modern British War Establishment" the year before. Kenneth Stuart, the journal's editor, declared it "the most thoughtful and valuable tactical discussion that has appeared in any British service journal for some considerable time."[37]

At various times during the inter-war period McNaughton hinted that he understood the requirement for the type of serious doctrinal inquiry exemplified in the writings of Burns, Simonds, Montgomery and others. Indeed, in the absence of field manoeuvres and actual war, his only recourse for professional development was to study. In his 1921 address to the United Services Institute he stated that, "we must be thinking about the

effect of these new weapons … and preparing our minds for the new conception of tactics which they involve. I am an earnest advocate of moral preparation which is largely thought, and thought costs little."[38]

There was no shortage of material on mechanization and armour to study. McNaughton had access to a wealth of imperial doctrinal and strategic material as DCGS and CGS and the works of Fuller and Liddell Hart, to name but a few of the visionaries, were in wide distribution. Fuller's most complete exposition on future mechanized warfare was contained in *Lectures on F.S.R. III* published in 1932.[39] McNaughton had met both Fuller and Liddell Hart during the 1927 manoeuvres. However, he chose not to study the latest military writings and he did not leave behind a massive library filled with penciled annotations of his thoughts on military subjects like Patton did.[40] He simply saw no personal value in it. Brigadier R.J. Orde reflected that McNaughton was "undoubtedly the first CGS that really engendered an atmosphere of 'Well, this is a professional job and let us make the best we can of it,'"[41] but that was most certainly not true. Harris's indictment that McNaughton "argued against the existence of a unique profession of arms if that entailed full-time, life-long, and concentrated study" comes much closer to truly defining him as CGS.

Courtesy of Canadian Archives PA-140144

General B. C. T. Paget visits Canadian Troops. Accompanied by Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, senior Air Force and Army Officers, Gen. Paget rides in one of the Blitz Buggies as they inspect the new aerodrome built by Canadian Army personnel for the RCAF, 22 July 1942

McNaughton saw no need for professional study because he fundamentally believed in the militia tradition, and the Canadian Corps, from Currie down, had been a Militia army. Nearly sixty-four percent of the Canadian commanders in World War I with the rank of brigadier or higher were from the militia.[42] Surely, this was proof enough that rigorous and formalized military training was not required to fight effectively. It was these amateurs who made such a fine impression on General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing in 1918. "The alertness and confidence of these neighbors of ours," he recorded, "were admirable" and one "soon caught the spirit of that superb corps."[43] What McNaughton had clearly missed, however, was that Currie and the other amateur Canadian commanders had gone about their business in a professional manner. As William A.

Stewart stated, the Canadians had to be "shocked by several sanguinary savagings" before they realized that the "amateur Militia approach was wildly incompatible" with the reality of the Western Front.[44]

By May 1935, it was clear that Bennett considered McNaughton a political liability because of the unemployment relief camps and pressed him to accept a new position, President of the National Research Council (NRC). Formed in 1916, it coordinated the nation's scientific and industrial research. As alluring as a scientific post must have been for him, McNaughton did not vacate his post as CGS without resistance, despite already having received one extension. He told Bennett that he would "much prefer" to remain as CGS because he could "be of greater service to the state" if he remained. However, after consultation with Grote Stirling, the Minister of National Defence, McNaughton relented.[45] According to Lieutenant General Elliot Rodger, nothing gave McNaughton "greater pleasure" than working with the scientists, and C.J. Mackenzie, who replaced McNaughton at the NRC when the war started, stated simply that his time at the Council was "the most tranquil period of his life and the most happy."[46]

When Mackenzie King's government decided that one division would be sent overseas to aid Britain in September 1939, Norman Rogers, the Minister of National Defence, suggested that McNaughton should be recalled from the NRC to command it.[47] King welcomed the suggestion, and on 6 October he and Rogers interviewed McNaughton, who quickly indicated that Canada's war effort should focus on production and "every effort should be made to arm and equip the troops to spare human lives." This was precisely what King, obsessed with the spectre of another conscription crisis if Canadian casualties soared, wanted to hear. King recorded in his diary that McNaughton's eyes "filled with tears and the right side of his mouth visibly twitched as he spoke of what the responsibility meant."[48] This was a not altogether uncommon display for commanders charged with the power of life and death.[49]

King considered the interview "as deeply moving as any I have witnessed in my public life" and judged McNaughton "the best equipped man for the purpose." He saw McNaughton again in early December and, although convinced that he was still the best choice for command, the Prime Minister hedged his bet. "I felt a little concern," King wrote, "about his being able to see this war through without a breakdown. I felt he was too far on in years to be taking on so great a job. Having been through the strain of a previous war he and many others like him might find they had not the endurance that they believed they had."[50]

The other possibilities for division command were few and much has been made of the fact that the Permanent Force consisted of a mere 450 officers in 1939, only half of whom were fit for field duty.[51] Only Brigadier General George R. Pearkes, a Victoria Cross winner, a Permanent Force officer and commander of Military District No. 13, would have been a serious alternative to McNaughton in 1939. Many Canadian military historians have little sympathy for Pearkes because they have accepted Montgomery's criticism of him, voiced in 1942, as unassailable evidence of his command deficiencies. This judgement is too harsh and superficial.[52]

Pearkes had recently attended the IDC in 1937 and had been intimately involved with the month-long army manoeuvres in East Anglia between the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions that year. While McNaughton laboured at the NRC, Pearkes was getting direct experience of the possibilities and problems of divisional command. Reginald Roy has pointed out that by the end of the summer of 1937 Pearkes' experience with large bodies of troops on manoeuvre "was far greater than any other senior officer in the Canadian permanent or non-permanent militia."[53] Moreover, he had at least been to the field to oversee militia training at the platoon and company level in the summer of 1938.

It is a sad fact, however, that none of the senior officers of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division which sailed for England in late 1939, including McNaughton, had exercised so

much as a battalion on manoeuvre since 1918,—a period of twenty-one years.[54] Conversely, Harold Alexander, another future British field marshal, commanded the Irish Guards from 1928-30, the Nowshera Brigade of Northern Command in India from 1934-38 and the 1st Division from 1938-1940. Montgomery commanded the 1st Battalion, Royal Warwickshires from 1931-34, the 9th Infantry Brigade from 1937-38 and the 8th Infantry Division from 1938-39. Brooke commanded the 8th Infantry Brigade for eighteen months and led it on several manoeuvres in 1934 and in 1937 assumed command of the Mobile Division on Salisbury Plain.[55]

Before the United States entered the war, Patton and many other senior American commanders had the opportunity to take part in the large-scale Tennessee, Louisiana and Carolina Manoeuvres of 1940-1941. When Patton's 2nd Armoured Division left Fort Benning, Georgia to commence the Tennessee exercise it moved in two columns each sixty miles long and he practiced his division moving in the dark, without lights and on radio silence.[56] Being able to move large bodies of men and machines efficiently was to be a professional minimum in World War II. Indeed, even Burns knew this, stating in a 1935 article, "The mechanics of military leadership is the calculation of time and space."[57]

While other scientifically gifted commanders of the past such as Napoleon or Robert E. Lee chose not to rest on their natural mathematical and engineering abilities, it appears that this is precisely what McNaughton did after 1918. He was a man of great conviction and was convinced that a citizen army backed up by the latest technology would be sufficient to win the next war. Yet for all his intellectual brilliance he allowed himself to be blinded to the fact that the swift technological and organizational changes of the inter-war years would not permit a citizen army the necessary time to figure out the battlefield of the next war. McNaughton, though clothed in the garb of a professional military man, was in fact an amateur commander on the verge of taking the Canadian army into a first class war in Europe. How successful this amateur was in building and training an army is another story.

About the Author...

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Endnotes

1. John A. English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 154, footnote # 6; John Swettenham, *McNaughton, I: 1887-1939* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1968), 74; Daniel G. Dancocks, *Spearhead to Victory: Canada and the Great War* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1987), 33.
2. The Otter Committee, under the chairmanship of Major-General Sir William Otter of Boer War fame, was constituted in the spring of 1919. In mid-April 1919 Patton reported to Washington and began to formulate tank regulations. In order to do so he and the other members of the board traveled to the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois and the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts to inspect tank production. At the time the Mark VIII Tank was in production. Martin Blumenson, ed., *The Patton Papers, Vol. I: 1885-1940* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 705-06.
3. David Fraser, *Alanbrooke* (London: Collins, 1982), 110.
4. Brian Bond, *The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), 12. See also Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Young, *The Story of the Staff College* (Camberley: The Staff College, 1958). The year before, the

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution was established to further the study of war. Brian Holden Reid, *The American Civil War* (London: Cassell, 1999), Chapter 1 on the Crimean War.

5. Sir Brian Horrocks, *A Full Life* (London: Collins, 1960), 69; Roland Ryder, *Oliver Leese* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987), 31. On the American side, there is a limited debate concerning the utility of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth (and other American service schools) in preparing commanders for World War II. Omar Bradley, who finished first out of eighty students in the Leavenworth class of 1915, considered the instruction methods less than stellar, but thought the courses were intellectually stimulating. Joseph Lawton Collins considered the instruction to be first rate. Timothy K. Nenninger "Leavenworth and Its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1920-1940" *The Journal of Military History* LVIII (April 1994): 204-205.

6. Those officers in the Senior Division underwent a one-year course while those in the Junior Division stayed for two years. Oddly, there is little direct evidence of Montgomery's performance at Camberley. He noted in his memoirs, "I believe I got a good report, but do not know as nobody ever told me if I had done well or badly: which seems curious." B.L. Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein* (London: Collins, 1958), 39. Nigel Hamilton has little to add, other than that Montgomery was disappointed by the quality of instruction. *Monty: The Making of a General, 1887-1842* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981), 151-153. Montgomery's brother, Brian, recalled that the Directing Staff considered him a "bloody menace." A Field Marshal in the Family (London: Constable, 1973), 179.

7. National Personnel Records Centre (NPRC), Ottawa, A.G.L. *McNaughton*, Confidential Report, 21 December 1921; Swettenham, McNaughton, I: 191. Anderson had been a major general on Sir Henry Horne's First Army staff during World War I.

8. The 17th Infantry Brigade, with nine battalions, actually had the rifle strength of a division and a large area of responsibility. Montgomery, *A Field Marshal in the Family*, 181.

9. MacBrien commanded the 12th Infantry Brigade during World War I.

10. Quoted in Swettenham, *McNaughton*, I: 236.

11. J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 57.

12. Norman Hillmer and William McAndew, "The Cunning of Restraint: General J.H. MacBrien and the Problems of Peacetime Soldiering" *Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ)* VIII, 4 (Spring 1979): 43; Stephen J. Harris, "The Canadian General Staff and the Higher Organization of Defence, 1919-1939" *War and Society* I (May 1985): 89. McNaughton also fought hard to exclude the deputy ministers in his department, G.J. Desbarat and Colonel L.R. Lafleche, from exercising any authority in the realm of policy or doctrine. He often bypassed them completely to discuss issues with the Minister of National Defence and sometimes bypassed everyone and took his concerns directly to Prime Minister R.B. Bennett, with whom he enjoyed a particularly beneficial relationship.

13. English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, 42. For a good analysis of McNaughton's role in the camps see Roy R. Maddocks, "A.G.L. McNaughton, R.B. Bennett and the Unemployment Relief Camps, 1932-35", Unpublished Paper, 1973, File 74/795, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Ottawa.

14. Stephen J. Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939" *Military Affairs* XLVI, 3 (October 1982): 122. McNaughton's decision to scrap Defence Scheme No. 1 and his personal and professional conflict with Brown are covered in Richard A. Gimblett, "Buster Brown: The Man and His Clash with 'Andy' McNaughton", Unpublished BA, Royal Military College, 1979.

15. Quoted in Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 179.

16. Major General A.G.L. McNaughton, "The Defence of Canada: A Review of the Present Situation, 28 May 1935" DHH, File 112.3M2009(D7); C.P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, I: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956), 7. Lieutenant Colonel E.L.M. Burns summed up the deplorable situation in 1936, stating, "Our forces are poorly trained and equipped." "The Defence of Canada" *CDQ* XIII, 4 (July 1936): 379.

17. Address to the United Services Institute, 10 December 1921, quoted in Swettenham, *McNaughton*, I: 228-29. He repeated this belief years later when he became CGS. "Trend of Army Development," Address to Canadian Military Institute, Toronto, 2 May 1929, McNaughton Papers, Vol. 347.

18. McNaughton, "The Defence of Canada"; Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey* (New York: William Morrow, 1970), 411.

19. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 99.

20. Desmond Morton, "Changing Operational Doctrine in the Canadian Corps, 1916-1917" *Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* II, 4 (Winter 1999): 39. In 1936 the Militia underwent a significant reorganization. Four cavalry regiments and six infantry regiments were converted to armoured car and tank units respectively. As for the Permanent Force, a tank school was not established until 1938. For a good survey of the changes see Major W. Alexander Morrison, "Major General A.G.L. McNaughton, The Conference of Defence Associations, and the 1936 N.P.A.M. Re-organization: A Master Military Bureaucratic Politician at Work", DHH, File 82/470.

21. Every year from the time McNaughton became CGS until the outbreak of the war, the British Army conducted collective field training at the brigade level or higher. English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, 29. One observer of the 1935 manoeuvres considered them "probably the best … since the War" and was certainly better than those conducted a decade earlier. Special Correspondent, "The Army Manoeuvres" *The Fighting Forces* XII, 4 (October 1935): 355. For an overview of what the British had achieved in the mid-1920s see Major General James H. MacBrien, "The British Army Manoeuvres September 1925" *CDQ* II (January 1926): 132-150. The Permanent Force exercised at

Camp Borden in the summer of 1938 at the brigade level, but the poor overall quality of pre-exercise training hindered the manoeuvres.
22. Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 193.
23. Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1952), 22-23; Major E.L.M. Burns, "A Step Towards Modernization" *CDQ* XII (April 1935): 305.
24. James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 260.
25. Ibid., 258.
26. Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, "The Military Engineer and Canadian Defence" *CDQ* VII, 2 (January 1929): 151, 154.
27. McNaughton, "The Development of Artillery in the Great War" *CDQ* II, (January 1929): 171; Swettenham, *McNaughton*, I: 229.
28. J.F.C. Fuller, "The Application of Recent Developments in Mechanics and Other Scientific Knowledge to Preparation and Training for Future War on Land" *Royal United Services Institute Journal* LXV (1920): 240-241, 252-56.
29. McNaughton, "The Development of Artillery in the Great War", 170; Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, "The Capture of Valenciennes: A Study in Co-ordination" *CDQ* X, 3 (April 1933): 279. English has suggested that he perhaps "fell into the trap of believing that the only experience that counts is one's own." *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, 50.
30. Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 192-209; For a good discussion of Guy Simonds' faith in, and ultimate reliance on the timed use of artillery see William J. McAndrew, "Fire or Movement?: Canadian Tactical Doctrine, Sicily 1943" *Military Affairs* LI (July 1987): 144-145.
31. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 138-39.
32. Shane B. Schreiber, *Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps and the Last 100 Days of the Great War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 142. Harris correctly observed that as a scientist-engineer McNaughton could not help but be "acutely aware of the implications of modern weapons on the battlefield." However, knowing that mechanization would change warfare is a long way from understanding precisely how it would be changed. *Canadian Brass*, 201.
33. William A. Stewart, "Attack Doctrine in the Canadian Corps, 1916-1918," Unpublished M.A., University of New Brunswick, 1984, 213. At Amiens, tank-infantry co-operation was "practically impossible" due to the poor visibility.
34. Fraser, *Alanbrooke*, 119. Fraser added that "at no point" had he "yet given evidence that he had a real insight into the strategic and operational opportunities, as opposed to the tactical advantages." In 1944 a small pamphlet entitled British Commanders was in circulation which gave brief bios of the principal commanders. The section on Brooke claimed he was "regarded as Britain's greatest expert on mechanization." This was no more true in 1944 than it would have been in 1939. DHH, File 000.2(D29). Liddell Hart recalled that while Brooke was teaching at Camberley in 1925 he had "set forth the attack method he was teaching, which made the action of tanks subordinate and subservient to the requirements of a well-organized barrage and timetable, while distributing the tanks in a string of small packets to aid the barrage-following infantry." *The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart* (London: Cassell, 1965), I: 101.
35. James H. Lutz, "Canadian Military Thought, 1923-1939: A Profile Drawn from the Pages of the old Canadian Defence Quarterly" *CDQ* IX, 2 (Autumn 1979): 48; Serge M. Durflinger, "The Canadian Defence Quarterly 1933-1935: Canadian Military Writing of a Bygone Era" *CDQ* XX, 6 (June 1991): 46.
36. B.L. Montgomery, "The Major Tactics of the Encounter Battle" *The Army Quarterly* XXXVI, 2 (July 1938): 272. Montgomery perfectly anticipated various dilemmas that would affect both the Allies and the Germans in Normandy. He recognized that the defence armoured divisions "must be replaced by normal divisions" to regain mobility. However, an actual relief would be hard because armoured divisions "should not allow themselves to become static." As for air power, he argued against its employment against rearward objectives and envisioned attacks on enemy concentrations. In effect, he favoured the interdiction of units on the move to the main battle area. "[T]he slowing up and the disorganization of the enemy's main armies might have far-reaching results for the side which could achieve this object." As for offensive tactics, he suggested that divisions should "push on without any idea of keeping alignment" so as to "drive in the advance elements without delay" in order to confirm the contours of the enemy's main position. This is what the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division did on D-Day, only to have its lead elements isolated and decimated by flanking attacks by 12th SS Panzer Division 'Hitler Youth.'
37. B.L. Montgomery, "The Problem of the Encounter Battle as Affected by Modern British War Establishment" *CDQ* XV, 1 (October 1937): 13-25, and Stuart's editorial in same issue, p. 1. Montgomery was by no means a prolific article writer, but did publish a five-part series entitled "The Growth of Modern Infantry Tactics" in *The Antelope* during 1924-25 and "Some Problems of Mechanization" in the same journal in 1926. See also "Letter of Advice to a Newly Appointed Adjutant in the TA" (The editors changed his original title, "Training in the Territorial Army") *Army Quarterly* (Autumn 1924).
38. Address to the United Services Institute, 10 December 1921, quoted in Swettenham, *McNaughton*, I: 228-29.
39. Burns was certainly studying. He wrote sophisticated reviews of works by Liddell Hart and Fuller. See Captain E.L.M. Burns, "The Principles of War: A Criticism of Colonel J.F.C. Fuller's Book "The Foundation of the Science of War" *CDQ* IV, 2 (January 1927): 168-175 and Major E.L.M. Burns, "The Remaking of Modern Armies: A Review" *CDQ* V, 1 (October 1927): 115-117.
40. Steve E. Dietrich, "The Professional Reading of General George S. Patton, Jr." *The Journal of Military History* LIII, 4 (1989): 390. In 1919 Patton gave a presentation to the officers of his tank brigade entitled "The Obligation of Being an Officer" in which he stated "Few are born Napoleons, but any of us can be good company commanders if we study … I

earnestly advise you all to read military subjects 3 ½ hours a week." Blumenson, *The Patton Papers*, I: 724. Omar Bradley reflected that while teaching at West Point "I began to seriously read-and study-military history … learning a great deal from the mistakes of my predecessors." In particular, he studied Sherman, "a master of the war of movement." A *General's Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 53-54.
41. MG 31 E42, Vol. 3, Interview Transcripts, Brigadier General R.J. Orde, p. 6.
42. Stewart, "Attack Doctrine in the Canadian Corps", 250.
43. John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), II: 2.
44. Stewart, "Attack Doctrine in the Canadian Corps", 256.
45. Swettenham, *McNaughton*, I: 315-316.
46. Mel Thistle, ed., *The Mackenzie-McNaughton Wartime Letters* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), xiii; Interview transcript, Lieutenant General Elliot Rodger, p. 14, MG 31 E42, Vol. 3, NAC; Mackenzie quoted in Bernd Horn and Stephen J.Harris, eds., *Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2001), 74.
47. Douglas MacArthur was also called out of retirement to resume command. He resigned from the active list on 31 December 1937, but President Roosevelt wanted him as Senior Commander in the Orient. On 26 July 1941 MacArthur was reappointed Major General in the army and the next day was promoted to lieutenant general. William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1978), 189.
48. J.W. Pickersgill, ed., *The Mackenzie King Record*, I: 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 38; King Diary, 6 October 1939, quoted in Granatstein, *The Generals*, 61; J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 25.
49. Patton was known to break down at the thought of his soldiers dying. Montgomery related a similar incident about Brooke at Dunkirk when the latter had been ordered to return to Britain. Montgomery stated, "I saw at once that he was struggling to hold himself in check; so I took him a little way into the sand hills and then he broke down and wept—not because of the situation of the B.E.F. ... but because he had to leave us all to a fate which looked pretty bad. He, a soldier, had been ordered to abandon his men at a critical moment—that is what disturbed him." B.L. Montgomery, *The Path to Leadership* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1961), 127-128.
50. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, I: 39.
51. Victor Odlum, a militia officer, was fifty-nine and had not commanded anything since the 23rd Infantry Brigade in 1925. In the intervening years he pursued business and politics. Halfdan F.H. Hertzberg, a Permanent Force officer, was fifty-five in 1939 and was serving as the Quartermaster-General in Ottawa. Forty-nine year-old E.W. Sansom, a future corps commander in England, was only a colonel.
52. Desmond Morton scoffed at the idea that Pearkes could have commanded the 1st Division during the "Canada and the Second World War" conference held in London, England in June 2004. Pearkes had an interest in military history and was always keen to extract lessons. See "The 1914 Campaign in East Prussia" *CDQ* VIII, 2 (January 1932): 248-254 and "The Winter March of a Brigade of Guards Through New Brunswick, 1862" *CDQ* XI, 1 (April 1934): 100-110.
53. Reginald H. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C. Through Two World Wars* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 129. Pearkes managed to get himself appointed as Assistant Chief Umpire for the three-week exercise. The 1st Division was commanded by Major General C. Armitage and the 2nd Division was commanded by Major General Henry "Jumbo" Wilson. Pearkes recalled, "there was very little 'air' recce and the battle like so many manoeuvres in peace time became deadlocked. I was very impressed by the night move of H.Q.s and could quite understand the thrill or romance of a mechanized force. The speed and distance of the move were remarkable at that time (of course we did the same sort of thing many times a few years later but I had never seen anything like it in Canada)." Pearkes Papers, University of Victoria Archives, Special Collections, Box 7.
54. Reginald H. Roy, *1944: The Canadians in Normandy* Canadian War Museum Publication No. 19 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1984), 2.
55. Brooke's brigade consisted of four battalions and Fraser has suggested that handling them on exercise "presented him with few difficulties", specifically because he had studied "voraciously" for the task. Brooke commanded the Mobile Division from the end of 1937 to July 1938. *Alanbrooke*, 108, 117, 121. Even the future Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, Bernard Paget, had inter-war command experience with the Quetta Brigade from 1936 to 1937.
56. Donald E. Houston, *Hell on Wheels: The 2nd Armoured Division* (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1977), 69. The umpires called it the most magnificent road move ever made by tanks. Patton specifically focused on attacking the enemy's rear time and again. In Louisiana he pushed his division 200 miles in twenty-four hours. Christopher R. Gabel, *The US Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1991), 52, 108, 110. Through study and actual field manoeuvres, Patton evolved a belief that tanks should not be used en masse. This differed fundamentally from Guderian's concept of "*Nicht klechern, sondern klotzen*" ("Not a drizzle, but a downpour"). Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, *German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them* (Norman, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1977), 89. The Tennessee Manoeuvres exercised corps-level formations only. In Louisiana Lieutenant General Ben Lear's Second Army (160,000 men) attacked Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Third Army (240,000 men). Twenty-seven divisions took part in the Louisiana Manoeuvres. The Carolina Manoeuvres followed in mid-November.
57. Burns, "A Step Towards Modernization", 301.

