

MANAGING TURMOIL

The Need to Upgrade Canadian Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal with Massive Change

**An Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee
on National Security and Defence**

October 2006

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39th Parliament – 1st Session

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Introduction

This report, the third of a three-part series, investigates scores of issues related to the tools Canadians will need to deal with **profound international and domestic change** likely to mark the early decades of the 21st century.

Wounded, the first of our three reports dealt with the state of Canada's military and was released in September 2005. It focused on the many problems facing the Canadian Forces following decades of neglect.

The Government's No. 1 Job, the Committee's second of the three reports was released in June 2006. It made recommendations for the rehabilitation of Canada's armed forces.

Managing Chaos, the Committee's third and final report in this series, sets out scenarios for potential change at home and abroad – some of them probable, some of them improbable but all of them possible – and concludes that Canadians will be woefully unprepared if even a few of these scenarios play out. This looks into the future and makes recommendations on changes the Committee feels are necessary to guarantee the sovereignty of Canada and the national security of Canadians.

The Committee had also planned on reporting in more detail on Canada's mission in Afghanistan and addressing our policy of diplomacy, development and defence (3D) in failed states. Unfortunately, the Committee visit to Kandahar was postponed in the final hour - negating the opportunity to visit the troops and view 3D in action. The Committee will return to this issue after visiting Afghanistan which we intend to do once the security situation in Kandahar stabilizes.

HOW THIS REPORT IS ORGANIZED

The 21st century will continue to bring widespread change to Canada and the world. Two of our most critical national tools for managing that change will be our foreign aid program and our armed forces. While these two tools function best on their own, they will occasionally serve our cause best if they act in tandem.

Your Committee sees this report as the beginning of a national debate on what threats and opportunities are likely to come rushing at Canadians in the coming decades, and how we can best prepare to meet those threats and realize those opportunities. If we do not prepare, the threats will increase and the opportunities will diminish.

Part I of this report will scan the horizon for potential change at home and abroad. It will advocate that Canada prepare for that change in three major ways:

1. Upgrade our Canadian Forces so that they can deal with more than one major crisis at the same time.
2. Rehabilitate Canada's foreign aid program so it can better deal with root causes of international unrest, which would lessen the chances of Canada being forced into wars.
3. Improve our working relations with the United States, a relationship that we must take advantage of to maximize our chances of succeeding in a world of flux.

Part II will focus on the Canadian Forces, and a number of ways more government money and more intelligent government approaches could create a military capability consistent with that of a prudent and reasonable nation.

PART I

The Role of the Canadian Military in Adapting to World Change

While the nature of threats to Canadian security will inevitably change over the coming decades, nobody can pinpoint which threats will pose the most serious challenges. What we can predict is that Canadians are likely to be confronted with a wider variety of major threats, and that there is a good chance that more than one of them will come at us at the same time.

This report's first job will be to examine this Committee's finding that Canada does not have the military tools in place to deal with more than one major threat at a time (at best) in an era when Canadians may be called upon to counter multiple threats in different places and simultaneously – both domestically and abroad.

Canada has, of course, tools other than the Canadian Forces for managing threats to its security. Agencies as diverse as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada's diplomatic corps, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA). All of these play either a pre-emptive or reactive role in creating a safer world for Canadians. So do provincial and municipal police forces, Non – Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in overseas development, and various other institutions. This Committee has assessed the roles of several of these institutions in earlier reports.

Inadequate Military Strength: Inadequate Foreign Aid

In this report we will focus primarily on what approach needs to be taken to upgrading the Canadian Forces to meet the challenges of a changing world.

The report will make one exception in this regard – we will also consider the importance of development assistance (the “carrot,” as opposed to the “stick”) in creating a more secure environment for Canadians; the level of foreign aid that

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would be more useful in pre-empting violence; and the role may be appropriate to the military in delivering foreign aid.

In terms of our focus on the current and future strength of the Canadian Forces, our primary thesis is that the Canadian government's current blueprint for rehabilitating Canada's military is too limited to deal with the kind of turmoil our country will face at home and abroad in coming decades.

The Need for Surge Capacity

Will the Canadian Forces face the level of turmoil we foresee? No one can be certain. But allow us to use the analogy of any large municipality's fire department.

No thoughtful citizen resents the fact that firefighters may go for hours or even days polishing fire trucks, lifting weights, and otherwise filling in time waiting for alarms to ring. We all know that when fires and other emergencies hit, more than one can occur at or about the same time. If any citizen's burning house is the third call the department receives back to back, that citizen expects the fire department to have the surge capacity to get to the first two houses in time – and to her third house as well.

Let us apply this vital need for surge capacity to Canada's military. The blueprint currently laid out by the Government of Canada – while it does give a welcome boost to defence spending after decades of neglect – will not give the Canadian Forces the capacity to deploy ground troops to two major assignments at the same time.

That is why – with 2,500 troops in Afghanistan¹ – the Government could not make any kind of substantial commitment to Lebanon or Darfur even if it wished to, and why it would have to turn somersaults to adjust personnel allocation if a major threat to Canada were to emerge at home or somewhere else abroad. This isn't just a temporary lack of capacity.

¹ Department of National Defence Press Release, "Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan: The Situation Today", February 28, 2006, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2038 Last visited: September 21, 2006.

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If the Canadian military is a one-trick pony at the moment, it will still be a one-trick pony when the government's plan to increase uniformed personnel from 62,000 to 75,000 comes to fruition in 2015. While the Department of National Defence says recruiting is going well, much of the influx of personnel over the next few years will simply come on board to top up "hollow units" and as replacements for departing personnel. Many current personnel are part of the demographic bulge that is growing older, and many skilled trades personnel – often victims of burnout because of overuse in recent years – are opting for more lucrative civilian opportunities.

Depending on Luck

Some may argue that having the capacity to mount one major military campaign at a time – which is already currently stretching Canada's capacity on the ground – represents a reasonable level of defensive capability for a middle power like Canada. After all, in military terms, Canada has never been a particularly muscular country during the decades that have followed the Korean War, and most Canadians are proud of the fact that Canada does not wander the world looking for trouble.

Indeed, the military capacity that the federal government is currently planning to put in place could turn out to be enough. The catch is that it will only be enough if we get lucky. Really lucky. Canadians have been lucky for many decades – perhaps that is what has lulled us. But our citizens should be aware by now that there are new risks at hand, both at home and abroad. These risks reduce the odds that we Canadians will have the capacity to deal with the multiple manifestations of chaos that may well confront us in coming decades.

Why Not Wait and See?

Canadians need to make decisions as to what level of protection makes sense to them, and we need to do it now. It will take at least a decade to ramp up to a realistic level of military capacity, even if the investment is made right away.

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We can, of course, dawdle – then point fingers at decision-makers when things start going wrong, and wonder how in the world we could have depended on luck to get us through on issues as important as our physical, economic and cultural self-preservation. That is what our politicians did in the years leading up to the Second World War and Canada paid dearly for their lassitude through reduced effectiveness and lives lost in the early part of the war.

Today, we again have to decide whether to dawdle, or prepare ourselves.

It comes down to deciding whether or not we Canadians want to insure our home. Right now our military plans amount to insuring half of it. Perhaps that is what Canadians want. Or perhaps many of us haven't taken a close look at all the change that is coming at us and the risks presented by that change.

A Turning Point for the Canadian Forces

The Canadian Forces have not been treated well in recent decades. They have been deployed too often, sustained with too little. Over the past decade multiple deployments – the kind of helpful deployments that Canadians support – were useful but produced a high degree of burnout and other types of institutional deterioration. It got to the point that in 2004 the Liberal Government was forced to tell the world that Canada could no longer answer the bell when it was time to mobilize in the interests of its citizens, and the interests of its allies. The then Minister of National Defence was forced to announce a pause in overseas deployments that lasted from August 2004 to February 2006.

That pause was certainly needed. In fact, our Committee had recommended it more than a year earlier.² But as necessary as the pause was, there is no denying that it was an embarrassment to Canada internationally. It demonstrated clearly just how battered our Forces had become, and how tight-fisted Canadian governments had been in providing them with the wherewithal to do their jobs.

A resuscitation process – at least the first stage of a resuscitation process – is currently underway. The new Conservative government has promised to purchase

² See the Committee's report "*For an Extra \$130 Bucks ...an Update on Canada's Military Financial Crisis, a View From the Bottom Up*". Recommendation 2, November 2002. p. 20.

important pieces of new equipment as well as to expand the number of personnel serving in the Canadian Forces.

However encouraging these promises have been, it is essential that Canadians know that the financial commitments to date are not likely to give Canadians the armed forces they will need over the coming decades.

We will know whether the Government is serious about fixing the Canadian Forces when we see the overdue Defence Capabilities Plan that was to be released by the Department of National Defence last spring, and which may finally appear this fall (one would hope it will have already been released when this Committee report goes to print). We will know it is not serious if the Plan does not call for such things as a new class of naval vessels to replace the worn out destroyers and aging frigates, fixed wing search and rescue aircraft, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

A One-Trick Pony **Run Long and Hard**

If the idea is to give the Forces the slender capacity to run one major operation in the field at any given time (such as the current Afghanistan mission) then what is being promised would probably be sufficient – but only just. Currently, the Canadian Army is stretched thin just handling the Afghanistan mission, with fewer than 2,500 troops in the field.

It is true that the Forces still possess naval and air force capacity that might be used in some other theatre. But when it comes to putting boots on the ground – for emergencies either at home or abroad – the army is already running flat out. The Forces do not have sufficient ground capacity to take on another major task, such as a deployment somewhere else in the world, especially when there is always a chance that it will also have to confront a variety of potential emergencies at home. Nor does the Committee believe that the Army will possess that kind of capacity if this Government's promise to increase Armed Forces personnel from 62,000 to 75,000 is realized in 2015.

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Although this Government has at least promised to invest more money than its predecessor, its budget projection for 2011-2012 still works out to about \$20 billion. The Committee is convinced that DND needs a budget of at least \$25 billion and more likely \$35 billion by 2011-2012. Senior military sources tell us that the higher figure is far more realistic.

Not only will the extrapolated current budget fall short down the road, commitments in the current budget are back-loaded so that relatively little money is being spent upfront. Our Committee believes that quickness is essential – adequate military strength delayed is adequate military strength denied when it may well be needed.

Canadians spend \$343 apiece on the most important role of any society – defending itself, and advancing its citizens’ interests abroad. The Dutch, who aren’t exactly known as warmongers, spend \$658. The Australians spend \$648. The British spend \$903. Responsible countries are spending in the neighbourhood of 2 percent of GDP on defence. Our Committee’s proposed budget would place Canada in that category. This government’s budget, if spending continues to increase in the same pattern in the coming years – will not come close.³

Country	Defence Expenditure - CDN \$ Per Capita
United Kingdom	\$903
The Netherlands	\$658
Australia	\$648
Canada	\$343

The Consequences of Underfunding

What are the consequences of continuing to underfund Canada’s military? That depends on what threats Canada is likely to face in the coming decades.

In the rest of Part I of this report, the Committee will take a look at the potential for change that is in the wind, both at home and abroad. We will ask readers to consider whether Canada is in a strong position to deal with all that change, and, if

³ See Appendix V re: the Committee’s financial arguments for DND budget.

not, whether it is realistic to believe that we Canadians could put ourselves in such a position at a cost consistent with what other responsible middle powers spend.

Whatever the public debate on this issue (and much more is needed) there is unlikely to be a powerful outcry for greater Canadian military capacity. Voters tend to be influenced by headlines telling them that what seems like large sums of money will be spent on new military equipment. Most voters then put a check mark beside the issue “military preparedness” and get on with their busy lives. They should not.

Political Leadership Required

Governments should overcome the urge to commit to the nation’s defence only what is likely to satisfy voters even if the “just enough” commitment may hobble the country down the road. We need genuine patriots on Parliament Hill. They don’t need to wave flags. They just need to do the right thing.

The Guessing Game: What are the Threats at Hand?

Today’s wisdom is that the main man-made threat to Canadian security will continue to be asymmetrical warfare waged by extremist religious forces. Perhaps. But the balance of power among the world’s nations is shifting, and it is just as likely that more traditional state-to-state military confrontations will return to centre stage.

There is another possibility in terms of man-made threats. While it may not be probable, it is not inconceivable that the place we may need our military most will be at home. More on that in a moment.

As for natural disasters, global warming appears to be the greatest threat on the horizon, with its potential to change the map of the world and the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

But global warming is far from the only natural problem at hand. Health authorities are currently taking very seriously the threat of widespread death from a range of

pandemics. Earthquakes, floods and fires have devastated other countries, and Canada is not immune.

What man-made and natural challenges will we need to confront? The truth is, *nobody knows*. The one thing we do know is that when natural disasters hit, the military is the one institution that has the capacity to come to the rescue when things get out of control. At least it *should* have that capacity.

Let us look briefly at “best guesses” on what kinds of changes might be forthcoming on the Canadian domestic scene and around the world, as well as looking at what kinds of changes could be forthcoming in our relationships with the United States.

A reasonable starting point for planning defences against potential threats at home and abroad is to ask “What if” questions. Some of these questions are likely to have unpleasant answers in the not-too-distant future. If too many of the Committee’s question marks have a genuine chance of transforming themselves into exclamation points, everyone should be aware that – under current military planning – Canada is not going to have what it takes to meet an assortment of challenges.

Canada Must Respond to Changing Needs at Home

In June 2005, the Canadian Forces announced a major overhaul of its command structure. The new blueprint created Canada Command⁴ separate from our traditional military focus on overseas theatres.

Our Committee welcomed this new focus on North America, and the vision voiced concerning the role of Canada Command:

“ . . . For the first time, a unified and integrated chain of command at the national and regional levels will have the immediate authority to deploy maritime, land and air assets in their regional areas of responsibility in support of domestic operations.”⁵

⁴ See Appendix IX for the current strategic level CF command organization and see Appendix VIII for the former strategic level CF Command Structure.

⁵ Department of National Defence, Canada Command, “Background”.

http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/en/background_e.asp Last visited September 20, 2006

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That is a realistic response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Canadians have generally felt themselves geographically remote from the world's conflagrations. But no more. Canadians need defending at home, and Canada must join hands with the United States in defending North America.

Two of the reasons that Canada needs a strong, well-rounded military – capable of taking on more than one assignment at a time – are domestically related:

- (a) The potential for disaster requiring military intervention has increased at home; and
- (b) The face of Canada is changing, and therefore, so may the definition of our Canada's national interest.

(a) Potential for Chaos at Home

Canada has traditionally been regarded as a safe haven from the world's troubles. Yes, we have had our incidents of man-made and natural turmoil – the Quebec crisis of the early 1970s, the Oka crisis, the Ice Storm in Eastern Ontario and Western Quebec, the power brownout in Quebec and Ontario, terrible floods in Quebec and Manitoba, forest fires in British Columbia, and more. But in comparison to some of the major wars and disasters that have ravaged so many other countries around the world, we have been blessed.

Which should not put anyone to sleep.

Are the following kinds of questions far-fetched? Are they alarmist? Or when we assess them carefully, should they inspire us to make preparations in case the answers turn out to be ugly.

- We know that Canada is on Al-Qaeda's short list of target countries. Is there any genuine risk that foreign radicals could attack here?
- Could "home-grown" radicals inspired by foreign ideologies or terrorists strike here? There have already been arrests.

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- If Canada were to experience civil unrest, could we deal with it effectively?
- Could Canadian militants move beyond making reasoned arguments and using current non-violent tactics – usually limited to occupations and standoffs – to something more radical?
- Could an epidemic – rooted in either natural or man-made causes – sweep the country with such devastation that military assistance would be critical to the nation’s well being?
- Could large parts of our population need to be evacuated from disaster areas? Shouldn’t the military have the capacity to help do that?
- Could an earthquake on the west coast or any other kind of disaster require hugely expanded hospital facilities at any given site? If so, shouldn’t we accelerate the plan for the Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART) to be equipped for domestic as well as overseas emergencies?

Some of these scenarios may seem unthinkable. But less than a generation ago the very idea of widespread suicide bombings in the Middle East would have been unthinkable. The scenario of airliners bursting through skyscrapers in Manhattan would have been dismissed as a second-rate Hollywood plot before the attack on the twin towers. Canadians must start preparing for the unthinkable because the unthinkable keeps finding hideous ways of turning societies upside down.

(b) The Changing Face of Canada

It isn’t just the nature of threats to Canadians that is changing. The very face of Canada is changing.

New citizens from all parts of the world have helped reformulate our concept of nationhood and have thrown new ways of looking at things into the mix. Canada’s changing demographics will steadily increase the ratio of Canadians whose families do not have European roots to those that do.

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This is no longer the same country that rallied to support Britain – the “mother country” – in two world wars. Most Canadians of all cultural backgrounds would say their first loyalties are to Canada, but many Canadians now also have cultural ties to countries other than Britain or France. That may change nothing when it comes to Canada’s international performance. Or it may. Changing outlooks and changing secondary loyalties could conceivably adjust Canada’s emphasis in some of the roles it plays internationally – through diplomacy, through foreign aid, and even through military assistance.

This raises new questions. Will a larger percentage of Canadians of Asian heritage mean more interest in Asia? Will a shift in Canada’s population westward toward the Pacific also stimulate a greater interest in Asia – which is already an area of increased interest because of the dramatic rise of countries like China and India as economic forces?

If Asia is as central to world politics in the 21st century as Europe was in the 20th century, what is this likely to mean to the Canadian Forces? Will Canadian troops find themselves deployed more often in Asian theatres, where the Navy tends to play a significantly greater role than it can play in Europe or the Middle East? Does that mean that the current efforts to bolster capacity in the Canadian Forces – which has focused largely on the Army – should be more balanced in terms of strengthening the Navy and Air Force? Is there a danger that our politicians and military leaders will focus so intently on contending with asymmetrical warfare in the Middle East that they will forgo the opportunity to prepare for other threats and obligations that may soon arise in other parts of the world?

**Larger Threats, Wider-Ranging Threats,
Require a Bigger, Broader-Based Military**

The Canadian Forces are being redesigned. They must be redesigned to meet the needs of Canada and all Canadians. This redesign must meet Canada’s needs, not just over the next few years but for the first half of this century. But new challenges are going to come at us quickly. Both the interests of Canadians and threats to their security may change much more rapidly than planners are preparing for. There is a lag time between the identification of new capabilities and when

that system is operational due to the time required for acquisition which must be considered.

The Canadian Forces are going to need sufficient capacity across the board to deal with the wide variety of contingencies they are likely to come up against. Their build-up should be more significant than is currently being contemplated by our politicians and military leaders. And it should be a much more balanced build-up – across the Navy, Army and Air Force – if Canada is not going to be caught unprepared.

Canada Must Respond to a Faster Spinning World

At a casual glance the world looks about the same in this 21st century as it did at the end of the 20th century. The same nations that occupy permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council half a century ago still do so, although there is talk of enlarging the Council with the addition of new countries on the rise. The United States remains the first among nations, although its legendary industrial prowess has largely shifted elsewhere and a lot of its huge debt lies in foreign hands. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty still exists, for what it is worth, with countries like India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran and Korea thumbing their noses at its restrictions. Canada, the last member to enter the G7, is still a member of its successor, the G8 – but some of the members of this very elite club are starting to look a bit frail in comparison to some of the emerging countries.

The stability that Canadians perceive in their vision of the world is starting to look like an illusion. There are enormous global changes taking place that have the potential to threaten Canada, physically and economically. Our nation is going to have to be both smart and strong to emerge from the next couple of decades as a country that still has enough heft to play a meaningful role on the international scene.

If Canada and other like-thinking nations are going to have any hope of managing change in the coming years they will need some of qualities that made Muhammad Ali such a phenomenal boxer in his day: brains, speed, physical strength and adaptability.

PART I
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No nation can hold its own on the world stage with a third-rate military. The current government is in the process of beginning to upgrade Canada's military. If it decides to content itself with half-measures, the change facing Canada and its allies will be managed by others.

When the Committee argues for a stronger military, we are not arguing in favour of fighting more wars. Quite the contrary. Just as having a strong police force discourages crime, equipping responsible governments with the capacity to deter nations (or non-state forces) that have destructive intentions can lessen the potential for war. Similarly, aid programs can help reduce the bitterness and despair that is often at the root of conflict.

What Could Explode Out There?

What could happen beyond our borders that could prove worrisome?

It is indeed a guessing game. But some of the questions that we are about to ask will have answers that are likely to alter Canada's destiny and the destiny of the world. Think tanks ask these kinds of questions. It is time the Canadian public started asking them. Canadians will need to make best use of national tools – including the Canadian Forces – to take advantage of all the new opportunities and counter all the new threats that will be coming at us.

ISLAMIC JIHAD

There is little evidence that the post 9-11 “War against Terrorism” has muted Islamic radicalism in the Middle East. In fact, it seems to have inspired radicalism within the Muslim community in places where it was not evident before. If traditional world powers fail to come to terms with countries like Syria and Iraq, if there is no settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, how many decades – or centuries – will our descendents live with terror?

RELIGIOUS RADICALISM

A similar question might be asked of the continued spread of religious radicalism, not just among (and between) Sunni and Shiite Muslims, but also among

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Christians, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and other traditional religions. Religious fundamentalists – searching for certainty in an increasingly uncertain world – believe the tenets set out in ancient scripture contain the truth, and that there can be no other truth. But there are interpretations of books like the Old Testament and the Koran that tend to send powerful, uncompromising messages of righteousness that leave little room for compromise with “the others.” Will religious fundamentalism continue to grow? If these kinds of mind sets widen and harden, will secular, democratically-elected governments lose their attractiveness?

EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

To ask whether the spread of nuclear weapons will continue is to ask a rhetorical question. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Israel has nuclear weapons. And now Iran – fiercely hostile to the West – is moving defiantly toward acquiring nuclear weapons, as is the strange, bellicose state of North Korea. Meanwhile traditional powers race to contain the loose nuclear weaponry left scattered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Any contribution the Canadian Forces can make to preempting situations that might trigger a nuclear disaster during this century would, of course, be helpful. But will Canada have even a modest capacity to intervene in such situations?

STATES vs. NON-STATES

Non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers are currently the most obvious threats to world security. Unless the world returns to its tradition of state-vs.-state conflicts, these rogue forces will continue to constitute the main threat to world stability. These non-state movements cause the kinds of problems that states were originally invented to eliminate. Will states join hands in an attempt to defend their sovereign powers by squelching these disruptive forces? If so, will Canada have the military resources to contribute to this joint effort? If not, will we be asked to leave the adults’ table?

DECLINE OF UNITED NATIONS

John Bolton, now U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, once famously said that “There is no such thing as the United Nations.” His contempt for the UN was denounced by diplomats everywhere. But the institution that statesmen hoped would help bring peace, stability and justice to the world in the aftermath of World

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War II is beginning to look more and more like the powerless League of Nations in the days that led up to that war. The UN must have the good will, contributions, and cooperation of powerful countries to be useful, and these commodities have been in short supply. The strongest states are extremely protective of their sovereignty and their power, and the most troublesome non-state powers are hardly interested in the *status quo*. Will the UN play a useful role in Lebanon and regain some of its lost esteem? Or will whatever strength the UN has left continue to wither away? If the UN becomes irrelevant, NATO will become more important. If NATO starts taking on more military assignments, will two tiers of membership evolve within the organization – those countries that pull their weight and those that don't? Where will Canada fit?

NATO vs. ?????

If the UN deteriorates, will individual states be forced to advance many of their causes through groups of countries protecting their own interests – the equivalent of street gangs in a tough neighbourhood? NATO and the Warsaw Pact threatened each other endlessly during the Cold War. Will there be a gang to replace the Warsaw Pact in this century? Will Russia respond to the dramatic enlargement of NATO by forming, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has intimated, a new power bloc with China and India? Would a two-gang world stimulate the same kinds of tensions that marked the Cold War?⁶

RICH VS POOR

With the fall of the Soviet Union – historically the world's most powerful communist state – and with the decline of communism as an economic philosophy in China, it has been all but assumed that the poor of this century lack the institutional strength to mobilize against the rich. But is this necessarily true? Is it possible that the incredible income gap that has emerged between suddenly-wealthy urban China and mostly-rural, impoverished China will explode? If that happened, would there be copycat revolutions around the world? Is the trend toward socialism in South America – centred on the growing influence of

⁶ For more information on NATO enlargement which has created a more robust alliance with an expanded land mass see, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Enlargements," *NATO Topics* Internet site. <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html> Last visited 20 September 2006; "Enlarging the Alliance," *NATO Prague Summit* Internet site. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in_focus/enlargement/index.htm Last visited 20 September 2006.

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Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez – a momentary blip, or a long-term movement? Is it really a move toward socialism, or is it a populist movement likely to evolve into authoritarianism, with Peronist undercurrents? If it turns out to truly be socialism in the nature of the Castro regime in Cuba, and it spreads throughout South America, could the first half of the 21st century witness a return to the kind of ideological conflict that marked the last half of the 20th century?

WORLD ENERGY SUPPLIES

Canada possesses massive oil reserves in the Athabaska tar sands. Meanwhile, many of the largest traditional oil supplies are in the hands of countries with unknown intentions and unknown futures: Russia (attempting to regain its status as a world power); Saudi Arabia (whose elitist and authoritarian regime is increasingly seen as fragile); Iran (whose leader is currently threatening to cut off oil supplies to the West if he does not get his way on nuclear issues); Iraq (where a Sunni-Shiite civil war appears increasingly likely); Nigeria (always a state close to the precipice); Venezuela (whose leader, Chavez, voices a distinctly anti-American mantra); and so on. These uncertainties are arising at a time when Canada's gas supplies are dwindling. Traditional North American oil reserves won't last forever, and countries like the United States and Canada have not yet made anything more than modest energy conservation efforts. What if we North Americans start having trouble getting affordable oil from abroad? Eastern Canada, after all, depends on imports from places like Venezuela and the North Sea. Canada's relationship with the U.S. would make it difficult to turn off the taps to the United States just because another part of Canada might be suffering shortages. Canada has oil. But Eastern Canada could conceivably find itself short of oil. What happens then?

WORLD WATER SUPPLIES

The world looks enviously at Canada's seemingly endless supply of freshwater, but Canadians aren't quite as well off as many people think. Global warming is already depleting some of our traditional sources of freshwater, and one only has to look at southern Alberta and Saskatchewan to see that Canada has some significant water problems of its own. These problems, however, don't rank with the water problems of some of the countries that stand to be the powerhouses of the 21st century, most notably the United States and China. Desalinization may eventually solve some of their problems, but right now it is a very expensive process. Meanwhile, more than half of China's cities have serious water shortages, and the

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majority of its rivers are so polluted that fish cannot live in them.⁷ China and Canada have virtually identical water resources, but China has 30 times the population.⁸ The southwest United States is virtually a desert, but it is an irrigated desert with a burgeoning population. The aquifer on which most of its irrigation depends has been significantly depleted. And so it goes. Water demand tripled around the world between 1950 and 1990, and is expected to double again in thirty-five years.⁹ Where will that water come from? More than 300 of the world's river systems cross national boundaries.¹⁰ The potential for conflict? *Enormous*. Are the pressures going to mount to raid the Great Lakes and the Columbia River? *Of course*.

