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FLIGHT SAFETY FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

20 March 2007





ENDORSEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF

The Canadian Forces' mandate is to provide combat capable, operationally effective forces for both the defence of Canada and for missions undertaken in accordance with the policies and priorities of the Canadian government on behalf of all citizens of our country. The preservation of personnel and equipment is critically important in maintaining the operational effectiveness needed to fulfill this demanding mandate.

It is clear that Flight Safety plays a distinct and integral role in supporting this objective through its primary tenets of promotion, education, investigation and analysis. We must collectively ensure that our personnel and materiel are afforded the protection of the best possible safety program. Hazards that could decrease operational effectiveness through loss of personnel and equipment must be recognized and positive action taken to eliminate them.

The Flight Safety Program helps ensure that the air missions of the Canadian Forces are accomplished at an acceptable level of risk. I endorse a vigorous Canadian Forces FS Program and expect everyone associated with air operations to do likewise.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "R.J. Hillier".

R.J. Hillier, CMM, CD
General
Chief of the Defence Staff

FOREWORD

1. A-GA-135-001/AA-001, Flight Safety for the Canadian Forces, is issued by the Chief of the Air Staff on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
2. A-GA-135-002/AA-001, Occurrence Investigation Techniques, is issued as a separate publication with limited distribution.
3. Suggestions for amendments are to be forwarded through normal channels to the Director of Flight Safety, Attention: DFS 3.

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LIST OF AMENDMENTS

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NOTE

Zero in Change No. column indicates an ORIGINAL page. A black vertical line in the margin indicates the portion of the text affected by the latest change. Changes to illustrations are indicated by miniature pointing hands or black vertical lines. The use of the letter E or F indicates the change is in English or French only

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Change # 2		
Change # 3		
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Change # 5		
Change # 6		
Change # 7		

This publication supersedes A-GA-135-001/AA-001 dated 2002-12-02. The official and most current version of A-GA-135 is available electronically on the DFS Internet and Intranet websites. Key Flight Safety staff and operational commanders or managers will probably keep an up to date hard copy of this publication as a handy reference manual. Notification of amendments and the details of each amendment will be done electronically and listed on the FS Internet and Intranet websites. Owners of the publication are responsible for printing and amending the publication as required.

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CHAPTER 1 – PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

GENERAL

21. The Flight Safety (FS) Program is a force enabler for the Canadian Forces. FS contributes to mission accomplishment in the DND / CF through the elimination of the accidental loss of aviation resources.

22. Orders and standards for operational and support personnel are, for the most part, developed out of concern for the safety of people and equipment. These standards represent levels of risk which are considered acceptable and practical for the full spectrum of DND / CF activities from peacetime training to wartime operations. It is understood that Commanders (Comds) in high intensity wartime action are likely to accept higher levels of risk than those considered acceptable in peacetime force generation activities. Risk management in the planning and execution of the DND / CF mission is fundamental to safe operations.

DEFINITIONS

OPERATING UNIT

3. This term refers to the unit under whose authority a flight has been authorized in accordance with B-GA-100-001/AA-000, National Defence Flying Orders.

AIR WEAPONS CAPABLE WING / UNIT

4. A wing / unit which uses ammunition, explosives and / or pyrotechnics in support of its role.

AIR WEAPONS SYSTEM.

21. A system containing mechanical, electromechanical and electronic components, that is part of the aircraft permanent equipment or installed as a mission kit and is used to suspend, launch, release or fire ammunition / explosives and / or pyrotechnics in support of the mission being flown.

NOTE

Aircraft fire detection and extinguishing systems, ejection and escape explosive charges, shielded mild detonating cord (SMDC) lines, and aircraft hoisting systems are not considered air weapons.

PYROTECHNIC

6. A chemical mixture of oxidizing and reducing agents capable of reacting exothermically. Such mixtures are used to produce light, heat, smoke or gas and may also be used to introduce delays into explosive trains.

AIM

7. The aim of the FS Program is to prevent accidental loss of aviation resources while accomplishing the mission at an acceptable level of risk.

SCOPE

8. The FS Program is a program of education, promotion and analysis. It is directed at military and civilian personnel involved in Canadian Forces aviation and its contracted support elements. Since understanding why safety occurrences happen is the key to an effective accident prevention program, accidents and incidents representing a risk to aviation, or which could lead to the implementation of preventive measures (PMs), should be investigated.

POLICY

9. The Canadian Forces shall conduct flying operations in accordance with this publication. An FS Program consistent with the roles and missions of the DND / CF shall be established at each level of command where flying operations are supervised or supported. Personnel at every level are required to participate in and support the program.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

10. The FS Program is based on the following four fundamental principles:
- a. the main focus of the FS Program is on the prevention of occurrences. Although cause factors are assigned to occurrences, this is only done to assist in the development of effective PMs;
 - b. personnel involved in conducting and supporting flying operations are expected to freely and openly report all FS occurrences and FS concerns;
 - c. in order to determine the cause of occurrences such that appropriate, effective PMs can be developed and implemented, personnel involved in conducting and supporting flying operations are expected to voluntarily acknowledge their own errors and omissions; and
 - d. in order to facilitate free and open reporting and voluntary acknowledgement of errors and omissions, the FS Program does not assign blame. Personnel involved in a FS occurrence are de-identified in the final reports and the reports themselves cannot be used for legal, administrative, disciplinary or other proceedings.

UNIVERSALITY OF FS PROGRAM

11. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) has been designated as the Airworthiness Authority (AA) for DND / CF. CAS retains as a residual responsibility the oversight of the FS Program across the full spectrum of DND / CF operations, at home or abroad. Therefore, the FS Program is applicable to:
- a. all DND / CF units conducting flying operations or supporting flying operations; and
 - b. any contracted organizations conducting or supporting flying operations, be it for maintenance support, logistics support or any other support role.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR FS PROGRAM

12. CAS is responsible for FS policy in DND / CF. FS policy is implemented by the chain of command at wings, bases and units. This policy also applies to National Defence Quality Assurance Regions (NDQAR) and work centres at contractor facilities where CF aircraft are being manufactured, overhauled, inspected or repaired. Supervisors at all levels are responsible for establishing their own FS Programs.

13. The FS Program is based on the continuous monitoring of hazards, appropriate investigation of aviation safety occurrences and thorough analysis of the investigation findings so that the risk of recurrence can be reduced. The complete program involves pre-occurrence activities like education and promotion; PMs and risk management techniques designed to reduce the chances of an occurrence; and post-occurrence activities including occurrence response procedures, investigations, occurrence analysis and feedback. Early involvement in capital acquisition projects is essential to ensure FS issues are considered in major equipment procurements.

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES

14. The success of the FS Program is reliant upon “buy in” and a commitment to the program by all personnel associated with DND / CF flying operations. This commitment can only materialize if all personnel believe in the value of the program and understand that they have a responsibility to actively participate in flight safety. In order to facilitate this, the individual shall be able to report any flight activity concerns and occurrences or propose better ways of doing business without fear of retribution.

UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES

15. The FS Program is designed to ensure that DND / CF flying activities remain safe while remaining operationally focused. The scope of the FS Program shall be such that individuals belonging to an organization conducting or supporting air operations will have a structured FS Program in place. Every unit conducting or supporting air operations shall have a flight safety program.

AIR WEAPONS SAFETY

16. The FS Program encompasses all maintenance and operational air weapons activities, including flying operations, from the moment that air weapons are removed from storage until they are delivered on target or are returned to storage. The Safety Orders for Canadian Forces Air Weapons Systems (B-GA-297-001/TS-000) remains the primary reference for all other air weapons related issues. All wings and units with an air weapons capability shall ensure that their FS Program encompasses air weapons safety (AWS) requirements.

AIRWORTHINESS RISK MANAGEMENT

FS RISK

17. A FS risk is defined as a possibility of injury, illness or loss measured according to the probability and severity of an adverse effect on health, property or safety of flight.

PROGRAM PRINCIPLES

18. The DND / CF Airworthiness Program is based on the fundamental principles that airworthiness-related activities are:

- a. completed to accepted standards;
- b. performed by authorized individuals;
- c. accomplished within accredited organizations; and
- d. performed using approved procedures.

PROGRAM ROLES

19. A regulatory approach is the most common method employed to implement. A regulatory approach means to control by rule and involves using regulations, orders, directives and standards to control airworthiness-related activities. A regulatory approach for controlling airworthiness activities has the following three distinct roles:

- a. Regulator. The regulator develops the airworthiness instrument (rules and standards) for the engineering, manufacture, maintenance, materiel support and operation of aeronautical products and ensures compliance (e.g. Transport Canada for civil aviation);
- b. Implementer. The implementer conducts the aviation activities associated with the engineering, manufacture, maintenance, materiel support and operation of aeronautical products (e.g. airlines, manufacturers and maintenance organizations for civil aviation); and
- c. Investigator. The investigator investigates airworthiness-related safety occurrences and aviation safety issues. The investigator is normally independent from the regulator and implementer. The investigator is also empowered to investigate the role that the regulator and implementer may have had in any aviation occurrence (e.g. Transportation Safety Board (TSB) for civil aviation).

20. Unlike civil aviation, where the airworthiness regulator, implementer and investigator are totally independent, the Aeronautics Act has assigned DND a self-regulating and self-investigating responsibility for airworthiness.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCEPTING RISKS

21. The ARM process ensures that conflicts between aviation safety mission accomplishment and resource expenditures are balanced. As promulgated in A-AG-005-000/AG-001 – DND / CF Airworthiness Program (to be published), overall responsibility for managing risks rests with COs, DND / CF managers at all levels, and designated contractor representatives. The identification / recognition of hazards is a responsibility shared by all DND / CF personnel or supporting personnel.

22. Due to the inherent dangers associated with operating military aircraft, a certain acceptance of safety risks is often required. The decision to accept risk must be controlled, balanced and approved at the appropriate level. The airworthiness risk management (ARM) process provides a logical and systematic means of identifying and controlling safety risks in the decision-making process.

23. Aviation safety-related risk is a primary concern of the Airworthiness Program. Other forms of risk, such as operational, financial and legal, may also be factors in any decision-making process and may at times conflict with aviation safety goals. The ARM process provides a means to assess and proactively balance airworthiness risk against both mission accomplishment and available financial resources. All personnel associated with aviation - from the pilot-in-command (PIC) of an aircraft to the technician troubleshooting an unserviceability on the hangar floor - will be required to make a decision, at some point, involving some degree of airworthiness risk assessment. Adoption of a standardized ARM methodology enhances the quality of these decisions.

AIRWORTHINESS PROGRAM AUTHORITIES

24. The Airworthiness Program contributes to aviation safety by influencing areas related to aeronautical products and their operation. The DND / CF Airworthiness Program is mandated by

the Minister of National Defence (MND) as detailed in DAOD 2015-0 (Draft) and DAOD 2015-1 (Draft) and amplified in A-GA-005-000/AG-001 – DND / CF Airworthiness Program. The elements of an effective airworthiness program consist of a full range of aviation activities including design, manufacture, maintenance, materiel support, facilities, personnel and operations.

25. Under the provisions of the Aeronautics Act, the MND delegates powers and responsibilities to the Airworthiness Authority, Technical Airworthiness Authority, Operational Airworthiness Authority and Airworthiness Investigative Authority. These roles and responsibilities are described in A-GA-005-000/AG-001 – DND / CF Airworthiness Program. Their roles and responsibilities are summarized below.

AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY (AA)

26. The AA is responsible for the development, promotion, supervision and management of an Airworthiness Program for the DND / CF. This includes the appointment of competent individuals to fill the positions of Operational Airworthiness Authority and Investigative Airworthiness Authority, described below, and in consultation with the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) (ADM (Mat)), the appointment of a competent individual as Technical Airworthiness Authority. The CAS is the AA for DND / CF.

TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY (TAA)

27. The TAA is responsible for the regulation of the technical airworthiness aspects of the design, manufacture, maintenance and materiel support of aeronautical products and the determination of the airworthiness acceptability of those products prior to operational service. The Director General of Aerospace Equipment and Program Management (DGAEPM) is the TAA for DND / CF.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY (OAA)

28. The OAA is responsible for the regulation of all flying operations. This includes responsibility for operational procedures; flight standards; operator training, qualification and licensing; aerospace control operations; and operational airworthiness clearance of aeronautical products prior to operational service. The Comd of 1 Canadian Air Division (Comd 1 Cdn Air Div) is the OAA for DND / CF.

AIRWORTHINESS INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY (AIA)

29. The AIA is responsible for regulating the airworthiness aspects of the FS Program. The AIA is also responsible for the investigation of airworthiness-related occurrences and for monitoring the Technical and Operational Airworthiness Programs to identify deficiencies. DFS is the AIA for DND / CF.

NOTE

It is the responsibility of each individual to cease unsafe activities, regardless of rank or position in the organization.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

30. The management responsibilities are as follows:

- a. immediately ceasing activities that are deemed unsafe or where an UNACCEPTABLE risk exists;
- b. notifying higher authorities of UNACCEPTABLE risks and the actions taken to mitigate them or of the need to seek additional resources to mitigate them;
- c. reviewing and accepting / rejecting the risk as per the auth delegated from AA, OAA and TAA;
- d. establishing the unit's risk control strategy;
- e. measuring and reporting on the effectiveness of risk management activities within the unit; and
- f. promoting risk management activities at the unit and formation level.

FSO RESPONSIBILITIES

31. The FSO is responsible for:
 - a. consulting and being aware of the unit's risk assessment criteria; and
 - b. immediately notifying the CO of any unsafe activities and unacceptable risks. In these cases the FSO must seek an order from an appropriate authority to cease the activity until the problem can be assessed and either resolved or mitigated to an acceptable level.

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES

32. Personnel are responsible for:
 - a. immediately ceasing unsafe activities under one's direct control;
 - b. notifying their supervisor and the FSO of the unsafe activity; and
 - c. formally identifying and reporting hazards.

CHAPTER 2 – ORGANIZATION

GENERAL

1. The accidental loss of aviation resources can be prevented if hazards are identified and, whenever possible, eliminated. The achievement of this objective requires an effective FS Program that is proactive, adaptable, relevant and highly visible to all members of the organization. This, in turn, requires a dedicated staff of highly motivated, trained FS professionals to develop, revise and administer the FS Program on behalf of the chain of command. FS professionals are required at all levels of the organization (tactical, operational and strategic) in order to optimize the effectiveness of the program.

LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY

FS TEAM ESTABLISHMENT

2. As a minimum, the unit CO or the manager of a contracted unit is required to form a dedicated FS team comprised of an FS Officer (FSO) and a Deputy FS Officer (D/FSO).-Besides the obvious HQs, wings, squadrons and units, this includes shipborne helicopter detachments, contracted flying training establishments, NDQARs and work centres at all contractor facilities where CF aircraft are manufactured, overhauled, inspected or repaired.

FS STRUCTURE

3. Table 1 below shows the different organizations and the corresponding appointed FSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL	FSO STAFF
STRATEGIC	
NDHQ (MND / CDS / VCDS / CAS / ADM (Mat)	Director of FS (DFS)
OPERATIONAL	
Comd 1 CDN AIR DIV / CANR	Division FS Officer (DFSO)
Canada Com Comd	CANSOFCOM Comd
DFSO	1 Wing FSO
CEFCOM Comd	DFSO
Region Comd	Applicable FSO as per Table 2, Annex A
TACTICAL	
Wing Comd	Wing FSO
Region Cadet Air Ops Comd	Region FSO
Deployed unit det comd	Lead Wing FSO
Unit / Cadet Gliding Centre Comd	Unit FSO (UFSO)
Contracted organizations	Contractor FSO
Deployed sub-unit	Dependent on strength of sub-unit and length of deployment
AETE CO	1 Cdn Air Div through 4 Wing
ATESS CO	1 Cdn Air Div through 8 Wing

Table 1 – Command levels and corresponding FSOs

4. For Canada Command, Comd 1 Cdn Air Div is the CF Air Component Commander and therefore is responsible for FS. For CEFCOM, CANSOFCOM, FS is a residual responsibility that is not relinquished by the CAS even when detachments are under comd to these commands.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

5. For non-Air Force units, the appointment of a dedicated FSO will be based on the unit's level of involvement in flying operations or support to air operations.

AEROSPACE ENGINEERING TEST ESTABLISHMENT (AETE)

6. AETE, an ADM (Mat) unit, is accountable to CAS for their FS Program. Their FS Program is monitored by 1 Cdn Air Div through 4 Wing. The flying and maintenance standards of AETE are the responsibility of 1 Cdn Air Div, which exercises this supervisory role on behalf of CAS.

AEROSPACE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING SUPPORT SQUADRON (ATESS)

7. ATESS is accountable to CAS for their FS Program, which is monitored by 1 Cdn Air Div through 8 Wing.

AIR CADET FS PROGRAM

8. The Air Cadet Flying Program, comprising the Air Cadet Gliding Program and the Air Cadet Powered Flight Program, must also comply with this publication. Specific arrangements and associated responsibilities are detailed at Annex A.

- a. The Air Cadet Gliding Program is a national program consisting of a fall to spring familiarization flights and a summer glider pilot flying training; and
- b. The Air Cadet Powered Flight Program is a national program consisting of a fall to spring familiarization flights and a summer pilot ab-initio flight training.

IMPLEMENTATION OF FS PROGRAM

9. Every organization who is assigned or tasked to facilitate the employment of air assets must implement a FS Program overseen by an FSO. The latter shall be a trained FS specialist who advises the unit CO or manager on FS and AWS Program issues. Being familiar with the full spectrum of operations in the organization, the FSO provides expert advice on both accident prevention and hazardous conditions.

ASSIGNMENT OF FSO RESPONSIBILITIES

10. A comd / manager normally assigns responsibility to the FSO for devising, revising, promoting and administering the FS Program including:

- a. disseminating FS educational material;
- b. administering FS Committee meetings;
- c. researching and staffing occurrence reports and supplementary reports (SRs) to determine PMs;
- d. conducting AWS surveys;
- e. conducting informal FS surveys;
- f. implementing a bird strike prevention program;

- g. correcting hazardous conditions;
- h. advising on FS matters; and
- i. participating as a team member in formal FS surveys.

11. Accident prevention is the responsibility of commanders at all levels and involves monitoring the control, conduct and support of air operations. Commanders are assisted by FSOs who provide specialist advice on the FS Program.

FSO ACCESS TO COMD

12. An FSO, whether employed full-time on FS duties or not, must have direct access to the comd. Although reporting directly to the comd, FSOs normally present their observations or recommendations to the officer who has the authority to take corrective action. Recommendations prepared by the FSO must be constructive, well thought out and tactfully presented.

MANAGEMENT LEVEL OF THE FSO

13. An FSO should be of at least captain rank, or in the case of civilian contractors, a mid-level manager. Senior positions at CAS, 1 Cdn Air Div and wing level are established at the rank of captain/major through colonel. FSOs and D/FSOs must have experience in the related operational roles and should have completed formal FS training (Basic or Advanced FS Course). In cases where an individual has not received formal FS training prior to their appointment, they should complete this training as soon as possible. Aircrew shall maintain flying currency wherever feasible. The DFS shall be advised of FSO and D/FSO appointments and qualifications. Candidates nominated for unit positions shall be able to occupy the position for 18–24 months. Candidates nominated for wing positions shall be able to occupy the position for a minimum of 36 months.

LIMITATIONS ON SECONDARY DUTIES

14. Although units vary in size, composition and role, it is expected that FSOs will have sufficient time to complete their duties during a normal workday. FSOs are expected to maintain professional qualifications and categories commensurate with the unit's role(s). However, the FSO should be actively involved in the stewardship of the unit FS Program. This may preclude major secondary duties. Additional duties / assignments that require full-time attention, particularly on a regular basis, should be avoided. If a unit CO considers it necessary to assign duties that may conflict with FSO duties, then the CO must obtain written approval from the WComd for a Sqn FSO. The WComd must obtain approval from the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div for a WFSO. The request shall outline the circumstances, mitigation and / or period required.

TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

15. FSOs shall be given the technical and administrative assistance necessary to perform their duties.

UNIT FS TEAM MEMBERS

D/FSO

ROLE

16. The role of the D/FSO is to assist the FSO in administering an effective FS Program.

APPOINTMENT

17. One or more D/FSOs shall be appointed, as required, at all units and sub-units with established FS Programs. They are employed as assistants to the FSO and may act as the FS representative for a sub-unit. For military units the D/FSO should be an NCM. As a minimum, a D/FSO should have completed the Basic FS Course. Candidates nominated for unit positions shall be able to occupy the position for 18–24 months.

DUTIES

18. It is the duty of a D/FSO to:
- a. complete tasks assigned by the FSO; and
 - b. act as FSO during the absence of the latter.

FSO SPECIALIST

RO LE

19. The role of the appointed Flight Safety Officer Specialist (FSOS) is to provide specific FS expertise to the FSO and D/FSO in order to help them administer a more effective FS Program.

FSOS WEAPONS (FSOS (W))

APPOINTMENT

20. An FSOS (W) shall be appointed in any unit utilizing air weapons. The FSOS (W) should be a qualified AERE Officer or weapons qualified senior NCM.

ROLE

21. The role of the FSOS (W) is to assist the FSO on matters affecting air weapons safety (AWS).

DUTIES

22. It is the duty of the FSOS (W) to:
- a. develop the unit AWS Program;
 - b. take the necessary actions to correct hazardous conditions;
 - c. advise on AWS matters;
 - d. liaise with the wing / unit Air Weapons Officer (appointed IAW B-GA-297-001/TS-000) on matters affecting AWS;
 - e. assist in the research and staffing of occurrence reports with air weapons implications;
 - f. assist the UFO in the conduct of internal AWS surveys;
 - g. assist in implementing and conducting AWS awareness training; and
 - h. participate as a member of the wing / unit FS Committee.

FORMATION FSO

CF, AIR FORCE AND ADM (MAT) FSO

23. DFS is the FSO assigned to the CDS, CAS and ADM (Mat). On behalf of the CAS, the DFS shall:

- a. provide advice on all FS and AWS matters;
- b. devise, implement and monitor the FS and AWS Programs as detailed in this publication;
- c. investigate aviation safety occurrences when required;
- d. monitor and facilitate follow-up action to all aviation safety occurrences;
- e. act as a staff advisor for all FS matters at NDHQ, including acting as FSO to ADM (Mat) in his capacity as comd of a Command;
- f. advise on the adequacy and suitability of policies, procedures and standards for AWS;
- g. collect, maintain and analyze FS and AWS statistics for prevention purposes;
- h. promote AWS awareness;
- i. monitor and participate in an educational program for the training of FS personnel;
- j. produce and distribute educational and promotional material;
- k. monitor the FS Program for air cadet glider and tow plane operations;
- l. recommend nominations for FS awards and approve, as applicable;
- m. represent the Canadian Forces at international FS conferences;
- n. conduct annual FS briefings at wings, units and contractor facilities; and
- o. participate in and / or conduct formal and informal surveys of wings and units and conduct surveys of contractor facilities.

1 CANADIAN AIR DIVISION FSO

24. The Division FSO (DFSO) is the FSO assigned to Comd 1 Cdn Air Div. On behalf of Comd 1 Cdn Air Div, the DFSO shall:

- a. provide the Air Div chain of command with specialist advice on FS matters;
- b. liaise with DFS on FS and AWS related matters;
- c. liaise with the unit to monitor, advise and promote the FS and AWS Programs;
- d. advise on the adequacy and suitability of policies, procedures and standards for FS and AWS;
- e. promote safety practices within the Air Force by maintaining effective feedback loops amongst the wings, 1 Cdn Air Div and the CAS;
- f. review FS and AWS occurrences;
- g. review FS award nominations;
- h. conduct FS surveys and AWS surveys of all Air Force wings and deployed units on a 24 month cycle;
- i. prepare survey reports, including recommendations for improvement, for review by the chain of command;
- j. represent Comd 1 Cdn Air Div at FS conferences and meetings; and
- k. conduct FS education by coordinating the administrative aspects of safety courses (Basic FS Course (BFSC) and Advanced Flight Safety Course (AFSC)), providing instructors for selected course serials, identifying FS training needs of wings / units, and ensuring sufficient numbers of trained FSOs / D/FSOs are available for units and contractors.

WING FSO

25. On behalf of the WComd, the Wing FSO (WFSO) liaises with the flying units and all of the support functions of a base. It is the WFSO's responsibility to:
- a. advise the WComd on all FS and AWS matters;
 - b. establish and implement FS and AWS Programs that encompass all aspects of wing operations;
 - c. ensure that all occurrences are reported, appropriate occurrences are investigated and that proper PMs are identified to the chain of command;
 - d. liaise with unit comds to conduct FS and AWS surveys;
 - e. monitor all safety aspects of flying operations and air weapons operations;
 - f. confirm that aircraft publications are up to date;
 - g. develop methods for detecting hazardous conditions;
 - h. be the focal point for all FS and AWS activities at the wing;
 - i. provide advice and assistance to the appropriate 1 Cdn Air Div staff officer;
 - j. monitor air cadet flying operations in accordance with this publication and A-CR-CCP-242/PT-001 – Air Cadet Gliding Manual; and
 - k. review supplementary reports (SR) from lodger units.

FSO FOR ASSIGNED / ATTACHED AIR ASSETS

26. The FS Program shall be promulgated through local flying orders, operations orders, standing orders and equivalent regulatory documents.
27. Comds shall appoint a dedicated FSO (e.g. BFSO, ship FSO) and / or utilize FS personnel within attached flying units (e.g. Sqn/Detachment FSO) to provide FS expertise and advice. This is an overarching requirement, separate from wing / unit programs and procedures that are specific to lodger or detached flying units and their chain of command.
28. For deployed operations, Comd 1 Cdn Air Div will appoint an Air Force wing to provide administrative support (e.g. FSOMS data entry) and quality control to the deployed unit for its FS Program and occurrence handling. If more than one aircraft type is involved, Comd 1 Cdn Air Div may designate additional wings to provide this technical support and assistance.

FS COMMITTEE

PURPOSE

29. In order to remain relevant, visible and adaptable to changes, unit / formation FS Programs must be periodically reviewed and reassessed. This is the objective of the unit / formation FS Committee. The committee should focus on the three pillars of the FS Program: promotion, education and analysis. In addition, the committee should use the minutes of their meetings to direct necessary changes to the FS Program.

ESTABLISHMENT OF FS COMMITTEE

30. An FS Committee shall be established either independently, or as part of a safety council. FS Committee requirements will be met as follows:

- a. CAS – this function is satisfied by the Airworthiness Advisory Board (AAB);
- b. 1 Cdn Air Div / CANR Headquarters – this function is satisfied by attendance at the Comd's senior staff meetings; and
- c. units or long-term deployments associated with flying operations.

GENERAL MEMBERSHIP

31. The FS Committee will be chaired by an individual who has executive authority, since it is expected to put in place concrete PMs and get things done in a timely manner. An FS Committee shall include a qualified representative from each major agency involved in the control, conduct or support of air operations. It should normally include:

- a. the comd, CO or manager of the formation responsible for flying operations, who shall be the committee chair;
- b. representatives of flight safety (WFSO, UFSO), operations, technical, support and medical services; and
- c. other representatives as required whenever the agenda for a meeting includes items relating to their specialties.

FREQUENCY OF MEETING

32. Ideally, FS committees should meet several times a year, but not less than twice per year.

CONDUCT OF MEETINGS

33. The committee should examine and consider:

- a. action items from previous minutes;
- b. FS and AWS surveys;
- c. feedback from FS and AWS occurrences;
- d. necessary corrective action;
- e. topical items related to present and upcoming operations;
- f. items for the next FS committee meeting;
- g. reports of subcommittees;
- h. emerging trends (i.e. what happened last year over the same period); and
- i. awareness training on relevant safety issues.

ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

34. The FS Committee should also:

- a. monitor implementation of PMs within their authority;
- b. recommend to higher authority measures beyond local capability and monitor the progress of such recommendations; and
- c. maintain minutes of the committee's proceedings.

WING FS COMMITTEE COMPOSITION

35. The Wing FS Committee should include the following, or their equivalent:

- a. the WComd, who acts as the chairperson;
- b. the comd of each unit involved in flying operations, including lodger units;
- c. the Wing Logistics Officer (WLogO) or his equivalent;
- d. the CO AMS;
- e. the Wing Surgeon or Flight Surgeon;
- f. the Wing Air Traffic Control Officer (WATCO);
- g. the FOD Committee chairperson;
- h. the WFSO;
- i. the D/WFSO; and
- j. staff specialists (i.e. Air Weapons Officer and / or Air Weapons Safety Technical Member) whenever an agenda item requires their presence or additional members as prescribed by the WComd.

36. The WComd will designate who will act as the secretary.

RECORDS OF DISCUSSION

37. Minutes of FS Committee meetings shall be officially recorded. The WFSO is responsible for tracking the progress of action items.

DISTRIBUTION OF MINUTES

38. Distribution of the minutes shall include one copy each for CAS/DFS2, DFSO and the WFSO if the minutes are from a unit. These copies should be sent simultaneously to the addressees, so that there is minimum delay. The comments of each level may still be sent through normal channels. Distribution of the minutes to common users should also be considered. Minutes shall be transmitted electronically to speed delivery.

FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE (FOD) COMMITTEE

39. Each unit associated with flying operations must establish a FOD committee in accordance with C-05-005-P10/AM-001. This committee should be set up as a sub-committee of the FS Committee.

OTHER FS COMMITTEES

40. The FSO shall also serve on committees dealing with issues that impact the safe conduct of flying operations, like hazardous materials (HAZMAT), bird strike prevention and snow and ice removal.

AGREEMENTS

41. Canada / DFS is a signatory of several FS agreements at the national and international level. Their implementation ensures our mandate is accomplished when operating air assets at home or abroad or when foreign military air assets operate in Canada. The following paragraphs summarize the principal flight safety agreements in place. A link to these documents can be found on the DFS Internet and Intranet sites.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

42. The DND / CF FS Program is aligned with the policies and aims of the aviation safety programs

of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

ICAO CONVENTION ANNEX 13

43. The ICAO Convention Annex 13 specifies the activities required following an occurrence to an aircraft of a contracting state in the territory of another contracting state.

NATO STANAG 3101

44. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes procedures for the exchange of safety information peculiar to aircraft types and missiles in current use by NATO nations.

NATO STANAG 3102

45. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes the requirement for coordination of accident prevention matters when a detachment of one nation operates within or over the sovereign territory of another nation for 8 days or more, or when aircraft of two or more nations participate in combined / joint air operations within the sovereign territory of any NATO nation and / or out-of-area air operations.

NATO STANAG 3117

46. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes the aircraft marshalling signals and the distinctive garment to be worn by aircraft marshallers.

NATO STANAG 3318

47. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes procedures for the aeromedical investigation of occurrences involving military aircraft or missiles where the equipment, facilities or personnel of two or more NATO nations are involved.

NATO STANAG 3230

48. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes the parameters for emergency markings on the outside and the inside of aircraft.

NATO STANAG 3318

49. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes the essential points to be covered in the aeromedical investigation of accidents / incidents in order to facilitate the exchange of commensurate information between NATO nations.

NATO STANAG 3379

50. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes the in-flight visual signals and the essential procedures for using them.

NATO STANAG 3531

51. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes procedures for the reporting and safety investigation of occurrences involving military aircraft where the equipment, facilities or personnel of two or more NATO nations are involved.

NATO STANAG 3533

52. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes basic safety procedures, regulations and responsibilities for flying and static displays that involve aircraft of two or more NATO nations.

NATO STANAG 3564

53. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes the responsibilities for the planning and conduct of NATO live air weapons demonstrations.

NATO STANAG 3570

54. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes procedures for the reporting and investigation of air traffic incidents.

NATO STANAG 3879

55. This NATO Standardization Agreement establishes the procedures and formats for the exchange of information on the intensity of bird migration and the reporting of bird strikes.

NATO STANAG 7160

56. This NATO Standardization Agreement is an aviation safety document (AFSP-1 Flight Safety) that sets out aviation safety principles, policies and procedures, in particular those aimed at accident prevention for use as required by NATO participating nations.

MoUs

57. Canada / DFS is a signatory of separate MoUs with the United Kingdom Defence Aviation Safety Centre and the Australian Defence Forces Aviation Safety Centre.

NATIONAL AGREEMENT

DFS / TSB WORKING AGREEMENT

58. FS investigations conducted by DFS follow a protocol similar to that of the TSB as prescribed by the *Aeronautics Act*. A working agreement exists between DFS and the TSB that provides direction for the coordinated investigation of transportation occurrences by DND and the TSB.

SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS

59. Different agreements have been signed between DFS or other departmental organizations mandated to support DFS during the conduct of investigations. Such agreements are in place with the Quality Engineering Test Establishment (QETE), Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto (DRDC Toronto) and the National Research Council of Canada.

Annex A
Chapter 2
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ANNEX A - AIR CADET FLYING PROGRAM

FS PROGRAM

1. The CF responsibility for the FS aspect of the Air Cadet Flying Program is derived from Section 43 of the *National Defence Act*. The CDS is tasked with operational command and control of the Air Cadet Flying Program, specifically all air cadet gliding and powered flight operations, including familiarization flying funded by DND / CF and the FS Program.

INVESTIGATION OF CADET OCCURRENCES

2. The investigation of air cadet occurrences will be as follows:

- a. Air Cadet Glider Program. The Air Cadet Glider Program is a national program consisting of the fall to spring familiarization flights and the summer glider pilot flying training. All air cadet gliding resources are owned by the provincial committees of the Air Cadet League of Canada and are Transport Canada registered, but operational control rests with the CF. All serious occurrences with aircraft involved in the Air Cadet Glider Program shall be investigated by DFS. Thus in accordance with section 18(1) of the *Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act*, the aircraft involved here are considered a “military conveyance”. The TSB must be notified by the quickest means possible following any significant occurrence, using the procedures prescribed in the *Canadian Air Regulations* (CARs) and the Working Agreement between DND and TSB; and
- b. Air Cadet Powered Flight Program. The Air Cadet Powered Flight Program is a national program consisting of the fall to spring familiarization training funded by the Local Sponsoring Committee of the applicable air cadet squadron and a summer pilot ab-initio flight training funded by DND. The conduct of a cadet occurrence investigation is governed as follows:
 - (1) Familiarization Flights. The civilian registered aircraft used to conduct the winter familiarization flying program are not considered “military conveyance” aircraft given these flights are contracted by the Local Sponsoring Committee. Therefore, the FS investigations of any occurrence related to this part of the ACPP would be the responsibility of the TSB. DFS would be invited to participate in the investigation as per the Working Agreement between TSB and DND, and
 - (2) Ab-initio Flight Training. The civilian registered aircraft used to conduct ab-initio flight training as part of the Power Pilot Scholarship program are considered “military conveyance” aircraft. Therefore, any FS investigations are the responsibility of the CF as per the *CTAISB Act*. Notwithstanding, TSB would be invited to participate in the FS investigation as per the Working Agreement between TSB and DND.

DESIGNATED SUPPORT WINGS

3. In view of the structure of the Air Force, certain FSOs from designated wings will act as FS advisors to the Region Comds. This working relationship will apply only when these personnel are performing FS duties associated with Air Cadet Glider program activities. The Region Comds and associated FSOs are listed in Table 2 below.

REGION	REGION COMD	DESIGNATED FSO
Atlantic	Comd MARLANT	14 Wing Greenwood
Eastern	Comd LFQA	3 Wing Bagotville
Central	Comd LFCA	8 Wing Trenton
Prairie	Comd 1 Cdn Air Div	17 wing Winnipeg
Pacific	Comd MARPAC	19 Wing Comox

Table 2 – Regions and designated FSOs

4. The FSO from the designated support wing will act as the FS advisor for each respective regional site. The FS support to Air Cadet Glider program gliding sites will be promulgated on an annual basis by 1 Cdn Air Div before the start of the annual Air Cadet Glider program.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

DFS RESPONSIBILITIES

5. The DFS responsibilities for the national cadet program are as follows:
- a. advise on the implementation and monitor the effectiveness of the regional FS Program in cooperation with D Cdts and the RCA Ops O;
 - b. coordinate FS investigations for aircraft occurrences and investigate as required;
 - c. provide annual FS briefings to summer gliding schools;
 - d. monitor incidents and the follow-up PMs; and
 - e. monitor FS surveys from all gliding sites.