FRONTLINES AND HEADLINES: THE 'MAPLE LEAF' NEWSPAPER AND ARMY CULTURE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Ms. Kathryn E. Rose

The "Yanks" had their own *Stars and Stripes*; the "Limeys" had their *Union Jack* and *8th Army News*. Yes… even from the German positions we captured we found the Jerry was getting his daily Berlin Bumph."[1] This editorial, published in the first *Maple Leaf*, thus proclaimed the Canadian Army's need for its own national newspaper.[2] Certainly troops valued reading material, whether national or not, as a distraction from the stress of active service. In the words of an American source, "Soldiers at the front read K-ration labels when the contents are listed on the package, just to be reading something. God knows they are familiar enough with the contents—right down to the last dextrose tablet."[3]

The *Maple Leaf's* mandate was to provide Canadian soldiers with what they wanted, notably including news from home, but also to assure that the material was non-partisan, and, above all, would maintain the morale of the Canadian troops. These goals were somewhat contradictory, but this paper will argue that the *Maple Leaf* generally succeeded as a result of the editors' constant efforts to present information in a manner that did not undermine the publication's reputation as the soldiers' own newspaper. Because of the editors' sensitivity to their very particular readership, *Maple Leaf*, in fact, provides insights into the culture of the Canadian Army. Yet the newspaper, because of its key mission to support morale, did a good deal more than simply reflect the desires, stated and perceived, of its readership. It endeavoured to shape the culture of the army in a manner that bolstered the self-confidence of the troops. *Maple Leaf* sought to underscore the idea that Canada's forces were supremely modern, capable and efficient because they were "scientifically" organized, trained and equipped. Canada's forces were the product of the best principles and best technology generated by the scientific mastery and industrial might of the western alliance. This article argues that the *Maple Leaf* itself was an instrument in the management of the Canadian military, and as such, provides an important means of understanding what the newspaper endeavoured to do, what it accomplished and its usefulness as a source for the study of the Canadian Army of the Second World War in particular.

During the Second World War, the Axis powers had achieved brilliant victories over the western allies in 1939 to early 1942, and Canadian land forces had suffered shattering defeats at the hands of the Japanese at Hong Kong in December 1941 and, at the hands of the Germans, at Dieppe in August 1942. Otherwise, the new Canadian overseas army had sat in England, endlessly training, until the 1st Canadian Infantry Division joined the Allied invasion of Sicily and then mainland Italy in July to September 1943. Until then, Canada's main contribution had been to the Allied industrial and scientific efforts: the mass production of sophisticated equipment, naval escort of these supplies to the fighting fronts in the high-technology war against the German submarine fleet in the Atlantic and the high-technology aerial bombing offensive against Germany. Much as Canada had established itself as an industrial engine in the Allied war effort, the challenge remained of preparing the Canadian Army, largely untried in combat, for major

THE MAPLE LEAF

(Contents Passed by Censor)

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S.I.W.

TWO under-strength Canadian infantry battalions fought the Battle of Ortona, a glorious feat of arms.

It took roughly a thousand men 10 days to kill most of the Germans who had turned the Adriatic town into a strong point and to drive the others out when they saw resistance was hopeless. Ten thousand man days.

Elsewhere on this page a few other statistics are printed. Medical figures show that 480 Canadian soldiers are being treated in Canadian hospitals here for VD. Treatment takes 24 days. That's 11,520 man days lost — more manpower than was needed to drive the German paratroops out of Ortona!

The MAPLE LEAF doesn't intend to preach. That's not its job. But the facts as shown might be worth a little quiet, sober reflection.

Every soldier knows or thinks he knows all about sex hygiene. But what he doesn't know, perhaps, is that the type of VDG prevalent in this country is a virulent type characterized by a very high proportion of complicated cases resistant to sulphanilamide and other drugs. Sometimes cure is very difficult, by no means certain.

Canada needs her fighting men for the all-out battles ahead. There will be other Ortonas. Are you going to be in there punching with your pals—or will you be occupying a bed in some VD ward?

C.W.G.

Canada Signs New Mutual Aid Pacts

OTTAWA — Canada has concluded a treaty with China formally relinquishing extra-territorial rights and other privileges which Canada, together with other nations, previously exercised in China.

The treaty provides that, not later than six months after cessation of hostilities, the two governments will enter into a comprehensive, modern treaty of friendship regarding commerce, navigation and consular rights.

The treaty does not affect existing rights of Canadian nationals owning property in China.

Prime Minister King also announced that Canada had signed a mutual aid agreement with the French Committee of National Liberation. G. Bonneau, delegate in Canada, signed on behalf of the French committee.

New Air Links

WINNIPEG — Northwest Airlines has made the first move in a new program calling for establishment of Winnipeg as a major base on two air routes between Chicago and Alaska.

In an application filed with the Civil Aeronautics board, in Washington, the airline has asked for authority to operate routes between Chicago and Anchorage, Alaska, the first to proceed through Milwaukee, Duluth, Winnipeg, McMurray, Alta.; Norman Wells, Northwest Territory, Fort Yukon and Fairbanks, Alaska, and the second northwest from Winnipeg to Edmonton, Whitehorse and Gulcon?, Alaska.

HONORED BY SOVIET

OTTAWA — Canadian servicemen who have been awarded Soviet medals are: Lieut. E. W. Bolen, RCNVR, who received "the Order of the Patriotic War, Second Class"; Sub-Lieut. C. R. A. Senior, RCNVR, "Order of the Patriotic War, First Class," and Flt.-Sgt. W. L. McGuinty, RCAF, "Medal of Courage."

No Business

GORE BAY, Ont.—Manitoulin Islanders have been behaving so well that Russell McDermid and his wife, Sarah, are leaving the island. McDermid is governor of the island's 10-celled jail and his wife is matron. They haven't had a prisoner in six months so McDermid is going to a new post at Sudbury, Ont.

"Infamous"

WASHINGTON — U.S. Secretary of State Hull denounced as "infamous" any propaganda urging Britain and the U.S. to join Germany against Russia.

At his press conference, he was replying to a question about reports of a Spanish broadcast from a Falangist station appealing to "civilized nations to unite against their common enemy Bolshevism."

"Anyone who originated such a suggestion must be conscious of the infamy of what he is doing," Mr. Hull stated.

MAIN PROBLEM

TORONTO — Wounded Canadian and American soldiers suffering compound fractures are the major problems facing medical officers at the battle-fronts at present, members of the American College of Surgeons attending the war sessions in Toronto were informed.

Germans Land Agents in Eire, Claim in Ulster

BELFAST—"I have no doubt whatever" German submarines have landed agents in remote harbors on the west coast of Ireland in recent months, declared Sir Hugh Oneil, chairman of the Ulster Parliamentary party, here.

It has been announced in Dublin that air services between there and Liverpool have been cancelled until further notice. The move is part of Britain's pre-invasion security scheme.

Venereal Disease Major Army Problem in Italy

Cost of Ignoring Available Protection Heavy; "Veritable Flood" of Cases Hampers Hospitals In Treating Wounded and Sick

TIME lost in treating soldiers for gonorrhea is one of the biggest problems of the medical branch of the Canadian Army in Italy because the Italian woman has developed a type of gonorrhea germ particularly resistant to latest methods of treatment.

Survey

This is the statement of a leading army medical authority after an extensive survey of the cost of venereal disease to the Canadian war effort in Italy.

Recent returns from hospitals in this theatre show that, on one day, 480 Canadian soldiers were under treatment for venereal disease. Each of the soldiers will occupy a hospital bed for an average of 24 days and the figure of 480 is no exception—some days it's more, some less.

"The figure of 480 does not include the Canadian soldiers who are treated for V.D. in forward medical units," it is pointed out. "That figure of 480 continues, day in and day out, and represents a veritable flooding of the medical units and hospitals which have a busy enough time looking after wounded and sick."

Only One Way

Venereal disease is contracted in only one way despite the fairy tales about towels and toilet seats. There's no need to draw diagrams regarding how it's contracted but medical statistics definitely show that many Canadian soldiers are ignoring accepted and efficient methods of prevention.

Unfortunately, venereal disease in a woman doesn't show any signs like the rash of measles or the cough of tuberculosis. The woman, herself, may not know she has the disease. Famous last words are, "She looked clean."

"The only sure prevention for venereal disease is staying away from the agent of transmission. Anyone who maintains a grown man needs to indulge in periodic sexual intercourse to keep healthy is an ignorant, bloody fool," it is stated.

"The urge or desire for sexual intercourse is a natural instinct common to all animals. A continent soldier controls this urge because of normal upbringing, moral training and common sense. The biggest single cause of incontinence and promiscuous sexual intercourse is liquor. If the 'vino' is left alone there won't be slip-ups.

Good Chance

"However, rather than offer only one course for the prevention of venereal disease, there is an alternative for those who cannot always suppress the urge. If every precaution is taken, the chance of avoiding V.D. is high.

"A supply of condoms and E.T. capsules plus the knowledge of how to use them are important. But even more important—a condom is no good if the soldier is too drunk to remember in which pocket he's carrying it.

"On top of that, a knowledge of the location of the 'PRO Station' is essential and an immediate visit following exposure even more so. Its no good going the next day."

More Serious

Syphilis is less common but more serious than gonorrhea. If untreated or inadequately treated, syphilis is one of the most dangerous diseases known. It is insidious and crafty. If undiscovered at the time of infection, it may lie dormant without symptoms for years and then the victim may develop crippling paralysis, blindness, insanity or any one of the numerous other manifestations of late syphilis.

This last statement, alone, is enough to make any soldier not only think twice, but three or four times before running any risks.



Large Build-Up For Protection

Unemployment Insurance Fund Reaches Total Of 182 Million

OTTAWA — With Canada's unemployment insurance fund totalling 182,613,627 dollars at the end of February, some 2,750,000 Canadian workers have an average of 66 dollars in a pot intended to help see them through slack periods.

Since the first worker became entitled to collect benefits from the fund, February 29, 1942 — after paying in for 180 days— a total of 11,711,443 dollars has been paid out in benefits.

More Apply

Although there has not been a large scale drain on the fund, recent months have shown increases and a natural seasonal tendency in winter, combined with home industrial layoffs, sent the number of applications for benefits to a new high of 11,751 in January.

The balance of 182,613,626 dollars has been accumulated since compulsory unemployment insurance was introduced in July, 1941. Employers and employees have jointly contributed 149,413,103 dollars and the government had paid 29,882,621. The balance has been earned in interest.

Those known as class one workers pay 12 cents weekly into the fund and their employers pay 21 cents. These workers are entitled, if they are single, to a benefit of 408 cents weekly or, if they have one or more dependents, 480 cents.

The second group up to workers earning 26 dollars weekly or more. In that category, employees chip in 36 cents weekly, employers 27 cents, and benefits are 1,224 cents for single persons and 1,440 cents for those with dependents.

After Nine Days

Records of payments are kept in unemployment insurance books which are issued for each individual employee. When the worker becomes unemployed, after nine days, he can start to collect benefits provided that during the previous two years he has made contributions for 180 days.

Men and women in the armed forces are having their rights in the fund protected during their services. Contributions made by these people are held by the commission and will stand to their credit when they leave the forces.

After a man is discharged and has worked at an insured occupation for 15 weeks, he gets credit also for the period he served in the forces with the government paying both employer and employees contribution. To the end of January, the government had paid 53,983 dollars into the fund under this plan.

SALVAGE SAVES TAXES

LONDON — British army salvage organizations in the Middle East are estimated to have saved British taxpayers at least 100,000,000 pounds. The scrap is used for re-manufacturing.

offensives against German forces that still appeared to be the most formidable in modern history. General A.G.L. McNaughton, commander of the Canadian Army Overseas until December 1943, was himself an engineer turned solider who passionately believed advanced technology would give his troops an essential edge. General H.D.G. Crerar, McNaughton's senior subordinate commander and a former artillery officer attuned to scientific methods, had nothing like McNaughton's confidence that the morale of the troops would look after itself. J.L. Ralston, minister of National Defence, a decorated First World War front-line infantry commander, shared Crerar's worries. Crerar and Ralston sought out newspaper executives already serving in the army to address specific concerns about morale. Crerar and Ralston, this paper will argue, essentially extended the management principles that had come to characterize the Canadian and Allied war effort to the issue of morale.

The army published the first issue of the *Maple Leaf* on January 1944 in Italy, four months after the Allies' September 3, 1943 landing. In October 1943, the Canadian government decided to increase Canada's level of participation to a corps, which arrived from England in three stages; 25,000 troops in November, 10,000 in December and 4,000 in January, adding to the 1,851 officers and 24, 835 other ranks already present. The corps was initially led by Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, who was succeeded by Major General E.L.M Burns. The corps included the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the First Canadian Armoured Brigade.[4] With the increased Canadian involvement, General Crerar and the Minister of Defence, Colonel J.L. Ralston, acknowledged the need for a public relations group, including a service newspaper.

Thus, while the increase in Canadian participation in Italy provided the impetus for the creation of a Canadian military newspaper, there was a further dimension to the story. An intense nationalist, General McNaughton's main concern was to keep the whole Canadian Army united for the main Allied victory offensive against Germany, which would take the form of a large invasion into France across the English Channel. He had agreed to the dispatch of the 1st Division to Sicily to gain battle experience, with the expectation that the division would returned to England for the invasion of France. Crerar and Ralston, however, had strongly pushed for the increased commitment in the Mediterranean, in part because they were worried that the long wait in England was dangerously undermining the morale of the troops. McNaughton, with a passionate nationalist's almost unbounded faith in the spirit of Canadian troops, did not share these worries about morale. In fact, he was so appalled at the government's decision effectively to "split" the Canadian Army that he resigned as commander in December 1944.

Crerar and Ralston, however, did not believe that getting troops into action was sufficient to sustain fighting spirit, especially not in the bloody, frustrating slog that was the Italian campaign, with the brilliant and tenacious German defence, the mountainous terrain and the chill fall rains. In November and December 1943, I Canadian Corps was on the Adriatic front in the fight to cross the Moro River.[5] During "Black December," the Corps experienced 2,339 casualties.[6] Colonel Ralston, while visiting the Mediterranean theatre, convinced a reluctant Canadian Brigadier Richard S. (Dick) Malone, then a liaison officer to the British 8th Army (of which the Canadian Corps formed a part) to lead No. 1 Public Relations Group. In civilian life, Malone was a successful journalist and newspaper executive who had worked with the Toronto *Daily Star* from 1927 to 1928, the Regina *Leader Post* from 1929 to 1933 and the Saskatoon *Star Phoenix* in 1934. He was a member of the Parliamentary Press Gallery in 1934-1935 and in 1936, he became assistant general manager of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, a paper that had unusual influence in federal politics and particularly close connections to the Liberal party.[7]

FOR CANADIAN TROOPS IN ACTION

THE MAPLE LEAF

(WITH CANADIAN PRESS NEWS SERVICE)

Vol. 1, No. 104. — ITALY EDITION — Wednesday, June 7, 1944

INVASION

Navy Supports Assault With Terrific Barrage

More Than 600 Warships, Including Canadian Vessels, Blast Invasion Coast While Thousand Bombers Roar Overhead; Soldiers Cheerful

ABOARD A BRITISH DESTROYER OFF BERNIERE-SUR-MER—It is Tuesday at dawn. Guns are belching flame from more than 600 Allied warships. Thousands of bombers are roaring overhead, fighters are weaving in and out of clouds as invasion of Western Europe begins. Rolling clouds of dense black and grey smoke cover beaches southeast of Le Havre as the full fury of the Allied invasion force is unleashed on the German defences.

Incredible Sight

IT IS a most incredible sight. This ship is standing 8,000 yards off the beaches of Berniere-sur-Mer and from the bridge of this little destroyer can be seen vast numbers of naval craft.

The air is filled with continuous thunder of broadsides and crash of bombs. Great spurts of flame come up from the beaches in long, snake-like ripples as shells ranging from 16 inches to four inches find their mark. In the last 10 minutes alone more than 2,000 tons of high explosive shells have gone down on the beachhead.

It is now exactly 0725, and through glasses can be seen the first wave of assault troops touch down on the water's edge and fan up the beach. Battleships and cruisers are steaming up and down, drenching the beaches ahead of the troops with withering broadsides.

Guns flash and great coils of yellow cordite smoke curl into the air. Great assault vessels are standing out to sea in their hundreds, and invasion craft are being lowered like beetles from davits and head toward shore in long lines.

They are crammed with troops, tanks, guns and armor-

(Continued on Page 4)

ORDNANCE DUMP

LONDON—Britain has become one vast ordnance dump, said a BBC reporter. He said roads are jammed with military traffic.

In every wood and leaf-shaden side roads, also private grounds, quarries and under embankments, this great traffic is concentrated.

Fuehrer in Charge

SENIOR Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel have been given a backseat in direction of the invasion battle of western Europe, according to news from underground sources reaching London that claim Hitler is taking personal command of all anti-invasion operations.

It is also reported Der Fuehrer has moved his headquarters to "somewhere in northern France" so as to be close to the scene of operations.

HUGE HEADLINES

Biggest headlines London newspapers could assemble announced the invasion of Europe had started. Many queues for papers assembled everywhere but there were no demonstrations—only a quiet undertone of confidence reflected in first comments of early newspapers.

D-Day Despatches

Complete Confidence

General Montgomery, on the eve of the invasion, said: "I personally have absolute and complete confidence in the outcome. The party is in first-class shape to win the match.

The German soldier is terribly good but I don't think the German general is as good as he used to be. He has been on the defensive for a very long time and I believe it must affect his mentality."

Sweet Revenge

The German news agency announced that docks at Portsmouth, London, Plymouth, Bristol and Hull were the "springboards of invasion" when the Allied forces landed in France yesterday. Many Canadians in Italy will remember when these cities were among the chief targets of the Luftwaffe in the blitz of 1940-41.

Take a Bearing

One hundred and twenty-five million maps had been prepared prior to the Allied landings in Europe, according to one of the reports on the landings released by the U.S. War Department.

Special Order

Before Allied troops embarked, each soldier was given a copy of General Eisenhower's Order of the Day which said:

"The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave

(Continued on Page 4)

Allied Gains Reach 10 Miles in One Day

Biggest Story of War Told in 24 Words; Greatest Naval, Air, Paratroop Concentrations In History; Canadians in Action

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—British, Canadian and American troops, supported by the navies and airforces of the three countries, yesterday morning opened the assault on Western Europe with seaborne and airborne landings on the west coast of France.

Number One

LONDON—First Allied invasion communique was a terse message of 24 words. It said:

"Under command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces, supported by strong airforces, began landing Allied armies this morning on the northern coast of France."

It was issued by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and was marked "Communique Number One."

NAZI STRIKEOUT

"It now appears that we have been given another month of grace before the invasion starts," said Eabert De Beaupian, spokesman for the Vichy-controlled Paris radio at 0500 hrs yesterday. "According to press reports from Washington, President Roosevelt will visit London about the end of June. Surely this indicates that the big event will not start before then," he said.

Well Inland

A CRYPTIC communique by General Eisenhower's staff confirmed earlier German radio reports that the news for which the entire world has waited for months—INVASION—had broken. Only 24 words were in the communique, but behind them lay the biggest story of the war.

Last night it was reported the assault forces were pressing well inland from the beaches, with fighting in Caen, strategic point on the railway from Cherbourg to Paris, and about Rouen. Caen is 10 miles inland. At other points advances of several miles have been made.

Paratroops led the invasion forces into France. About 30,000 of these specialists floated to earth behind the Atlantic Wall in the largest exploitation of airborne troops the world has ever seen. Official sources say their losses were exceptionally light and they have seized many strategic points including bridges which the Germans had no time to blow. Many of the paratroops were veterans of the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. Glider-borne troops joined them. Losses of troop-carrying planes were not heavy.

4,000 Ships

Soon after first light the first troops touched down on beaches scattered from Le

(Continued on Page 4)

ROLE FOR FRENCH

WASHINGTON—Henri Hoppenot, French Committee of National Liberation delegate to Washington, declared Tuesday French troops soon will participate in the Western European operations.

Where First Blows Landed



Malone's professional experience had brought him to the notice of the top levels of the army, notably Ralston and Crerar. An infantry officer in the part-time militia, Malone had volunteered for active service in the infantry, but within months was appointed staff secretary to Ralston.[8] He then took the War Staff College course to qualify him for military staff appointments, and served as a Staff Captain in the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. He was subsequently appointed Brigade Major in the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, and landed in Sicily with the first waves of troops. In Sicily, Malone was wounded in a mine explosion. He described the event to a friend in a letter, dated 23 July 1943: "I was in a carrier and ran over a mine and blown a mile, the others killed… My guts are still badly out of joint and I am a little deaf—but I have all the pieces and don't think it's serious."[9] However, Malone wondered about his future role in the war effort, as "There is a new bird in my job already," and he estimated that he had two more weeks of bed rest.[10]

Malone returned to duty on General Montgomery's personal staff at the end of August 1943, just before the invasion of the Italian mainland. He continued in this position until Montgomery left to prepare for the invasion of Northwest Europe on 21 December 1943.[11] Malone, then yielding to Ralston's urgings, accepted the new appointment as the chief of Canadian Public Relations in Italy.[12] The position included responsibility for communications with I Canadian Corps, war correspondents, amplifiers and sound systems, the gathering of military news and the creation of the *Maple Leaf*.[13]

Malone's personal relationships with the high command, because of their central importance to the creation and development of the *Maple Leaf*, require further exploration. The sources are silent as to when Malone first met Ralston, although his early selection for Ralston's personal staff would suggest a previous acquaintance. This would not be surprising given Malone's familiarity with Ottawa from years of work covering federal politics. It is clear that during Malone's time on Ralston's staff, the men became lasting friends. When Malone was Montgomery's Canadian liaison, he encouraged the British General to meet with Ralston and was able to brief Ralston on the General's peculiarities. With this guidance, Ralston was able to impress Montgomery, who had been very reluctant to meet the Minister.[14] In a letter written to Malone, Ralston emphasized his gratitude for this assistance: "I repeat that nothing could have been more to my liking than to have you as a guide, counsellor, and friend on that interesting, informative, exhilarating and stimulating tour."[15] Malone felt comfortable returning such correspondence, as on 8 November 1943, he wrote to wish the Minister a "Happy Christmas," and "best in the coming year," noting the difficulties experienced by a junior officer attempting to write the Minister of Defence.[16] These two instances reflect the comfortable nature of the relationship that existed between these two men.