OUR DETERIORATING ENVIRONMENT

Freshwater shortages are far from the only problem associated with the environmental threats the world faces. Global warming is expected to bring the world less freshwater and more unwanted saltwater. If oceans rise and large parts of populous countries like Bangladesh are obliterated, where will these people go? If it has proven to be impossible to totally stem illegal immigration into North American and European countries under current conditions, how powerful will migratory pressures be when land is disappearing into the sea?

GLOBALIZATION

When globalization was first being promoted it was suggested that traditional western economies would do well because of their technological advantages, and poorer states would do well because of their low labour costs. But several of the states with low labour costs – including India and China – have made huge leaps in technological acumen, some of which has been purchased from the West, some of which has been stolen, and some of which has simply been developed by fine minds in these countries. What will happen to the West's economic advantage if some countries develop both cost *and* technology advantages over us? And what will happen if a significant amount of this technology is funnelled into military strength, nuclear or otherwise? Several Asian countries have been pumping billions

⁷ Michael Dorgan, "China is running out of water, and time", *Mercury News Beijing Bureau*, 11 July, 2000, <http://www.rense.com/general2/watt.htm> Last visited 20 September 2006.

⁸ Marq De Villiers, *Water*, Stoddart Publishing, Toronto, 1999, p 34.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 20.

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into military expansion, including constitutionally non-militant Japan. Perhaps all this military build-up will never affect Canadians. And perhaps it will.

THE RISE OF ASIA'S ECONOMY

In late August, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gave its support to a plan that would see a new trade bloc established that would represent nearly half of the world's population and rival two trade blocs representing "older" economies – the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Included in the group's membership – accounting for about a quarter of the world's GDP – would be the ten members of ASEAN plus China, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Not invited to join, to this point: the United States and Canada, both bordering on the Pacific. Does Asian economic power threaten North American economic power? Will Asian economic unity lead to more political unity and/or military unity? Or will these countries continue to count on the United States to police stability in Southern Asia? If so, it has become obvious that U.S. military power is not infinitely expandable. Will Canada be capable of lending a hand?

U.S. DEBT

The United States is Canada's closest ally and the economies of the two countries are intertwined. How will the United States – with a population now saddled with enormous personal debt ratios combined with record-setting government debt – work its way back to fiscal respectability? And what will happen if it doesn't? What would happen if China and Japan – which have been huge purchasers of U.S. government debt – decide to call in the more than \$US 300 billion the United States currently owes them? It has been in these countries' interests to make low-return investments in the U.S. economy to keep Americans buying their products, but what if they decided to square off against the Americans in a struggle for power, and found it in their interest to pull the plug on all those investments? Economists currently don't believe that it would be in China's interest to destabilize the world economy. But stranger things have happened.

U.S. WORLD INVOLVEMENT

The United States has been criticized for trying to police the world, but there were occasions during the 20th century when it was criticized for not doing so – for

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turning its back on international problems. It was accused of being isolationist and was initially reluctant to enter both world wars – either one of which might have gone the other way had the U.S. not finally become involved. There remains a strong streak of isolationism among American political thinkers. If the U.S. is embarrassed and financially weakened by its involvement in Iraq – or if it suffers through a period of economic difficulty for other reasons – is it likely to turn its back on the world? What would be the effect on world security? What would be the effect on Canada?

CANADIAN MILITARY SPENDING

If the U.S. economy does suffer a “hard landing” recession some time in the next decade – which many economists believe is quite possible – the Canadian economy would clearly take a big hit as well. More than 80 percent of our exports go to the United States. The large federal surpluses Canadian governments have racked up in recent years would likely evaporate. Military spending is the easiest government spending to cut back on, because so much of it is discretionary. If the Canadian government is unwilling to invest in its military now – when it is flush – isn’t there a very good chance that it will never make that investment? And if it doesn’t? Will Canada be left to face belligerent states – and/or non-state actors – with little more than a shadow defence? Who will want us as allies? Would the U.S. decide to take on the role of defending North America on its own? Canadian sovereignty has managed to survive within the parameters of a partnership with an infinitely more powerful neighbour. Would it continue to survive if Canada turned into the equivalent of a U.S. protectorate?

What to Do?

There are many, many other questions to be asked about where the world may be headed in the coming century, but one thing is clear: Canada’s greatest ally – the United States – is unlikely to continue to remain the world’s one great superpower, presiding over a unipolar world. Other forces are on the ascendancy. How can Canada bolster its capacity to act in tandem with its allies so as to protect its interests in an increasingly wobbly world?

The Committee suggests this as a simple starting point: invest 2 per cent of GDP in the Department of National Defence rather than 1 per cent. Other reasonable

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nations are doing this. Yes, that would likely cost Canadian taxpayers \$35 billion annually by 2012, rather than the current projected \$20 billion military budget.¹¹ The extra spending would amount to \$571 per Canadian in 2012.¹² That isn't insignificant, but if we are going to spend what we do every year to insure our homes, shouldn't we be willing to spend it on insuring our country?

There is more. If the world is going to become a more stable place, military intervention in itself is not going to get us there. In fact, it should be the last resort. Wars, after all, are not only horrific; they represent the failure of humanity to solve problems in a peaceful way. We need to do everything in our power to pre-empt wars. We need to help create a fairer, less embittered world.

In addition to creating a reasonable military capacity, Canada should double its current foreign aid budget of \$ 2.7 billion,¹³ which represents .36 percent of our Gross National Product. The world target of .7 per cent is either being met or committed to by countries with the same kind of mindsets and interests as Canada. We Canadians should be doing our share to encourage justice and pre-empt instability.

Canada managed to sneak through most of the Cold War as a 98-pound military weakling. It wasn't that difficult because that war was primarily a struggle between two superpowers, when the U.S. military and the U.S. economy were in their ascendancy. If it was a terrifying time, but there was also a measure of stability to the standoff between two military giants.

We are moving into a multipolar world. Stability will not be the watchword in this era for any nation. Lord Baden Powell, the founder of the international scouting, gave that movement its slogan:

Be prepared.

Canadians aren't.

¹¹ An approximation based on 2005-06 projections. A firm defence budget figure for 2006-07 has not yet been published in public.

¹² Based on a projected Canadian population of 35 million people, up from the current 32.5 million people.

¹³ Canadian International Development Agency, "Statistical Report on Official Development Assistance, Fiscal year 2003-2004" [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/stats/\\$file/Stat_rep_03-04.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/stats/$file/Stat_rep_03-04.pdf). Last visited 22 September 2006. This is the most recent aggregated figure available from CIDA.

Butter Beats Bullets: The Need to Expand Canada's Foreign Aid Budget

Canada dispenses foreign aid for a variety of reasons: humanitarian concern for the less fortunate; desire for international stability; self-interest in allying Canada with poor countries as well as rich countries; and interest in developing markets for our goods. All these are legitimate goals.

In real terms, Canada is the seventh largest contributor of foreign aid of 22 OECD countries, but Canada's generosity has wilted in recent years, which has not only diminished our reputation as a humanitarian country, but has reduced our commitment to a more stable world.

World stability cannot be enforced entirely – or even primarily – through the use of arms. Countries with embittered populations tend to be hotbeds for violence. When it comes to diminishing conflict, “winning hearts and minds” can often be more important than winning battles.

Lester B. Pearson had just stepped down as Canada's Prime Minister when he was chosen to lead the World Bank “Pearson Commission” that set out international guidelines for wealthy countries' allocation of foreign aid. The commission issued a report in September 1969, calling for developed countries to set aside .7 percent of Gross Domestic Product for official development assistance to developing countries.¹⁴

Several countries have met or exceeded the .7 percentage: In 2004 they were:

- Norway (.87 percent)
- Denmark (.85 percent)
- Luxembourg (.83 percent)
- Sweden (.78 percent)
- Netherlands (.73 percent).

¹⁴ Although at the time Pearson's 0.7 ratio was expressed as being related to GDP, today GNI (Gross National Income) is sometimes used in place of GDP. In either case, the ration comes out to be about the same.

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Six other countries – including the UK, France, Germany, Spain, Finland, and Belgium have committed to meeting the target by 2015 or earlier.

International Cheapskates

In 1975, Canada's foreign aid budget hit its all-time high at .53 percent of Gross National Income. By 2001, our foreign aid spending had plummeted to .22 percent.

Things started to turn around a bit in 2002, and by 2006 Canada's foreign aid spending had worked its way back to .36 percent of GDP – about half of the .7 target first advocated by Mr. Pearson in 1969.

Twice Canada has gone on record in support of meeting Mr. Pearson's target.¹⁵

- In 1970, Canada voted in support of the UN General Assembly's Resolution 2626 calling for all developed countries to meet the .7 target.
- Thirty-five years later, in 2005, the House of Commons adopted a report of The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade which called for Canada to reach its foreign aid (ODA - official development assistance) commitment of .7 per cent of Gross National Income by 2015.

However good Canada's intentions, no Canadian government has ever put its money where its mouth is. Neither the last Liberal Government nor the current Conservative Government have committed to joining other countries that have vowed they will hit the target by 2015.

The best Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been able to come up with so far has been his 2006 election campaign commitment to put another \$425 million into Official Development Assistance over the next five years. This works out to an average of \$85 million per year: this doesn't even get us close.

¹⁵ United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), "0.7% Background", June 2006, http://www.unicef.ca/portal/Secure/Community/502/WCM/HELP/take_action/G8/Point7_EN.pdf#search=%22Canada%20Overseas%20Development%20Assistance%20Percentage%20of%20GDP%22] Last visited 20 September 2006.

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That announcement was accompanied by a press release saying that the new government's goal was "to move toward the average level among Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members" – which at the time was .47 percent of GDP.¹⁶

Note that the commitment is to "move toward" the average OECD level – there is no commitment that Canada will ever actually get to that level.

The average Norwegian spends [\$477] a year on Official Development Assistance; the average Canadian spends \$80 a year.

Our self-image as a moral nation is built more on the way we treat ourselves – through programs such as national health care – than on the way we treat others.

The Committee acknowledges that its desire to double Canada's foreign aid budget to \$5.2 billion is, like raising the military budget, going to cost ordinary Canadians some money. Instead of spending \$80 per capita on foreign aid, we would be spending \$160 per capita.

We recognize that Canadians could do other things with that money. But we believe that most Canadians would see this as a worthwhile investment.

First, the likelihood of reducing world turmoil through military responses alone is a mug's game. Force won't work on its own. Most Canadians know that. We need a strong military, just as we need a strong police force. But policing alone won't solve crime problems, and no military will ever snuff out all the fury created by poverty and injustice.

Second, other reasonable countries are contributing at the level that we are proposing. Are the citizens of those reasonable countries more understanding, and more generous, than Canadians? If so, how legitimate is the good-guy image that Canadians are so proud of?

¹⁶ Conservative Party of Canada Press Release, "Harper Announces Increase in Overseas Development Assistance", 13 January 2006, <http://www.conservative.ca/EN/1091/38757> Last visited 20 September 2006.

The Committee recommends that:

- 1. The Government of Canada honour its pledge to the UN General Assembly – and respond to a unanimous 2005 vote in the House of Commons – by increasing Canada’s Official Development Assistance budget to .7 percent of GDP by 2015.**
- 2. The Government of Canada get started on working toward an aid budget of .7 percent of GDP by increasing Canada’s foreign spending for 2007-2008 by \$500 million.**
- 3. The Government of Canada increase its defence spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2015.**
- 4. The Government of Canada get started on working toward a defence budget of 2 percent of GDP by increasing Canada’s defence spending for 2007 – 2008 by \$2 billion.**

Bridging the Aid Gap in Kandahar

Since Canada become militarily involved in Afghanistan, that country has become the No. 1 recipient of Canadian foreign aid. The Canadian International Development Agency’s scheduled distribution to Afghanistan is \$100 million a year for the fiscal years 2006/07 and 2007/08 –in June 2006, Prime Minister Harper announced that the Government has promised to maintain that level at least through 2011.¹⁷

Canada has nearly 2,500 troops serving in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan, home territory to Taliban insurgents and among the two or three most dangerous regions. That Canadian mission is committed to a “3D” approach to putting an end to violence in the region: Diplomacy, Development and Defence. But it appears that CIDA activity in the Kandahar area has been sparse.

¹⁷Government of Canada, “International Policing”, *Protecting Canadians-Rebuilding Afghanistan* Internet site, http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/inter_police-en.asp Last visited 20 September 2006.

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For the past six months, the Committee has made repeated attempts to determine how aid is being distributed in Kandahar, only to be told that CIDA can only provide information on a countrywide basis, and cannot break it down for particular regions.

The Committee then called upon the Honourable Josée Verner Minister of International Cooperation to testify and asked her to describe the nature of Canadian aid to the province of Kandahar. During her testimony on 29 May 2006, she was unable to provide that description. In light of her testimony, the Committee invited the Minister to reply further in writing.

The letter the Committee received from the Minister at the end of July didn't help. Under "Lists of projects in Kandahar" it said:

"The bulk of CIDA's development assistance to Afghanistan goes to National programs delivered through the central government. Some of these programs are active in Kandahar province; however, at this stage we cannot give specific figures as to how much of Canadian money in support of these programs goes to Kandahar province."¹⁸

Since Canada's principal military operations are in the province of Kandahar, Committee members find this strange. The Committee also finds it unsatisfactory that Canadian aid seems to be distributed primarily through multilateral agencies and through the new government of Afghanistan, which in its infancy has developed a reputation for some degree of corruption.

New-Think/Old-Think/Dumb-Think

CIDA officials have told the Committee that the traditional method of delivering aid is through central governments. But this is, in fact, "old-think." These officials neglected to mention "new-think". One of CIDA's own development thrusts over the past few years has been toward "decentralization." The concept of decentralization is based on experience in the aid world that when money is funnelled through central governments it often doesn't get to the people who need

¹⁸ See Appendix XI – Minister of Canadian International Development Agency, Hon. Josée Verner, letter to the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, July 2006.

it, many of whom are far outside capital cities and do not live in areas that are closely attached to ministers and bureaucrats who control government purse strings.

Several of the projects showcased by CIDA in its booklet *Thinking Big*, which was distributed at the World Urban Forum in Vancouver in June, are built around “new think”, the concept of decentralization – getting money into needy areas by *avoiding* the central governments, particularly if they are inefficient or corrupt.

As for using multilateral agencies, it is impossible to measure the success of Canadian development projects in Afghanistan if Canadian aid funds are being given to third parties to use in a way that may or may not be efficient, may or may not be getting to the people in remote and dangerous areas, and may or may not be in Canada’s interests or the interests of Canadian troops serving in Afghanistan.

In visiting Kandahar at the end of August 2006, the Honorable Gordon O’Connor, Minister of National Defence, as much as acknowledged that the money Canada has been pumping into Afghanistan has not been reaching the volatile southern region, including Kandahar. He promised more Canadian funds would be forthcoming, but said there would be strings attached:

“More effort by the national government [of Afghanistan] has to be put into Southern Afghanistan, and I’ll be making that argument . . . that we would like to see more of the Afghan national army, more efforts on the police and more construction efforts from the central government here in the south.”¹⁹

Distribute Aid Through the Canadian Military Until Stability Arrives

The Committee does not believe that using Canada’s military to deliver aid should become the norm. But when regions are so dangerous that aid agencies cannot work there, and when central governments cannot be trusted to deliver there, and when Canadian soldiers are desperately trying to demonstrate that they are there to heal rather than hurt, why would the Canadian government not use the military as a interim means of delivering Canadian assistance?

¹⁹ CBC Radio News, August 31, 2006

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Kandahar is the area in which the Canadian government is focusing its military efforts in Afghanistan, and will be for some time. Kandahar should also be the focus of Canada's aid efforts in Afghanistan, at least at this time, and there is no evidence that this is the case. Using Canadian Forces to help deliver that aid would bring our Kandahar deployment much closer to the genuine 3D kind of effort that the Government trumpets as the Canadian way. Right now it looks very much like a Single D effort – hunting down insurgents. This view has been substantiated by the recent decision to send another 200 -500 personnel including a company of infantry from Valcartier, 15 Leopard tanks, armoured engineering vehicles to help with rebuilding projects, and a counter mortar capability. This will bring to approximately 2500 personnel deployed on the Afghanistan mission, the majority of which are in Kandahar province.

The Committee believes that Canada's aid effort in Afghanistan should be clearly tied to Canada's military effort in Afghanistan, to make a clear impression on the hearts and minds of the residents of Kandahar that these troops are not bloody-minded occupiers, but rather providing protection for the reconstruction of the country.

The Committee recommends that:

- 5. CIDA refocus its aid allocation to Afghanistan so that most of it goes directly to development projects in the province of Kandahar where the CF is conducting military operations.**

Looking at Canadians from a Kandahar Resident's Perspective

Think about the residents of Kandahar and their attitude toward Canadian troops. They have no idea that the Canadian military is committed to a "3D" approach to help rehabilitate the country. The majority of the Afghan people see Canadians trying to effect change through the use of force. Even if this is in their long-term interests, the fighting clearly increases the level of danger they are exposed to in the short term.

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So whom do they back? The Canadians, who currently appear to represent force and force alone? Or the Taliban, who also represent force, but are probably from their tribe, were instrumental in driving the Soviet invaders out of Afghanistan, and who will still be around a decade from now when the Canadians will almost certainly be gone?

Canadian troops are totally dedicated to their mission in Afghanistan. To succeed, they need the right tools. If they are going to gain the hearts and minds of the ordinary inhabitants of Kandahar, would it not help greatly if they had something to offer them other than bullets – like wells, schools, hospitals and the like? The Canadian Forces in Afghanistan need to follow the example of Sgt. Marc Leger who became known as “King Marko” to the villagers of Livno Valley in Bosnia for his work with the local community. Sgt. Leger was later killed in the “friendly fire” accident in Afghanistan. His wife carried on his work by creating the Marc Leger Memorial Fund which raised funds to restore the Livno Valley Community Centre which serves as a social-culture, and multi-purpose hall.²⁰

Not only would having our troops involved in the delivery of foreign aid help gain them support (and possibly good intelligence) in the communities of Kandahar province, it would certainly help get the aid delivered. At this stage, in this volatile region, the Committee believes that aid can probably be best distributed by the military.

When Muscle is Needed to Deliver . . .

The Canadian Council for International Cooperation appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Defence and Veterans Affairs in November 2005, spoke *against* Canada’s “3D” approach to intervention in Afghanistan, arguing, “Humanitarian action must be independent from military action.” CCIC maintains, “the effectiveness and viability of aid is dependent on a clear separation between politics and aid.”

The Committee believes that the effectiveness and viability of aid depends on the delivery of aid, and it has seen little evidence that Canada can, at this time, deliver aid effectively in Kandahar without military assistance.

²⁰ Captain Cat Haylock “In Honor of their Fallen Comrade” published 23 May 2003

The Committee further believes that the effectiveness and viability of Canada's military efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan depend a great deal on its soldiers being seen as rescuers, rather than occupiers.

In more stable circumstances, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation is probably right – humanitarian aid is best delivered separate from military activity. But these are not stable circumstances. Indeed they are highly dangerous. That is why the Committee recommends that substantial funds be provided to the senior local military commanders for use in development projects. That fund can be used as a bridging mechanism to deliver Canadian aid to the residents of Kandahar until the security environment permits CIDA and NGOs to operate in the area.

The Committee recommends that:

- 6. Until the security situation improves, the development budget allocated to the Canadian Forces commander in Kandahar be set to an amount of \$4 million immediately.**

Defining Success

Since Canada has committed a large military force in Afghanistan and Afghanistan is now Canada's largest recipient of foreign aid, Canadians need to know how success is to be measured.

Canada is part of an alliance working together to bring new hope and an improved quality of life to the people of Afghanistan. A stable Kandahar is essential to the overall security of Afghanistan. How goes Kandahar, so goes Afghanistan. The Committee believes that the success of Canada's mission in Kandahar consist of, at least, the following:

1. A government that is able to provide for the security and safety of its citizens;
2. A citizenry that is fed and sheltered in an adequate manner;

3. Significant improvements to the infrastructure such as wells, roads and schools ;
4. Basic health services;
5. Education that is universally available to both genders;
6. Steps are well advanced in the development of a democratic process in the province; and
7. A growing and diversified economy that does not rely on the drug trade.

From time to time, the Government of Canada should report fully to Canadians on the progress in achieving of these objectives.

Riding the Elephant: Taking Advantage of Our Relationship with the U.S.A.

"Geography has made us neighbours. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies."

President John F. Kennedy
Address to the Parliament of Canada
May 18, 1961

Britain was the most powerful nation in the world in the 19th century, presiding over its mighty Empire. The United States took over as top dog in the 20th century and became the world's one and only superpower when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.

But nothing lasts forever. The U.S. may still be No. 1 at the end of the 21st century, or it may not. A report from the National Intelligence Council²¹ predicts some slippage:

²¹ The National Intelligence Council is a centre of strategic thinking within the U.S. government that provides the President and senior policymakers with analyses of foreign policy issues.

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“The likely emergence of China and India . . . as major global players – similar to the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a powerful United States in the early 20th century – will transform the geopolitical landscape with impacts potentially as dramatic as those in the previous two centuries.”²²

The document says that only 15 years from now the United States –while it is likely to remain “an important shaper of the international order” – won’t be quite the mover and shaker that it has been for more than a century, with states like China, India, Brazil and Indonesia elbowing their way onto the international playing field.

Canada is currently the largest trading partner and longest-standing friend of the most powerful nation in the world – a nation that may be starting to lose some of its edge. Is this the right time for Canada to step back from our relationship with the Americans?

The Committee believes that if Canadians are savvy enough to recognize their own best interests, Canada will step forward instead.

U.S. Will Need Allies

Some Americans believe that their country should push forward on its own in international affairs, ignoring its enemies and allies alike. Other Americans believe that this is misguided.

Canada is a sovereign nation and acts in its own interests. Those interests coincide with the United States in many matters. When they do not, Canada should pursue its own interests. The United States does not need worshippers; Canada need not bow down to Washington. But the Government of the United States has come to realize that multilateralism is better than unilateralism and it will need allies even more as the world becomes increasingly chaotic and other states and non-state powers rise to challenge its power.

²² Fred Kaplan, “20/20 Vision: A CIA Report Predicts That American Global Dominance Could End in 15 Years”, *Slate Magazine*, 26 January 2005. <http://www.slate.com/id/2112697/> Last visited 21 September 2006.

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Canada should strengthen its working relationship with the United States on the basis of mutual respect. Earlier in this report, our Committee recommended increases to both the foreign aid and military budgets in Canada's interests. An added effect of this action will be the strengthening of our working relationship with the United States.

Seizing the U.S. Opportunity

A strong working relationship with United States will continue to present Canada with the best opportunity to advance its own interests at home and internationally.

We Canadians can continue to offer constructive criticism of U.S. missteps internationally (and only a fool would pretend that Washington or anybody else including us have not made mistakes internationally).

We can continue to refuse to join the Americans in places we do not wish to go – places like Vietnam and Iraq. We can continue to speak frankly to U.S. legislators about what works in the Canadian jurisdiction and what doesn't. Americans appreciate frank and candid talk.

But differences between our two countries on these kinds of international issues, as well as on bilateral issues such as softwood lumber, should be treated as *exceptions* to a relationship largely based on shared interests and shared values, and certainly based on need. These differences should not be taken out of context, especially when the overall context is so valuable to both countries.

The values and interests of the two countries are not identical, but they are as similar as those of any two countries in the world. One has only to count the number of nations that share borders with hostile neighbours to recognize how lucky Canadians and Americans are.

The relationship should be based on attempting to accommodate one another's needs. Canada needs to manage this relationship in its own interests, but the tone should always remain civil if either country wants the other to make adjustments to its way of looking at things.

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Outrage and contempt don't work if one side or the other is really looking for accommodation, and this relationship is too valuable to both sides for either side to sink to a juvenile level.

The United States is a lot bigger than Canada. We are going to have to be smart to manage our end of the relationship in our own best interests. Smart, but not smart-assed.

The Positives are There

It is the nature of journalism that differences and disagreements make news.

When Americans notice Canadians, it is generally because some Canadian has annoyed them or Canada has created a potential problem – perhaps just an alleged problem. The allegation that the 9-11 bombers entered the United States from Canada was untrue, but it stuck.

When Canadians think of Americans, too many of us think of one type of American, or of the mistakes the U.S. government has made.

Why do so many Canadians dismiss the United States as a country full of “ugly Americans”? Some are, some aren't, and the same applies to Canadians.

The truth is that all countries rack up stacks of negatives and positives that stick to their images. Naturally enough, America's negatives are writ large. We Canadians shouldn't ignore them, but we do need to get past them. The positives are there - in spades. And the positives are what Canadians need to focus on and take advantage of.

Looking for Better Neighbours?

When we think of America, we Canadians need to remember that the United States overcame its isolationist instincts and not only helped save Europe in two world wars, but shouldered much of the burden of rebuilding Europe with the Marshall Plan after World War II.

We need to remember that the United States took a leadership role in creating NATO – a team of like-minded nations that includes Canada – and that NATO succeeded in stopping the expansion of the Soviet Union.

We need to remember that the United States has, for a long time, been the most generous, innovative and economically dynamic country in the world, and the chances are it will continue to be so, even as other economic powers challenge its supremacy.

We need to ask ourselves which countries we would prefer on our southern border. Ask yourself – can you name a better country with which to live in relative harmony, advance your interests, share an economy, and defend a continent?

Canadians also need to get over their hang-ups about being dominated by American culture. After half a century of being bombarded by American television and movies, Canadian culture is doing fine, thanks. In fact one author, Michael Adams, – actually makes a compelling argument that Canadian-U.S. values have become *more* divergent.²³

Many Canadians are constantly fretting that the nature of our relationship with the United States is endangering our sovereignty. The truth is that an honest, pragmatic, working relationship with the United States *strengthens* Canadian sovereignty. How? It enhances two of the most vital components of sovereignty: citizens' security, and citizens' economic well being. It is far easier to love and cherish Canada if Canada keeps you safe and prosperous. It is hard to argue that our relationship with the United States doesn't have something to do with that.

“Smart Canada” Policy

The only thing that should matter to Canadians is this: does it make sense for Canada to have a harmonious and lasting working relationship with the United States – economically and militarily – even when politics and economic treaties occasionally go awry? And the answer is clearly, yes.

²³ Michael Adams, *Fire and Ice, Canada and the United States and the Myth of Converging Values*, Penguin Canada, Toronto, 2003.

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The power of the United States may well wane in relation to the power of other emerging countries, but the United States is going to continue to be a huge economic power and a formidable military power for generations to come. And it is going to continue to be ten times Canada's size. We need America. And America needs dependable allies.

We don't need to tug our forelock to be a dependable ally. But the Canadian government should be investing in an information campaign that breaks through the negative perceptions that too many Americans and Canadians have of each other.

How many Americans know that Canada is their No. 1 trading partner? How many Americans know that Canada is the #1 trading partner of 39 U.S. states? How many Americans know that about a third of the natural gas consumed by the state of California comes from Canada? How many Americans know that Canadian and U.S. troops fought shoulder to shoulder in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Gulf War, and are currently fighting side by side in Afghanistan? How many Americans know about the quick response of those Canadians who rushed to help during the 9/11 disaster in 2001 and when Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005?

How many Canadians know that a large number of manufacturing jobs in Ontario have been created by companies that make products containing components from both sides of the Canada-U.S. border, which often depend on just-in-time delivery to each other's doorsteps? How many Canadians know that approximately 80% of our exports go to the United States, and that without those markets, our economy would be crippled? How many Canadians know that when Canadian troops and equipment had to be moved across our country to provide assistance during the 1998 ice storm, the U.S. got strategic lift aircraft to us in a matter of hours to help us do the job?