1 CDN AIR DIV RESPONSIBILITIES

6. 1 Cdn Air Div responsibilities for the national Air Cadet Glider program program are listed below:
- a. annually assign the FSO positions to meet designated regional gliding school and gliding familiarization site requirements; and
 - b. provide advice and assistance to Comd 1 Cdn Air Div on Air Cadet Glider program FS matters.

SUPPORT WING RESPONSIBILITIES

7. The responsibilities of the WFSO and responsibilities for the national Air Cadet Glider program are to:
- a. provide FS assistance to Air Cadet Glider program activities at a designated site;

- b. advise the school / site comds on FS matters in cooperation with the Air Cadet Glider program FSO;
- c. monitor the safety aspects of flying operations in cooperation with the Air Cadet Glider program FSO;
- d. provide assistance in the preparation and timely submission of initial and supplementary occurrence reports, and recommend PMs resulting from occurrences;
- e. conduct biannual FS surveys of all designated gliding sites in conjunction with RCA Ops O;
- f. provide assistance to DFS and RCA Ops O in the event of an accident;
- g. assist the Region Comd in preparing comments for FS investigation reports; and
- h. review Air Cadet Glider program occurrence reports for quality assurance.

FSO RESPONSIBILITIES

8. RCA Ops O shall designate a unit FS Officer (FSO) for all regional gliding schools (RGS) and gliding familiarization sites. The FSO must be familiar with the unit's operations in order to provide sound advice on accident prevention and hazardous conditions. The FSO's responsibilities are as follows:

- a. advise the school/site comd on all aspects of FS;
- b. report all incidents and accidents in accordance with A-GA-135-001/AA-001;
- c. aid school/site comds in the implementation of the unit FS Program; and
- d. monitor all aspects of the operation and advise school/site comds of hazardous conditions.

DETECTION OF UNSAFE PROCEDURES

9. If, during the course of their duties, FS personnel detect any unsafe procedures / practices, they shall immediately notify the site comd, who will immediately rectify the situation and advise the RCA Ops O of the corrective action proposed / implemented.

OCCURRENCE ACTION

10. In the event of an FS occurrence:
- a. the FSO will file or submit to the designated WFSO the initial occurrence report;
 - b. the FSO is responsible through the site comd for investigating the incident and filing a supplementary report (SR) within 30 days;
 - c. the support FSO will monitor the reporting process;
 - d. the WFSO will assist the FSO with any investigations into air occurrences within their region of responsibility; and
 - e. the FSO will advise the Region Comd on gliding occurrences as required.

ACCIDENT ACTION

11. In the event of an accident:
- a. the FSO / site comd shall complete the necessary immediate actions required and initiate

reporting in accordance with a detailed Site Specific Emergency Response Checklist approved by the RCA Ops O.

NOTE

This requirement will differ from site to site depending upon whether the field is DND or TC and controlled or uncontrolled.

- b. the UFSO / site comd shall ensure that the RCA Ops O and the designated WFSO are contacted immediately. The RCA Ops O shall immediately advise DFS (1-888-WARN DFS) that NDCC, AOC and D Cdts 4-6 have been notified. Personnel requirements for an investigation will be coordinated by DFS and NDHQ / D Cdts 4-6, the National Cadet Air Operations Officer; and
- c. DFS will conduct the investigation.

REVIEW PROCESS

12. On completion of an FS investigation, copies of the Draft for Comment of the Final Report will be sent to persons of direct interest (PDI), CO RCSU (or equivalent), Region Comd and NDHQ VCDS. The action letter for PM implementation will be signed by the CAS as the AA.

Annex B
Chapter 2
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX B – CONTRACTOR FS PROGRAM

GENERAL

1. Contractors form an important part of the DND aircraft maintenance philosophy and by extension, the preservation of DND assets during this unique activity. It is essential that each contractor develop a comprehensive FS Program that takes into account the depth of maintenance and extends to flight line test and ferry flight activities. In those locations where the civilian contractor falls under the FSO for FS matters, the contractor shall follow the wing FS Program.

APPOINTMENT OF FSO SPECIALIST

2. The contractor shall appoint a Flight Safety Officer Specialist (FSOS) at all contractor facilities where DND owned or controlled aircraft are maintained. The FSOS and other FS personnel shall attend the CF BFSC. Course loading is done through the 1 Cdn Air Div / DFSO.

FSOS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3. The FSOS must have direct access to the CEO or equivalent or a delegated company representative with sufficient authority to implement corrective action if required. The FSOS must be experienced in the relevant aircraft systems and operations and have a good knowledge of all specialties under the contractor's control. DFS shall be advised of FSOS appointments and qualifications.

4. The post-occurrence obligations of a contractor FSOS are fairly similar to those of a DND FSO; however, it is recognized that the Airport Authority or other authorities may have areas of responsibility that supersede or overlap those obligations. It is also realized that much of A-GA-135-001/AA-001 is specific to DND organizations and therefore requires some interpretation for civilian application. Accordingly, the contractor FSOS shall ensure that the intent of the requirements of this publication are addressed either by the company or by other authorities, and shall document those areas that are under direct contractor control and those areas that are the responsibility of another authority.

5. The contractor FSOS shall ensure that all FS occurrences involving DND aircraft are reported and investigated. The contractor's role with respect to a flight safety investigation (FSI), for other than a flight safety occurrence report (FSOR), will be determined on a case-by-case basis by DFS. If applicable, questions can be directed to the NDQAR FS representative or DFS.

6. Contractors that are co-located with units/wings are encouraged to work closely with the local FSOs. Offices should be established to promote synergies between the military and civilian programs. Project offices and PWGSC contracting personnel should promote the possibility of joint DND / contractor FS offices during the contracting process.

CHAPTER 3 – EDUCATION AND TRAINING

GENERAL

1. FS education is one of the fundamental elements of the FS Program. All personnel who are involved in flying operations or the support of flying operations must not only be aware of the FS Program, they must have a solid understanding of the program's objectives, principles and basic processes. This therefore requires a robust formal and informal education program.
2. FS education is one of the three pillars of the FS Program (the others being analysis and prevention). The teaching of specific skills and knowledge is essential in achieving the aim of preserving aviation assets necessary to conduct the missions of the CF. Thus FS education is the responsibility of all personnel.

INFORMAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

3. FS education/training is achieved through both formal and informal means. Informally, FS publications, magazines, bulletins, videos, posters, web-based materials, FS briefings, aviation conferences and seminars, including those from other militaries and civilian organizations such as Transport Canada, are all resources that may be used in FS education. This list is not exhaustive, so Air Force personnel are encouraged to actively seek materials and information from numerous sources in order to broaden their FS knowledge. Links to the FS websites and FS Programs and materials can be found on the DFS websites.
4. One of the most effective but often overlooked methods of FS education is the passing of lessons learned from leaders and experienced personnel to those with less experience. The FSO should encourage and afford opportunities to facilitate the exchange of information between unit personnel.

FS QUALIFICATION

5. Personnel selected for FS positions require formal training in order to execute the duties and responsibilities of FS professionals.
6. Formal training is required for FS personnel to obtain an FS accreditation. There are two formal CF flight safety courses designed to fulfill this training requirement. These courses lead to a recognized qualification and are conducted by 1 Cdn Air Div FS staff. The relevant course codes are:
 - a. Basic Flight Safety Course: AEVM (formerly AGNL); and
 - b. Advanced FS Course: AEWd (formerly AGQG);

INVESTIGATOR QUALIFICATION

7. Under the requirements of the CF Airworthiness Program, all occurrence investigators must be accredited in order to conduct FS investigations. The Airworthiness Investigation Manual (AIM) describes a formal system establishing two levels of basic investigators (BI 2 and BI 3) and three levels of investigators in charge (IIC 1, IIC 2 and IIC 3). The qualification level (1, 2 or 3) determines the highest Class of investigation in which an IIC or BI can participate as described in Chapter 9. The AIM specifies the standards and qualifications for these FS investigators.

AIR WEAPONS SAFETY AWARENESS TRAINING

8. Aircrew personnel working directly with air weapons shall receive air weapons systems familiarization training and instruction on the operational and safety requirements for weapons-loaded aircraft in accordance with B-GA-297-001/TS-000.
9. Air weapons awareness training is applicable to personnel who are regularly exposed to the hazards of air weapons such as maintenance officers, aircraft technicians, aircrew, fuel bowser drivers or those personnel who may have to respond to an air weapons occurrence, such as firefighters or security personnel. This training is required to ensure that those working with or around air weapons possess the knowledge required to perform their duties safely and effectively. This training shall be conducted in accordance with BGA-297-001/TS-000 (Safety Orders for Canadian Forces Air Weapons Systems).
10. The training will be included in wing or unit familiarization briefings and should encompass, but not be limited to the following:
 - a. recognition of the air weapons used at the unit and the dangers associated with them, including the precautions to be taken in the vicinity of the weapons;
 - b. recognition of air weapons warning signs, placards, flags and banners that indicate danger areas and hazards;
 - c. danger areas into which personnel shall not enter unless authorized;
 - d. armament operations which could impinge on the daily routine of the unit i.e. conveying air weapons along regular traffic routes or closing some part of the unit when a particular air weapons operation is in progress; and
 - e. persons to contact if air weapons safety information is required.

SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATOR TRAINING

11. DFS and DFSO investigators undergo additional advanced investigator training. FSOs are encouraged to get additional investigative and FS training as their responsibilities, budgets and COs permit. A list of additional courses is available on the DFS website.

OTHER SAFETY COURSES

12. A variety of other safety courses have links to, or application within, the FS education and training program. Courses such as Human Performance in Military Aviation (HPMA) contribute directly to the aims of the FS Program. Courses for other established safety programs also offer opportunities for education/training in FS. These courses include General Safety, Laser Safety, Nuclear Radiation Safety, Electro Magnetic Radiation Safety, Ramp Safety, and On Scene Comd Emergency Response.

FS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

13. It is anticipated that comds and managers will provide all FS staff with timely opportunities to enhance their professional knowledge and to interact with local and regional FS organizations like TSB, TC, airport authorities and regional aircraft operators. Participation in relevant FS and aviation conferences / seminars on an annual basis is encouraged. A list of recommended conferences and seminars is available on the DFS website.

CHAPTER 4 – PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

GENERAL

1. Two of the major FS prevention activities are the Bird Strike Prevention Program and the FS survey. Effective Bird Strike Prevention Programs and FS surveys are key to maintaining a combat-capable and operationally effective force.

BIRD STRIKE PREVENTION PROGRAM

AIM OF PROGRAM

2. The aim of any Bird Strike Prevention Program is to minimize bird hazards to aircraft operating from DND airfields.

OBJECTIVES

3. The Bird Strike Prevention Program must have at least four objectives:

- a. management of the environment;
- b. dispersal of birds;
- c. education of aircrew; and
- d. reporting bird strikes and near misses.

4. Birds constitute a significant hazard to aircraft. The vast majority of bird strikes occur within five miles of an aerodrome. A comprehensive Bird Strike Prevention Program shall be implemented to reduce their impact.

5. The key element of a good Board of inquiry is the establishment of an effective unit bird and animal control committee. Although bird and animal control is an ATC responsibility, FSOs must play an active role.

6. The Bird Strike Prevention Program strives to manage the environment around the airport. The objective of the plan is to make the airfield unattractive to birds. Studying the birds that inhabit the environment of the airport will suggest measures that can be taken to make the airport unattractive to them. Some measures are obvious such as draining wet areas and cutting down trees. Others, such as changing ground cover or using chemicals, are more complex. Each airport has its own study and improvement plan, which must conform to environmental constraints.

7. Successful measures to modify an airport habitat require the advice of an ornithologist. Almost every DND airport has been surveyed. Reports are available through the FSO or DFS. If a new survey is required, the wing can request NDHQ / DGRPP (Director General Realty, Policy and Plans) to arrange a bird hazard survey in conjunction with the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS).

BIRD STRIKE REPORTING

8. A link to detailed information on airfield environment management procedures can be found on the DFS websites. Further guidance is available in CFACM 2-813, *Air Traffic Control Manual of Operations – Aerodrome Bird and Animal Control*, and in *Sharing the Skies – An Aviation Industry Guide to the Management of Wildlife Hazards* (TP13549).

PREVENTION STRATEGY

INFORMATION ON BIRDS

9. Transport Canada has opened a bird hazard website to provide access to bird strike data and TC documents on wildlife control. The DFS website provides a link to this TC website.

REPORTING BIRD ACTIVITY

10. Pilots shall advise air traffic control and other aircraft of any significant bird activity.

11. Aircrew shall report to their FSO each time they experience a bird strike or near miss. Form CF 215 – FS Occurrence Information Sheet shall be used to assist in providing the required information. The FSO will ensure that the information collected, including category of damage, is entered in the FSOMS database. This will supply the information on bird habits necessary for preventing bird strikes.

IDENTIFICATION OF BIRD TYPE

12. Accurate identification of bird remains provides invaluable information for an effective Bird Strike Prevention Program. Local expertise (bird watcher groups, ornithologists, wildlife specialists) should be used whenever possible to identify bird remains. Annex A contains a list of regional offices of the CWS.

FS SURVEYS

PURPOSE

13. An FS survey measures the effectiveness of an FS program and assists in the identification of recommended PMs. Comds have found that FS surveys identify deficiencies that would otherwise have gone undetected until revealed as the causes of occurrences.

REQUIREMENT

14. Surveys are an FS necessity at every level of operational command as well as at contractor facilities that support the maintenance and operation of CF aircraft.

FREQUENCY

15. FS surveys must be conducted on a regular basis if they are to be effective. The type of survey normally dictates how often they should be conducted.

TYPES

16. There are four types of FS surveys:
- a. a formal survey;
 - b. an informal survey;
 - c. an air weapons survey; and
 - d. a contractor survey.

FORMAL SURVEY

17. A formal survey is usually conducted by specialists from a formation other than that which is

being surveyed (e.g. 1 Cdn Air Div survey of a wing, base or unit). The comd of the formation to be surveyed is usually notified in advance and is always briefed on the results. The survey team must be cooperative, understanding and helpful. Comds can also request surveys whenever they want to have an outside view of their unit. Formal surveys of ATESS and AETE shall be conducted on behalf of the CAS by the 1 Cdn Air Div FSO, and the Divisional Staff will be responsible for follow-up action.

INFORMAL SURVEY

18. An FSO informal survey is normally carried out as a minimum once a year by the FSO as part of the FS Program. Inviting an FSO from outside the unit to conduct the survey provides a fresh view and an invaluable exchange of ideas.

19. FSOs should survey the units in their formation once every year as a minimum. Unit FS teams should survey their unit on a regular basis as part of their yearly program. Both the UFSO and FS NCM should visit each section regularly throughout the year. Further, whenever someone joins an FS team, be it at the wing or unit level, they should visit all sections within their purview within one month of assuming their duty.

AIR WEAPONS SURVEY

20. An internal air weapons safety survey shall be conducted in any unit involved in air weapons operations. The survey should be a coordinated effort involving both FS and AWS personnel. A combined FS/AWS Formal Survey should be conducted by 1 Cdn Air Div every 24 months.

CONTRACTOR SURVEY

21. DFS will conduct a contractor survey of all contractor facilities where DND owned or controlled aircraft are maintained. Annex C contains a sample contractor FS survey checklist. These surveys will be conducted every 18–24 months.

CONDUCT

22. Survey members may receive conflicting information. The survey team must attempt to balance these inputs and must rationalize these inputs with the “big picture”. There are three basic tenets to conducting an effective FS survey: listen effectively, observe objectively and share all observations in an open and honest manner. The biggest challenge to overcome is the fact that a survey is a snapshot in time and it is difficult to receive feedback and insights from everyone.

TEAM COMPOSITION

23. A survey team comes in many shapes and sizes, all based upon the scope of the survey. An informal unit survey by a WFSO may be comprised of a sister squadron FSOS, the host UFSO / FS NCM and the D/WFSO, whereas a formal survey by 1 Cdn Air Div FSO will have up to 12 members. A unit team that surveys its own operation would likely consist of the UFSO and FS NCM. Another perspective is to do a combined survey, perhaps with the general safety organization, and make up a joint team.

QUESTIONNAIRES

24. Questionnaires can be used effectively during surveys. One of the difficulties of taking a snapshot of a unit is the number of people one can meet. A simple questionnaire that can be distributed beforehand and collected during the survey provides the survey team a much broader reach. The

questionnaire should be short, easy to complete, anonymous, and use questions that are objective in nature. It is important to collate the results quickly and ensure effective feedback is provided to both the chain of command and those who were surveyed.

FORMAL SURVEY REPORT

25. The formal survey report process will consist of three distinct phases:
- a. the first phase is that the survey team lead will provide a verbal debrief, at the end of the survey, to the host WComd / Sqn CO. The debrief should include all significant findings and observations as well as any analysis from items such as survey questionnaires;
 - b. the second phase is a written report to the WComd and other applicable comds. The report must identify recommendations and where possible, suggested action levels, e.g. CAS, 1 Cdn Air Div, and wing. The written report should be staffed and distributed within one month of the survey completion date; and
 - c. the third and final phase of the survey process is for the host wing / unit to provide written feedback on the status of final report recommendations. 1 Cdn Air Div FSO will track status / closure of formal FS report recommendations.
26. Surveys consist of two phases: the actual 3-part survey and the resulting implementation of recommendations. Annex B contains a sample FS survey checklist. Annex D contains a sample FS survey checklist for the Air Cadet Gliding Program.

ACTION ON CHANGE OF COMMAND

27. When there is a change of command, a survey of the unit shall be conducted as soon as practical to provide the CO with an updated FS health check of the unit.

FEEDBACK AND FOLLOW-UP

28. The survey process is conducted primarily to provide the chain of command with credible advice on how to better accomplish the mission. There are a variety of formats available to provide such advice, be it the informal verbal debrief or a more formal written report. Regardless of which method is utilized, it is essential to have a clear aim and a set structure that leads to a logical conclusion and recommendations. To ensure closure, it is important that realistic target dates be established for each recommendation; moreover, recommendations must be affordable, achievable and based on common sense. Recommendations without an assigned target date for closure can cause the survey to become merely an event instead of a process, thereby greatly limiting any potential improvements or enhancements that could result from the operation. There are tremendous advantages to capturing the observations and recommendations in a written format. A written report, be it in point form or in full paragraph form, provides a clear delineation of the observations and recommendations.

CONDUCT OF FORMAL SURVEY

29. 1 Cdn Air Div FSO will conduct a formal survey of each wing once every 18–24 months. The FS survey checklist at Annex B will be used as a guideline for areas to be surveyed. A formal report will be released by the DFSO to the host WComd / Sqn CO within one month of the survey completion date; subsequently the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div and A-staff will be de-briefed on the survey findings and recommendations. The DFSO is responsible for tracking the status of all recommendations in the written report .

TEAM MEMBERS

30. The survey team for a formal survey will usually be composed of some 10 to 12 members as follows:

- a. Lead – The formal survey team will normally be led by the appropriate DFSO desk officer at 1 Cdn Air Div;
- b. appropriate desk officer from DFS;
- c. additional 1 Cdn Air Div FS team members as required;
- d. FSO from sister wing (e.g. survey of 4 Wg will have 3 Wg FSO on team);
- e. ATC rep;
- f. maintenance reps (including augmentation from A4 Maint and DFS); and
- g. other members as required.

TIMELINES

31. The following are the recommended timelines for a formal survey:

- a. initial staff check for timings with wing 4–6 months before survey;
- b. request for team member participation 2–4 months before;
- c. survey directive with questionnaire released by DFSO to WComd 1 month before;
- d. initial FS team brief by team lead 1–2 weeks before survey;
- e. final written report to Wcomd 1 month after survey completion; and
- f. response from applicable OPIs, based on survey recommendations, to 1 Cdn Air Div.

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ANNEX A – REGIONAL OFFICES OF CANADIAN WILDLIFE SERVICE

ATLANTIC REGION

Canadian Wildlife Service and Environment Canada
63 East Main Street
P.O. Box 1590
Sackville, New Brunswick E0A 3C0

QUEBEC REGION

Canadian Wildlife Service and Environment Canada
1141, route de l'église, 9th Floor
C.P. 10 100
Sainte-Foy, Quebec G1V 4H5

ONTARIO REGION

Canadian Wildlife Service and Environment Canada
49 Camelot Drive
Nepean, Ontario K1A 0H3

WESTERN AND NORTHERN REGION

Canadian Wildlife Service and Environment Canada
Room 210, 2nd Floor
4999 - 98th Avenue
Edmonton, Alberta T6B 2X3

PACIFIC AND YUKON REGION

Canadian Wildlife Service and Environment Canada
P.O. Box 340
Delta, British Columbia V4K 3Y3

Annex B
 Chapter 4
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX B – FLIGHT SAFETY SURVEY CHECKLIST

LEGEND

A: SATISFACTORY

B: SATISFACTORY WITH DEBRIEFING

C: UNSATISFACTORY

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
FSO / D/FSO					
1.	Access to comd: <input type="checkbox"/> Direct <input type="checkbox"/> Indirect				
2.	Access to branch and section heads: <input type="checkbox"/> Direct when necessary				
3.	Relationship with subordinate personnel: <input type="checkbox"/> How well are the FSO / FSNCM known? <input type="checkbox"/> Meetings with FS team				
4.	Adequacy of personal visits to sections: <input type="checkbox"/> Regular and frequent <input type="checkbox"/> Non-flying units				
5.	Feedback process to CO: <input type="checkbox"/> If problems identified on visits <input type="checkbox"/> Areas of concern through trend analysis <input type="checkbox"/> Routine or only as required				
6.	Training: <input type="checkbox"/> Basic, Advanced, FSOMS <input type="checkbox"/> Additional courses (human factors, SCSI, etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Time in job				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
7.	Concept of Ops / Business Plan: <input type="checkbox"/> Structured routine or reactive <input type="checkbox"/> Mission, assumptions, risks, initiatives				
8.	Does the FSO have any secondary duties? <input type="checkbox"/> Time dedicated to FS duties <input type="checkbox"/> Time dedicated to other duties (primary or secondary) <input type="checkbox"/> Other major projects				
9.	Does the FS NCM have any secondary duties? <input type="checkbox"/> Time dedicated to FS duties <input type="checkbox"/> Time dedicated to other duties (primary or secondary) <input type="checkbox"/> Other major projects				
10.	MOS ID currency: <input type="checkbox"/> Meets requirements / staying current <input type="checkbox"/> Time away from FS job as a result				
FS OFFICE					
11.	Location: <input type="checkbox"/> Proximity to flight line <input type="checkbox"/> Proximity to comd <input type="checkbox"/> Proximity to clerical staff				
12.	Adequacy of equipment: <input type="checkbox"/> Cellular, pager, voice mail <input type="checkbox"/> FSOMS, Internet, laptop <input type="checkbox"/> Digital camera <input type="checkbox"/> Accident kits (complete)				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
13.	Supplies: <input type="checkbox"/> Resource material <input type="checkbox"/> Hazard reports <input type="checkbox"/> Posters <input type="checkbox"/> Magazines <input type="checkbox"/> Videos				
14.	Support: <input type="checkbox"/> Technical <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative				
15.	Files: <input type="checkbox"/> Functional <input type="checkbox"/> Adequacy <input type="checkbox"/> Special interest items <input type="checkbox"/> Completeness				
16.	FSOMS: <input type="checkbox"/> Number of terminals <input type="checkbox"/> Location <input type="checkbox"/> Handbook <input type="checkbox"/> Familiarity				
17.	Publications: <input type="checkbox"/> A-GA-I35-001 <input type="checkbox"/> AOIs for all unit aircraft <input type="checkbox"/> Aviation Safety Book, R. Wood (WFSO) <input type="checkbox"/> Human factors books <input type="checkbox"/> Safety magazines <input type="checkbox"/> ERP				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
FS PROGRAM					
18.	Written program: <input type="checkbox"/> CO's philosophy <input type="checkbox"/> Focused, fast, flexible, friendly <input type="checkbox"/> Achievable <input type="checkbox"/> Updated and current				
19.	Occurrence reporting: <input type="checkbox"/> Process <input type="checkbox"/> Records / filing system <input type="checkbox"/> Inclusion of flying / ground supervisor <input type="checkbox"/> Process for deployed operations <input type="checkbox"/> Preventive measures follow-up <input type="checkbox"/> Trends analysis technique				
20.	FS meetings: <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency <input type="checkbox"/> Format <input type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Attendees (ops, maint, support)				
21.	FS boards: <input type="checkbox"/> Location <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Up to date <input type="checkbox"/> Methods of display				
22.	Hazard reports: <input type="checkbox"/> Use promoted <input type="checkbox"/> Availability of blanks <input type="checkbox"/> Processing of completed forms <input type="checkbox"/> Follow-up procedures				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
23.	Education and promotion: <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency and venue <input type="checkbox"/> Relevance <input type="checkbox"/> Topics (HF, communication, seasonal) <input type="checkbox"/> Aircrew / ground crew <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-deployment <input type="checkbox"/> Originality				
24.	ALSE: <input type="checkbox"/> ALSEO trained <input type="checkbox"/> Process to staff and track issues <input type="checkbox"/> Attendance/inputs to annual PRM				
25.	Awards program: <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Visibility				
26.	Local surveys: <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency <input type="checkbox"/> Use of external resources (FSOs, FS NCMs) <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness in tracking findings <input type="checkbox"/> Follow-up action				
27.	Use of external resources: <input type="checkbox"/> Use of external subject matter experts for briefings <input type="checkbox"/> Use of lessons from similar fleets <input type="checkbox"/> Linking lessons learned from other fleets				
28.	UCR program: <input type="checkbox"/> FS input				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> FSO comments as required <input type="checkbox"/> FS stamp <input type="checkbox"/> Follow-up procedure				
29.	Emergency Response Plan: <input type="checkbox"/> Completeness <input type="checkbox"/> Updated and current <input type="checkbox"/> Date last tested <input type="checkbox"/> Warning system <input type="checkbox"/> Transport to site <input type="checkbox"/> Photographer				
30.	Accident investigation: <input type="checkbox"/> Control of wreckage <input type="checkbox"/> Guards <input type="checkbox"/> Liaison with supporting DND WFSO				
31.	Incident investigation: <input type="checkbox"/> Reporting <input type="checkbox"/> Thoroughness <input type="checkbox"/> Completeness of report <input type="checkbox"/> Control of report				
AIR WEAPONS SAFETY					
32.	Written program: <input type="checkbox"/> Integrated within FS Program (reporting, prevention, education, promotion) <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Encompasses all air weapons activities from ready-use storage to target or return to ready-use storage <input type="checkbox"/> Current <input type="checkbox"/> Air Weapons Safety Committee				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
33.	Established AWSO / AWSTM: <input type="checkbox"/> Appointed <input type="checkbox"/> Trained and qualified <input type="checkbox"/> Member of unit FS committee <input type="checkbox"/> Member of Air Weapons Safety Committee				
34.	Training: <input type="checkbox"/> Air weapons safety indoctrination and awareness training conducted at unit including all flight line support staff (firefighters, fuel tender drivers, Military Police) <input type="checkbox"/> Annual AWS training <input type="checkbox"/> Annual aircrew familiarization training <input type="checkbox"/> Load crew training <input type="checkbox"/> Weapons load officer training <input type="checkbox"/> Convoy training arm / de-arm training <input type="checkbox"/> Records system exists to document training				
35.	Safety survey: <input type="checkbox"/> Annual informal survey conducted <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness (follow-up, corrective actions)				
36.	Operations: <input type="checkbox"/> Absolutely no maintenance carried out on aircraft in the armed state <input type="checkbox"/> Unit SOPs detailing maintenance activities that may be undertaken on loaded aircraft are covered in local orders <input type="checkbox"/> Arming / de-arming areas designated and approved <input type="checkbox"/> Location and number of arming / de-arming areas designated and approved				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> Checklist used for acceptance checks on aircraft with air weapons loaded <input type="checkbox"/> Loaded aircraft recovery procedures ensure direct routing to de-arming area <input type="checkbox"/> Aircraft loaded with forward-firing weapons pointed away from populated areas <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency jettison areas identified in flying and air weapons orders <input type="checkbox"/> Pilot's hands visible during arming / de-arming operations				
37.	Administration: <input type="checkbox"/> Unit air weapons SOPs current and available <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable publications available and current to enhance unit AWS Program <input type="checkbox"/> Deployment SOPs include air weapons requirements (manpower, EOD, procedures, equipment) <input type="checkbox"/> AWS representative appointed for unit hosting deployments / exercises Emergency Response Plans include AWS considerations including evacuation distances for applicable air weapons				

Annex C
 Chapter 4
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX C – CONTRACTOR FLIGHT SAFETY SURVEY CHECKLIST

LEGEND

A: SATISFACTORY

B: SATISFACTORY WITH DEBRIEFING

C: UNSATISFACTORY

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
CONTRACTOR FSO (CFSO)					
1.	Access to Director: <input type="checkbox"/> Direct <input type="checkbox"/> Indirect				
2.	Access to branch and section heads: <input type="checkbox"/> Direct when necessary				
3.	Relationship with company personnel: How well is CFSO known? <input type="checkbox"/> Meetings with FS team				
4.	Adequacy of personal visits to sections: <input type="checkbox"/> Regular and frequent				
5.	Feedback process to Director on problems and current projects: <input type="checkbox"/> Regular briefings or only as required <input type="checkbox"/> Areas of concern through trend analysis				
6.	Training: <input type="checkbox"/> Basic, Advanced, FSOMS <input type="checkbox"/> Additional courses (human factors, SCSI, etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Time in job				
7.	Contractor FS instructions: <input type="checkbox"/> Structured routine or reactive <input type="checkbox"/> Mission, assumptions, risks, initiatives				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
8.	Survey report distribution: <input type="checkbox"/> To Director <input type="checkbox"/> To NDQAR <input type="checkbox"/> To DFS				
9.	General: <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Mutual exchange of information <input type="checkbox"/> Occurrence reporting procedures				
FS OFFICE					
10.	Location: <input type="checkbox"/> Proximity to flight line <input type="checkbox"/> Proximity to Director <input type="checkbox"/> Proximity to clerical staff				
11.	Adequacy of equipment: <input type="checkbox"/> Cellular, pager, voice mail <input type="checkbox"/> FSOMS, Internet, laptop <input type="checkbox"/> Digital camera <input type="checkbox"/> Accident kits (complete)				
12.	Supplies: <input type="checkbox"/> Resource material <input type="checkbox"/> Hazard reports: <input type="checkbox"/> Posters <input type="checkbox"/> Magazines <input type="checkbox"/> Videos				
13.	Support: <input type="checkbox"/> Technical <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
14.	Files: <input type="checkbox"/> Functional <input type="checkbox"/> Adequacy <input type="checkbox"/> Special interest items <input type="checkbox"/> Completeness				
15.	FSOMS: <input type="checkbox"/> Number of terminals <input type="checkbox"/> Location <input type="checkbox"/> Handbook <input type="checkbox"/> Familiarity				
16.	Publications: <input type="checkbox"/> A-GA-135-001 <input type="checkbox"/> AOIs for all DND aircraft <input type="checkbox"/> Applicable safety precautions and accident prevention instructions <input type="checkbox"/> Safety magazines <input type="checkbox"/> Company Emergency Response Plan (ERP)				
FS PROGRAM					
17.	Written program: <input type="checkbox"/> Director's philosophy <input type="checkbox"/> Focused, fast, flexible, friendly <input type="checkbox"/> Achievable <input type="checkbox"/> Updated and current				
18.	Occurrence Reporting: <input type="checkbox"/> Process <input type="checkbox"/> Records / filing system <input type="checkbox"/> PMs follow-up				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> Trends analysis technique				
19.	FS meetings: <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency <input type="checkbox"/> Format <input type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Attendees (ops, maint, sp)				
20.	FS boards: <input type="checkbox"/> Location <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Up to date <input type="checkbox"/> Methods of display				
21.	Hazard reports: <input type="checkbox"/> Use promoted <input type="checkbox"/> Availability of blanks <input type="checkbox"/> Processing of completed forms <input type="checkbox"/> Follow-up procedures				
22.	Education and promotion: <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency and venue <input type="checkbox"/> Relevance <input type="checkbox"/> Topics (HF, communication, seasonal) <input type="checkbox"/> Aircrew / ground crew <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-deployment <input type="checkbox"/> Originality				
23.	Awards program: <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Visibility				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
24.	FS Committee: <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency <input type="checkbox"/> Attendance <input type="checkbox"/> Feedback				
25.	Award Program: <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Visibility				
26.	Local surveys: <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency <input type="checkbox"/> Use of external resources <input type="checkbox"/> Effective tracking of findings Follow-up action				
27.	Use of external resources: <input type="checkbox"/> Use of external subject matter experts (SMEs) for briefings <input type="checkbox"/> Use of lessons learned from similar fleets / contractors <input type="checkbox"/> Linking lessons learned from other fleets / contractors				
28.	Emergency Response Plan: <input type="checkbox"/> Completeness <input type="checkbox"/> Updated and current <input type="checkbox"/> Date last tested <input type="checkbox"/> Warning system <input type="checkbox"/> Transport to site <input type="checkbox"/> Photographer				
29.	Accident investigation: <input type="checkbox"/> Control of wreckage <input type="checkbox"/> Guards				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> Liaison with supporting DND WFSO				
30.	Incident investigation: <input type="checkbox"/> Reporting <input type="checkbox"/> Thoroughness <input type="checkbox"/> Completeness of report <input type="checkbox"/> Control of report				