Despite his civilian experience and his respect for Ralston, Malone was not eager to accept the public relations position. In his experience, "Others who had tackled the job had suffered badly through lack of authority."[17] Not comfortable with declining outright, Malone presented several conditions to Ralston. He hoped Ralston would not be able to satisfy the demands and select another candidate.[18] Malone contended:

> That one would require…complete authority on Canadian Press matters within the theatre, [and] direct access at all times to either the Army Commander or the Minister. I further stipulated that it would be impossible for me to become the personal publicity agent for any commander, which frequently happened when P.R. officers had no other alternative.[19]

Ralston, a stickler for propriety and correctness and never noted for his jocularity, responded with surprisingly good humour, "So you are making conditions now as to how

you will work."[20] Ralston agreed, but quite properly and cleverly left the condition regarding the work as publicity agent for higher commanders to clear with Crerar.[21] Although hesitant to approach Crerar on the matter, "Colonel Ralston gave me no out on the matter… There was nothing else for it so I said exactly what I thought."[22] To his surprise, Crerar agreed and gave Malone "complete responsibility and authority for Cdn Army Press and Public Relations in the CMF."[23] Malone's carefully considered terms, the great confidence he had won in his relations with Ralston and his resulting support for the independence he demanded for *Maple Leaf* were crucial to its success.[24]

Malone described in his memoirs the editorial policy he laid down for the newspaper:

> The paper would not comment or express opinions on any domestic political issue… and any internal army matter which would injure army morale would also be taboo as far as any editorial opinions or comment was concerned.[25]

This policy ensured that military officials would not use the newspaper as a method for promoting personal propaganda, and would not have to "sell the policies of the party in power," which would have undermined soldiers' confidence in the publication.[26] When Crerar and Ralston agreed to his policy, Malone prudently asked them to record their agreement for posterity. In fact, the written agreement proved not to be necessary, as Malone related in his memoirs: "At no time in the future history of the various editions of the *Maple Leaf* did either of these men [Crerar and Ralston] interfere. The agreed basis was that if they didn't approve of the paper I should be fired, but otherwise I should be free of any direction."[27] Often, editors and journalists of military newspapers sought to impose the qualities of a peace-time press on a military newspaper, which included the right of a journalist to publish sensitive material, to the chagrin of the higher ranking officials.[28] The agreement made between Malone, Crerar and Ralston ensured that such tensions would not occur with the Canadian newspaper.

Malone thus used his relationships and his business executive's strategic approach to the management and editorship of the *Maple Leaf*, to ensure that contents of the newspaper would interest and appeal to common soldiers. Numerous comments in soldiers' memoirs offer evidence that Malone was successful. In George Blackburn's *The Guns of Normandy*, he describes his memory of the *Maple Leaf*, as it related to the undignified process of accommodating normal bodily functions while in combat. He states: "However, this one particular throne… will for you be unforgettable, as you sat there today, you were handed a copy of the *Maple Leaf*."[29] As Blackburn sat in his vulnerable position, he was careful to listen for warnings of incoming mortars, and wondered,

> Whether to save your life, you could actually bring yourself to take shelter in the putrid mess in the hole below you… a question of some substance, familiar to every soldier. The scene hardly qualifies as unforgettable until you come across a strikingly relevant cartoon… A soldier stands in a trench, with his head and shoulders emerging from what is obviously a Compo box toilet seat, shaking his first at a circling Air OP Auster aircraft… You can't help bursting out laughing. It's so easy to identify with that poor bugger, arising, suitably adorned, from that Compo box. And evidently so can everybody else, for suddenly there are explosive guffaws arising from all the gun pits where copies of the Maple Leaf have been distributed and are being devoured.[30]

Malone's tenure in the Mediterranean did not last long, as he left the Mediterranean theatre on 23 March 1944 to begin his work with No. 2 Public Relations Group, in Northwest Europe. Colonel C.W. Gilchrist replaced Malone at No. 1 Public Relations Group and continued to fulfill the editorial policy established by Malone. Gilchrist had a long career in the newspaper industry prior to the war, having worked at the *Saint John*

FOR CANADIAN TROOPS IN ACTION

THE MAPLE LEAF

{WITH CANADIAN PRESS NEWS SERVICE}

Vol. 3, No. 1 — ITALY {ROME} EDITION — Saturday, November 25, 1944

Liberal Party Break Threatens; Flare-Ups Reported In Quebec

Recce Patrols Across Rhine

Threat To Saarbrucken Grows With New American Thrusts

SHAEF—French First Army troops, sweeping northward along the Franco-German border in Lorraine yesterday were fighting in the streets of Colmar, on the Rhone canal, due south of Strasbourg.

Between the converging French First and American Seventh armies, 50,000 Nazi troops in the Vosges were in grave danger. In the Seventh Army's sweep through Alsace, 3,000 German prisoners, including two generals, were captured.

Lighter Opposition

Recce formations of the Seventh Army crossed the Rhine from Strasbourg into Germany yesterday. Other Seventh Army troops expanded their salient around captured Saverne, 20 miles east of Sarrebourg. German resistance in the Alsace plains west of Strasbourg was weakening.

The American Third Army, on its 11-mile front, was fighting in Merzig, 10 miles inside the Reich Saar basin north of Saarbrucken. Other formations, from Metz, were at Johannes Rohrback, on the road to Saarbrucken. Approximately 3,000 German troops were

(Continued on Page 8)

Rome Prison Riot Quelled

ROME—Regina Coeli prison here is relatively calm and the five-day riot involving elements of approximately 500 prisoners is "completely under control," Capt R. M. Freeman, regional supervisor of prisons, said yesterday.

The Italian authorities are said to have the situation in hand, quelled the disturbances and taken measures to the 'complete satisfaction" of the Allied officials of the public safety division.

The back wings of the prison have been emptied of prisoners and a large number has been removed to other jails, Capt. Freeman said. One prisoner was slightly wounded by a ricochetting bullet from the rifle of a Carabiniere, called in to quell the outburst.

It was pointed out by Capt. Freeman, out of the hundreds of prisoners, only a "relatively few were actual rioters." They were agitated by some 40 to 60 ringleaders Political reasons and the simple fact they "didn't like to be in jail," were among the chief causes given by Capt. Freeman.

Chinese Continue De-Japping Bhamo

Chinese troops in Burma slashed into Bhamo at two more points in the south part, yesterday's SEAC report stated.

British troops opened an offensive against Pinwe and crossed the Gyobin Chaung river. On the Chindwin front, operations continued against stiff opposition west of Kalewa. Allied aircraft destroyed five bridges near Kalewa.

Liberators crossed the Indian ocean in a round-trip of 2,300 miles to attack a new Japanese base near Victoria Point at the southernmost tip of Burma.

Is Your Journey Really Necessary?

NO, he isn't a midget hitchhiker looking for a world's fair, but a little Dutch boy who became separated from his parents when war hit Holland. Such goings-on were about as clear to him as the contents of that suitcase, so he sat down and decided to let civilian administration officials settle the whole schmozzle. *(Released Through PWB)*

Tokio Unloading Area For Super-Fort Raid

First Attack on Japanese Capital for Two and One-Half Years; Shipping at Yokohama and Kobe Bombed Also

TOKIO rocked under the bombs of a great task force of Super-Fortresses Thursday, when daylight raiders blasted Japan's capital for the first time since April, 1942.

Heaviest of War

The attack, carried out by B-29 aircraft based on Saipan Island in the Marianas, was the biggest aerial assault on Japan since the beginning of the war. Targets included industrial sections scattered through the capital and hyoro-electric plants, dams and Tokio's inflammable factory centres and shipyards.

Yokohama harbor and Kobe also were hit by the Super-Fortresses, it was announced. Two planes were lost.

Japanese news agency report stated that American planes heavily bombed the Wuhan area of China, including the ports of Hankow and Wuchang, for more than an hour Wednesday night.

General H. H. Arnold, chief of the USAAF, in a report to President Roosevelt, stated the battle for Japan had just begun. No part of Japan is now out of range, the general said, and attacks will be carried on relentlessly from the air until the day of the land and sea invasion.

NEW ARMY PARADES

ROME—Motorized elements of a reborn Italian army—trained and equipped by the Allies—yesterday rolled through Rome. For several hours the long line of vehicles rolled past the reviewing stand in front of the big Ministry of Marine.

SHIP MISSING

STOCKHOLM — The Swedish liner Hansa, en route from the mainland to Visby on the Baltic island of Gottland, is missing. Planes scouting for the ship have located lifeboats not far from Gottland. The ship was following a course outside the zone proclaimed unsafe by Germany.

PRISONERS HOME

STOCKHOLM—The first contingent of 1,250 Finnish prisoners of war has returned to Finland from the Soviet Union.

One-Man Anti-Tank Crew Awarded Posthumous V.C.

LONDON—For gallantry at Arnhem, Sgt. John Daniel Baskerfield of the South Staffordshire Regiment, 1st British Airborne Division, has been posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

He was in command of a six-pounder anti-tank gun at Oosterbeek when the Germans were developing a major attack. Early in the action, Sgt. Baskerfield's crew destroyed two Tiger tanks, and at least one self-propelled gun. He was badly wounded in the leg, and the rest of his crew knocked out, but he refused to be carried to the regimental aid post.

The Germans attacked again, and Sergeant Baskerfield, now manning his gun alone, was the main factor in keeping the tanks at bay. He continued firing until his gun was put out of action. He then crawled under intense fire, to a nearby six-pounder crew of which had been killed by a shell from a German tank, and fired it without assistance until he was killed.

This is the second Victoria Cross won at Arnhem, and the 117th of the war.

5,000 Conscripts Due Next Month

Move to Send Draftees Overseas Sends P.Q. Members Into Emergency Huddle; Defence Minister Says First Batch To Reach War Front In December

OTTAWA—With his Liberal Party crumbling under the impact of the conscription issue, emotions running high throughout the country and open disturbances in Quebec, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King is today struggling to hold the government together, Reuter's News Service reported last night.

A caucus of Liberal members from Quebec Province was summoned today (Friday) and there were persistent reports that at least half of them are planning to withdraw their support from the government. Two French-speaking members have already deserted the government ranks but most of the Quebec ministers are expected to stay in the cabinet.

All Over By May

Five thousand conscripted troops will arrive overseas next month as vanguard of the 16,000 draftees authorized by order-in-council as battle-front reinforcements, Defence Minister A. G. L. McNaughton told the Canadian House of Commons, the Canadian Press reported.

Another 5,000 will be sent over in January and the remainder by May, he advised. The defence minister said he could not disclose the size of reinforcement pools he proposed maintaining in the Western Europe and Mediterranean theatres and the United Kingdom.

General McNaughton explained the 16,000 draftees were in addition to the supply of general service men it was planned to send in any event. He could not state that the 16,000 men would be entirely draftees as some might be general service infantry changing from one place to another but the net increase in overseas pools would be 16,000.

Further details of the defence minister's statement to the House and the move providing for conscripts overseas were trimmed with reports of an anti-conscription parade in Quebec City, demands from some quarters for formation of a new government and for the resignation of Gen. McNaughton. As well, came more information regarding the build-up to the government decision.

The Canadian Press reported that, when Parliament convened in special session, Prime Minister King read exchanges of letters between himself and Col. J. L. Ralston, former defence minister, on the latter's resignation. Before reading the correspondence, the prime minister explained that sovereign consent had to be secured and he had advised the Earl of Athlone, Governor-General of Canada, that it was in the public interest that the correspondence be made public.

Bulletin

The BBC reported early today that Prime Minister King had not accepted the resignation of Air Minister Power. The minister was reported to have resigned because of the government move to send conscripts overseas.

It was also stated Defence Minister McNaughton had announced that the units to make up the first 16,000 conscripts for overseas had been selected.

The prime minister said that first indication the war committee of the cabinet had that additional personnel would be needed overseas was on October 19. He read letters from Col. Ralston stating that his stand demanding that Home Defence troops be made available as reinforcements overseas was in line with the stand he had taken in the House of Commons.

In reply, the prime minister had stated that, during the Quebec Conference, there had been no indication that there was likely to be an insufficiency of reinforcements.

"The only difference that exists between us," wrote the prime minister, "is one of methods or method in meeting this vital necessity." The first he had learned that reinforcements were required was in a report from the Chief-of-Staff Overseas, October 19.

The prime minister agreed that the first duty was to the fighting

(Continued on Page 8)

Globe, *Telegraph Journal*, *Montreal Star* and *Evening Times-Globe* in a variety of capacities, including managing editor.[31] His managing editor for the Italian edition of the *Maple Leaf* was Captain J.D. MacFarlane, who, appointed to work with Malone in January of 1943, at the age of twenty-eight, had seven years of experience with the *Windsor Daily Star* and the *Toronto Star*.[32]

When it first appeared under MacFarlane, the *Maple Leaf* was a weekly, four page publication that provided information on the war, the home front, the United Kingdom, Canadian units, editorials, sport highlights and cartoons.[33] The *Maple Leaf* provided pin-ups of movie stars and entertainers with headlines that captured the attention of the soldiers.[34] *Maple Leaf*, in the words of historian Jeffrey Keshen, had a "cynically humorous take on military life [and tried to] help men vent their frustrations and tensions in a safe and controlled way."[35] That in itself was a significant boost to morale. Less evident but equally important, the present paper argues, the careful focus on support of morale was itself a part of the Canadian Army's effort to be modern and scientific. The newspaper, moreover, endeavoured to sustain morale by underscoring the modern and scientific nature of both the Canadian Army and the Allied forces as a component of which it fought. Certainly the newspaper was successful. Following soldiers' positive responses in Italy, editions appeared in other theatres, including England, France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, as the war progressed.

Given the context of the *Maple Leaf's* creation, and those involved with its establishment and publication, one can see the potential of this source to provide insights into the experiences and views of Canadian soldiers who fought in Italy. The discussion that follows is based on the coverage offered in the Italian edition during 1944, beginning with a summary of the salient events of this year.

The last months of 1943 in Italy were hard on the Canadians, and the New Year brought about preparations for the Ortona Salient winter offensive, which started on 16 January with the Arielli River, just north of Ortona. In the "Arielli Show," the Canadians faced intense resistance that cost them "eight officers and 177 other ranks."[36] The Canadians were not alone in Italy, as the 5th US Army carried out an offensive near Anzio and the 10th British Corps faced the German defence of Rome.[37]

The *Maple Leaf* published its first edition as action along the Ortona Salient began. This consisted of "holding and patrolling,"[38] for the Canadians, until 17 January, when the Allied initiated the push towards the Arielli valley. In the closing days of January, the Canadians attacked at the Piano di Moregine, a 500-foot plateau, to take the Villa Grande—Tollo road.[39] For the next three months, the Canadians did not see any major action, allowing the *Maple Leaf* to explore other active areas.

With the spring season, the Canadians held their positions in the Adriatic and shifted their attention to Rome.[40] On 11 May, they initiated an advance toward the Liri Valley, where they breached the Gustav Line, the first line of German defences. They then attacked and broke through the Hitler Line on 23 May.[41] Despite difficulties with radio communication and heavy enemy fire, "the road to Rome lay open at long last."[42] The Canadian advance stopped outside of the Italian capital on order from General Oliver Leese, Montgomery's successor in command of the British Eighth Army.[43] Leese informed General Burns on 4 June that the I Canadian Corp was to move to Volturno Valley to the south for rest after nearly a month of continuous extremely heavy action.[44] Although the they needed this rest, Canadian soldiers and the Corps leadership were not impressed by Leese's order, as it prevented them from participation in the liberation of the capital city, the culmination of their great efforts of late 1943 and the first half of 1944.

A month and a half later, on 18 July, General Leese notified the Corps that they would return to active operations to "continue the offensive against the enemy and break

through the newest line of German defences, the Gothic Line."[45] This order came into effect on 5 August, near Perugia, but the Canadian involvement in the Florence sector was brief, as they moved to a staging area to mislead the Germans.[46] With several Canadian armoured units remaining in the lines, on 25 August, they moved towards their objective of Mount Cerrone. In the face of this advance, the German defenders withdrew to the mountains of Northern Italy, leaving blown bridges, cratered roads and demolished buildings for the Canadians.[47]

At the end of August, the Allies turned to the Gothic Line, established just north of Florence, as General Leese positioned the Canadians to assist in this objective. Atop a ridge, just north of the Foglia River and valley, the Gothic Line was a considerable defensive position, with tremendous German fortifications.[48] On 30 August, the Canadians initiated a three-day attack, where several units plunged into the German lines on day one, widening the breach in the afternoon.[49]

As fall came, the quick pace to which the Canadians had become accustomed soon dissipated. With the breakthrough at the Gothic Line and advance into the Foglia Valley, the Canadians stormed Coriano on 13 September in an "overnight" engagement which they completed successfully eight days later. On 22 September, the First Canadian Division received the order to withdraw from action. The nine-mile northward advance from the Conca River to Rimini took them eighteen days, slightly damaging their hard-earned poise.[50]

The Canadians continued towards the Po Valley, as Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister's Fifth Armoured Division joined them. Like the Foglia valley before, the Po was not a quick or easy victory. As September bled into October, the rough weather continued and the First Infantry Division returned to action.[51] On 19 October, despite damp soil and the heavy counterattacks, the Canadians found reason to boast. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada used their secret tank-hunters during the engagement with great success, as Private Ernest Alvia "Smoky" Smith won a Victorian Cross for taking out two German Panther tanks and subduing a counterattack.[52]

On the night of 23 October, after previously engaging German forces on the bank of the Savio River, north the Cesna, the Canadians discovered these positions vacated. At the end of the night, the leading battalion advanced two miles, followed by another six the next day. Mother Nature continued to harass the Canadians, as heavy rains destroyed the bridges along the river. However, the British Fourth Division relieved them shortly after, and the Canadians departed for the Rimini rest area on 28 October, ending a depressing month.[53]

As the cool rains continued, the Canadians grew restless. General Charles Foulkes replaced General Burns, and returned the Canadians to battle on 2 December in the advance towards Bologna.[54] The fight for the Canale Naviglio began on the evening of 12 December, and involved the Corps' two divisions, supported by tanks. After creating a breach in the German lines that grew to over a thousand yards by the evening of 13 December, the Canadians were able to hold, despite two counterattacks involving tanks and self-propelled guns.[55] The Germans continued to provide stiff resistance, however. On the evening of 19 December, the Canadians attacked at Fosso Munio, and gathered 99 prisoners.[56] The movement northward resulted in a nine-mile advance and the capture of 1,670 Germans, at a cost of 548 officers and other ranks, 1,796 wounded and 212 prisoners.[57] This push ended the Canadian involvement on the Italian front for 1944, as the fighting eased for the Christmas season, only to resume in the New Year. Although much of the Italian conflict occurred in less than optimal fighting conditions, as the weather and disease riddled the Canadian efforts, these efforts ended in success.

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Triple Trouble for Axis

AACHEN . . . the Philippines . . . Belgrade. At week's end, the Allies delivered these three straight rights to the Axis to rock Hitler and Tojo on their respective heels.

The capture of Aachen is not only a military success but can be measured from a morale standpoint for in the city's cathedral lies the tomb of Charlemagne, one of the greatest of all German kings and a symbol to the Herrenvolk of military might. The Allies weren't worried about tombs of kings—they were more concerned about adding a considerable number to Wehrmacht cemeteries and they did just that as Aachen became the "Cassino" of the Siegfried Line.

The first German city has fallen. It can only be an indicator to the Herrenvolk of what's to come.

The move in the Philippines comes as a shot in the arm to the Pacific campaign. In hitting Leyte Island, Allied forces have, in General MacArthur's words, at "one stroke split Japan's Philippines garrison in two." The Japanese have shown increasing signs of the jitters, of late, and well they might. The new, sharpened Allied axe is cutting Japanese tentacles one after another and the strokes are falling ever nearer the heart of the octopus.

The fall of Belgrade can be taken as the clincher in Yugoslavia. For some time, the loss of Yugoslavia to the Nazis has been considered only a matter of time. The capital's capture sets the clock ahead plenty.

The Axis had a hangover before the weekend even started.

J. D. M.

Greeks Return In RCN Ship

ATHENS — Prime Minister Papandreou, whose reception in Athens is being likened to that accorded Woodrow Wilson in Paris, sailed for his native country aboard a Canadian ship.

The Greek premier was accompanied aboard HMCS Prince David by his son, members of the cabinet, government officials and British Ambassador Rex Leeper.

At Patras, fishermen recognized Papandreou, a tall, striking figure with iron grey hair. The mayor and members of the Committee of Liberation boarded the Prince David to extend a welcome.

Before leaving the ship the prime minister addressed officers and men, expressing the gratitude of his country to the British Commonwealth. He then transferred to the cruiser Averoff, flagship of Vice-Admiral Voulgaris, commander-in-chief of the Greek Navy. Appearance of the Averoff in Piraeus harbor was the signal for a wild demonstration on the part of the Greeks.

NO DIPHTHERIA DEATHS

QUEBEC — Cities and towns of Quebec have not had a single death from diptheria in the past three years.

Labor Camps Urged For Gestapo Agents

LONDON—A suggestion that all Gestapo members and Nazi party leaders should be permanently expelled from Germany after the war and sent to some Devil's Island or to forced labor camps is made by Sir Walter Layton, economist, in a pamphlet "How To Deal With Germany."

"It would be a fitting act of retributive justice if one of the tasks of this convict labor was building of homes for dispossessed Jews in whatever part of the world it is decided to found one," he says.

Hitler should not be prosecuted under any legal code or statute, but should be summarily tried for repudiating and deliberately breaking fundamental laws of society he said.

REMOVED

LONDON—The Palestine Government, in a communique last night from the colonial office, said: "In the interests of public security and safety of life and property in Palestine, 251 persons, who had been detained under emergency regulations as terrorists or for complicity in terroristic activity, have been transferred to military custody and removed to a place of detention outside Palestine."

Pacific Turnabout Grows Stronger

U.S.-Australian Forces Hit Philippines As Pressure Increases On Japanese Hold; Russians Score Smashing Successes As Allies Held to Limited Gains In South and West

By Capt. J. L. McKenna
Assistant Editor, The Maple Leaf

THE Pacific war bounced back into prominence again this week with the invasion of the Philippines, after a long period devoted to building up bases and supplies.

Astride Shipping Lines

Occupation of the Philippines will put the Allies astride the shipping lines Japan has been using to supply her garrisons in the vast chain of islands to the south. It will not isolate them, but will force the Japs to use only small coastal vessels and a long, tortuous overland route which never was intended to carry the needs of a modern army at war—or else risk a full-scale naval clash, which the Japs seem unwilling to do.

It is not going to be as easy as all that. The Japs are believed to have a quarter of a million men in the Philippines, and 350,000 fanatical Japs just don't drop off like flies. They have to be killed, and it takes quite some time to kill that many men.