Over the past few years, Canada has opened seven new consulates in the United States, in Denver, Raleigh-Durham, San Diego, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Anchorage and Tucson. Good. That's a start. We need to place more of our diplomats outside the Washington beltway so they can understand where members of Congress and state governors are coming from. Canada cannot influence U.S. policy without

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understanding the needs of the American people, and getting our message across to them.

Much of an improved Canada-U.S. relationship will depend on building good will between politicians and bureaucrats. Canada should mount a concerted public relations campaign to drive home the importance of the two countries and promote our interests in the United States. But both countries could also place a far greater focus on improved border crossings, energy savings, and rehabilitation of the North American environment. On some issues, the philosophies of the two countries will differ, but we should seek out areas in which we think alike and can work together.

Some Possibilities for Joint Action

Here is a short list of some ways in which the Committee believes Canada and the United States should be upgrading the mechanisms they use to support one another and to defend North America.

Billion Dollar Border Boost

A coordinated border security development plan is being pursued. It is good as far as it goes. It needs more people, and more money.

It is hard to think of anything that Canada can do to improve our own security while at the same time improving our relationship with the United States, than investing in safer and more efficient border crossings.

Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) bring together Canada and United States partner agencies²⁴ to share information and work together on issues of national security and organized crime. However, the number of IBETs is insufficient to provide adequate security along the Canada/US border.

IBETs should be expanded from 23 to at least 30. Increasing the number of IBETs will allow the RCMP to further enhance their proactive deployment capability.

²⁴ IBET partner agencies are: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the US Customs and Border Protection/Office of Border Patrol (CBP/OBP), the US Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the US Coast Guard

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This would involve the use of technology (including approximately 6 Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)), 6 helicopters and a number sensors to monitor movement in remote areas) to create better presence and awareness of activity along the border while reducing response time to all land border crossings.

The Committee believes that both countries should better coordinate security activity on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway System (GLSSS). However, Canada currently has limited capacity to enforce federal statutes on the GLSSS, a role which should be carried out by the RCMP.

In order to effectively secure the GLSSS, the Government must give the RCMP Marine Program²⁵ the teeth it needs. The 9th Division of United States Coast Guard (USCG) – the lead agency in the United States responsible for securing the Great Lakes, employs approximately 2200 active duty members located at 48 stations from Alexandria Bay, New York to Duluth Minnesota.²⁶

Securing the GLSSS will require an expansion of the RCMP Marine Program from its current level of approximately 14 officers to between 1200-1600 RCMP personnel, positioned at strategic locations on the GLSSS such as Thunder Bay, Kingston, Quebec City and others.²⁷

This expansion in personnel should also be accompanied by a significant investment in infrastructure, marine-related assets and technology such as 12 rapid patrol vessels, 2 helicopters, 6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and a high frequency wave radar.

The Committee believes that this will allow the RCMP to:

²⁵ The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Marine Imports Program is the joint RCMP Canadian Coast Guard Mid shore patrol program utilizing three vessels on the Great Lakes. The RCMP contribution is 14 RCMP officers. The RCMP contribution will be raised to 30 officers by 2008.

²⁶ <http://piersystem.com/go/doc/443/23081/> - The USCG is also employs by 190 civilians and is assisted by approximately 1100 reservists, and 4,200 auxiliary members. The district facilities include 92 units in all, of which 48 are stations (with 188 small boats) including two air stations, one air facility, 10 cutters and two LORAN stations.

²⁷ The Committee estimates that it would take approximately: 550-600 people (not all of whom need to be RCMP officers) to make up part of the crews for newly high speed and other patrol vessels; 200-300 people required to crew a number smaller vessels at critical points around the lake; 50-100 people required to staff and support a Great Lakes Marine Security Operations Centre on a 24-7-365 basis; and, 50-100 people required to manage and operate air assets (air assets would include 2 helicopters and 4-6 UAVs).

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- a. Provide sufficient coverage and patrol capacity to effectively enforce federal statutes on the GLSSS;
- b. Gain better situational awareness of activities on the GLSSS;
- c. Maintain interdiction capacity on the GLSSS on a 24-7-365 day basis; and
- d. Have the capacity to become an effective partner to the USCG in securing the GLSSS.

While the Committee believes that the capacity of the RCMP to secure the GLSSS must be significantly increased, the Committee also believes that the number of joint Canada-U.S. projects to secure the GLSSS should become a permanent fixture on the GLSSS. The Shiprider pilot project which was comprised of joint patrols between the RCMP and U.S. Coast Guard was a good start. But it was only a two week pilot project. Pilot projects are not enough to secure the Great Lakes. More permanent joint projects and more police are required.

Canada and the United States should begin a joint program to install reverse border inspection stations at all bridge crossings between the two countries, so that security and customs inspections will regularly be done *before* travellers reach the country of destination to ensure the safety of the facility. The Committee is aware of the pilot projects being planned for Buffalo/Fort Erie and Lansdowne/Alexandria Bay and feels it is time to move forward elsewhere with implementation of this concept.

Military Cooperation

A joint Canada US maritime force planning unit should be established to allow the navies of the two neighbouring countries to ensure shared surveillance of offshore areas and coordinated response to maritime threats to both countries.

The two countries should be co-operating to get a “real time” picture of what is happening off our coasts. Canadian authorities should seek coordination of the Recognized Maritime Picture²⁸ with the US Coast Guard. Perhaps we don’t need a joint command structure like NORAD – things happen more slowly at sea. But we do need better systems to alert one another that something suspicious may be approaching our coasts.

²⁸ The Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) is a pictorial plotting of maritime activity on each of Canada’s coasts.

Battalion or battle group Canadian Forces training exercises – particularly those permitting Canadian and American troops to function effectively together in warfare – should be re-instituted as quickly as possible to permit Canada's Army to work in harmony with the armies of its allies, particularly the Army of the United States. Both countries are stretched thin militarily at the moment, but should be making plans for such exercises when personnel become available.

Disagreements Among Friends Should Not Get in the Way of a Great Partnership

Two of the greatest annoyances over Canada-U.S. relationships at the moment involve the fact that the U.S. government will soon require Canadians and Americans entering the United States to show passports, and disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

PASSPORTS AT THE BORDERS

The U.S. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative will require all Canadians and Americans entering the U.S. by air and sea to carry a passport or other secure identification card by January 8, 2007. The start date for land crossings is scheduled for one year later.

Border towns, tourist destinations and frequent border crossers are all complaining about this requirement for passports, with some reason – passports are expensive enough to deter some travellers from one country to the other to stay home, which will pinch both countries economically. The Committee applauds the efforts in the United States Senate to delay the implementation of this Act. But we also recognize that the intention of the Act has validity.

This Committee has repeatedly called for better documentation at our borders. Too many people with untoward intentions have been crossing our borders with nothing more than drivers' licences of unknown validity from far-off states and provinces.

We obviously need a better system, and passports at least constitute a start. But we've got to do even better, and that isn't as easy as it sounds. Identity cards

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and/or passports containing biometrics are coming, but they need to be based on better “breeder documents” than birth certificates or drivers’ licences. Otherwise border inspectors will only be able to ensure that the identity document matches the person carrying it – they will never be certain that the person carrying the document is who he or she claims to be.

In 2005, following a comprehensive assessment of vulnerabilities at Canada’s land border crossings, the Committee recommended, that by 2007, the government require documentation of all people entering Canada (including Canadians) that is:

- a) Tamper-proof;
- b) Machine-readable;
- c) Biometrically enhanced; and,
- d) Known to have been issued on the basis of reliable documentation.²⁹

The government should adopt this recommendation and work with the U.S. to ensure that each country’s identification card will be designed according to compatible standards.

Allowing would-be terrorists, gun runners, kidnappers and other types of criminals into each other’s country is too serious an issue to drop just because tougher screening is going to cause some short-term economic problems. It will. But we need to smarten up our procedures, make the documentation affordable, and get on with life in a new era.

NAFTA

Canadians railed about the palpable injustice of U.S. arbitrary duties on the import of softwood lumber, and so they should have. But the problem got sorted out – more or less – after far too long a delay. The solution wasn’t perfectly fair to Canadian producers, but neither are some of the import restrictions Canada places on other countries.

²⁹ Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Borderline Insecure, Recommendation 19,” June 2005.

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Again, we should be looking at the big picture. NAFTA works well for most Canadians, most of the time. We should never expect that any one trade agreement will solve all our trade problems with a market as massive as that of the United States. We should push for fairness, and often we will get it. But we won't get it every time.

Remember . . .

There are three things to keep in mind about the United States:

- The Americans aren't always right;
- They are a lot bigger than we are and from time to time they throw their weight around;
- We Canadians can manage this important relationship much better if we approach them with our brains, instead of our emotions.

That last point is the only one that really counts.

Conclusion to Part I

In this first section of the report, the Committee has attempted to look over the horizon and examine the immense spectrum of change that may well face Canadians in the coming decades – change that may bring new opportunities, but that will certainly bring new risks.

It is the Committee's belief that Canadians stand to have much more success in dealing with all this change if the Government of Canada moves quickly to:

- Strengthen Canada's military
- Strengthen Canada's foreign aid program
- Strengthen our relations with the United States

This is going to be a tumultuous century. Canadians must be prepared.

PART II

Canadian Security and Defence: The Brain, the Body

Forgive us – the Committee is compelled to return to its analogy of Canada confronting security threats the way a boxer confronts danger in the ring. To meet the threats that are going to come at our country over the coming decades, Canada is going to have to be smart, quick and strong.

Strength is only part of the package. Yes, new equipment and more personnel are clearly vital parts of that package. But the Government of Canada is also going to have to be more intelligent about how it handles the systems that constitute the nerve centres of the nation’s defences.

Part II of this report will address both brains and brawn.

Smarter Defence Purchasing

The Government could up its IQ level on issues of national defence considerably simply by treating the Department of National Defence as an extraordinary part of the federal bureaucracy – as a department unlike all the others.

At the moment DND is subject to the same procedural checks and balances and the same interdepartmental interference as every other federal department.

Everyone remembers DND's purchase of toilet seats costing close to \$1,000 a piece for the HMCS Bonaventure just prior to scrapping it during the 1960s. Should DND be exempt from financial scrutiny? Absolutely not.

When DND is purchasing photocopiers, desks and the like, it should be subject to the same scrutiny as any other government department.

But when major pieces of military equipment are being purchased, it should not take an average of 14-16 years to get them into the hands of Canadian Forces personnel.³⁰ The Committee supports recent DND initiatives to streamline the process by simplifying the specifications of new equipment and limiting the number of projects in play at any given time. One of the things this means is that there will be a reduction in Canadian military-unique specifications for equipment (the CF should ensure that the pursuit of perfection does not delay an excellent project).

The purchase of major pieces of equipment has been bogged down by a lengthy approval process, and the intervention of other departments whose restrictive legislation does not take into account the extraordinary demands placed on the Canadian Forces³¹ and the need to take to Cabinet every project valued at more than \$30 million a figure that has remained in place for a number of years. The Committee has recommended that this limit be raised dramatically to \$500 million.

³⁰ Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Wounded: Canada's Military and the Legacy of Neglect, Our Disappearing Options for Defending the Nation Abroad and at Home," September 2005, p.110.

³¹ Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "The Government's No. 1 Job, Securing the Military Options It Needs to Protect Canadians," June 2006, p.101

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By the Committee's count, there are 49 projects costing more than \$30 million coming up for approval in the near future. It is inconceivable that any minister will approach cabinet with complex proposals for funding approval virtually every week. There are simply too many other issues on the cabinet agenda. Ministers have to take their turns.

The Minister of National Defence should be allowed to approve projects up to \$500 million. That would reduce to ten the number of projects that need to go to Cabinet – a manageable number.

A good example of what the Committee is proposing is illustrated by the Nyala story. In Kandahar, when it was discovered that CF equipment did not provide adequate protection for our soldiers against roadside bombs, DND went looking for an immediate solution. They determined that the vehicle that provided the best protection for our troops was the Nyala made in South Africa. The purchase of the Nyala vehicles was streamlined through the system and delivered to the troops in 5 months.

No worries about regional development. No fretting about offsets (which normally increase the price of a project, in any event). Just a quick and appropriate response to an urgent operational requirement.

Examples of this kind of streamlining are all too few. To expedite military procurement, the Committee believes that there should be a review of the legislation governing the Department of Public Works and Government Services, and the Treasury Board.

Why should the military not have to jump through the same hoops as every other government department?

Because:

- These purchases are urgently required to protect the safety of Canada and all Canadians.
- The lives of the people serving in the CF are on the line.
- Equipment delayed may turn out to be obsolescent by the time it arrives.

- Our troops need to have the right equipment in a timely way. Determining the right equipment for our troops is important for them to be effective and protected. Throwing in non military factors such as regional economic development results in unnecessary bureaucratic process and delays that are costly in every sense of the word.

Pork Barreling Trumps National Defence

The Committee is fed up with the continuing practice of governments using military purchases as regional pork barrels to enhance their political prospects.

This has been a practice over many decades by governments of all stripes.

If we care about the defence of our country, it is time to put an end to this nonsense.

The Committee recommends that:

- 7. Prior to 31 March 2007, the Government complete a review and report to Parliament on all legislation, regulations, and policies governing military purchases for the purpose of streamlining the process.**
- 8. The Government not use military spending as a political pork barrel, and that efficacy alone be the criterion for those purchases.**
- 9. As recommended in our report “The Government’s Number One Job’ (June 2006), the Government increase**
 - a. the expenditure authority of the Minister of National Defence to \$500 million for any capital project; and**
 - b. increase the monetary threshold value of those defence-related projects that must be reviewed by Cabinet – also known as Major Crown Projects – to \$500 million.**

When the Goose Turns Out To Be Pork, the Military Loses

In “*The Government’s No. 1 Job*” this Committee took a strong stand against two intertwined phenomena that have too often warped decisions as to how to spend money meant for the defence of Canada.

- The first is partisan political interference.
- The second is the use of military spending as a regional development tool.

As we say, the two are often interconnected. Political parties like to win. Often electoral success in an economically depressed riding can depend on promises of economic support. All political parties have been guilty of making those kinds of promises over the years.

When such promises involve the placement of military infrastructure – or the awarding of a contract that provides economic benefits for a riding, to achieve a partisan political end– they may well be contrary to the national interest.

There will always be economic and political advantages to military spending wherever it occurs. But we repeat that partisan political considerations should not be a factor in the allocation of funds from the budget of the Department of National Defence.

Those funds should be sacrosanct. There are departments and agencies of government that can properly be used to promote economic development. The Department of National Defence is not one of them.

Without security for the nation, there can be no Canadian economic development – regional or otherwise. DND funds are appropriated by Parliament for the safety of Canadians everywhere, and for the safety of the young men and women who serve Canada.

When Canada’s defence spending is in 28th place among 30 NATO nations, it is unconscionable to siphon off any defence money for other purposes.

Military Waste

When the country's defence priorities change, so do the military's requirements for bases and buildings. When once-busy facilities are no longer used efficiently, there is a limit to how long they should be maintained. Enough is enough, and at some point practicality must overcome political expediency. Closures are in the interests of a rationally-funded military.

Nor should we be building new facilities that don't efficiently serve the needs of the military.

Goose Bay: The Poster Boy For Warped Military Spending

There are dozens of examples of wasteful military spending across the country, but Goose Bay has become the poster boy in that the bidding by both parties has gotten out of hand.

Goose Bay used to be an important military base. Military aircraft were still kept aloft with propellers during the Second World War, and Happy Valley-Goose Bay, located in remote Labrador, was a critical staging point for aircraft headed to the European theatre.

The Goose Bay air base was built in the middle of the War, and the town of Happy Valley was developed in 1943 to house workers who built the base. As this is one of the most sparsely-settled areas of Canada, it provided a good location for the low-altitude training of air crews from various NATO countries after the war. Ideally, the topography was similar to that of NATO's great nemesis – the Soviet Union.

But by the 21st century, the Soviet menace had been replaced by other threats. Through bitter experience by the Royal Air Force during the first Gulf War in 1991, low-altitude attacks started to play a less important role in many military strategies. As NATO countries ceased to train at Goose Bay, and, despite its proud history, the base became redundant.

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That did not stop either Liberal or Conservative governments from pouring money into it, egged on by a remarkably powerful lobby from such a small community (fewer than 8,000 residents), and the fact that those residents determined in each federal election – and one notable by-election – who would win the electoral seat of Labrador which contains Happy Valley-Goose Bay.

While there is no apparent operational military mission for Goose Bay, both the Liberals and the Conservatives engaged in a bidding war for the seat, each upping the ante during recent election campaigns.

The riding went to the Liberals in a crucial by-election in 2005 that kept Paul Martin's minority government afloat – after the Liberals had promised to repave the airport runway. In an effort to win the seat, during the winter 2006 campaign, Conservative Leader Stephen Harper promised to locate approximately 650 Rapid Reaction Forces troops and their families in Goose Bay – a strange location for rapid response forces that might be called upon to deal with emergencies in large Canadian population centres. That promise will require the building of additional infrastructure to house and train this new force.

Militarily, this made no sense. Why would the Canadian Forces undertake new building projects when they already have excess capacity in other parts of the country?

An article by Ottawa Citizen defence writer David Pugliese on May 23, 2006 cited Army sources as being concerned about the Conservative promise:

“The army . . . has concerns about the Conservative plan to station troops in Goose Bay. The army is focused entirely on its ongoing mission in Afghanistan and there are questions about where troops for new army units at Goose Bay and other locations would come from...”³²

David Rudd, president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, said the military leadership is also concerned about the government's plans to station a rapid response battalion in Goose Bay and other units in places like Comox, B.C. He noted there is "absolutely no military reason to station troops in Goose Bay"³³.

³² Pugliese, David, “Military Pushing for Hovercraft to Guard Arctic,” *Ottawa Citizen*, May 23, 2006.

³³ Pugliese, “Military Pushing for Hovercraft to Guard Arctic,” *Ottawa Citizen*, May 23, 2006 ”.

Rudd said “some officers have suggested increasing reserve units in Goose Bay and other locations to deal with the Harper government's election promise.”³⁴

The Government has also promised that Goose Bay will be home to operators of UAV (uninhabited aerial vehicles) flying patrols over the Atlantic. The operators will direct the vehicles by remote control but they could do so at any location in Canada.

Canadians should be asking themselves some questions about loveable old Goose Bay, which does have a great name and an enchanting history, but . . .

If this force of Rapid Reactors is going to be one of the key military components of this Government's plan to defend Canadians:

- What training facilities will they need at Goose Bay? Will facilities have to be built that are available elsewhere?
- How will this unit get their personnel? Will there be an impact on operational units at major army bases?
- What kind of readiness can be maintained? Will there be 50 percent on notice to move immediately, or will there be a requirement to have a phased readiness? What will the command and control relationships be?

Let's Get Sensible

The Committee recognizes that the people of Happy Valley cannot be hung out to dry. It is the Government's responsibility to assist them in shifting their economy away from the military and into a sustainable and dependable field of economic endeavour. They need help, and the Government has a responsibility to respond.

The Committee feels that the Government should develop a transition plan to assist Happy Valley in changing its economy. Done right, this plan could serve as a blueprint for other towns that need to retool as a result of a large employer - be it governmental or private business - relocating or ceasing operations.

³⁴ Pugliese, “Military Pushing for Hovercraft to Guard Arctic,” *Ottawa Citizen*, May 23, 2006”.

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The essentials of this plan could be:

1. Marketing and financial assistance from the appropriate national regional economic development agency;
2. Retraining for all workers to acquire marketable skills;
3. Federal and Provincial Government support in the production of a business development plan for the local area; and
4. Bridge funding to ease the transition from reliance on the military to total self-sufficiency on a reducing scale. For example, funds from the appropriate government development department could be provided in year one at about the same level of present DND spending. The subsidy would gradually diminish to zero over a period of time – around 10 years.

There are numerous examples of communities large and small, i.e. Summerside PEI, Cornwallis NS, Chatham, NB, Toronto and Calgary making an effective transition from reliance on military expenditures to new economic activities. Transition should be viewed as a new opportunity. All that is required is innovative thinking and a little help from the Government.

The Committee recommends that:

- 10. The Government reconsider its plan to deploy a Canadian Forces Rapid Response contingent to Goose Bay;**
- 11. The federal Government work with the provincial and municipal governments to assist in the development of a transition business plan for the area of Happy Valley;**
- 12. The federal and provincial Governments commit to a shared arrangement to provide bridge funding on a progressively diminishing annual scale to assist in the transition of Goose Bay from military to a sustainable and dependable economic activity; and**
- 13. The Canadian Forces review their operational requirements for the facilities at CFB Goose Bay.**

The Need for Public Engagement on Issues of National Security

The core responsibilities of any democratic government are to protect citizens and advance their interests. The Government can do that by improving security at our airports and sea ports and along our borders. It can do that by enhancing the coordination of emergency response mechanisms across the country. And, of course, it can do that by bolstering the capacity and capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Because issues like these are so basic to the reason that we have a nation, one would expect Canadians to take a keen interest in them. Addressing these issues is critical to the physical, economic and cultural well-being of Canadians.

But there is no such widespread interest. Nor do governments encourage such interest – particularly during periods in which the military is being starved of funds, as it has been in recent decades.

There are probably a number of reasons Canadians have been lulled into holding their military at arm's length.

- After World War II ended in 1945, Canadians didn't want to think about war any more. They wanted get on with their lives and celebrate the growth and prosperity that followed the war, which they did.
- There was, of course, no conscription or pressure on middle-class youth to join the military following the war. The Canadian military naturally shrunk during peacetime. There was no longer a national imperative to join the military. Nor did military service offer the kind of financial rewards that so many other opportunities were offering in an expanding post-war economy.
- Military training takes place in relatively remote locations, and for most Canadians seeing someone in uniform was a very occasional thing.
- Lester B. Pearson made a name for Canada by coming up with the “peacekeeping” solution to the Suez Crisis of 1956, which created the illusion that the main mission of Canadian troops in the coming years would

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not be to fight, but to stand between hostile parties and help guarantee the peace.

- The Cold War was primarily a standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union – Canada’s military role was vastly diminished from what it had been during World War II.
- The Peace Movement in the 60s produced powerful anti-military feelings among young Americans and Canadians during U.S. participation in the Vietnam War – feelings that lingered over the next three decades as Canadians largely ignored their military and focused on their own lives.
- Individualism – featuring the “me” generation – took hold among young people, and traditions like loyalty, discipline and patriotism seemed herd-like and outdated. They took a back seat to self-fulfillment and materialism.
- With the end of the Cold War, all nations looked for a peace dividend and slashed their defence spending. Canada closed its bases in Europe and cut defence spending by 25% in anticipation of a more secure world. The increase in asymmetric threats and non state actors was not anticipated.

Then Came the Shock

Peacekeeping was the theme of the period. However, the majority of Canadians did not see that Pearsonian peacekeeping was subtly changing to peace making as the UN intervened between various warring factions. The CF peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was significantly different from peacekeeping in Cyprus.

As the 21st century dawned, it soon became apparent that Canada and other established nations were faced with an array of new asymmetric threats that would make active and effective security – built around a competent military – a handy thing to have. September 11, 2001 was one of the early wakeup calls. Others followed.

Canada responded to the attacks on the twin towers by sending troops to Afghanistan in early 2002. While the CF could not sustain this mission due to shortages generated by defence cuts in the 1990s, it was clear that this mission was peace making at the high end. The CF returned to Kabul in 2005 to support the

security situation and provide ISAF with a military presence, The move from Kabul to Kandahar in late 2005 raised the stakes again.

By 2006 Canadians started to face a new reality. Canada had troops on the battlefield in Afghanistan, and a lot more of them were dying than during peacekeeping missions. Until the caskets started coming home, few Canadians seemed aware that these young men and women had been deployed.

Kandahar snuck up on Canada. Kandahar clearly wasn't peacekeeping. Kandahar was flat out war.

And so Canadians began to discuss war. *After* it had started. Isn't that a bit late to start talking about something so momentous – something of such grave consequences to all Canadians?

A Continuous Conversation

The Committee maintains that it is in the interests of any national government to encourage continued public discussion about national defence and security.

Governments do not encourage such discussion – particularly when things are going wrong. This is the kind of thinking that led to government attempts to prevent media coverage of the return of soldiers killed in Afghanistan, and instructions to witnesses coming before our Committee to refuse to discuss security problems on the specious grounds that bad people could take advantage if there was a public discussion of security flaws.

The truth is that people who want to commit crimes focus on the weaknesses in any system designed to prevent it. They make it their business to become aware of every security flaw out there.

The general public is far less likely to be aware of these flaws. As a result, they tend not to get fixed. Democracy demands awareness. At the very heart of democracy is the fact that public awareness creates public pressure that leads to reform.

The last thing politicians enjoy, of course, is public pressure. That is too bad, because openness with the public often turns out to be good politics. But beyond

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that, in the case of something as important as the country's security, it is a politician's patriotic duty to be candid about what we Canadians now have available to protect ourselves, and what else we need to protect ourselves. Politicians should see it as their duty to take a leadership role in engaging Canadians in an honest debate about security. For a start they need an answer to a very basic question: once Canadians have some sense of the threats at hand – and the strengths and weaknesses of Canada's defences – what percentage of federal spending will they deem appropriate to spend on security and defence?

The Committee believes that another way to engage Canadians to think about and discuss security and defence issues is for Canadians to see more of their military on a daily basis. Too many of Canada's military bases are located in remote regions of Canada, far away from a large part of our population. The Committee believes that the CF should set up a Speakers Bureau which provides local organizations with a list of topics and military speakers available to speak in the community.

The new CF organization created Canada Command (CANCOM) community liaison officers to work with local responders on assisting in the response to emergencies. It seems to the Committee that the duties of the liaison officers should be expanded to promoting more awareness of the CF in the local community through regular visits to local organizations and schools.

The Committee believes that the time is right for the Government to set up a Defence Foundation which would augment existing academic organizations that focus on the military by encouraging the study of national security and defence issues at universities across the country. This foundation would sponsor academic chairs in defence and security studies as well as providing a system of scholarships and awards across the academic spectrum in the study of national security and defence. It would also fund seminars, conferences and research activities across the country.

As part of the cost cutting initiatives in the early 90s, DND and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) closed the National Defence College. This College brought together promising mid level individuals from the CF, allied nations, other government departments and various private industries to study political, security and defence issues for ten months. The curriculum focused on in-depth studies of current national and international issues and included a travel program which permitted course members to better

understand the international issues of the day. It also permitted the government leaders of tomorrow the opportunity to gain a better perspective of the role of the various departments. The Committee wants this institution to be re-established. This advanced college should be run by DND with support from the DFAIT and Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC).