Annex D
 Chapter 4
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

**ANNEX D – AIR CADET GLIDING PROGRAM
 FLIGHT SAFETY SURVEY CHECKLIST**

LEGEND

A: SATISFACTORY

B: SATISFACTORY WITH DEBRIEFING

C: UNSATISFACTORY

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROGRAM					
1.	FS publications <input type="checkbox"/> Incident / accident reports <input type="checkbox"/> Magazines <input type="checkbox"/> Posters <input type="checkbox"/> Flashers <input type="checkbox"/> Memoranda <input type="checkbox"/> Bulletins <input type="checkbox"/> Distribution <input type="checkbox"/> Method of display				
2.	FS films and videos				
3.	FS briefings <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency <input type="checkbox"/> Seasonal <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness				
4.	Standard operating procedures (SOPs) <input type="checkbox"/> Display <input type="checkbox"/> Current / adequate <input type="checkbox"/> All read and signed				
5.	Publications <input type="checkbox"/> Amendments <input type="checkbox"/> Availability				
6.	Facilities Display <input type="checkbox"/> Airfield layout				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> Location				
7.	Marshalling signals as per SOPs <input type="checkbox"/> Compliance with orders <input type="checkbox"/> Poster display				
8.	<input type="checkbox"/> Radio procedures <input type="checkbox"/> Standardization				
9.	Aircrew <input type="checkbox"/> Qualifications <input type="checkbox"/> Proficiency <input type="checkbox"/> Currency				
10.	Operations <input type="checkbox"/> Launch control <input type="checkbox"/> Scheduling <input type="checkbox"/> Duty time limitations <input type="checkbox"/> Flying time limitations				
11.	Publications for aircraft and equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Checklists <input type="checkbox"/> Availability <input type="checkbox"/> Use of pre-take-off and landing checklist <input type="checkbox"/> Aircraft owner's manual <input type="checkbox"/> Aircraft handover <input type="checkbox"/> Checklist handover <input type="checkbox"/> Location				
GLIDER OPERATIONS – GENERAL					
12.	Checkouts <input type="checkbox"/> Thorough <input type="checkbox"/> Realistic				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> Simulated rope breaks <input type="checkbox"/> As per SOPs				
13.	Medical <input type="checkbox"/> Valid <input type="checkbox"/> Restrictions <input type="checkbox"/> Hazards posed by illness <input type="checkbox"/> Procedures to ensure that aircrew cannot fly while medically unfit				
14.	Publications <input type="checkbox"/> On-time dissemination AIP <input type="checkbox"/> VFR Supplement <input type="checkbox"/> Amendments distributed				
15.	Briefings <input type="checkbox"/> Location <input type="checkbox"/> Requirement to attend <input type="checkbox"/> Number per day <input type="checkbox"/> Special requirements <input type="checkbox"/> Current weather <input type="checkbox"/> Ops conditions <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency procedures				
16.	Launch Control Officer (LCO) <input type="checkbox"/> Qualifications <input type="checkbox"/> Responsibilities				
17.	Launch Personnel <input type="checkbox"/> Duties understood <input type="checkbox"/> Adherence to SOPs				
18.	Weather / wind limitations <input type="checkbox"/> Daylight VFR only				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> 90° crosswind limits <input type="checkbox"/> Z-33 8 knots / 10 mph <input type="checkbox"/> Scout 15 knots / 17 mph <input type="checkbox"/> L-19 10 knots / 11 mph <input type="checkbox"/> 15 kts / 17 mph for stds / check pilot conducting training only <input type="checkbox"/> Gusts not greater than 10 knots or 12 mph				
19.	Glider movements <input type="checkbox"/> Supervision <input type="checkbox"/> Sufficient personnel <input type="checkbox"/> By hand when backwards <input type="checkbox"/> By vehicle when forward				
20.	Glider parking as per SOPs <input type="checkbox"/> Distance between gliders <input type="checkbox"/> Alignment and direction <input type="checkbox"/> Parked configuration <input type="checkbox"/> Spoilers extended <input type="checkbox"/> Low wing into wind <input type="checkbox"/> Tie-down as per SOPs				
21.	Vehicular traffic <input type="checkbox"/> Control of movement				
22.	Spectators <input type="checkbox"/> Supervision				
23.	Pilot log books <input type="checkbox"/> Maintained and up to date <input type="checkbox"/> Log book certification for proficiency and qualifications				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
GLIDER OPERATIONS – EMERGENCY PROCEDURES					
24.	Occurrence Response Plan <input type="checkbox"/> Effectiveness <input type="checkbox"/> Warning system <input type="checkbox"/> Transport to site <input type="checkbox"/> Photographer / camera <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel knowledgeable of plan				
25.	Grid maps <input type="checkbox"/> Available and current <input type="checkbox"/> Understood by drivers				
26.	Accident alarm system				
27.	Vehicles to accident site <input type="checkbox"/> Rules governing vehicle movement <input type="checkbox"/> Control of vehicles by tower <input type="checkbox"/> Markings <input type="checkbox"/> Current weather <input type="checkbox"/> Ops conditions <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency procedures				
28.	Accident responsibilities <input type="checkbox"/> Recovery of wreckage <input type="checkbox"/> Wreckage guards <input type="checkbox"/> Wreckage schematic <input type="checkbox"/> Accident trailer and accident site equipment				
29.	Notification to <input type="checkbox"/> Local firefighters <input type="checkbox"/> Local police / RCMP <input type="checkbox"/> CF FS personnel				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
30.	Availability of ambulance <input type="checkbox"/> Response time <input type="checkbox"/> Capability				
31.	Fire extinguishers <input type="checkbox"/> Spot checks in hangars, flight line, aircraft and winch <input type="checkbox"/> Up to date <input type="checkbox"/> Knowledge of use				
32.	Emergency procedures <input type="checkbox"/> Knowledge and practice <input type="checkbox"/> Take-off abort <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency release <input type="checkbox"/> Non-release <input type="checkbox"/> Rope / cable break <input type="checkbox"/> Off-field landing				
AIR SERVICES					
33.	Bird strike <input type="checkbox"/> Records, i.e. CF 215				
34.	Airfield condition <input type="checkbox"/> Ramps, taxiways, runways, lighting, approaches, over-run areas, in-field areas <input type="checkbox"/> Method of disseminating previously discussed information to users				
35.	Weather services <input type="checkbox"/> Access to current and forecast conditions <input type="checkbox"/> Information displayed <input type="checkbox"/> Information updated, e.g. use of PIREPs				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
36.	Control tower <input type="checkbox"/> Communications with all glider operations <input type="checkbox"/> Local gliding procedures <input type="checkbox"/> Visibility of entire glider ops and traffic patterns <input type="checkbox"/> Tower control of gliders and tow aircraft <input type="checkbox"/> Tower control of vehicles on airfield				
MAINTENANCE AND SERVICING					
37.	Relationship with FSO <input type="checkbox"/> Mutual exchanges of information				
38.	FS publications <input type="checkbox"/> Poster displays <input type="checkbox"/> "Safety Comment" forms availability and use <input type="checkbox"/> Aircraft accident summaries				
39.	Use of intake duct plugs <input type="checkbox"/> Tow planes				
40.	FOD Program <input type="checkbox"/> Airfield inspections <input type="checkbox"/> No loose equipment in cockpits				
41.	Flight testing <input type="checkbox"/> Approved personnel <input type="checkbox"/> Checklists used				
42.	Maintenance administration <input type="checkbox"/> Equipment inspections <input type="checkbox"/> Snags recorded <input type="checkbox"/> Aircraft technical logs up to date				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> Corrective action on snags <input type="checkbox"/> Storage conditions <input type="checkbox"/> Cleanliness of aircraft and hangar				
SAFETY SYSTEMS					
43.	Life support equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Proper type <input type="checkbox"/> Well maintained <input type="checkbox"/> Storage <input type="checkbox"/> Inspections valid				
44.	Personnel-issue as per scale of issue <input type="checkbox"/> Users fitted and briefed on equipment care and handling procedures for overdue equipment				
45.	Emergency locator transmitter (ELT) <input type="checkbox"/> Availability <input type="checkbox"/> Usage				
46.	Accident response <input type="checkbox"/> Equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Availability <input type="checkbox"/> Usage				
47.	Accident response equipment <input type="checkbox"/> First aid kit <input type="checkbox"/> Disposable camera <input type="checkbox"/> Rescue knife (harness cutter) <input type="checkbox"/> Two fire extinguishers <input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle capable of transporting equipment and personnel close to accident site <input type="checkbox"/> Accident axe				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
	<input type="checkbox"/> Firefighter's combination tool <input type="checkbox"/> Two wool blankets				
TRAINING					
48.	Supervisor training <input type="checkbox"/> Frequency				
49.	Local surveys <input type="checkbox"/> Regular and systematic <input type="checkbox"/> Adequacy of corrective action <input type="checkbox"/> Use of FSO resources				
50.	Gliding school lectures as per directives <input type="checkbox"/> Lesson plans <input type="checkbox"/> Adequacy <input type="checkbox"/> According to syllabus <input type="checkbox"/> Training aids				
AIR TOW LAUNCH PROCEDURES					
51.	Air tow launch crew <input type="checkbox"/> Number of crew three (3) minimum <input type="checkbox"/> Briefed on operation <input type="checkbox"/> Understand duties				
52.	Position of signallers <input type="checkbox"/> Wingman <input type="checkbox"/> Tow aircraft signaller 45° ahead of aircraft, 50 ft. from take-off path, facing wingman and aircraft				
53.	Tow rope attachment procedure <input type="checkbox"/> Only when glider ready <input type="checkbox"/> Ropes as per SOPs <input type="checkbox"/> Condition of rope checked				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
54.	Pre-take-off checks <input type="checkbox"/> Back release and forward release checked at start of daily operations <input type="checkbox"/> As per checklist				
55.	Signals <input type="checkbox"/> Verbal and hand signals <input type="checkbox"/> Usage as per SOPs <input type="checkbox"/> Clear and understood				
56.	Tow aircraft handling procedure <input type="checkbox"/> Take-off and climb as per SOPs <input type="checkbox"/> 15° to 20° of bank <input type="checkbox"/> Release descending left turn <input type="checkbox"/> Rope drop in designated area <input type="checkbox"/> Landing clearance of trailing tow rope				
WINCH LAUNCH PROCEDURES					
57.	Winch launch crew <input type="checkbox"/> Number in crew (4 minimum) <input type="checkbox"/> Briefed on operation <input type="checkbox"/> Understand duties <input type="checkbox"/> Certified winch operators				
58.	Winch cable and attachment <input type="checkbox"/> Conditions checked <input type="checkbox"/> Only when glider ready <input type="checkbox"/> Multiple winches: correct cable installed <input type="checkbox"/> Downwind glider launched first				
59.	Winch launch signalling <input type="checkbox"/> Proper signals used <input type="checkbox"/> Easily seen by crews <input type="checkbox"/> Correct usage				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
60.	Signals <input type="checkbox"/> Mechanical <input type="checkbox"/> Verbal and hand signals <input type="checkbox"/> Clear and understood <input type="checkbox"/> Usage as per SOPs				
61.	Take-off and climb <input type="checkbox"/> Technique <input type="checkbox"/> Initial climb shallow <input type="checkbox"/> Safety altitude: 200 feet AGL <input type="checkbox"/> Safety speed: 50 mph <input type="checkbox"/> Maximum climb speed: 69 mph				
62.	Climb control procedure <input type="checkbox"/> Yaw to reduce power <input type="checkbox"/> Release if too slow				
63.	Cable break procedure <input type="checkbox"/> Glider in flying attitude <input type="checkbox"/> Non-release signals and procedure				
64.	Cable retrieving <input type="checkbox"/> Signals <input type="checkbox"/> Originated by winch op <input type="checkbox"/> Maximum speed of 15 mph to lay or retrieve cable				
AUTO LAUNCH PROCEDURES					
65.	Auto launch crew <input type="checkbox"/> Number in crew (4 minimum) <input type="checkbox"/> Briefed on operation <input type="checkbox"/> Understand duties <input type="checkbox"/> Certified vehicle driver and observer				

SER	ITEM	A	B	C	REMARKS
66.	Auto tow cable and equipment <input type="checkbox"/> As per SOPs				
67.	Cable attachment <input type="checkbox"/> Only when glider ready				
68.	Auto tow launch <input type="checkbox"/> From runway or hard surface				
69.	Position of signallers <input type="checkbox"/> Launch vehicle observer in place				
70.	Signals <input type="checkbox"/> Verbal and hand signals <input type="checkbox"/> Clear and understood <input type="checkbox"/> Usage as per SOPs				
71.	Take-off and climb <input type="checkbox"/> Technique <input type="checkbox"/> Initial climb shallow <input type="checkbox"/> Safety altitude: 200 feet AGL <input type="checkbox"/> Safety speed: 50 mph <input type="checkbox"/> Maximum climb speed: 69 mph				
72.	Climb control procedure <input type="checkbox"/> Yaw to reduce power <input type="checkbox"/> Release if too slow				
73.	Cable break procedure <input type="checkbox"/> Glider in flying attitude <input type="checkbox"/> Non-release signals and procedure				
74.	Cable retrieving <input type="checkbox"/> Parachute not dragged				

CHAPTER 5 – PROMOTION

GENERAL

1. The objective of the FS Promotion Program is to facilitate the maintenance of a strong and committed FS culture within all organizations that conduct or support DND / CF flying operations. An active and visible FS Promotion Program designed to engender full participation in the FS Program at the tactical, operational and strategic levels is an excellent way to achieve the objectives of the FS Program with a relatively small investment.
2. The CF FS Program uses a series of briefings, FS documents and awards as the main mechanisms for the Promotion Program.

PROMOTIONAL BRIEFINGS

DFS ANNUAL BRIEFING

3. The DFS annual briefing is one of the main FS promotion activities. The objective of this briefing is to remind all personnel of the requirement for and the importance of the FS Program. In addition, this activity is used to update personnel on new FS concepts as well as to identify key lessons learned through the analysis of occurrences over the previous 12 to 18 months. The intent of the annual DFS presentation is to brief as many civilian and military personnel as possible at the tactical, operational and strategic level. Although the briefing will be focused on CF / DND formations, wings and units, the briefing will also be presented where possible to OUTCAN formations such as NATO AWACS and NORAD detachments.

FSO BRIEFINGS

4. FSOs are encouraged to provide / conduct briefings on subjects pertinent to their units.

BRIEFING CONTENT

5. Briefings must be relevant to the audience, informative, current and interesting.
6. Visual aids should be used to the extent possible. A presentation that contains photos, charts, graphs and statistics relevant to the verbal message can greatly assist in maintaining audience attention and communicating the message.

PROMOTIONAL MATERIAL

CF FS PUBLICATIONS

FLIGHT COMMENT MAGAZINE

7. *Flight Comment* is the FS magazine of the Canadian Forces and is produced three times a year. The objective of *Flight Comment* is to provide relevant, interesting and timely FS information to all personnel involved in air operations. The intent of the magazine is also to provide a forum for anyone to present written articles on any issue related to FS. Accordingly, any individual can submit an article or poster concept for publication in *Flight Comment*. DFS reserves the right to edit these articles for length and content.

DEBRIEFING PAMPHLET

8. The objective of the “Debriefing” pamphlet is to highlight significant FS concerns in a timely manner. “Debriefing” is a short, one-to-two page electronic pamphlet that is produced by DFS or DFSO in a bilingual, electronic format on a monthly basis. The content generally covers current trends, threats and occurrence information. All back issues of “Debriefing” are archived on the DFS website.

FLASH PAMPHLET

9. The objective of an FS FLASH is to highlight critical FS information to both the chain of command and the rest of the FS team as quickly as possible. An FS FLASH is released on the authority of DFS and is produced on an as-required basis. Typically, an FS FLASH will be produced as a result of issues identified during the investigation of a serious occurrence.

OTHER FS PERIODICALS

10. FS information is available from a myriad of FS magazines produced by national and foreign government departments as well as companies and safety organizations. These periodicals contain a wealth of relevant and interesting FS information that can be used to raise the level of FS consciousness. All members of the FS team are encouraged to regularly review these publications for items of interest. An updated list of appropriate periodicals can be found on the DFS website.

OTHER MEDIA

VIDEOS

11. FS videos can be obtained from a variety of sources. DFS maintains a library of FS videos that can be acquired through the DFS website.

POSTERS

12. DFS also maintains a library of FS posters that can be obtained through the DFS website. Individuals and units are encouraged to create their own FS posters pertinent to their specific operations and share them with other FS organizations through DFS.

WEBSITES

13. DFS maintains comprehensive Intranet and Internet websites that provide information on a variety of FS topics. Most Air Force units post their FS Program, current issues and links to a myriad of other sites and resources. Links to the recommended FS sites can be found on the DFS website.

14. Publishing SRs on the Defence Wide Area Network (DWAN) is allowed. It promises to significantly improve flight safety processes and the FS reporting culture. Still, care must be taken to ensure that it does not inadvertently compromise the reporting culture. Only completed reports may be posted on the Intranet after a diligent review of the SRs by senior FS staff. Completed SRs may be released to the DWAN as long as:

- a. personnel cannot be identified;
- b. no cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information, medical information or witness statements are included;
- c. reports are reviewed carefully to ensure that blame is not assigned to anyone; and

- d. a disclaimer is included in each report stating: “Flight Safety incident reports are produced under the authority of the Minister of National Defence (MND) pursuant to section 4.2(n) of the Aeronautics Act (AA) and in accordance with A-GA-135-001/AA-001 – Flight Safety for the Canadian Forces. They are prepared solely for the purpose of accident prevention and shall not be used for legal, administrative or disciplinary action.”

FS NOTICE BOARDS

15. Dedicated FS notice boards are an effective and efficient method of transmitting FS information. The purpose of FS notice boards is to remind personnel of the goals and impact of the FS program. To do this, FS notice boards should be erected in high-traffic areas and should be restricted to FS matters such as the “Debriefing” newsletter, the Flash bulletins, awards and AWS incidents. Notice boards should be prominent enough to be easily seen from a distance and bordered by red and white alternating stripes (minimum of 5 cm / 2 inches) to be effective. A pictorial sample of a suitable FS board can be seen on the DFS website.

AWARDS

OBJECTIVE

16. The objective of the FS Awards Program is to recognize the efforts of individuals, teams and organizations that have made a significant contribution to the objectives of the FS Program.

17. In order to qualify for an FS award, the action(s) of the nominee(s) must be outstanding for a “Good Show” and superior for a “For Pro”. Submissions must clearly describe the efforts of the individual or individuals nominated. The submission must describe the explicit actions and related facts demonstrating why the action(s) was / were exceptional and above and beyond the scope of normal duty for the individual.

18. Often a well-written FS nomination does not meet the excellence criteria for winning an FS award. But while the actions are commendable, they may be within the scope of the normal duties of the individual. As an example, a submission for a “For Pro” stated that a qualified technician working as part of a fuel tank load crew discovered hydraulic fluid on the bottom of the aircraft. The technician informed the Servicing Supervisor. Further investigation by the maintenance crew revealed a very serious problem with a hydraulic feed line for the landing gear. This nomination would likely be rejected because the technician performed his duties as expected.

TIMELINESS OF AWARDS

19. As with all promotional activities, the more timely it is, the more effective it is in raising FS awareness as well as the profile of the FS Program. Ideally, the period from the date of occurrence to the date of notification of approval or rejection should not exceed two months.

TYPES OF AWARDS

20. Awards are an excellent way of recognizing performance that is truly exceptional. In FS, individual or group performance that achieves the aims of the program should always be commended and if significant enough, should be rewarded / heralded. Originators and reviewing authorities must give careful thought to which form of recognition would be most appropriate and timely.

21. The following are the official FS awards available through the CF. Acts that fit the descriptions hereunder should be submitted to the chain of command for recognition.

- a. Good Show;
- b. For Professionalism (For Pro).

22. A nomination for an official FS award may be denied at the DFSO or DFS level. It would be anticipated then that the unit CO, formation comd or manager would award a Commander's Commendation.

GOOD SHOW AWARD

23. The "Good Show" Award is given when an aircraft accident or serious incident is averted or reduced in severity by a timely, skilful, devoted or professional act that is clearly outstanding or above and beyond the call of duty.

24. A Good Show will be awarded when one or more of the following conditions have been met:

- a. the actions of an individual, crew or team directly prevented loss of life or loss of an aviation resource;
- b. the actions of an individual, crew or team directly reduced the severity of an accident or serious occurrence;
- c. an individual, crew or team identified and rectified a critical hazard to FS in truly exceptional circumstances; or
- d. an individual, crew or team demonstrated outstanding skill, knowledge, judgement or situation awareness in exceptional circumstances.

25. Good Show Awards must be endorsed by the formation comd or equivalent position, the DFSO on behalf of Comd 1 Cdn Air Div and DFS. Good Show Awards are approved by the CAS. The award is signed by both the CAS and DFS.

FOR PROFESSIONALISM AWARD

26. The For Professionalism Award recognizes acts that may not qualify for the Good Show Award yet reflect a superior professional attitude that averted or reduced the severity of an aircraft accident or serious incident. Acts in the line of duty may qualify if clearly indicative of commendable extra effort. The For Professionalism scroll is signed by the DFSO and Comd 1 Cdn Air Div. When doubt exists as to which award applies, originators are encouraged to make the nomination for the Good Show Award. A For Pro Award will be awarded when one or more of the following conditions have been met:

- a. an individual, crew or team demonstrated superior skill in identifying and rectifying a significant hazard to FS in very difficult circumstances;
- b. an individual, crew or team demonstrated superior, timely and professional reactions in rectifying a significant hazard to FS in difficult circumstances; or
- c. an individual, team or crew exhibited a superior display of skill, knowledge, situation awareness or judgement in difficult circumstances that resulted in a significant contribution to the DND / CF FS program.

27. The For Pro Award is recommended by the WComd or equivalent position, endorsed by the DFSO and approved by the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div. The award is signed by both Comd 1 Cdn Air Div and the DFSO.

COMMANDER'S COMMENDATION

28. The Commander's Commendation is given for an act that does not warrant either a Good Show or For Professionalism Award but does deserve recognition. Given that the award submission has been endorsed by a wcomd before being staffed up the chain, the minimum award a nominee should receive is a Commander's Commendation.

SICOFFA AWARD

29. Canada is a member of the international aviation association called Sistema de Cooperación entre las Fuerzas Aéreas Americanas (SICOFFA). This is a Spanish name meaning system for the cooperation of the air forces in the Americas. Each year SICOFFA provides member countries with an FS Award to recognize a deserving unit within their individual air force. The Canadian award is granted by CAS each year. The award is given to a wing or unit that has demonstrated the highest level of dedication to the furtherance of FS in the CF and, by their actions, been an exceptional example to others. It is intended to acknowledge a concerted effort over a period of time.

30. The guidelines for this award are for the unit or formation that has developed, implemented and performed at a high level of FS efficiency or has an FS program that is:

- a. innovative;
- b. proactive;
- c. comprehensive;
- d. effective; and
- e. enthusiastically embraced by all members of the FS team.

31. The SICOFFA FS award is originated by the 1 Cdn Air Div FSO, endorsed by DFS and approved by the Chief of the Air Staff. A call letter for nominations will be issued yearly by the 1 Cdn Air Div FSO.

AWARD STAFFING PROCEDURES

32. Nominations for Good Show and For Professionalism Awards shall be e-mailed to both DFS and 1 Cdn Air Div FS to reduce the time required for a final decision. Submissions are to follow the format at Annex A and are to include a fully detailed account in Word format that is suitable for use as the citation on the commendation scroll. If approved, the citation will appear outside the individual's community, so early reference should be made to the aircraft type. Formations should develop local staffing procedures to appraise the nomination. The FSOMS occurrence report, UCRs, technical references and other such material should not be shown in the proposed narrative, but must be included as references in the submission to allow proper assessment. Units may be required to provide the DFSO or DFS staff with a copy of these references, on demand.

33. For Pro nominations will be reviewed by DFSO staff. If approved, DFSO will produce the award scroll, have it signed by Comd 1 Cdn Air Div and sent to the unit for presentation. DFS will be advised and the award citation will be forwarded for publication in Flight Comment and on the DFS website.

34. For Good Show Awards, once reviewed and endorsed by the DFSO staff, they will be forwarded to DFS. If approved, DFS will produce the award scroll, have it signed by CAS and sent to the unit for presentation.

35. If a nomination is not approved, DFS / DFSO staff, as applicable, will officially inform the submitting unit with a brief explanation as to why the nomination was rejected and if other forms of recognition are recommended.

36. The Good Show or For Professionalism scroll will be forwarded to the appropriate wing, base or unit FS staff, who will coordinate the presentation; local publicity is encouraged. A narrative describing the event will appear in the earliest possible issue of Flight Comment and on the DFS website.

Annex A
 Chapter 5
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX A – FLIGHT SAFETY AWARD NOMINATION FORM

FS AWARD NOMINATION					
UNIT AT TIME OF OCCURRENCE:					
NOMINEE(S)					
Rank	Surname	First name (Desired on scroll)	Initial(s)	SN	Occupation
Type of award recommended	Good Show				
	For Pro				
Reference document(s)	Technical Documents:				
	Occurrence #:				
	UCR #:				
	Other (specify):				
Photograph	Electronic copy (min. 5 by 7 inch at 300 dpi) showing personnel on job-related duties.				
Citation Language	English				
	French				
NOMINATION STAFFING					
RANK, NAME, INITIALS, POSITION					DATE
1. PROPOSER:					
RECOMMENDED TEXT FOR AWARD CITATION (300 to 500 words recommended)					

2. SECTION HEAD:	
Approved: Yes No	
3. UFSO:	
Supported: Yes No Comments:	
4. CO:	
Approved: Yes No Comments:	
5. WFSO:	
Supported: Yes No Comments:	
6. Wing Comd:	
Approved: Yes No Comments:	
7. Submission sent by WFSO / D/WFS (Submission sent to DFS and 1 Cdn Air Div FS)	



CHAPTER 6 – FS FEEDBACK TO THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

GENERAL

1. It is the responsibility of FS personnel at all levels to advise their comd when they have concerns with respect to FS issues. This advice can take many forms (formal / informal briefings, briefing notes, safety committee meetings, informal discussions), but it is essential that all FS professionals, as advisors, make their concerns known to the chain of command.

INTENT OF FEEDBACK

2. The intent of feedback is to provide an assessment to the applicable comd, in as objective a manner as possible, of the degree of safety of flight-related activities with the aim of making this information useful and relevant to the comd. Ideally, feedback should highlight the areas upon which comds must focus in order to improve the safety of flying operations. Flight safety indicators that highlight to the chain of command the degree of safety of flying activities or the level of risk at which operations are being conducted is what the FSO is trying to measure.

ASSESSMENT OF FS INDICATORS

3. The assessment of the FS indicators in a unit should be done by looking at the following components:

- a. documentation of unit FS Program;
- b. FS implementation or culture within the unit; and
- c. resources dedicated to the unit FS Program and the status of the various FS tasks at the unit.

FS DEDICATED RESOURCES AND TASKS

4. In order to run an effective flight safety program, established FS positions must be filled by appropriate personnel. In establishing the number of FS positions, some key elements that must be considered are:

- a. the existence of a succession plan to ensure continuity in unit FS positions;
- b. whether the incumbents have the proper qualifications, the appropriate background, the opportunity to build and effectively use FS experience, and any additional secondary duties are assigned in accordance with this order;
- c. infrastructure and equipment (offices, equipment storage and, when appropriate, classrooms, IT/IM hardware and software, crash kits);
- d. basic transportation (when required) and communication equipment (including IT resources);
- e. business plan incorporating FS priorities and objectives with a suitable budget to deliver or the commitment of the Comd to support these initiatives; and
- f. budget allocation matching the business plan intent.

5. The number of established FS positions should be revised annually to adjust to the mission and tempo of the organization based on the degree to which FS tasks are being completed, with an assessment of:
- a. the status of occurrence investigations and reports;
 - b. regularity of Safety Council meetings and the publishing of meeting minutes;
 - c. degree of completion of safety measures recommended from FS investigations, surveys and follow-up actions from FS meetings;
 - d. frequency and conduct of informal flight safety surveys and tours of facilities;
 - e. frequency of review of unit and fleet FS occurrences;
 - f. currency and relevance of promotional material posted on FS bulletin boards and made available to personnel via different media; and
 - g. frequency of submission of nominations of suitable candidates for FS awards and suitable public and private recognition of deserving individuals.

STRESS POINTS

6. Another indicator of the relative safety of a flying operation is the presence or absence of stress points. The presence of stress points that, in the opinion of the FSO, have significant impact on the safety of the unit's flying operation, must be quantified as accurately as possible and reported when observed. Care must be taken to ensure that the stress points reported actually do affect FS.

FEEDBACK METHODOLOGY

7. In order to act on FS issues, the chain of command must be made aware of the concerns of their FS professionals. It is the duty of the FSO to question, to warn and to suggest alternatives. As champions of FS, the FSO cannot shrink away from making subjective assessments, but we must recognize the need to more clearly quantify our assessments wherever possible.

8. Reporting to a comd may be done verbally or in writing. The latter is preferred in that it is more formal and provides the comd with documented examples that can be acted upon. This also allows the comd to acknowledge the report and indicate his/her intentions, if any, to address problematic issues.

9. Performance measurement of the flight safety program could be reported through some form of balanced scorecard system or a matrix using a "traffic light" system (RED, YELLOW, GREEN) to indicate performance on the criteria assessed. As a minimum, a brief factual justification for factors rated unsatisfactory or RED must be included in order to fully explain the situation leading to the RED assessment. Such a matrix shows at a glance where the FS staff believes there are concerns and where attention should be focused. The matrix should include objective criteria where possible, but given the nature of some of the issues within the matrix (culture, stress points), a subjective assessment is also required. Wherever possible, subjective assessments should be backed up with facts (statistics, trend analysis, statements from personnel) in order to lend more credence to the assessment. However, it is acknowledged that sometimes the best professional judgement of the FS staff and their "gut feel" will be all that is available. A suggested example of the report matrix format is shown in Annex A. The DFS website contains a quantitative description of the factors listed above which can be used as a guide for the production of the report.

FEEDBACK CONSIDERATION

10. A careful balance must be achieved between the requirement to inform the chain of command and unnecessarily overstating the level of concern. By continually stating that there will be dire consequences if a particular measure is not taken, there is a risk that leadership will become inured to these warnings. Similarly, operations must be periodically reviewed to ensure that more risk has not gradually been assumed over time due to the absence of occurrences. Judicious use of warnings and regular assessment of risk levels are in order to prevent the gradual increase of risk.

11. The FSO will, at times, be in the position of advising non-Air Force COs. In these instances, it must be remembered that the comd may not be aware of the requirements of this manual or of his / her responsibilities under the Aeronautics Act. A tactful explanation of these requirements will be necessary in such situations. By raising the comd's awareness of the basic principles of FS, these situations should be overcome. However, as these are valid, legal, regulatory requirements, the FSO must ensure that the comd is made aware of his / her responsibilities and, if required, must enlist the assistance of other FS personnel to ensure that these requirements are not violated.

Annex A
 Chapter 6
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX A – EXAMPLE FS FEEDBACK MATRIX

FACTOR¹	DESCRIPTION³	REMARKS
MANNING	All positions fully manned and trained	
PROGRAM	Air Weapons Safety Program not fully documented in FS Program	
FS RESOURCES	FS staff and offices fully re-sourced including funding for PD courses / seminars	
CULTURE	Clear evidence of a fair and flexible reporting and learning culture in the unit	
TASKS	Preventive measures not being tracked until completion	
STRESS POINTS²	Some stress points are present.	
OVERALL	Subjective combined assessment on how safe the unit is operating	

¹ Assessments factors may be added as required by the FSO, but they must include an explanation as to their intent.

² Any individual or overall factors assessed as RED must be accompanied by a suitable explanation and supporting documentation.

³ The DFS website contains a quantitative description of the factors listed above. These can be used as a guide for the production of the FS feedback report.

CHAPTER 7 – OCCURRENCE REPORTING

References: A. Joint Program Office UAV Campaign Plan, February 2006
B. DAOD 2008-3 – *Issue and Crisis Management*

PURPOSE

1. The purpose of FS reporting is to alert all concerned of circumstances that have resulted in or have the potential to cause damage to aircraft, air weapons or injuries to personnel. FS occurrence reporting and investigation allow appropriate PMs to be identified and implemented by comd authorities.

DEFINITIONS

AIRCRAFT

2. A machine capable of deriving support in the atmosphere from reactions with the air.
- a. **CF aircraft**: This includes aircraft that have been accepted by the CF through purchase, loan or bailment including, for FS purposes, aircraft belonging to the Air Cadet League of Canada. Aircraft under production for the CF are considered CF aircraft from the moment they leave the production line following final assembly, regardless of the actual acceptance date. This situation could be modified by contract provisions or special agreements.
 - b. **Non-CF aircraft**: These are subdivided as follows:
 - (1) **Non-CF Military Aircraft**. There are two categories of non-CF military aircraft:
 - (a) **Allied military aircraft**. These are aircraft belonging to an allied military force. When the CF assumes quality-assurance responsibility for these aircraft during production, repair, modification or overhaul, they are considered CF aircraft from the moment they are accepted by the contractor until they leave Canada or are accepted for flight by an aircrew of the country of ownership.
 - (b) **Non-allied military aircraft**. These are aircraft belonging to a non-allied military force.
 - (2) **Civilian aircraft**. This term is normally self-explanatory, but when a CF aircraft is lent or bailed to a civilian agency on a temporary basis, the CF continues to be involved.

COLLATERAL INVESTIGATION

3. This term applies to any investigation of an occurrence conducted by other than FS personnel or for purposes other than FS.

FS INVESTIGATOR

4. A FSO appointed by DFS who has received specialty training in aviation occurrence investigations.

FS OCCURRENCE

5. Any event involving the operation of an aircraft or support to flying operations that constitutes an accident or incident. This could be an air occurrence (air accident or air incident, with or without weapons implications) or a ground occurrence (ground accident or ground incident, with or without weapons implications).

FS PUBLICATIONS

6. FS publications include all material published by DND for FS purposes, including posters, charts, booklets and the like, intended to assist FSOs and others in reporting procedures and cause factor assessment.

FS REPORTS

7. This term refers to all reports, whether oral or written, made under the authority of this manual.

AIR ACCIDENT

8. An event involving an aircraft between the time the first power plant start is attempted with intent for flight and the time the last power plant or rotor stops (for a glider, from the time the hook-up is complete until the glider comes to rest after landing), in which one or more of the following occurs:

- a. someone is missing or receives fatal, very serious or serious injuries or illness (Black, Red or Yellow) as determined by a medical officer in accordance with CFAO 24-1. The aircraft, its equipment or its operation must have contributed to the event for it to be classed as an air accident; or
- b. a CF aircraft is destroyed, missing or sustains very serious or serious damages.

NOTE

This definition excludes damage caused by enemy action.

AIR INCIDENT

9. An event involving a CF aircraft intended for flight between the time the first power plant start is attempted and the time the last power plant or rotor stops. For a glider, from the time the hook-up is complete until the glider comes to rest after landing, in which one or more of the following results:

- a. someone receives minor injuries (Green) as determined by a medical officer in accordance with CFAO 24-1, or there is risk of injury. The aircraft, its equipment or its operation must have contributed to the event for it to be classed as an air incident;

NOTE

During paradrops, SAR Techs and their equipment are considered part of the aircraft until the SAR Tech or equipment has safely reached the ground or water.

- b. a CF aircraft sustains minor damages;

- c. there is no injury or damage but accident potential did exist;

NOTE

This includes precautionary power plant shut-down, loss of cargo or slung loads, paradrops, no-damage lightning strike and any other event having accident potential, including damage from bird strikes.

- d. there is a malfunction of life-support equipment or a crew member experiences an aeromedical problem;
- e. there is a near collision (sometimes referred to as a near miss);
- f. there is a jettison, accidental release, inadvertent firing or hang-up of airborne armament equipment or munitions, or an aircraft occurrence involving armaments (see CFAO 71-4 for additional procedures involving armaments and weapons); or
- g. there is damage to civilian or military property.

GROUND ACCIDENT

10. This type of event involving an aircraft occurs when there is no intent for flight, or when there is intent for flight but no power plant start has been attempted, or after the power plants and rotors have stopped, in which one or more of the following results:

- a. a person is missing or receives fatal, very serious or serious injury or illness (BLACK, RED and YELLOW) as determined by a medical officer in accordance with CFAO 24-1. The aircraft equipment or its operation must have contributed to the event to be classified as a ground accident; or
- b. an aircraft is destroyed, missing or has sustained very serious or serious damage.

GROUND INCIDENT

11. This type of event involving an aircraft occurs when there is no intent for flight, or when there is intent for flight but no power plant start has been attempted, or after the power plants and rotors have stopped, in which one or more of the following results:

- a. a person receives minor or no injuries (GREEN or NIL) as determined by a medical officer in accordance with CFAO 24-1, or there is a risk of injury or illness. The aircraft equipment or its operation must have contributed to the event to be classified as a ground incident;
- b. the aircraft sustains minor damage;
- c. there is no damage but accident potential existed;
- d. there is a jettison, accidental release, inadvertent firing or hang-up of airborne armament equipment or munitions, or any aircraft occurrence involving weapons or armaments (see CFAO 71-4 for additional procedures involving armaments); or
- e. there is damage to civilian or military property.