Again the question of supply comes to the fore. Shortest route from Japan to the Philippines requires the crossing of large stretches of ocean, and in those seas is gathered a tremendous Allied naval force hoping the Japs will try like hazardous run. The alternative is the land route to the southernmost of the Japanese-held islands, and then hide-and-seek jumps from island to island along the chain. The latter is far too slow for an operation as large as the one in the Philippines.

Once the Philippines are secure, they will be not only an indirect threat to the Japs farther south, but they are near enough to Formosa to make an invasion of that island a distinct possibility. From Formosa, it is only 100 miles to the mainland of China.

Long Way Back

Gen. Douglas MacArthur is directing the American and Australian troops in the attack. It was General MacArthur who directed the defence of the Philippines in 1942, when American soldiers and marines made their never-to-be-forgotten stand on the Bataan peninsula and the fortress island of Corregidor — a saga of courage and determination which ranks with Tobruk and Sebastopol. General MacArthur has come a long way along the road back from Australia, where he set up headquarters after the Philippine defeat.

The invasion was preceded by heavy attacks from the air on Japanese bases from which aid might have been sent. The enemy's airforce was particularly hard hit, with losses averaging 100 planes a day over a period of 10 days. These gigantic blows will make the job of the landing forces much easier.

New maps of Burma will have to be brought out for those following the war there. Last of the places which have been familiar for the past few months, Tiddim, has been captured. It will be like losing old friends not to read any more of Tiddim and Imphal, but there will be no grief, for their occupation means another short step toward final peace.

As this is written, only news of a great Russian push into East Prussia has been provided from German sources. There is no reason to doubt the Nazi announcement. It is quite common for the Germans to give out information of big events from 24 to 48 hours before the Soviets, who prefer to wait until they can announce some tangible success.

To the Russians have struck, it is possible they may overrun most of East Prussia before being forced to stop again for regrouping. They have been building up for this move for months, so there should be no question of shortage of men and materials delaying them.

All Out

Undoubtedly the German defences there are very strong. Every available man, woman and child has been thrown into the job of building fortifications and digging trenches. Advances may not be spectacular, but they should be steady.

Hitler thinks will get an early idea of how his Home Guard army will fare against seasoned veterans like the Russians. It would be surprising if they are a success. With the exception of the very young, most of the ardent Nazis already have been pressed into the services, and it is unlikely that any but fanatics at this stage of the war, will fight with the enthusiasm which must make up for their lack of training and experience. The boys of 16 and 17 have had the Nazi doctrines so drilled into them they will die for Hitler, and for this reason it would be unwise to completely overlook their possible assistance to the dimming German prospects.

A great Russian offensive also is sweeping through Czechoslovakia toward Southern Germany. It has liberated large stretches of the second country to be gobbled up by Hitler, following only Austria. Thus of all the countries Germany occupied in her days of success, only Norway and Denmark remain completely in German hands.

Hungary, too, has seen more Russian successes, although so far there has appeared no great German defection as a result of the confused developments of last weekend, when Admiral Horthy, the black-hearted regent, announced Hungary could no longer expect to gain from the war and was asking for an armistice.

Some Hungarian army men, including the commander-in-chief of the First Army, immediately gave themselves up to the Russians. Others still fight for the Germans. A Nazi puppet government, has been set up and has ordered the army to fight on beside the Germans. The split will help the Germans. How much it aids the Allies depends on the width of the rift.

Yugoslav Partisans have extended their hold in the southern part of their country as a barrier against the Germans still in Albania and Greece. The British forces in Greece have been increased in number, but so far they have had no major clash against the retreating Germans.

Into Cesena

Progress in Italy was made principally by the Eighth Army, which has fought its way into the key city of Cesena, once again spearheaded by Canadians. Cesena is the biggest prize yet tackled in the valley of the Po, and its capture will pull the cork the Germans had in the coastal bottleneck.

The Western Front this week has been notable mostly for the sustained pressure against various sections of the German defensive. The Americans have been trying to eliminate Aachen, and finally have pushed the Germans right out of the city. The British have been busy cleaning up the Germans still west of the Maas (Meuse), with considerable success. Farther south, other Americans, unable to squeeze Metz out from one direction, have tried from another.

The Canadian First Army has been successful in joining up its bridgeheads in the Scheldt pocket, and has cut the German holdings in half their original size. When this sector is cleaned up, there still remain the Scheldt islands to be disinfected before Antwerp can be used by the Allies as a port, need of which is growing daily.

Another Canadian Army attack has begun to strengthen the right flank of the force controlling the causeway leading to the islands. With their present slim hold, the Canadians twice have had to yield ground to German counter-attacks, although the second failed to move them far enough to bring the Germans much benefit.

Agreement Seen

The Moscow conferences continued this week, with the possibility increasing that rival Polish factions coming to an agreement. Another political bot appears to be breaking out in France, where it is considered General De Gaulle's government is not being given sufficient say in determining future events. This is easily understood, for the French are accustomed to being treated as a great nation. In the present circumstances, however, it would seem France could apply itself better to improving internal conditions instead of those of the outside world.

CASSINO MONUMENT

The daily newspaper, Il Tempo yesterday opened subscriptions in Rome for the erection at Cassino of a monument to the soldiers who fell in the liberation of Italy.

Herbie

by Coughlin



As a newspaper geared to maintaining the morale of the soldiers, the *Maple Leaf* offered information that wove a common thread between soldiers, particularly on the Italian front. This coverage offered during 1944 contained several different portrayals of the Canadians in the theatre, as influenced by the ebb and flow of the action. During periods of heavy combat, the *Maple Leaf* utilized language that emphasized the success and strength of the Canadians as they contributed to the larger Allied successes.[58] In several articles, the *Maple Leaf* described how the Canadians repulsed counterattacks through the use of their advanced resources and the superior ability to draw on these resources. In one article, the newspaper stressed as the "Tough veterans of the 1st German Parachute Division and the 26th Panzers hit at the Canadians," the Canadians sustained a pitch battle until the enemy retired.[59] Others noted how the Canadians "sledge-hammered their way through a thousand yards of the Rimini bottleneck,"[60] and "battled for days around San Martino… throwing six attacks before the enemy withdrew,"[61] reflecting the tendency of the *Maple Leaf* to stress the Canadian resource superiority and availability during engagements.

Although not as frequent as the first type of article, the second type presented a distinctive Canadian effort, isolated from the larger Allied objective during slower periods in the theatre.[62] In these articles, the *Maple Leaf* stressed the way in which the qualities of individual Canadian soldiers, such as their knowledge of artillery and armour, contributed to the larger Canadian success. These articles often occurred in periods when action was slow, such as the month of March, when the Canadians were resting. One article, titled "Bombardment Buries HPE's,"[63] described how six members of the Hasty P's were buried in their slit trenches by a German bombardment. The final sentence of this article stated: "They were pretty shaken up, but they took over our shovels and started to dig new slit trenches,"[64] encouraging such behaviour. Similarly, Cpl. H.J. Funnel received accolades for his successful transition from office work to front-line action. "With barely three weeks' training as an assault engineer, this former 2 Ech clerk plunged into action during an attack by the Three Rivers Regiment and completed a difficult task with his sub section in spite of a rain of bullets."[65] The *Maple Leaf* stressed the superior technological and scientific abilities of this Canadian soldier, once a lowly clerk transformed into a successful engineer. The newspaper also noted the contributions of the Calgary Squadron of the Royal Canadians Engineers, who were particularly efficient in completing the tasks allotted to them.[66] With the slow action and the increasingly restless Canadian, the *Maple Leaf* pointed out how the knowledge and ability of the Canadian soldiers stood to be a deciding factor in the Allied effort in the Mediterranean theatre.

The third type of article in the *Maple Leaf* discussed the Canadian effort and emphasized qualities of specific Canadian units that assisted in the Canadian and Allied victories. One article focused on the 12 Canadian Tank Regiment (CTR) (Three Rivers Tank Regiment), as it stated, "This regiment, which figured so prominently in the Sicilian battle for Leonforte and Nissoria, has won uncontested praise from every infantry commander under whom it has served."[67] The *Maple Leaf* even quantified the actions of the mobile canteen to prove its efficiency. It reported one canteen served "more than 1,200 cups of tea with biscuits," and distributed "a package of ten Canadian cigarets [sic], a box of matches and other comforts… compliments of the Auxiliary Services."[68] The newspaper similarly praised other Canadian regiments who used their expertise in artillery, armour or soldiering to contribute to the war effort. This is evident in the articles that describe the training of a Canadian unit:

> For in those four years they had been trained in the weapons of war, a training which when added to their knowledge of field craft from civilian life, their ability to make almost anything from nothing resulted in well trained confident troops.[69]

This type of praise was particularly frequent during the first two months of 1944, following the harsh conditions of November and December 1943. These articles suggest that the *Maple Leaf* emphasized the successes of these troops so other Canadian soldiers would attempt to emulate their actions. As the Canadians had trouble on the Arielli front, the *Maple Leaf* focused on their past record. Statements like "The Canadians destroyed or put out of action 10 German Mark 4 Special Tanks at small cost to themselves,"[70] denote a results-based motivation tactic that would lead soldiers to believe that, based on previous experience, they had the knowledge and ability to achieve success in future engagements. By using this motivational tactic, the *Maple Leaf* reinforces Comacchio's idea that "industrial and scientific metaphors are used to valorize ideas and practices that lead to advancing the nation's standing in the modern world order."[71]

When the *Maple Leaf* recognized Canadian units and their contributions, the newspaper stressed the scientific and statistical approach of these successes. When the Canadians took the "Frosinone Fringe," the newspaper reported that it was only 24 miles west of Valmontone, and required a 2,500 foot climb to reach the top of a ridge in the sector.[72] The newspaper constantly mentioned artillery, armour, air support and engineering skills, as well as the specific gains that resulted from these resources. This quantification and emphasis in the discussions on the Allied victories illustrates the scientific perspective of the *Maple Leaf*, and its desire for Canadian soldiers to view these victories according to these terms.

As the *Maple Leaf* presented these three categories of motivational articles, the newspaper also provided information on the two most difficult aspects of the war: the enemy and the Italian weather. At the start of 1944, the *Maple Leaf* commented on the enemy the Canadians faced, as an article stated:

> After 21 days of hard enough fighting the Canadians had seven days and eight nights of fearful battle in Ortona against one of the best units ever produced by the fierce Germans, a Parachute Division—demons of men—and now the battle was over and won, at no small cost.[73]

Another article pointed out that these "demons" were responsible for the looting and raping in Northern Italy, which "left countless Italians without food or homes to live in."[74] A variety of articles, including those on Ortona, reflected these negative sentiments,[75] the experiences of Canadians in action[76] and reports on Germans themselves.[77] Given that the Canadians had relatively little experience fighting against the Nazis, the *Maple Leaf's* emphasis on the horrific nature of their foe, reassured Canadian soldiers of the necessity of their task.

The weather, the second enemy the Canadians faced, also received attention in the pages of the newspaper. The *Maple Leaf* noted the, "savage fighting conditions," caused by the weather, and in certain instances, affected the Allied progress.[78] However, as the *Maple Leaf* described these challenges, the newspaper did not place the Canadians within these conditions. One article described how the infantry and armour were "standing firm after a thrust across the river," and "crossed the shallow river under cover of darkness and stormy weather."[79] By separately depicting the harsh fighting conditions and the experiences of the Canadians, the *Maple Leaf* described the front as it was, but did not place the Canadians within this experience.

In addition to the stories of successes and difficulties on the Italian front, the newspaper provided soldiers with information on events that did not pertain to combat operations. The discussions on postwar reconstruction, medical sciences in the army and the conscription crisis illustrate the care exercised in the depiction of such topics for the morale of the I Canadian Corps.

FOR CANADIAN TROOPS IN ACTION

THE MAPLE LEAF

(WITH CANADIAN PRESS NEWS SERVICE)

Vol. 1. No. 93. — ITALY EDITION — Thursday, June 1, 1944

Allied Pressure Relentless

Congratulations From Premier

Canada's Pride in Corps Accomplishments "Beyond Words"

IN a personal message to the First Canadian Corps commander, Lt.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Prime Minister King has sent his congratulations on brilliant victories of Canadian troops in the Italian campaign. The message follows:

Coast-to-Coast

"The Minister of National Defence has shown me your message of the 25th May. I should like to add a personal message to the official word Mr. Ralston has sent on behalf of the Government.

"The news of the brilliant and continuing successes of the 1st Cdn Corps has stirred Canada from coast to coast. I send to you and all other officers and men of the Corps my heartfelt congratulations on all that thus far has been achieved and my best wishes together with high hopes and expectations for further operations.

"The 1st Cdn Corps has already begun another memorable chapter in the military record of our country.

Conscious of Cost

"All here at home are deeply conscious of the cost in human lives and in suffering of the achievements of the Corps. I should like to extend my deepest sympathy to the comrades of those who have fallen and the hope that those who have suffered wounds will be speedily restored to health. Never forget that the thoughts of all in Canada are constantly with you as you continue your advance northwards. Our pride in your accomplishments is beyond all words."

Heavies Put Blast On Air, Rail Links

Germany was given no respite from the paralysing Allied aerial offensive as British and Italian-based aircraft smashed another series of hard blows at airfield and railway installations across Nazi Europe, Wednesday.

Liberators and Fortresses, with more than 1,200 fighters, pounded the airdrome at Fluxeuil, in France, while other U.S. heavies followed an RAF night attack in the Boulogne area with widespread assaults inside the Reichland.

BAN FORECASTS

LONDON — British troops in India have been warned against fortune tellers. Hanging around outside every camp is a professional sage who waits to tell Tommy Atkins his destiny for as large a fee as can be extracted. A security officer explained "military information might be unwittingly given by service men to fortune tellers."

FOOD FOR ROME

NAPLES — Special food stocks estimated to be adequate to feed the population for 20 days are among preparations for entry into Rome, a council meeting of the Allied Control Commission was told.

On the Hunt for Huns

THEY don't call em the PBI for nothing. Here you see some of the Canadian infantrymen who have been responsible for reducing the Hitler Line to a memory, loaded with tommies, brens, .303's, ammo and hoofing it under the brilliant title sun somewhere in the area of Ceprano, which they captured.

(Canadian Army Photo)

Boots, Ankle, for Use Of, Lead to Victories

Canadian PBI Maintains Strong Momentum in Drive On Key Highway Junction; "They Are Magnificent," Says Brigadier

By Sgt. Howard Ruisey
Staff Writer, The Maple Leaf

WITH THE CANADIAN CORPS IN ITALY — Heavy Canadian boots have pounded forward over the white rubble of Italian villages and through green, shell-pocked hills, and moving inside them have been fighting men of the Canadian Corps who have reached the outskirts of Frosinone, key town on Highway Six.

Steady Advances

IN the hills guarding the approaches to the German-defended town, Canadian infantrymen and machine-gunners could be seen sweeping into the attack. Across heavily-mortared and machine-gunned fields and roads, the Canadians drove to close in on the enemy rearguard which, for the past six days, has steadily fallen back.

A picturesque green fertile country lies below Frosinone. The white puffs of smoke rising from the hill ridges,

(Continued on Page 4)

Message to Pope

WASHINGTON—All the Catholic archbishops in the United States joined in dispatching a cablegram to Pope Pius XII expressing hope that the Allied commanders in Italy, whose forces are driving close to Rome, can "discover a way to victory" that will spare the Holy City from destruction.

The message was signed by the four top-ranking prelates of the Catholic Church in the United States on behalf of the entire American episcopate.

Submarine Holds Up Refugee Ship

PHILADELPHIA — A German submarine stopped the Portuguese liner Serpa Pinto, carrying refugees, in mid-ocean on May 26, it was announced here yesterday, and two passengers were taken prisoner.

According to naval officials here the Germans threatened to torpedo the ship. The submarine crew removed all 385 passengers and members of the crew from the vessel. Only after the refugees, Europeans bound for Canada, had spent nine hours in lifeboats were they permitted to re-embark.

Three persons, including a 16-month-old baby, lost their lives during the transfer between liner and lifeboat.

An official announcement says the ship was stopped by gunfire at midnight. "Her cap-

Canadians Reach Frosinone Fringe

Weight of Eighth Army Offense Forces Continued German Withdrawal; Bitter Fighting For Valletri-Valmontone Line on Fifth Army Front

CANADIAN forces, moving steadily forward against strong enemy rearguards, have reached the outskirts of Frosinone, key enemy point astride Highway 6 and only 24 miles west of Valmontone, at the other end of the highway. The enemy is continuing to fall back, under the steady pressure of the Eighth Army, all along the broad front from the Sacco River to north of Highway 6.

Mile by Mile

The fierce battle, which for four days has raged around the rim of the Alban hills south of Rome, continues with unabated fury. Strong enemy resistance is being encountered by the Fifth Army all along the enemy line from Valmontone to the sea, and it is clear the Germans intend to try and hold this line at all costs. In spite of this resistance, American tanks and infantry yesterday pushed a mile forward to reach within 15 miles of Rome.

Troops of the Eighth Army are moving slowly and steadily forward beyond the Liri river against enemy rear guards who are making utmost use of demolitions to delay the advance. Contact with the retreating Nazis has been maintained along the whole of the front.

In the attack developing on Frosinone, hilly country north of Highway 6 has been captured and many commanding features have been occupied. In addition to Arce, Fontana-Liri and Strangolagalli, north of the highway, have been occupied, and Arnara, to the south, has been by-passed on both sides.

Kiwis Near Sora

An increasing number of mines has been encountered as the advance toward Frosinone proceeds and the enemy is developing its mortaring and shelling in the area. New Zealand troops continue to advance on Sora, pressing in from the east and southeast,

(Continued on Page 4)

Canadian Ships Gang Hell Outa German U-Boat

LONDON — An admiralty communique yesterday says combined action by ships of a Canadian escort group, under Cmdr. F. W. Burnett in the Frigate Saint Catharines, resulted in destruction of a U-boat in the North Atlantic recently.

First contact with the U-boat was made by the Destroyer Gatineau which, in company with other ships of their group, carried out a series of depth-charge attacks and forced the sub to the surface. The Canadian ships immediately engaged it with gunfire and obtained many hits which prevented the U-boat crew from manning their guns.

Soon after, the U-boat was sunk by the Destroyer Icarus. A number of survivors were picked up and made prisoners.

Allies Press Ahead As Monsoon Starts

The monsoon has come to Northern Burma and blinding rain is hampering, though not lessening, the pressure of the Chinese and American troops on the Jap base of Myitkyina, it was announced in yesterday's communique.

Further vigorous attacks by the Allies closing in from the west are going forward, and northwest of the town a Japanese column was cut off and scores were killed. Chindits are supporting the drive down the Mogaung Valley and are ceaselessly attacking enemy communications.

The Mogaung-Kamaing road, life-line of the Jap garrison at Kamaing, has been cut and the block has been held despite strong enemy counter-attacks.

Nice Guys

WITH THE POLISH FORCES IN ITALY—A Polish soldier, who was taken prisoner by the Germans when his detachment entered Villa St. Lucia, has described his experiences during the three days before he was discovered by his regiment.

He said: "The Germans took me to their shelter where I was questioned by an officer. I was hit and kicked by the officer, and later put in prison, with only bread and water to eat for three days. My wounds were not looked after and when my detachment found me my wounds were infected owing to lack of attention.

SPEEDY PRODUCTION

WASHINGTON — The United States now is producing a plane every five minutes round the clock, excluding Sundays. Since Pearl Harbor the United States has produced a total of 171,257 planes.

In November 1942, England published the Beveridge Report, written by William Beveridge, a well-respected socio-economist. The Canadian government responded by commissioning a report on social security on 21 December 1942, appointing Leonard Marsh, who had previously studied under Beveridge, as its author. On 15 March 1943, Marsh proposed a comprehensive social security system, including national employment programs, insurance protection against work interruption, old age pensions, health insurance and family allowances. Although the government did not immediately implement his suggestions as a whole as recommended, the report initiated a nation-wide discussion on the issue of social security, a discussion that was reflected in the pages of the *Maple Leaf* during the winter of 1944.[80]

The first coverage allotted to postwar reconstruction appeared on 28 January, presenting the opinion that the government was obliged to provide opportunities to the soldiers upon their return to the country they so bravely served.[81] This article was the first in a month-long series on the topic. The other articles in the series looked at the problems the government faced in its attempt to deal with the issue of postwar reintegration, how the soldiers returning home would have the "power to bring new democracy to their homeland with an unselfish approach,"[82] and how Canadian soldiers could use their wartime experiences for the betterment of their country.[83]

The *Maple Leaf* also covered the progress made by the government in the postwar planning process. At the beginning of April, the *Maple Leaf* started a column called the "Quiz Program," which sought to provide soldiers with a forum to pose questions. The editors decided, "Any questions that cannot be answered by Canadian authorities in this theatre will be sent to CMHQ for official answers," assuring soldiers that their questions and uncertainties would receive attention.[84] Another column, the "Postwar Quiz," was similar in focus, while a "well known Canadian padre"[85] answered questions in "In Search of Knowledge."[86] In the six articles that appeared in this series, none illustrated a religious influence, as they focused on the political aspects of the policies, showing the non-religious approach of the newspaper to Canada's participation in the war.

During the summer months, the only articles to discuss the postwar focused on elections occurring over the summer.[87] These articles discussed issues such as the Canadian housing industry, the creation of veteran land programs, studies related to postwar employment and the creation of government postwar policy, as included in various platforms.[88] Several larger articles on the postwar policy appeared, discussing government responsibilities, respective budgets, veteran training and the communication of necessary information to returning soldiers, pensions, and civil service employment opportunities for service members.[89]

Postwar reconstruction was, at times, a very popular topic in the *Maple Leaf*. The fall months were not an exception, as the newspaper provided a great deal of information on the postwar era, as motivation for Canadian soldiers to fulfill their objectives. The newspaper discussed how the war would affect the postwar world, through changes in clothing styles, international trade, the industrial capacity of the country and individual companies.[90] By providing the troops with information on the decisions made by the military administration and Canadian government on postwar rehabilitation, Canadian soldiers were reassured that the government had not overlooked plans for their return home. This focus shows that the *Maple Leaf* utilized the topic as a motivational tool to remind soldiers of the reward for completing their patriotic duty in Italy, surviving the horrible weather conditions and a dogged enemy—to return to a Canada guided by the suggestions of the veterans.

As the newspaper for the soldiers, the *Maple Leaf* not only provided hope for the postwar future, but also sought to alleviate immediate anxieties. To ease the foremost

fear of severe injury, the *Maple Leaf* provided a great deal of information on the state of medicine in the army and the care received by the wounded. On 22 April, the newspaper published an article that claimed, "In this war the army doctors are curing fear,"[91] in regards to the use of hypnotism for battle exhaustion. The article stated that doctors: "are doing wonderful work in rehabilitating the psycho-neurotic casualties of battle, in ministering to minds diseased and sending the patients back to their units,"[92] stressing the effectiveness of the treatment available. With the harsh fighting experienced by the Canadian soldiers, incidents of battle exhaustion had greatly increased. Knowing that the Canadian Army Medical Corps was curing such patients would have alleviated worries about a failure of nerve among motivated troops, and served as a gentle reminder to less well-motivated soldiers that presentation of nervous symptoms would not provide a ticket away from combat.