Beyond the Committee's wish to see an increased willingness on the part of the Prime Minister and other government ministers to encourage public discussion on national security issues, the Committee makes the following recommendations that:

- 14. The National Defence College be re-established with joint leadership by DND, supported by DFAIT and the PSEPC;**
- 15. The Government should set up a Defence Foundation that will promote the study of national security and defence at universities across Canada;**
- 16. Canada's core values and vital interests in relation to the national security policy, international policy and defence Policy be debated, evaluated and articulated by a broad range of individuals from educational institutions across Canada;**
- 17. The Minister of National Defence instruct the Canadian Forces to bolster its efforts to make Canadians more aware of real stories about the accomplishments of its military;**
- 18. DND create a Speakers Bureau of experienced officers to speak to organizations in communities across Canada;**
- 19. The federal government establish a number of scholarships for national defence studies at every Canadian university offering courses in such studies; and**
- 20. The Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defence provide both Houses of Parliament with weekly public situation reports on Canadian military activities overseas.**

Regular Defence Policy Reviews

There has been little rhyme or reason to Defence Policy Reviews since World War II. That war ended more than 60 years ago, and since then defence policy has undergone formal reviews on only six occasions – a paucity considering the number of changes in military situations and needs that have occurred during that period.

Reviews by Year	Significant Situational Changes by Year
<p>1947 – A defence statement made in Parliament by the Minister of Defence, the Honourable Brook Claxton</p>	<p>1945 – End of the Second World War</p> <p>1946 – United Nations established</p> <p>1947 – UN General Assembly votes to partition Palestine between Arabs and Jews</p> <p>1948 – Communists seize control of Czechoslovakia, Berlin blockade, Arab-Israeli war</p> <p>1949 – the establishment of Communist China, NATO formed</p> <p>1950 – the Korean War</p> <p>1954 – USSR detonates its first nuclear device</p> <p>1956 – UN peacekeeping mission in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis</p> <p>1958 – establishment of NORAD</p> <p>1960 – UN ‘peacekeeping’ mission in Congo engages in combat operations;</p>

PART II
Canadian Security and Defence:
The Brain, the Body

	1962 – Cuban Missile Crisis
1964 – White Paper on Defence; promulgated by the Honourable Paul Hellyer	1965 – growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam War and associated anti-war movement 1967 – Arab-Israeli ‘ Six Day War ’
1971 – Defence Policy Statement <i>Defence in the 70s</i> ; promulgated by the Honourable Donald Macdonald	1973 – Arab-Israeli ‘ Yom Kippur War ’ and associated ‘ oil shock ’, US withdraws from Vietnam 1979 – Iranian Revolution and Americans held hostage, USSR invades Afghanistan 1980 – Iraq invades Iran 1983 – Korean Airlines Flight 007 is shot down by Soviet fighters killing 269 people 1984 – US invades Grenada 1985 – Gorbachev introduces <i>glasnost</i> and <i>perestroika</i> in USSR 1985 – Air India Flight is bombed killing 329 people
1987 – Defence Policy Statement <i>Challenge and Commitment</i> – promulgated by the Honourable Perrin Beatty	1988 – US invades Panama 1989 – Berlin Wall falls and Germany reunified 1991 – Balkan Wars start; First Gulf War

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	1993 – bombing of World Trade Centre in New York
1994 – White Paper on Defence: promulgated by the Honourable David Collette	1994 – Rwandan genocide 1999 – NATO Kosovo Campaign 2001 – Terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon , US invades Afghanistan 2003 – US invades Iraq 2004 – Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’
2005 – Defence Policy Statement, promulgated by the Honourable Bill Graham	2005 – Canadian reconstruction troops in Afghanistan ; 2006 – Canadian combat missions in Afghanistan

Regular Defence Policy Reviews should encourage Canadians to do two things: engage in the discussion of important military issues, and promote change within the Canadian military structure to meet new challenges.

Both are vital to a healthy and secure Canada. There should be more reviews, and they should occur on a regular basis.

Federal politicians should understand that, on a matter as vital as the physical protection of Canada and Canadians, they should operate as though they have a contract with both their citizens and their military to promote and encourage discussion over the level and type of security Canadians need and desire.

The Committee recommends that:

- 21. At the beginning of each new Parliament, there be a Parliamentary Defence Policy review followed by the issuance of a Government Defence Policy statement**

Defending Our National Interest - Obligations

The primary role of any government is to provide its citizens with a safe and secure environment. Canadians enjoy that safety and security to a large extent because of their Canadian Forces. The Committee feels it is important for Canadians, the Government and the Canadian Forces to understand their obligations to each other. If these obligations are not clearly understood, missions on which the Government sends the CF will not have a broad measure of public support.

Canadians, through their taxes, pay for their military and it is important that Canadians understand what they are getting in return.

It is equally important that the Government understand the capabilities of the Canadian Forces and that the Canadian Forces understand their obligations to the Government.

Obligation of the Government to Canadians

1. Canadians are entitled to safety and security as a nation. It is the obligation of the Government to provide for a military which is both robust and effective enough to safeguard these conditions.
2. An effective Canadian military must have sufficient capabilities with which to respond to the diverse threats which may face the country.
3. The federal Government has a duty to create a climate of openness and encourage frank public discussion about Canada's security environment and the state of the Canadian Forces. Then Canadians can determine for themselves if the Government is meeting its primary obligation.

Obligation – Between the Federal Government and Its Armed Forces

1. Recognizing that Canadian Forces personnel voluntarily accept unlimited liability in the service of Canada, the Government has an obligation to provide them with:
 - a. effective leadership, training, weapons and equipment;
 - b. a responsible operational deployment tempo;³⁵
 - c. high quality care if they are physically and/or psychologically injured;
 - d. appropriate remuneration and pensions;
 - e. an environment which is supportive of both service personnel and their families and is responsive to the difficult circumstances under which they serve; and
 - f. the fullest assistance possible for their family if they die or are injured in the service of their country.
2. The federal Government should foster an open relationship between the Canadian Forces, the Parliament of Canada and the Canadian public.
 - a. Organizations such as the Department of National Defence's Directorate of Parliamentary Affairs have been very slow to respond to the Committee's requests for information. The Directorate's principal client should be Parliament as a whole and its goal to provide both Houses with timely, accurate and useful information. This is necessary in order to ensure that there is constructive public debate about military and national defence issues.
 - b. Regulations should be amended to encourage military officers of General/Flag rank to provide their best *professional* military advice when testifying before Parliament. If these people are not allowed to be candid with Parliamentarians about the state of the Canadian military, no genuine debate can take place.

³⁵ Operational tempo normally refers to unit activity on deployed operations.

Deploying Canadian Forces to International Danger Zones – The Importance of a National Consensus

The decision to deploy Canadian Forces personnel to international danger zones should rank as any government's most difficult decision. Such missions invariably involve the loss of life and very high financial costs.

History has shown that nations often get it wrong when they go to war. While there are no-brainers from time to time – such as Canada's involvement in rescuing Europe from the Nazis during the Second World War, such clear cut cases are rare.

Military deployments cost lives and create immeasurable hardship. Some of them are justifiable; some of them even prove to be critical to the world's well being. But one has to ask how many national leaders who led their countries into major conflicts over the past two centuries would give the same order to deploy if they had it to do all over again.

Which brings the Committee to Canada's deployment to Afghanistan.

There are strong arguments as to why this deployment makes sense, to Canadians, to our allies and to the world. And there are strong arguments against.

Only history will tell. We all have our opinions, but even the most opinionated among us has to concede that present circumstances are too uncertain for anyone to be absolutely sure that he or she is right.

One thing is certain, however. No Canadian Government should send young Canadians off to risk their lives for their country without completing a rigorous checklist as to whether the decision to deploy is the right one.

Political leaders must address these issues– publicly – *before* deploying:

- 1. What is the purpose of the mission?**
- 2. Is the mandate clear and realistic?**
- 3. Are the forces committed adequate to reach the mission’s goal?**
- 4. Can success of the mission be measured and if so, how?**
- 5. Is there sufficient public support to see the mission through?**
- 6. Does the government have the political will to persist even if the deployment becomes unpopular, to ensure that the mission’s goal is reached?**

During the initial stages of the Canadian Forces deployments to Afghanistan, the Chief of the Defence Staff repeatedly explained to the Canadian public why Canada was in Afghanistan and how long it might remain there. This was not his job. **This was the job of the two Governments of the day.**

The first ‘take-note’ debate on Canada’s mission to Afghanistan –, held in late 2005 under the auspices of the Liberal government of Paul Martin – was a perfunctory event at best. The 2006 debate over the decision of the new Prime Minister Steven Harper to extend the duration of the mission was marginally better, but insights into substantive issues fell victim to a lack of adequate preparation and partisan wrangling.

There should be a structured, non-partisan mechanism put in place that obliges the Governments to communicate to Parliament and the public the answers to the questions on the Committee’s checklist.

The Committee recommends that:

- 22. Parliament should vote on every mission proposed by the Government that would deploy Canadian military forces to:**
- a. a United Nations mission;**
 - b. a NATO operation beyond any contribution to the NATO Response Force;**
 - c. an ad-hoc coalition operation beyond North America; and**
 - d. a solely Canadian operation beyond Canada.**

Defence Capability

Canada's Defence Capabilities Plan: The Defining Moment

The much-delayed Defence Capabilities Plan (DCP) had not yet been released when this report went to print. The Department of National Defence began work on the Plan after the Defence Policy Review was published in 2005. The Plan was supposed to be forthcoming last Spring, but Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor said it would be delayed until this Fall as there were problems "refining" it.³⁶

The Plan may be in the reader's hands by now. If not, it should be.

Once it comes out, examine it closely. This Plan will determine whether the Department of National Defence is willing to assert its needs candidly, or whether it is going to keep going to the Government with a begging bowl – as it has over most of the last two decades.

³⁶ Brewster, Murray, "Navy to get Three New Ships," CNEWS, June 26, 2006. <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Politics/2006/06/25/1652765-cp.html> The article quotes Minister O'Connor as saying, "military staff is developing what we call a capability plan...[and] it'll be another few months before this capability plan is refined".

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The Government is entirely correct in demanding that DND get its act together in setting out its needs before the Government agrees to pay for what it needs: no plan, no money. The military needs to move quickly to begin procurement of new equipment. This is an arduous process even when it is not hobbled by unnecessary bureaucracy.

If the Government is right in demanding a rational Plan that will set out the equipment purchases DND intends to make over the next ten years before it coughs up the money for major expenditures, the Government would be wrong to place pressure on the military to leave out major requirements for budgetary reasons.

The Plan should be a clear outline of what Canada's military needs to protect Canadians and advance their interests at home and abroad. It should not be the product of a saw-off between Government and the Canadian Forces that sacrifices genuine military needs to politics.

As the Committee noted in its last report, the Government's current budget for defence will not provide enough funding in place to give the military the tools and personnel it needs to defend Canadians and advance Canada's interests. We estimate that if current spending patterns continue, DND's budget for 2012 will be \$20 billion – or between \$5 and \$15 billion short of what will be needed.

This Defence Capabilities Plan must not shave military needs to meet the Government's spending intentions. DND should tell the Government what it really needs. If the Government wishes to do its shaving in public, fine. Then at least the public would be in on the dialectic between what the military says it needs and what the Government says it can afford.

Here is a short list of items that the Committee is convinced that the military will need over the next decade. If they are missing from the Defence Capabilities Plan, the public should know that self-censorship has won the day and military needs are not being honestly expressed:

- Fixed Wing Search and Rescue (SAR) – this project is urgently required to replace the C130 Hercules and Buffalo aircraft (originally planned to cease operations in the 90s). This project was announced in 2004 as a “fast track” project but has not moved since that time.

- Single Ship Replacement – providing a replacement for both the destroyers and frigates needs to be initiated now to ensure the capability in ten years.
- Land Forces Intelligence Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance – needed to collect battlefield information and link several battlefield functions to assist commander in decision making.
- Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles – Urgently required to provide surveillance of our three ocean approaches.

If these items are missing, the debate must begin as to why they are missing, and how they went missing.

The Strategic Capabilities Investment Plan (SCIP) will follow the Defence Capabilities Plan. It will set out planned expenditures in more detail, once the cabinet had approved all or part of the Defence Capabilities Plan.

On March 13, 2006 the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) released a critical assessment of what DCP and SCIP will mean to the military's future – *The Strategic Investment Capabilities Plan: Origins, Evolution and Future Prospects*. Here is an excerpt from its introduction:

“ . . . Unless and until the new minority Conservative government finalizes a broad Defence Capabilities Plan (DCP) and an accompanying more detailed SCIP, DND will continue on a path of reacting to crises in CF equipment and manpower requirements, instead of embarking on a more long-term, strategic route... The SCIP will establish a mechanism by which all of the equipment, infrastructure, construction, human resources, technology and concept development of the Canadian Forces will work together in holistic fashion to create military capability... Both the DCP and the SCIP must first overcome a number of hurdles including endorsement from the Minister of National Defence, the Treasury Board and the Cabinet itself. Only once in recent memory has a Minister of National Defence put his signature on a long-term planning document and sent it to Treasury Board for approval but that was a decade ago under a majority government....As it stands today, Defence could build a facility that is central to improving military capability, but once complete, lack the people needed to work there,” says Dr. Sloan...Until the DCP and accompanying SCIP are approved there will be

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no effective long-term planning for the Canadian Forces. The result will be ineffective spending by the military, the use of equipment that is past its prime, and the distinct possibility of lives being lost.”³⁷

The Committee could not agree more. DND has been painfully slow at producing the Plan that will be critical to the well-being of Canadians for years to come. The Committee recognizes that a new government has just come into power. However, if the Plan is late, it should at least be forthright. Then a genuine debate can begin as to what the federal governments of the coming decades *should* be spending to protect Canadians.

If the Plan is not released in the very near future, the Committee can only conclude that, once again, a government has provided a short term political solution for election purposes rather than meet the valid equipment requirements of the Canadian Forces.

Neglecting the long term requirement of the Canadian Forces for equipment required for national security is foolhardy

Weapons In Space

Space is becoming increasingly important to Canada’s national security and defence.

Given the devastation that war has inflicted on humanity over the centuries, it is not surprising that many Canadians wince at the thought of putting weapons in space.

Space is, after all, the place to which humans have traditionally looked when they think of the heavens above. So how could we possibly be thinking of putting weapons into such a safe and sacred place?

³⁷ Sloan, Elinor, “The Strategic Capability Investment Plan: Origins, Evolution and Future Prospects,” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2006. <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Strategic%20Capability%20Investment%20Plan.pdf>

Why would we put weapons where they have never gone before? How can we possibly ask emerging states to abstain from the use of nuclear weapons when we are prepared to ratchet up warfare by militarizing space?

The truth is that there is nothing inherently evil about weapons, just as there is nothing inherently sacred about space. Weapons can be used in both good and evil causes and space has become – for all practical purposes – an extension of the earth’s circumference.

Whether we Canadians like it or not, space has already been militarized.

Satellites in space that are already used to communicate with and guide precision munitions. All developed nations, including Canada, rely on space satellites for the strategic operations such as operational command and control communications at all levels of government and within the military. Virtually every operation by all arms of the military relies on the use of satellites. Some military operations are entirely dependent upon this technology. Global Position System (GPS) satellites are used to guide military movements and gather intelligence.

In 1906, no one believed that man would ever fly. Yet by 1913, aircraft were being used as bombers in the First World War. We ignore the future use of space to our peril. Space is already being used for military purposes. Weaponization is just around the corner.

Major powers have the capacity to defeat existing satellite systems. If that were to happen, Canada and our allies would lose the capacity to defend ourselves.

To pretend that there is a moral distinction between militarization and weaponization is flawed logic. To make a moral distinction is to ignore history and human nature, and places Canada and Canadians in a position of great vulnerability.

The Government has an obligation to ensure that Canada is not vulnerable to space-based weapons.

To some critics, the idea of putting weapons in space is unthinkable. To this Committee, what is really unthinkable is waiting so long that potential adversaries are allowed to gain an advantage in space that might be insurmountable.

The weaponization of space could become the most important security issue of this century. Canada has been one of the world's leading space nations since the 1950s, and if our country is to remain relevant, it will inevitably be involved in how the issue unfolds.

The Committee recommends that:

23. The Government of Canada proceed with research to provide systems to defend Canada from space-based weaponry.

Canada's Involvement in the Use of Space Capabilities

Canada is a world leader in satellite technology. There are a number of Canadian satellites providing essential satellite communications for the average Canadian. For example:

- **RADARSAT-1** Launched in 1995, Radarsat-1 is a sophisticated and militarily useful Earth observation satellite developed by Canada to monitor the planet. It provides Canada and its allies with an operational radar satellite system capable of timely delivery of large amounts of data. Equipped with a powerful Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) instrument, it acquires images of the Earth day or night, in all weather and through cloud cover, smoke and haze. The civilian value of this satellite was proven by its usefulness in monitoring the movement of the Red River during the Manitoba floods of 1997.
- **RADARSAT-2** is scheduled to be launched in March 2007. It will also have both military and civilian uses. The Department of National Defence (DND) is participating in the RADARSAT-2 program by funding the Moving Object Detection Experiment (MODEX), which will develop and validate an experimental space-based ground moving target indication (GMTI) mode to routinely detect measure and monitor vehicles moving on the Earth's surface. Radarsat 2 is Canada's next generation commercial radar satellite that will enhance marine surveillance, ice monitoring, environmental monitoring and disaster management in Canada and around the world.

Military uses of Radarsat 2, when operational, will contribute to the monitoring of the Canadian coasts; provide intelligence to deployed Canadian Forces operations, and permit tactical tracking of vehicles on the battlefield.

Canadian Forces Joint Space Project (JSP)

Missile warning mission and sharing satellite Intel

Canada has limited satellite capacity to monitor the coastal approaches in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic. A major advantage with living beside the United States is that they have more capacity for surveillance given their comprehensive satellite systems. Canada should avail itself of that capacity and as part of the joint defence of the North American continent, leverage that advantage. Canada should enter into an agreement with the United States to share satellite coverage of the North American continent. This additional satellite coverage would have the added benefit of providing Canada with a real time picture of our coastal approaches and the Great Lakes.

The goal of the Joint Space Project (JSP) is to maintain access to appropriate space capability to support DND strategic partnerships with our allies, sovereignty operations in the defence of North America, and Canadian Forces operations overseas.

The Joint Space Project (JSP) is mandated to deliver, as appropriate and when substantiated, projects in six capability areas:

- intelligence collection
- surveillance from space
- surveillance of space
- environmental observation
- warning of an attack, and
- missile defence.

JSP maintains Canada's critical space capabilities by leveraging existing and emerging space capability in partnership with our allies, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the Canadian telecommunications industry, and government.

Partnership is central to the JSP concept. A mission partnership arrangement gives Canada more influence and greater assurance of access to non-DND space-related information, at potentially lower cost, and with benefit to Canada's space industry.

Within Canada, DND is working closely on a number of projects with the Canadian Space Agency. These projects are in various stages of development.³⁸

The Committee recommends that:

- 24. Canada enter into an agreement with the United States to share satellite and radar coverage of continental North America to include maritime approaches in the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic;**
- 25. Canada should enhance its space capabilities by accelerating that part of the JSP project that will establish an array of Canadian satellites which permit real time surveillance of Canada's four maritime approaches and the Great Lakes;**
- 26. Canada accelerate the remaining projects of the JSP program to enhance the security of Canadians;**
- 27. Canada enter into an agreement with the US and other allies to share satellite intelligence; and**
- 28. To enhance North American defence, the data from satellite coverage be fused with other data at the Canadian joint operations centers on each coast.**

³⁸ See Appendix XIV for a description of the Joint Space Project

Global Surveillance

Imagine the world covered by a swarm of satellites, like black flies on a summer afternoon. There are currently more than 3,000 satellites circling the globe, studying the universe, monitoring the earth's atmosphere, mapping the land, examining the oceans, enabling and listening to world-wide communications and photographing as much of it as possible. A number of these are Canadian.

Consider too that the Canadian Government also maintains a number of offices around the world that can collect information for national security purposes. A few examples are embassies, high commissions, consulates, military missions, and commercial enterprises. These elements are regularly reinforced by temporary activities abroad such as business visits, conferences, educational exchanges and sports events.

While each department of government controls its own international outreach programs, it remains unclear how much effort is devoted to security and defence issues. There is also an aura of secrecy with regard to collation and analysis of information gained as well as the dissemination of any intelligence produced.

Canada and its NATO allies are connected via a strategic communications network. They routinely share information and intelligence gained from a variety of national sources in space, on land and at sea. Most of this exchange occurs between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Canada also maintains established bi-lateral security and defence communications with other close non-NATO allies, such as Australia and New Zealand.

In addition to all this, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service conducts security intelligence operations around the world. CSIS investigates threats, analyzes information and produces intelligence for the Government of Canada. Through its Security Screening Program, CSIS makes recommendations to government departments on non-Canadians who pose security concerns from entering Canada or receiving permanent resident status or citizenship.

The Communications Security Establishment³⁹ monitors the global information architecture for the purpose of providing foreign signals intelligence to the Government of Canada.

North American Surveillance and Defence

The US and Canada maintain satellite surveillance of the North American airspace land-mass and maritime approaches, but all land territory and maritime areas cannot be covered all the time, for reasons related to satellite orbits, weather and size of the area to be monitored.

North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)

The North American Aerospace Defence Agreement is the premier defence arrangement between Canada and the US. It is the basis for the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is a bi-national aerospace defence establishment responsible to both the President of the US and the Prime Minister of Canada. NORAD's role is to monitor, control and defend Canadian and US airspace. NORAD is commanded by a US four-star General or Admiral. A Canadian three star Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral is the Deputy Commander.

NORAD uses a network of ground-based radars, sensors and fighter jets to detect, intercept and, if necessary, engage any threats to the continent.

NORAD also receives surveillance data on potential threats from outer space. Through the use of a sophisticated satellite and radar capability, NORAD provides senior officials of both Canada and the United States threat warning and assessment of all missile launches throughout the world. This warning of potential attacks by ballistic missiles has been a NORAD mission since the late 60s.

Canada and the US recently renewed the NORAD agreement and extended its mandate to include maritime surveillance and warning.

³⁹ See Appendix XII for a description of the Canadian Security Establishment (CSE) and a definition of signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Canada Should Become a Partner in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence Program

Despite an invitation from Washington, Canada has yet to join the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program, designed to defend North America against ballistic missiles.

The Committee believes that the lobby against BMD in Canada is based more on emotions than a rational analysis of BMD's potential benefits to Canada.

An effective BMD system could save hundreds of thousands of Canadian lives.

This Government should not make the mistake that the last Government made, by refusing to support the United States in this project.

It is in our national interest to cooperate with America to defend the continent. Supporting BMD would help do that.

The Critics

Some criticisms and responses:

- The technology behind BMD was thought to be unattainable on a reliable basis. *But recent tests against new and more complex targets have been very successful.*
- BMD could lead to an escalation of the international arms war, since other countries would want to counter increased U.S. capability if the technology does work. *But BMD is a defensive system that counters threats to North America. It is not offensive and not a threat to any other nation.*
- BMD weaponry could eventually be launched from space. *But space is already used for numerous military purposes from communications, to surveillance and intelligence.*
- The high cost of BMD. *But the United States has not asked Canada to fund the BMD program – funding has been approved by the U.S. Congress. In*

fact, Washington is not asking Canada for anything in order to participate in the program.

- The US will request that surveillance equipment and missiles be located on Canadian soil as the price for Canadian participation in BMD. *But, the US plan is to locate all BMD missiles on US soil or in US Navy ships.*

Why We Should Do It

The United States initially invited the previous Government to join BMD, and was rebuffed. The current Government has not commented publicly as to whether the U.S. invitation has been reissued, and, if it has, whether it will agree to join this time around.

The Committee believes that the Government should revisit the question of BMD for the following reasons:

- BMD is designed to enhance the security of North America as a whole – not just the United States – and the defence of the continent is clearly in Canada’s interests.
- The defence of North America – in partnership with the United States – is a Canadian responsibility.
- BMD is designed to respond to an attack by *deflecting* the attack, rather than by retaliating. Unlike the existing Russian defensive system, BMD will not produce nuclear fallout, because BMD missiles do not have nuclear warheads.
- Canada has not been asked to contribute funds or even offer bases to locate missiles – all we have been asked to do is support the idea and enter into discussions as to how we might best be protected.
- Recent tests against complex targets have proven successful.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ CNN.com, “Pentagon: Missile interceptor test successful,” September 1, 2006.
<http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/09/01/missile.test.reut/index.html> Last visited on September 22, 2006.

- Non-nuclear technology that can shoot down costly weaponry is a deterrent, not an offensive weapon that will cause an arms race.
- Weapons in space are inevitable. Better we prepare for it now than be caught unawares.
- The Americans are going ahead with the program. Participation will ensure our sovereignty by giving us a seat at the table. If we do not participate, Americans alone will decide if and how Canada is protected.
- As discussed in the NORAD section above, Canada has been the recipient of information on potential ballistic missile warning threats to North America for more than 30 years. The US is considering moving that function from NORAD to their US-only Strategic Command. Should that move occur, Canada would no longer be assured of receiving such warnings.
- Even if BMD does not work, why should Canada be concerned about something that is being paid for by America to defend the continent?
- Washington is going ahead with BMD and it might end up saving Canadian lives. If there is the tiniest chance that it could, why would we turn up our noses at the opportunity to be a partner in this project?

The Committee recommends that:

29. Canada should enter into discussions with the U.S. Government with the aim of participating in the Ballistic Missile Defence program.

Canadian Surveillance and Defence

The Committee continues to be concerned about the lack of surveillance of our coastlines by Canadian assets. As discussed in our report of October 2003 entitled “*Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World*”, we feel that Canadians are vulnerable to attack due to our limited surveillance capability. There are a number of areas where improvements can be made.

Incomplete Satellite Surveillance

Canada does not have complete or constant satellite surveillance of Canadian maritime approaches, land mass and air space. What coverage does exist comes largely through NORAD for Canadian airspace. It is anticipated that once the Radarsat II program is launched and matured, coverage of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts will be enhanced. However, even that capability will be limited the area covered and the revisit time of the satellite over specific area.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The Committee is encouraged by recent announcements by the Government to establish medium to high altitude Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadrons to operate over the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, but this capability is still a long way off. This capability should be an urgent requirement in the Defence Capabilities Guide. Fielding of UAV capability is needed now.

Intermittent Air Patrols

Over the years, the Air Force has conducted a limited number of air patrols by Aurora aircraft to exercise sovereignty control in the remote arctic regions of Canada. Some years there were a couple of patrols and in some years, there were none. If the Government is serious about northern sovereignty, these patrols must increase until a more effective and permanent satellite presence can be established.

Sparse Territorial Surveillance

Canadian Rangers provide a military presence in those sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada that cannot conveniently or economically be provided for by other components of the CF.

The Canadian Rangers are part-time reservists in Northern regions. They are responsible for protecting Canada's sovereignty by reporting unusual activities or sightings, collecting local data of significance to the CF, and conducting

surveillance or sovereignty patrols as required. They have been particularly useful in reporting unidentified vessels operating within Canadian water off the northeast coast of Quebec in the Bay of Salluit, and observers/guides to counter illegal immigration.

The Rangers are the sole military presence over large parts of the Canadian north. The Government has committed to a robust presence in the North to maintain Canadian sovereignty in the region. Announcements of icebreakers, deep water ports, training facilities are welcome news, but the implementation of these initiatives is still a long way off. Until that time, Canadian security is in the hands of our Rangers.

There are currently 4,000 Canadian Rangers in 165 communities across Canada. This number is expected to increase to 4,800 by March 2008. The Committee endorses an expansion of the Rangers and encourages the Government to consider a further expansion of this valuable resource for national security.