STAGE OF OPERATION

12. This term refers to the task that is being attempted or performed at the time of an occurrence. To ensure consistency in statistical analysis, the stages of operation are categorized as follows:

- a. **Parked:** Power plants and rotors are stopped, and the aircraft is stationary or unintentionally in motion; chocks may or may not have been used. No action is in progress that is directly associated with any other stage of operation.
- b. **Maintenance:** Power plants are stopped and maintenance duties, including servicing, refuelling, inspection, modification, repair and arming, are being performed on the aircraft. Towing, loading and run-up are excluded.
- c. **Towing:** The aircraft is being positioned, or prepared for positioning, by towing, pushing or bear trap handling.
- d. **Loading:** The aircraft is being loaded or unloaded with cargo, passengers or crew or is being prepared for loading or unloading.
- e. **Ground running:** The aircraft is stationary or unintentionally in motion, with a power plant being started, running or being shut down. Temporary pauses in the taxi stage are not categorized as ground running.
- f. **Taxiing:** The aircraft is intentionally moving under its own power on land, a flight deck or water before the application of power for take-off or after the direction of the landing roll is changed to taxi. It also includes aircraft moving by intentional coasting with power plants stopped or taxi operations where there is no intent for flight. It does not include air-taxiing by helicopters.
- g. **Take-off:** Lasts from the time that power is applied for take-off until reaching 500 feet AGL or operating height, whichever is lower. For a deliberate touch-and-go landing, the take-off stage starts when power is re-applied.
- h. **In flight:** In flight lasts from the time the aircraft reaches 500 feet AGL or operating height, whichever is lower, until the landing phase is initiated. Helicopters are considered to be in flight when air-taxiing, slinging, hoisting, rappelling or hooking up or jettisoning loads. Occurrences involving paradrops are also included under this stage of operation.
- i. **Landing:** Landing lasts from the time the landing phase is initiated until the time the direction of the landing roll is changed to taxiing.

HAZARD CONDITION

13. Any actual or potential condition that results or can result in the degradation of the level of aviation safety.

UNIT OF OCCURRENCE

14. This term refers to the unit involved in the event or, in the case of an accident occurring at other than a CF wing or base, an appropriate unit close to the accident site.

UNIT OF OWNERSHIP

15. This term refers to the unit that has control and authority over the aircraft. For ground occurrences, the unit of ownership is the unit, wing, or base to which the aircraft is assigned in order to accomplish a specific operational or maintenance task. The only exceptions are:

- a. for aircraft that are undergoing depot-level maintenance at a contractor's plant, the appropriate NDQAR is the unit of ownership and ADM (Mat) / NDHQ is the headquarters;
- b. for new aircraft being produced for the CF, the applicable NDQAR assumes unit of ownership status from the moment that the aircraft leaves the production line following final assembly, regardless of the acceptance date;
- c. the provisions of subparagraphs above also apply to allied military aircraft that are being maintained or manufactured in Canada under a CF-supervised contract; and
- d. for other non-CF aircraft, the DFS shall make suitable arrangements.

FS REPORT FORMS

16. The forms listed below were created to support the FS Program and unless otherwise indicated, they may be obtained through normal supply action. Some FS forms have been specifically designed for the FS Program, while others serve many purposes.

- a. ADDN Occurrence Report: This form is for ships at sea.
- b. Accident Investigation Tag (NSN 9905- 21 -872-3060): This form is used by investigators to identify and quarantine items during the conduct of FS investigations;
- c. Report of Emergency Escape from Aircraft: This document has no catalogue number because of its limited use, but is available from the DFS; and
- d. Report of Emergency Landing on Water: This form has no catalogue number because of its limited use, but is available from the DFS.

17. FS-related forms. The following forms, although established primarily for other purposes, have specific FS applications as indicated:

- a. Report on Injuries or Immediate Death Form: This form is used to report serious or very serious injuries and fatalities;
- b. Coroner's report: A copy of this report, if raised, shall be included with the medical report; and
- c. CF 777A – Unsatisfactory Condition Report: A UCR is submitted in accordance with CFTOs on conditions, some of which affect FS.

SCOPE

18. A critical requirement of the FS Program is that occurrences be reported. If all events that cause a potential or actual compromise of flight safety are reported, then emerging trends can be identified and analyzed. The analysis then allows appropriate PMs to be devised and implemented. Comds must encourage personnel to report all occurrences and hazards.

REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY

19. Comd 1 Cdn Air Div retains responsibility for the reporting of all FS occurrences involving CF air assets. Comds of commands, formations, wings, bases, and units and managers of contracted organizations responsible for conducting or supporting air operations shall ensure that all FS occurrences, the applicable cause factors and PMs are reported in accordance with the provisions of this

manual. Comds shall ensure that all aircraft commanders, air vehicle operators and all other personnel supporting air operations are conversant with FS reporting procedures.

20. Injuries reported as part of an FS occurrence and under the authority of this manual must also be reported to the General Safety Program and will require investigation in accordance with A-GG-040-001/AG-001.

HAZARD REPORTING

21. Personnel at all levels must maintain vigilance for potential hazards within the work place. This could take the form of unsafe work habits, environmental conflicts, or management direction. When these hazards are recognised, personnel should be encouraged to report them to the FS representatives in their unit. The Hazard Report Form (Annex A) can be used to alert the FS System to potential problem areas. It is available in electronic format on the DFS website. This form may be submitted anonymously or it may be signed. When the unit FS NCM or Officer receives a Hazard Report it shall be assessed for its validity and possible PMs to mitigate it. If the Hazard Report has been signed the person that submitted the report may be contacted for further clarification if desired.

22. The hazard shall be treated the same way as an occurrence with respect to the responsibilities for tracking and closing, and the report will be closed only when the PMs have been implemented or rejected by the appropriate authority. Once a hazard report has been closed, it is essential that the FSO report back to the individual who submitted the report (if identified) on the action taken or why, as applicable, PMs could not be implemented. This all-important step is key if we are aiming to encourage open and honest reporting of hazards.

INITIAL INCIDENT REPORT

23. The FSOMS is normally used to report a simple occurrence. If unable to access the FSOMS, a telephone call or a CF215 FS message report is to be submitted to the home unit for input to the database.

INITIAL ACCIDENT REPORT

24. Immediately following an accident or serious occurrence, call DFS at 1-888-WARN DFS (927-6337) and the chain of command (NDHQ / CanadaCOM / CEFCOM / SOFCOM, and / or 1 Cdn Air Div AOC immediately. An initial report (IR) must follow. See Annex B for Accident Notification Procedures.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCES

25. The following guidelines should be applied to ascertain if an event should be reported as an FS occurrence:

- a. Was there an injury or illness to personnel engaged in or supporting air operations, damage to a CF-owned aircraft or aircraft operated by or on behalf of CF / DND or damage to CF equipment used to support air operations?
- b. Was there potential for injury or illness or damage to an aircraft?
- c. Could reporting the FS event generate a PM that may prevent a similar occurrence?
- d. If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then an FS occurrence report shall be filed.

26. This concept can be directly applied to occurrences involving flight and support to flight operations, however, the concept is more difficult to apply where involvement in flight line operations is less obvious. If flight safety is not jeopardized, then the event should be reported as a general safety occurrence.

FS REPORT CLASSIFICATION

27. FS reports and supporting documentation will normally be unclassified. However, some of the information contained in these reports and documentation is protected under the *Aeronautics Act*, the *Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act*, the *Canadian Human Rights Act* and the *Access to Information Act*. Therefore, FS information will not be released without the express authority of DFS.

OBLIGATION TO REPORT

28. An FS occurrence IR is required for each separate event involving injury to personnel or damage to CF aircraft, air vehicles or support equipment, or when flight safety was affected. If two or more aircraft are involved in a single event, one FS report will normally be required.

OCCURRENCES INVOLVING NON-CF AIRCRAFT

29. Regardless of the report(s) required by non-cf authorities, occurrences involving non-cf aircraft shall be reported as directed in this publication.

AIRCRAFT AT CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS

30. FS occurrence reports are required for each occurrence involving aircraft where there is CF involvement during the periods specified as follows:

- a. new aircraft – except when special arrangements exist, from the time a CF aircraft leaves the production line after final assembly;
- b. aircraft on inspection, repair or overhaul – for the entire period an aircraft is at a civilian contractor facility; and
- c. allied military aircraft under CF-supervised contract – treat as a CF aircraft until it leaves Canada or is accepted by aircrew of the country of ownership.

CONTRACTED AIRCRAFT / FACILITIES

31. Reports are required for each occurrence involving a non-CF aircraft when there is CF involvement. In the case of contracted training, operational flying or maintenance, the applicable contract or memorandum of understanding (MOU) will govern the organization's FS reporting requirement and clearly identify the extent of CF involvement:

- a. non-CF aircraft and facilities under contract to provide support to CF flying operations at or below the wing / base or unit level shall be included within the existing wing / base or unit FS program and will report FS occurrences under the authority of the applicable wing / base or unit comd;
- b. FS reporting by contractors providing support through NDQAR or equivalent third-line maintenance facilities shall report occurrences through an assigned wing FSO familiar with those contractor operations; and

- c. CF aircraft FS occurrences involving civilian aircraft, civilian facilities and civilian aircraft operating at military facilities in Canada shall be reported to the nearest TSB Regional Office. Near misses or similar occurrences involving civilian ATC units are to be reported to the NavCanada Regional Air Traffic Services Officer, and a normal FS occurrence report is to be filed.

OCCURRENCES INVOLVING PARACHUTISTS

32. Occurrences involving SAR Tech personnel jumping from either CF aircraft or CF military conveyance aircraft will be classified as FS occurrences if the event took place during the jump exit, parachute descent or parachute landing. These occurrences will be filed against the tail number of the aircraft from which they jumped. Occurrences after the SAR Techs are safely on the ground are to be handled through the General Safety Officer.

33. Parachute occurrences involving all other parachutists who are jumping from either CF aircraft or CF military conveyance aircraft will be classified as FS occurrences only if the event took place while on board the aircraft during the jump exit. If it is determined that the aircraft or aircraft equipment used did not contribute to the occurrence, then the occurrence shall be reported through the General Safety Officer.

OCCURRENCES INVOLVING UAVS

UNINHABITED AERIAL VEHICLE DEFINITION (UAV)

34. A UAV is defined as a power-driven aircraft that is designed to fly without a human operator on board.

CATEGORIES OF UAVS

35. UAVs are divided into three categories as follows:

- a. Tier one: high-altitude long endurance UAV (HALE) / medium-altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs. These are large UAVs weighing up to several tonnes. They operate at high altitudes and have an endurance as long as 30 hours. They can require runway infrastructure similar to manned aircraft for launch and recovery.
- b. Tier two: tactical UAVs weighing up to 300 kg. They operate at intermediate altitudes as high as 15 km and have several hours endurance. They can be launched by catapult, by booster launcher, or from a short runway or conventional reinforced ramp.
- c. Tier three: small / mini / micro UAVs weighing only a few kg. They operate within a 1 km radius at altitudes of several hundred metres. Endurance is less than one hour. Ideally, they can be launched by hand and as a rule are man-portable.

UAV OCCURRENCE REPORTING

36. UAVs, like any other CF aircraft, are subject to the CF FS Program. UAV FS reporting takes into consideration design, function, complexity and level of skill required for their operation and maintenance. Damage to a UAV component that is designed as consumable will not normally be reported using FSOMS. The following guidelines will apply to the reporting of UAV FS occurrences:

- a. Tier one UAVs: no change from manned systems;
- b. Tier two UAVs: the following items will be reported:
 - (1) complete destruction or loss of UAV or major damage to it,

- (2) engine failure during flight,
 - (3) injury or illness to personnel or potential for injury or illness,
 - (4) uncommanded control input,
 - (5) failure of flight reversionary system,
 - (6) collision with other aircraft or near miss,
 - (7) collision with ground vehicles or infrastructure; and
 - (8) violation of assigned airspace.
- c. Tier three UAVs:
- (1) injuries or potential for injuries, and
 - (2) violation of assigned air space.

OCCURRENCES INVOLVING AIR WEAPONS

37. Occurrences that must be reported and, if necessary, investigated and monitored include:
- a. accidental functioning of an air weapons store;
 - b. inadvertent release or firing of an air weapons store;
 - c. hazardous malfunctioning of an air weapons system or air weapon, e.g. hang-up, runaway gun;
 - d. accident or incident which damages or could have damaged an air weapon or air weapons system; and
 - e. any other occurrence associated with air weapons, air weapons system, or explosives/pyrotechnics used in support of mission that may reflect on the reliability of the air weapon, the air weapons system, the explosives / pyrotechnics, the operating procedures or personnel.
 - f. any occurrence associated with air weapons, air weapons system, or explosives/pyrotechnics from the time it is removed from its ready-use storage with the intent to be used in support of an air mission to the time it is returned to a ready-use storage.

NOTE

In addition to the FSOMS occurrence entry, an Ammunition Defect, Malfunction Report and Disposal Request (CF 410), shall be submitted by the unit armament authority IAW A-GG-040-006/AG-002 for all occurrences where the ammunition / weapon / explosive is faulty, damaged, or the direct cause of the occurrence. The Flight Safety Report number shall be referred to in block 23 of CF 410.

NOTE

In situations where occurrences involving Air Weapons are entered into and investigated within FSOMS, the requirement to file an Ammunition Accident, Incident Report under the Explosives Safety Program is satisfied through the completion of the FSOMS occurrence. Additional Reports.

38. The following additional reports are available to record and promulgate CF occurrence information. These reports can be used by FSOs to ensure command authorities are properly advised of the circumstances surrounding an occurrence.

- a. Significant Incident Report (SIR). This report should be filed when an aircraft occurrence will likely create public interest. DAOD 2008-3 – Issue and Crisis Management governs the production of an SIR.
- b. FS Hazard Report. This form is designed to track and record (through FSOMS) observations on hazardous conditions or deficiencies in the aviation system. A sample form can be found at Annex A.
- c. Report of Emergency Escape From Aircraft (DND 1056). This form shall be submitted by every survivor who has abandoned an aircraft during an emergency situation, e.g. fire, ejection or bail-out.
- d. Report of Emergency Landing on Water (DND 724). This form shall be submitted for every emergency water landing (ditch).
- e. Ammunition Defect, Malfunction Report and Disposal Request (CF 410). This form shall be submitted for all occurrences as per A-GG-040-006/AG-002 - DND Ammunition Accident/Incident/Defect/Malfunction Reports And Disposal Requests.

NOTE

The Ammunition Accident, Incident Report falls under the Explosives Safety Program, not the Air Weapons Safety Program.

- f. Aircraft Maintenance Management Information System (AMMIS) (CF 349 and 543). To be submitted by first-, second- and third-line maintenance facilities when required (C-05-030-001/AG-001 and C-05-030-001/AG-001 govern). Maintenance documentation produced as a result of an FS occurrence must be annotated as an FS occurrence to ensure that the FS investigation is prioritized and to ensure the chain of evidence custody is preserved.
- g. Unsatisfactory Condition Report (UCR). FS UCRs may be submitted to address conditions directly affecting the safety of flight, and when submitted, shall be submitted in accordance with C-02-015-001/AG-000. All FS UCRs shall be coordinated with the FSO.

FS OCCURRENCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

39. To evaluate the effectiveness of their FS Programs, comds and FSOs at every level must maintain records of every FS occurrence and hazard involving their facilities, equipment and personnel. The FS Occurrence Management System (FSOMS) is the primary tool to assist this process and is useful for identifying trends.

40. The FSOMS was developed to meet the automated support needs of the CF FS Program. It provides FSOs at all levels with an ability to input, record and track FS occurrences.

41. FSOMS shall be used to record all FS occurrences. If unable to access the FSOMS or if the situation warrants immediate notification of a serious occurrence, the FS occurrence information shall be forwarded to an FSO by telephone, fax or CF msg using the CF 215 FS message form. Routine FS

occurrences will be submitted to the home unit FSO for input to the FSOMS database. As FSOMS does not automatically inform comds of FS occurrence information, FSOs shall review FSOMS on a regular basis to ensure FS information has been distributed as required.

42. The unit of ownership is responsible for originating the FS report and ensuring it is entered in FSOMS. The unit of occurrence shall also ensure all additional reports related to the occurrence have been completed. In certain circumstances coordination between the unit of ownership and unit of occurrence may be necessary to ensure all pertinent FS information has been recorded.

43. FSOMS development and policy is a DFS responsibility. The training of FS personnel on the use of FSOMS to input initial investigation data and hazard reports is the responsibility of 1 Cdn Air Div FS and will be delivered through the Basic FS Course.

Annex A
Chapter 7
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX A – HAZARD REPORT FORM

FLIGHT SAFETY HAZARD REPORT



Reference: A-GA-135-001/AA-001

You can prevent aircraft accidents by reporting hazards. A flight safety hazard is any condition that has the potential to cause injury or damage. Please take a moment to complete this form. Pass the completed form to your FS staff as promptly as possible so this hazardous condition may be addressed *BEFORE* it causes an occurrence.

The report may be submitted anonymously to any Flight Safety Office or mailed to DFS directly at DFS 2, NDHQ, 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa ON K1J 1J7 (e-mail: dfs.dsv@forces.gc.ca). Reports will be treated in the strictest confidence. The voluntary inclusion of contact details will help the Flight Safety staff to follow up the investigation.

DATE REPORTED: _____

NAME: _____ **RANK:** _____ **UNIT:** _____ **PHONE #:** _____

HAZARD DESCRIPTION: The hazard I observed is

(Use additional sheet if needed)

HAZARD SEVERITY: (Provide your personal evaluation of the potential consequences if this hazard materializes.)

- CATASTROPHIC:** Multiple deaths or very severe equipment losses or environmental damage
 - HAZARDOUS:** Single death or multiple severe injures/permanent disabilities or extensive equipment losses or environmental damage
 - MAJOR:** Single multiple severe injury/permanent disability and multiple minor injuries/temporary disabilities or major equipment losses or environmental damage
 - MINOR:** Single minor injury/temporary disability or minor equipment losses or environmental damage
-

PROBABILITY: (Provide your personal estimate of the likelihood of this hazard occurring.)

- FREQUENT:** Occurs continuously for the entire fleet or aircrew population
 - PROBABLE:** Occurs or likely to occur several times per year for the entire fleet or aircrew population
 - REMOTE:** Occurs or likely to occur one or more times per year for the entire fleet or aircrew population
 - EXTREMELY REMOTE:** Not expected to occur or likely to occur one or more times for the entire operational life of the fleet or aircrew population
-

SUGGESTED SOLUTION:

Annex B
 Chapter 7
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX B – ACCIDENT NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

TYPE OF OCCURRENCE	BY UNIT OF OCCURRENCE OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER OR SENIOR SURVIVOR	BY WING OF OWNERSHIP	BY DFS
“A”, “B” and “C” Accidents Fatalities Very serious injuries Missing persons Missing aircraft Civilian aircraft accident	Notify unit of ownership by fastest possible means. If not practicable, call 1-888-WARN DFS (927-6337).	Immediately telephone: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFS at 1-888-WARN DFS (927-6337) if not done already. • National Defence Operations Centre: 613-945-5551 • Canada COM Operations Centre 613-944-8888 (Joint Command Centre) • Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) Operations Centre 613-995-0454 (Deployed Ops) • Commandement de la Force expéditionnaire du Canada (CANSOFCOM) Operations Centre 613-945-1137 or through NDOC • 1 Cdn Air Div Air Operations Centre (AOC) 204-833-2650. 	If civilian involvement, notify TSB for a coordinated investigation.
	Telephone wing of ownership.	Ensure DFS and 1 Cdn Air Div FS are advised as soon as possible. Brief Duty Officers and confirm details as known.	If foreign military involvement, contact appropriate FS organization.
	If outside North America or Europe, notify the nearest Canadian diplomatic or foreign liaison staff.	If a fatality is involved, notify the local provincial coroner in accordance with CFAO 24-6.	Task an FS investigation.

	Within 12 hours send an FS Occurrence Initial Report using format at Annex E, Chapter 9.	If a civilian aircraft is involved, inform the nearest Air Traffic Control Centre (ATCC).	
	CFAO 24-1 provides direction for casualty reporting and administration.		

NOTE

Cellular phones should not be used to transmit sensitive information such as crew injuries or fatalities.

CHAPTER 8 – POST-OCCURRENCE ACTIVITIES

PURPOSE

1. As indicated earlier, the objective of the FS Program is to prevent the accidental loss of aviation resources. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts of all concerned, accidents can still occur. Accordingly, wings and units must prepare sound plans for this eventuality to ensure that loss of life and injury to personnel is minimized, damage to property is minimized and evidence is collected and protected to facilitate a thorough investigation. In addition, aircraft accidents understandably attract a lot of attention. Therefore plans must include provisions for the timely release of accurate information to the chain of command, next of kin and the media.

RESPONSE PROCEDURES

EFFICIENT RESPONSE ELEMENTS

2. The CO, through the FSO, must ensure the unit is prepared to respond to any occurrence, regardless of location. The occurrence response plan shall include provisions for:
 - a. saving lives and preventing injury or further damage;
 - b. protecting the response team from hazards at accident sites as per Annex A; and
 - c. thorough investigation of every occurrence.
3. The elements of an efficient occurrence response are:
 - a. immediate, accurate and thorough reporting;
 - b. thorough investigation leading to the discovery of cause factors and findings that identify PMs;
 - c. implementation and recording of PMs and feedback of information; and
 - d. periodically revisiting PMs at a later date to ensure that they were properly implemented and have been effective.
4. Operation orders for CF activities involving air assets or support for air assets like exercises, operations and deployments on airshows shall include contingencies for FS occurrences. Comds should use this opportunity to assess the hazards of the operation and risks involved, and draw attention to specific areas where there might be particular concern. These should be highlighted in a statement on the overall importance of FS in the conduct of operations.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

5. Planning is required to ensure that evidence is protected and to conduct a safe and expeditious investigation. Time is most important in post-occurrence activities; evidence may change or be lost, or there may be another accident before PMs can be implemented.
6. In preparing a response to an FS occurrence, DFS will:
 - a. maintain a suitable cadre of trained and accredited aircraft accident investigators;
 - b. maintain an adequate inventory of field investigation equipment including recording devices (audio and video), personnel protective equipment (PPE), communication devices, portable IM/IT and field navigation equipment;

- c. maintain a permanently monitored occurrence notification system (1-888-WARN-DFS);
 - d. maintain arrangements for specialist investigation support from organizations such as AETE, QETE, DRDC Toronto and National Research Council (NRC);
 - e. maintain arrangements for coordinated investigations with other agencies within Canada (TSB) and with other nations (where feasible);
 - f. develop a process that can initiate investigations quickly and deploy investigation teams within 24 hrs domestically and 48 hrs internationally; and
 - g. develop a process that can be used to prepare, revise and finalize FSIs.
7. 1 Cdn Air Div shall:
- a. ensure that units receive adequate training;
 - b. provide guidance in the preparation of accident response plans and review the plans and checklists as part of FS surveys;
 - c. follow up on PMs flowing from SRs; and
 - d. conduct trend analyses to provide FS advice to Comd 1 Cdn Air Div.
8. In many instances, action items are not the responsibility of the FSO. However, the FSO shall ensure that the appropriate actions are taken as required.

ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN REVIEW

9. Each unit shall develop an accident response plan and validate it to ensure that critical actions are not overlooked. This plan should be reviewed and exercised periodically. It shall be held by:
- a. the unit chain of command and UFSO;
 - b. the Duty Officer;
 - c. the Control Tower;
 - d. the Operations Section;
 - e. the Military Police; and
 - f. the local civilian police, fire halls, hospitals, ambulance services, telephone operators and information services.

ACCIDENT RESPONSE COMPONENTS

10. The response plan shall include, in order of precedence, those individuals to be advised. The Aircraft Accident Checklist at Annex B lists the actions anticipated from the organizations concerned in case of a serious accident.
11. The accident response plan should include:
- a. provisions for the immediate involvement of aeromedical personnel;
 - b. training of firefighting personnel in aircraft rescue techniques;
 - c. availability of rescue personnel whenever flying is in progress, including personnel to disarm, remove or safety explosive devices and pressurized systems;
 - d. provision of technical and operational advice to the pilot in an emergency;

- e. a checklist to be used during emergencies by personnel in key positions like CO, DCO, SAMEO, tower, operations, OSCER and FSO;
- f. procedures for recovery or diversion of aircraft;
- g. briefings to the local authorities on how to report an occurrence and what to do at the scene until CF authorities arrive, like liaising with coroner or police;
- h. alert the agencies that must respond to an off-unit site occurrence;
- i. communications for all rescue vehicles and agencies, e.g. Padre, Environmental Officer and PAO;
- j. the accident-rescue grid map of the airfield and surrounding area. Copies should be kept in the control tower, dispatch centres, OSCER vehicle, helicopters, ambulances, fire trucks, maintenance, and other vehicles that must respond to an accident or emergency;
- k. preparations for evacuation and medical treatment of casualties. Make arrangements with local hospitals, fire halls and police for assistance, including briefings on rescue procedures and toxicology requirements for personnel involved in the accident. Copies shall be kept in the tower, ambulances and accident response vehicles;
- l. the search-and-rescue (SAR) plan (water, land or air parties), arrangements for a search centre and for SAR support;
- m. considerations for runway clearance and diversion procedures to allow, if possible, the recording of evidence before wreckage is moved;
- n. procedures for runway clearance, including instructions for the selection, maintenance and use of heavy equipment, cranes, jacks, portable floodlights, spare wheels and slings;
- o. media response guidelines;
- p. security of the aircraft;

NOTE

Whenever sabotage is apparent or suspected, Security Orders for the Canadian Forces apply.

- q. periodic review of instructions, including:
 - (1) the testing or practice of crash alarm systems;
 - (2) the accident rescue response procedures; and
 - (3) the use of training films and other aids;
- r. preparations for safeguarding evidence. Plans should include the following:
 - (1) making video recordings of emergency landings;
 - (2) guarding and protecting accident sites to protect evidence and any contaminated areas associated with the accident site. An accident security team shall be established with a designated comd, who shall be responsible for:
 - (a) if crash site is outside a defence establishment, coordinating with local police authority to identify CF security needs and ask for their support;

- (b) seeking and issuing proper rules of engagement for military personnel;
 - (c) issuing, maintaining and using equipment to support guard operations;
 - (d) developing a shift system;
 - (e) making provisions for transport, money, rations and accommodation;
 - (f) ensuring that communications equipment is functional; and
 - (g) ensuring that provisions are made to set up a single controlled accident site entry / exit point at which appropriate protective instructions and kit will be issued;.
- (3) selecting and briefing alternate security comd and crew;
- s. establishing chain of command for site control, within or outside the defence establishment site, prior to and following the arrival of the FS investigation team;
 - t. selecting, maintaining and using equipment for the protection and collection of evidence;
 - u. using the services of the Recovery and Salvage Squadron (RASS) of ATESS for heavy equipment and diving or dragging equipment to recover wreckage, using both civilian and CF resources (see C-05-010-002/AG-000 – Aircraft Salvage Procedures); and
 - v. preparing for the commencement of the investigation by ensuring that perishable evidence is recorded, personnel involved and witnesses are isolated and requested to provide a written statement as soon as possible after the accident, personnel are instructed to take and ship samples, measurements are taken, accident site diagrams are prepared, appropriate medical exams are conducted, appropriate items are quarantined and impounded as required, witnesses (including start crews) are identified, and weather observations at the time of the occurrence are taken.

NOTE

Annex E amplifies details of the photographic requirements. Custody of photographs must be carefully controlled to ensure maintenance of the chain of evidence custody.

NOTE

A Report of Emergency Escape From Aircraft and / or Report of Emergency Landing on Water may also be required.

COMMUNICATIONS

NOTIFICATION OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES

12. When occurrences involve non-CF aircraft and / or locations and facilities, DFS shall notify the countries involved as required by NATO STANAG 3531, Letters of Agreement and other standing arrangements, so that the actual owners of the aircraft may discharge or take possession of their property and indicate what type of support they require from DFS.

REQUESTS BEYOND SUPPORTING WING CAPABILITY

13. Normally, the nearest practicable wing will be designated as the supporting wing. Requests for assistance that are beyond the capabilities of a wing or a supporting wing shall be directed to 1 Cdn Air Div / CANR Headquarters.

NOTIFICATION TO CORONER

14. In the case of fatalities, the provisions of the appropriate provincial coroner statute shall be respected. The coroner is responsible for establishing the cause of death and is the final authority for the removal of human remains.

RELEASE OF INFORMATION

PUBLIC AND MEDIA QUERIES

15. The release of information to the public is the responsibility of the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). Following an FS occurrence, the FSO or IIC shall maintain contact with the PAO to ensure timely and accurate news releases. Public and media interest must be anticipated and the FSO should be prepared to assist the PAO. When pressed for information, the FSO and IIC should be guided by DAOD 2008. If the occurrence is a significant event in that it involves either prominent persons or circumstances likely to create public interest, there will be a requirement to generate a Significant Incident Report.

16. The FSO and the IIC may be asked to answer questions concerning an occurrence and its investigation. At no time shall they admit Crown responsibility for any damage, no matter how obvious this liability may seem in the circumstances. They should reinforce that the mandate of the FS Program is to investigate to prevent future occurrences and the aim of the investigation is not to assign blame.

17. The investigation team members should be responsive to media or public requests for general or background information, and should always treat reporters politely. The PAO shall be notified of any intent by or request to a team member to conduct an interview related to the investigation.

18. Under no circumstances will the individuals involved in an FS occurrence be interviewed by the media until they are cleared to do so by the IIC.

BRIEFING TO NEXT OF KIN

19. The unit is responsible for keeping family members informed of the progress of an investigation. In the case where the accident involved casualties, the norm would be for DFS to provide the next of kin with an initial briefing describing the FSIR process and provide them with a copy of the FTI prior to its public release on the DFS website. The intent of conducting the initial briefings is to provide the NOK with an explanation of the investigation process and provide them with a copy of the FTI so they can get ready to address the press prior to DFS public release. DFS will also give family members a detailed briefing on the findings, causes and recommendations contained in the final FSIR prior to its public release. Close coordination with Wing and Unit commanders and their advisors is essential to meeting the aim of the briefings while minimizing stress on the NOK and survivors.

INFORMATION NOT TO BE RELEASED

20. To prevent impeding the investigation and to avoid premature or incorrect conclusions, the following shall not be released:

- a. the specific location of an off-site occurrence if rescue procedures would be impeded by sightseers;
- b. names of personnel killed, missing or injured until after their next of kin have been informed;
- c. detailed descriptions of injuries or fatalities;
- d. classified information and / or equipment, including weapons loading;
- e. privileged information, such as witness statements, related evidence and all flight recorder information;
- f. statements that tend to indicate responsibility of the Crown or any person;
- g. statements that imply failure of equipment or facilities;
- h. premature speculation that could jeopardize the conduct of the investigation;
- i. statements on causes to civilians, including news media representatives;
- j. accident statistics, rates, trends, costs of accidents and similar information without DFS authority; and
- k. when civilian or allied military aircraft or installations are involved, anything that has not been approved by their local representatives.

RELEASING INFORMATION TO CONTRACTORS

21. Releasing information to commercial firms under DND contract is subject to QR&O 19.36, in that only general information may be released immediately to contractors, field service representatives or technical representatives. In addition, they may be given other information only as authorized within security limitations to fulfil their contracts. There will be occasions when field service or technical representatives will be enlisted as specialist advisors to investigations. In that case they will be allocated observer status while supporting the investigation.

RELEASING INFORMATION TO NATO NATIONS

22. NATO STANAGs provide guidance for the dissemination of FS information. STANAG 3101 provides for exchange of information concerning aircraft or missiles in common use. Information concerning FS matters arising from the operation of a nation's air services within or over another NATO nation's territory is exchanged under the terms of STANAG 3102.

ACCIDENT SITE HEALTH PROTECTION

23. At most accident sites, there will be dust, chemicals and / or fumes that can be toxic or very hazardous to health. Therefore it is essential to protect all personnel working at the accident site. Equipment must protect the lungs and skin from contact with and ingestion of particles and fumes. The CF has a legal obligation to ensure the safety of all personnel involved in the support of an accident investigation, including any agency or civilian contractor involved in work at the accident site or the salvage operation. Accident Response Plans must ensure that any information regarding dangerous substances is passed to these support agencies. Refer to Annex A for further details.

24. The particulars of all personnel involved in post-crash activities will be recorded prior to entering the cordon placed around the accident site or at the quarantine facility. The nature and duration of each exposure to the accident site / quarantine and the PPE worn during that exposure will also be recorded. This information will be placed on individual personnel files and medical records.

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION KIT

25. Kits must be available at all wings and units operating in isolation. The FSO Accident Investigation Kit is referred to in the tool control system as TLD 1246. Units looking to re-supply their kits can get the necessary information from CFTCCS ATESS in Trenton. The FSO is responsible for the provision and safekeeping of these kits. Because of the value and attractiveness of many of the items, a member of the investigation team is required to be responsible for the kit when it is in use. Annex C lists the recommended items to be contained in the FSO accident investigation kit. There are three types of items:

- a. Hand-portable items. These are likely to be required at every accident site;
- b. Contingency items. These are heavy or bulky items that may be needed on site; and
- c. Facilities. These may be needed on returning from the accident site to complete the investigation.

PROTECTION OF EVIDENCE

SITE SECURITY

26. Security is normally required at every accident site and local police are usually the best option unless the site is very isolated or only accessible to CF / DND personnel. On defence establishments it is the responsibility of the MPs. If the site is outside CF military facilities or what is considered a defence establishment, the local police has jurisdiction. The aircraft commander, the CO or the senior capable survivor may obtain local police or other civilian personnel to perform the initial security.

27. Investigators are not to be tasked with the administration of the security party; thus a separate security comd shall be appointed, briefed and equipped to handle this responsibility.

28. With the exception of established field service representatives (FSR) under contract to DND, company or contractor representatives are not to be permitted access to an accident site or wreckage components unless authorized by DFS. In the case of FSIs, access to the accident site and the extent of investigative participation is left to the discretion of the DFS. Representatives of the news media should be asked to stay clear to protect the evidence on the crash site and for their own safety. They should be informed that a PAO will provide all details which may be released to the public. Cooperation of news photographers should be requested, but no force will be used by CF personnel to prevent them from gathering imagery. The PAO should be advised of any news media in breach of restricted access areas. Similar procedures are to be followed with owners of the property involved, remembering that a full and effective investigation may depend upon a property owner's cooperation.

29. However, when it is impractical or of doubtful value, the CO, having considered the security classification of the components, may decide not to secure the area. COMSEC authorities should be consulted when COMSEC material is present.

30. For accidents or forced landings outside Canada, security will likely be provided by the country of occurrence, particularly if that country is a signatory of NATO STANAG 3531. Whenever CF security is not provided, DFS shall be informed.

SECURITY DUTIES

31. Security personnel must be briefed to ensure that no evidence is disturbed or obliterated, unless it is absolutely necessary in order to save lives or to prevent injury or serious damage. Moreover,

personnel shall have been briefed on accident site hazards and made aware of the PPE required when working on site. If possible, items should be moved only short distances, in straight lines parallel to other parts being moved to preserve the layout of the scene. Photographs and video should be taken before evidence is disturbed and notes made of any explosive charges made safe and pressure systems deflated. The security comd shall ensure that:

- a. doctors, coroners, first-aid personnel, firefighters, rescue teams, aircraft disarming and wreckage recovery personnel, and authorized investigators and photographers are allowed access and are not impeded in the performance of their duties;
- b. civil and military property is adequately protected;
- c. unauthorized persons are not permitted to enter the area; and
- d. following release by DFS, accident aircraft components appearing on the list of classified equipment are accorded appropriate security. Classified equipment may be removed from the site, on approval of the DFS investigator-in-charge (IIC) to ensure security control during the investigation. Ultimate disposal of classified equipment remains the responsibility of the NDHQ Item Manager, or DCOMSEC for COMSEC material.

SECURITY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

32. Outside Canada, the local authorities or locally provided security have jurisdiction for physical security. CF requirements should be made known and CF methods should be tactfully suggested. For details concerning the security of evidence within NATO countries, refer to STANAG 3531, available on the DFS website.