The harsh weather experienced in Italy posed a number of medical problems for Canadians in the area. Mosquitoes and malaria were foremost concerns, as articles looked at the use of mepacrine in the prevention of malaria deaths, the casualty statistics from the disease and the need for an anti-malaria drive.[93] Although the presence of malaria among the troops would have affected their morale, to exclude the disease from the pages of the *Maple Leaf* risked raising the ire of its readers and decreasing their confidence in the newspaper as a soldiers' publication. By carrying articles on the disease, the *Maple Leaf* was writing for its particular set of readers, and was showing soldiers the advances made by the Medical Corps in order to alleviate some of their concerns.

The issue of venereal disease and its treatment in the Canadian army was another challenge faced by Canadian soldiers in Italy. Unlike its discussion on malaria, the *Maple Leaf* only published two articles on venereal disease. The first, published on 17 April, focused on the cost to the Canadian Army in Italy caused by this health issue, and described "an extensive survey of the cost of venereal disease to the Canadian war effort in Italy." It observed, "On one day, 480 Canadian soldiers were under treatment for venereal disease."[94] The article quantified the effects, stating, "Each of the soldiers will occupy a hospital bed for an average of 24 days,"[95] equalling "11,500 man days lost—more manpower than was needed to drive the German paratroopers out of Ortona!"[96] The second article responded to Reverend Luxton, the dean of St. Paul's Cathedral in London, Ontario, as he criticized "army medical officers for their attitude towards sex matters," and suggested that they "peddled an unsavoury attitude through the forces," with the distribution of prophylactics.[97] The medical officers demanded the Reverend retract his statement, arguing that they did "preach continence and advise against the evils of immoral sexual intercourse," but that their main objective, "the saving of manpower to the army is as much a duty of the medical corps as it is any other officer."[98] The *Maple Leaf* did not appeal to the soldiers' sense of family to prevent them from engaging in promiscuous activity, nor did it attempt to provoke a response based on morals. Instead, the newspaper presented reasons based on the disease's influence on the soldiers' ability to carry out their objective and defeat their Nazi enemies.

Like venereal disease, the discussion on conscription in the *Maple Leaf* provides insight into the strategic manner in which the newspaper presented controversial information. With the start of the campaign in Northwest Europe, Prime Minister King's persistent avoidance of conscription compounded the shortage of recruitments available for the Italian theatre.[99] However, the *Maple Leaf* initiated coverage on the issue of reinforcements as early as 23 March 1944,[100] as an article claimed: "A total of 418,532 men were ordered to report for military training from the time compulsory training was introduced in 1940… 238,277 men who had been called in were postponements."[101] Colonel Ralston assured readers that "the provision for casualties is sufficient [and] we

FOR CANADIAN TROOPS IN ACTION

THE MAPLE LEAF

(WITH Canadian Press NEWS)

Vol. 1, No 5 — ITALY EDITION — Friday, February 4, 1944

Government Presents 12-Point Postwar Plan

Japs Rob Prisoners' Gifts

Premier Reports Supplies Pilfered

Canadians Mistreated But No Atrocities Like Those To British, U.S.

(Special to The Maple Leaf)

OTTAWA — The Canadian Government and International Red Cross have sought to alleviate conditions of Canadian prisoners in Japanese hands by sending supplies by ship "Greysholm," but they have been delayed and pilfered, with only a limited quantity reaching the men. This was revealed by Prime Minister King, in speaking to the House of Commons on treatment of Canadians by Japan.

In contrast it is announced from Kelowna, B.C., that a shipment of soya bean paste and other Japanese foods has arrived from Japan for Japanese interned in Canada, by the Greyshoim, which recently returned with Canadian repatriates.

No Canadian troops were involved in Japanese atrocity incidents mentioned by the United States, but the Canadian Government has reports of grave action of mistreatment of Canadian soldiers taken prisoner at Hong Kong.

Mr. King told the House that reports of atrocities committed by Japanese against Allied prisoners of war are "shameful and overwhelming as to be almost incredible." He said the government and people of Canada have the utmost sym-

(Continued on Page 4)

'Monty' Fed Up

LONDON—"This war began a long while ago. I am getting fed up with the thing," Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery told thousands of his troops at a South England town this week. "I think it is nearly time we finished it," he went on. "We could not see at the beginning how it could end. That is not so today, definitely not. Today we can see how this business is going to end. The only thing we cannot see is exactly when, but I would say we must make a great effort to finish it off this year. We can do so and we will. You and I will see this thing over together."

Murder-Suicide

AYLMER, Ont. — Provincial police reported the shotgun riddled bodies of 33-year-old Claude Charlton, farmer, and his eight-year-old son, Jim, were found in a tobacco barn on the Charlton farm. Police termed it murder and suicide but said investigation revealed no reason.

Rome -- 16 Miles

Germans Massing for Counter-Attacks as British, U.S. Troops Drive Inland; Cassino Doomed

ALLIED forces are 16 miles from Rome. British troops are striking north from the Anzio bridgehead along the shortest road to the Italian capital and stiff fighting is going on near Camoleone. On the British right, U.S. forces are fighting near Cisterna, Appian Way town.

Signs are increasing that the Germans are massing for strong counter-attacks.

CASSINO DOOMED

Early this morning, French and American troops on the main Fifth Army front were reported to be within 500 yards of Cassino, German stronghold which has held up the Allied advance for weeks. Artillery was pounding the town to bits. One report described street fighting in the northern section of the town. To the north of Cassino, the Germans are fighting to stem the advance of the French - American force, now only three miles from the main road to Rome.

The two Allied armies are 60 miles apart, their paths converging and heading for two historic roads to the capital—via Appia and via Casilina.

On the Eighth Army front patrolling continued. Enemy was nervous and discharged flares frequently during the night. Enemy motor movement was heard at night in the Orsogna area and was engaged by our artillery.

Sholto Watt, Canadian war correspondent, has moved into the Anzio bridgehead, and his despatches on operations in that vital theatre will be carried by The MAPLE LEAF. He writes:

FROM THE ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD — The Germans are massing troops to hold Cisterna road junction on Littoria-Rome highway, which they must keep if they are to hold the mounting Allied strength in the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead. Numerous German battalions are now grouped around Cisterna, and elements of several divisions have been identified there.

TRANSFER FORCES

Among these are units from some of the best German troops and it is now clear that some of the best fighting soldiers are being withdrawn from the Fifth Army's Cassino front to this sector.

(Continued on Page 4)

Prohibit Strikes

QUEBEC—The Quebec Legislature gave third and final reading to the government bill prohibiting strikes on all public services by 44-14. The vote was taken after the Union Nationale amendment was rejected by the same majority.

Government Plans Boost In Allowance

OTTAWA — The government has decided to increase treatment allowances to service men and women, discharged for medical reasons, and allowances paid to veterans of the first Great War under the Veterans' Allowance Act, Pensions Minister Mackenzie announces.

The minister said in future treatment allowances will be equal to the regular pay of rank up to lieutenant, plus the regular scale of dependents' allowances.

Select committees of the House of Commons are to be set up to study and report on the national social insurance plan and postwar reconstruction and re-establishment, he advised.

BEWARE — V.D.

TORONTO—Dr R. P. Vivian, Ontario health minister, warns that venereal disease has become the greatest single public health problem in Ontario.

Canadian Tanks Remove Enemy Observation Tower

(Special to The Maple Leaf)

With Canadians in Italy — A high tower, which the Germans had been using as an observation post, has been knocked down by Canadian tankmen who pumped in 40 shells to do the job.

The troop of a western Canadian armored regiment succeeded where artillery, bombers and other tanks had failed. They demolished the troublesome tower from more than two miles away.

The feat was cheered by men all along the front, from the forward slit trenches back to headquarters, for the tower overlooked our positions and roads and miles of country roundabout.

When the lads got through cheering they expressed the hope Heinie's best FOO'S were in it at the time.

The troop responsible was commanded by Lieut. E. J. Perkins, of Derbyline, Vermont, U.S.A.

Supporting infantry units, Maj. G. Lee Symmes, Toronto, led Canadian tanks against Hun dug-in positions, cleaning out trenches, mortar and machine gun posts as well as stone houses held by the enemy as fortresses. This was done in face of shelling from enemy long-range guns.

One of our tanks was put out of action but Lieut. George C. Catton, Regina, gave covering fire while Sgt. D. A. G. Pensuicuick, Vancouver, tied a cable to it and brought it back for repairs.

NEW DEPARTMENTS TO HELP SOLDIERS

Move Aimed at Social Security, Development of National Economy; War Service Grants

(Special to The Maple Leaf)

OTTAWA—Creation of three new government departments, designed to take long steps in the direction of social security and maintenance and development of national economy after the war, is forecast in the speech from the throne read at the opening of the 1944 Canadian Parliament.

Russians Trap Ten Divisions

THE Russians, across both the Estonian and Polish borders, have launched another offensive in the Ukraine. Two Soviet armies have decisively broken German defences. Nine enemy infantry divisions and one armored division are reported surrounded.

New advances, west of Veliki Luki, bring the Soviet troops to within 40 miles of Latvia. Since the offensive began in the northern sector, the Red Army has freed an area of 10,000 square miles.

BOMBER RANGE

Roi Island, best airfield in the Marshall Islands, has been captured by American troops. Taking this island, at the northern end of the group, means that Jap bases in the Carolines are within range of land-based bombers.

The Japanese, showing signs of extreme starvation and exhaustion, were surprised by the use of American tanks and medium artillery. Tanks had been used only once before in that area.

COLUMNIST KILLED

Raymond Clapper, 51, well-known U.S. columnist, was killed when two planes collided in the attack on the Marshall Islands and crashed into the sea.

HERE are the principal proposals on which the government will seek approval of parliament:

1. Family allowances.
2. Establishment of an industrial development bank to provide credit for convers.on of war industries to peacetime use.
3. A bill to ensure or guarantee export credits to aid in obtaining export markets.
4. Creation of three government departments in the fields of postwar planning:
   (a) Veterans' Affairs — to handle rehabilitation of service personnel and pensions.
   (b) Reconstruction to promote planning for national development and postwar employment.
   (c) Social Welfare—to administer federal activities in health and social insurance.

MUTUAL AID

5. Revision of the Bank Act.
6. A bill to extend the principle of mutual aid to postwar relief of liberated countries.
7. Approval for Canadian participation in an international organization to maintain peace.
8. A bill to provide war service grants for persons who served in the armed forces and other measures to supplement existing rehabilitation program.
9. Expansion of research activities.

(Continued on Page 4)

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

Manitoba to See Cabinet Changes

WINNIPEG — The Manitoba Legislature will open its 1944 session Feb. 8. Cabinet changes are expected before the house opens with new ministers named to portfolios of labor and health, now held by Hon. J. D. McLennighen and Hon. Errick F. Willis, respectively.

New Water Plan

MOOSE JAW, Sask. — The Saskatchewan Reconstruction Council, opening a two-day sitting, heard representations from the city council urging a number of postwar construction works for the city and touching on a plan for piping water from the South Saskatchewan river to Moose Jaw and Regina.

INDUSTRIALIST DIES

TORONTO — John MacKinnon Toronto industrialist, is dead.

are budgeting for 4,000 men per month during the year… maintaining the pool overseas."[102] Despite this seemingly optimistic tone, the newspaper discussed the protests against the government's position, including the Legion's opposition to voluntary enlistment until home troops went overseas, the reduction of the call-up age and conviction of 4,342 individuals who had defaulted on mobilization regulations.[103] With the government's anti-conscription position, the *Maple Leaf* publicized alternative options, thus managing the effect of the conscription discussion on the Canadian soldiers in Italy.

The discussion of conscription continued into the summer, yet it did not attract the same emphasis as it had during the spring, despite the fact that disease and attrition had decreased the manpower available for the war. The majority of the articles that appeared during the summer were positive in tone, describing the cessation of air force recruiting due to a decrease in casualties, the availability of 50,000 Canadian soldiers for overseas service, and the adjustments made by the government to ensure soldiers overseas had adequate reinforcements.[104] This optimistic tone continued until late September, when the issue reached a climax with the publication of an article written by Conn Smythe, a well-known Toronto executive.

Since the *Maple Leaf* had pledged to exclude issues that could harm morale, the issue of reinforcements and conscription was problematic. Symthe's article criticized the reinforcements' state of readiness: "Reinforcements received… are green, inexperienced, and poorly trained."[105] Despite the criticism, the *Maple Leaf* reported, "some thousand of trained volunteers are already overseas as reinforcements, or about to be dispatched."[106] Four days later, the newspaper claimed that the former Minister of Defence, Col. J.L. Ralston, had resigned due to the government's refusal to institute conscription.[107] The newspaper turned its focus on the new Minister of Defence, Andrew McNaughton, as he continued support for volunteers, locating 14,000 to send overseas.[108] A group of officers voiced their concern in Parliament, stating, "The dominion's volunteer system for overseas service was inadequate for needed reinforcements."[109] The *Maple Leaf* reported the following day that the Prime Minister made "16,000 conscription home troops available for overseas service."[110]

Canada greeted this order-in-council with a furor, and *Maple Leaf* articles showed the divisiveness of the decision. One headline read, "Liberal Party Break Threatens; Flare-Ups Reported in Quebec," due to the "5,000 Conscripts Due Next Month,"[111] while other articles discussed the training of the conscripts, and reaction to the government's decision,[112] including the mutiny of 1,500 Army Draftees in British Columbia and Montreal.[113] The *Maple Leaf* discussed plans to place draftees in non-combatant roles and attempted to explain why this issue caused a national crisis, as that newspaper reflected the concerns of the Canadian soldiers and emphasized the need for these reinforcements.[114]

The *Maple Leaf's* coverage of the conscription crisis shows its allegiance to the Canadian soldiers in Italy. The newspaper described McNaughton's attempts to provide solutions to the reinforcement shortage, and was partly successful. As with many other controversial issues, the *Maple Leaf* balanced the coverage of the conscription issue by reporting on how the government sought to assist soldiers though policy implementation, how the military integrated scientific advances to support the infantry towards their objectives and how non-combatant supported the front line soldiers.

Taken together, the *Maple Leaf's* coverage of the Italian front, the wider Allied effort and events in Canada, suggests several conclusions. The *Maple Leaf* consistently gave priority to information relevant to the daily lives of soldiers. The type of information the *Maple Leaf* provided to the soldiers, moreover, illustrates how the newspaper approached its mission. The simple fact is the *Maple Leaf* never avoided discussion of

the cold, hard facts of war. In order to maintain the trust of the soldiers, it faced issues head-on, avoiding the label of pandering to the demands of the military leadership. This was a foundation stone of the newspaper's ability to help sustain the morale of the Canadian force. From a management perspective, moreover, the frank discussions of the challenges of combat helped give a tight focus on the mission to be accomplished. At the same time, however, the *Maple Leaf* balanced these starkly realistic articles with information that detailed how the management of the Canadian and Allied forces, and, in particular, the application of the latest technology and techniques not only gave a winning edge, but enhanced the soldiers' chances of survival. In the articles on combat units, the newspaper stressed successes, and showed how these successes resulted from excellent training and the superb equipment of Canada's modern army. It is interesting to note that through the discussions of the Canadian contribution, the *Maple Leaf* seems to have downplayed the military command hierarchy, and instead emphasized that the army's strength lay in the matchless quality of the intelligent, quick thinking, healthy and physically powerful soldiers. In many respects, *Maple Leaf*presented the army as a highly progressive corporation whose strength lay in its top quality people and its superb orchestration; an orchestration sharply focused on excellence by supporting the initiative of its people with the best training and most advanced technology.

Significantly, the *Maple Leaf* included no discussion of religion or any religious dimension to the war. Even in articles that discussed substantial successes by the Canadian forces, the newspaper credited these successes to their expertise and their scientifically advanced resources, and not to the grace of God. Similarly, other than the repeated emphasis on the evilness of the enemy, there were few or no appeals to Canadian nationalism. The *Maple Leaf's* major theme was the successful completion of the war. Even when the *Maple Leaf* discussed the risks associated with promiscuous behaviour, the editors did not appeal to soldiers' morality, or their family obligations. Such sentiments did not appear in the newspaper at any point in 1944, thus portraying I Canadian Corps as an organization that derived its strength not from Canada's special place in God's domain, but rather from the capabilities of a thoroughly modern, democratic industrial nation.

In the *Maple Leaf's* endeavour to maintain and enhance the morale of I Canadian Corps in Italy, the newspaper emphasized the Corps role in the larger Allied effort. Through a discussion of the successes of various units, the *Maple Leaf* stressed how the Corps contributed to the overall progress of the war. Although the newspaper emphasized the uniqueness of the Canadian force, it was important for the soldiers to understand the context in which they fought in the Mediterranean. In this endeavour, the *Maple Leaf* strove to convince soldiers that their role was critical to the success of the action in Northwest Europe. By reminding the soldiers of their value, it stood to reason that their morale would not suffer, but would remain relatively high, a similar objective to maintaining an anti-union work environment. The newspaper suggested that if the intelligent and driven Canadian soldier could employ his unique set of scientifically based skills, combined with the technologically advanced resources and support system that he had at his disposal, he alone could contribute significantly to the success of I Canadian Corps and thus influence the outcome of the larger Allied effort.

These concluding remarks beg the question: what does this tell us about I Canadian Corps in Italy in 1944? With the intense focus on output, objectives, incentives, training and scientific advances, the *Maple Leaf* portrayed the Canadian contingent as though it was an industrial organization, whose only focus was successful completion of its task. As a newspaper for that organization, one might compare the *Maple Leaf* with a company newsletter. However, unlike many company newsletters, *Maple Leaf*, was

produced by gifted, highly experienced journalists and newspaper executives who were deeply, fundamentally committed to serving their readership. As a result, *Maple Leaf*won credibility among the troops in a way that many corporate newsletters fail to do among employees. The achievement was in no small part the result of the considerable—but not complete—independence demanded by Brigadier Richard Malone, the founding editor. He was able to achieve that independence because of the confidence he had won in his work with the Minister of National Defence, J.L. Ralston, and with General H.D.G. Crerar, who at the time of the newspaper's founding was being elevated to command of the First Canadian Army. Both men were willing to give Malone the free hand he demanded because of their concern about morale and their sensitivity to the challenges of sustaining morale. In the end, even while promoting morale according to enlightened management principles, Maple Leaf succeeded in making itself the soldier's own newspaper. The newspaper both reflected and helped to shape the culture of I Canadian Corps during its hard combat in Italy.

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NOTE TO FILE—ON THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT UNDER IFOR

Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Williams, MSM, CD and Major Jim D. Godefroy, CD

As the fall of 1995 came to a close, in the wake of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), plans started to solidify for what was to become known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), the NATO-led follow on forces that replaced the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). For Canadians serving in UNPROFOR, it was often a toss-up as to who remained in the Balkans and changed berets and who went back to Canada. As the force ceiling was capped at 1,000 soldiers for the initial Canadian contribution, figuring out the who, what and where was undoubtedly a challenge for force planners in Ottawa.

Photo Courtesy of Author

Blatna-Ivanjska, 12 Apr 96

Under the UNPROFOR mandate, the UN did not have intelligence staffs (G-2) but rather "information officers." The reluctance to use the dreaded "intelligence" word and a general suspicion among UN troop contributors had tended to hamper the sharing of intelligence and was more than likely responsible for the notable variety of personnel collecting "information." The JCOs (Joint Commission Observers), various SF Dets, UNMOs (UN military observers), ECMM (European Community Monitoring Mission) and the French RDP (*Régiment de dragons parachutistes*) were but a few of the many characters that were encountered by members of IFOR. These, together with a number of departing UN information officers, were to prove to be a valuable source of information and potential contacts for incoming NATO G-2 staffs.

The eventual 2 (CA) Multi-National Brigade (MNB) that deployed to the northwest section of Bosnia Herzegovina as Canada's contribution to the IFOR was composed of personnel from 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) in Petawawa as well as a number of Canadians from the Canadian UNPROFOR contingents in both Croatia and Bosnia. The former Bangladeshi UN camps at both Velika Kladusa and Coralici were taken over by a small number of Canadian UN staff from small detachments of the British 1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The bulk of the NATO forces that were to make up IFOR began to arrive in early January 1996. Although planned to number approximately

60,000, the force never surpassed 55,000 soldiers.

Photo Courtesy of Author

Korice, 13 Mar 96

2 (CA) MNB headquartered at Coralici, together with the 4 (UK) Brigade headquartered at Mrkonjic Grad, made up the 3 (UK) Armd Div under the command of then MGen Mike Jackson of the Parachute Regiment. While 3 (UK) Armoured Divivision was headquartered initially at Gornji Vakuf, it later moved to Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska (RS). Each formation had its own integral intelligence staff. The takeover of Coralici was assisted by the turnover provided by the departing Bangladeshi G-2, a naval lieutenant-commander who was a fluent Serbo-Croat speaker and who had attended naval academy in the former Yugoslavia. His grasp of the current political and military situation in the Bihac Pocket greatly assisted the initial Canadian understanding of the new area of responsibility, and our G-2 staff was to build upon it. Brigade intelligence resources included field human intelligence (HUMINT) teams, a light electronic warfare team (LEWT), liaison officers, JCOs and the integral brigade intelligence staff of six Canadian personnel (one major, one captain, one warrant officer, two sergeants and one master-corporal). This was further augmented with a Czech major.

The area of responsibility (AOR) had not only seen fighting involving the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniacs (or Bosnian Muslims) but had also been witness to Bosnian Croat assistance to the Bosniacs and a Bosniac civil war between Fikret Abdic's APWB (Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia) and loyal elements of General Atif Dudakovic's 5th Corps. The nearby refugee camp at Kuplensko in Croatia, which still held many of Abdic's followers, was a daily reminder of the fortunes of war. The routing of the Krajina Serbs as a result of the 4 August 1995 Croat-led Operation STORM (Op OLUJA) in Croatia only served to complicate any true understanding of who was who and whose information could be relied upon.

One of the first orders of business for IFOR, as a priority in implementing the DPA, was the cantonment of the heavy weaponry of the former warring factions (FWFs), so as to ensure that it was under NATO observation, if not control. Determining how much military kit each faction possessed in its order of battle initially relied upon inaccurate declarations, and the true scope of each side's holdings was slowly revealed through careful counts coupled with almost daily discoveries of previously undeclared kit. These discoveries were not surprising given the recent cessation of hostilities, the lack of mutual trust between the FWFs, and the unknown entity known as IFOR. As many of the belligerents felt that the UN-led UNPROFOR had already failed them, why should they trust IFOR?

Given this, the building of trust was a daily task for all IFOR personnel. Attempts to derail the DPA and/or discredit the IFOR forces were frequent. The police forces were trusted by no one, and the military, many of which had known no other employment than killing for three years or more, were now supposed to demobilize but had nowhere to go.