The Committee recommends that:

30. The Government commit to a further expansion of the Canadian Rangers to 7500 by 2011.

Creating Real Reserves

Canadians pay their military Reserves to parade regularly to train for combat and support roles. Most Canadians probably assume that these Reserves are therefore available for active military service in times of emergency, when for whatever reason regular forces are short of capacity to serve the nation's needs.

But all Reservists are not available much of the time. Some cannot get away because of family or employment obligations. Some simply do not want to go.

It is true that the Government of Canada can call up any individual, unit or any other element of the Reserves to active service by means of an Order-in-Council. However, this mechanism hasn't been used since the Second World War.

As a result, Reservists who have gone on active service have done so voluntarily. But over the past 60 years, many Reservists could not or would not respond to national emergencies to. Which raises the question: Why are we paying Reserves to train when they may not answer the bell when their country needs them?

The Committee wonders whether it is time to consider some form of compulsory call to active service for Reservists.

It's a Question of Onus

Should it be the norm that Reservists are able to ignore call-ups if they have other priorities? Shouldn't Reservists be available for short-term active duty, as individuals or formed units in emergencies, unless there is some compelling reason they cannot be? In other words, the onus should be on the Reservist to demonstrate why he or she cannot serve. It should not be up to the government to invoke a special Order-in-Council to require service.

Consider that most Canadian citizens are liable to serve on a jury when called. Such jury duty is compulsory under the law, unless the individual can show cause why they cannot do it. It should be the same for Reservists.

If the Reserve really is part of the Total Force, and if, as the Chief of the Defence Staff has stated, that the aim is to have all members of the CF available for overseas deployment, the Committee believes that fundamental changes must be considered to the way the Reserves function. Some of those changes might include:

- When on duty, all Reservists should be paid the same amount as regular force personnel⁴¹;
- All Reservists deployed on an overseas mission should expect to be on active service for up to 18 months – to include sufficient time for theatre specific training; 6-7 months of deployed operations; and 2 or more months of debriefing and reintegration back home;

⁴¹ Presently, Class A, and B reservists are paid 85% of the rate of pay of the Regular Force personnel in the same rank. Class C Reservists who serve on operational missions receive the same pay as the Regular Force personnel.

- All Reserve recruits would be required to reach basic classification qualification⁴² status within three years;
- All members of the Reserve would have to be “qualified and deployable” within five years or face separation; and
- If Reservists are required to serve if called out, then some sort of job protection is essential. It would be the task of the Government to ensure job protection for all reservists who are called out to support their country.

The Committee recommends:

31. That the Government redefine the terms and conditions of service for Reserves taking these views into account.

Joint Task Force 2

Shrouded in Secrecy

The Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) was formed to replace the RCMP as a force capable of neutralizing hi-jackers who controlled an aircraft on the ground. As time passed, and concerns about terrorism gripped the world, their mission expanded to a broad range of tasks, from close protection of VIPs, to hunting down Taliban in Afghanistan. There have been unsubstantiated rumours of JTF2 operating in a number of foreign locations. And that is the problem. Canadians do not know where our JTF2 is operating, under what authorities and under what rules of engagement.

While this Committee has been supportive of the development and expansion of an elite special forces unit within the Canadian Forces, members have become increasingly skeptical of the secrecy that continues to surround this unit. We have also been concerned at what may well be a lack of monitoring of JTF2’s activities.

⁴² Classification qualification means that the individual has achieved the basic skills required to do his/her job in the Canadian Forces.

Managing Turmoil

Elite military units have the potential to take it upon themselves to play by their own rules. Canadians should be confident that no unit – however elite – could shroud such behaviour in secrecy if it so decided.

There can be no excuse for any government not to define either the general composition of JTF2, or its role and responsibilities. No foreign or domestic terrorist organization is going to alter its game plan because it knows how many personnel the special forces unit has, or what its responsibilities are.

Neither would it be proper in a democracy for citizens to wash their hands of monitoring JTF2's activities carefully to ensure that the unit is doing what the Government intends it to do, while operating in a manner consistent with the law.

Extraordinary units are called upon to do extraordinary things. But they must not mandate themselves or be mandated to any role that Canadian citizens would find reprehensible.

While the Committee has no evidence that JTF2 personnel have behaved in such a manner, the secrecy that surrounds the unit is so pervasive that the Committee cannot help but wonder whether JTF2's activities are properly scrutinized.

If they are, who is doing it? What tests, measures and standards are being applied? This organization is answerable to the Chief of Defence Staff. Is it appropriate for him to be the sole judge of the propriety of their activities?

Any institution can get out of whack, especially if it is expected to rise to huge challenges in life-and-death situations. The Committee understands that. But no institution can be tolerated if that institution does not have to account for its behaviour.

The Committee is not asking that JTF2 be required to give a public accounting of every detail of its composition or activities. But we do want a clear picture of what this unit's responsibilities are and what capacity it has to fulfill those responsibilities.

Canadians Deserve Answers

- Are taxpayers getting value for money from JTF2, and is this the best way to get the job done?
- What does JTF2 do that other CF units cannot do?
- How are they tasked? Do they take orders only from Canadian commanders, or are they lent out to other countries to fulfill their missions?
- Is there any Cabinet input into their missions? Is there any civilian oversight of their missions?
- Who assures that JTF2 acts according to the Geneva Convention and the laws of Canada?
- Is JTF2's mandate within Canada consistent with the Charter? If they have to exercise lethal force, who determines if they have done so in a lawful manner?

Comment

In the Committee's last report, *The Government's No. 1 Job*, a number of recommendations were made that were supportive of JTF2. However, the Committee has in the past been concerned about the lack of information provided to it about JTF2 and that concern continues.

Toward that end, the Committee recommends that:

- 32. The Chief of Defence Staff ensure that the appropriate Committees of the Senate and the House of Commons are properly informed on a regular basis, on the functioning and scope of JTF2 and Special Operations Forces Command.**

The Canadian Arctic

The Committee believes the following three things to be true:

1. The **Canadian Arctic** is vitally important to Canada's people, natural resources, sovereignty, and to our vision of what this nation is all about.
2. The **Canadian Forces** are vitally important to defending Canada's citizens, natural resources, sovereignty and to our vision of what this nation is all about.
3. Nonetheless, the Canadian Forces should **NOT** be the primary tool used by the Government of Canada to protect and defend our country's Arctic sovereignty.

The Future of the Northwest Passage

Global warming has caused a reawakening of interest in the Canadian Arctic. Glaciers are melting away at an alarming rate, prompting some to speculate that the fabled Northwest Passage between Europe and the Orient may actually become a reality some day soon.

Never mind that experts who gathered at a recent conference⁴³ in Tuktoyaktuk, NWT were largely in agreement that there is little likelihood that the Northwest Passage will ever become the northern equivalent of the Panama Canal.

Officials from Transport Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans argue that variability of ice conditions will continue to prevent transit shipping through the Canadian Arctic for many decades – their best estimate is 60-75 years.

Mariners such as Duke Snider, a long time Arctic ice pilot who now directs the Coast Guard's Pacific operations say that "ice in the Canadian Arctic is as

⁴³ Canada Coastal Zone Association, Coastal Zone Canada 2006 conference "Arctic Change and Coastal Communities," <http://www.czc06.ca/e/home.html>. According to the conference website, "Arctic Change and Coastal Communities" was the seventh conference in a biennial series, sponsored by the Canada Coastal Zone Association and was the first of the series to be located on the Arctic coast.

unpredictable and dangerous as it ever was and is likely to remain so-----there is every indication that variability will continue for a number of decades to come.”⁴⁴

While some parts of the eastern passage are at times relatively ice-free, the western section is much more unpredictable: “Ice continues to drift down from the polar ocean to be driven against the western shores of the High Arctic islands by a combination of winds and currents called the Beaufort Gyre.”⁴⁵

While shippers would certainly welcome a short route from Europe to Asia, and while the potential for development of vast oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic exists, the sense is that high risk – combined with the price of ice-capable vessels, the requirement for on-time delivery and the high cost of insurance – will limit significant Arctic traffic to occasional tourist vessels and submarines for decades to come.

The Committee recognizes that Government must ensure Canada’s sovereign rights in the Arctic. However, claims that the Arctic will soon become a bustling hive of industry and shipping appear to be vastly overblown.

Canadian Forces – Primary Guardians of Northern Sovereignty?

Canadian sovereignty must be protected in the Arctic, as elsewhere. So, why not use the resources of the Canadian Forces as the primary tool for offering that protection, as they are used in the rest of the country?

Why does the Committee believe that the Government’s current plan to build three Canadian Forces icebreakers is wrong? ⁴⁶

There are several reasons why arctic sovereignty should not be a significant part of DND’s mandate. Among them:

- There is no serious military threat to Canada through the Arctic – its lack of people and capital assets and its remoteness from the rest of the country make the odds of it being considered a likely military target ridiculously low

⁴⁴ Weber, Bob, “Arctic Shipping Unlikely, Experts Say,” *Globe & Mail*, August 23, 2006.

⁴⁴ Weber, Bob, “Arctic Shipping Unlikely”.

⁴⁵ Weber, Bob, “Arctic Shipping Unlikely”.

⁴⁶ Huebert, Rob, “Arctic Sovereignty's Trapped in a Policy Ice Jam,” *Globe & Mail*, August 17, 2006.

- While there are countries that challenge Canada's claims to sovereignty in its Arctic waters – most notably the United States and some European nations – these challenges are of dubious legitimacy. Canada maintains that the Northwest Passage is national territorial waters using the criteria of drawing a straight line from one point of national territory to another. While this procedure is internationally accepted, there is a requirement for traditional use which is also validated by the traditional use of the land by the Inuit. However, Canada must continue to have a presence in the Arctic to maintain its strong position.
- The best way for Canada to maintain a presence in the Arctic is not through sending large groups of military personnel there; it is by sending icebreakers on a consistent basis to perform useful tasks. Canada's icebreaker fleet – which is in desperate need of upgrading – is in the hands of the Canadian Coast Guard, not the Canadian Navy.⁴⁷ The skills to operate those icebreakers also rest with the Coast Guard, and to force the Navy to reacquire those skills and purchase a fleet of icebreakers would diminish its capacity and capability to carry out its other military responsibilities.⁴⁸
- The best way for Canada to conduct surveillance of its sovereign territories in the Arctic is via satellites. Canada's Arctic surveillance satellites come under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Space Agency, which can gather data from a number of satellites, one of which (Radarsat 1) is Canadian. It is the Committee's view that the present surveillance is unsatisfactory and feels that Canada should expand its program to five national satellites to ensure full and continuing coverage of the northwest passage. The information from existing and future satellites should be shared among those number of departments responsible for Canadian sovereignty, including the Department of National Defence.
- The Navy should be responsible for establishing monitoring devices at choke points leading into the Northwest Passage. Information from these devices should be available to the Canadian joint operation centres on each coast.

⁴⁷ The Canadian Navy briefly operated HMCS Labrador from 1954 to 1957. That icebreaker was subsequently transferred to the Department of Transport and then to the Canadian Coast Guard in 1961.

⁴⁸ Huebert, "Arctic Sovereignty's Trapped in a Policy Ice Jam".

Deep Water Port?

Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor are properly concerned about Arctic sovereignty and believe that the principal tool of ensuring it is the Department of National Defence.

The Committee endorses their concern over Arctic sovereignty but feels that Arctic sovereignty can better be preserved in a number of other ways that have very little involvement of the Canadian Forces.

Further the Committee is concerned that this approach by the Government is yet another effort to try to get a double bang from the defence buck by disguising regional development projects as DND facilities.

Several Nunavut communities are vying to be home to the new port, including Pond Inlet, on the top of Baffin Island adjacent to the Northwest Passage; Iqaluit, the territorial capital; Kimmirut, on the southern tip of Baffin Island; and Nanisivik, which already has port facilities currently used by the Coast Guard.⁴⁹

Many of the people who speak for these communities speak optimistically about the great economic opportunities that would accompany new port facilities.

The Committee continues to take a firm stand against using this method to create economic opportunities in disadvantaged areas (see Goose Bay, pp.53-56).

The defence of Canada and its citizens is an expensive proposition, and scarce military resources should not be hived off for non-military purposes. If the Government wishes to provide economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions, there are other federal agencies with the mandate to do that.

If a port is to be built, the costs should be paid by Public Works and Government Services Canada or other government agencies that have a legitimate Arctic mandate.

⁴⁹ Weber, Bob, "Choosing Spot and building New Arctic Port Compared to Building Rideau Canal," Arctic Net (published by the *Calgary Sun*, August 26, 2006). <http://www.arcticnet-ulaval.ca/index.php?fa=News.showNews&sub=1&home=4&menu=3>

Winter Warfare School?

Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor has also said that he is considering establishing a winter warfare school at Resolute, Nunavut.

While the Committee believes that placing much of the onus for defending Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic with the Canadian Forces would be misguided, it does support the Government's suggestion that a Canadian Forces northern training facility for both Canada and its allies could be useful, if it were established at a reasonable cost. This facility will provide the CF with the ability to conduct operations in the North and also to develop its winter warfare skills.

Projecting Power in the North

The Government's Speech from the Throne stated that the CF would acquire an airborne capability (which we hope will be confirmed in the upcoming Defence Capabilities Guide). These soldiers should be the first to receive training at the new northern training facility.

With the Government's decision to purchase new tactical and strategic lift aircraft, it will be possible to project CF presence anywhere in the Arctic in a matter of hours.

Arctic Search and Rescue/Recovery

The Government urgently needs to replace its antiquated fixed wing search and rescue aircraft. The north is a vast area that does not presently have adequate Search and Rescue (SAR) coverage. Providing SAR capability throughout the Arctic is a de facto method of demonstrating national sovereignty.

The Legal Situation

Notwithstanding the foregoing, issues of Arctic sovereignty are principally going to be resolved through negotiation with other interested parties such as the United

States and the European Community. The lead agencies will be the Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs.

The Committee has commissioned and received a detailed legal opinion⁵⁰ from Dr. Donat Pharand former Dean of the University of Ottawa Law School-(see Appendix XVI) it is clear from that the most likely outcome of future negotiations will be an agreement to disagree and a continuation of the status quo.

This in no way diminishes the need for Canada to continue to take concrete steps to exercise its sovereignty over its Arctic territory.

The Committee's Position on Defending Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic

It is the Committee's position that there is not a major military threat to Canada through the Arctic, and that Canada's sovereignty can in the main best be asserted there through an array of government departments such as the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canada Space Agency, Industry Canada, Transport Canada, Environment Canada and others including DND.

The Coast Guard should retain responsibility for icebreaking and sovereignty patrols. Two of its icebreakers are aging, and will have to be replaced. The money for this project should not come from the DND budget, which should focus on countering legitimate military threats.

DND funds should not be used for the construction of a deepwater port in the Arctic.

The Canadian Forces should continue to expand their presence in the North by basing more Search and Rescue aircraft in Yellowknife.

It should conduct more operational deployments in the North. And it should establish a winter warfare training facility.

⁵⁰ See Appendix XVI

But Canada's military should not be considered the primary tool for asserting Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. Scarce military funds should not be diverted to non-defensive purposes. It is the Canadian Government's presence that is required in the Arctic, not its guns.

The Committee recommends that:

- 33. Assertion of sovereignty over the Arctic is a government-wide responsibility that should not rest solely upon the Canadian Forces;**
- 34. Maritime sovereignty in the Arctic can best be effected by a revitalized Canadian Coast Guard with constabulary powers;**
- 35. The Government should be encouraged to continue economic development in the north as an end in itself and as a means of demonstrating Canadian sovereignty, but this should be funded by government departments such as Public Works and Government Services Canada, Industry Canada, Environment Canada, the Department of Transport and others;**
- 36. The Government should enhance Arctic surveillance by the acquisition of more satellites for a total of 5 by the year 2009. Information obtained by these satellites should be shared among the government departments involved in Canadian sovereignty including the Department of National Defence;**
- 37. The Navy should be responsible for establishing monitoring devices at choke points leading into the Northwest Passage. Information from these devices should be available to the Canadian joint operations centres on each coast; and**
- 38. As part of the renewal and recapitalization of the Canadian Coast Guard, three armed icebreakers capable of operating year round in the Arctic should be constructed no later than 2012.**

WANTED: A Coast Guard That Actually Guards Coasts

The waters off Canada's coasts – as well as those on the Great Lakes and along the St. Lawrence Seaway – constitute what the Committee first described three years ago in the Committee report of 2003 entitled “*Canada's Coastline - The Longest Under-defended Borders in the World.*”⁵¹ They are vast. They are vulnerable. And, unfortunately, they are still largely unattended.

Canada is a huge and vulnerable country badly in need of a robust maritime interdiction and law enforcement capacity on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic coasts, on the Great Lakes and on the St. Lawrence Seaway.

The Committee acknowledges that there has been some modest progress to bolster Canada's surveillance and constabulary strength on these littoral waters.⁵² However, funding has been marginally increased for Navy and Coast Guard patrols, and the RCMP is now conducting Joint Marine Security Patrols⁵³ in vessels currently provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) on the Great Lakes. These are worthwhile gestures, but modest gestures nonetheless.

The Committee envisions that in respect of national security, this robust capacity should be part of a layered approach in which the RCMP is responsible in the Great Lakes, the St Lawrence Seaway and border rivers, the Coast Guard is responsible in the littoral waters and the Arctic, and the Navy is responsible in the area of ocean beyond our 200 mile limit.⁵⁴

Canada has a significant number of vessels operating near coasts, harbours and major river systems that are under utilized -- The Canadian Coast Guard. It is ironic that they are called the coast guard because they perform a number of

⁵¹ Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World,” October 2003. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep17oct03-e.htm>

⁵² United States Navy, “Forward...From the Sea,” Washington, March 1997. <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html>. The US Navy describes littoral regions as “those areas adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces”

⁵³ The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Marine Program is the joint RCMP Canadian Coast Guard Mid shore patrol program utilizing three vessels on the Great Lakes. The RCMP contribution is 14 RCMP officers. The RCMP contribution will be raised to 30 officers by 2008.

⁵⁴ See Appendix XVII

valuable tasks for the citizens of Canada, but protecting the Canadian coastline for national security is not one of them and they are neither armed nor trained in the use of light weapons.

The Committee is of the view that Canada can, by revising the roles and responsibilities of the CCG, make better use of the Coast Guard and provide a significant new layer of defence for Canada and the North American continent.

The role that the Committee envisions for the CCG would fill a void that the Navy is currently not equipped, nor trained to address – the littoral. The Committee also envisions the Canadian Coast Guard as the principal marine sovereignty and national security presence in the North.

The Coast Guard is uniquely suited for these roles and will complement the work of the Navy in providing maritime security to Canada's approaches.

Currently, the Canadian Coast Guard is divided between the Department of Transport (DOT), and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). The Committee is of the view, given these new responsibilities and roles, that the Canadian Coast Guard should be transferred to the Department of Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) where they would perform important interface among DND, RCMP, and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), while still providing service to the Departments of Transport, Fisheries and Oceans, and the Environment.

The Committee believes that the RCMP, with its proven capacity for law enforcement, should police the 19 designated ports, Great Lakes, the St Lawrence Seaway and the border rivers; the Coast Guard should be refurbished to patrol our littoral waters to the 200-mile limit; and the Navy should continue with its responsibilities in waters beyond that limit.

The Roles of a Real Coast Guard – National Security in the Littoral

The Committee believes that the Coast Guard is an under-used resource⁵⁵ that could develop the capacity to make policing our coasts a core function. They are the institution that is most familiar with Canada's coastal waters.

⁵⁵ Canada's Coastlines, October 2003.

The Committee in its report of 2003 “*The Longest Under-defended Borders in the World*”: expressed the view that the Coast Guard’s new role would be based on a tiered intervention model, working in harmony with the Navy, police and other government agencies.

Tier 1: Constabulary. The Coast Guard would continue to conduct enforcement duties related to vessel regulations and maintain a patrol program with a response capability. This would continue to include compliant vessel inspections. In their area of jurisdiction, they would have responsibilities to enforce the *Fisheries Act*, environmental legislation, customs and immigration, transport regulations and *Criminal Code* infractions. In the course of these duties, the Coast Guard may well be called upon to conduct interdiction and boardings of vessels. This restructuring would relieve the RCMP and the DFO, and Environment of the obligation to be in CCG vessels when it was anticipated that infractions had been committed. The simple presence of an armed Coast Guard would act as a deterrent.

Tier 2: Interdiction. It would also act as a deterrent to criminals generally. The interception of such activities as the importation of drugs and the smuggling of people and goods would be part of the Coast Guard’s mandate. This would require a high level of enforcement capability, including the ability to monitor, pursue, and contain vessels and perform ship boardings. If a ship were detained, it would be brought into port and handed over to local authorities to conduct their investigation.

Tier 3: Dealing with a National Security/Terrorist incident. The Coast Guard should place this role at the very centre of its mandate. Potential terrorist incidents would quickly involve the police and the CF (JTF2). The Coast Guard would have to provide both containment, and Command and Control capability on their platform in conjunction with the Canada Border Services Agency, the RCMP, the Navy and first responders.

Adopting this approach will require the institution to change how it recruits, trains and equips its people to the standards of a peace officer. Ships will have to be built or modified to carry weapons to ensure protection when conducting boarding operations.

The Canadian Coast Guard is currently unarmed. The Committee has previously recommended that the Coast Guard be armed, as required. Members should be

armed and Coast Guard vessels should have weapons. The Committee has received testimony from both unions representing officers and other ranks of the Coast Guard who have supported the constabulary proposal. They further agree that, given appropriate training, equipment and pay, they support the idea of being armed and having weapons on their vessels.

The Moment is Right

If there were ever a moment to transform the role of the Canadian Coast Guard, this is it. If the CCG were a robust agency performing roles that nobody else could do, there might be good reason to resist change. But the Coast Guard has become a debilitated operating agency within Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Its ships are badly in need of replacement, and it now plays a role that the private sector could do without compromising any Canadian's well being.

With a new constabulary mandate, the Coast Guard would be better placed in a department like Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC).

Most of the Coast Guard's more traditional roles – like buoy tending – could be privatized, although they would not have to be. These kinds of details could be worked out. If there are some Coast Guard employees uncomfortable with the more constabulary role, they could be shifted into alternate employment with appropriate compensation.

Old ships must be replaced by new ships. The Coast Guard needs platforms more suited to interdiction and pursuit – platforms with some teeth in addition to platforms suited for buoy tending, small craft safety, search and rescue and ice breaking.⁵⁶

The Committee is of the view that the Coast Guard should take on a proactive role in maritime security. This would fill a dangerous void on our littoral waters; one that the Navy has neither the equipment nor the skills to perform. The Committee's proposal will fill this important void in the layered defence of Canada and our part of North America.

⁵⁶ See Appendix XV

A revamped Coast Guard would also be the best institution to provide the marine capacity in the Arctic needed to enforce Canadian sovereignty. The Coast Guard has both the skills and experience to do the job. Better to replace the more outdated Coast Guard icebreakers than to build three new icebreakers for the Navy. The Navy does not possess the icebreaking expertise required and purchasing icebreakers would inevitably divert funds from the equipment it needs to prosecute its role in projecting force on Canada's behalf.

Even after this sizable reorganization of the Coast Guard, the Committee believes there are still substantial risks that have not yet been addressed in Canada's ports, major rivers, and the Great Lakes.⁵⁷

The Committee is awaiting the long-overdue (promised a year ago) release of the RCMP's maritime Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. Pending the RCMP report, we believe that the following recommendations will go a long way toward addressing maritime threats of concern to Canada.

The lack of sufficient surveillance and enforcement presence off Canada's coasts, on the Great Lakes and along the St. Lawrence Seaway, cause the Committee to make the following recommendations:

- 39. That the Government of Canada change the mandate of the Canadian Coast Guard to include an armed constabulary role, and make the protection of Canada's coasts its central function;**
- 40. That the Government of Canada transfer the Canadian Coast Guard into the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness;**
- 41. That the Government of Canada commit to an urgent recapitalization of the Canadian Coast Guard to ensure that it has the number and type of vessels it needs to fulfill this new role;**
- 42. That the Government of Canada assign the Canadian Coast Guard the maritime enforcement roles of the Departments of Fisheries and Ocean, Transport, Environment, Canada Border Services Agency, and appropriate sections of the *Criminal Code*; and**

⁵⁷ See appendix XVII which shows the committee recommended areas of responsibility of the Coast Guard, the RCMP and the Navy. The Coast Guard will continue to perform its icebreaking duties on the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence Seaway.

- 43. That the Government of Canada should plan for these changes immediately with a view to completing the transformation and re-equipping of the Canadian Coast Guard by 2015.**

Canadian Foreign Intelligence Capacity

In order to conduct successful joint expeditionary operations overseas and to enhance protection of Canadians at home, Canada must have an effective strategic-level intelligence capability. While it is Canadian policy to engage in overseas missions as part of a coalition of like-minded nations, the CF will not always be deployed into areas where other members of the coalition have already been and gathered intelligence. It makes sense whenever and wherever possible, to have CSIS conduct operations in advance of CF deployments to assist in analysis of the intelligence environment.

Although it regularly cooperates with allies and coalition partner countries in the acquisition and production of intelligence, Canada should not ultimately depend on other nations' intelligence analysis to conduct Canadian military operations. It is important that Canadian decision making be based on intelligence collected in the interests of Canada and not based only on intelligence collected by others in their national interests. Canada should have its own capacity to analyze the political and situational dynamics of the areas where its Forces are operating, in order to ensure its decision-making and subsequent actions are not accidentally or unduly influenced by biases of partner nations. Canadian decisions must, in the end, be based primarily on Canadian intelligence.

If, as described in the Defence Policy Statement, Canada is to be “selective and strategic when deploying military personnel overseas, focusing where our interests are at stake and where we can make a meaningful contribution,”⁵⁸ Canada needs an expanded intelligence capability, at both the strategic and operational level⁵⁹.

⁵⁸ Department of National Defence, “Canada’s international Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Defence,” 2005, p.2.

⁵⁹ Strategic intelligence is used by national strategic level decision makers. It usually relates to the probable national or high-level intentions of an adversary and deals with its political and strategic aims. Operational intelligence supports theatre level decision-makers in the planning of operational campaigns that broadly design the battles to be fought in order to achieve strategic aims. Operational intelligence usually deals with the nature of the battle space in which the campaign will be fought, the overall disposition of forces and their probable intentions.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) – Canada’s primary security intelligence organization – can perform a key role here. CSIS is responsible for gathering intelligence related to threats to the security of Canada. The CSIS Act places no geographic limits on this activity. CSIS already operates abroad, and while CSIS works with the CF, the Committee believes that this support can, and should, be expanded⁶⁰. The Committee has not, however, examined the issue of CSIS overseas deployment in any detail. This will be the subject of discussion in a future report that will examine amongst other things the requirement for a foreign intelligence service, and the structure of the Canadian security and intelligence community.

CSIS resources have marginally increased since the dramatic events of September 11, 2001 but they are still below the establishment levels that CSIS had in 1992/3 when it had 2760 personnel⁶¹. Government restraint programs in the early 1990s resulted in a loss of 760 positions⁶², leaving CSIS with an establishment of 2000 in 1998/99⁶³.

At the same time, threats to Canada, coupled with demands from government, have increased. CSIS has been expected to do more with less.