IMPOUNDING ARTICLES

33. Impounding articles refers to safeguarding material to prevent the loss or alteration of all records, documents, films, tapes, and forms that may be required for the investigation. The person designated as the impounding officer shall submit a statement of impoundment to the investigative authority, using the format shown in Annex F. All impounded items shall bear the following notation:

Impounded:(*time, date, month, year*) on the authority of:

(*full details of authority for impounding*)

(Signature and Rank)
Impounding Authority

NOTE

On forms or documents this endorsement should be made immediately after the last entry (see C-05-005-P04/AM-001 for aircraft maintenance record set entries). The endorsement is not to be made in aircrew logbooks or medical and dental documents.

ITEMS TO BE IMPOUNDED

34. Following an accident, the following items shall be impounded:

- a. the maintenance record set, current logbooks and computer records from ADAM or similar systems for the aircraft concerned and its components;
- b. pertinent Aviation Fuel DAND Sampler Reports (CF 907), Equipment Oil Sampling Register (CF 34-2) and Spectrometric Oil Analysis Reports;
- c. aircraft crash position indicator (CPI), flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR), or any other recording devices (e.g. HUMMS, MSDRS, HUD tapes), non-volatile memory chips;

NOTE

DFS will issue handling instructions for any recording devices removed from an aircraft involved in an occurrence.

- d. the flight authorization form, flight plan, passenger manifest and load sheets for the flight in question;
- e. data stored on the Mission Management Application (MMA) can be captured through the “impound” feature;
- f. the crew’s log books;
- g. unit training and standards records;
- h. tower log books and ATC tape recordings. In the case of civilian ATC facilities, contact DFS or DFS IIC, who will make the official impoundment request;
- i. pertinent meteorological records, forecasts and special observations;
- j. pertinent photographic records;
- k. radar unit log books, radar scope tape and voice recordings relating to the occurrence;

NOTE

These must be handled carefully, since they are irreplaceable.

- l. medical records and, in the case of fatalities, dental records and fingerprints from NDHQ / National Defence Identification Service (NDIS); and
- m. any other documents, forms, tapes, films or computer records that are pertinent, e.g., maintenance, arrestor cable or AMSE records.

QUARANTINING

35. Quarantining is the withholding and safeguarding of physical evidence or hazardous items. Such items may include complete aircraft components, equipment, stores, and production lots or batches. Quarantining shall begin as soon as a unit learns of an FS occurrence. Objects to be quarantined shall be removed from use immediately. If the item has a log book, an entry shall be made that the item is quarantined under authority of this publication. In the case of an accident, the person designated by the CO as the quarantining officer shall submit a statement to the DFS IIC using the format at Annex F.

ITEMS TO BE QUARANTINED

36. The following items, if applicable, shall be quarantined:

- a. the aircraft;
- b. the aircraft components (to include software and test equipment used to verify component serviceability) or personal equipment involved or suspected in the occurrence;
- c. the equipment or facilities that last serviced the aircraft with oxygen, POL, armaments or other stores;
- d. any other equipment such as that which may have hit the aircraft, cargo that caused problems, defective ground radar, arrestor cable, starting unit or other facilities; and
- e. any stocks, particular makes or batches of components, like stores and POL, that are suspect.

37. When the facility involved is a civilian contractor for into-plane services, quarantining the facility shall be the responsibility of the appropriate technical services detachment.

ONBOARD RECORDING DEVICES

38. To ensure valuable investigation data is not lost, the following policy will apply:

- a. for any FS occurrence with the potential to be upgraded to an accident or which will be reported by means of an FSIR, all onboard recording devices like the OLM, MSDRS, MDAU, CVR and FDR will be quarantined pending a decision on the requirement to retrieve the recorded data. This decision will be taken following consultation with unit FS Personnel when DFS if necessary. Until that decision is taken, personnel will avoid turning on the battery power or ground power to avoid losing recorded data, such as CVR information;
- b. the quarantine will remain in effect until the data has been successfully downloaded and is proven usable for evidence purposes; and

FLUID SAMPLING

39. Fluid sampling is the gathering and submission of specimens of POL and other fluids for analysis. Sampling shall begin as soon as a unit learns of an occurrence. In the case of an accident, the sampling officer, usually the AFSO, must submit a statement of impoundment to the DFS Investigator using the format shown at Annex F. Sampling procedures shall be as directed in applicable CFTOs; if not specified, use sound engineering practices to prevent further contamination. If contamination is unavoidable, record its nature and if possible obtain a sample of the contaminant. When possible, more than one sample should be taken from each source.

40. Ideally, all fluid sample analysis should be done at QETE. However, the need to avoid operational delays may dictate that a preliminary analysis be conducted locally. Coordination with QETE shall be carried out prior to any local fluid sample testing and QETE will provide either direct or delegated oversight of the tests. In this case, a second set of fluid samples will be sent directly to QETE for analysis.

41. Unless clear evidence exists that contamination or other component breakdown did not contribute to the occurrence, the following items must be sampled:

- a. all entrapped fluids in any wreckage;
- b. all entrapped fluids in any failed or suspect fluid systems such as fuel, oil, hydraulics and oxygen along with associated filters; and
- c. all ground equipment (e.g. LOX/HOX cart, fuel bowser) and facilities (e.g. fuel tank) involved.

42. Custody of samples. Samples must be analyzed as quickly as possible. If duplicate samples are taken they should be retained by one of the following until they are released:

- a. FSO or D/FSO;
- b. DFS;
- c. CO or designate; or
- d. a CF-approved laboratory when authorized by one of the above and when overseen by QETE.

NOTE

Samples shall be labelled with the source component or item, the section or system of that item, the date and time of sampling, the nature of the sample fluid with any known or suspected contaminants, and any other information which will assist in the analysis.

43. The Fluid Sampling Kit (NSN 8115-21-886-4126) should be used, and is to be sent to QETE in accordance with transport instruction contained therein. QETE will send a replacement kit on request.

RELEASE FROM QUARANTINE

AUTHORITY TO LIFT QUARANTINE

44. Quarantine can be lifted as follows:

- a. by DFS thru the IIC for Class I, II and Class III ESR investigations; and
- b. by the WFSO, FSO, CO or a CO's delegated person of authority having the required knowledge to ascertain that the lifting of the quarantine of item(s) will not affect the conduct of the investigation for Class III and IV SR or CR investigations.

PROVISION FOR RECORDING DEVICES

45. Lifting of quarantine for recording devices can only be done once the agency charged with producing the data has advised the applicable authority that the information was successfully downloaded and is usable and that a printed copy of the data has been produced.

RECORDING THE LIFTING OF QUARANTINE

46. Whenever log book entries have been made impounding or quarantining an item of evidence, the following endorsement shall be made in the log book on release of the item:

Released (<i>time, date, month, year</i>) on the authority of: <hr/> <i>(full details of authority for impounding)</i> <hr/> <p>(Signature and Rank) Impounding Authority</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">NOTE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">For aircraft maintenance record sets, see C-05-005-P04/AM-001.</p>
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47. Disposal instructions for certain items may only be issued by the appropriate authority at higher HQ, e.g. the applicable item manager at DAEPM. Before issuing such disposal instructions, the authority concerned must confirm whether the item is to be shipped under an FS quarantine or is to be released from quarantine.

48. Disposal instructions will include one or more of the following actions:
- a. DFS handling instructions for the FDR, CVR, MSDRS, HUMMS or any other recording devices from the occurrence aircraft;
 - b. repair or return the items to normal use, including the return of personal property to the rightful owner;
 - c. return the items to supply or forward for repair and overhaul;
 - d. forward the items to a specified agency, e.g., QETE, AETE or contractor, for further investigation and analysis. Items are to remain under the FS quarantine and must be accompanied by sufficient details to describe the occurrence (e.g., UCR, CF 543, initial / supplementary report). Pack such parts in accordance with D-LM-008-001/SF-001 – Specifications for Methods of Packing, and A-LM-187-001/JS-001 – Packing and Preservation General Procedures;
 - e. retain the items for a specified period; or
 - f. scrap the items.

CIVILIAN REFUELLING FACILITY

49. When a civilian into-plane servicing facility under DND contract has been quarantined by the appropriate NDQAR, the release from quarantine shall be carried out by the CFQAR.

PROCESSING OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

50. Certain items must be handled with particular care and caution to avoid personnel injury or equipment damage and to prevent further damage that might hinder the investigation. Specific handling instructions are outlined below.

ESCAPE SYSTEMS

51. If the occurrence involves an ejection seat or canopy, it should not be moved before the AETE specialist arrives on site.

52. Escape system components involved in ejections or damaged in accidents are to be photographed using close-up, high-quality colour photography before any on-site movement. All escape system components must be safetied by an AETE specialist prior to being shipped as per IIC instructions. Such items include ejection seats and all related components, e.g., leg straps, seat-pack shells, seat-pack / torso-vest contents, and parachutes. These components are to be packed in accordance with appropriate CFTOs to ensure that they arrive at AETE in the same condition as found at the accident site. Applicable armament orders shall be observed before shipping any armament component, and the parts shall be packed in accordance with CFTOs.

53. Ejection equipment is not to be dismantled and parachutes are not to be repacked in their original enclosures. This equipment is to be packaged so as to prevent further damage in shipment. If the seat rocket has not fired, separation of the catapult tubes could cause the rocket to ignite unless the seat is made safe by an AETE specialist.

AVIATION LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

54. In all ejections and in accidents involving injuries, all aviation life support equipment (ALSE) and all items of apparel must be suitably packed, annotated, and shipped to DRDC Toronto. DRDC Toronto should be consulted on proper packing / shipping procedures. Such items include aircrew helmets, oxygen masks, survival vests and contents, immersion suits, anti-G suits, handwear, footwear, flight clothing, and underclothing such as thermal vests, T-shirts and turtlenecks. To preserve the integrity of evidence, in-depth investigation of these items should not be attempted without the approval of DRDC Toronto. These items are to be struck off the appropriate inventory before shipping, as they will not be returned by DRDC Toronto. Personally purchased survival items, crests and badges are not to be removed. They will be returned to the owner when the DRDC Toronto investigation is completed.

DISCLOSURE OF RECORDED INFORMATION

COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER

55. Information stored in the CVR is considered “privileged”. The information can be utilized by the IIC during occurrence investigation but the recording itself and any excerpts or transcripts of the recording will not be disclosed.

FLIGHT DATA RECORDER

56. Information stored in the FDR will normally be used only for the purposes of accident prevention. However, the use of FDR data for maintenance troubleshooting is authorized as per OAA directives.

OTHER RECORDING DEVICES

57. Aircraft can be equipped with different recording devices such as video cameras. If the recording captured only the engine and performance instruments, this data will be handled and treated as FDR data. Recordings that provide details on crew actions and communications will be treated as CVR data.

HANDLING RECORDED DATA

58. All documents associated with a Cat. “A” accident must be handled as prescribed in C-05-005-P04/AM-001, Part 1

- a. whenever an FDR is required by this order, it must be operated continuously from the time electrical power is first available to the recorder before the flight to the time electrical power is removed from the recorder after the flight;
- b. except for data erased as authorized in paragraph (c) below, each certificate holder shall keep the recorded data prescribed by this order, until the aircraft has been operated for at least 25 hours. When an FDR is removed from an aircraft the FDR must either:
 - (1) be retained until 25 hours have been accumulated by the aircraft; or
 - (2) be copied and the data be retained until 25 hours have been accumulated by the aircraft;
- c. a total of one hour of recorded data may be erased for the purpose of testing the flight recorder or the flight recorder system;
- d. any erasure made in accordance with this paragraph must be of the oldest recorded data accumulated at the time of testing; and
- e. in the event of an occurrence (incident or accident) that requires notification of the DFS, the certificate holder shall remove the recorder from the aircraft and quarantine the recorded data.

DATA CONVERSION DOCUMENTATION

59. Documentation sufficient to convert recorded data into the relevant engineering units and discrete values must be maintained by the certificate holder.

FDR DATA CORRELATION

60. A correlation must be established between the values recorded by the FDR and the corresponding values being measured in the cockpit or on the aircraft. The correlation must contain a sufficient number of correlation points to accurately establish the conversion from the recorded values to engineering units or discrete state over the full operating range of the parameter. A single correlation may be established for any group of aircraft:

- a. that are of the same type;
- b. on which the flight recorder system and its installation are the same; and
- c. on which there is no difference in the type design with respect to the installation of those sensors associated with the FDR system. Correlation documentation must be maintained by the certificate holder.

RECORDER MAINTENANCE AND TESTING

61. The data recorders shall be serviced and tested regularly. They are critical for occurrence investigation, especially when the crew is unavailable and the aircraft is totally destroyed, in which case there is little evidence available to the investigators.

62. In the event of an occurrence that requires an FS investigation, the unit shall remove the recorder from the aircraft and quarantine the recorder data. No person shall use or erase any communication pertaining to the flight under investigation that has been recorded by the recorder without the express permission of DFS.

ON-BOARD RECORDING

63. The on-board recording of digital communications is required by all CF aircraft equipped with a CVR and FDR, which are equipped to utilize digital ATS communications and operate in a CNS / ATM environment.

Annex A
Chapter 8
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX A – PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

1. The following PPE shall be available:
 - a. Coveralls. Coveralls shall be comfortable, light and repellent to the great majority of liquids. Since they are very distinctive, they will also assist in site security.
 - b. Gloves. The gloves shall be leather work gloves or service gloves providing adequate protection for most contaminated situations. With liquid contamination, rubber overgloves shall be used.
 - c. Boots. Combat boots provide good protection and should be cleaned or changed before the wearer leaves the site. If there is liquid contamination, rubber overboots shall be used.
 - d. Goggles. The goggles shall protect against splashing liquids and flying debris and provide considerable protection from dust.
 - e. Disposable industrial dust mask. Unlike the similar-looking surgical mask, when this light, comfortable industrial dust mask is properly fitted to the face it allows very little unfiltered air to be inhaled. It provides adequate protection from particulate hazards such as composite fibres, lead oxide dust, depleted uranium dust and asbestos. If fumes are involved, self-contained breathing apparatus will be required.

DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH PROTECTION KITS

2. Health protection kits are issued for aircraft accident sites as per the Appendix 1. These kits will normally be distributed as follows:
 - a. 15-person kits. 5 Wg Goose Bay, 9 Wg Gander, 16 Wg Borden, CFB Edmonton, CFB Gagetown, CFB Petawawa, CFB Valcartier, 438 Sqn St. Hubert, 440(T) Sqn Yellowknife. These kits are the responsibility of the FSO.
 - b. 30-person kits. 3 Wg Bagotville, 4 Wg Cold Lake, 8 Wg Trenton, 12 Wg Shearwater, 14 Wg Greenwood, 15 Wg Moose Jaw, 19 Wg Comox, HS 443 Esquimalt. These kits are the responsibility of the FSO.
 - c. 50-person kits. Two deployable 50-person kits exist for DFS use. They are held by FSO 17 Wg Winnipeg.
3. DFS will dispatch a 50-person kit to an accident site to augment the responding wing's issue if required.

Appendix 1
 Annex A
 Chapter 8
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

APPENDIX 1 – HEALTH PROTECTION KITS

HEALTH PROTECTION KITS			
KIT	KIT SIZE		
	15-PERSON	30-PERSON	50-PERSON
Extra protection – hooded coveralls (size a/a) NSN 8415-21-907-9476	30	60	100
Gloves, work, leather (size a/a) NSN 8415-21-510-5230	15	30	50
Mitten, chemical and oil protective NSN 8415-21-866-6927 (must be purchased locally)	15	30	50
Nitril/latex gloves (must be purchased locally)	90	180	300
Respirator, air filtering NSN 4240-00-629-8199	90	180	300
Goggles, industrial NSN 4240-21-843-3685 (must be purchased locally)	15	30	50

Annex B
Chapter 8
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX B – AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CHECKLIST

- References: A. QR&O 19.36 to 19.375 and 19.41
B. DAOD 1002-2, Informal Access to Personal Information
C. DAOD 2008-0, Public Affairs Policy – Authorities Table
D. DAOD 2008-3, Issues and Crises Management
E. DAOD 2008-4, Public Affairs, Military Doctrine and CF Operations
F. NDHQ Public Affairs Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs)

ACTIONS ON NOTIFICATION OF AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

1. Personnel at the site of an accident and for every occurrence shall ensure that action is taken to prevent loss of life, injury to personnel or damage to property and to protect evidence and classified material against loss, alteration or compromise, irrespective of the locations described in the following paragraphs.

TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION

2. When information is received by telephone, the following should be recorded:
- a. the informant's name, location and telephone number;
 - b. the time of the accident;
 - c. whether there is a fire;
 - d. exact location of accident site and its accessibility;
 - e. location and condition of the crew and passengers;
 - f. immediate medical response no matter what the condition of crew and passengers;
 - g. in the case of a fatality, whether the coroner has been advised;
 - h. whether there is serious property or environmental damage;
 - i. the type and tail number of the aircraft;
 - j. where the rescue team will be met;
 - k. whether local emergency services have been notified;
 - l. any other information that may be volunteered; and

NOTE

The checklist should include the need for phoning the informant back to check authenticity.

- m. the times at which the information was received and when it was relayed to designated recipients.

NOTE

Before ending the telephone call, caution the informant to remain clear of the wreckage, and ask the caller to attempt to deter others from entering the area or tampering with evidence. Suggest that this could well jeopardize the investigation and warn of hazards such as fuel fumes, fire, explosives, dust from composite materials, ejection seats, armaments, jettisonable tanks and pressurized systems.

RESPONSE PROCEDURE AT ACCIDENT SITE

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

3. For every aircraft accident, personnel at the site shall ensure that the accident is reported as quickly as possible and that action is taken in conjunction with local authorities to:

- a. prevent loss of life, injury to personnel or damage to property (including arranging for medical aid, fire suppression, making explosives safe, and SAR); and
- b. protect evidence and classified material against loss, alteration or compromise (including arranging for guards, crowd control and photographing of wreckage before it is removed from runways or before the onset of snow).

4. The immediate response to an accident will normally be under the direction of the firefighters, and if fire or fumes are involved, self-contained breathing apparatus, coveralls, gloves and eye protection may be required. Only firefighters and medical personnel should be directly involved in the immediate response.

5. There must be a strictly enforced policy of no smoking, eating or drinking at the site, as these activities promote the inadvertent ingestion of potentially hazardous or toxic materials from the wreckage.

6. Establish a protected entry point to the site, at which a facility should be erected to enable access control, the donning and doffing of protective equipment, cleaning of boots and washing of hands before departing the site. All disposable gear such as masks, coveralls and gloves shall be removed and disposed of in accordance with appropriate directives.

HEALTH PROTECTION

7. After rescue activity is complete and the immediate threat to personnel and property has passed, the OSCER will give the DFS IIC access to the site. The IIC shall inspect the site in full protective gear to assess hazards. The following should be considered (IAW publication C-05-010-002/AG-000):

- a. Fire hazards. Extreme caution should be exercised if the site is contaminated by fuel. Smoking is prohibited. Aircraft batteries should be disconnected as soon as possible.
- b. Explosion hazards. Qualified technicians should safety all explosives including armaments and explosive-activated devices. Death or serious injury can also be caused by a tire exploding due to a damaged wheel.

NOTE

All personnel are to be kept a minimum of 500 feet from explosive devices and pressurized systems that have been subjected to accident impact forces or fire.

- c. Blood-borne pathogens. All blood, tissue and certain body fluids should be treated as hazardous. Puncture-resistant disposal containers must be available at the site if any of these substances are present. Proper biological hazard warning signs must be placed on the containers. Therefore, FS investigators and immediate accident responders should be inoculated for Hepatitis A and B. Non-disposable equipment such as boots and goggles shall be disinfected at the site.
 - d. Composite materials and toxic substances. Smoke and burning composite materials are toxic and hazardous to personnel and aircraft systems. Carbon fibre released from burning composite materials can be inhaled, become embedded in the eyes, or penetrate the skin or aircraft electrical system with adverse effects. Fibres can also be released in the atmosphere when this material is impacted or cut. For further details refer to C-05-040-012/TS001 – Post Aircraft Accident/Accident Release of Carbon Fibre. Exposed carbon fibre should be covered with plastic or sprayed with shellac. Some aircraft also contain plastics or other materials that give off toxins that may be inhaled or absorbed on exposure. Battery acid and Skydrol hydraulic fluid are highly corrosive.
 - e. Radiation hazards. Although efforts have been made to remove equipment containing radioactive substances, many of the older aircraft still have flight instruments containing radioactive material. The main hazard is from inhalation and ingestion of radioactive particles in dust when this equipment is broken or burnt. Refer to CFAO 34-24, Ionizing Radiation Safety.
 - f. Parts and equipment containing radioactive material are listed in C-02-040-003/TP-000. If a radioactive hazard is suspected, the Base Radiation Safety Officer shall be notified.
8. Once the site survey has been completed, the investigator will determine the protective clothing and PPE that personnel must use.

RESPONSE PROCEDURE FOR FIRST UNIT ADVISED

NOTE

When the unit of occurrence is also the unit of ownership, the actions listed in Para 10 also apply.

9. On the declaration of any air emergency in the area of a flying unit, the occurrence response plan should be implemented immediately. This ensures that medical, firefighting and rescue services are alerted and brought into position. Occurrences at non-flying units should be referred immediately to the nearest flying unit. The following actions may be required after an occurrence:
- a. preventing loss of life, injury to personnel and damage to property through the provision of medical aid, firefighting, SAR and safeying of explosives, pressure systems and ejection seats;

- b. security and protection of evidence, including wreckage (specific instructions regarding classified equipment are to be obtained from wing security officer. If COMSEC material is involved, the wing COMSEC officer should be consulted);
- c. B-GA-100-001/AA-000 and CFMO 42-04 require that all personnel involved in an air or ground accident or physiological incident receive a medical exam, toxicology screen and human factor assessment. This should be completed as soon as practicable following the occurrence.
- d. If there is a possibility that a “D” Category occurrence may be upgraded to an accident, then the medical requirements of CFMO 42-04 must be implemented; all personnel involved in an air or ground accident or physiological incident receive a medical exam, toxicology screen and human factor assessment. This should be completed as soon as practicable following the occurrence;
- e. reporting the occurrence as quickly as possible to the unit of ownership;
- f. taking photographs of the wreckage and other evidence IAW CFAO 53-2 before it is disturbed or obliterated by the elements;
- g. making a preliminary wreckage diagram should it be necessary to move the wreckage prior to the arrival of the DFS investigator;
- h. quarantining, impounding and / or taking samples from applicable items of evidence;
- i. locating and identifying all witnesses to the occurrence, including start crew supervisors and acquaintances of personnel involved (see CFAO 21-9 and A-GA-135-002/AA-001, Occurrence Investigation Techniques);
- j. implementing investigative procedures as required;
- k. assisting investigators by providing the following:
 - (1) administrative and logistic support,
 - (2) wreckage search-and-recovery teams
 - (3) transportation, and
 - (4) accommodation;

NOTE

If provision of these services is beyond the capability of the unit, refer to para 16 Recovery and Salvage section below.

- l. When an FS investigation is convened, the recovery and salvage officer (RASO) assigned to the occurrence is to abide by the recovery instructions from the IIC. Prior to the complete recovery/salvage of the aircraft, the RASO is to liaise with the appropriate DFS investigator (see also DAOD 4003-0, Environmental Stewardship);
- m. instituting or recommending measures to remedy the causes of the occurrence;
- n. observing the deadlines and routing for all reports by the unit of ownership; and
- o. disseminating information relating to the occurrence.

RESPONSE PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OF OWNERSHIP

10. On the declaration of any aircraft accident involving a unit aircraft, the occurrence response plan should be implemented immediately as follows:

- a. ensuring that arrangements at the accident site comply with above section entitled Response Procedures for Unit of Occurrence, and providing the necessary assistance to the unit of occurrence;
- b. ensuring that the occurrence is reported as quickly as possible. The following may require notification or direction with respect to impounding or quarantining, depending on the severity of the occurrence:
 - (1) CAS, DFS (1-888-WARN DFS);
 - (2) 1 Cdn Air Div AOC or through CanadaCOM; CEFCOM or CANSOFCOM;
 - (3) the wing or unit of occurrence;
 - (4) unit(s) of last fuelling, servicing;
 - (5) last unit of departure and other units involved;
 - (6) other units involved (for example, the army unit owning the vehicle being airlifted having developed a fuel leak when airborne);
 - (7) TSB thru DFS if the occurrence involves civilian aircraft and /or ATC agencies;
 - (8) NDQAR (if the occurrence involves a civilian maintenance or servicing contractor); and
 - (9) Director Quality Assurance (if the occurrence involves aircraft at NDQAR).

NOTE

If an Address Indicator Group (AIG) is used, ensure that all other applicable addressees are also included in the message.

- c. Wing maintenance shall immediately refer to their copy of the appropriate security guide, i.e., C-12-XXX(A/C type)-000/AS-000, and prepare a list of classified equipment carried by the accident aircraft. Copies of the classified equipment list are to be given as soon as possible to the following personnel at the designated support wing and NDHQ:
 - (1) the Wing Security Officer,
 - (2) the FSO,
 - (3) the DFS IIC, and
 - (4) NDHQ / DAEPM for the item manager;

NOTE

The wing custodian, assisted by appropriate personnel, shall determine the type and quantity of COMSEC equipment and material on board. The reporting procedures for loss and / or compromise of COMSEC material are contained in CIS/01/2, CF Instructions for COMSEC Material and Accountable Publications. This report must be sent without delay.

- d. quarantining, impounding and / or taking samples from applicable items of evidence;
- e. locating and identifying all witnesses of the occurrence, including start crews supervisors, and acquaintances of personnel involved (see CFAO 21-9 and A-GA-135-002/AA-001, Occurrence Investigation Techniques);
- f. conducting an appropriate investigation of the occurrence or requesting assistance;
- g. disposing of evidence only as authorized. When an FS investigation is convened, the RASO assigned to the occurrence is to abide by the recovery instructions from the IIC. Prior to the complete recovery/salvage of the aircraft, the RASO is to liaise with the appropriate DFS investigator (see also DAOD 4003-0, Environmental Stewardship);
- h. instituting or recommending measures to remedy each cause;
- i. observing the deadlines and routing of all reports by the unit of ownership; and
- j. disseminating information related to occurrences.

RESPONSE PROCEDURE FOR OTHER WINGS OR UNITS INVOLVED

11. On being notified of the occurrence or when so requested, any other wing or unit involved in an FS occurrence shall immediately carry out the following actions as appropriate:

- a. quarantine, impound and / or take samples from local items of evidence;
- b. identify witnesses of the occurrence, including:
 - (1) servicing and start crews;
 - (2) tower controllers; and
 - (3) anyone else with pertinent information;
- c. report the above actions by message to:
 - (1) the wing, base or unit of occurrence;
 - (2) the wing, base or unit of ownership; and
 - (3) CAS/DFS and 1 Cdn Air Div;
- d. assist investigators as required, e.g. providing administrative and logistic support, transportation and accommodation, as required;
- e. institute or recommend measures to remedy each cause of the occurrence that has been assigned as a responsibility of that unit; and
- f. disseminate information related to occurrences.

RESPONSE PROCEDURE BY DFS

12. The DFS occurrence response procedure includes:

- a. for occurrences involving non-CF aircraft, notifying the owners of the aircraft as required by NATO STANAG 3531, Letters of Agreement, or other standing arrangements, so that the actual owners of the aircraft may discharge their responsibilities;
- b. acting as FS advisor to test establishments, technical services agencies and their units;

- c. monitoring 1 Cdn Air Div, wing, base and unit actions;
- d. initiating and conducting DFS investigations;
- e. recommending special investigations when extraordinary circumstances prevail;
- f. reviewing and amending each cause factor as required;
- g. analyzing and recording PMs;
- h. recommending and monitoring PMs as necessary; and
- i. performing analysis, follow-up and dissemination of statistics and accident prevention information arising from occurrence reports.

RESPONSE PROCEDURE BY NDHQ

13. NDHQ agencies shall respond to occurrences by:
- a. providing specialist advice, facilities and special testing as required; and
 - b. implementing those PMs that are beyond the capabilities of subordinate formations.

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

14. The unit of occurrence and unit of ownership must provide the DFS IIC with the assistance required to conduct the investigation. If special technical, medical or other assistance is required beyond that available at the unit of occurrence or unit of ownership, such assistance will be requested by DFS. Special assistance might be in the form of:

- a. airlifting personnel and equipment to and from the accident site;
- b. ground search parties;
- c. shelter and messing;
- d. detectors for locating vital aircraft parts;
- e. underwater recovery personnel and equipment;
- f. infrared scanning for aircraft wreckage location; and
- g. a receiver to detect the underwater acoustic beacon.

15. In addition, specially trained advisors may be approved by CAS or NDHQ to assist in salvage or analysis. In accordance with a letter of understanding between DFS and DRDC Toronto, DRDC Toronto will provide a human factors specialist for all A, B and C Category accident investigations. In addition, a DRDC Toronto Human FactorF/Life Support Equipment member will be provided if requested for examination of non-ejection seat life support equipment. For ejection seat accidents, an AETE ejection specialist will normally be assigned to the investigation team (in accordance with MOU between AETE and DFS).

NOTE

In all cases, DFS must be advised of any such requirements in order to evaluate the benefits and arrange the support.

**RECOVERY AND SALVAGE, COMMAND / CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
GUIDELINES**

16. There are four basic accident scenarios for which different command, control and communications guidelines are applicable; the following directions shall apply:

a. On DND property:

- (1) The unit comd, through a designated representative, shall retain command of the emergency response until the DFS IIC arrives. Upon completion of all pertinent on-scene investigations, control shall revert to the unit comd's representative;
- (2) Duties IAW A-GA-135-001/AA-001 shall be carried out by the FSO or his/her representative(s);
- (3) The unit comd shall ensure the site is cordoned and secured. Access to the site is permitted only on the appropriate authority of the DFS IIC or the unit comd's representative during the pre- and post-investigation process;
- (4) The DFS IIC shall assume the responsibilities outlined in A-GA-135-001/AA-001 and, in cooperation with the unit RASO, shall determine the hazards that exist and the level of protection required;
- (5) The RASO assists the DFS IIC as required. The DFS IIC may direct that the wreckage be collected and relocated for further investigation;
- (6) Accident site communications equipment shall be used, within reason, to ensure communications security. All requests for information should be directed to the DFS IIC through the designated PAO; and
- (7) The unit comd is responsible for the coordination of all activities that support recovery actions, salvage and clean-up of the site. Such activities shall normally be coordinated through the Environmental Officer, who will ensure that all reasonable efforts are made to leave the site in a condition that will not pose any hazard to the public (see also DAOD 4003-0, Environmental Stewardship).

b. Off DND property:

- (1) The supporting unit shall liaise with local authorities, and shall ensure coordinated support that may require a designated representative to be on site. If local authorities are present, military Emergency Response shall assist as required;
- (2) Applicable duties IAW A-GA-135-001/AA-001 shall be carried out by the FSO or designated representative(s);
- (3) If the accident is in a remote area or military flying area, the supporting unit shall ensure site control until the DFS IIC arrives;
- (4) The DFS IIC, in cooperation with the supporting RASO, shall determine the hazards which exist and the level of protection required;
- (5) The supporting RASO assists the DFS IIC as required. The DFS IIC may direct that the wreckage be collected and relocated for further investigation;
- (6) Accident site communications equipment shall be used, within reason, so ensure communications security. All requests for information should be directed to the DFS IIC through the designated PAO; and

- (7) The supporting unit is responsible for coordinating all activities that support recovery actions, salvage, and clean-up of the site. Such activities shall normally be coordinated through the Environmental Officer, who will ensure that all reasonable efforts are made to leave the site in a condition that will not pose a hazard to the public.
- c. Submerged aircraft:
- (1) Emergency Response and SAR shall be coordinated by the appropriate RCC. The supporting unit shall liaise with RCC and provide available support;
 - (2) Applicable duties IAW A-GA-135-001/AA-001 shall be carried out by the FSO or his/her representative(s);
 - (3) DFS shall coordinate any external military / civilian assistance beyond the capabilities of the supporting unit for site security and aircraft recovery and salvage. If non-Air Force assets are required, an NDCC Ops tasking will be issued;
 - (4) In cooperation with the supporting RASO, the DFS IIC shall provide the external agencies with technical advice, notification of possible hazardous material and the associated safety precautions;
 - (5) The DFS IIC may direct the collection and relocation of the wreckage by external military/civilian agencies for further investigation at another site; and
 - (6) Accident site communications equipment shall be used, within reason to ensure communications security. All requests for information should be directed to the DFS IIC through the designated PAO; and
 - (7) The supporting unit, in cooperation with the external military/civilian agency, is responsible for the coordination of all activities that effect recovery actions, salvage and clean up of the site. Such activities shall normally be coordinated through the Environmental Officer who will ensure that all reasonable effort has been made to leave the site in a condition that will not pose any hazard to the public at large. If non-air force assets are required, a NDCC Ops tasking will be issued; and
- d. Civilian airport:
- (1) Local Emergency Response authorities shall be in charge according to existing MOUs and Working Agreements and the Aeronautics Act. The supporting unit shall liaise with local authorities. The Working Agreement in force with TSB shall govern the investigative agency that will lead any investigation;
 - (2) DFS shall coordinate any external military assistance beyond the capabilities of the supporting unit for aircraft recovery and salvage operations;
 - (3) In cooperation with the supporting RASO, DFS shall provide the external agencies with technical advice, notification of possible hazardous materials and the associated safety precautions;
 - (4) The supporting RASO assists the designated investigative agency as required; and
 - (5) Accident site communications equipment shall be used, within reason, to ensure communications security. All requests for information should be directed to DFS through the designated PAO.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT NEEDED ON RETURN FROM AN ACCIDENT SITE

FACILITIES

17. The following facilities should be readily available so that investigators can compile their field reports:
- a. a large secure room to which investigators may have 24-hour access;
 - b. a telephone (preferably a dedicated line);
 - c. competent administrative assistance with applicable security clearance;
 - d. a white or blackboard, markers, chalk and eraser; and
 - e. at least five large tables or desks for examining evidence and laying out the report during assembly.

REFERENCE MATERIALS

18. The following references should be available:
- a. QR&Os and CFAOs;
 - b. B-GA-100-001/AA-001, Canadian Forces Flying Orders;
 - c. 1 Cdn Air Div Orders;
 - d. local orders and instructions; and
 - e. complete CFTO series for the aircraft concerned.

REPORT COMPILATION MATERIALS

19. The following materials should be available:
- a. forms for FS Investigation Report, Ditching Report, and Emergency Escape from Aircraft Report (held by DFS);
 - b. a personal computer with Microsoft Word application; and
 - c. hard covers, fasteners and labels.
20. The supporting unit, in cooperation with the unit of ownership, is responsible for coordinating the activities that affect recovery and salvage operations and the clean-up of the site. Such activities shall normally be coordinated through local authorities and the Environmental Officer, who will ensure that all reasonable efforts are made to leave the site in a condition that will not pose a hazard to the public.

Annex C
Chapter 8
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX C – ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION KITS

HAND-PORTABLE ITEMS

1. The following items should be prepared for immediate issue and easy transportation.
 - a. Publications;
 - b. Survey Equipment;
 - c. Tools and Sampling Materials; and
 - d. Photographic Equipment.

PUBLICATIONS

2. The following publications should be available:
 - a. A-GA-135-001/AA-001 and A-GA-135-002/AA-001;
 - b. photocopies or excerpts from frequently used CFAOs and QR&Os (see Annex D to Chapter 9 for listing of publications);
 - c. CFTOs for unit aircraft;
 - d. the unit telephone directory and a list of local civilian authorities' addresses and telephone numbers;
 - e. notes for the Conduct of Investigations Into Aircraft Accidents, B-GA-015-003/FP-001;
 - f. FS investigation handbooks for the technical and aircrew members; and
 - g. Human Factors Guide for the Conduct of Aircraft Accident Investigation, B-GA-015-001/FP-001.