Photo Courtesy of Author

Kulen Vakuf, 16 Jan 96

Unemployment and destruction of essential infrastructure was widespread, and little opportunity existed. The situation did not provide fertile ground for talk, and concrete evidence of positive change and progress was essential to gain local support. In an effort to demonstrate concern for the health of the local children, one of the more bizarre vignettes of the mission was the collection and burning of over 1300 dead pigs at Sanski Most, leading to the coining of the term "PIGINT." Many IFOR soldiers in area swore off bacon for quite a time afterwards!

Besides focusing on identifying and cataloguing cantonment sites (eventually to number over 50 in the brigade AOR), IFOR worked to establish an inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) between the Federation (Bosniac and Bosnian Croat) and the Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb). The many crossing points—including WHITE FANG, BLUE DRAGOON, MINSTREL BOY, BONDAI BEACH and ICE STATION ZEBRA—became well known to the IFOR as "hot spots" and areas for dispute. Return of captured territory, such as the evacuation of the area of the Republika Srpska known as the "Anvil" by Federation forces, in order to achieve the mathematically accurate 51/49 % split of territory between the Federation and Republika Srpska was but another complicating factor. The requirement to patrol hard-won territory given back as a result of a political decision was to make life difficult, to say the least, for the new IFOR forces.

Politically strong and economically motivated General Atif Dudakovic was not one to have his tanks cantoned. The 501st from Adil Besic Barracks in Bihac attempted a breakout and were stopped on route BLUEBIRD. The situation at the border town of Kulen Vakuf was a flash-point that was to flare up often, but the establishment of a platoon house and the use nearby of British AS-90s and Bosanski Petrovac-based Challenger tanks (a squadron of the Queen's Royal Hussars) helped to keep it in check. The riots at Otoka on 20 April 1996, when the bridge linking the east and west sides of the River Una was opened (thereby allowing potential quick access to Novi Grad in the Republika Srpska), was another memorable event, the management of which required detailed knowledge of the local power brokers and trouble makers, who were often the same people.

Photo Courtesy of Author

Otoka, 19 Jan 96

The Canadian IFOR contingent also included a Czech battle-group under the

command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sedivy. The Czechs were not only trying to figure out NATO operations (they became part of NATO in 1999) but were also were trying to learn Canadian and British staff procedures. They performed well throughout, with the Czech company responding appropriately during the 20 April 1996 events at Otoka, where they

Photo Courtesy of Author

Otoka, 20 Apr 96

used approximately 450 rounds of small arms fire and 50 rounds of 30 mm cannon as warning shots.

In addition to the daily challenges from the FWFs and the incessant boundary delineation disputes, the issue of tracking and/or locating PIFWCs (personnel indicted for war crimes) was another task that fell upon intelligence staffs. The PIFWC list, a public open indictment list, contained many errors and poor quality photos (if any), but it was only part of the puzzle. In addition to this public list, the Hague Tribunal had also issued a sealed indictment list, which was not available to the IFOR forces. This meant that the local authority figures IFOR was dealing with could be potential PIFWC without IFOR forces being aware. Given that IFOR was trying to gain trust and credibility, it seemed counter-productive and is an example of just one of many challenges that faced us as we spread out across our AOR to take stock.

In addition to the staffs at division and brigade level, Canada provided a national intelligence cell (CANIC) that was co-located with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) headquarters at Camp Ilidza in Sarajevo. This cell acted as an interface between the G-2 staff of the ARRC and national-level intelligence staff back at Director General Intelligence in Ottawa. It also exchanged assessments and analysis with the cells of other nations involved in IFOR. Small and ad-hoc in infrastructure, its staff consisted of only a major, a captain, a master warrant officer, a sergeant and a couple of master-corporals. Communications vans mounted on the back of MLVWs (medium logistics vehicles wheeled) backed up to each other provided the workspace, and some concertina wire around them delineated our “turf.” The cell went through some growing pains as it worked to establish effective liaison with its national-level counterparts in Ottawa and took some time to identify ways it could provide value-added while dealing with the expectations of all of its clients and partners. Happily, the working environment

was warm and collegial, and the lure of Sarajevo meant that an endless stream of visitors passed through. The first municipal election in Mostar on 30 June 1996 was an historic event, and as we monitored the peaceful conduct of the polls, we had a sense that stability might yet return. Further elections, scheduled for mid-September 1996, had us looking ahead, seeking to develop the indicators that might warn of violence or bloodshed and to identify those places most likely to become hotspots. Happily, with IFOR troops demonstrating a heavy presence, the polls again were relatively peaceful, and another historic milestone in the march towards lasting peace was achieved. Ongoing IFOR confrontations with the FWFs over cantonment issues and tracking the dismantlement of the FWF kept our cell well occupied, as did our efforts to develop an understanding of the interests and influence of the various personalities who controlled the now-divided Bosnia-Herzegovina. As IFOR wound down and transitioned to SFOR (Stabilisation Force), the CANIC staff was able to look back on some very effective liaison, a voluminous output of original assessment and product and a well-earned reputation as a solid mission partner for the ARRC and the other national cells.

Using ad hoc as a guideline, the cantonments were achieved on time, stability of sorts was achieved, and the people of Bosnia, though perhaps disbelieving the war was over, were given a chance to rest. Trust continued to be built and tested, and the steady performance of IFOR, its operations driven by sound intelligence, improved the situation on a seemingly daily basis. Intelligence challenges continued throughout the mission and the transition to SFOR, and there was never a quiet nor a dull day in the AOR. Hard to believe all that was ten years ago….

— BOOK REVIEWS —

FOR HONOUR'S SAKE: THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE BROKERING OF AN UNEASY PEACE

ZUEHLKE, Mark. Toronto, Knopf Canada, 2006, 464 pages. $37.95 CAN

Reviewed by Major John R. Grodzinski, CD



Mark Zuehlke is a popular writer, whom many readers of this journal may know for his books on Canadians in the Italian campaign, specifically those dealing with the campaigns at Ortona, the Liri Valley and the Gothic Line. *For Honour's Sake* is the author's first venture into colonial warfare.

Zuehlke's previous works were noteworthy for the tales he crafted—he ably mined veteran's accounts and official reports to weave wonderful tales of events at the tactical level. In many ways, this is easier to do for a period that is within the reach of one's immediate family and societal experience. When delving into the events of nearly two centuries ago, reliance must be made on secondary and primary sources, where the facts may indeed get in the way of a good, or popular, story. Populism is fine, but too often it fails in advancing our understanding and in the end, obscures it. Consequently, while Mark Zuehlke has written a hefty tome on the War of 1812, it is plagued by many errors and repetition of myths.

I am always suspicious of book announcements that emphasize that an author has made use of "never before seen archival material." While the publisher Knopf Canada can be blamed for zealous marketing, it did promise much with its press release on this book and the dust jacket blurb. I am forced to say that while this may be a popular book, the 24 pages of notes reveal the use of only two primary source documents from an archive, and these have been already been used in other secondary works. The few published documents referenced certainly do not qualify as "never before seen." Even more significant is the lack of reference to works by many important contemporary *Canadian* historians, such as Barry Gough, Donald E. Graves, Faye Margaret Kert and Robert Malcomson. Thus, secondary works form the basis of this book as seen in the chapter notes, which often give reference to a few well-used secondary sources.

The very same press release even suggests that Canadians were responsible for burning down the President's Mansion in Washington in 1814, when no Canadians are known to have been present during that campaign.

Given the emphasis on diplomatic matters, it is curious Zuehlke did not consult Robin Reilly's *The British at the Gates: The New Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812*, which is acknowledged as the best study of the diplomacy from the British perspective about the origins of the war and the negotiations at Ghent that ended it, or the published British Parliamentary papers on British-American relations during this period.

As a result, Zuehlke perpetuates certain myths about the war, and his book is rife

with errors. For example, Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost is said to have led a division against Plattsburgh in 1814, of which "two-thirds were Peninsular War veterans," referring to their having been under Wellington's command in the Iberian Peninsula between 1808 and 1814. In fact, recent scholarship has demonstrated that only six of the 14 battalions, totalling one-third of Prevost's force, had been under Wellington. This is an important point as Prevost's army was not the finely tuned juggernaut that American writers often claim it to have been. Following Napoleon's abdication, the British sent 44 cavalry, infantry and artillery units to North America, but only 21 of them came from the Peninsula and only 12 of them were destined for the Canadas. Not all of them saw active service in North America.

At Chippawa, in July 1814, the British are said to have been "packed in columns rather like the formation common to French assaults." Again, this is untrue. Solid scholarly work conducted in 1967 established that the British were in line, a conclusion reinforced in more recent studies of this battle.

The story of Laura Secord was not, as Zuehlke asserts, "enlarged into myth" soon after her trek in 1813. Rather, her story only became popularized in the 1860s after she had recounted it to the Prince of Wales and American historian Benson J. Lossing, who published it in his massive *Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812* in 1868. By that time, Secord was quite old.

The analysis of Sir George Prevost's defensive plans formulated during 1811 and 1812 is flawed by the lack one critical detail: Prevost had received specific instructions during 1811 that if war with America commenced, he should not to do anything to provoke a widening of the conflict. British strategic focus lay in Europe, and a war in North America posed a dangerous diversion to British war aims—although Zuehlke does acknowledge the Royal Navy sought to avoid clashes with American vessels that would fuel the war hawks in Washington. Furthermore, Isaac Brock largely agreed with Prevost on the impossibility of defending Upper Canada, at least until 1811, when he conceived the idea that by commencing operations further to the west, the likely American goal to cut the Canadas in two and take Montreal would be thrown off balance. Indeed, John Graves Simcoe, the first Governor of Upper Canada, outlined the basic strategy the British would follow during the war, years before.

As for higher organization, the British had no War Department, but a War Office, and Viscount Castlereagh could not, as the author writes, oversee foreign or colonial matters during 1810, because he was out of government. Castlereagh returned to office in 1812, when he became the foreign secretary, a post he held throughout the war.

During the summer of 1814, an American division under General George Izard was sent to reinforce another division under Jacob Brown at Fort Erie. Zuehlke describes Izards' force as "undoubtedly …the most efficient force the United States had yet managed to deploy inside Canada." Izard is said to have forced the British under Drummond to flee north to Chippawa, with the Americans camped nearby at Sandy Creek. While these fresh troops did indeed push back the British, their position lay near Street's Creek, just south of Chippawa, while Sandy Creek was more than 200 km away near Sackets Harbor and scene of another action, with completely different forces in May 1814. This may just be poor editing. Furthermore, it was Jacob Brown's division, relieved by Izard at Fort Erie, that was the finest one the Americans fielded during the war, not the other way round.

Once the war ended, or rather once news of its end reached the appropriate commanders in North America, American warships did not "ply" the waters of the Great Lakes; rather, once Commodore Isaac Chauncey received confirmation of the peace in February 1815, he immediately ordered suspension of all work at his base at Sackets

Harbor and wrote to his opposite at Kingston, Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, of the news. Yeo in turn ordered work on a new base at Penetanguishine halted but work on a new ship at Kingston to continue, at least momentarily. Yeo even accepted Chauncey's invitation to visit him. With Britain exhausted by years of war and the American treasury drained, neither side was willing to begin anew on the slightest excuse, although Britain was facing the prospect of another European war.

In the end, while this may be a well written and presented book, because of its many weaknesses, it does not make a contribution to the growing literature of the War of 1812. While reading this book and in preparing this review, I have tried to remain open minded about new perspectives and ideas. But Zuehlke offers none, which is unfortunate, as his other books have been more useful. More in-depth research, more extensive use of modern Canadian secondary works and perhaps discussion of certain perspectives would have resulted in a better book.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY

SHEEHAN, Michael. Boulder, Co, Lynne Rienner, 2005, 199 pages. $49.00 USD

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek



At the dawn of the twenty-first century, security remains a central issue in international relations. As noted by David Baldwin, redefining security over the last decade has become something of a cottage industry[1] reinforcing W. B. Gallie's claim that security remains an "essentially contested concept"—that which generates unsolvable debates about meaning and application.[2] However, throughout history the concept of security has remained central to humanity and its definition has evolved to reflect the changes in the social constructs that underpin our very existence. As noted by Barry Buzan, few people would deny that security figures prominently among problems facing humanity.[3] It is within this context that Michael Sheehan offers a readily digestible and comprehensive look at how a deeper understanding of security has emerged and where the boundaries of contestability may lie.

Sheehan begins his book with a detailed chapter on the traditional conception of security under the realist paradigm which focuses on military power, competition, and the state as the primary referent—routinely referred to as "national security". Sheehan explains that the evolution of international politics increasingly exposed the limitations of the traditional approach to security necessitating a reevaluation of the concept. In a separate chapter, Sheehan outlines early attempts at a better understanding of security focusing on the exploration of "security communities and democratic peace". Although these conceptions remained firmly based on a majority of realist assumptions and methodologies, they contributed constructively to the security debate by demonstrating a different understanding of security within the existing realist paradigm.

At the end of the Cold War, however, realism's state centric, power politics and competitive underpinnings were increasingly exposed as limitations in dealing with the increased range of problems emerging on the international agenda.[4] Sheehan articulates that a major advance in the study of security was the emergence of the broader agenda characterized by sectoral approaches to security—economic, societal, and environmental security—and more radical approaches that emerged under feminist, postmodern and critical theory monikers. Sheehan dedicates a chapter to each

approach detailing the basic foundations while noting differences and similarities with the realist conception of security noted above. The chapters are thorough and thought provoking providing many references for future investigation and research. A particularly interesting theme underlying much of Sheehan's work is a portrayal of a move from the state to the individual as the main referent of security. This point resonates strongest with his arguments in support of a human security approach to economic security in chapter five, environmental security as it threatens human welfare in chapter seven, security of people as detailed under gender in chapter eight and human emancipation called for under critical security in chapter ten. Sheen acknowledges that this broader approach is useful to the security debate for it allows us to take account of what is all taking place in world politics but rightly cautions that we must take care so that the concept [of security] does not become devoid of all meaning.[5]

Even though there was a general consensus that security should be extended into new sectors, for example economics societal, and environment security, Sheehan supports Krause and Williams' call for a "basic rethinking"[6] of the concept of security as he has articulated in the chapters on gender, postmodernism and critical security. While acknowledging that both gender and postmodern security are constructive components of the broader agenda, Sheehan believes that the critical theory approach provides the greatest possibilities for understanding and engaging with the practical problems of insecurity as well as providing the strongest critique of the realist paradigm. Critical security calls for a move away from the absolute necessities of the state which is to be supplanted by an "… international society who had been marginalized and rendered insecure by the existing approach [national security] to understanding security."[7] Further, a critical security approach is centered on a concern with 'human emancipation' and accordingly relocates human rights, humanitarian intervention, ecological and environmental concerns and distributive justice away from the peripheral terrain they occupied during the period of state dominance."[8] Sheehan does not totally dismiss the traditional conceptions of security; however, he offers insight into what might be considered "the other side of the coin" to the realist conception of security—a broadening (environment, economic) and deepening (human, societal, international) of the security agenda.

Dr. Michael Sheehan is a professor of International Relations at Swansea University and is well published in the area of international security studies. This offering, while repetitive in some areas, is well suited to students of international relations at all levels; however, the final chapters on the radical approaches may provide some "heavy lifting" for the layman unfamiliar with the international relations field. Security remains a powerful concept within international relations and is likely to remain an intellectual and political battleground in the future. Sheehan's contribution to the field of security as articulated in "International Security" provides useful insight into this battleground allowing for a better understanding of the meaning and the boundaries of contestability with the concept of security.

Endnotes

1. David A. Baldwin, "The concept of security", *Review of International Studies*, (1997), 23: 5.
2. Barry Buzan, *Peoples, States and Fear* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991): 7.
3. Buzan: 1.
4. Michael Sheehan, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005): 23.
5. Sheehan: 46.
6. Sheehan: 153.
7. Sheehan: 153.
8. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, (London: Penguin Group, 1998): 383.

TIDEWATER'S NAVY

LINDER, Bruce. Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2005, 343 pages. $45.00 USD

Reviewed by Mr. Neil Chuka



No navy can operate for very long without a robust homeport. Ships are complex platforms that integrate an array of systems geared to complete various tasks in some of the harshest, most corrosive environments on the planet. Their great bulk requires specialized construction and maintenance infrastructure as well as skilled trades-people expert in the peculiar needs of nautical platforms. Despite these facts, stories of the relationship between navies and their homeports are rarely told in more than an anecdotal or flippant manner. Bruce Linder's *Tidewater's Navy* is therefore rare in that it successfully interweaves the stories of ships, sailors, war, peace, and the geographic region from whence those ships were born and nurtured.

Tidewater refers to the area of Virginia that includes the communities and regions of Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Hampton Roads, and Newport News. This area of Virginia is blessed with numerous deep and protected anchorages, the result of a meteor impact some 35 million years ago and the convergence of a number of tidal rivers, including the Elizabeth, James, and York that flow into Chesapeake Bay. The anchorages proved favourable economically and strategically, even prior to the US Revolutionary War. It was almost inevitable then that the region would become the birthplace of the U.S. Navy (USN).

Linder, a retired USN captain, has produced a well-researched, written, and illustrated volume that does an admirable job in filling a gap in the historiography of the USN. This book is a companion to 2001's *San Diego's Navy*, also from the Naval Institute Press. Divided into eras most relevant to the story being told, the book progresses from the Revolutionary War, through the formative years of the Union, the Civil War, the transitory years of the Great White Fleet, and on through the 20th century. The often acrimonious relationship between residents of the region and the transient naval population is well detailed, as is the history of the ships that were built, serviced, and protected the region. The volume also makes clear that this region has had a strategic influence on the entire globe: all of the USN's nuclear powered aircraft carriers have been built by Newport News Shipbuilding, a good number of the USN's submarines were constructed and based there, and the area remains a major staging area for U.S. forces deploying overseas.

Linder's study benefits from strong research, with a good mix of primary and secondary sources. As well, although they force a somewhat awkward book format, the skillfully documented photographs serve to provide 'a face to the name' for the many ships cited in the text. If the book suffers at all it is from a dearth of maps. Regional and local maps that place Tidewater in geographic context and trace the development of the region through the eras would provide an invaluable note of clarity to the reader.

This book is not just for naval buffs. The region and the ships that have sailed from it have influenced numerous wars and individual battles, from the 18th to the 21st century. Students of military history in general would be well served to read this book.

OUT OF DARKNESS—LIGHT: A HISTORY OF CANADIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, VOLUMES 1-3

SKAARUP, Harold A. Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 2005, vol. 1—650 pages, vol. 2—571 pages, vol. 3—617 pages. $37.95 USD each

Reviewed by Dr. Bob Martyn







As one can surmise from the individual titles, these books present a review of Canadian Military Intelligence as it evolved over the years. Major Hal Skaarup, the three volumes' author, is a senior Army Intelligence officer whose diverse experiences range from NORAD headquarters to the Intelligence School to operational deployments in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

The series was created as a sequel to Robert Elliot's ground-breaking *Scarlet to Green: Canadian Army Intelligence: 1903-1963*, (Toronto: Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981). Skaarup's stated aim is to "highlight the major stepping-stones in the recent record of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch," written primarily "for those of us 'in the trade,' so to speak."[1] Non-indoctrinated outsiders, however, need not worry; lists of acronyms are provided in each volume.

Canadian Military Intelligence in Three Volumes

The opening volume of this trilogy starts, improbably, with the visit to what would be Canada, by the Nordic king Woden-Lithi, circa 1700 BC. Selecting this as a start point for a history of Canadian Military Intelligence is justified by the statement that "there would have to have been a great deal of scouting and intelligence gathering conducted in making contact with the Algonquians."[2] Perhaps a stretch. We then advance quickly, at one- and two-paragraph snippets, through the Seven Years War, Napoleon, and the Boer War, to reach the Twentieth-Century. Acceding that much of this work is covered in Elliot's *Scarlet to Green*, the First World War is covered in 16 pages, with 90 pages allotted to the Second War.

Skaarup thus does not actually hit his stride until Chapter 7: "The Canadian Intelligence Corps, 1963-1968." This, and the final chapter, spans 1963 to 1982, providing several interesting insights into Canadian intelligence operations of the period. This first volume then concludes with appendices listing Intelligence Corps' Colonel-Commandants and selected senior officer biographies.

Volume 2 continues the history Canadian military intelligence, but would be more correctly titled a chronology of events, in that each year is accorded its own chapter. This proved to be an interesting time for intelligence, featuring increased demand for intelligence personnel across the CF, Arms Verification Inspections, and a rebirth of Reserve Intelligence that included the creation of five new units. It is puzzling, however, that this volume features merely four references to the Gulf War, and these in a most cursory manner.

This instalment features seven appendices, which review topics as diverse as Intelligence Branch numbers, to the history of Airborne Intelligence sections, to updating lists of senior Branch officers.

The final volume of the trilogy brings the story up to 2005. Structurally, it continues the precedent established in Volume 2 of according each year its own chapter. There are two additional chapters, outlining various Intelligence-sharing agreements, and a short chapter providing a view of Canadian Military Intelligence's future, which appears to be based largely upon a graduate thesis produced by BGen (ret'd) James Cox. This volume also features numerous appendices updating previous volumes' lists, in addition to discussing Intelligence Branch music, and listing Sir William S. Stephenson Trophy Winners. For some reason, there are also three non-Intelligence related appendices, giving a historical overview of each of the Regular Army brigades.

The Good, The Bad and the Ugly…

These three books have arrived at an opportune time—several "planets" are aligning. Based perhaps unfairly upon the US justification for operations in Iraq, there is a growing demand for works that shed light upon intelligence. Further, there has been a spate of books unlocking the intelligence secrets of the Second World War, which has generated interest in equivalent Cold War revelations. Finally, there is the growth in Internet weblogs, or blogs, where people can find a broad spectrum of minutiae. This trilogy has something for each of these people

The compilation provides a veritable treasure trove of insights into the roles and missions of Canadian Intelligence personnel, primarily from the tumultuous period of the Cold War and its aftermath. That researchers in history and international relations continue to assess events in this period makes this a timely addition to the contemporary historiography. As but one example, a previously unavailable article by Major (ret'd) Gary Handson on Canadian operations in Vietnam with the International Commission for Control and Supervision, provides a fascinating first-person account of this rarely-acknowledged Canadian mission, and the intelligence support it required.[3]

Another strong point of this series, for both Intelligence practitioners and researchers looking for insights into the functioning of the intelligence system, are the many newsletter articles reprinted, which may have escaped notice when first published. Major Paul Johnston, for example, provides a very useful article on perceptions of intelligence from within the Air Force's tactical fighter world.[4] Re-reading his article also reaffirms that wheels sometimes do require reinvention, whether through failure to capture "lessons' learned," personnel changes, or simply "discovering" techniques that were actually in use many years before.

Of the three volumes, the third is particularly fascinating for its obvious contemporary relevance. Because of the current, ongoing nature of the operations, the author relies to a greater extent than in the earlier volumes on personal emails from personnel. This volume also contains submissions of greater academic utility, such as extracts from Captain Lisa Elliot's Master's Degree thesis.[5] This volume also focuses

upon a period of great change within the Canadian Forces and the Intelligence Branch—a period when post-Cold War conversions were beginning to be seen operationally.