The events of September 11, 2001 increased government and public awareness of the terrorist threat and new resources were added to the CSIS. By 2004/05, the agency only grew to 2357⁶⁴—still 403 personnel short of its establishment 12 years earlier.

⁶⁰ According to the CSIS, supporting deployed forces is a key part of its mandate to participate in the protection of Canadians at home and abroad, which is identified both in its enabling Act and in the government’s 2004 National Security Policy; Judd, Jim. “Testimony,” *Presentation to the Senate Special Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act* March 7, 2005. <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/speeches/speech07032005.asp> Accessed September 2006. CSIS Director Jim Judd testified that “we have not been immune from the effects of terrorism ... Canadian Forces personnel have been killed and wounded by terrorist attacks while serving in Afghanistan. The threat to our deployed Forces in Afghanistan remains high, and for this reason, the Service makes it a priority to support the Canadian Forces deployed”

⁶¹ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2002 Public Report, “Figure 2 - Human Resources” http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/annual_report/2002/report2002.asp#8b

⁶² CSIS, “Backgrounder No. 4”. Between 1992 and 1998 initiatives like Program Review decreased the size of the Service by 28 percent or 760 positions.

⁶³ CSIS, 2004 Public Report, “Figure 1 – Human Resources,” http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/annual_report/2004/report2004_e.pdf

⁶⁴ CSIS, 2004 Public Report, “Figure 1 – Human Resources”.

This is unfortunate, because the requirement for CSIS to operate outside Canada – in response to potential threats to Canada – has increased dramatically. When CSIS must undertake a mission overseas, experienced investigators now travel from Canada. This takes them away from Canada-based investigations highlighting their shortage of resources to conduct operations.

The Committee has long argued that due to today's threat environment, Canada's security and intelligence resources should be expanded significantly.⁶⁵

How CSIS Should Contribute To Canadian Forces Overseas Missions

The Committee is of the view, that if the recommendations that follow are accepted, lives will be saved and there is a greater likelihood of CF overseas missions being successful.

1. Part of the job of CSIS is to provide the political leadership with a good knowledge of the environment in which the CF may be operating. This will give the government a broader range of advice when considering what action to take. To do this, CSIS will require an expansion of their resources to address financial, investigative, operational and technical requirements.
2. CSIS should be provided with the resources necessary to conduct the full range of operational activity required to operate abroad without having to rely on support of other allied organizations.
3. CSIS should be capable of taking on an operational role in conjunction with elements of the CF for example JTF2 or the Air Force, instead of or prior to the main CF deployment.
4. Once a CF force is deployed, CSIS should have the capacity to work with the CF mission on a day to day basis.

If CSIS is to be in a position to respond to foreign threats to Canada, protect Canadians at home, and work with the CF in their operational engagements, the

⁶⁵ Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness," February 2002. In this 2002 report, the Committee recommended that the government allocate sufficient resources to CSIS in order to deal with lengthy delays in processing of Citizenship and Immigration Canada applications by the Service.

Committee believes that CSIS is going to require approximately an additional 750 personnel.

The Committee believes that CSIS should receive a \$300-500 million increase to its annual budget by 2011-2012, to support current operations, to develop a strategic capacity to identify and respond to emerging crises and to boost the recruiting and training capacity.

It takes time to recruit and train personnel. The government should be making the necessary budget allocations today if CSIS is to have an enhanced overseas capacity five years from now.

Until the agency's overseas capacity can be adequately staffed, there are ways of getting the ball rolling. Experienced CSIS personnel who have retired, or are in the process of retiring, should be brought on board to fill immediate needs. To supplement short term requirements overseas, CSIS may wish to engage private contractors.

The Committee recommends that:

- 44. The Government expand the size of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service by approximately 750 people to ensure that CSIS has the resources necessary to operate overseas, operate domestically and provide additional support to the CF.**
- 45. The Government should increase the Canadian security and intelligence service's budget by \$300-500 million over the next two years to:**
 - a. expand its capacity to investigate threats to Canada and Canadians domestically and foreign;**
 - b. provide the government with more comprehensive advice on areas of potential CF operations;**
 - c. develop an operational capacity to work with CF special operations forces with aim of accomplishing objectives without the necessity of a full CF deployment;**
 - d. provide ongoing intelligence in the course of CF operations overseas.**

APPENDIX I Order of Reference

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Thursday, April 27, 2006:

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Kenny, seconded by the Honourable Senator Moore:

That the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence be authorized to examine and report on the national security policy of Canada. In particular, the Committee shall be authorized to examine:

(a) the capability of the Department of National Defence to defend and protect the interests, people and territory of Canada and its ability to respond to and prevent a national emergency or attack, and the capability of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to carry out its mandate;

(b) the working relationships between the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering, and how they collect, coordinate, analyze and disseminate information and how these functions might be enhanced;

(c) the mechanisms to review the performance and activities of the various agencies involved in intelligence gathering; and

(d) the security of our borders and critical infrastructure.

That the papers and evidence received and taken during the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Parliaments be referred to the Committee; and

That the Committee report to the Senate no later than March 31, 2007 and that the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee until May 31, 2007.

After debate,

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Paul C. Bélisle
Clerk of the Senate

APPENDIX II

Index of Recommendations

1. The Government of Canada honour its pledge to the UN General Assembly – and respond to a unanimous 2005 vote in the House of Commons – by increasing Canada’s Official Development Assistance budget to .7 percent of GDP by 2015.
2. The Government of Canada get started on working toward an aid budget of .7 percent of GDP by increasing Canada’s foreign spending for 2007-2008 by \$500 million.
3. The Government of Canada increase its defence spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2015.
4. The Government of Canada get started on working toward a defence budget of 2 percent of GDP by increasing Canada’s defence spending for 2007 – 2008 by \$2 billion.
5. CIDA refocus its aid allocation to Afghanistan so that most of it goes directly to development projects in the province of Kandahar where the CF is conducting military operations.
6. Until the security situation improves, the development budget allocated to the Canadian Forces commander in Kandahar be set to an amount of \$4 million immediately.
7. Prior to 31 March 2007, the Government complete a review and report to Parliament on all legislation, regulations, and policies governing military purchases for the purpose of streamlining the process.
8. The Government not use military spending as a political pork barrel, and that efficacy alone be the criterion for those purchases.
9. As recommended in our report “The Government’s Number One Job’ (June 2006), the Government increase:

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- a. the expenditure authority of the Minister of National Defence to \$500 million for any capital project; and
 - b. increase the monetary threshold value of those defence-related projects that must be reviewed by Cabinet – also known as Major Crown Projects – to \$500 million.
10. The Government reconsider its plan to deploy a Canadian Forces Rapid Response contingent to Goose Bay.
 11. The federal Government work with the provincial and municipal governments to assist in the development of a transition business plan for the area of Happy Valley.
 12. The federal and provincial Governments commit to a shared arrangement to provide bridge funding on a progressively diminishing annual scale to assist in the transition of Goose Bay from military to a sustainable and dependable economic activity.
 13. The Canadian Forces review their operational requirements for the facilities at CFB Goose Bay.
 14. The National Defence College be re-established with joint leadership by DND, supported by DFAIT and the PSEPC.
 15. The Government should set up a Defence Foundation that will promote the study of national security and defence at universities across Canada.
 16. Canada's core values and vital interests in relation to the national security policy, international policy and defence Policy be debated, evaluated and articulated by a broad range of individuals from educational institutions across Canada.
 17. The Minister of National Defence instruct the Canadian Forces to bolster its efforts to make Canadians more aware of real stories about the accomplishments of its military.
 18. DND create a Speakers Bureau of experienced officers to speak to organizations in communities across Canada.

19. The federal government establish a number of scholarships for national defence studies at every Canadian university offering courses in such studies.
20. The Prime Minister or the Minister of National Defence provide both Houses of Parliament with weekly public situation reports on Canadian military activities overseas.
21. At the beginning of each new Parliament, there be a Parliamentary Defence Policy review followed by the issuance of a Government Defence Policy statement.
22. Parliament should vote on every mission proposed by the Government that would deploy Canadian military forces to:
 - a. a United Nations mission;
 - b. a NATO operation beyond any contribution to the NATO Response Force;
 - c. an ad-hoc coalition operation beyond North America; and
 - d. a solely Canadian operation beyond Canada.
23. The Government of Canada proceed with research to provide systems to defend Canada from space-based weaponry.
24. Canada enter into an agreement with the United States to share satellite and radar coverage of continental North America to include maritime approaches in the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic.
25. Canada should enhance its space capabilities by accelerating that part of the JSP project that will establish an array of Canadian satellites which permit real time surveillance of Canada's four maritime approaches and the Great Lakes.
26. Canada accelerate the remaining projects of the JSP program to enhance the security of Canadians.
27. Canada enters into an agreement with the US and other allies to share satellite intelligence.
28. To enhance North American defence, the data from satellite coverage be fused with other data at the Canadian joint operations centers on each coast.

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29. Canada should enter into discussions with the U.S. Government with the aim of participating in the Ballistic Missile Defence program.
30. The Government commit to a further expansion of the Canadian Rangers to 7500 by 2011.
31. That the Government redefine the terms and conditions of service for Reserves taking these views into account.
32. The Chief of Defence Staff ensure that the appropriate Committees of the Senate and the House of Commons are properly informed on a regular basis, on the functioning and scope of JTF2 and Special Operations Forces Command.
33. Assertion of sovereignty over the Arctic is a government-wide responsibility that should not rest solely upon the Canadian Forces.
34. Maritime sovereignty in the Arctic can best be effected by a revitalized Canadian Coast Guard with constabulary powers.
35. The Government should be encouraged to continue economic development in the north as an end in itself and as a means of demonstrating Canadian sovereignty, but this should be funded by government departments such as Public Works and Government Services Canada, Industry Canada, Environment Canada, the Department of Transport and others.
36. The Government should enhance Arctic surveillance by the acquisition of more satellites for a total of 5 by the year 2009. Information obtained by these satellites should be shared among the government departments involved in Canadian sovereignty including the Department of National Defence.
37. The Navy should be responsible for establishing monitoring devices at choke points leading into the Northwest Passage. Information from these devices should be available to the Canadian joint operations centres on each coast.
38. As part of the renewal and recapitalization of the Canadian Coast Guard, three armed icebreakers capable of operating year round in the Arctic should be constructed no later than 2012.

39. That the Government of Canada change the mandate of the Canadian Coast Guard to include an armed constabulary role, and make the protection of Canada's coasts its central function.
40. That the Government of Canada transfer the Canadian Coast Guard into the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
41. That the Government of Canada commit to an urgent recapitalization of the Canadian Coast Guard to ensure that it has the number and type of vessels it needs to fulfill this new role.
42. That the Government of Canada assign the Canadian Coast Guard the maritime enforcement roles of the Departments of Fisheries and Ocean, Transport, Environment, Canada Border Services Agency, and appropriate sections of the *Criminal Code*.
43. That the Government of Canada should plan for these changes immediately with a view to completing the transformation and re-equipping of the Canadian Coast Guard by 2015.
44. The Government expand the size of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service by approximately 750 people to ensure that CSIS has the resources necessary to operate overseas, operate domestically and provide additional support to the CF.
45. The Government should increase the Canadian security and intelligence service's budget by \$300-500 million over the next two years to:
 - a. expand its capacity to investigate threats to Canada and Canadians domestically and foreign;
 - b. provide the government with more comprehensive advice on areas of potential CF operations;
 - c. develop an operational capacity to work with CF special operations forces with aim of accomplishing objectives without the necessity of a full CF deployment;
 - d. provide ongoing intelligence in the course of CF operations overseas.

APPENDIX III

Index of Recommendations from **“The Government’s No. 1 Job”**

1. Canadian defence budgets be based on longer-term thinking about the security needs of Canadians, rather than short-term fixes to manpower shortages and equipment rust-out.
2. The Government should grow to, and maintain the annual budget of the Department of National Defence at, between \$25 Billion to \$35 Billion by 2011-2012 to increase its capacity to protect Canadians and their interests at home and abroad, and to contribute to international peace and security.
3. A minimum of 30 per cent of the defence budget be allocated to capital expenditures every year to ensure that Canadians serving their country have the infrastructure and equipment they need to do their jobs well, with as little threat to their lives as possible.
4. The Government should immediately cancel the Expenditure Review Committee commitments affecting the Department of National Defence and ensure that the Department has use of at least the full allocation of the original \$12.8 billion over five years allocated by the previous Government AND the additional \$5.3 billion over the next five years, promised by the current Government.
5. The Canadian Forces increase the authorized strength of critical, high-demand trades to ensure an operationally sufficient supply of personnel in those trades, so that deploying operational units are never undermined by a lack of specially trained personnel to do critical technical tasks; and that the Canadian Forces recruiting and training system is specifically geared to sustain those levels.
6. The Canadian Forces should maintain regular strength of 90,000 personnel. This is the minimum needed to keep 75,000 trained and effective personnel – the number required to sustain the domestic and overseas tempo Canada may be required to protect its citizens and advance their interests.

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7. The Government publicly commit to a moratorium on additional deployments of the Canadian Army until it has reached a steady state of personnel, likely around 2011-2012.
8. The Canadian Forces should build a recruiting and training system that can recruit and train the personnel necessary to maintain a steady state level of 90,000 personnel.
9. All recruiting processes should be streamlined so that every transaction is electronic and transferable between Canadian Forces' components.
10. The Canadian Forces expand incentive programs to ensure that qualified personnel do not leave the Canadian Forces.
11. The Canadian Forces be allocated the resources to allow them to create a Navy demonstration team to co-ordinate recruiting activities with ship visits to Canadian cities and complement the Snowbird and Skyhawks.
12. Once new recruits are trained, the Canadian Forces should utilize them to attract other new recruits by allowing them to go home for short periods of special leave to encourage others with similar potential to join the Forces.
13. The Canadian Forces should shorten the recruitment process for both the Regular Forces to a maximum of one-month between enrolment and the commencement of basic training.
14. The Department of National Defence should be allocated enough funds to invest at least 4 per cent of Realty Replacement Cost annually – the amount recommended by Treasury Board guidelines – toward the maintenance and replacement of its infrastructure to address outstanding deficiencies caused by years of underfunding.
15. The Department of National Defence:
 - a) Consolidate its aging armouries;
 - b) Initiate a National Reserves Construction and Rationalization Program that will build or lease modern accommodation for Reserve units, with

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Index of Recommendations from
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particular attention to creating shared-use facilities with local or provincial agencies where possible.

16. The Department hire experienced private contract personnel to quickly expand its project management capacity.
17. The Government eliminate duplication of approval levels between the Department of National Defence, Public Works and Government Services Canada, and the Treasury Board to reduce the average time between the identification of a deficiency and award of a contract by two-thirds.
18. The Government increase
 - a. the expenditure authority of the Minister of National Defence to \$500 million for any capital project; and,
 - b. increase the monetary threshold value of those defence-related projects that must be reviewed by Cabinet – also known as Major Crown Projects – to \$500 million.
19. The Department of National Defence should create two High Readiness Task Groups – one based on the Atlantic coast and one on the Pacific coast.
20. The Canadian Forces accelerate the Single-Class Surface Combatant project as a successor to the Iroquois-class Destroyers and the Halifax-class Frigates, with the goal of first delivery by 2013.
21. The Canadian Forces complete the Frigate Life Extension Project as efficiently as possible to minimize any reduction in the capacity of the Forces.
22. The Department acquire enough capacity to have at least one Joint Support Ship available at high readiness on each coast at all times, which requires at least four ships.
23. The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Joint Support Ships as quickly as possible, with first delivery by 2010.

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24. The Canadian Forces should acquire sufficient Landing Platform Dock vessels or their equivalent, each capable of carrying an Army battle group and its equipment at a time.
25. The Government should provide the Department with whatever resources it requires to acquire four Landing Platform Dock-like ships as quickly as possible.
26. The Canadian Forces should restore its submarine capability by making Canada's four submarines operational as quickly as possible, setting in place plans for their mid-life refit as necessary, and outlining a plan for their eventual replacement by a new generation of submarines.
27. The Government aggressively pursue the recapitalization of the Navy and Coast Guard fleets as quickly as possible, wherever the most cost-effective solutions can be acquired;
28. The Government maintain steady funding for new ships to support rational and timely fleet management;
29. The Government ensure that any non-defence related premium that arises from a procurement decisions for Navy ships not be borne by a government department such as Industry or Heritage Canada, and not the Department of National Defence.
30. The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Integrated Soldier System Project relying on proven capabilities, to achieve full operational capability by 2009.
31. The Department of National Defence should accelerate the Land Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (LF-ISTAR) project, with the aim for full operational capability not later than 2009.
32. The Government should accelerate the acquisition of approximately 2,900 Medium Support Vehicle Systems (MSVS), with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2008.

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Index of Recommendations from
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33. The Government should accelerate the acquisition of the next generation of light support vehicles, with the intent to take first delivery no later than 2011.
34. The Government should complete procurement and fielding of the new generation M777 guns no later than 2008
35. The Canadian Forces acquire a fleet of 6 to 8 strategic airlift aircraft by early 2008 that can guarantee a rapid response to emergencies in Canada and around the world and proper support to Canadian operations overseas.
36. The Canadian Forces should replace the oldest 20 to 25 aircraft in its Hercules fleet as an urgent priority with a target of no later than 2007 for the first delivery of the new aircraft with similar capabilities.
37. The Canadian Forces commence procurement of a fleet of 16 to 20 medium-lift helicopters with a target of 2007 for first delivery.
38. The government and the Canadian Forces make it a priority to complete the Aurora upgrade programs in the minimum possible time so that these essential capabilities are once again available to protect Canadians.
39. The government re-energize the “fast track” acquisition of approximately 20 to 24 aircraft to fulfill the fixed-wing search and rescue role so that the first of these aircraft can be delivered by 2007.
40. The Government and the Canadian Forces should acquire, deploy and operate an array of uninhabited air vehicles as an integral component of a national intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance picture by 2008.
41. DND immediately establish a standing Special Operations Forces Equipment Project Office to address the need for expanded special operations equipment on a continuing basis, for an enlarged Canadian Special Operations Forces formation.
42. The Canadian Forces complete the expansion of JTF-2 by 2009.
43. Other Canadian Forces elements provide further “jump start” formed bodies, commensurate with their ability to do so and in keeping with the unit ability to

absorb them. For instance, to follow the lead of The Royal Canadian Regiment, each of the other Army infantry regiments might provide a company. Or the Royal Corps of Canadian Artillery and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps could provide a platoon each. The Navy may wish to contribute an initial group of trained boarding party personnel to establish a presence.

44. DND immediately establish a project office to initiate procurement of a modern, combat capable tactical helicopter suitable for use by Canadian Special Operations Forces; and
45. A Special Operations Forces helicopter be acquired by 2009, to be operationally capable when the expanded JTF-2 and the full Canadian Special Operations Regiment reach its full operational capability.
46. The acquisition of medium lift helicopters, recommended earlier in this report, include sufficient numbers to ensure the availability of at least three helicopters, to be placed in support of special operations if needed.
47. In addition to the replacement CC-130 Hercules aircraft called for earlier in this report, DND further procure three additional Hercules aircraft to be dedicated to special operations and appropriately equipped for that role; and
48. Of the three special operations aircraft, at least one be maintained at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces it will support.
49. In procuring a fleet of strategic airlift aircraft, as recommended earlier in this report, the aircraft acquired must be suitable for the strategic deployment of Canadian Special Operations Forces direct to the maximum possible number of locations in Canada, in a time and manner appropriate to operational readiness requirements that will be established; and
50. The strategic airlift aircraft required be appropriately adaptable to the support of special operations and that the numbers acquired allow for at least one aircraft to held at the same high readiness as the Special Operations Forces.

51. The Canadian Forces should:

- a) Station the DART and its equipment at a facility that is co-located with the strategic and tactical airlift that will move it;
- b) Acquire sufficient capable Canadian-controlled strategic airlift to give the DART a global reach within hours;
- c) Establish closer liaison between DART and appropriate government departments and agencies such as the Public Health Agency, the RCMP and Transport Canada;
- d) Conduct joint training exercises to ensure that the DART will be able to operate in efficient harmony with provincial and municipal first responders across the country, and conduct similar exercises with other like-minded nations around the world; and,
- e) Expand the DART’s capabilities to deal with a wider array of natural disasters.

52. The government should:

- a) Instruct the Canadian Forces that the Government’s default decision will be to deploy the DART where possible, as soon as possible, and the unit should prepare accordingly;
- b) Ensure that regional defence and police attachés are aware of the DART’s capabilities and are trained to assist the DART advance team as soon as it is on site;
- c) Speed up federal decision-making on the use of the DART by establishing more effective inter-departmental protocols for its deployment.

53. The Canadian Forces should expand the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence and increase the number of trained military intelligence officers.

APPENDIX IV

An Overview of the Committee's Reports

CANADIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS (February 2002)

The Committee's first report was tabled during the 37th Parliament's First Session in February 2002. It was a first look at the state of Canada's military readiness and ability to protect its citizens. An ambitious introduction to the wide range of issues, the report focused on defence and security individually, as well as how they interact with each other.

Defence issues studied by the Committee included: (i) recruiting and retention; (ii) operations tempo; and (iii) the Canadian Forces Reserves. Security issues included: (i) lack of central coordination; (ii) control of ports and airports; and (iii) border security

The Committee concluded that the development of a national security policy should be a high priority for the government, as well as building better information-sharing and inter-agency cooperation.

The themes studied in this groundbreaking first report would be revisited again individually in future reports. In particular, the Committee felt it necessary to outline the cooperation between Canada and the United States in defence and security matters. During meetings in Washington with congressional leaders and administration officials, senators discussed the establishment of the new US Northern Command, scheduled for October 1, 2002.

DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA: A CANADIAN RESPONSIBILITY (September 2002)

Tabled in the Senate in September 2002, this report was a direct result of the focus on cooperation between Canada and the United States. It noted that the effectiveness of NORAD has not been enough to motivate a similar organization for maritime and land forces interoperability. This report recommended, among other things, a closer level of cooperation between Canada and other maritime nations in tracking both incoming and outgoing ships; centralized intelligence centers on both coasts; new security measures for the Great Lakes; and a joint Canada-US land force planning unit.

FOR AN EXTRA \$130 BUCKS ... UPDATE ON CANADA'S MILITARY FINANCIAL CRISIS: A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM UP (November 2002)

During a meeting in June 2002 with the then newly appointed Minister of National Defence, the Hon. John McCallum asked for detailed information on funding as part of the budget consultations. Hence, the Committee's third report made a forceful case on the need to provide better resources to our armed forces. This report, tabled in November 2002, outlined the low per capita cost of bringing back the strength of our armed forces.

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The most controversial recommendation of the report centered on a proposal to call back all Canadian troops overseas and then have a 24 month pause in further deployments to allow the troops to regroup, refresh and re-establish. This was after the Committee had traveled extensively across Canada, getting a first-hand look at military bases and equipment.

The report highlighted three main categories of deficiencies in the armed forces: personnel; operations; and capital equipment.

THE VALIANTS PROJECT (December 2002)

This report examined the proposal of the Valiants Group for the erection of statues in downtown Ottawa to salute the heroic wartime sacrifice of the valiant men and women who fought victoriously for the independence of Canada during the 17th, 18th 19th and 20th centuries, and helped to establish Canada's nationhood. The Committee recommended that the Government of Canada reconsider the Valiants project, taking into account the proposals of the sponsors to reduce the number of statues, alter the choice of valiants, and lower the costs.

FIXING THE CANADIAN FORCES' METHOD OF DEALING WITH DEATH OR DISMEMBERMENT (April 2003)

This report, tabled in April 2003, had a significant impact on soldiers who were injured or killed while serving. The crux of the problem was a dual scale of compensation whereby senior ranks received additional compensation that was not available to lower ranks. The Minister of National Defence responded quickly to the Subcommittee's work and all ranks are now entitled to enhanced compensation.

OCCUPATIONAL STRESS INJURIES: THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING (June 2003)

In June 2003, the Subcommittee tabled this important report which, among other things, addressed the long-overlooked issue of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The recommendations centered primarily on increasing awareness of these conditions, as well as developing a proper diagnosis and treatment program to help veterans suffering from this debilitating condition.

THE MYTH OF SECURITY AT CANADA'S AIRPORTS (

During its initial survey of defence and security matters, the Committee identified weaknesses in both Canada's airports and seaports. Thus, its fourth report took a closer look at how security is managed at Canada's airports and found some alarming deficiencies in how Canada has responded to the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Tabled in January 2003, the report found that the federal government and Canada's air industry have focused on introducing measures to toughen security that are highly visible to the traveling public such as more vigilant screening of hand luggage; questions as to whether luggage could have been tampered with; and the requirement that passengers accompany their luggage on all

APPENDIX IV

An Overview of the Committee's Reports

flights. These measures may have reassured many travelers that security in Canada's air travel industry had been significantly tightened but there was little or no improvement to huge security gaps behind the scenes.

The Committee made a series of recommendations to address these gaps in the following areas: (1) training air crew, immigration and customs officials, and maintenance staff; (2) improving in-flight security; (3) dealing with potential threats concealed in checked baggage, parcels and mail; (4) dealing with the threat of undercover terrorists operating inside a terminal; (5) dealing with the threat of subversives operating from outskirts of airports; (6) dealing with the threat of terrorists attacking aircraft from beyond the perimeter of an airport; (7) improving airport policing; (8) improving the governance of Canada's airways; (9) assuring financial accountability; and (10) the need for a new transparency.

CANADA'S COASTLINES: THE LONGEST UNDER-DEFENDED BORDERS IN THE WORLD

Thereafter, the Committee returned to its earlier overview of Canada's ports and expanded it to include Canada's coastlines and a perceived weakness in intelligence gathering and analysis. The result of the Committee's efforts was tabled in October 2003.

This ambitious two-volume report highlighted significant gaps in Canada's ability to know what threats exist off Canada's coastlines, let alone defend against them. It recommended a more centralized security and intelligence portfolio that would report directly to the deputy Prime Minister. The Committee also noted a serious deficiency in the resources, both human and capital, that are currently being used to guard Canada's coastlines.

Among the more controversial recommendations were the ones related to the role of the Coast Guard. The Committee proposed, among other things, that the Coast Guard should become a separate agency and no longer part of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. It further proposed that Coast Guard personnel be armed and trained for boarding, essentially taking on a more constabulary role in protecting Canada's coastlines.

This report also included a chapter on the organization of the security and intelligence machinery of government. The Committee concluded that Canadians need a central agency to deal with issues such as Canada's territorial integrity, intelligence fusion, the U.S. file, and national disasters generally. It recommended that national crisis management should be the primary mandate of a strong Deputy Prime Minister; that dedicated bureaucratic support should be provided to the Deputy Prime Minister from the Privy Council Office (PCO), which also provides support to the Prime Minister; and that a strategic operations centre be established in Ottawa, with an appropriate backup centre.

COMMEMORATIVE ACTIVITIES (November 2003)

This report contains recommendations regarding commemorative activities undertaken by the Department of Veterans Affairs to keep alive the memory of veterans' achievements and sacrifices for all Canadians. The report focuses on three components - first the National and

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International Memorials. Among other things, this section emphasizes the need for care and maintenance of monuments and battlefields as well as the graves and cemeteries where Canadians who served the country in war and peace are buried. The second component looks at the restoration of the Canadian National Vimy Memorial and twelve other First World War memorials in Europe, which are a vital part of this country's heritage. The third component, Community Engagement, deals with the organization of various activities including commemorative ceremonies in Canada, and overseas pilgrimages to battlefields where Canadians were heavily involved.