SURVEY EQUIPMENT

3. The following equipment may be used:
 - a. maps of the area (1:50,000);
 - b. 1,000 feet of light rope or heavy cord, marked at 50-foot intervals;
 - c. a 50-foot tape measure;
 - d. a 12-inch steel ruler;
 - e. a magnetic compass and / or a GPS;
 - f. 50 lightweight stakes;
 - g. a small box of accident investigation tie-on tags (Form CF 219);
 - h. a small pad of accident investigation adhesive tags (similar to the above, but with no catalogue number);

- i. a knife;
- j. a hatchet;
- k. a small shovel;
- l. magnifying glasses (5X and 10X);
- m. spray lubricant;
- n. rags;
- o. small stiff and soft-bristled brushes;
- p. an aircraft fluids sampling kit (NSN 8115-21-886-4126, available through QETE);
- q. three siphons of various sizes;
- r. plastic bags (assorted), non-static bags for permanent memory chips;
- s. carbon fibre ash stabilizer kit including:
 - (1) paper coveralls (various sizes),
 - (2) disposable latex gloves,
 - (3) liquid floor wax,
 - (4) manual spray pumper, and
 - (5) dust masks;
- t. masking and duct tape;
- u. work gloves;
- v. packaged wash cloths;
- w. hand cleanser;
- x. paper towels; and
- y. an inspection mirror.

TOOLS AND SAMPLING MATERIALS

- 4. The following tools and sampling materials should be available:
 - a. wrenches (adjustable);
 - b. pliers and wire-cutters (assorted);
 - c. screwdrivers (several, including Philips);
 - d. flashlight (with spare bulb and batteries);
 - e. hammer, chisel and small portable cutting torch;
 - f. small magnet and string;
 - g. hacksaw with spare blades;
 - h. small wood saw; and
 - i. knife.

PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT

5. Still cameras (traditional 35 mm with colour film, or digital) and video cameras may be used. Ideally the digital camera shall be a 5 megapixel camera with minimum 3X optical zoom with 2 GB of storage capacity.

SURVEY EQUIPMENT KIT

6. The survey kit shall contain the following:
- a. a small first-aid kit;
 - b. pens, pencils, grease pencils and chalk;
 - c. two clipboards;
 - d. notebooks, graph paper and scratch pads;
 - e. tape recorders, spare cassettes and batteries; and
 - f. scale model(s) of unit aircraft.

CONTINGENCY ITEMS

7. The following items are needed only under certain conditions. Notwithstanding the above, all FSOs of frequently deployed units and all Base FSOs must have the items that are scaled on L-49-070-021/LC-092 in their kits and ready for use at all times. Also, all FSOs must arrange to have the following items available for issue to investigators when required, remembering also to provide for necessary transportation of the items to the accident site:

- a. a health protection kit (see Annex A Appendix 1);
- b. tents, bedding, rations and cooking gear;
- c. coveralls, boots, parkas and rain suits;
- d. emergency funds, including foreign currency if applicable;
- e. axes, machetes, chain saws, floodlights and other heavy equipment;
- f. assorted sieves (up to 3 feet square) to sift mud for evidence;
- g. portable lightweight means of on-site communication, e.g., field telephones, portable radio sets or loudhailers, and spare batteries;
- h. protective packing materials, containers and string for shipping evidence from the site;
- i. a tape recorder, spare cassettes and batteries;
- j. a CPI receiver (normally available at SAR units and at the home bases of CPI-fitted aircraft); and
- k. an underwater acoustic beacon receiver (held by SAR units).

Annex D
 Chapter 8
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX D – OCCURRENCE CHECKLIST

This checklist is a guide for the FSO when monitoring occurrence response procedures.

REQUIREMENTS	REMARKS
Receipt and dissemination of basic information. These procedures are to be carried out by the FSO.	Initiate and maintain a log to record critical information, such as names, phone numbers and locations.
Record the initial details of the occurrence.	Note the phone number and location of the contact at the accident site. Check that the information is genuine.
Initiate an occurrence response plan.	Confirm the aircraft tail number and unit of ownership. Determine if the aircraft was armed or carried dangerous cargo or COMSEC.
Give preliminary details to a higher authority by telephone. NDHQ / NDCC, 1 Cdn Air Div AOC, DFS and wing / base / unit must be notified.	Ensure DFS is advised via the toll-free hotline: 1-888-WARN DFS (1-888-927-6337).
Examine the flight plan for en-route stops and ATC agencies.	Advise ATC and servicing personnel of the occurrence and requirements.
Monitor occurrence response planning. Confirm the dispatch of the following, as required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • medical aid • firefighting and rescue • wreckage safety specialists • security crews and • photographers 	All personnel dispatched to the accident site are to receive prior briefing on evidence protection. Wreckage is not to be disturbed unless essential to prevent further injury or damage. Take colour photographs or videos before disturbing. Check provisions for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • transportation • accommodation • rations • finances • communications • special equipment
If the runway is blocked, are plans being made for the recovery of airborne aircraft?	

REQUIREMENTS	REMARKS
If an exercise, deployment or airshow is in progress, the unit should be umpired out and communications restrictions waived.	
Request all necessary external assistance (e.g., SAR, heavy equipment).	
Ensure that Public Affairs is aware of the details.	The exact accident location shall not be mentioned in radio or TV reports. The public should be advised to stay away from the site and its access routes.
Locate the flight data recorder / cockpit voice recorder and CPI, if fitted. Impound and quarantine these items and turn them over to the DFS investigator.	Shut off the CPI transmitter.
The Occurrence Response Plan should have provisions for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. notifying the next of kin; b. notifying a coroner or nearest civil authority IAW CFAO 24-6; and c. reporting property and environmental damage. 	
Obtaining initial evidence. These procedures are to be carried out by the FSO.	This should include written witness statements taken in isolation.
Determine the category of aircraft damage.	Always include the damage category in the initial report. If an accurate assessment is not possible within the time frame for the dispatch, indicate an estimated damage category.
Determine whether DFS investigative assistance is required.	DFS tasks all Class I to III investigations as per Chapter 9, Annex B. DFS should be informed of any significant D Cat Category occurrence.
Ensure all evidence and wreckage is photographed before being disturbed.	Record any instances in which evidence was disturbed.
Ensure an appropriate medical authority has been notified.	CFAO 24-1 injury Class.
<p>NOTE</p> <p>B-GA-100-001/AA-000 and CFMO 42-04 require that all personnel involved in an air or ground accident or physiological incident receive a medical exam, toxicology screen and human factor assessment. This should be completed as soon as practicable following the occurrence. If there is a possibility that a D Category occurrence may be upgraded to an accident, then the medical requirements listed above must be actioned.</p>	

REQUIREMENTS	REMARKS
Prepare a preliminary wreckage diagram.	See A-GA-135-002/AA-001.
Record a brief description of the accident site.	Include the current and forecast weather and the extent of fire and property damage.
Ensure that impounding, quarantining and sampling actions are in hand (see Quarantining, this chapter).	
Ensure that special weather observations are taken.	
Record the events leading up to the occurrence.	Record: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the planned mission • the T/O time • the direction of the flight • the impact angle • whether the accident was preceded by fire or smoke • any ejections • any parachute descents • any unusual manoeuvres • or noises • the weather at the time
Note the present location of the aircraft commander or senior survivor.	
Locate all witnesses to the occurrence and preceding events. Include the last people to speak with the pilot, such as friends, supervisors and start crew. Try to secure a written statement from all witnesses available. Ensure the witnesses will be available by securing contact information, such as home and cellular phone numbers.	
<p>NOTE</p> <p>If, at any time during the gathering of evidence or the investigation of the event, it becomes apparent that action should be taken before the completion of the investigation to prevent a recurrence of the event, that action is to be taken in consultation with the DFS investigator. Comments should be added to the investigation record detailing the action taken. This will normally be actioned by message.</p>	
Complete the IR occurrence report (FSOMS or CF 215) in all available detail.	Ensure all necessary addresses are included. Report any sabotage in accordance with A-SJ-100-001/AS-001.
Convening the investigation. These procedures are to be carried out by the DFS, DFSO or FSO.	

REQUIREMENTS	REMARKS
Determine the type of investigation required.	See Chapter 9, Class of Investigation, commencing at Para 19.
Establish contact with the investigators.	
Determine if an interpreter or liaison officer is required, and if so, coordinate.	STANAG 3531 (10B), ICAO 13 and ASCC Air Standards 85/2A deal with procedures for accidents involving foreign aircraft.
Establish the terms of reference.	
Issue tasking orders to all concerned e.g. heavy equipment and RAS.	
Arrange a briefing for the investigators.	
Provide for these administrative services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • administration • finance • photographic support • accommodation • rations • protective clothing • communications • transportation • special equipment 	
Check kit contents and issue an investigation kit.	
NOTE Casualties must be reported in accordance with CFAOs.	
NOTE When an accident or incident involves injury or death to civilian personnel, the occurrence must also be reported in accordance with A-GG-040-001/AG-001, DND General Safety Program. Ensure the coroner is also informed.	
NOTE If the occurrence results in the release of fibres from composite material, notification procedures must be completed in accordance with part 6 of C-05-040- 012/TS-001, Post Air Crash Accident.	
NOTE A register is to be kept to document the exposure of personnel to free composite material fibres in accordance with Part 4, Chapter 25 of C-05-040-012/TS-001.	

Annex E
Chapter 8
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX E – PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO COVERAGE

Reference: CF Imaging Instructions, A-PH-007-000/AG-001

INTRODUCTION

1. Any photographic or video coverage of an aircraft accident is an extremely valuable record. It assists in the determining the exact cause(s) of an accident, thus facilitating remedial procedures and suggesting training to prevent a recurrence. The reference is the official document governing photographic and video coverage in support of aircraft accident investigations. This annex is based on that document and shall serve as a quick field reference for any photographer assigned to the investigative team.

PHOTOGRAPHIC WORK ORDER

2. Accident response procedures shall incorporate local procedures to facilitate the timely arrival of the Imagery Technician at the accident site. Photographic coverage will normally be carried out under the direction of the investigating authority on the scene. The investigating authority could be a DFS investigator or an FSO. Unless specifically stated otherwise at the time of the request, the request for photographic coverage will be considered an emergency, and the requirement for the originator to complete a CF315 (Photographic Work Order) prior to the commencement of work will be waived. It is the responsibility of the photographer on site to ensure that a CF315 is completed by a member of the accident / fire investigation team as soon as practicable after the initial response.

PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE

3. If the photographer arrives on the scene ahead of the investigating authority, he / she is to commence taking photographs in accordance with a list describing the minimum coverage required. Photographs need to be taken in the case where fatalities have occurred and the CO / OSCER has authority from the coroner to remove the remains before his arrival (refer to Para 8, y below).

PERSONNEL SAFETY

4. Imaging Technicians, including contracted photographers, must be aware of the health hazards inherent in burning aircraft that are constructed of composite materials and the release of carbon fibres. Personnel are not to approach any burning aircraft until it has been established safe by competent authority (OSCER, AERE Technical or DFS investigating officer). All Imaging Technicians who potentially may be involved in photographing burning aircraft shall become familiar with the content of *Post Aircraft Accident/Accident Release of Carbon Fibres (C-05-040-012/TS-001)*. Appropriate caution must also be exercised where hazards are created by unburned fuel, POL, hydraulic fluids and possible unexploded armaments.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF IMAGE RECORDS

5. It is the responsibility of the photographer on site to contact the investigating authority and confirm the security classifications that may apply, as soon as this is practicable. Negatives, prints,

transparencies, digital pictures or video images constituting an imagery record shall be handled as CONFIDENTIAL until the investigating authority assigns a more appropriate security classification or designation in accordance with the *National Defence Security Policy*. Similarly, all photographic coverage that depicts human remains shall, as a minimum, be designated PROTECTED B until the investigating authority assigns a more appropriate security designation.

CONTROL OF IMAGERY

6. Imagery acquired by CF Imagery Technicians shall be identified and catalogued in accordance with the Reference, Chapter 9. All coverage of an accident site is considered part of the accident investigation. In addition to that provided by the Imagery Technician, it includes coverage obtained by the pathologist, DFS investigator, military police, firefighters, accident truck operators, ATC tower personnel or anyone else who, by virtue of their responsibilities, is required to be at the accident site and who may have taken such coverage with privately owned equipment. Under the direction of the investigating authority, all coverage of this type shall be turned over to the unit Imaging Section for official recording and processing. FS investigators and photographers might be the first persons on site. Because imagery is considered as factual info, it is releasable to Board of inquiry and criminal investigators if required. Therefore, Imagery Technicians involved in an FS investigation need to maintain chain of evidence custody of the imagery taken on the accident site for possible release to other investigations. Photographic prints, transparencies and video tape recordings can only be released under the authority of DFS and shall conform to the provisions outlined in this publication.

STILL AND VIDEO COVERAGE OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS

7. The photographer shall:
- a. label each roll of film by photographing an identification card at the beginning of each roll;
 - b. maintain an image log describing every shot taken;
 - c. include a scale reference such as a ruler in the picture, whenever practical; and
 - d. when shooting video, pan slowly over the scene and leave room for editing.
8. When photography is undertaken without the direction of the investigating authority, minimum coverage, where possible, shall include:
- a. once the emergency rescue team / OSCER or accident crew have declared the area safe, the photographer shall ensure photos and video coverage are taken before the wreckage / evidence are disturbed or obliterated by the elements;
 - b. an overall view of the accident scene showing the damaged aircraft (with identification and insignia, if possible), supplemented by two general photographs from different cardinal setting positions; if facilities permit, and the wreckage is strewn over an extended area, a view from the air is desirable;
 - c. a general view from a vantage point closer than that taken above, clearly showing the aircraft number;
 - d. an overall view of the area surrounding the accident scene, including nearby objects, to show the approach of the aircraft and the weather conditions;

- e. if the accident occurred in trees or bush, a view showing broken tree-tops with a person in the scene to indicate the approximate scale;
- f. a view from the aircraft towards the first point of impact;
- g. a view of each point of impact with skid marks leading to the aircraft or, where wreckage extends over a large area, general views taken at various distances from the first point of impact to the main part of the aircraft wreckage;
- h. marks on aircraft from cartwheel impact to aid correlation with ground marks and possible loose paint flakes;
- i. where wreckage is strewn over a large area, general views from the first point of impact to each main part of the wreckage as guided by marks made, and showing the marks made by parts of the wreckage on the ground;
- j. close-up views of each main part of the wreckage such as the fuselage, wings, rotor blades, engines, tail assembly and tail rotor to record the damage;
- k. a view of the flaps from the tail position, supplemented by a close-up of flaps to show the angle of flap deflection (include a ruler to indicate the scale);
- l. views of the cockpit to include operating controls, fuel selector(s), fuel, radio, electrical control and circuit breaker panels; on dual control aircraft, similar views of both cockpits; if flying was solo in a dual control aircraft, a photograph of the physical positions of the stick/yoke, throttle, landing gear, flap controls and safety harness;
- m. a general view of the undercarriage area; if undercarriage is retracted, views of the underside of the aircraft after the aircraft has been lifted at least six feet above the ground;
- n. photographs of any fluid leakage on any parts of the aircraft, like the engine cowlings, windscreen and fuselage;
- o. photographs of fire/heat damage or discoloration;
- p. photograph of human remains, injuries and blood/tissue smears on wreckage;
- q. photograph of extra or missing items;
- r. if the aircraft was propeller-driven, a view of any marks on the ground made by the propellers with the aircraft in the background and a view to show the degree of pitch on the propeller hub (with a scale indicator);
- s. where appropriate, view(s) showing propeller impact marks on the ground that show length of slashes and distance between slashes, and detailed views of slash marks (front or rear) that show traces of propeller abrasion marks or paint flakes;
- t. close-up views of damage to property that might result in a claim by or against the Crown;
- u. close-ups of fracture surfaces;
- v. close-ups of improperly installed components or any components suspected of having contributed to the damage;
- w. photographs of seats, restraining harness, helmets, parachutes and all other items of life support and safety equipment used;

- x. photographs of steps in removing, opening or cutting apart components; and
- y. when a fatality has occurred and before the remains are removed from the accident scene, photographs shall be taken and shall include views of the general position of the remains in relation to the aircraft, as well as medium to close-up detail views from all angles to show injury patterns and identification; in addition, photographs with a visible scale reference shall be taken to show the relationship of the remains to nearby life-support equipment.

Annex F
Chapter 8
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX F – STATEMENT OF IMPOUNDING / QUARANTINING / SAMPLING FORM

STATEMENT OF IMPOUNDING / QUARANTINING / SAMPLING

I, (SN, rank, initials, surname), in my capacity as (position), did (impound / quarantine / sample) the items of evidence listed below which pertain to the occurrence on (date) to (type of aircraft) tail (number).

ITEM	DATE/TIME	IMPOUNDED/QUARANTINED/SAMPLED	DISPOSAL OF ITEM	PRESENT LOCATION OF ITEM

(Date)

(Signature)

CHAPTER 9 – INVESTIGATIONS

Reference: CFAO 24-1

INTRODUCTION

1. FS occurrences result in or have the potential to cause the loss of aviation resources. It is therefore important to investigate appropriate occurrences with the objective of quickly identifying effective PMs that will either prevent or reduce the risk of a similar occurrence. This chapter outlines the authorities for investigations, the occurrence classification system, the investigation classification system and the types of FS investigations done by DND / CF.

DEFINITIONS

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE

2. Damage is defined as physical harm to an aircraft that impairs the value or normal function of that aircraft. Damage is said to have occurred when the aircraft or any portion of it is lost or requires repair or replacement as a result of unusual forces like a collision, impact, explosion, fire, rupture, or overstress. Damage does not include faults that progressively develop from repeated applications of load at or below the design operating limits of the aircraft as a result of normal flight stresses. Additional damage resulting from stress failures may be classified appropriately as damage. Routine system or component unserviceabilities are not considered to be damage, and need not be reported unless the originator feels that there was injury or damage potential.

NOTE

If the equipment has not been misused or subjected to unusual stress failures, it shall not be classed as damage, but as normal wear resulting from prolonged service use.

AIRCRAFT MAJOR COMPONENTS

3. Aircraft major components are:

a. Fixed wing:

- (1) the fuselage, cargo ramp and major structural sections thereof, but does not include canopies, jettisonable stores, windows, astrodomes, antennae, radomes, MAD booms, aerodynamic braking devices, small non-structural panels, doors or hatches, and non-integral nacelles,
- (2) the wings and major structural sections thereof, but not including the wing-tips, non-integral nacelles, spoilers, flaps, ailerons or other control-of-lift devices, and
- (3) the empennage and major structural sections thereof (vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, and stabilator), but not including the rudder or elevator;

b. Rotary wing:

- (1) the fuselage, cargo ramp and major structural sections thereof, but does not include, windows, astrodomes, antennae, radomes, small non-structural panels, doors or hatches, and non-integral nacelles,

- (2) the main rotor and tail rotor blades system, main transmission, and gearboxes but not including the drive shafts,
 - (3) the helicopter tail boom and pylon, but not including the fairings, non-integral vertical or horizontal stabilizers or synchronized elevators, and
 - (4) the landing-gear oleos, legs, struts, sponsons and similar weight-supporting members and structures, but not including the tail wheel strut or support assemblies, wheels, floats, shoes, skis, helicopter cross-tubes or skids, non-integral removable axles, brakes, tires, gear doors or actuating rods; and
- c. UAV major components. UAV major components will be defined on a case-by-case basis as determined by individual UAV type and consultation with DFS.

DFS INVESTIGATOR-IN-CHARGE

4. A trained accident investigator appointed by DFS. The IIC reports to the DFS for all aspects of the investigation. All activities of personnel involved in the investigation are to be coordinated through the IIC.

FS INVESTIGATION

5. A flight safety investigation (FSI) refers to any investigation conducted under the terms of this publication for the sole purpose of occurrence prevention.

FS INVESTIGATION REPORT

6. The report produced in support for a Class I or most Class II FSI into the circumstances of a particular FS occurrence, and subsequently commented upon by various levels of command and the PDIs is titled a FSI Report (FSIR).

POWER PLANT

7. The power plant includes the engine, engine-driven components and related systems, including propellers, afterburners, fans and the like.

PERSONS WITH A DIRECT INTEREST

8. A PDI is a person, in the opinion of DFS, whose behaviour or the performance of whose products or organization may be commented on in the report and whose rights or reputation, or his/her product reputation may be adversely affected by the report. Typically, PDI status is given to crew members, the CO, Comd 1 Cdn Air Div and contractors directly involved in the operation maintenance or manufacturing of the aircraft.

NEED TO INVESTIGATE

9. FS occurrences result in or have the potential to cause a loss of resources. Therefore, any occurrence that could lead to the identification of causes and determine effective PMs will be investigated. This chapter describes the tasking authorities and necessary protocols for the conduct of FSIs.

AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE

10. The *Aeronautics Act* and A-GA135-001/AA-001, Flight Safety for the Canadian Forces, provide the authority to investigate FS occurrences. These documents define terminology, responsibilities and procedures for investigation. The A-GA135-002/AA-001 also provides guidance for terminology and prescribes procedures specific to investigative techniques.

FSI CONVENING AUTHORITY

11. DFS is the convening authority for Class I and Class II investigations as well as Class III investigations done in the form of an ESR. The convening authority for a Class III and IV investigations is the WFSO.

INVESTIGATION RESPONSIBILITIES

DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

12. The MND has designated DFS as the Airworthiness Investigative Authority for the CF. DFS shall ensure that occurrences as defined in this document are documented and investigated as required. In principle, the completion of a Combined Report or a Supplementary Report constitutes in itself an investigation, although it may consist of the simple gathering of facts as done for occurrences labelled as Repetitive Occurrences (ROs).

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

13. The unit CO shall ensure that all FSIs affecting aircraft under unit control are investigated. If an investigation is impractical for the unit of ownership to investigate, the WComd / Comd 1 Cdn Air Div and DFS shall be advised.

OCCURRENCE CATEGORY

14. FS occurrences are categorized according to the overall seriousness of the occurrence.

15. The occurrence category is an alphabetical designation assigning an overall seriousness classification to an occurrence.

- a. aircraft damage level (ADL); or
- b. personnel casualty level (PCL).

16. Occurrence categories range from A to E for both air and ground occurrences, with A being the most serious and E identifying situations where, although no damage occurred, the potential for an accident or injury existed. Annex A details the Occurrence Category to be assigned to an occurrence based on the ADL and PCL.

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE LEVEL

17. The ADL is a qualitative categorization system used to determine the level of damage sustained by an aircraft during an occurrence. The following damage level definitions are used to reflect the degree of damage:

- a. Destroyed / missing: The aircraft has been totally destroyed, is assessed as having suffered damage beyond economical repair or is declared missing.

NOTE

Aircraft totally destroyed are normally written off the inventory. Accidents with a lower ADL may subsequently result in administrative write-off of the aircraft for reasons not directly related to the damage. The original ADL will be recorded in the FSOMS for statistical purposes.

- b. Very serious: The aircraft has sustained very serious damage to multiple major components requiring third-line maintenance.
- c. Serious: The aircraft has sustained serious damage to a major component requiring third-line maintenance.

NOTE

For very serious or serious damage levels, third-line maintenance is considered applicable if the damaged component is shipped to a contractor or a third-line facility for repair, the repair is carried out in part or in full by a mobile repair party from a contractor or third-line facility dispatched specifically for that purpose, or the repair is carried out by a third-line maintenance capability integral to a military unit.

NOTE

When a fuselage, wing, helicopter drive train or rotor blade are damaged beyond economical repair or are shipped to a repair facility, the level of damage will be referred to DFS for categorization (e.g. rotor blade change is minor damage, multiple blade changes is serious damage, transmission overspeed requiring overhaul is minor damage, sudden stoppage requiring complete change of drive train is serious damage).

- d. Minor: The aircraft has sustained minor damage or damage to non-major components requiring normal second-line maintenance repair.

NOTE

When there are unique contractual maintenance arrangements in place that preclude CF personnel from performing repairs that are considered within second-line maintenance, the case will be referred to DFS, who will assign the ADL.

- e. Nil: The aircraft, including the power plant, has not been damaged.

PERSONNEL CASUALTY LEVEL

18. The PCL is a colour-based categorization system used to identify the most severe casualty suffered by personnel in an FS occurrence. The PCL is determined by a medical officer in accordance with

CFAO 24-1. The PCL assigned for an occurrence is defined as follows:

- a. BLACK. BLACK is the PCL level assigned when a fatality has occurred;
- b. GREY: GREY is is the PCL level assigned when personnel is missing;
- c. RED. RED is the PCL level assigned when personnel is very seriously injured or ill and the person's life is in immediate danger;

- d. YELLOW. YELLOW is the PCL level assigned when when personnel is seriously injured or ill. There is cause for immediate concern but the patient's life is not in immediate danger. Usually the person is non-ambulatory; and
- e. GREEN. GREEN is the PCL level assigned when personnel is moderately ill or injured in an occurrence for which medical attention is needed but there is no immediate concern. Usually the person is ambulatory.

CLASS OF INVESTIGATION

CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING FSI CLASS

19. In order to assign investigations to the appropriate authority, an occurrence investigation classification system is used. The purpose of classifying FSIs is to determine the amount of time and resources that will be devoted to the investigation. The type of investigation into an occurrence and the level of effort will be determined by an assessment of the following three criteria:

- a. the occurrence category;
- b. the safety of flight compromise level; and
- c. other factors which could impact on the reputation of the FS Program, the CF and the Department.

20. FSIs will be classified I to IV based on the above criteria. Annex B shows the Class assigned based on these criteria.

SAFETY OF FLIGHT COMPROMISE LEVEL

21. The SFCL is categorized with a qualifier that describes the level to which safety margins were compromised during an occurrence. By extension, it provides an indication of how much the crew and / or aircraft were put at risk.

- a. Extreme. The aircraft and / or crew were exposed to an extreme risk and the outcome of the occurrence could have been catastrophic and might have resulted in the loss of life or the aircraft;
- b. High. The aircraft and / or crew were exposed to a significant risk and the outcome of the occurrence could have been hazardous and might have resulted in very serious injury or damage to the aircraft;
- c. Medium. The aircraft and / or crew were exposed to a moderate risk and the outcome of the occurrence could have been major and might have resulted in serious injury or damage to the aircraft; and
- d. Low. The aircraft and / or crew could potentially have been exposed to minor risks if the hazard was left uncorrected and this exposure might have resulted in minor injury or damage to the aircraft.

OTHER AGGRAVATING FACTORS

22. There are other factors that may elevate the level at which an occurrence is investigated. If a higher level of investigation might lead to a more effective reduction of risk to persons, property or the environment then this level should be assigned. Consideration shall also be given to maintaining the trust of CF personnel and the general public in the FS Program and the CF by having occurrences investigated at the appropriate level.

FSI CLASS REPORT

23. Each FSI Class requires the production of a report format as follows:
- a. Class I: FSIR;
 - b. Class II: FSIR, A/FSIR or ESR;
 - c. Class III: ESR or SR; and
 - d. Class IV: CR or SR.

CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS

24. DFS conducts all Class I and Class II investigations. A specific FSO will be tasked by DFS to conduct any Class III ESR. All other investigations are conducted by unit FSO and are released by the supporting wing FSO. Some occurrences are repetitive in nature and limited benefit would be gained by carrying out a full-scale investigation. Basic investigation technique, such as RO, as defined below could then be used for selected Class III and IV investigations.

REPETITIVE OCCURRENCES

BACKGROUND

25. Some occurrences are repetitive in nature and limited benefit may be gained by carrying out a detailed investigation. In the past, the term “For Tracking Purposes Only” (FTPO) had been used in FSOMS to track these occurrences but little guidance was provided for the management of such occurrences and the criteria used to qualify an occurrence as FTPO were inconsistent. Further, the term FTPO gave the impression to FS staff that no investigation had been carried out and that the data was more or less valuable for trend analysis. A simple methodology requiring minimal effort is required to capture these occurrences as they provide valuable statistical data.

DEFINITION OF REPETITIVE OCCURRENCE

26. A Repetitive Occurrence (RO) is defined as a recurring type of FS incident where the event and investigation results are consistent with a previous investigation. The use of an RO is limited to a SR or a CR.

27. Typical ROs are the Cormorant tail rotor half-hub cracks, bird strikes with little to no damage and the Griffon chip light detectors occurrences. Given the repetitive nature of these incidents and the limited potential to find new causes and original PMs, a rudimentary investigation is still required to ascertain the facts and confirm the occurrence is similar in all aspects.

RO CONDITIONS

28. To qualify as an RO, an occurrence must meet the following conditions:
- a. the personnel involved has suffered no injury;
 - b. the aircraft has sustained only minor or no damage;
 - c. the PMs and cause factor(s) for the investigated occurrence is/are in line with a reference occurrence; and
 - d. the FS risk and aggravating factors, if any, are in line with the reference occurrence which will serve as the initial RO.

RO STAFFING, APPROVAL AND MONITORING

29. Any occurrence which will be treated as an RO must refer to an original FSOMS reference ID # for which a detailed investigation was completed. It will use the same key words, cause factor(s) and PM(s) of the reference RO.
30. The DFSO staff monitors the occurrences reported by different wings and is the approving authority to accept a type of occurrences as an RO. If it is determined that a certain type of occurrences should be treated as a RO, the FSO or WFSO shall submit a request to the DFSO for approval and inclusion on the RO master list. The suitability of the RO designation will be evaluated by the DFSO staff and approved, as applicable. The WFSOs and FSOs of affected units will be informed of the newly approved RO. The approved RO list will then be updated by the DFSO staff and posted on the FS Intranet site.
31. By keeping track of ROs, DFS can initiate more detailed analysis if some concerns are identified or as required. The RO list shall be reviewed annually for suitability by the FSOMS WG and briefed as an agenda item at the DFS annual seminar.

FSI TEAM SELECTION

32. FSI team personnel are tasked by the appropriate FS tasking authority. The selection of the IIC and FSI team members for Class I, II and Class III ESRs occurrences is determined by DFS.
33. DFS will task the investigation of certain Class III ESR occurrences to Wing. The tasked member shall liaise with DFS for support and guidance, as required.

INVESTIGATOR-IN-CHARGE

34. All FS investigations will have an IIC. This is normally the WFSO for Class III or IV investigations. The IIC for Class I or II investigations should be a DFS accident investigator currently employed at DFS. In unusual circumstances, DFS may appoint another trained investigator who is not currently employed at DFS. Anyone tasked to conduct an FSI shall be excused from all other duties until released from the investigation by DFS. The IIC reports to DFS for the conduct of the investigation.
35. The IIC has the authority to quarantine and impound evidence, interview witnesses and examine documents and equipment related to the occurrence. Additionally, the IIC can requisition toxicological samples, as required, from personnel involved in the occurrence. Detailed process guidance for the investigation is promulgated in A-GA135-002/AA-001.

36. The mandate of the IIC is to conduct an investigation of the occurrence, gather factual information, analyse the information and conclude with findings and recommendations and submit a report on the FSI in the mandated format. While deployed for this effort, the IIC shall remit daily SITREPs as per Annex C to DFS. For ESRs, the IIC will liaise through an appointed DFS desk officer.

MEMBERS AND ADVISORS

37. Personnel assigned to an FSI team are tasked by DFS and will report to the IIC until released from duty by DFS. Unless there is no reasonable alternative, a team member should not be selected from the unit of occurrence. The circumstances of the occurrence will dictate the team complement best suited to investigate considerations such as human factors, technical issues, recovery and salvage support and

medical issues. In addition, advisors such as meteorologists, other aircrew, air traffic controllers and paradrop officers should be appointed when the need arises. Specialist advisors not specifically assigned to the FSI team in the tasking order may be required to assist in the investigation. These individuals will be appointed with an observer status and will have limited access to information not related to their field of expertise and will have no access to privileged information.

MINIMUM FSI TEAM COMPLEMENT

38. The FSI team tasked by DFS will ideally comprise:
- a. IIIC. This person is a qualified investigator who is familiar with the aircraft type and role;
 - b. Aircrew member. This person is a subject matter expert who is qualified and current on the aircraft type involved in the occurrence;
 - c. Technical member. This person is the DFS AERE Officer or an AERE officer familiar with the aircraft type;
 - d. Medical member. This person is the DFS Flight Surgeon or a military physician, ideally a flight surgeon;
 - e. Specialist advisors. Advisors will be appointed as required; and
 - f. Observers. Observers will be appointed as required.

REPORT TYPES

TYPES OF OCCURRENCE REPORTS

39. There are several types of FS occurrence reports that may need to be completed depending on the Class of investigation carried out:
- a. Initial Report (IR);
 - b. Supplementary Report (SR);
 - c. Combined Report (CR);
 - d. Enhanced SR (ESR);
 - e. Abbreviated FSIR (A/FSIR); and
 - f. FSIR.

INITIAL REPORT

40. The Initial Report (IR) describes the immediately available particulars of the occurrence and must be sent within 12 hours of the event. It is generally reported through FSOMS. If the user is unable to access the application, occurrence details shall be sent to the designated wing for input into the database. Annex E lists the information that must be submitted in the IR.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT

41. The Supplementary Report (SR) is the report normally produced by the wing or unit for aircraft incidents of category D and E. It shall be submitted within 30 calendar days of the occurrence. The report requirements are shown in Annex F.

COMBINED REPORT

42. The Combined Report (CR) is the combination of the IR and SR in a single report submitted for minor occurrences requiring limited or cursory investigation, provided it can be released within 48 hrs of the occurrence. The report format is the same as the SR.

ENHANCED SR

43. An Enhanced SR (ESR) is to be used for occurrences that are sufficiently complex to warrant a more thorough investigation than a normal SR, but do not require the same degree of scrutiny that is required for an FS Investigation Report (FSIR). The reporting requirements are the same as for the SR except that the investigation paragraph will be more detailed. DFS is the tasking and releasing authority for ESRs.

FS INVESTIGATION REPORT

44. An FSIR is a comprehensive report on an FS occurrence and all related aspects, so the reviewing authorities have detailed information on which to base recommended PMs. The report follows the ICAO accident report format. DFS is the tasking and releasing authority for FSIRs. The FSIR requirements are available on the DFS website.

45. FSIRs shall normally be unclassified and be released to the public via the DFS Internet site and internally to the Department on the Intranet site.

ABBREVIATED FSIR

46. The *Draft for Comment* report stage may be omitted for accidents for which there are no further substantive PMs or for accidents in which all PMs have already been implemented. DFS may also elect an abbreviated review process if the report is straightforward and findings and recommendations are not expected to be controversial. In this case, an FSIR Draft for Comment may be distributed by e-mail or other means. Comments will be requested within 10 working days of receipt of the draft report. This final report resulting from this abbreviated review process is called an Abbreviated FSIR.

FSIR

47. In the process of staffing a FSIR the IIC will have to submit different documents which will include:

- a. Preliminary Report;
- b. From the investigator;
- c. Draft FSIR;
- d. Final FSIR; and
- e. Epilogue.

PRELIMINARY FSIR

48. The purpose of this report is to provide senior management with factual information pertinent to the occurrence and provide immediate PM recommendations where appropriate. The preliminary report shall include Part 1, Factual Information, and Part 4, Safety Recommendations of the FSIR. One blank page for each of Part 2 and Part 3 shall be included for completeness. In the interest of expediency, the report may be produced in one language only (normally English unless the addressee is a French language unit (FLU)).

FROM THE INVESTIGATOR (FTI)

49. The FTI summarizes information contained in the preliminary report. It shall describe factual information, immediate safety actions taken and the focus of the ongoing investigation. The FTI will be

published in bilingual format on the DFS website and in “Flight Comment.” The complete document will not normally be longer than two pages.