As mentioned above, the primary audience for these works are serving and former Intelligence personnel. Perhaps it can be forgiven, therefore, for its adherence to that micromanaging style of intelligence supervision—"give me the raw data and I'll make my own assessments." Herein is a compilation of articles and musings, predominantly from Intelligence Branch and Association newsletters, in which the author avoids even a preliminary assessment of the details presented; instead, he has chosen to let them stand on their own merits and within the timeframe of their having been originally written. Absent even a rudimentary appraisal of the practitioners' efforts, through the lenses of hindsight and time, readers are left to wonder which advances and operations proved critical for Canada in the world, versus those which merely provided the Intelligence Operator with an opportunity for a really nice suntan.

The books also feature a significant number of course photographs—those habitual, "sit at attention, closed hands on knees, no smiling" images from military schools everywhere. These serve to reinforce that the target audience is the personnel who populate the photos, although there may be some interest from hostile intelligence services and anyone researching trends in moustache wear over the decades.

While this series has undeniable strengths, what must be considered "just plain ugly" is the excruciating wading through obviously unedited, verbatim Association reports. As merely one, randomly-chosen example, an Intelligence newsletter tells us,

> Capt Phil R. Berikoff and guests presided over the inauguration of 2 Int Pl in Ottawa on 8 Apr 1995. Col Patrick D.R. Crandell reported on the Yugoslav "roller-coaster" he and his wife have been riding for the past 2-1/2 years in Belgrade, Serbia. Pat returns to Ottawa from his posting as Canadian Military Attaché in Aug 1995. Maj Robert C. Dale in Halifax retired from the Militia. Capt Ted Ether spoke of his retirement in Nanaimo.[6]

This style of writing is common throughout all three volumes. While the detail is thus preserved in all of its original flavour for future historians, it does make for painful reading.

Conclusion

This work has all the hallmarks of a seriously-practiced hobby. The author's journal notations, which appear more frequently as the chronology progresses suggests Skaarup has had this project in mind for some time. But what is clearly missing from this wonderful collection of details is the "so what." Just as intelligence must be actionable to be useful, so too would this series benefit from an assessment of what these "major stepping-stones" in recent Canadian Intelligence experience has meant. Skaarup is well situated to provide such an informed assessment, being an experienced intelligence officer who would bring credible academic qualifications to the difficult task of assessing past accomplishments. Perhaps creating such a scholarly assessment would be a suitable follow-on goal, having gathered all of the requisite basic research to produce these three volumes.

Despite this shortcoming, the series nonetheless provides a veritable stockpile of documents for follow-on research. If viewed as a compendium of documents, rather than a cohesive history of Canadian Military Intelligence, then it has certainly made its mark.

Perhaps this trilogy is most accurately summed in the Foreword, written by the former Colonel-Commandant of Canadian Military Intelligence (1985-1997), Major-General (ret'd) Reginald Weeks:

"This book is neither amusing nor entertaining; but then it is not intended to be amusing or entertaining…..it is in fact, a work of reference."[7]

Endnotes

1. Vol. 1: xxix, xxi.
2. Vol. 1: 4.
3. Vol. 1: 459-470.
4. Vol. 3: 160-163.
5. Vol. 3: 314-395.
6. Vol. 2: 284.
7. Vol. 1: xvii.

AFGHANISTAN'S ENDLESS WAR: STATE FAILURE, REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN

GOODMAN, Larry P. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2001, 264 pages. $25.00 USD



Reviewed by Ms. Heather Hrychuk

Sun Tzu once said if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. This truth is all the more salient with the Canadian Forces' (CF) ongoing anti-Taliban counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan. To understand the Taliban, their present and prior actions, such as the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, one must look at the collapse of the Afghan state, and the Taliban's rise to power.

In *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*, Larry Goodson, professor of international studies at Bentley College, Massachusetts, attempts to explain the deterioration of Afghanistan and the Taliban's rise in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent Afghan civil war. Aiming to fill a gap in the pre-9/11 body of literature on Afghanistan, Goodson synthesizes and then builds upon prior work which was generally sparse, superficial, or tainted by Cold War bias.[1] His analysis is well documented, but suffers from a heavy reliance on secondary sources. The final chapter, which provides four scenarios for Afghanistan's future, is outdated, with Goodson no more able than anyone else to predict 9/11 or the after effects of that day. However, the bulk of the work provides a concise explanation of the origins of the struggle Afghanistan continues to face.

To Goodson Afghanistan embodied the situation in which many proxy states found themselves at the end of the Cold War. Struggling to maintain themselves as states, these nations often suffered at the hands of their vulnerable governments, who aimed to retain power, but were unable to escape change. Simultaneously, the international community's interest in these nations decreased, as they were no longer considered vital in thwarting the communist threat. Throughout the work Goodson retains this focus on the Cold War, ignoring the impact of the rise in terrorist activity and organization on Afghanistan. In fact he makes scant reference to Osama bin Laden, his motivations and role in Afghanistan, and neglects to mention Al Qaeda's activities in the country.

To explain the collapse of Afghanistan Goodson points to six critical factors: ethnic-linguistic cleavages, social structures, religious ideology, the recent and devastating

history of conflict, geographical position and limited economic development. Taken together these provide a more comprehensive look at the variety of issues particular to Afghanistan than previous work. Despite correctly highlighting these critical variables, the author fails to devote adequate attention to these very issues. Rather than devoting the bulk of the work to the interplay of these factors, only the opening chapter references their interaction. The remainder of Goodson's analysis looks to the Soviet intervention in the 1980's and the repercussions of this conflict. He correctly explains how the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 created a power vacuum prompting the reemergence of traditional socio-economic problems as the anti-Soviet alliance collapsed in a competition to control Afghanistan and ultimately to civil war.

It was this civil war that allowed the Taliban to gain and consolidate power at Afghanistan's expense. As Goodson provides a lengthy account of the Taliban's rise and the subsequent societal impact in Afghanistan, a glaring omission in the work becomes apparent. Despite addressing the Taliban as a movement of religious students, Goodson fails to mention the religious foundation of the ideology. At no point does he state the school of Islam to which they subscribe, which leads to an incomplete understanding of their base motivations. Instead descriptions are limited to vague terms such as 'fundamentalist," and "traditionalist."[2]

In summary, Goodson argues that many of Afghanistan's problems and its collapse are due to its past, not the inexperience of the religious movement that garnered power. The country's issues are rooted in its history and the destruction of traditional power structures after Soviet withdrawal. His explanation of the collapse of Afghanistan and the Taliban's rise provides timely insight into an area of the world that has now captured international attention. The chapter regarding Afghanistan's future must be disregarded, and the shallow analysis of the Taliban's religious motivations must be tempered with alternative sources. But these faults do not render the work irrelevant. *Afghanistan's Endless War* can provide a basis for understanding the enemy the CF currently faces.

Endnotes

1 For examples of the pre-2001 literature regarding Afghanistan see Ludwig W. Adamec's work, *Dictionary of Afghan Wars*, Revolutions and Insurgencies. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1996; or Ralph Mangus' work, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid*. Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1998.

2. Larry P. Goodson. *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*. Seattle, Washington. University of Washington Press. 2001. Pg. 62.

CLIO'S WARRIORS: CANADIAN HISTORIANS AND THE WRITING OF THE WORLD WARS

COOK, Tim. Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2006, 326 pages. $85.00 CAN

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy

Though the subject of how history was written has recently become as popular as the writing of history itself, seldom does the profession of Canadian military historians receive such detailed attention in this regard. In his latest work, *Clio's Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars*, Canadian War Museum historian and author Tim Cook has tackled the fascinating and complex tale of those who spent their professional lives collecting, recording, archiving, documenting and writing Canadian military history during the twentieth century.

Compiling the official record of Canada's military history has been anything but an easy or simplistic affair. From the very outset, the entire enterprise has often been



viewed with disdain or challenged by those whose actions were to be recorded. Politicians were often especially suspicious of the process unless it could serve to strengthen their personal careers or the longevity of rule of their political party. Senior military leaders were also concerned about how history might view them and their actions. Yet despite these reservations, many ministers and generals understood well the critical importance of the official history of warfare to the strengthening of the national fabric, and wisely chose not to ignore history for fear that history might ignore them and the events of their time.

Official Canadian military history in the twentieth century began largely as a result of individual innovation and patriotism. The First World War provided the first noteworthy crucible for Canadian official historians, though as Cook explains in considerable detail, the task quickly became much more complicated than the journalistic writing of events as they happened. The perceived stalemate of the western front combined with the tremendous casualties sustained made the issue of post-war presentation a matter of international concern. Those charged with writing the official history of the Canadian Corps soon found themselves to be not only historians but also the guardians of national reputations. For example, Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, assigned to write a multi-volume history of Canada's military in the First World War, spent most of the early post-war years in heated debates with official British historians over how the Canadian divisions were presented in England's own official record of the war. Despite his passion for accuracy and detail, Duguid's sluggish rate of publication ultimately killed the entire effort to produce an official history of the Canadian Corps, and the task was not completed until the early 1960s when another official historian completed an abridged single volume on the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

Though Duguid's successor, Colonel C.P. Stacey, ensured that the official history of the Second World War would not meet the same fate, he often faced incredible challenges in completing his assignment. His task was nothing short of titanic in its proportions when one considers the global extent of Canada's military activities. Though concentrating primarily on the ground war, Stacey covered events from Hong Kong to Norway, and from Sicily to Falaise Gap. In addition, as he emerged as the country's preeminent military historian, Stacey was soon tasked to write broader political-strategic accounts for both senior soldiers and politicians. Cook captures the successes and failures of Stacey's career as Canada's senior military historian during the Second World War in this very readable text, and provides considerable additional insight on Stacey's well recorded public life.

Delivered in six lengthy chapters, the text keeps its focus primarily on the creation and publication of the military's official histories. The Army dominates much of the discussion but this is not due to any bias from the author. In fact, he devotes

considerable attention to the Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy historical programs, and plainly describes how a near-complete lack of dedicated interest and support from the senior leadership of these services contributed to their utter failure to produce anything comparable to the Army's official history series quickly after the end of the war. In reading their experiences the reader often feels sorry for the RCAF and RCN's historians, who clearly tried to generate greater interest and resources for their efforts only to receive little—if anything—beyond a few polite words of encouragement. It was undoubtedly frustrating for them, and it would be well into the 1980s and beyond before these two services began publishing their own official histories. In the case of the RCN, for example, it is planning and hoping to complete its history of the Second World War sometime before 2010.

The experience of the other services revealed in Clio's Warriors should serve as a strong reminder of what can happen when military history is thought of as only an afterthought by the Department of National Defence. Although there are understandable constraints on resources and funding for military historical projects, it is disheartening to observe that the vicious cycle of ignorance about the importance and national value of official military history has a lengthy quasi-official history of its own. When histories are published too long after the events or too late for some who were there to see and read in their lifetimes and this is lamented by the government and the public, why then do these same lamenters allow the cycle to continue?

The author also takes time at the end of the book to briefly explore the nature of the profession since the 1960s—after the majority of the wartime serving official historians had retired from active duty. What one finds is a passing of the torch, and the names of those who teach Canadian military history today are revealed as once being the best and the brightest students of the men originally responsible for writing the canon of Canada's official military history during the World Wars. For those with a personal connection to the Canadian military history community, this part serves as an especially enjoyable read.

Overall the book suffers very few flaws and will undoubtedly become a staple in the libraries of all members of the profession as well as those who study or follow it with interest. As stated at the start of this review, seldom has the historiography of the field received such detailed, passionate, and comprehensive attention. Serving soldiers and military historians should consider themselves lucky to have Tim Cook, himself a War Studies graduate and an accomplished military historian, capably deliver this story.

BRITISH FORCES IN NORTH AMERICA 1793-1815

CHARTRAND, René. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, Men-at-Arms no. 319, 1998, 48 pages. $22.95 CAN

WOLFE'S ARMY

MAY, Robin. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, Men-at-Arms no. 48, 1998, 48 pages. $22.95 CAN

Reviewed by Captain Zane Piekenbrock

The strength of the Osprey Men-at-Arms series lies in the photos, illustrations, and the studies of uniforms and equipment. The many beautiful and accurate drawings and the accompanying plate descriptions allow the reader to understand and explore the uniforms, insignia and appearance of the subjects while the accompanying text places them into context providing details of the time periods. These books are of interest to anyone with a passion for military history, however it should be mentioned that these





books are a primer, giving an overview of their subject focused towards a non-specialist reader. Not withstanding, they will make a great addition to any bookshelf and since the first Men-at-Arms *Foot Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard* was published in 1971, well over four hundred titles have been published. The two books reviewed here, *British Forces in North America 1793-1815* and Wolfe's Army, have a particularly Canadian content.

At first glance one would think *Wolfe's Army* covers General Wolfe and the army he led at the Plains of Abraham in 1759. Unfortunately it seems that *Wolfe's Army* is more of a primer/overview of the wars in North America from about 1745 to 1759. It focuses primarily on the French and Indian wars; the first 30 odd pages discuss the Seven Year War, the selling of Ohio, and the George Washington, Braddock, and Dunbar actions in North America (Wolfe was still in England as the book mentions at the time). The book then covers 1755-57 and the Louisburg expedition of which Wolfe, then a colonel under Jeffery Amherst, had a small part. General Wolfe, and his army, make their first appearance on page 33. Actual information on "Wolfe's Army" is found on pages 35-40 where the battle of the Plains of Abraham is discussed.

The book is well written and contains excellent illustrations that cover all the periods mentioned above. The authors of *Wolfe's Army* have written an interesting book, just not one focused on the army of General Wolfe. The two authors, Robin May and Gerry Embleton have non-academic backgrounds; Mr. May was an actor who became a writer and journalist specializing in opera, theatre and the American west. Mr. Embleton is an illustrator and researcher of historical costumes. Both have been active with in the Osprey Publishing since the 1970s. All in all, this Osprey title provides some basic background on the French and Indian Wars and some of the political background of the British attack on Quebec by General Wolfe. It would have been nice to have more of a spotlight on the army Wolfe commanded, and more of an in-depth look at the particular dress and histories of the units[1] under his command. As with all Osprey books, the illustrations and information contained in the plates make this book worthwhile for anyone interested in this period of Canada's history.

British Forces in North America 1793-1815 covers the dress and units active in North America during the timeframe. This Osprey title contains great information on not

just the British Forces but the "Canadian Units" including provincial, incorporated, volunteer, fencible, select embodied and, sedentary militias. Some of these units existed only for a few years but left a lasting impression on the history of Canada, one such unit being the Canadian Voltigeurs, lead by Colonel de Salaberry that defeated an American force at the battle of Chateguay. It existed for only three years before being disbanded in May 1815 at the end of the War of 1812.

As mentioned earlier, the book contains information on styles and orders of dress, both summer and winter that units in Canada adopted. Along with the illustrations, again by Gerry Embleton, there are many portraits, drawings and artefacts pictured to assist in giving a better view of the equipment, units, and the personalities involved with British Forces in North America. Many of the pictured items are from private collections or smaller museums—such as the Chateau de Tramezay Museum in Montréal or the Musée de Québec in Quebec City, and it is pleasant to see these artefacts included here; otherwise one may never have known of their existence in the various collections.

The author of this Osprey title is a Canadian, Rene Chartrand, a freelance writer and historical consultant. He has published ten Men-at-Arms titles and the first two volumes of *Canadian Military Heritage*. The illustrator is Gerry Embleton, the co-author and illustrator of the previously mentioned Osprey title, *Wolfe's Army*.

Both titles contain a brief bibliography that give the reader the ability to expand their reading and delve deeper into the subjects if they are interested. If one had to pick only one of these titles, I would recommend *British Forces in North America 1793-1815*; it is more fulfilling in that the contents covered are exactly as described in the title. There are no surprises and as an addition to a reference collection it would be first rate. I would caution that *Wolfe's Army* is not exactly about Wolfe's Army, but takes a broader view of that period of time, which may disappoint someone looking for information on the army General Wolfe commanded before his untimely death on the Plains of Abraham at Quebec City. Overall, both of these Osprey titles are a great addition to the library of anyone interested in North American military history, the illustrations are first rate and the overview provided by the text and plate descriptions is a fast way to come to terms with the dress, terminology, and style of the times.

Endnote

1. The Army consisted of the 15th, 28th, 35th, 43rd, 47, 48th, and 58th Regiments, Fraser's Highlanders (78th Regt) and 2 battalions of the Royal American Regiment along with other assorted troops.

SWIMMING SHERMANS: SHERMAN DD AMPHIBIOUS TANK OF WWII

FLETCHER, David. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, New Vanguard no. 123, 2006, 48 pages. $22.95 CAN

Reviewed by Dr. Aaron P. Plamondon

Although the subject of weapons and equipment is still an emerging topic in Canadian military history, the Vanguard Series of the Osprey Publishing house has done widespread work on the British and the U.S. armoured units involved in the 1944 Normandy landings. David Fletcher is a historian at the Tank Museum in Bovington, U.K. and has spent over forty years studying the development of British armoured vehicles during the two World Wars. This experience is apparent in his new study of the Sherman DD (duplex drive) amphibious tank of World War Two (WWII). His direct contact with the extensive WWII armour collection at Bovington has clearly allowed him to attain a



complete understanding of not only British prototypes, but American models as well—in this case the DD Sherman.

The idea of an amphibious tank was originally very controversial. After all, a tank was not designed to float or navigate at sea. But the idea gained support nonetheless, as Allied planners knew that they had to have armoured support for the infantry on the beaches as soon as possible. The first attempts for an amphibious model began in Britain and concentrated around using giant flotation devices on either side of the tank. This concept did not last long as it made the tank too wide to load on a ship.

The next idea to bring about amphibious armour was the 'duplex drive'. Each tank was enveloped with waterproof canvas screens sealed around the tank. This was incorporated with the idea of driving a propeller off of the normal transmission of the tank and allowed the tank to move itself around at sea. This was eventually proven to be a brilliant innovation. After the tank was launched from a ship and the screens allowed it to float, the DD system then brought the tanks to shore. The screens were to deflate after landing and the tank would shift into its true *raison d'etre* as a fighting vehicle on land. By 1943, the Valentine was obsolete and the DD system was transferred to the American Sherman model. By then the Sherman was the main battle tank used by all the Western allies, including Canada.

As Fletcher has revealed, technical military innovations often begin with tragic failures and on June 6, 1944, not all of the tanks entered the land battle successfully. Indeed, many of the tanks never made it ashore in the face of German firepower due to their sluggishness in the water. Many were also swept off course by the wind and the tide. Some simply sank to the bottom after being launched when their propellers failed to engage. Fletcher has also not limited himself to Normandy, and does explain how further challenges awaited the tanks in North West Europe, such as the crossing of the Rhine.

The book is unique in its imagery because of the artwork of Tony Bryan. Bryan has been the illustrator for many of the titles in the Vanguard Series, and his full colour depictions add to the clarity of Fletcher's narrative. This includes cutaway artwork that allows the reader see how the tank and screen were assembled and how such a large machine would be able to carry out a naval landing. Moreover, there is elaborate photography throughout the book, which includes previously unpublished images. These visuals also allow the reader to follow Fletcher's discussion of how the DD worked and was developed.

It is obvious that Fletcher is an analytical writer, as he openly questions some of the validity of some of his sources that date back to 1945. But the lack of footnotes hurts the credibility of his work and the bibliography makes it clear that secondary material was used for most of it. Moreover, there are sections that include far too much speculation. The vocabulary is also overly complicated at times and requires some experience with tanks or ships on the part of the reader. It would require much effort for the layman to follow Fletcher's story. A related problem, which was likely beyond the author's control, was the size of the manuscript; in all, it is only forty-eight pages. This is far too short for a history of British and American armour development during the Normandy landings and beyond. The primary focus of the book, however, is to explore the main tanks deployed during D-Day by all of the Allied Forces and it is successful in this task.

LES MERCENAIRES ALLEMANDS AU QUEBEC 1776-1783

WILHELMY, Jean-Pierre. Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 1997, 268 pages. $25.00 CAN

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert S. Williams, MSM, CD



In the year 2006, did you ever wonder why in the province of Quebec you or an acquaintance has a German origin or at least a German sounding name? This curiosity has led to an in-depth study of demobilized foreign soldiers of Germanic origin by one such individual. Jean-Pierre Wilhelmy has researched the large contingent of German origin soldiers, often referred to throughout the ages as Hessians, who served in the United States during the American War of Independence, at least two thousand of whom decided to settle in Canada at the conclusion of the hostilities. These early 'Canadian' settlers are the subjects of his detailed book.

This entire volume offers a well constructed and chronologically arranged description of the 1776 to 1783 period as well as the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. In order to ensure that England would never have to renounce any of her colonies, she simply needed more soldiers. One such solution to augment this shortage of 'deployable soldiers' was foreign mercenaries. Given that King George III was of Hanoverian origin, the source was obvious. The book's chapters deal with the English search for mercenaries, the recruitment of German mercenaries, the War years and either the return to Europe or the settlement in Canada. Each chapter can be read in isolation, a definite aid to any researcher or historian only interested in a particular era or niche subject. The maps of British North America and present day Germany are most helpful, since the modern states of Germany, the United States and Canada, for that matter, didn't exist in their present state during the era in question.

The numerous detailed appendices provide a wealth of information on units, regiments and companies, and commanding officers, as well as an extensive nominal role with a compendium of professions and country/state of origin. Given the literacy levels at the time, the variations of the different name spellings also prove quite useful. This treasure for the researcher also includes a comprehensive bibliography to aid in future research. The research trove is completed with an appendix providing descriptions of the various uniforms for the war gamer/military miniature hobbyist.

The passage of time since the end of the American Revolutionary War has in no way made the history any less interesting. Mr. Wilhelmy's compact reference is bound to cause additional unexpected but none-the-less rewarding research for any reader. The tangent taken from the original intent upon taking the book in hand is bound to be even more interesting. Jean-Pierre Wilhelmy is to be thanked for his valuable contribution to early Canadian history. Any potential reader intrigued by its title will not be disappointed by the time spent reading any of of its fascinating chapters. This compact book is recommended to those engaged in genealogical research into their ancestry in Quebec as well as those interested in the perhaps lesser known contribution of foreign ex-mercenaries to the settlement of Canada.

RE-ENACTORS' GUIDE TO THE FRENCH ARMY IN NOUVELLE-FRANCE, VOLUME 1, THE BASICS

GOUSSE, François. Chambly, QC, La Fleur de Lyse, 2005, 51 pages. $22.00 CAN

RE-ENACTORS' GUIDE TO THE FRENCH ARMY IN NOUVELLE-FRANCE, VOLUME 2, THE CAMPAIGN OF 1755

GOUSSE, François. Chambly, QC, La Fleur de Lyse, 2005, 51 pages. $32.00 CAN

Reviewed by Officer Cadet Éric Plante





A *tactical* view of events

In his first two volumes of the *Re-enactors' Guide to the French Army in Nouvelle-France*, François Gousse provides a *tactical* view of events. As an expert on Canadian and French military life during the 18th century, the author has participated in many historical re-enactments in Canada and the United States since the early 1990s. The stated goal of this text is to serve as a guide for re-enactors, but it has largely surpassed its aim. The author bases his booklets' organization on letters written by various individuals from the period, and this brings the action to life. For example, with letters describing preparations for an expedition, he provides copies of the orders of march and many military equipment lists issued to the troops. As such, his booklets are based on correspondence between the colony's senior officers.