NATIONAL EMERGENCIES: CANADA'S FRAGILE FRONT LINES (March 2004)

An exhaustive study on the state of First Responders across the country, the report, tabled in March 2004, makes 19 recommendations toward improving emergency preparedness in Canada, to ensure that the needs of first responders, and by extension all Canadians, are met. The report also criticizes the lack of cooperation between different levels of government, urging greater harmony and resource-sharing between these various levels of government.

CANADIAN SECURITY GUIDE BOOK, 2005 EDITION: AN UPDATE OF SECURITY PROBLEMS IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS (December 2004)

In December 2004, the Committee published an assessment of the implementation of the various recommendations contained in the nine substantive reports that the Committee had released in the three years leading up to the 2004 federal election. The Committee acknowledged that a number of measures had been taken over the three years in an attempt to revamp Canada's approach to national security. However, it was the Committee's contention that the government had, in many cases, fallen short in its response to both the increased and changing nature of manmade and natural threats to Canadians and had not sustained the kind of focus needed to mitigate these threats.

Each of the recommendations (except a few which in retrospect seemed inconsequential or incorrect to the Committee) was discussed under four headings: (1) problem; (2) Committee's recommendation; (3) Government response; and (4) Challenge to the Government.

In order to highlight the government statements or actions that the Committee identified as being pertinent to the suggested recommendation, the Committee undertook to identify government responses in three ways. First, the past and current Chair of the Committee wrote relevant departments and agencies in July 2004 and requested pertinent information. Second, Committee staff sought out information from publicly available statements and websites. Third, in some cases, Committee staff asked specific detailed questions of departments and agencies to clarify their public statements.

The section entitled *Challenge to the Government* sets out goals that the government has yet to accomplish to solve the problem that the Committee identified. In some cases where problems have not been addressed, the Committee challenged the government to do so, or explain to Canadians why it cannot.

BORDERLINE INSECURE (June 2005)

In June 2005, the Committee published an assessment of vulnerabilities at Canada's land border crossings. The Committee acknowledged that while a number of measures have been taken in the more than three and a half years since 9/11, there remains an unsettling lack of progress on both sides of the border to improve efficiency and strengthen security at land border crossings. Beyond the obvious need for upgrades to infrastructure and systems, the Committee believes that the only way to twin good security with good commerce is to change the entire culture at border crossings.

This report looks at the big picture of land border crossings - how we must adjust our priorities to make them do what we need them to do - and further examines the human challenges of border personnel, training and equipment. Finally, it looks at operations, infrastructure challenges at Windsor-Detroit, and future directions for committee studies. The report contains a series of 26 recommendations, each with explanations of how and why the committee came to the conclusions that fostered the recommendations.

WOUNDED – CANADA'S MILITARY AND THE LEGACY OF NEGLECT (September 2005)

In September 2005, the Committee published a report measuring the current capacity of Canada's armed forces against their role to protect Canadians and act in Canada's national interests at home and abroad. This first in a series of three reports, documents, in detail, a large number of themes that, taken together, undermine the capabilities and the effectiveness of Canada's armed forces. While the Committee acknowledges that Canada has a first-class professional fighting force, it also offers insights into the weaknesses that chronic under-funding has brought to the Canadian Forces. Cuts to defence spending have resulted in long-term vulnerabilities that limit the ability of Canada's armed forces to defend Canada's sovereignty and advance its vital interests outside its borders.

This first report provides a basis for greater understanding of the crisis facing the Canadian Forces. A second report will put forward a list of proposed solutions to the vulnerabilities, and a third and final report will take a look into the future and determine how Canadians can best shape their military to pursue our nation's interests in the decades to come.

THE GOVERNMENT'S NO. 1 JOB – SECURING THE MILITARY OPTIONS IT NEEDS TO PROTECT CANADIANS (June 2006)

In June 2006, the Committee published the second report in its three-part series, examining the pluses and minuses of the Government's announced commitments to addressing decades of military neglect. Fixing the Canadian Forces is not an easy task. If the Government of Canada is really interested in rehabilitating Canada's armed forces, it must make some tough choices about the military Canadians need to protect themselves and their interests.

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This report questions whether there is sufficient will to fix Canada's military; sufficient public support; and whether the Government, which the Minister of Defence says *has* the money, is really willing to *spend* the money. This report does the math. It adds up the money that will be needed, and compares it to what has been committed. It shows which holes are being mended, and which are being neglected. It focuses on solutions to persisting problems.

APPENDIX V

Detailed Comparison with Other Countries

Defence and Foreign Aid Spending: NATO and G-20

This appendix contains various measures of defence and foreign aid spending of both NATO and G-20 countries.

Data has been collected from several open sources. Numbers for a specific country may vary slightly from table to table or graph to graph. Precise figures vary from source to source, and because of the calculations, rounding errors may occur.

COUNTRY	Population (2004)	Country Data		Defence Expenditure - 2005			Foreign Aid - 2005		
		GDP (2004) (\$US billions)	GDP (2005) (\$US billions)	US\$ (billions)	US\$ per capita	% of GDP	US\$ (billions)	US\$ per capita	% of GDP
Argentina	39,537,943	153.00	181.00	1.79	\$40	0.99%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Australia	20,090,437	637.30	665.00	13.20	\$582	1.98%	1.67	\$25.14	0.25%
Brazil	186,112,794	604.00	783.00	13.17	\$49	1.68%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Canada	32,805,041	978.00	1,079.37	10.90	\$308	1.01%	3.73	\$61.91	0.35%
China	1,306,313,812	1,650.00	1,890.00	29.50	\$19	1.56%	n/a	n/a	n/a
France	60,656,178	2,046.00	2,150.00	41.60	\$659	1.93%	10.06	\$119.68	0.47%
Germany	82,431,390	2,740.60	2,850.00	30.20	\$360	1.06%	9.92	\$82.30	0.35%
India	1,080,264,388	691.20	761.00	22.00	\$18	2.89%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Indonesia	241,973,879	257.60	277.00	2.53	\$10	0.91%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Italy	58,103,033	1,677.80	1,740.00	17.70	\$301	1.02%	5.05	\$41.87	0.29%
Japan	127,417,244	4,622.80	4,700.00	44.70	\$354	0.95%	13.10	\$69.69	0.28%
Korea (South)	47,912,000	680.00	817.00	20.70	\$342	2.53%	0.74	\$5.82	0.09%
Mexico	106,202,903	682.00	740.00	3.09	\$26	0.42%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Russia	143,420,309	582.40	750.00	18.90	\$99	2.52%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Saudi-Arabia	26,417,599	250.60	301.00	25.40	\$731	8.44%	n/a	n/a	n/a
South Africa	44,344,136	212.80	231.00	3.40	\$74	1.47%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Turkey	69,660,559	302.80	299.00	8.00	\$122	2.68%	n/a	n/a	n/a
United Kingdom	60,441,457	2,124.40	2,230.00	51.10	\$811	2.29%	10.75	\$103.94	0.48%
United States	295,734,134	11,711.80	12,500.00	495.00	\$1,557	3.96%	27.46	\$54.96	0.22%

SOURCES

The International Institute For Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006 (Volume 106, Number 1 / June 2006)*

2004 Data: World Bank, World Development Indicator's database, Updated 15 July 2005, available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html>, 2005 Data: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006 (Volume 106, Number 1 / June 2006)*

The International Institute For Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006 (Volume 106, Number 1 / June 2006)*
Data for all countries derived from the OECD, "TABLE 1: NET DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 2005, Preliminary Data," *Aid Rows for USD 100 billion in 2005*, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/27/356418598.pdf>.

Where Foreign Aid data is unavailable, it is because no data could be found or the country is a net recipient of Foreign Aid according to the World Bank.

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid spending per capita and as a % of GDP was calculated based on the most recent available data on ODA (2005) and comparable population (2004) and GDP (2005) data.

Defence spending per capita and as a % of GDP was calculated based on the most recent available data on defence expenditures (2005) and comparable population (2004) and GDP (2005) data.

There are 19 nation state members of the G-20. The 20th member, European Union, is not represented here.

NOTE: THESE CALCULATIONS ARE ESTIMATIONS ONLY.

EXTRACTED FROM: Department of National Defence, *Making Sense Out Of Dollars 2005-2006 Edition* (March 2006), available at: http://www.admfnscs.forces.gc.ca/financial_docs/Msood/2005-2006/intro_e.asp (last visited: June 15, 2006).

NATO DEFENCE BUDGETS IN US\$

The United States projected defence budget for 2005 is approximately US\$472.2B. For comparison purposes, United Kingdom's defence budget is estimated at US\$52.8B, France's at US\$54.8B, Germany's at US\$39.3B, Italy's at US\$32.4B, Canada's at US\$12.5B, Turkey's at US\$11.7B, and Spain's at US\$13.6B.


All budget amounts are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditures and may differ from the countries' national budget. However, the use of a unique definition allows for a comparative analysis.

For reference purposes, explanations of the acronyms/abbreviations used on the graph are defined as follows:

BEL - Belgium	LUX - Luxembourg
BUL - Bulgaria	NET - Netherlands
CAN - Canada	NOR - Norway
CZE - Czech Republic	POL - Poland
DEN - Denmark	POR - Portugal
EST - Estonia	ROM - Romania
FRA - France	SLK - Slovak Republic
GER - Germany	SLN - Slovenia
GRE - Greece	SPA - Spain
HUN - Hungary	TUR - Turkey
ITA - Italy	UK - United Kingdom
LAT - Latvia	USA - United States of America
LIT - Lithuania	

Note that Iceland is not included as it does not have armed forces.

NATO DEFENCE BUDGETS IN US \$ /
 BUDGETS DE DÉFENSE DE L'OTAN EN DOLLARS US
 2005 ESTIMATES / ESTIMATIONS DE 2005



SOURCE: NATO PRESS RELEASE DECEMBER 2005
 SOURCE: COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE DE L'OTAN DÉCEMBRE 2005


EXTRACTED FROM: Department of National Defence, *Making Sense Out Of Dollars 2005-2006 Edition* (March 2006), available at: http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/financial_docs/Msood/2005-2006/intro_e.asp (last visited: June 15, 2006).

**NATO DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT**

It is estimated that Canada spent 1.1% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on Defence in 2005. At the other end of the scale, it is estimated that the United States spent 3.7%, Turkey 3.2% and Greece 3.1%. While this ratio is commonly used to compare defence expenditures, it should be used with some caution because of many differences in various national measures of GDP.

NATO DEFENCE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT /
 DÉPENSES DE DÉFENSE DE L'OTAN EN POURCENTAGE DU PRODUIT INTÉRIEUR BRUT

2005 ESTIMATES / ESTIMATIONS DE 2005



SOURCE: NATO PRESS RELEASE DECEMBER 2005
 SOURCE: COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE L'OTAN DECEMBRE 2005

APPENDIX VI

Committee Rationale for a Budget of \$25-35 billion

The Committee's Projections:
Arriving at Our Estimate of \$25 Billion to \$35 Billion

Committee Projection of 2011-2012 Department of National Defence Budget		
	Projected Dollars	% of Budget
Personnel	\$12.5-15.5 billion	45-50%
Capital	\$6-11 billion	30%
Operations & Maintenance	\$6-11 billion	30%
Statutory, Grants and Contributions	\$1.3-2 billion	5%
TOTAL:	\$25 Billion to \$35 Billion	100%

None of these numbers is etched in stone. The Committee accepts that there are many ways to make ends meet, and that increasingly creative ways may be found to put together armed forces that can do the job that Canadians need done. But one simply cannot ignore the fact that there is a lot of catching up to do given years of neglect.

Overall, it is difficult to see how anyone could argue against the fact that virtually every component of the Department's budget is going to require a greater infusion of money in absolute terms. Certainly the increases required to correct capital equipment and infrastructure shortfalls are going to require *a lot* more money.

Let us consider each component in turn.

Personnel

Personnel costs include salary, benefits, pension contributions, and personnel-related O&M like clothing, medical, rental of living quarters, and so on.⁶⁶ The Committee estimates expanding the Canadian Forces to 90,000 (which the Committee will recommend in Part III) would cost between \$12.5-\$15.5 billion annually, up from more than \$7 billion this year.⁶⁷

Comparison of Government and Committee Growth Projections for the Regular Force			
	Total Force Size	Committee's Estimate of Annual Cost	Completion Date
Government Planned Expansion	75,000	\$9.6 billion - \$2.6 Billion	2010-2011
Committee Recommended Expansion	90,000	\$12.5 billion – \$15.5 billion	2011-2012

The majority of the estimated escalation is due to increased salaries and benefits for an expanded Canadian Forces. It is based on the gradual expansion of the Regular Force to an authorized strength of 90,000 by 2012 – approximately 28,000 more than the current level; 23,000 more than envisaged in the Defence Policy Statement and 15,000 more than promised by the new Government.

The Committee estimates that the cost of each additional 10,000 military personnel to be approximately \$2 billion.⁶⁸ Based on that estimate, it is reasonable to calculate that fulfilling the Committee's recommendation of expanding the Regular Forces by an additional 28,000 personnel would cost at least \$6 billion annually.

This cost will not be as great if the Government decides to hold itself to its election commitment of increasing the Forces to 75,000 personnel overall. The Committee estimates that fulfilling this promise – i.e. expanding by only 13,000 additional personnel – would cost approximately \$2.6 billion annually. That having been said,

⁶⁶ Department of National Defence, *Making Sense Out of Dollars 2005-2006*, 46

⁶⁷ Department of National Defence, *Making Sense Out of Dollars 2005-2006*, 46

⁶⁸ The Committee bases this estimate on a rough order of magnitude calculation that each additional member of the Canadian Forces would cost approximately \$150,000 – 200,000, including salary, benefits, health care, training, personal kit, living facilities and space to work.

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Committee Rationale for a Budget of \$25-35 Billion

the Committee is convinced that at some point the Government will recognize that their promised increase will not deliver close to enough personnel to maintain a capable, sustainable military that is going to be tasked at the tempo of recent years.

(The Committee has chosen to focus on the Regular Force in this study but it believes that the Reserve Force will continue to be an important part of the Canadian Forces mission.)

In addition to the extra costs associated with a larger force, the Committee believes that the Forces will also face significantly higher recruitment and retention costs as they try to:

- a. Expand to 90,000 personnel;
- b. Retain personnel approaching natural retirement points; and,
- c. Address the challenge of undermanned trades.

Expanding to 90,000 personnel will mean significantly higher recruitment costs. The Forces will have to attract larger pools of people to the Forces than at any other time in decades. Convincing so many of today's young people to join the Canadian Forces will require unprecedented effort and creative solutions – both of which will cost money.

Retaining personnel approaching natural retirement points will also cost significantly more in coming years. As the Committee described in its last report, *Wounded*, the Canadian Forces are facing a demographic bulge as much of their workforce approaches eligibility for retirement. Many of those who might be getting ready to leave have invaluable knowledge and experience that the Forces can ill afford to lose, especially as they grapple with expansion. However, retaining such quality people will undoubtedly require incentives, which cost money.

The final element of increasing personnel costs is the challenge of fixing chronically undermanned, or stressed, trades.⁶⁹ The Canadian Forces will continue to be plagued by a personnel crisis until it can assure that the problem of undermanned trades is addressed.

⁶⁹ Please see Part III of *The Government's No. 1 Job* published June 2006 for a more detailed discussion of stressed trades.

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To address these so-called stressed trades, it is necessary to entice a large number of people in highly sought-after trades – like doctors, dentists and mechanics – to choose the Canadian Forces; and conversely, it will be necessary to dissuade personnel in highly sought-after trades from choosing to leave the Forces with their expertise. Again, this will involve incentives.

Expanding the capacity of the Forces to provide additional post-secondary, graduate and post-graduate education for its officers (as the Committee will discuss further in its next report) will also carry a cost.

Breakdown of Committee Estimate of DND 2011-2012 Budget - I	
PERSONNEL COST IN 2011-2012	APPROX COST
Current 62,000 civilian and military personnel	\$7.7 billion
28,000 additional military personnel; <i>(per committee recommendation to create an authorized Force of 90,000 personnel)</i>	\$3 billion
Increased recruiting and retention costs <i>(per committee recommendation to address stressed trades and jumpstart recruiting)</i>	Unknown
TOTAL COST – PERSONNEL	\$10-13 billion

Capital Funding: the Need for Disaster Relief

Years of underfunding has forced the Department of National Defence to fall behind in the replacement of existing equipment and the acquisition of new capabilities. The existing listing of projects that must now be tackled – from ships to aircraft to trucks, and buildings that need to be replaced, built or bought – is long and expensive. That is why capital funding is the area in which spending must increase the most.

The Department spent 16.7 per cent of its budget last year on capital.⁷⁰ As the Committee pointed out in *Wounded*, this percentage simply does not provide

⁷⁰ Department of National Defence, *Making Sense Out of Dollars 2005-2006* 44.

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enough money to prevent a decline in equipment and infrastructure. Last year was a fairly typical year and is indicative of a cycle that cannot be allowed to continue.

The Department has tried to increase capital expenditures on equipment and infrastructure for many years, without much success. It even tried to formalize the pegging of its capital spending as a percentage of overall defence spending in 1999. In *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* the Department set out a five-year target for capital spending that was intended to lead to a “viable and affordable” defence structure.⁷¹ That goal was to be achieved by spending a minimum of 23 per cent of every annual defence budget on equipment and infrastructure. As a first step, *Defence Planning Guidance 2000* set an interim goal of 21 per cent by April 2004. The Department of National Defence never got close.⁷²

As the Department’s Assistant Deputy Minister of Materiel Alan Williams testified to the Committee in November 2004:

“We are trying to balance paying people, paying for infrastructure, buying new equipment and sustaining existing equipment. You must make those prioritization decisions. [Capital spending] is often the one that is [neglected], because you must pay people, you must sustain the equipment, and you have to house the people, as well as have proper facilities for the equipment. Therefore, it is not surprising that what must be affected most is front-end capital.”⁷³

Setting a firm, ambitious, target for capital-funded renewal as a percentage of overall Departmental spending would be a reasonable way to correct past investment deficiencies, to restore the Forces’ major weapons systems and capabilities, and to rationalize major procurement schedules for the future.

The Committee applauds the *Strategy 2020* attempt to reach a 23 per cent goal, but it isn’t going to be sufficient considering the continued deterioration of equipment and infrastructure. A healthy armed forces budget assigns approximately 25 per

⁷¹ Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*.

⁷² Office of the Auditor General, *October 2000 Report*, “Chapter 4 – Follow up on 1998 Report on Buying Major Capital Equipment,” available at <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/0016ce.html>

⁷³ Assistant Deputy Minister Material Alan Williams “Testimony,” Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (November 1, 2004), available at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/02eve.htm?Language=E&Parl=38&Ses=1&comm_id=76

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cent to capital-funded equipment and infrastructure replacement. The Committee believes that a more appropriate level would be approximately 30 per cent.

Why? Because the Forces are fighting from behind. The under-capitalization of the Forces has continued for almost seven years since *Strategy 2020* was published. Since then, the capabilities of the Forces – from the availability of the Air Force’s Hercules transport aircraft to the age of the Navy’s Destroyers to the state of base infrastructure – have continued to deteriorate.

Take, for example, the state of infrastructure. In *Wounded*, the Committee made the case that the government was falling over \$200 million short *every year* in its Operations and Maintenance spending on the repair of infrastructure across the Forces.

This chronic under-funding has created a huge backlog of deferred maintenance that of course never goes away, but more often than not, creates a much worse situation as roads, buildings and other infrastructure deteriorates past the point of economical repair. At the very least the money must be found to fund necessary ongoing maintenance and stop the decay. In reality, however, additional funding must also be found in the capital accounts to rebuild and replace infrastructure that, due to age and neglect, has passed the point of no return.

Regrettably, a similar situation exists amongst the various fleets of ships, aircraft and vehicles operated by the Canadian Forces. Necessary updates and replacements have been delayed or not done at all and far too much of this equipment has become unmaintainable or operationally irrelevant due to obsolescence.

A number of factors go into replacing equipment. For example, equipment needs to be replaced when it no longer capable of countering threats, when it is technologically obsolete, or when its original manufacturer no longer supports it (making it difficult and costly to get spares or replacements). All of these conditions apply to the Canadian Forces now.

To escape this vicious cycle, the Department will have to dedicate more than what a normal defence organization would to capital spending. The Committee is therefore recommending that the Government fund the Department sufficiently to allow it to dedicate 30 per cent of its budget to capital funding by 2011-2012.

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There would be a corollary benefit of dedicating a firm percentage of budget to equipment and infrastructure: the creation of stable and predictable spending patterns. This will enable the efficient planning of new military equipment acquisition or infrastructure renewal when it is needed. The Forces would then be able to schedule their expenditures in the most economical way possible. This will help avoid the annual reprioritization of projects that compete for too few capital dollars.

Nuts and Bolts

Consider the cost of the largest capital equipment projects that have to be dealt with over the next two decades if the Government is going to implement the Committee's recommendations.

The Committee has estimated its equipment requirements and cost projections based on a Canadian Forces of 90,000 personnel.

Estimated Cost of the Committee's largest Equipment Priorities 2006 – 2025⁷⁴		
PROJECT NAME	Estimated Number Required⁷⁵	COMMITTEE'S COST ESTIMATE
Joint Support Ships	4	\$2,800,000,000
Strategic Sealift Ships	4	\$4,000,000,000
Frigate Life Extension Program	12	\$3,000,000,000
Single Class Surface Combatant ⁷⁶	18-20	\$15,000,000,000 - \$30,000,000,000
Submarine Life Extension Program	4	\$160,000,000
Integrated Soldier System Project	--	\$500,000,000

⁷⁴ These are rough order of magnitude, indicative, numbers and are intended only to give a sense of scale the projects ahead. These estimates represent acquisition costs and list may or may not include some of the Operations and Maintenance that could be included as part of the project and could comprise about 30% of the above totals.

⁷⁵ The Committee estimates these numbers as a way to illustrate what the Government will be able to acquire for the estimated cost. In the event that the Government decides not to acquire number of pieces of equipment suggested by the Committee, the cost estimate will change

⁷⁶ The majority of the cost of this project may not be realized by 2025 if the Government sticks to current timelines for procuring the Single Class Surface Combatant. The Committee believes that these vessels must be acquired sooner and in greater numbers that is currently planned.

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Land Forces Intelligence Surveillance Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance project	--	\$1,000,000,000
Artillery	80	\$900,000,000
Light Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle	200	\$650,000,000
Medium Trucks	2,900	\$1,430,000,000
Light Trucks	4,700	\$910,000,000
Acquisition of new Strategic Airlift Aircraft	6-8	\$2,800,000,000
Replacement of Hercules Tactical Airlift Aircraft	20-25	\$4,300,000,000
Completion of Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft Modernization	18	\$1,000,000,000
Completion of CF-18 Modernization	80	\$560,000,000
Medium or Heavy Lift Helicopters	16-20	\$2,000,000,000
Fixed Wing Search and Rescue Aircraft	20-24	\$1,500,000,000
Joint Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Project	--	\$500,000,000
Maritime Helicopter Project	28	\$3,000,000,000
Next generation fighter aircraft ⁷⁷	--	\$7,000,000,000 - \$15,000,000,000
SUB-TOTAL		\$53,010,000,000 - \$76,010,000,000

Government estimates of the total cost of equipment in the decades ahead are likely lower than those of the Committee. That is in part, because it plans to acquire less of some items. For example, the Joint Support Ship. The Government plans to acquire three Joint Support Ships, whereas the Committee advocates four are required for reasons outlined in Part IV.

In addition to the priorities that the Committee has identified, the Government is also planning the following major projects which the Committee estimates will cost:

⁷⁷ An estimated cost of \$15 billion for the next generation of fighter aircraft is meant as an indicative number only.

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Estimated Cost of Additional Government Equipment Projects in Progress		
PROJECT NAME	Estimated Number Required	COMMITTEE'S COST ESTIMATE
Armed Navy icebreakers	3	\$3,450,000,000
Mobile Gun System		\$1,170,000,000
Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle		\$950,000,000
SUB-TOTAL		\$5,570,000,000 Minimum

Therefore, the Committee estimates that the expected cost of the largest equipment projects facing the Canadian Forces over the next two decades will cost between \$58 - \$81 billion.

Committee Priorities Sub-Total	\$53,010,000,000
	-
	\$76,010,000,000
Other Government Projects Sub-Total	\$5,570,000,000
TOTAL	\$58,580,000,000 - \$81,580,000,000

It should be noted that the above estimate is not the total cost of all capital projects facing the Canadian Forces. Instead it is a list of the largest ticket equipment items only.

The list does not include the myriad of smaller equipment projects that will have to be acquired on an ongoing basis. To get a sense of the magnitude of those other projects, consider that the 13 most significant capital equipment projects in the Department of National Defence totalled only approximately 55.3% of the total Capital Equipment portion of the department's budget for the year 2004/2005.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Department of National Defence, *Making Sense out of Dollars 2004-2005* (February 2005), 55, available at: http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/financial_docs/Msood/2004-2005/MSOOD04_b.pdf.

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Nor does the list include any of the infrastructure construction projects that will have to be addressed. Government priorities like building an a deepwater port and a training centre in the Arctic, moving quick reaction units to the east and west coasts, installing an airborne battalion in Trenton or creating Territorial Battalions will come with hefty infrastructure costs. These priorities will be addressed further in the Committee's next report.

The Committee acknowledges that the Department of National Defence is working on a Defence Capability Plan, which is intended to be a comprehensive list of the capabilities the Canadian Forces must have to fulfill the missions assigned to by the Defence Policy Statement and the government's additional election commitments. That list will obviously include equipment needs. The equipment needs listed in that plan will be critically important. When the Plan is completed and presented to the government for sign-off, the Government should brand it as a roadmap for change.

Breakdown of Committee Estimate of DND 2011-2012 Budget - II	
CAPITAL FUNDING	APPROX COST
Infrastructure recapitalization <i>(per committee recommendation to adhere to Treasury Board guidelines for infrastructure replacement and to address infrastructure decay backlog)</i>	\$500-750 million
Major new equipment <i>(per committee recommendation in Part 4 to increase Canadian Forces capabilities as soon as possible)</i>	\$6-9 billion
Other capital requirements	\$4-6 billion
TOTAL COST – CAPITAL	\$10-15 billion

Operations & Maintenance

As the Canadian Forces enter a period of growth, it is important to recognize that every acquisition of new equipment, every new building constructed, every person brought into the Forces comes with an attendant large tail of costs that continues year after year.




Figure 1 – The Classic Total-Life Cycle Cost Iceberg. Acquisition is just the most obvious of the costs. Source: “A Particular Aspect Of Decide Bid Decision Support System: Modelling of Life-Cycle Processes and Costs,” Paper presented at the IEEE Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics (Orlando, Florida), 12-15 October 1997, available at: <http://www.esi2.us.es/prima/Papers/mac97.pdf> (last visited: June 13, 2006).

The acquisition or construction cost is the tip of the iceberg in terms of the overall costs of a piece of equipment. Spare parts, repairs, training, software and hardware upgrades, even disposal, contribute to the total life cycle cost of a piece of equipment.

Successive Governments have Underfunded Operations and Maintenance

Managing Turmoil

The failure of successive governments over the last twenty-five years to recognize these costs has been one of the contributing causes of the Canadian Forces' current situation.