FSIR DRAFT FOR COMMENT

50. The purpose of the FSIR Draft for Comment is to confirm the accuracy and completeness of the report. The FSIR Draft for Comment will be distributed directly to all PDIs, and PDI comments will be returned directly to DFS. The purpose of this report is to capture factual information, analysis, findings and PMs pertaining to the occurrence. The purpose of the direct response is to ensure privileged information is protected as required by the *CTAISB Act*.

FINAL FSIR

51. FSIR is a comprehensive report on an FS occurrence and all related aspects to provide reviewing authorities with detailed information on which to base recommended PMs. The report follows the ICAO accident report format. DFS will be the tasking and releasing authority for the report. The report requirements are available on the DFS website. The Final FSIR will include valid PDI input from the Draft for Comment process. The report will be produced in both official languages.

52. FSIRs shall normally be unclassified and be released to the public via the DFS Internet site and internally on the DND Intranet site.

EPILOGUE

53. The Epilogue summarizes the information contained in the Final Report. The Epilogue will be published in bilingual format on the DFS website and in Flight Comment.

STAFFING OF FS REPORTS

REPORT FORMAT

54. In the course of investigating an FS occurrence, the IIC shall be responsible for staffing a Preliminary FSIR, a Draft FSIR for Comment and a Final FSIR. All three reports will adhere to the same format and each successive report will be a more detailed or refined iteration of the previous report. Although formally addressed in the Preliminary and Final Report, safety recommendations will be promulgated by the IIC whenever the investigation discovers a deficiency that requires immediate action from the chain of command.

55. Investigations of aircraft accidents and serious incidents are promulgated by means of the FSIR. The report closely parallels the internationally accepted ICAO format. The Final Report is released to the public under the authority of the DFS. The report contains four sections:

- a. facts;
- b. analysis;
- c. conclusions; and
- d. PMs.

REPORT DEADLINES

56. Report deadlines shall be met unless there are extenuating circumstances and an extension is authorized by DFS / DFS 2. All times are not-later-than times referenced from the date of occurrence. Table 3 provides the timelines for each report type.

REPORT TYPE	TIMELINE
Preliminary FSIR	4 weeks
FTI	5 weeks
Draft FSIR	7 months
Final FSIR	12 months
Epilogue	12 months

Table 3 – Report timelines**STAFFING OF FSIRs**

57. Since the chain of command is routinely involved in post-occurrence PMs, superior officers may well benefit from (or contribute to) inputs submitted by PDIs at subordinate levels. If a PDI wishes the chain of command to be given access to their representations, they may indicate this by signing a waiver and identifying those individuals (or levels of command) that they believe should have access to their input. DFS will then distribute accordingly.

58. When an input from a PDI is released to the chain of command, the input remains privileged. It needs to be treated as such and circulated on a need to know basis only. It may only be used for accident prevention purposes. The principle of protection of representations, as espoused in the *CTAISB Act*, shall be overriding and, where doubt exists regarding further dissemination, DFS must be consulted.

STAFFING FINAL FSIRs

59. DFS will forward the Final FSIR to CAS, who will subsequently distribute it to the OAA and TAA, as applicable, to allow them the opportunity to provide input into the proposed PMs. They will have access to the PDI comments for which a waiver has been signed, in accordance with Paras 52 and 53 above. They will have 21 days to submit their comments; following that, the CAS will issue an action letter directing the actions to be taken.

60. Once the action letter has been released by CAS, DFS will send a letter to each PDI outlining the DFS position on their representations. The cover letter shall clearly indicate if the PDI comments were incorporated in the FSIR and the rationale for the DFS decision in this regard.

61. Should the OAA or TAA determine that a recommendation in the FSIR is not feasible, they must advise the Airworthiness Authority in writing of their decision and the rationale for it. It is highly desirable that the decision not to implement a recommendation be accompanied by a formal risk assessment. This risk assessment will be forwarded to the AA (CAS) for consideration during formulation of the action plan. The AA will consider the input from the OAA and TAA during the formulation of the final action directive.

USE AND HANDLING OF FS REPORTS

62. Reports prepared under the authority of this publication are considered by the CF to be sensitive documents and, unless specifically authorized, these reports and their attachments shall not be used for any purpose other than FS. The special treatment accorded these reports is of vital importance in obtaining complete cooperation from witnesses and in determining the real cause(s) of an occurrence. Authorization for other uses shall only be granted with the express concurrence of DFS. Examples of agencies who might have access to FS information are as follows:

- a. a coroner requests access for the purposes of a coroner's investigation; and
- b. an individual is conducting a coordinated investigation under the provisions of one or more signed agreements (a STANAG or an MOU with TSB).

CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT

63. The concept of classifying information given during an FS investigation as privileged encourages a frank and open reporting culture. This helps to determine the cause(s) quickly and to develop the most appropriate PMs. It must be noted that FS reports may be accessed through the *Access to Information Act*. Nevertheless, the contents of the reports are eligible for protection under the *CTAISB Act*, *Access to Information Act* and *Privacy Act*.

CONTROL OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS

64. It is the policy of DND that some investigation reports will be made available to the public in order to facilitate accident prevention throughout the aviation community. They are released under the authority of the DFS pursuant to the powers delegated to him / her by the MND as the Airworthiness Investigative Authority of the Canadian Forces, with the understanding that the reports will be used for no other purposes than accident prevention.

RECONVENING AN FSI

65. An investigation shall be re-opened by DFS or the delegated FSO without delay if it appears that some evidence was not considered or was omitted; if a relevant aspect was not covered adequately; or new evidence has been uncovered, and this evidence would lead to a PM which has not already been recommended. Such action should not be taken unless absolutely essential.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FSI AND BOARD OF INQUIRY

66. The effectiveness of the FS Program is reliant on open, honest and timely reporting of occurrences by individuals without fear of retribution. When required, the CF may be required to convene a collateral investigation concurrent with or in addition to a FS investigation for the purposes of determining administrative or disciplinary disposition. In order to preserve the fundamental principles of the FS Program, FSOs shall not be appointed to or participate in collateral investigations. Information gained by FSOs through the conduct of a FS investigation shall only be provided to a collateral investigation on the authority of DFS.

67. When an aircraft accident occurs, a separate Board of inquiry may be convened in accordance with QR&Os. The requirement to conduct a Board of inquiry might be for a variety of reasons such as Investigation of Claim By or Against the Crown; QR&O 21.46, Investigation of Injury or Death; or to support COMSEC, administrative or disciplinary actions. This collateral investigation shall be independent of the FS investigation into the same occurrence. Privileged information (as defined in sections 28–30 of the *CTAISB Act*) which is gathered during the course of the FSI shall not be made available to the Board of inquiry President. However, all the factual information and a statement of cause, if available, will be made available upon request.

COORDINATED INVESTIGATIONS

68. Within Canada, TSB is responsible for investigating all aviation occurrences involving aircraft other than military conveyance aircraft or facilities. DND has the responsibility for investigating all occurrences involving military conveyance aircraft or facilities. The *CTAISB Act* defines a military conveyance aircraft as one being operated by or on behalf of DND, CF or a visiting force.

69. When the occurrence involves both civilian and military aircraft and / or facilities, the work of civilian and military investigators will be coordinated and will be governed by a DND / TSB Working Agreement developed for that purpose. The DND investigation will be conducted under the authority of section 4.2 of the *Aeronautics Act*, the *CTAISB Act*, the DND / TSB Working Agreement and in accordance with this publication. The TSB investigation will be conducted under the authority of the *CTAISB Act* and in accordance with the DND / TSB Working Agreement. Coordinated investigations with other military forces will normally be conducted within the procedures contained in ICAO Annex 13 for investigations involving non-NATO foreign military aircraft, and in STANAG 3531 for investigations involving NATO nations.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION REQUESTS

70. The *Access to Information Act* (ATIA) provides broad and effective legal access to information generated by government employees and information about government employees. With respect to FS investigations in general, and more specifically aviation accident / incident investigations, the ATIA, the *Privacy Act*, the *Aeronautics Act* and the *CTAISB Act* provide some protection for information obtained through investigations. Provisions for protection of privileged information is fully protected from release through the *ATI Act*. WFSOs are not expected to be current with the provisions of the various statutes mentioned above nor are they expected to handle ATI requests unless they have been so delegated by a CO and appropriately trained to do so. All requests for FS information should be immediately routed through the designated ATI officer for the wing. If that officer is not aware of the protections afforded by the various laws, they should be cautioned and advised to contact DFS or the Judge Advocate General (JAG) for legal advice.

Annex A
Chapter 9
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX A – OCCURRENCE CATEGORY TABLE

AIRCRAFT DAMAGE LEVEL (ADL)	PERSONNEL CASUALTY LEVEL (PCL)	OCCURRENCE CATEGORY
Destroyed or missing	Fatal injury or missing	A
Very serious damage	Very serious injury / illness	B
Serious damage	Serious injury / illness	C
Minor damage	Minor injury / illness	D
Nil	Nil	E

Annex B
 Chapter 9
 A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX B – FLIGHT SAFETY INVESTIGATION CLASS TABLE

This table serves as a guide only and DFS reserves the right to determine the Class of investigation to be done on any category of occurrence. DFS is the tasking authority for investigations requiring an FSIR, A/FSIR or ESR.

FACTORS			INVESTIGATION		
OCC CATEGORY	SFCL	OTHER AGGRAVATING FACTORS	INV CLASS	AGENCY	REPORT TYPE
A	–	–	I	DFS	FSIR
B, C	Extreme to High	Extreme to High	II	DFS	FSIR or A/FSIR or ESR
C, D	Medium to Low	Medium to Low	III	WFSO or UFSO	ESR or SR
D, E	Low to Nil	Low to Nil	IV	UFSO	SR or CR

Occurrence category: The occurrence category is based on the combination of the ADL and PCL as per the Occurrence Category Table at Annex A.

Safety of flight compromise level: The SFCL indicates the actual level of risk experienced by the crew and / or aircraft during an occurrence or the potential SFCL if it was assessed as nil for the flight.

Other aggravating factors: There are other factors that may elevate the level at which an occurrence is investigated. If a higher level of investigation might lead to a more effective reduction of risk to persons, property or the environment then this level should be assigned. Consideration shall also be given to maintaining the trust of CF personnel, the trust of the general public in the FS Program and in the CF by having occurrences investigated at the appropriate level.

Annex C
Chapter 9
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX C – FSI SITREP TEMPLATE

This report contains information related to an on-going Flight Safety investigation. Information shall not be released to the public in whole or in part except under the authority of the Director of Flight Safety, National Defence Headquarters.

FS INVESTIGATION SITREP # ____

Date/time: Use local times

Accident Aircraft Tail #:

Location:

Details of actions completed since last sitrep: For initial sitreps, include arrival status of team members. Include a summary of any pertinent factual information collected since last sitrep, like witness interviews completed, photographs taken and recorders removed/sent. Include any on-site analysis since the last sitrep sent. Avoid conjecture.

Details of next planned action items: Include plan for next day team action items. Identify any extra support required for the investigation like logistical support, administrative support, public relations and financial approvals.

PMs taken: Include any immediate safety actions taken by the unit or any higher-level agency (not already reported in a sitrep).

Recommended immediate PMs: Include any recommended measures that the team feels, after initial analysis, may prevent similar incidents / accidents in future (not reported in a previous sitrep).

Administration: Place to include investigation cost during the day and expected cost for coming day.

IIC hotel info: Only required in first sitrep unless it changes. Include hotel phone number.

Contact numbers: Only required in first sitrep unless changes or additions are made. Include all team members cellular, support cell or operations desk contact numbers, SatCom and / or pager numbers.

IIC name:

Ce rapport contient des informations relatives à une enquête de la Sécurité des vols. Ces informations ne peuvent pas être divulguées au publique en tout ou en partie par qui que ce soit sans l'autorisation du Directeur de la Sécurité des vols, Quartier général de la défense nationale.

Annex D
Chapter 9
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX D – REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

- *Aeronautics Act*
- Q R&O 21.47, Findings of Injury or Death
- QR&O 21.56-57, Aircraft Accidents
- QR&O 24.20, Post-mortem Examination
- CFAO 24-6, Investigation of Injuries or Death – Coroner's Inquest
- CFAO 53-2, Photographs of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents
- CFAO 59-3, Claims By or Against the Crown
- CFAO 210-1, Civilian Witnesses – Fees and Expenses
- CFMO 42-03-04, Medical Investigation and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents/Aeromedical Incidents
- B-MD-007-000/AF-003, CF Flight Surgeons' Guidelines for FS Investigation
- B-GA-015-001/FP-001, Human Factors Guide for the Conduct of Aircraft Accident Investigation
- CFTO C-05-010-002/AG-000, Aircraft Salvage Procedures
- CFTO C-02-015-001/AG-000, Unsatisfactory Condition Report – CF 777
- STANAG 3318, Medical Aspects of Aircraft Accident /Incident Investigation
- STANAG 3531, Investigation of Aircraft/Missile Accidents/Incidents

NOTE

Users of this publication who have a requirement to be familiar with STANAG 3531 should obtain a copy of the most recent edition.

- STANAG 3101, Exchange of Accident/Incident Information Concerning Aircraft and Missiles
- Applicable 1 Cdn Air Div Orders, wing / base, unit orders
- B-GA-015-003/FP-001, Notes for the Conduct of Investigations into Aircraft Accidents
- B-GA-015-002/FP-001, Aircraft Accident Handbook – Technical Member
- B-GA-015-004/FP-001, Aircraft Accident – Handbook for Aircrew Member
- Aircraft Accident Investigation, Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
- NATO Airborne Early Warning & C Force Command (NAEW&C), Aircraft Occurrence Response Manual, Number 81-100-12, Dated 19 Sep 00
- ASCC Air Standard 85/2A

Annex E
Chapter 9
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX E – INITIAL REPORT CONTENT

The following information should be reported in the event of an aircraft occurrence and will form the content of the Initial Report and be entered into FSOMS within 12 hours of the occurrence.

GENERAL

- Date/Time of Occurrence
- Type of Occurrence
 - Accident / Incident
 - Air / Ground
 - Bird Strike
 - Armament
- Injury Classification (most serious injury assessed IAW B-MD-007-000/AF-003)
 - Nil
 - Green (Minor injury or illness)
 - Yellow (Serious injury or illness)
 - Red (Very serious injury or illness)
 - Black (Fatality)
 - Grey (Missing)
- For Each Injury
 - MOS ID
 - Role (Aircrew, Maintenance, Other)
 - Position on aircraft if on board
 - Injury Severity

AIRCRAFT

- Level of Damage
 - Missing or Destroyed
 - Damaged (must be shipped to contractor for repair)
 - Damaged (major component/structural requiring MRP or ferry authorization)
 - Minor Damage
 - Potential for Incident or Accident
- Aircraft Type and Registration
 - Unit of Operation
 - Unit of Ownership
- Stage of Operation (e.g. parked, in-flight with description, maintenance)
- Type of Flight (short description)
- Flight Attributes (if applicable)
- Barrier Engagement (IAS, Wind, Weather, and Temp)

LOCATION

- Location of Occurrence (describe)
- Navaid Location (applicable for bird strikes)

DESCRIPTION

- Detailed Description of Occurrence
 - Statement of fact (Who, What, Where and When)
 - De-identified information

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

FOR EACH PERSON INJURED, THE FOLLOWING IS REQUIRED:

- Role
- MOS ID
- On Board Aircraft
- Injury Classification (most serious injury assessed IAW B-MD-007-000/AF-003)

CONDITION

- Weather
- Cloud
- Visibility
- Light Condition
- Wind Speed / Direction

BIRD STRIKE REPORT REQUIREMENTS

The following information should be reported in the event of a bird strike and will supplement the content of the Initial Report and be entered into FSOMS within 12 hours of the occurrence.

BIRD STRIKE REPORT

- Category
 - Impact / Near Miss / Sighting
- Remains Submitted
 - Yes / No
- Within 5 NM of Airport
 - Yes / No
- Flight Disruption
 - Continued Flight
 - Returned to Airport
 - Landed Nearest Airport
 - Aborted Take-off
- NOTAM Warning
 - Was Alerted
 - Didn't Check
 - None Issued
 - Not Available

- Lights On
 - External
 - Wing
 - Navigation
 - Strobe
 - Red Rotating Beacon
 - White Rotation Beacon
 - Landing
- Part Struck
 - Canopy
 - Radome
 - Engine #1 / #2 / #3 / #4
 - Nose
 - Tail unit
 - Wing
 - Fuselage
 - Flap
 - Rotors
 - Landing Gear
 - Stores / Tanks
 - Other
- Type of Damage
 - Aircraft Skin Ruptured
 - Air Inlets / Scoops Blocked
 - Impaired Function of Flight Controls, Flaps, Spoilers, Slats
 - Metal Deposited in Oil Filters or other Internal Engine Damage
 - Windshield or other Glazing Damaged
 - Fans / Compressor Blades, Inlet Guide Vanes
- Bird Description
 - Species / Quantity
- Bird Size
 - Small (Starling) / Medium (Gull) / Large (Duck) / Very Large (Swan)

Annex F
Chapter 9
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX F – SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT REQUIREMENTS

The following information should be reported as part of the Supplementary Report (SR) and will form the content of the information entered into FSOMS. Not all the information categories below are required on all occurrence investigations. FSOs should provide information in the categories below only if that information is considered as contributing to the occurrence.

AIRCRAFT

- Flight Attributes
- Altitude
- Air Speed
- Dive Angle
- G Status
- Heading

MAINTENANCE INFORMATION

- Aircraft Maintenance
- Time Since New
 - Time Since Overhaul
 - Time Since Inspection
 - Inspection Type
 - CF349 #
 - CF543 #

AIRCRAFT COMPONENT INFORMATION

- Aircraft Component or Munitions: for each component
- Nomenclature
 - WUC
 - Serial #
 - Time since new (TSN)
 - Time since overhaul (TSO)
 - Time since installation/inspection
 - Part number
- CFTO reference
- Munition Lot and Batch #
- Disposition

ARRESTING SYSTEM

- Arresting System – if arresting system was engaged or attempted, this report shall include:
- Aircraft speed and weight at arresting system
- Position and angle of engagement from runway centreline
- Use of brakes at engagement
- Chute used (visiting aircraft)

- Distance
- Successful or unsuccessful – explain
- Reason for engagement
- Damage to arresting system – brief description
- Elapsed time until arresting system available for reuse
- Aircraft damage caused by engagement – brief description

FLIGHT CONDITIONS

- Flight Conditions
 - Flight Conditions (i.e. IFR/VFR)
 - Ceiling (ft)
 - Temperature (Celsius)
 - Visibility (Nautical Miles)
 - Light Conditions (i.e. Twilight – dusk/dawn)
- Alighting Conditions:
 - Type of Alighting Area (unprepared)
 - Alighting Surface Conditions (ice-covered)
- Weather
 - Wind Speed
 - Wind Direction

PERSONNEL

- For all personnel identified
 - Time on duty: Last 48 hours
 - Time on duty: Day of occurrence
- For Aircrew only – Flying Hours
 - Grand total
 - Total on type
 - Past 30 days (all types)
 - Last 48 hours (all types)
 - Aircrew role (Aircraft comd, Co-pilot)
- Investigation Narrative
- Detailed explanation of how and why
- Cause Factors/HFACS
- PMs

CHAPTER 10 – CAUSE FACTOR ASSESSMENT

PURPOSE OF CAUSE FACTOR ASSESSMENT

1. The purpose of FS investigations is to prevent future accidents through the careful determination of causes and the formulation of recommended PMs. FS does not assign blame. Determining cause factors is thus not an end in itself but a means of identifying problems and assisting in trend analysis. Specifying cause factors in FS occurrences results in a more exhaustive analysis of the occurrence, which in turn leads to the formulation of measures that will prevent a recurrence of the problem. Since the purpose of assessing cause factors is accident prevention, they need not be, in the legal sense, established beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Cause factors assist in understanding all of the reasons why an accident or incident occurred. Since the purpose of cause factors is not to assign blame, investigators should not avoid assessing cause factors that seem to implicate individuals, such as “non-compliance with orders”.

CAUSE FACTOR DEFINITION

3. A cause factor is defined as any event, condition or circumstance whose presence or absence, within reason, increased the likelihood of an FS occurrence. Cause factors are assigned for prevention purposes only, and need not be substantiated in the strict legal sense, nor need they comply with QR&O 21.47 concerning causes of injuries or death for Pension Board purposes.

FSIR NON-ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE FACTORS

4. The cause of the occurrence will be stated in the report but cause factors will not be assessed in FSIRs by investigators. Cause factors shall be assessed by DFS for statistical purposes when the report is finalized. Cause factors will continue to be assessed at unit / wing level for SRs in accordance with the criteria outlined in this chapter. The final authority for cause factor assessment is DFS.

5. Cause factors should lead to PMs. Similarly, all PMs should have associated cause factors.

CAUSE FACTOR CATEGORIES

6. Cause assessments constitute the basis for the creation and application of PMs.

7. For purposes of record keeping and trend analysis, it is necessary to use standard terminology for cause factors. Care must be taken to identify and systematically list cause factors as described in this chapter. Listed below are the definitions for the six cause factors that are applied to aviation occurrences in the Canadian Forces.

8. Cause factors will be defined as follows:

- a. Personnel: Acts of omission or commission, by those responsible in any way for aircraft operation or maintenance or support to operations, which cause an occurrence.
- b. Materiel: Materiel failures include failures of aircraft components or any facility related to flight that have a bearing on the occurrence.
- c. Environment: Included in this cause factor are such hazards as birds and weather in the aircraft operation environment. This factor is assigned only if all reasonable precautions have been taken and applied to a condition that is beyond human control within the present state of the art.

- d. Operational: This cause factor is used when an accident or incident occurs as a result of a specific search and rescue flight or during commitments related to the preservation of national security as defined by B-GA-100. This cause factor must be recommended by the Comd of 1 Canadian Air Division and approved by the CAS.
- e. Foreign object damage: This cause factor is used when aircraft damage results from a foreign object.
- f. Undetermined: This cause factor is applied to occurrences where the evidence available is insufficient to permit a reasonable determination of the cause; however, probable causes are normally assigned so that PMs can be implemented.

PERSONNEL CAUSE FACTOR

BACKGROUND

9. Until 31 Dec 2003, the FS Program used a different nomenclature for the assignment of personnel cause factors (PCFs). The list of these factors can be found at Annex A if required for data mining or statistical comparisons. Since 1 Jan 2004, the CF is using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).

HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

10. When an occurrence or unsafe condition involves personnel, the study of human factors has shown that there are two general categories for the causes associated with the situation. These categories are referred to as active failures and latent conditions. FS investigations need to identify both the active and latent causes for occurrences and hazards so that effective PMs can be implemented to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

11. Using the concept of active failures and latent conditions, the HFACS causal model has four levels for classifying failures or conditions associated with personnel:

- a. Unsafe acts or conditions (active failures);
- b. Preconditions for unsafe acts (latent conditions – direct);
- c. Supervision (latent conditions – remote); and
- d. Organizational influences (latent conditions – remote).

12. Refer to diagram at Annex B for the causal model and Appendix 1 to that Annex for specific examples of Active and Latent Failures.

ACTIVE FAILURES

13. Active failures are the errors, events or conditions that are directly related to the occurrence. Usually active failures are the last action leading to the condition or act.

LATENT CONDITIONS

14. Latent conditions are events, circumstances or errors associated with the individuals or the system of management of the individuals involved in the occurrence. Latent conditions contribute to the final sequence of events in the occurrence or hazard by predisposing it to happen; though they are not the direct cause, their impact on the negative outcome can be as great as a direct cause or active failure. Looking at this human factor causal model as a whole, unsafe acts or conditions are the active cause factors, but are the end result of latent conditions originating in other parts of the organization. Latent conditions may lie dormant or undetected until one day an unsafe act or condition occurs.

UNSAFE ACTS OR CONDITIONS

15. This is the active cause factor level and is most closely tied to the act or condition. It is often the last crucial flaw before an accident or incident occurs. Unsafe acts and conditions are subdivided into errors and rules and regulations. (see Figure 4).




Figure 4 – Unsafe Acts / Conditions

ERRORS

16. Errors occur because they are an inherent element of human nature. Consequently, lapses in human performance are a factor in most occurrences or conditions. Not all errors are the same, and thus further classification is necessary. There are five basic types of errors.

DECISION

17. The decision error is based on decisions that are not dictated by regulations or procedures, and are therefore discretionary on the part of the decision-maker. Decision errors represent intentional behaviour that proceeds as intended, but the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. Often referred to as “honest mistakes”, these unsafe acts or conditions represent the actions or inactions of individuals whose intent is valid but who simply made a wrong choice. Regardless of the outcome, the individual made a conscious decision. They typically represent poor decisions, improper procedural execution or misinterpretation or misuse of relevant information. The individual made a conscious choice and elected to do what was done; unfortunately, it didn’t work.

TECHNIQUE-BASED

18. The technique-based error involves operation, workmanship or mechanical skills below the level that can be reasonably expected from a person with proper training and experience. Usually the actions associated with these skills occur without significant conscious thought. Typically, some sort of breakdown occurred that resulted in an unsafe act or condition. Skill- or technique-based actions are particularly linked to failures of proficiency, appropriate training and currency. They can occur, for example, when a maintainer damages a delicate engine valve by handling it roughly, or a pilot applies insufficient crosswind control inputs on landing.

ATTENTION / MEMORY

19. The attention / memory error describes the situation where an individual omitted a step in a procedure or failed to devote sufficient attention to a given task. Examples of this error include inadvertent activation of controls, incorrect ordering of steps in a procedure, omitting items in a checklist, flight crew instrument scan failure, loss of situational awareness and forgotten intentions. Sometimes during an emergency situation, when personnel are under stress, steps in emergency procedures or radio calls may be missed or a maintainer may miss a hand signal.

KNOWLEDGE OR INFORMATION

20. A knowledge or information error occurs when the knowledge or information needed to complete a task is incorrect, impractical or absent. For example, the technical order for a task is followed as written but the end product is not correct. Poorly written CFTOs or deficiencies in baseline training can lead to this kind of error.

PERCEPTION

21. The perception error is due to a problem based on perception. When the individual involved has perceived a situation that is different from reality, an error has occurred. Typically, perceptual errors happen when sensory input is degraded or “unusual” as is the case when visual illusions or spatial disorientation occurs. Visual illusions occur when the brain tries to fill in the gaps by inserting what it feels belongs in a visually impoverished environment, like that seen at night or in weather. The individual is left to make a decision based on faulty or insufficient perceptual information, leading to an error.

DEVIATION

22. The deviation error represents the wilful disregard of orders, regulations or other rules, and typically does not occur often. There are two forms of rules and regulation deviations: routine and exceptional. The two types are not differentiated by the nature of the act but by whether or not the act had become the norm within the organization, whatever its level.

ROUTINE DEVIATION

23. Routine deviation is a part of the individual’s normal behaviour. It tends to be commonplace or habitual and is often thought of as “bending” the rules. These acts are often tolerated and, in effect, accepted by supervisory authority or peers. By definition, if a routine deviation is identified, one must look further up the supervisory chain to identify those that are condoning it.

EXCEPTIONAL

24. Exceptional rules and regulations deviations are isolated departures from authorized acts and not necessarily typical of an individual’s behaviour pattern. Usually, management does not condone this behaviour. It is important to note that while most exceptional deviations are flagrant, they are not considered exceptional because of their extreme nature. Rather, they are considered exceptional because they are neither typical of the individual nor condoned by authority.

PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS

25. This is the latent condition level that is usually directly associated with personnel involved in an unsafe act or condition (see Figure 5). Identification of causes at this level reveals additional information about the circumstances within which the unsafe act or condition occurred. Preconditions for unsafe acts are subdivided into conditions of personnel, practices of personnel and working conditions.




Figure 5 – Latent Conditions – Preconditions

CONDITIONS OF PERSONNEL

26. This subdivision of preconditions identifies the unsafe conditions that affected the personnel involved in the occurrence. These conditions are divided into mental states, physiological states and physical / mental limitations in order to better identify problem areas.

MENTAL STATES

27. The category of mental state involves those mental conditions that affect performance. Being prepared mentally is critical in nearly every aviation endeavour. For example, if an individual is mentally tired for whatever reason, the likelihood that an error can occur increases. Loss of situational awareness, task fixation, distraction and mental fatigue due to sleep loss are examples of conditions that apply to this category. Also, personality traits and attitudes such as overconfidence, complacency and misplaced motivation are included in this category. These undesirable attitudes will influence the likelihood that an unsafe act or condition will be encountered. Mental states should be identified so that effective PMs can be implemented.

PHYSIOLOGICAL STATE

28. The physiological state category refers to a medical or physiological condition that precludes safe operations. Particularly important to aviation are physiological conditions that lead to spatial disorientation, which are usually due to stimulation of the ear's circular canals due to aircraft movement. Also, G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC), hypoxia, physical fatigue and the myriad of pharmacological and medical abnormalities are known to affect performance. If, for example, an individual has an inner ear infection, the likelihood of spatial disorientation when entering IMC goes up markedly. Consequently, the medical condition must be addressed within the causal chain of events.

PHYSICAL / MENTAL LIMITATION

29. Physical / mental limitation refers to those instances when the mission / task requirements exceed the capabilities of the individual involved in the activity. This could also be a limitation that all people share simply because they are human. If it is a human condition, then we need to work on the human-machine interface; but if it applies only to the individual involved, then reassignment or adjusting the recruiting standard may be required. Physical / mental limitations can take many forms. For example, at night our visual systems are limited by the capability of the photo sensors in our eyes, so vision is severely degraded when compared to daylight conditions. Usually this precondition involves an aptitude or other physical characteristics over which the person involved may not have much control.

PRACTICES OF PERSONNEL

30. The practice of personnel precondition involves the individual work habits, training and qualifications of the persons directly involved in the unsafe act or condition. Interpersonal management of personnel considerations such as Human Performance in Military Aviation (HPMA) would also be involved in this precondition category.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

31. The resource management precondition relates to the effectiveness of coordination among aircrew, maintenance and support personnel associated with the safe conduct of operations. All phases of air operations and maintenance require effective teamwork; effective teams make use of the knowledge, skill, perceptions and abilities of all members of the team. Hence, there is a requirement to identify deficiencies or breakdowns in resource management when they occur. This includes interpersonal coordination within and between aircraft, ATC and maintenance control, as well as facility and other support personnel.

TRAINING

32. The training precondition is present when a person is involved or responsible for a job or task but they are not properly trained or do not have the appropriate skills to safely complete the task. Usually this precondition will be linked to supervision or management latent cause factor levels because supervision is required to ensure tasked personnel are appropriately skilled and / or the organization is required to provide appropriate training for personnel involved in air operations.

QUALIFICATION

33. The qualification precondition is present when a person is not qualified / or authorized to perform a task yet attempts to do the job. Usually this factor is linked to supervision because most qualifications / authorizations are monitored at that level.

PERSONAL READINESS

34. The precondition personal readiness is present when individuals fail to prepare physically or mentally for the tasks they must perform. Individuals are expected to report for duty ready to perform at optimal levels. If personal habit patterns interfere with this requirement, then this precondition is present. For example, a person arriving at work after just completing a marathon run probably is not personally ready to function effectively in the workplace.

WORKING CONDITIONS

35. The working conditions precondition relates to the fact that a person's working conditions often play a large role in errors observed and have a profound effect on performance. Consequently, latent environmental, equipment and workspace conditions must be documented so appropriate PMs can be implemented.

EQUIPMENT

36. Equipment working conditions refers to the unavailability of the right equipment for the job or the use of damaged or outdated equipment. For instance, a person who uses a defective test set may miss problems with the aircraft when troubleshooting. Likewise, manuals may be out of date or be presented on a medium (CD-ROM or Intranet) that is either unavailable or difficult to work with. As a result, the person may work with the available equipment but an unsafe act or condition could be the result.

WORKSPACE

37. The workspace precondition is present when workspaces are confined, obstructed or inaccessible. This could also apply to the cockpit or other crew duty stations, and the fix may be related to human factors in the ergonomic sense. These characteristics create a setting whereby the person is forced to “make do”, putting himself at risk and increasing the potential for error. Two examples are a maintenance stand that cannot be positioned properly because of obstructions, and persons doing inspections in areas beyond their reach.

ENVIRONMENT

38. The precondition environment is present when the environmental surroundings impede the ability of personnel charged with a task to complete the task effectively. This includes weather, lighting and other environmental hazards that have an impact on the setting where the failure occurred. A person who fails to properly secure an aircraft in a driving rainstorm has been affected by weather and thus an environmental precondition was present.

SUPERVISION

39. The supervision latent condition is often part of the causal chain of events. However, it is indirect in that the conditions or unsafe acts were “set up” by a supervisory deficiency but the supervisory circumstance was not directly involved in the occurrence (see Figure 6). Level of supervision, planned activities, problem correction and regulatory deviation are the subdivisions of this level.




Figure 6 - Latent Conditions – Supervision Factors

LEVEL OF SUPERVISION

40. The level of supervision category applies when supervision proves inappropriate, improper or may not occur at all. The role of any supervisor is to provide the opportunity to succeed. To do this the supervisor, regardless of the level, must provide guidance, training opportunities, leadership, motivation and the proper role model.

PLANNED ACTIVITY

41. The planned activity category applies to improper planned activities which put the safety of the mission at risk. Included in this category are issues of crew pairing, improper manning or performing tasks without due consideration of the risk.

42. Occasionally, the operational tempo and / or schedule is planned such that individuals are put at unacceptable risk, rest is jeopardized, and ultimately performance is adversely affected. Such operations, though arguably unavoidable during emergency situations, are unacceptable during normal operations.

PROBLEM CORRECTION

43. The problem correction category refers to instances when deficiencies among individuals, equipment, training or other related safety areas are known to the supervisor, yet are allowed to continue

uncorrected. For example, the failure to consistently correct or discipline inappropriate behaviour certainly fosters an unsafe atmosphere, but should not be considered a violation if no specific rules or regulations were broken.

REGULATION DEVIATION

44. The regulation deviation category is used for those instances when supervisors wilfully disregard existing rules and regulations (i.e. permitting or directing an individual to perform duties without current qualifications or authorization).

ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES

45. Unsound decisions by upper-level management, although latent in nature, can have a direct impact on the organization; moreover, they can have a direct negative effect on supervisory practices or the conditions and actions of operators (see Figure 7). Although the impact of organizational influence on the areas in question is direct, it is considered an indirect latent factor because it did not play an active role in the condition or act under examination. These factors must be identified so effective PMs can be put in place. These latent organizational failures are sub-divided into three categories: resource management, organizational climate and operational processes.



Figure 7. Latent Conditions – Organizational Influences Factors

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

46. This category refers to the management, allocation and maintenance of organizational resources, such as personnel, financial resources and equipment / facilities. Personnel here refers to the management of operators, staff and support and maintenance personnel. Issues that directly influence safety include selection, training and staffing / manning. Financial resources here refers to the management of non-human resources, primarily monetary resources. For example, excessive cost-cutting or a lack of funding for proper and safe equipment and resources will adversely affect both operator performance and safety. Finally, equipment / facility refers to issues related to equipment design, including the purchasing of unsuitable equipment, inadequate design of workspaces and failure to correct known design flaws. Management should ensure that human factors engineering principles are known and utilized and that specifications for equipment and workspace design are identified and met.

ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE

47. Organizational climate refers to a broad class of organizational variables that influence worker performance. In general, organizational climate is the prevailing atmosphere or environment within the organization. It can be defined as situation-based consistency in the organization’s treatment of individuals. Organizational structure, policies and culture are elements that affect the climate. The term “structure” refers to the formal component of the organization—its form and shape. An organization’s structure is reflected in the chain of command, delegation of authority and responsibility, communication channels and formal accountability for actions. Organizations with maladaptive structures will be more prone to accident. “Policies” refers to a course or method of action that guides present and future

decisions. Policies may refer to postings, hiring and firing, promotion, retention, raises, sick leave, drugs and alcohol, overtime, accident investigations and use of safety equipment. When these policies are ill defined, adversarial or conflicting, safety may be reduced. Finally, “culture” refers to the unspoken or unofficial rules, values, attitudes, beliefs and customs of an organization. Other issues related to culture include organizational justice, psychological contracts, organizational citizenship behaviour, esprit de corps and union / management relations. All these issues affect attitudes about safety and the value of a safe working environment.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS

48. This category refers to the formal process by which things get done in the organization. Three factors are included in this area: operations, procedures and oversight. The term “operations” refers to the characteristics or conditions of work that have been established by management. These characteristics include operational tempo, time pressures, production quotas, incentive systems and schedules. When set up inappropriately, these working conditions can be detrimental to safety. “Procedures” are the official or formal directives that dictate how the job is to be done. Examples include performance standards, objectives, documentation and instructions about procedures. All of these can negatively impact supervision, performance and safety. Finally, “oversight” refers to management’s monitoring and checking of resources, climate and processes to ensure a safe and productive work environment. Issues here relate to organizational self-study, risk management, and the establishment and use of safety programs.

MATERIEL CAUSES

49. Materiel cause factors can only be assigned in cases which identify:

- a. flaws in the basic material used to manufacture a part;
- b. improper design, manufacture, construction or assembly by a non-CF organization (design); or
- c. failure or malfunction of components when there was no overstress, abuse or misuse, and proper maintenance practices were carried out (undetected progressive breakdown).

50. Materiel includes all aircraft and / or engines, equipment and facilities used in the conduct and support of air operations. Although most materiel failures may be traced ultimately to some human origin, personnel causes are assigned only when failures result from incorrect maintenance by CF or contracted parties or from incorrect operating procedures. It is preferable, both statistically and realistically, to consider the remaining cases as materiel failures of the items in themselves, regardless of the reason or mode of failure. Materiel cause factors are divided into the following categories.

MATERIEL – AIRCRAFT OR ENGINE COMPONENTS

51. Aircraft or engine equipment failure or malfunction. The failed or damaged component must be specified. If it is beyond the capability of the unit to precisely determine the technical nature of the fault, then the component need only be identified. For example, it may require a repair contractor to determine that a bushing has failed in a generator. The unit should specify “generator” as the component.

MATERIEL – RELATED FACILITIES

52. Failure or malfunction of facilities or equipment that is not part of but relevant to the operation of aircraft, such as maintenance support equipment. The nature of the item is to be specified, for example:

- a. ground vehicles, test stands, ladders, chocks, tow bars, helicopter ground handling wheels, and similar equipment used in the vicinity of aircraft;

- b. personal safety equipment;
 - c. ground equipment supporting air navigation and ground / air communication; and
 - d. helicopter securing device such as the bear trap used in shipborne helicopter operations.
53. Materiel causes should be amplified with a short descriptive narrative including, when possible:
- a. the mode of failure, e.g. fatigue, shear, corrosion, wear, seizure, overheat, out of adjustment; and
 - b. the reason for failure, if known, e.g. improper design, manufacture, construction or assembly.

ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES

54. Environmental cause factors are applied to conditions that are beyond human control with the present state of the art. Care must be taken when considering the application of environmental causes. They are not to be assigned in place of, but may be assigned in conjunction with, personnel or materiel causes. Environmental causes apply only to those events where adequate and reasonable care and precautions were exercised. Reasonable precautions include but are not limited to full use of forecast information, use of airborne weather radar and requests for vectoring to avoid areas of hazardous weather. Environmental factors are to be stated as set out below.

ENVIRONMENT – WEATHER

55. Phenomena such as cloud, hail, lightning, rain, snow, sea state and wind.

ENVIRONMENT – ALIGHTING AREA

56. The condition of an area of land, deck or water used for take-off, landing and surface manoeuvring of aircraft which caused the occurrence and could not have been detected or avoided.

ENVIRONMENT – BIRD STRIKE

57. Self-explanatory. Applicable only when reasonable avoidance measures have been taken.

ENVIRONMENT – UNUSUAL PHENOMENA

58. Reserved for environmental conditions that cannot be specifically assigned under other categories, e.g. tidal waves, earthquakes and landslides.

ENVIRONMENT – OTHER

59. Assigned when none of the above definitions fits. An example might be a ricochet in some circumstances, i.e. when all reasonable precautions have been taken and all orders and regulations were complied with.

OPERATIONAL CAUSES

60. This factor can be assigned only when the CAS / 1 Cdn Air Div or higher authority has accepted the high risk (in accordance with B-GA-100-001/AA-000 Volumes 1 and 3):
- a. to meet a commitment related to the preservation of national security;
 - b. to conduct a flight essential to the interests of the Government of Canada; or
 - c. to conduct a specific search and rescue flight.

61. Assignment of an operational cause factor acknowledges that no other controllable circumstances contributed to the event. Therefore, this cause factor shall not be assigned in conjunction with or in addition to a personnel or materiel cause factor. When this cause factor is assigned, it must be recommended by the Comd 1 Cdn Air Div and approved by the CAS. It may also be approved by the CO of the Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment (AETE) in occurrences resulting from development testing in which higher authority has accepted the known areas of high risk or in which hazards could not be forecast.

UNIDENTIFIED FOD CAUSES

62. This factor is applied to occurrences caused by the presence of a foreign object when the object or its source cannot be determined. Known foreign objects originating from known sources should be assessed under the appropriate personnel, materiel or environmental factors. Systems or components such as fuel pumps that generate contamination will not be assessed under this cause factor.

UNDETERMINED CAUSES

63. This factor is to be assigned only when there is not enough evidence to either reasonably determine an exact cause or eliminate two of the three main cause factor categories (personnel, materiel and environment). If evidence permits two of these categories to be eliminated, then the other will be assigned even if the precise malfunction or failing cannot be identified. An undetermined cause factor should only be assigned as a last resort when all investigative avenues have been exhausted, in which case possible cause factors should be listed.

Annex A
Chapter 10
A-GA-135-001/AA-001

ANNEX A – PRE-HFACS PERSONNEL CAUSE FACTORS (OBSOLETE)

NOTE

The cause factors listed in this Annex are the old cause factors used before the introduction of HFACS in January 2002. They are to be used only for statistical comparison, trend analysis and research purpose.

PERSONNEL CAUSE ATTRIBUTION

1. Personnel cause factors refer to any act of omission or commission by personnel resulting in an occurrence. The cause factors can be assigned to any of the personnel listed below:
 - b. Personnel – Management / (Level): Personnel engaged in the formulation of plans, the apportionment of resources, and the creation and writing of orders and instructions;
 - c. Personnel – Supervision / (Level): Personnel engaged in ensuring that orders and instructions are being followed. They are normally involved in on-the-job monitoring and direction, including such activities as work scheduling, handling of personnel problems, and counselling. When a supervisor actually performed the task resulting in an occurrence, this shall be assigned under one of the individual categories shown in subparagraph c and d, rather than under Personnel - Supervision;
 - d. Personnel - Flight Crew (specify): “Unknown” is to be used only when the type of flight crew cannot be identified);
 - e. Personnel - Support Personnel (specify): Personnel engaged in the support of aircraft operations, other than Flight Crew. Use “Unidentified” only when it cannot be determined whether the maintenance organization was CF or non-CF. “Unknown” is to be used only when the type of support personnel cannot be identified); and
 - f. Personnel - Other(specify): Any persons other than flight crew or support, such as military/civilian, spectators, etc.

PERSONNEL CAUSE FACTORS SUBCATEGORIES

HUMAN INTERACTION

2. Human Interaction Factors involve interaction between two or more people such as that found in the command and control structure, or in the cockpit or technical environment. This may include known or recognized problems or deficiencies that, although accepted by the organization involved, could be rectified given appropriate resources. Sub categories are:
 - b. Human Engineering: Human engineering problems in the workplace should be discussed in a human factors investigation to determine the probability of disorientation, confusion about controls, or the misreading of instruments. Effective task assignment depends upon the properly balanced allocation of tasks to both man and machine to prevent overload. Design factors to be investigated include:

- (1) the design and location of instruments,
 - (2) the design and location of switches and controls,
 - (3) visual obstruction,
 - (4) personnel/equipment interference,
 - (5) work space comparability (include working areas and working conditions such as noise, vibration, temperature, lighting and motion),
 - (6) habit interference, using wrong control,
 - (7) confusion of controls, switches,
 - (8) misinterpretation of instruments, and
 - (9) labelling, marking and colouring.
- b. Information/Communication: Necessary information in written or oral instructions is omitted, incorrect, impractical, or vague. This is to include inter personnel communication at all levels and also communication discipline, e.g., aircrew ATC. This also includes crew discipline and crew co ordination in every aspect of flight operation , whether routine or emergency.
- c. Resources: Inadequate manpower, finances, equipment, knowledge, skill level, or training was provided to properly accomplish the task.
- d. Other - Human Interaction: Assigned when none of the above definitions fit the human interaction factor(s) involved.

PHYSICAL AND/OR PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS

3. Physical and/or Physiological Factors involve the physical and/or physiological limitations of humans. The human being is limited in regards to the aviation environment and these limitations can cause occurrences if not properly taken into consideration. Sub-categories are:

- b. acceleration effects;
- c. decompression sickness;
- d. disorientation;
- e. fatigue;
- f. hypoxia;
- g. noise, vibration and buffet;
- h. thermal stresses;
- i. trapped gas effects;
- j. visual illusions/limitations; and
- k. other - physical/physiological.

PSYCHOLOGICAL (BEHAVIOURAL)

4. Psychological (Behavioural) factors involve behavioural characteristics of individuals which may affect workplace performance. Sub-categories are:

- b. boredom;
- c. carelessness;
- d. channelized attention;
- e. complacency;
- f. confidence;
- g. distraction;
- h. expectancy;
- i. human information processing;
- j. inattention,
- k. judgement;
- l. motivation;
- m. non-compliance with orders;
- n. pressing;
- o. technique;
- p. training; and
- q. other – psychological.

PATHOLOGICAL

5. Pathological factors involve any previous or sudden medical condition that may be a cause factor. When a medical cause factor is assigned, a detailed description of the condition must be contained in the Medical Report.

PHARMACOLOGICAL/TOXICOLOGICAL

6. Pharmacological/Toxicological factors involve any prescription, over-the counter, or illicit drugs, and alcohol. When this cause factor is assigned, a detailed description of the condition must be contained in the Medical Report.

DEFINITIONS OF PHYSICAL AND/OR PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR

7. Acceleration Effects. An impaired condition caused by G forces on the body including loss of consciousness, reduced visual perception, and all other physical and physiological reactions to G loads.

8. Decompression Sickness. Effects produced by evolution of gas (usually nitrogen) from tissues and fluids resulting in impairment or incapacitation of the aircrew during ascent to flight altitude. This is commonly called the bends.

9. Spatial Disorientation. An incorrect perception of one's attitude with respect to an appropriate reference (usually the surface of the earth or another aircraft in formation). Unrecognized Disorientation (often called Type I or Mis-orientation) is particularly dangerous as there is no perceived stimulus to correct one's orientation. Recognized (Type II) Disorientation is more upsetting, but is usually sorted out, preventing an accident.

10. Fatigue. A decreased capability to perform some specified task due to prolonged and/or extreme mental or physical activity, or sleep deprivation. This includes circadian rhythm upset which results in a performance decrement due to an upset in the biological process as a result of crossing several time zones quickly or working different shifts without adequate transition time.
11. Hypoxia. Oxygen deficiency in the tissues sufficient to impair function or performance. The most common form in aviation is hypoxic hypoxia which is due to a reduction of the oxygen pressure in the inspired gas during ascent to altitude.
12. Noise, Vibration, and Buffet. The performance of certain tasks may be adversely affected in conditions of specific patterns of noise, excessive vibration or buffeting. The degree of interference with task performance will vary with the nature of the task.
13. Thermal Stresses. Extremes of ambient temperature may produce changes in body temperature causing discomfort or a decrease in task performance.
14. Trapped Gas Effects. Discomfort or pain caused by the expansion of gas during an ascent, resulting in the impairment of the aircrew which may range from simple distraction to incapacitation.
15. Visual Illusions/Limitations. Erroneous perception of visual stimuli, for example: white-out (low contrast phenomenon), prism effect (image distortion when objects are viewed through a rain-covered windscreen), sloping runways, or when visual acuity is impaired by restrictions like glare or night vision.
16. Other Factor – Physical/Physiological. Assigned when none of the above definitions fit the human factor(s) involved.


DEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL (BEHAVIOURAL) FACTOR

17. Boredom. Low level of awareness caused by a dull, undemanding, repetitive task may and, as a result, required actions may be omitted in normal operations or during an emergency.
18. Carelessness. Due care is not exercised. There is a display of indifference, laxity, or disregard of established procedures.
19. Channelized Attention. When a person's full attention is focused on one stimulus to the exclusion of all others. This becomes a problem when the person fails to perform tasks or process information of a higher or more immediate priority, failing to notice or having no time to respond to cues requiring immediate attention.
20. Complacency. Complacency is the result of overconfidence, repetition of action, and contentment. The effects of complacency are revealed in a lowered state of awareness, cursory pre flight/maintenance checks, and decreased attention to detail. As tasks become routine, performance becomes automatic and less attention is paid to detail. Because of past success in mastering the environment, the complacent individual becomes increasingly likely to perform routine tasks casually, rather than planning ahead. Complacent individuals are unaware of their gradual deterioration in performance since their ability for critical self-appraisal has been lost.
21. Confidence. Over-confidence or lack of confidence may undermine the ability to make rational judgements or decisions. Normally a positive characteristic which allows one to act with some degree of self-assurance.

22. Distraction. Occurs when attention is interrupted by the introduction of another stimulus unrelated to the task being performed.
23. Expectancy. The anticipation of certain environmental cues and tendency to search selectively for those cues more actively than others. One extreme of this anomaly is when expectancy is so strong that one perceives cues that in fact are not there; the other extreme is when one does not expect cues, thus does not detect cues that are there.
24. Human Information Processing. The process of receiving information, assessing its meaning, and deciding on an appropriate response. The brain's capacity to process information received from different sources simultaneously is limited, especially when the signals are of short duration and are not anticipated. There can be a loss of signals that are concurrent with or closely follow signals already being dealt with.
25. Inattention. An inappropriate low level of attention to a task and/or failure to respond to relevant cues. Not paying attention is an accurate description of this aberration, since conscious attention must be given to a task.
26. Judgement. Person faced with a choice and the decision, or lack of decision, proves to be wrong, resulting in an occurrence. In this context, judgement involves a mental reasoning process requiring an assessment of options, rather than the exercise of skills used in assessing physical quantities like speeds or closing rates. For the determination of cause factors, judgement is the mental process used to recognize, analyse and evaluate all information about the aircraft and the environment.
27. Motivation. Excessive motivation or under-motivation degrading one's ability to make rational judgements or decisions. That which stimulates and causes an individual to act.
28. Non-compliance with Orders. The deliberate omission or commission contrary to published or verbal orders. It should be assigned only for wilful breaches of orders, negligence, and deliberate acts of irresponsibility. The report shall refer to the order in question.
29. Pressing. The perceived need to continue a task beyond personal, equipment, or environmental limits, conferring on the task higher priority than really exists. Reasons for pressing include self-imposed or peer pressure, or command pressure.
30. Technique. Operation, workmanship, or mechanical skills below a level which can be reasonably expected from a person with proper training and experience. Technique involves using skills to assess and react to physical cues such as speeds, distances, closing rates, etc.
31. Training. Training is the acquisition of the skills, knowledge, and attitudes required to perform satisfactorily. Assignment of this factor would relate to issues such as insufficient training or inappropriate training. When assigning this cause factor it is important to remember that the responsibility for training rests with the training entity, not with the individual involved in the occurrence. The only exception is negative transfer of training, such as carrying over past procedures to another aircraft; this can be assigned to the individual.
32. Other-Psychological. Assigned when none of the above definitions fits the human factor(s) involved.

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ANNEX B – HFACS CHART



Appendix 1
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APPENDIX 1 – HFACS EXAMPLES

ACTIVE CAUSE FACTORS

UNSAFE ACTS / CONDITIONS

ERRORS

DECISION

- Improper take-off
- Improper approach / landing
- Improper procedure
- Misdiagnosed emergency
- Wrong response to emergency
- Exceeded ability
- Inappropriate manoeuvre
- Poor decision
- Inadequate risk assessment
- Misdiagnosed situation
- Misinterpretation of information
- Other decision error

TECHNIQUE-BASED

- Poor technique
- Inappropriate technique
- Delayed response
- Failed to recognize extremis
- Inappropriate use of flight controls
- Incorrect procedure
- Other technique-based error

ATTENTION / MEMORY

- Omitted procedural step
- Distraction / interruption
- Failed to recognize condition
- Omitted checklist item
- Failed to prioritize attention
- Loss of situational awareness
- Failed to respond
- Sequence error
- Procedural error

KNOWLEDGE / INFORMATION

- Inadequate task knowledge
- Inadequate process knowledge
- Inadequate aircraft knowledge
- Incorrect information provided
- Information ambiguous
- Information inadequate
- Inadequate baseline training
- Other knowledge / information error

PERCEPTION

- Misjudged distance / altitude / airspeed
- Spatial disorientation
- Visual illusion
- Other perceptual errors

DEVIATIONS

ROUTINE

- Failed to adhere to brief
- Transgression of regulations / SOP
- Failed to use RADALT
- Flew an unauthorized approach
- Failed to execute appropriate rendezvous
- Transgression of training rules
- Failed to adhere to departure procedure
- Flew over-aggressive manoeuvre
- Failed to properly prepare for flight
- Failed to comply with SOP
- Did not use publications
- Other routine rule & regulation item

EXCEPTIONAL

- Unauthorized flight
- Not current, qualified or authorized for mission or task
- Intentionally exceeded the limits of the aircraft
- Intentional violation of regulations / SOP
- Failed to ensure compliance with rules
- Unauthorized low-altitude flight
- Flew unauthorized manoeuvre
- Did not use required equipment
- Signed off without inspection
- Other exceptional rule & regulation item

LATENT CAUSE FACTORS

PRECONDITIONS

CONDITIONS OF PERSONNEL

MENTAL STATES

- Boredom
- Carelessness
- Channelized attention
- Complacency
- Distraction
- Drowsiness
- Expectancy
- Mental fatigue
- Inattention
- Life stress
- Motivation
- Overconfidence
- Peer pressure
- Get home-itis
- Haste
- Misplaced motivation
- Task saturation
- Self-imposed pressure
- Negative transfer of learning
- Other mental states

PHYSIOLOGICAL STATES

- Medical illness
- Pharmacology / toxicology
- Acceleration effects
- Decompression sickness
- Hypoxia
- Trapped gas effect
- G-induced loss of consciousness
- Impaired physiological state
- Physiological incapacitation
- Physical fatigue
- Other physiological states

PHYSICAL / MENTAL LIMITATIONS

- Incompatible aptitude
- Incompatible physical capabilities
- Body size / strength / sight / hearing
- Reach / view
- Information processing
- Insufficient reaction time
- Visual limitation
- Incompatible intelligence
- Other physical / mental limitation

PRACTICES OF PERSONNEL

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

- Failed to back up
- Failed to communicate
- Failed to coordinate
- Failed to conduct adequate brief
- Failed to use all available resources
- Failure of leadership (within the team)
- Misinterpretation of traffic calls
- Cross-cockpit authority gradient
- Rank gradient
- Not working as a team member
- Ineffective or inadequate communication
- Non-standard hand signals
- Inappropriate log entry
- Inadequate shift turnover
- New to group / unit / squadron
- Non-adherence to change
- Other resource management conditions

PERSONAL READINESS

- Intoxicated at work
- Hungover
- Inadequate rest
- Drug / medication use
- Self-medication
- Over-exertion
- Other personal readiness issues

QUALIFICATION

- Not qualified for task
- Not qualified on aircraft type
- Not authorized for task
- Not authorized on aircraft type
- Other qualification or authorization anomalies

TRAINING

- Not trained for task
- Unrealistic training
- Ineffective OJT
- Inadequate skills
- Other training issues

WORKING CONDITIONS

EQUIPMENT

- Unsafe / hazardous
- Unreliable / faulty
- Inoperable
- Uncontrollable
- Unavailable for use
- Inappropriate for task
- Power sources inadequate
- Miscalibrated
- Switchology
- Design
- Other equipment conditions

WORKSPACE

CONSTRAINED TOOL / EQUIPMENT USE

- Constrained position
- Obstructed, not visible or partially visible
- Inaccessible, totally or partially
- Cockpit layout
- Workspace layout
- Other workspace conditions

ENVIRONMENT

Inadequate lighting / light at dusk / night time
Inadequate natural / artificial light
Unsafe weather / exposure: temperature, precipitation, wind
Unsafe environmental hazards: noise, housekeeping, cleanliness, hazardous / toxic substances
Other environmental conditions

SUPERVISION FACTORS

LEVEL OF SUPERVISION

Failed to provide guidance
Failed to communicate appropriately
Failed to provide operational doctrine
Failed to provide oversight
Failed to provide training
Failed to track qualifications or authorizations
Failed to track performance
Inappropriate task planning, task delegation, task assignment
Other levels of supervision condition

PLANNED ACTIVITIES

Poor / improper manning
Task / mission risk without benefit
Improper work tempo
Poor crew pairing
Unrealistic expectations (resources, pressing)
Provided inadequate opportunity for crew rest
Other planned activities situation

PROBLEM CORRECTION

Failed to correct document error
Failed to correct inappropriate behaviour
Failure to identify correct behaviour
Failed to act on a known reported problem
Failed to correct other problems
Other problem correction situation

DEVIATIONS

Task / mission not IAW with regulations / SOPs
Not adhering to rules and regulations
Assigned unqualified personnel
Wilful disregard for authority by supervisor
Other rules and regulations anomaly

ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Human resources:

- Selection
- Staffing
- Manning
- Training

Monetary / budget resources:

- Excessive cost-cutting
- Lack of funding

Equipment / facility resources:

- Poor design
- Purchasing of unsuitable equipment
- Other resource management conditions

ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE

Structure:

- Chain of command
- Delegation of authority
- Communication
- Formal accountability for actions

Policies:

- Postings
- Hiring and firing
- Promotion
- Drugs and alcohol

Culture:

- Norms and rules
- Values and beliefs
- Organizational justice
- Citizen behaviour

Other organizational climate situations

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS

Operations:

- Operational tempo
- Time pressure
- Production quotas
- Incentives
- Measurement / appraisal
- Schedules
- Deficient planning

Procedures:

Standards

Clearly defined objectives

Documentation

Instructions

Oversight:

Risk management

Safety programs

Other organizational process items

CHAPTER 11 – PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND ANALYSIS

APPLICATION OF TERMINOLOGY

1. Common terminology accepted by the CF shall, with few exceptions, meet the aims of this manual and maintain consistency. Where terms or words have taken on meanings specific to FS, they are defined below.

ANALYSIS PURPOSE

2. The goal of the FS System is to prevent accidental loss of CF aviation resources. This is met through the clear identification of hazards and the effective implementation of practicable preventative measures (PMs). Such measures normally modify some aspect of procedures in the manufacture, support, operation or maintenance of aircraft or components. Further, by investigating occurrences, the FS System obtains valuable feedback and develops PMs so that similar occurrences can be reduced, mitigated and ideally eliminated. Feedback also allows lessons learned by a unit to be used by other units not directly involved and raise the awareness of personnel.

3. FSOs at all levels should make every effort to ensure that PMs / corrective actions are monitored to ensure they are implemented and assessed for effectiveness. Feedback shall be provided to subordinate units and HQ as to the status and effectiveness of these measures.

DEFINITION

PREVENTATIVE MEASURE

4. A preventative measure (PM) is any step that can be taken to decrease the likelihood of an aircraft occurrence. When practical, one or more PMs should be applied to each cause factor assigned to an occurrence.

ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

5. Most types of analysis involve statistics. Statistics can be misleading, and methods for avoiding the more common pitfalls are described in the paragraphs that follow. It is suggested the following data be considered:

- a. the number of occurrences involving a formation in any given period;
- b. the most common types of occurrences and cause factors (look for trends and their root causes);
- c. the most common PMs (have they been implemented and are they effective?);
- d. trends in individual aircraft and / or components, equipment, stages of operation, units, sections and personnel and the probable reasons for these trends;
- e. environmental and seasonal factors; and
- f. the effects of exercises, competitions and deployments.

OCCURRENCE RATE

6. The rate of occurrences is expressed as the number of occurrences per 10,000 flying hours. It is calculated with the formula: (# of accidents) / (incidents) / (occurrences) X 10000 ÷ (# flying hours). E.g. four air accidents in 30,000 flying hours would result in an accident rate of 1.33.

ANALYSIS OF LOCAL OCCURRENCES

7. Comds and FSOs at every level must evaluate the effectiveness of their FS Programs. To achieve this, FSOs must maintain records of every FS occurrence involving facilities, equipment and personnel. The FSOMS is the primary tool used to aid this process and is useful for identifying trends.

ANALYSIS AVAILABLE FROM FSOMS

8. The FSOMS trending tools can provide FS staff with a comprehensive range of data for use in identifying problem areas and implementing PMs. FSOs can contact DFS either directly or through their D/FSO for assistance in generating or interpreting an analysis.

USE OF RESULTS

9. Regular in-depth analysis can indicate where additional PMs are required. Recommendations should be made to the first level authorized to implement them.

DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE PMs

10. The guidelines for developing effective PMs are listed below:

- a. PMs should, when applicable, target the lowest level in the chain of command that is able to deal effectively with the PM;
- b. PMs must treat the cause of a problem and not its effect;
- c. PMs must be realistic and practicable, and their effects on operational capability should be considered. PMs must also be judged according to cost-effectiveness, training and manpower requirements and implementation time;
- d. PMs need not be limited to the cause of a specific incident, as other hazards may surface during the course of an investigation;
- e. occurrences resulting from personnel cause factors should lead to a search for PMs in management, training and supervision;
- f. PMs resulting from an occurrence should be consistent with and developed logically from the cause;
- g. similar occurrences in the past or with other fleets should be reviewed for ideas;
- h. the organization responsible for ensuring that PMs are completed should be identified and target dates set for all follow-up action;
- i. when a hazard is identified that requires immediate action, comds and FSOs should address the particular problem immediately and independently;
- j. units shall action PMs contained in SRs from other units if applicable; and
- k. lessons learned shall be identified and disseminated when applicable.

11. When preparing the SR, the FSO should focus on PMs that can truly mitigate or eliminate the chance of future accidents, like improving a training syllabus, amending SOPs and modifying equipment, to name a few.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTING PMs

12. Comds at all levels, with advice from their FS staffs, are responsible for devising and instituting PMs and for advising higher HQ of required PMs that are beyond local capabilities.

13. PMs are to be implemented so that they will have lasting effects despite frequent changes in personnel. New accidents are rare; usually it is simply a matter of new people being involved in “old” accidents. Short-term PMs, such as briefing aircrew or maintenance personnel, have little lasting effect and may allow hazards to reoccur when new people arrive.

REVIEWING OCCURRENCES

1 Cdn Air Div Review

14. On review of the occurrences reported, 1 Cdn Air Div will:
- a. Implement the appropriate PMs within their authority;
 - b. recommend additional PMs and, where applicable, identify the responsible offices and target dates for follow-up action;
 - c. provide recommendations for PMs that are beyond their capabilities; and
 - d. consider whether or not specific PMs should also apply to other aircraft types under their cmd.

DFS Review

15. On review of the occurrences reported, DFS shall:
- a. coordinate with other agencies for action as necessary;
 - b. establish target dates for outstanding items;
 - c. disseminate PMs and information back to 1 Cdn Air Div / CANR, wings, bases, and units;
 - d. consider the application of PMs to other aircraft types; and
 - e. produce educational material for distribution to units.

TRACKING OF PMs

16. Tracking means monitoring all PMs until they have been fully implemented or rejected by the appropriate authority. Tracking ensures that the entire user community is kept up to date on the nature, status and effectiveness of PMs. Additionally, it ensures that PMs are not forgotten. Tracking is the responsibility of the wing that initiated the PM recommendation. Key to ensuring that all PMs are implemented is the drafting of supporting documentation by the unit proposing the PM and signed by the chain of command. For each PM implemented, the tracking authority will ensure that:

- a. for each PM, the date of completion or rejection is entered in the DATE COMPLETED box on the PMs screen of the occurrence reporting window;
- b. any actions completed during the implementation of PMs will be recorded in the applicable wing; and if 1 Cdn Air Div or DFS makes comments in the text box on the PMs screen, the applicable wing shall be notified;

- c. when a specific PM has been implemented, the wing responsible will close it;
- d. when a proposed PM is rejected, a record of the reference documentation from the level of comd that rejected it shall be included in the entry window; and
- e. PMs derived from a contractor occurrence will be tracked and closed by DFS if the contractor involved is not in direct support of a wing.

MAPPING CF DATA TO ICAO DATA

17. For data comparison and exchange of information, the FSOMS is required to be mapped to ICAO data. Annex A details the relationship between the CF occurrence categorization system and the ICAO occurrence categorization system.

18. In order to map FSOMS data to ICAO data, CF FS occurrences are divided into three major occurrence classes. Appendix 1 to this Annex details the specific mapping.

- a. 100 Accident Class. A 100 accident is defined as any occurrence categorized as an “A”, “B” or “C” category occurrence. It involves a CF aircraft, its equipment or its operation having caused someone to be missing (Grey) or have received fatal (Black), very serious (Red) or serious (Yellow) injuries or illness, or where the CF aircraft is either destroyed, missing or left with serious damage which adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component(s).
- b. 200 Serious Incident Class. A 200 serious incident is defined as any “D” or “E” category occurrence involving a CF aircraft, its equipment or its operation where there was extreme to medium potential for a serious accident or where someone received a minor injury or where the CF aircraft sustained minor damage. A list of likely serious incidents can be found at Appendix 1 of Annex A.
- c. 300 Incident. A 300 incident is defined as any “D” or “E” category occurrence involving a CF aircraft, its equipment or its operation where a low potential for an accident or serious incident existed.

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ANNEX A – MATRIX MAPPING CF OCCURRENCES TO ICAO DATA

OCCURRENCE CATEGORY	SAFETY OF FLIGHT COMPROMISE	ICAO OCCURRENCE CLASS
A	Yes	100 ACCIDENT
B		
C		
D, E	Extreme to Medium	200 SERIOUS INCIDENT
D, E	Low to Nil	300 INCIDENT

Appendix 1
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APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF SERIOUS OCCURRENCES

1. The incidents listed are typical examples of incidents that are likely to be serious. The list is not comprehensive and only serves as guidance to the definition of serious incident.
 - a. Near collisions requiring an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid a collision or an unsafe situation or when an avoidance action would have been appropriate;
 - b. Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) only marginally avoided (near CFIT);
 - c. Aborted take-off on a closed or occupied runway;
 - d. Take-off from a closed or occupied runway with marginal separation from obstruction;
 - e. Landing or attempted landing on a closed or occupied runway;
 - f. Gross failure to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb;
 - g. Engine fire or fire and smoke in the passenger cabin or cargo compartment, even though such fires were extinguished with extinguishing agents;
 - h. Event requiring the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew;
 - i. Aircraft structural failure or engine disintegration not classified as an accident;
 - j. Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems seriously affecting the operation of the aircraft;
 - k. Flight crew incapacitation in flight;
 - l. Fuel quantity requiring the declaration of an emergency by the pilot;
 - m. Incidents such as runway undershoot or overshoot or running off the side of a runway;
 - n. System failure, weather phenomenon, operation outside the approved flight envelope or other occurrences that could have made controlling the aircraft difficult; and
 - o. Failure of more than one system in a series of redundant systems mandatory for flight guidance and navigation.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA: Airworthiness Authority
ADL: Aircraft Damage Level
ADM (Mat): Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)
AERE: Aerospace Engineer
AETE: Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment
A/FSIR: Abbreviated Flight Safety Investigation Report
AFSO: Aviation Fluids Services Officer
AGL: Above Ground Level
AIA: Airworthiness Investigative Authority
AIG: Address Indicator Group
ALSE: Aviation Life Support Equipment
AOC: 1 Canadian Air Division Air Operations Centre
ATESS: Aerospace and Telecommunications Engineering Support Squadron
ATI: Access to Information
AMO: Aircraft Maintenance Officer
AOIs: Aircraft Operating Instructions
AWSO: Air Weapons Safety Officer
AWSTM: Air Weapons Safety Technical Member
BOI: Board of Inquiry
Canada COM: Canada Command
CANSOFCOM: Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CAS: Chief of the Air Staff
CAT: Clear Air Turbulence
CDLS: Canadian Defence Liaison Staff
CDS: Chief of the Defence Staff
CEFCOM: Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command
CF: Canadian Forces
CFAO: Canadian Forces Administrative Order
CFMO: Canadian Forces Medical Order
CFQAR: Canadian Forces Quality Assurance Region
CFR: Aircraft Crash, Firefighting and Rescue
CFTO: Canadian Forces Technical Order
COMSEC: Communication Security
CPI: Crash Position Indicator
CTAISB: Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation Safety Board
CVR: Cockpit Voice Recorder
CR: Combined (Initial and Supplementary) Flight Safety Investigation Report

DAEPM: Director Aerospace Equipment Program Management
DAOD: Defence Administrative Orders and Directives
DCDS: Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DCIEM: Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine
DF: Direction Finding
DFS : Director/Directorate of Flight Safety
DFSO: Division FS Officer
DGAEPM: Director General Aerospace Engineering and Project Management
DGQA: Director General Quality Assurance
DGRC: Director General Reserves and Cadets
DND OI: Department of National Defence Office of Information
DPLS: Director Personnel Legal Services
DPM: Director Preventive Medicine
DPSA: Director Procurement and Supply Aerospace
DQA: Directorate of Quality Assurance
DRDC: Defence Research and Development Canada
D Stzdn C: Director Standardization Coordination
ESR: Enhanced Supplementary Flight Safety Investigation Report
FDR: Flight Data Recorder
FLU: French language unit
FOD: Foreign Object Damage
FS: Flight Safety
FSI: Flight Safety Investigation
FSIR: FS Investigation Report
FSO : Flight Safety Officer
FSOMS: FS Occurrence Management System
FTI: From the Investigator
HALE UAV: High-altitude Long Endurance UAV
HFACS: Human Factor Accident Classification System
HUD: Head-Up Display
IAS : Indicated Airspeed
IAW : In accordance with
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR: Instrument Flight Rule
IIC: Investigator-In-Charge
IR: Initial Flight Safety Investigation Report
IRT: Instrument Rating Test
JAG: Judge Advocate General

MALE UAV: Medium altitude long endurance UAV
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
MOSID: Military Occupation
MRP: Mobile Repair Party
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBCW: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare
NDHQ: National Defence Headquarters
NDQAR: National Defence Quality Assurance Region
NDOC: National Defence Operations Centre
NOTAM: Notice to Airmen
NRCC: National Research Council of Canada.
OAA: Operational Airworthiness Authority
PAO: Public Affair Officer
PAR: Precision Approach Radar
PCL: Personnel Casualty Level
PDI: Persons with a Direct Interest
PIREPS: Pilot Reports
PM: Preventive Measures
POL: Petrol, Oil and Lubricants
QETE: Quality Engineering Test Establishment
RO: Repetitive Occurrence
RASO: Recovery and Salvage Officer
RCR: Runway Condition Report
SAMA: Senior Aircraft Maintenance Authority
SFCL: Safety of Flight Compromise Level
SOAP: Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program
SOP: Standard Operating Procedure
SITREP: Situation Report
SR: Supplementary Flight Safety Investigation Report
STANAG: NATO Standardization Agreement
TAA: Technical Airworthiness Authority
TCN: Transport Control Number
TSB: Transportation Safety Board of Canada
TSN: Time since new
TSO: Time since overhaul
UAV: Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle
VCDS: Vice Chief of Defence Staff
VFR: Visual Flight Rule