Any soldier or individual interested in this chapter of history can rely on these two works to better understand and imagine the Canadian military campaigns of 1755. Today's soldiers will be struck by the similarities between the way tasks were assigned to the various ranks of the French army of the period and the way they are assigned in today's military. Thus, François Gousse explains not only the military *groupings* of the period, namely the command structure and operations of regular units, but also helps us understand the problems inherent in relying on a defence force as heterogeneous as that of New France, which was composed of regular troops, colonial troops, militia, and

First Nations warriors. Thanks to the quality of this research, we learn what the defenders of New France carried in their haversacks. To summarize, the author brings to life the faces and images of these individuals, their impressions, and the events unfolding around them during a period that, even today, is not widely understood. Who was the Baron de Dieskau, Montcalm's predecessor? How were military operations conducted several hundred kilometres from the nearest town? How did troops march on the enemy? How were resupply operations conducted? The reader will discover the answers to these and many more such questions in these two volumes.

Even though the information provided by these texts is highly relevant, its presentation sometimes confuses the reader. The author was probably concerned with using the exact terms for the sake of re-enactors; consequently, he inserts French words in each sentence. In fact, all the terms describing military equipment, ranks, and professional matters are in French. This results in bilingual sentences, which can bog down the reader. Anyone who does not read French will certainly be hindered by this structure, which nevertheless is unavoidable. However, the insignificance of this one negative point speaks volumes about the quality of these texts. In conclusion, I strongly recommend these booklets to anyone interested in discovering a new chapter in Canadian military history, a *tactical* view of our history and the gripping individual dramas of members of the French Army in North America during the Conquest.

THE STAND-UP TABLE

Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal

EDUCATING OFFICERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A RESPONSE TO MAJOR SIMON BERNARD

Major Sébastien Blanc, CD, MSc, CHRP, writes ...

It was with interest that I read Major Simon Bernard's article on professional training for officers, specifically academic training at the bachelor's and master's degree levels. In his article, the author uses Samuel P. Huntington's theoretical model to justify the officer's pursuit of a university education. According to Huntington, the professional status of regular force officers depends, in part, on their specialized knowledge. Since Huntington believed that professional officers' expertise lies in their ability to manage violence,[1] the author implies that studying academic subjects related to the conduct of war and operations other than war is necessary to acquiring the professional knowledge specific to the military profession. In his conclusion, the author writes:

> Although I support the Department's initiative and believe in a graduate officer corps [i.e., the requirement for all officers to have a bachelor's degree and for colonels to have a master's degree], I believe that the current approach [i.e., to allow our officers to prepare a second career at CF expense] does not advance the professionalism of the Canadian military. We would do better to promote the study of subjects related to the conduct of war and operations other than war rather than prepare our members for their second careers.[2]

Even though, to my understanding, the ideas presented in Major Bernard's text agree completely with Huntingdon's, they do not agree with the modern definition of military professionalism as stated in the Canadian Forces publication *Duty with Honour*. In fact, the CF explicitly rejects Huntingdon's vision, in which only expertise in managing violence is a prerequisite to membership in the profession of arms. Since the CF's role is to ensure the military security of the State (and not only to conduct war, as Huntingdon suggested in 1957), and that this security depends as much on our ability to project force as it does on our ability to conduct humanitarian and reconstruction operations,[3] it follows that the study of a single category of academic disciplines could compromise the effectiveness of the CF and undermine its reputation, both at home and abroad.

Given that the success of modern operations (both third- and fourth-generation) undeniably rests on our ability to integrate the specialist knowledge found in various branches of the Army, we must necessarily distance ourselves from the single model proposed by Huntingdon (and indirectly suggested by the author) in order to encourage the pursuit of higher education in a wide variety of fields. As stated in *Duty with Honour*, "the body of professional knowledge that must be imparted through professional development has expanded beyond traditional areas of study (e.g., history and international affairs) to include many other disciplines not previously regarded as relevant to military operations."[4]

Although the relevance of various study programs depends in part on their course content, and some are more directly applicable than others, it is nevertheless true that each field has its specific method of acquiring knowledge (for example, the scientific method), which has its own intrinsic value. Therefore, given the complexity of today's operations, it is desirable that general officers be able to count on senior officers who can analyze problems from various angles—the political/historical perspective being only one among many others.

In conclusion, since the Army's future depends in part on its ability to recruit, train, and retain its personnel, I believe that we need to adopt a liberal approach to higher education and reconcile the personal interests of our generalist officers with those of the CF. Even though some fields of study are more directly applicable to operations and tactics, it would be wrong to encourage what would amount to intellectual cloning and to promote only one category of academic study (namely the study of war and operations other than war). Our ability to adapt to the outside world and to influence it depends, in part, on our individual ability to acquire specialist knowledge in a variety of academic disciplines. This last statement reflects the spirit of Chapter 7 of the CF Leadership Manual—Leading the Institution.[5]

Endnotes

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2. Bernard. S. (2005). "Educating Officers for the 21st Century: Card Punching or Profession of Arms?" *Canadian Army Journal*, 8(4), 59-73.
3. *Defence Policy Statement* reviewed in May 2006 at the following Internet address: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/main/intro_e.asps
4. Canadian Defence Academy (2003). *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, p. 18.
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THE CANADIAN FORCES: A BUREAUCRACY THAT STIFLES INITIATIVE?

Warrant Officer Godefroid, analyst for the International Criminal Court in The Hague, The Netherlands, writes ...

It is interesting to see that the majority of the civilian population perceive the Canadian Forces (CF) as an institution characterized by organization and efficiency. This finding would make many an experienced soldier laugh. Transformation, digitization, three-block war and fourth-generation warfare—those are the current buzzwords. Major changes and restructuring, new organizations and new HQs, and doctrine that is taking a sharp turn to move from the Cold War to the current threat—that is the reality of today's CF . It is a rapidly changing environment that requires a great deal of flexibility, where success depends in large part on the ability to innovate and take the initiative. But at the same time, it seems that administrative procedures are becoming more onerous. CF bureaucratic procedures have remained largely unchanged over the past decade (some would say two decades). Has the administration, in the broad sense, of the CF become so disconnected from 21st-century requirements for flexibility and speed that it is stifling initiative?

I was formerly in charge of operations in the LFQA Command Support Capability (CSC). This new Reserve unit was created in fall 2004 by LFQA, to include 4 Intelligence Company (4 Int Coy), the civil-military cooperation company (CIMIC) and the psychological operations company (PSYOPS). The unit thus brought together an occupation (int) for which there is a growing, even exponential, demand, along with two new CF capabilities. At the same time as the CSC was being set up, the new Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) was intoduced. The CSC was immediately given the mandate of providing a CIMIC platoon, a PSYOPS tactical team, and individual reinforcements for intelligence specialists for TF 02-06.

Complicating things further was the fact that the CSC began its activities before it was recognized as a separate unit, which meant that it was created without a table of organization and equipment. CSC HQ has thus had to work in an environment of

uncertainty in order to set up this new entity, while working on the buildup for CIMIC and PSYOPS at LFQA. To add to that, there was no firmly established doctrine concerning CIMIC or PSYOPS training. Nor were any battle task standards (BTS) approved for any of the three entities. On what, then, are we to base our requests for equipment and training to guarantee that new members of these fledgling organizations are adequately trained? Based on the experience of personnel returning from operational tours in Bosnia and Afghanistan, we knew exactly what it takes for intelligence specialists, CIMIC operators and members of PSYOPS tactical teams to do their jobs and stay alive. But imagine our surprise when we realized how difficult it was to obtain what we needed, even though we had been clearly mandated to provide direct support to operations.

We ran into one brick wall after another while planning our training, making equipment requests, and getting our individual and collective training needs met, and each victory was achieved only after a fierce struggle with the various chains of command and technical chains. Those struggles involved lengthy justifications, telephone calls, endless explanations to one decision-making level after another, being referred from one approving authority to another, etc—and they were exhausting.

Gradually, without realizing it, the best among us became exhausted, left or surrendered to the inevitable: the bureaucracy and its endless requirements and justifications had mired us in cement that had almost set.

The lessons learned the hard way in theatre by our troops or our allies are difficult to incorporate into our teaching and training. Of course, lessons learned documents are circulated and clear recommendations are written, but in concrete terms, are we changing our courses and training as quickly as we should? Of course not—bureaucracy and the approving authorities make their presence felt. Course standards prevent us from doing a number of things: if it's not in the training plan (TP), good luck. The safety of the troops is one reason given. For example, CIMIC drivers must wear night-vision goggles when driving in theatre. What could be more logical than to allow new drivers on the G Wagon predeployment training course to train in this specific type of driving? But Area HQ refused: it was not in the TP and was considered a safety risk. The necessary steps must be taken to modify the TP, and obviously they are complex procedures that take months, if not years, to complete. This means that soldiers who will have to drive at night are being sent to Afghanistan with no experience in doing so. Let's bury our heads in the sand and hope for the best!

To give another example, last winter 4 Int Coy designed a new two-week course covering techniques, procedures and knowledge required by intelligence personnel being deployed to Afghanistan. In the technical chain for Intelligence, up to the national level, the course curriculum and the lesson plans were received enthusiastically and deemed necessary by almost everyone. However, we were told that the course would have to be officially recognized before it could be given. But that process would certainly take more than a year, and the CF is deploying personnel now, not in two years. Whether or not the course is recognized by the “appropriate authority,” it will be given anyway, because it is needed. Isn't the training system disconnected from reality?

The CSC is made up of people who are transferred in. We recruit qualified people with ranks from corporal to major. We have noted that it takes an average of at least three months to have an individual officially transferred to our unit. And these are people who, like us, are in Montreal! For three months, the member is left in limbo. Course nominations and taskings are difficult to arrange, because the person no longer has a real home unit. The result is an administrative nightmare, and dealing with it becomes a full-time job for a number of people. With all the computer systems and other technology we have nowadays, why does it still take three months to transfer someone?

Think about it. The last time you conducted a course, an exercise, or any other project, did you conform to all the regulations, and meet all the standards and follow all the procedures set out in the books? If you think carefully, you will realize that you certainly omitted one or two details or asked favours of well-placed friends to get things moving or to measure the risk attached to not following a regulation. It is clear that if you had to adhere to every CF standard, procedure and regulation you would never accomplish anything. Instead, you would be bogged down in bureaucratic and administrative details.

Are you smiling as you read this? Maybe you should be crying. The situation I have described is an unmistakable sign of organizational calcification. Motivated members, who are the key to the CF's development, can succeed in implementing innovative solutions only after expending immense effort in the face of this bureaucratic structure that will end up sapping their initiative. In the end, we will all pay the price. And that is unacceptable for the CF, which must remain a flexible organization capable of reacting rapidly to counter the new threats of the 21st century. The Cold War is over. It is time to oil the bureaucratic machine and shift it into 4th gear. Clearly, administrative processes must be simplified. New tools and new ways of doing things must be introduced to accelerate the bureaucratic process. The conduct of operations, and the teaching and training required for it, must take priority. Bureaucratic processes must not hinder the introduction of innovations that would increase our troops' effectiveness and improve their chances of survival on today's battlefields. We are in the middle of a transformation—what better time to turn the situation around!

CRUSHING THE BOX—A NEW PARADIGM FOR ARMY GROWTH

Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Sabatier,
Commanding Officer of the Fort Garry Horse, writes …

By now it is certainly no news to most that growth within the Canadian Army is not simply a desire, it is a necessity. The growth numbers of 5000 regular and 3000 reserve have been repeated to commanders at all levels as a key ingredient in releasing a significant degree of pressure on the current forces that are facing the challenges of CF transformation and Managed Readiness. In order to achieve this, it is clear a “One Army” approach to all our tasks will be required because the current operational and training capacity of the Regular Army cannot cope with the simultaneous demands of increased overseas, domestic and growth operations. Over the past sixty years our recruiting and training system was structured to sustain CF capabilities, and training throughput was reduced as the Forces downsized from 120 000 to 100 000 to 90 000 to where we are now at 55 000 on an optimistic day. The training system of the 90 000 (+) CF worked because each trade had the critical mass of trained leadership. I believe that the recruiting and training system today on its own, with significantly reduced manning in relation to operational demands, will simply not meet the demands necessary for rapid growth. The situation has changed so radically in terms of demand for growth, combat competence, and equipment that we as commanders must not only think outside the box, we must consider crushing the old box, burning it and constructing an entirely new box that will meet the demands of today. In this article I wish to present the argument that increasing the Army Reserves’ full-time manpower has a greater likelihood of yielding greater short to medium-term growth than does increasing the “old-box” Regular Army focussed recruiting and training system.

NEEDED FOR GROWTH

In order to achieve its target levels of growth the Canadian Forces must succeed in three vital areas: connecting Canadians with our purpose, dramatically increasing our training capacity and providing the infrastructure and resources for this growth. If Canadians from across Canada do not recognize the purpose and need for a significant growth in our Armed Forces we simply will not attract the number of suitable youth given the recruiting competition for the same fit, educated and dedicated young adults. Should we be able to connect with Canada's youth and recruit them, it goes without saying that without timely, quality training we will lose them through boredom, frustration or lack of relevance. Timely training will only be achieved by dramatically increasing the training capacity right from Development Period 1 (DP 1, basic trained soldier level) through to Development Period 3 (DP 3, Section/Crew/Patrol Commander level). The question of infrastructure to support the housing, feeding and training of 1000s of new soldiers is another significant challenge, but given the reduction of Regular Army infrastructure over the past 15 years this will be a problem that requires a solution. I believe that within the Canadian Army Reserves there is a significantly underestimated capacity that can have a dramatic impact on each of these three areas.

NEW SITUATION—NEW ESTIMATE

It is my sense that the Reserves have been underestimated simply because "today's" Army Reserves bear little resemblance in capability to the Reserves of eight, and perhaps even five, years ago. The contributing factors of: accumulated overseas operational experience; decentralized PLQ training that has resulted in significant growth in trained Section level leadership; and increased Component Transfers from Regular to Reserve force in many units, have steadily yet quietly increased the capabilities of the Reserves in multiple aspects. Reserve training is far better planned and executed than before, and our capabilities have enabled us to operationally prepare composite Platoon size elements from ELOC—DLOC (essential level of capability and deployment level of capability) with 45 days training.[1] With the increased depth in trained leadership, units can manage multiple activities such as ELOC training on the same weekend as conducting a formal course. In the past, units usually had to choose one activity over the other with the increased risk of losing soldiers due to lack of meaningful, well-supervised training. The new situation has created a sense of legitimacy and relevance that was often lacking within and towards the Reserves in the past. It is my sense that the influence of this new and increasing dynamic capability within the CF is not fully recognized and hence is not being properly accounted for and exploited. With disciplined, intentional and focussed training within the Army Reserves there is an underestimated capacity that is capable of significantly alleviating many of the demands incurred in growing our Army. However, my fear is that we will not realize this capacity if the need for robust full-time manning support to the Reserves is not fully recognized nor supported.

CONNECTING THE CANADIAN FORCES MISSION WITH CANADIANS

When a Regular Force soldier is recruited and trained s/he is extricated and somewhat sheltered from Canadian society, simply through the nature of full-time training and the locations of Army training centres. Every Reserve soldier who is trained and parades within their hometown is a multiple victory for the Canadian Forces in connecting with Canadians without the cost of one ad campaign. Every enrolled recruit for a Reserve unit is dear, and from the first moment an individual puts on their military uniform a Reserve unit is actively attaching them to military life and providing productive

training and supervision. Each day that soldier returns to their home, workplace or school prepared to explain what it is he/she does and why. This is a dynamic that does not occur within the Regular Force training system. Once the Reserve soldier is actively parading, they are introduced and integrated into the military ethos with the built-in combined support system of their family, friends and Regimental family. Those soldiers that make it through Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) and Soldier's Qualification (SQ) are prepared to survive the adjustment to full-time military training either during summer training or component transfer to the Regular Force.

Additionally, the community footprint achieved during routine training such as fitness, driver courses, low-level battle drills and collective training exercises in every Reserve Armoury location is what makes the Army relevant to Canadians, not high-priced ad campaigns. These activities achieve a dramatic impact when properly exploited; however it takes a committed, trained, full-time staff to enable the part-time soldier to achieve this. The more robust a unit's full time staff the more effectively this is maintained.

RESERVE TRAINING CAPACITY

Serving within 38 Canadian Brigade Group (Saskatchewan, Manitoba, NW Ontario), a Reserve Brigade, as G3 and Commanding Officer of a unit, it has been repeatedly and consistently demonstrated that focussed efforts produce tangible increases in attraction and training. Every year, for the past seven years I have been in this Brigade, a minimum of 600 course certificates are handed out between the months of October and May within the Brigade individual training cycle. Each year between 150-200 of these certificates are for new soldiers trained to the Basic Military Qualification (BMQ). The remaining courses range from DP 1 Infantry, Support Weapons Courses, Driver Wheeled Courses and a number of devolved Development Period 2 and 3 (DP 2, DP 3) courses as required. These numbers have been dramatically increasing recently with the increased level of local awareness of the military in general. Given that there are 10 Army Reserve Brigades across Canada, if this capacity is being duplicated this is a significant number if one is looking for growth opportunities. 6000 course certificates, of which 1500-2000 could be BMQ, could be issued outside the summer training period. Add summer training to this and these numbers likely double. These numbers are based on fact, and have been achieved by deliberately focussing Class A leadership, supported by full-time staff, towards individual training priorities. It is the recent changes within the Reserves outlined earlier that have enabled this to happen. As mentioned previously, though, these achievements and tempo are unsustainable in the short term without a committed, trained, appropriately manned, full-time staff.

WHERE DO THE FULL-TIMERS COME FROM?

The Canadian Forces is competing with RCMP, local Police Services and businesses for the same motivated and educated young adults. Within the Reserves we already employ many of the best youth within our country up until the point they become University graduates. As well, it is usually at this point that these soldiers have just completed their Primary Leadership Qualification (PLQ) after 4-6 years service in the Reserves. These people are typically looking for full-time employment and enjoy the Army, but many don't wish to join the Regular Army, as they prefer to build families in their home regions. Rather than allowing these people to join local City Police, and hope they stay committed Class A Reservists, the Army needs to be offering competitive employment options that will keep these soldiers working for the Army. We have already invested probably close to $200K per soldier once they become PLQ qualified, and yet we are allowing this resource to slip from our hands because we are reluctant to offer

the incentive of employment as full-time Reservists within their geographic region. What will retain these skilled workers? Long term commitments to employ them within their trade, recognizing they do not want join the Regular Army as it exists now. Provide training that benefits both the CF and them, as they work to maintain skills and increase their experience that keeps them relevant to a civilian workforce.

Additionally, we need to consider the risks in manning Regular Force staff positions in domestic headquarters at the expense of manning positions that directly increase the training capacity of the Army. Reserve positions within Units impact the overall capacity of the Army significantly. Every position within a Reserve Unit directly contributes to individual training, recruiting, community footprint, advanced level training and retention of soldiers through sustained supervision, and these positions rapidly lead to generating soldiers trained to a level where they are able to support training, if not deliver it. Additionally, the level of training provided within the Reserves allows reservists to be tasked with minimal preparation on Domestic Operations and numerous other Army tasks within Canada.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND RESOURCE EFFICIENCIES

The Reserve Force's capacity and efficiency in attracting, retaining and training soldiers in DP1 within a soldier's geographic region is significant. Although a comparable amount of money and effort is put into a Reserve recruit compared to a Regular recruit, the efficiencies expand dramatically once the Reserve soldier dons their uniform. First, all the support mechanisms that help motivate a soldier to stick through their training are all immediately available throughout, and this translates to good retention rates throughout BMQ. Secondly, no money on transportation, permanent accommodation, rations and downtime pay are being expended while they train during a Class A cycle. The soldier lives at home, reports to duty, trains and goes back to his non-Army life during non-training time. All this occurs within existing infrastructure still maintained by the CF in communities throughout Canada. In fact, it could be argued that the full capacity of much of this infrastructure is not being utilized as Reserve unit infrastructure such as classrooms, Small Arms Trainer ranges and garages are used by a unit 2-3 days/ week, many of those days being weekends. Hire trained Reservists throughout Canada to conduct full-time, during the week, DP1 level training for all recruits within their geographic region and this training infrastructure will be utilized, and you tap into the retention dynamics mentioned above.

CONCLUSION—PLEA FOR SUPPORT

The Canadian Army Reserves are imbedded in communities across Canada with an extensive network of support through associations, Senates and families. The ability to reinforce and augment the CF and Army's efforts to grow currently exists and can easily grow with a modest investment of full-time support and effort within each Regiment across Canada. If we do not connect Canadians to our raison d'être while we have their fleeting attention (and support?) we will fail in the long run to recruit and retain the soldiers we need. If we succeed in making that connection, we cannot fail to deliver timely and relevant training, making best use of existing infrastructure and resources.

The Canadian Army clearly needs significant growth in the short-term in order to provide our nation the defence capacity to meet our security needs, and provide robust options for Canada to meet its international obligations. This means a large number of trained soldiers with commensurate leadership, not 8 000 untrained recruits. This type of capacity is only available by committing Canada's Army Reserves to full-time service while at the same time ensuring the health of the same system that promotes, recruits, trains and retains soldiers capable of meeting our defence needs. The "old-box"

recruiting and training system that fed a large standing Army during the years of the Cold War is an outdated model for an old estimate. I believe it could be argued that it will not be capable of meeting the attraction and training targets without irreparably damaging the sustainability of those same Reserve units that provide the trained soldiers and leadership needed to make the "old-box" system work.

Almost any community across Canada is capable of sustaining a strong Reserve unit and providing the many benefits to Army growth outlined above, but this is only possible if these units are properly supported with good full-time staff and leadership (Regular or Reserve). For the first time in decades, significant growth in leadership at the MCpl-Sgt level is being reported by all units, adding to the capability and capacity of the Reserves. Aat the same time the Reserves have been contributing to operational and training tasks in significant numbers. However, right at the crucial moment when we have nearly pushed the boulder of sustainable growth to the crest of the hill the critical enablers of full-time staff, trained NCO's and lower than minimal levels of equipment are being pulled from the Reserves. If this is not acknowledged soon, the Army could very well find the Army Reserves and Army growth crushed by this rock, and the rock sitting back at the bottom of the hill.

Endnote

1 During OP APOLLO ROTO 1 (Spring 2004), 38 CBG stood up the camp security platoon for Camp Mirage in 45 days. Infantry and Armoured Recce soldiers went from Level 1 ELOC capabilities (IBTS) to Platoon live-fire (Level 3 DLOC) with 45 days' training over two months.