Shortfalls in national procurement accounts mean that you can't buy enough parts and has often required the shifting of parts between ships or aircrafts or vehicles for operational duty⁷⁹ Peter gets robbed to pay Paul, if only temporarily. The process increases wear and tear on parts and ties up technicians who are already in short supply.

Underfunding infrastructure maintenance has a similar impact. The deferred maintenance and recapitalization bill for infrastructure between 2000 and 2004 alone is almost \$1 billion (the recapitalization part of which has been discussed above). That means hundreds of millions of dollars worth of lower-priority preventative maintenance didn't get done between 2000-2004. Skipping preventative maintenance leads to decay taking hold quicker and equipment and/or infrastructure being replaced sooner.

The Canadian Forces must invest significantly more than they have in the past to address the Operations & Maintenance shortfalls.

The growth in Operations and Maintenance costs will be predicated on:

- The need to address the chronic underfunding of the National Procurement account
- The increased size of the Forces to 90,000 personnel as recommended by the Committee
- The increased capabilities of the Forces as recommended by the Committee (in Chapter 4)
- The increased cost of operations and maintenance on technologically advanced new equipment

⁷⁹ The National Procurement (NP) Program, a sub-element of the Department of National Defence's (DND) Operations & Maintenance(O&M) account, is the portion that is allocated for the centrally-managed acquisition of material and services (excluding realty assets(required to support equipment, services, and systems in DND.

- The increased levels of readiness promised in the Defence Policy Statement and as recommended by the Committee (in Chapter 4)
- The increased number of missions the Forces can be expected to undertake in the coming years

That is because the Committee believes that some current costs in O&M are inordinately high because equipment is old and needs more substantial attention on a more frequent basis. The purchase of new equipment should mitigate some of those pressures.

New Equipment is Not Enough

In May 2006, Minister of National Defence Gordon O'Connor testified to the Committee that:

“Whenever we replace the current Hercules fleet, which is costing upwards of \$400 million a year to maintain, I think you will find that that new fleet, whichever one it is, will not cost the same amount of money to maintain. That starts to change the O&M [Operations and Maintenance] mix.

...To maintain current medium army trucks is very expensive. As we start to replace the trucks, the cost of maintaining them will go down.

... A lot of the O&M problems are a result of having out-of-date equipment that is costing a fortune to maintain. As we start to move through some of these capital projects, it will start to change that balance. We will certainly improve the O&M problem into the future; not so much by pouring more money into it, but by changing how they are maintaining and upgrading the equipment.”⁸⁰

The Committee finds the Minister's statement questionable. In November 2004, the Department of National Defence's Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel, Alan Williams, testified that:

⁸⁰ Minister of National Defence Gordon O'Connor, “Testimony,” *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence* (May 8, 2006), available at: <http://www.sen-sec.ca>.

Managing Turmoil

“It is generally believed that the cost to maintain new equipment must be less than that for old equipment. In fact, the opposite is true, with the costs of new equipment often doubling or tripling that of older equipment. New equipment is technologically more complex and involves the maintenance and updates of sophisticated software.”⁸¹

A plan to reduce O&M by acquiring new equipment appears short-sighted to the Committee because it will often be as expensive, if not more expensive, than existing equipment.

An absolute increase in operations and maintenance spending is required to allow the Forces to address many of the complaints that the Committee has heard about including: inadequate spare parts, having to share equipment, and a lack of flying hours and sea-days to properly train pilots and ship crews.

Breakdown of Committee Estimate of DND 2011-2012 Budget - III	
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE COST IN 2011-12	APPROX COSTS
Current operations and maintenance cost	\$4.3 billion
Increased cost of: <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Addressing National Procurement shortfalls– Maintaining higher levels of readiness and maintaining equipment in a larger Canadian Forces– Maintaining modern equipment– Additional training exercises	\$4-7 billion
TOTAL COST – OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE	\$8-11 billion

⁸¹ Assistant Deputy Minister Material Alan Williams, “Testimony, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, (November 1, 2004), available at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/02eve.htm?Language+E&Parl=38&Ses=1&comm_id=76

Statutory, Grants & Contributions

Statutory, Grants & Contributions is an amalgam of non-discretionary legislated funding. It is principally made of contributions to NATO and to academic groups. The former accounts for the vast majority of the spending and can be expected to increase commensurate with an increase in the size of the Canadian Forces. The Committee believes that the latter amount will also have to increase significantly. Details to follow in our next report.

Breakdown of Committee Estimate of DND 2011-2012 Budget - IV	
STATUTORY, GRANTS & CONTRIBUTIONS COSTS IN 2011-12	APPROX COSTS
Statutory directed contributions <i>(per committee recommendation to international organizations like NATO)</i>	\$1.1-1.5 billion
Expansion of academic and related programs <i>(see the Committee's next report)</i>	\$200-250 million
TOTAL COST – STATUTORY, GRANTS & CONTRIBUTIONS	\$1.3-2 billion

APPENDIX VII

Government of Canada Description of 3-D Approach

Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar Province⁸²

The PRT is a new undertaking for Canada, which requires a joint effort by:

- development workers;
- military forces;
- diplomats; and,
- civilian police.



Background on the Canadian PRT in Afghanistan

The PRT in brief:

Canada assumed command of the Kandahar Province PRT in August 2005.

The Canadian-led PRT is a multi-departmental effort, employing personnel from the Department of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other Canadian police forces.

The PRT's mission is to help extend the authority of the Afghanistan government in Kandahar province by promoting local stability and security, improving local governance structures, and engaging in reconstruction activities.

The PRT also ensures that operations respect religious, ethnic and cultural sensitivities.

⁸² Information taken from Government of Canada Website 20 September 2006: http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/prov_reconstruction-en.asp

What is a PRT?

In the absence of a traditional peace support operation throughout Afghanistan, small, inter-disciplinary PRTs have been deployed to assist in establishing a secure environment and extending the authority of the Afghan Government. Comprised of both military and civilian elements, the exact composition of each team is tailored to the specific requirements of each region, in accordance with local reconstruction requirements as well as the local threat and tactical risks.

What is the history of PRTs?

The PRT concept was initiated in November 2002 by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as a critical component of its effort to stabilize Afghanistan. PRTs were conceived as a way to integrate diplomats, development officials, military assets and police officers to address the causes of instability: poor governance, weak institutions, insurgency, regional warlords and poverty.

The first PRTs were located in the South under US command and in the North under the UK. Starting in 2004, NATO's International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF) has assumed command of PRTs in both the North and the West and is set to extend its oversight of PRTs in the South this summer.

How do PRTs work?

PRTs are designed to:

- promote the extension of the Afghan central and provincial government;
- implement development and reconstruction programs;
- assist in stabilizing the local security environment; and
- support security sector reform.

The teams engage with the local population using a combination of diplomatic, development, military and police officials, and "good offices" influence and advocacy, along with the strategic deployment of reconstruction assistance.

How many PRTs are operating?

As of March 2006, there were 23 PRTs in Afghanistan (14 under OEF and 9 under ISAF).

How long has Canada been involved in Kandahar?

Canada took command of the PRT in Kandahar province in August 2005, and it is currently operating under the OEF.

Why Kandahar?

The former seat of the Taliban regime, Kandahar was chosen as the ideal location for Canada due to its strategic significance to peace and stability in Afghanistan, and the fact that ISAF expansion is next scheduled to take place in the South in summer 2006. Kandahar is, however, an extremely challenging environment. Since August, there has been an increase in the number of attacks, including suicide bombings. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) remain the biggest threat.

What are Canada's objectives in Kandahar?

The PRT's aim is to help extend the authority of the central and provincial government and strengthen the capacity of the local administration to provide good governance. Since coming under Canadian command in August, the PRT has focussed on three major areas:

- Good Governance
- Security Sector Reform (including providing training and equipment to Afghan police)
- Reconstruction and Development

Who comprises Canada's PRT?

Canada's PRT brings together about 150 personnel, including military, civilian police, political, and development experts.


How is Canada's PRT funded?

The PRT will be a channel for programming from the Department of National Defence, DFAIT, CIDA, and the RCMP.

APPENDIX VIII
Maps


APPENDIX IX

Canadian Forces Organization – 2005



APPENDIX X

Canadian Forces Organization Chart - 2006



NOTE: CMS, CLS, CAS and CMP are also Commanders of Maritime, Land Force, Air and Military Personnel Commands respectively.

APPENDIX XI

Reliable Documentation

There is no clear standard for documentation to enter Canada. Consequently, persons attempting to enter Canada from the United States use a range of documents from driver's licenses to birth certificates, many of which cannot be validated. This lack of standard significantly reduces the chances of CBSA officers detaining someone who should not be entering the country reducing Canada's capacity to use its border crossings as effective chokepoints for security.

The current requirement for U.S. citizens entering Canada at a land border crossing is photo identification plus proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate or a driver's license. Identification does not have to be machine-readable, nor include a biometric, such as a fingerprint.

For an American, or someone who claims to be an American, that means they can enter Canada with any combination of documentation, they choose. For example, someone born in Providence but living in New Orleans can, with their Rhode Island birth certificate and Louisiana Driver's License, enter Canada at any crossing. This presents a difficult challenge for a CBSA officer trying to assess the authenticity of identification. Requiring machine-readable documents would save time and allow border officers a greater chance to concentrate on travelers who may pose a threat to Canadian security.

Canada should raise its standards for documentation, so border inspectors can make quick and reliable judgments as to the authenticity of travelers. Having to punch in information contained on various types of identification is problematic – one key wrongly punched either means faulty identity or starting the process over again. Inspectors have better things to do with their time.

In short, machine readability would be a major time saver for border officials and requiring a biometric would help ensure that persons presenting documentation are who they say they are.

Using biometrics is no longer a particularly expensive, complicated or revolutionary process. Many new computers now accept a simple application of an

approved user's thumb to the correct spot on the computer as a password. As for introducing identity cards that swipe, there are very few credit cards and other types of formal identification that do not swipe anymore. So why not come up with a standard set of modern identification that is reliable and easy to use?

The Committee reiterates the recommendation made in our report of June 2005 “*Borderline Insecure*” which stated that

By 2007, the government require documentation of all people entering Canada (including Canadians) that is:

- a. Tamper-proof;**
- b. Machine-readable;**
- c. Biometrically enhanced; and,**
- d. Known to have been issued on the basis of reliable documentation.**⁸³

⁸³ Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Borderline Insecure,” pp.43-44, June 2005, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repintjun05-e.pdf#search=%22Borderline%20Insecure%22>

APPENDIX XII

Minister of CIDA Letter to the Committee

The Honourable Colin Kenny, Senator
Chair
Standing Committee on National Security and Defence
The Senate of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A4

Dear Senator Kenny,

I am writing to follow up on my testimony of May 29, 2006, before the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, concerning the current situation in Afghanistan.

I wish to thank you for your warm welcome at that meeting. I am pleased to send you the following documents, prepared in response to the questions then raised:

- 1) List of projects funded in the Kandahar region, including amounts invested and the duration of these projects
- 2) Success indicators: How we ensure that a program works; how we can know if we are achieving expected results; how to know if funds spent (from Canadian taxpayers) are effectively used. Presentation of two sample projects, showing how the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) measures the success of the initiatives it carries out in Afghanistan.
- 3) The Government of Afghanistan's Mine Action Program
- 4) Afghanistan's community renewal project
- 5) *Building on Success: The London Conference on Afghanistan* (This document is available in English only, since it is an international publication and not a CIDA publication.)

...2

If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact Christine Campbell, Corporate Secretary, President's Office, CIDA, at 819-934-7025.

I hope that you will find this documentation useful.

Yours sincerely,

The Honourable Josée Verner, PC, MP

Enclosures

c.c. Barbara Reynolds, Co-clerk, Standing Committee on National Security and
Defence

*List of projects in Kandahar
Amounts and duration*

The bulk of CIDA's development assistance to Afghanistan goes to National programs delivered through the central government. Some of these programs are active in Kandahar province; however, at this stage we cannot give specific figures as to how much of Canadian money in support of these programs goes to Kandahar Province. The funds that CIDA provides to national-level programs are not earmarked for Kandahar province, as we support the aid principle of the recipient government setting their own priorities, making it difficult for CIDA to track its funds to the provincial level among Afghanistan's 34 provinces. CIDA can make attempts to engage the Government of Afghanistan's central Ministry of Finance to provide global dollar figures of national programs that were also implemented in Kandahar, and attempt to pro-rate accordingly. With respect to the timing of most national-level programs, they are rolled out as the funding becomes available from the donor community through the World-Bank administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) or the United Nations Development Program.

The complete list of projects available to the public is found on the CIDA website "Project Browser". Please find below the projects and the dollar figures associated with the two initiatives that directly target Kandahar: Alternative Livelihoods for Kandahar and the Confidence in Governance initiative.

The Alternative Livelihoods Program in Kandahar is a pilot program conducted by UNDP and by the Afghan Government, which seeks to demonstrate that there are viable and sustainable alternatives to poppy production. These alternatives are offered to farmers and labourers in Kandahar to allow them to sustain their families, while giving up the illegal cultivation of poppies. This project ensures that vulnerable groups and individuals (women and men) have increased legal livelihood opportunities (farm and off-farm) and local communities have increased access to provincial and regional markets, and to economic and social services. The project, which is in line with the Government of Afghanistan's Alternative Livelihoods Implementation Plan, is Canada's flagship project in support of counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and could lead to similar approaches elsewhere in the country. The total amount for this initiative is \$18.5M and it will run from 2006-2010.

Managing Turmoil

The program to strengthen Confidence in Government is a CIDA development assistance project with a planned budget of \$6M over 2 years, as part of the work carried out by Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar. More funding can be made available as results permit. The CIG program is coordinated by an Afghan advisory committee, which includes representatives from the Governor's Office, the Provincial Council and provincial offices of Afghan government ministries.

CIDA is working very closely with the advisory committee in their selection of districts and groups of villages. The village councils will present funding proposals for small projects in accordance with the needs and priorities identified in their respective communities. For example: rural infrastructure, schools, health clinics, and employment programs. Projects will be implemented by NGOs, as well as locally based UN agencies and provincial departments, on behalf of CIDA. Already, \$900,000 worth of projects are planned for the Shah Wali Kot district in Kandahar based on priority initiatives identified by targeted local communities. Several districts have been retained, each with similar levels of funding. These districts have been chosen based on reasonable security levels to permit ongoing implementation -although ongoing monitoring of these conditions is an obvious requirement. (In order to ensure the sustainability of such a project, additional CIDA funding will be used to support provincial level governance and institutional strengthening initiatives that will enable the government to undertake this kind of work on its own in future.

Indicators of success
(Measurement of program, anticipated results and value for the money
expended)
Examples of measurement

Canada has allocated \$100 M for development assistance to Afghanistan this year (FY 2006-07) that will be invested using a balanced approach at the national level, investing the vast majority of assistance in national programs that are designed and run by the Afghan government and implemented in the provinces. For the national level programs, the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks serve as the indicators of success (see attached).

Other donors also fund *national level* programs. Accordingly, it would not be feasible for each donor to put in place its own specific monitoring mechanisms for each one of the specific national grants for each initiative implemented, as it would create an unbearable pressure on the limited reporting capacities and the human, physical and financial resources of the Government of Afghanistan.

Therefore, it is the responsibility of the implementing partners, including the World Bank, the United Nations and the Government of Afghanistan, to put in place overall performance monitoring and evaluation systems, including progress and financial reports. It is on the basis of these efforts that CIDA ascertains whether Canadian taxpayers are getting the value for money expended and makes future spending decisions.

For national level programs, the World Bank or UN Agency responsible for implementing the specific national program prepares the indicators in consultation with the Government. These same multilateral institutions carry out oversight functions for the programs they are responsible for to ensure value for money in supporting these initiatives. Given that these programs are predominantly geared toward providing community-level basic infrastructure, there are visible and tangible outputs that can be monitored easily. For example, the National Solidarity Program has resulted in the construction of 700 new schools in Afghanistan to date.

In addition, mid-term evaluations are undertaken by the government, the United Nations and the World Bank to determine progress towards achievement of the objectives and the results. In the particular case of the National Solidarity Program, there are regular supervision missions in which donor countries

Managing Turmoil

participate to monitor, review and evaluate program activities, progress towards results, and identify issues for follow up. The World Bank has engaged Price Waterhouse Cooper as a monitoring agent to pre-screen the financial capacity of potential grant recipients, for monitoring all grant disbursements, and for overall progress reporting.

For both bilateral and national-level programs, CIDA undertakes due diligence and financial risk assessments. For national-level programs with the Government of Afghanistan, CIDA relies on World Bank diagnostic reviews to evaluate the overall quality of public financial management (PFM) systems and to assess fiduciary risks — covering budget development, implementation, monitoring, audit and external scrutiny of public finances.

For *bilateral initiatives*, all projects have Logical Framework Analyses (LFAs), which articulate indicators of success according to objectives and results at the output, outcome and impact levels. These are all established at the time of project approval.

The LFA is a key project management tool which CIDA uses to present:

- the **results** anticipated from a project;
- the underlying **assumptions** and **risks**; and
- how **progress** towards these results will be measured.

The LFAs are included in CIDA's grant or contribution agreement with the implementing partners and/or funding channels (UN, WB, etc.). For your reference, we have provided LFAs for the following bilateral and national-level projects: the Aga Khan Community Development Project and Mine Action National Development Budget (national level).

The LFAs in all programs form the basis of data collection. Much of the responsibility for the collection of data is delegated to the Canadian Embassy in Kabul, the Program Monitoring Team, the staff of the Program Support Unit in Kabul and partners. Through collection of data on indicators, results and financial spending trends, CIDA is able to determine if results are being achieved and whether Canadians are receiving value for money. CIDA also reserves the right to conduct an evaluation and audit on any project, and those findings are given due consideration in decisions about continued financing.

Example 1.

Project: Mine Action National Development Budget

Description: CIDA's contribution enables United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to continue its work and build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in the clearance of anti-personnel mines, destroying all antipersonnel mine stockpiles, providing mine-risk education, assisting landmine survivors, and meeting reporting requirements. More than 90% of landmines and un-exploded ordinance (UXO) are concentrated in villages, farms and grazing lands. This project also supports the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines in line with Afghanistan's obligations under the anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty.

The Mine Ban Treaty is the international agreement that bans anti-personnel landmines. Sometimes referred to as the Ottawa Convention, its official title is: the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The treaty is the most comprehensive international instrument for ridding the world of the scourge of antipersonnel mines. It deals with everything from mine use, production and trade, to victim assistance, mine clearance and stockpile destruction. In December 1997 a total of 122 governments signed the treaty in Ottawa, Canada.

Examples of the metrics in the project that CIDA considers success and measurements that correlate to this metric:

- i) The number of mines destroyed. Cumulatively, 65,973 mines have been destroyed since September 2002.
- ii) Release of known contaminated areas. Almost 19.35 percent of known landmine - and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contaminated area was released through survey and clearance activities (a total of 138.6 million square metres).
- iii) Reduction in the number of highly affected communities. In fiscal year 2005-06 CIDA's funding to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) land mine survey and clearance activities reduced the number of highly affected communities by over 30 percent to under 280 communities with a combined population of over 715,000 people.

Example 2.

Project: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) in Afghanistan

Description: The disarmament of pre-democracy armed forces has contributed greatly to the overall improvement of the security environment in Afghanistan, however, a significant number of illegal armed groups still exist posing a serious threat to peace and stability in the country.

This initiative supports the Government of Afghanistan's goal to establish a secure environment through disarmament and disbandment of these groups, setting the conditions for good governance and the rule of law, thereby reducing the level of armed violence throughout the country.

CIDA's funding of the DIAG program supports activities for voluntary compliance by armed groups for disarmament. The DIAG program contributes to a more stable, secure enabling environment for the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar.

Examples of the metrics in the project that CIDA considers success and measurements that correlate to this metric:

- i) The number of individuals who have been disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated. To date the figures are as follows: Disarmament 63,380; Demobilization 62,044; Reintegration 56,366
- ii) The number of weapons (small arms) and heavy weapons collected. To date, the figures are as follows: Weapons Collected 36,571; Heavy Weapons Collected 12,248

Afghanistan Community Renewal Program (ACRP)
Alternative Livelihoods
(AF-32440)

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

Country/Region	Afghanistan	Project No.	AF/032440
Project Title	Afghanistan Community Renewal Program (ACRP) - Alternative Livelihoods	Project Budget	\$7.3 million (CIDA)
CEA/Partner Organization	Aga Khan Foundation - Canada (AKFC)	Project Manager <i>f</i>	Janet Lam
Related C/RPF Dated	CIDA's Interim Assistance Plan for Afghanistan (2003-05)	Project Team Members <i>f</i>	Nipa Banerjee, Head of Aid Tamim Asey, LES Tamara Sequeira, Gender Brian Weller, Environment Micheline Hudon, Contracts
NARRATIVE SUMMARY		EXPECTED RESULTS	
Project Goal (Program Objective)	Impact	PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT	ASSUMPTIONS / RISK INDICATORS
To support the efforts of the citizens of Afghanistan to lay the foundations for a prosperous country.	Sustainable reductions in the socio-economic vulnerability of rural communities in North-eastern Afghanistan by mainstreaming alternative livelihood strategies.	- Household vulnerability measures - Human Development Index, sex-disaggregated - Incidence of poppy production in project area	Should the security situation deteriorate significantly in the lead-up to and/or aftermath of the upcoming elections, some elements of this project may be delayed and/or put at risk. [medium]
Project Purpose	Outcomes	Performance Indicators	Assumptions/Risk Indicators
To provide effective alternative livelihood options through community-based, integrated rural development in the context of concerted anti-narcotics efforts.	1. Increased range of licit income generating opportunities for women and men in Northern Afghanistan. 2. Increased capacity of VDCs to resource, implement and sustain a range of community development initiatives.	1.1 Increased proportion of households with diversified livelihood opportunities. 1.2 Improved standard of living through alternative livelihood options, by household, sex-disaggregated. 2.1 No. of VDCs implementing development plans that comprehensively address traditional knowledge, potentials and needs. 2.2 Extent to which VDCs partner with external service providers to realize development objectives.	Increased dominance of poppy industry could prevent successful achievement of full project impact. [medium] It is assumed that the Government will provide effective law enforcement, ideally in the form of both eradication and interdiction. However, project will continue to work toward expected outcomes with or without the assistance of law enforcement as project success not wholly dependent upon eradication and interdiction efforts.

Managing Turmoil

Resources	Outputs	Performance Indicators	Assumptions/Risk Indicators
<p>CIDA's contribution for project activities: \$7,000,000 over 3 years (2005-2008)</p> <p>CIDA's budget for Evaluations and Monitoring: \$300,000</p> <p>AKFC's contribution: \$1,235,360 over 3 years</p>	<p>1.1. Increased levels of agricultural productivity for female and male producers; more equitable access by women to productivity-enhancing opportunities.</p> <p>1.2. Increased knowledge of and more equitable access to markets by female and male headed small enterprises in vulnerable communities</p> <p>1.3. Increased and more equal access to agricultural extension and business development services for men and women</p> <p>2.1. More representative (women and men) self-reliant, participatory, effective, & innovative VDCs</p> <p>2.2. Improved collaboration between different village institutions</p> <p>2.3. Increased organizational capacity of civil society institutions to contribute to national and international gender objectives.</p> <p>2.4. Strengthened network of partnerships between communities and external service providers; stronger networks of support for women and men pursuing sustainable developmental objectives.</p>	<p>1.1.1. Increase in licit agricultural productivity, by household, sex-disaggregated; No. of male and female producers and entrepreneurs receiving improved levels of support.</p> <p>1.2.1. No. of new market link roads</p> <p>1.2.2. No. and quantity of products exported out of target districts</p> <p>1.3.1 No. of women and men receiving technical assistance from service providers</p> <p>1.3.2 No. of micro-enterprises established in project area; Number, type and gender composition of enterprise start-ups</p> <p>2.1.1 No. of VDCs actualizing development plans</p> <p>2.1.2 Proportion of community participation of men and women/self-financing of major activities</p> <p>2.1.3 Percentage of VDCs demonstrating increased levels of self-reliance and sustainability</p> <p>2.2.1 No. of VDCs of different villages holding joint meetings</p> <p>2.2.2 No. of community-based organizations comprising members from different villages and active in venture development</p> <p>2.3.1 No. of people (women and men) receiving training on gender issues;</p> <p>2.3.2 No. of initiatives with explicit gender components or outcomes</p> <p>2.4.1 No. and type of active partnerships between VDCs/community groups and external service providers</p> <p>2.4.2 No. of VDC-initiated external partnerships.</p>	<p>There is currently a promising increase in service providers working in Afghanistan, although their capacity and reach are still limited.</p> <p>Should these institutions not expand as predicted, some community development initiatives may not be fully realized. [medium]</p> <p>Key stakeholders in poppy production and trade could create problems for those attempting to pursue alternative livelihoods. [high]</p> <p>As well, land and water rehabilitation could be misused for increased poppy cultivation. Both sets of issues will need to be managed carefully by the project. [medium]</p> <p>The project will have to follow a careful, culturally sensitive and appropriate approach in working with women and female groups.</p> <p>The timeliness of certain outputs could be affected by the difficulty in accessing resources in remoteness of project areas. [medium]</p>

AFGHANISTAN PROJECT LIST
8 May 2006

A032168 Mine Action National Development Budget
Project Budget: \$30,000,000
Project Period: 2002-2006

As a state party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (also known as the Ottawa Convention), both Canada and Afghanistan are committed to the removal and destruction of anti-personnel mines. The goal of achieving a mine and unexploded ordinance effect free Afghanistan is an important priority for the Government of Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan has committed, through the program, to establishing a complete ban on anti-personnel mines through the implementation of an overarching framework for mine action, including the clearance of anti-personnel mines within ten years, destroying all antipersonnel mine stockpiles, providing mine-risk education, assisting landmine survivors, and meeting reporting requirements.

Mine clearance promotes agricultural revival, economic development and human security in Afghanistan. Mine Action also promotes awareness and provides educational workshops and assistance for the rehabilitation of the victims over the past decades. Canada has led the international process in the development of the International Convention Against the Use of Landmines and is currently the lead nation on mine action in Afghanistan. CIDA's contribution enables United Nations Mine Action Service to continue its work in mine clearance, impact surveys, mine awareness programs and rehabilitation for victims.

A032194 Women's Rights Fund
Project Budget: \$1,750,500
Project Period: 2003-2005

With CIDA's support, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Rights and Democracy) promotes the rights of women through the Women's Rights Fund. The Fund supports women's rights education projects, leadership training for women, capacity building and peace building initiatives, the participation of women in political processes, networking and information sharing, and programs for gender mainstreaming. Furthermore, the Fund and related advocacy work by Rights and Democracy promote and protect women's rights in Afghanistan and ensure that the issue remains on the agenda.

A032234 Microfinance Program in Afghanistan (MISFA)
Project Budget: \$28,000,000
Project Period: 2003-2006

The Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) is a national microcredit program in Afghanistan. The MISFA was launched by the Government of Afghanistan in June 2003 as a multi-donor wholesale facility to build the micro-finance sector of Afghanistan.

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The MISFA has been providing investment funds to a wide range of microfinance institutions that are committed to providing large-scale financial services to the poor and vulnerable of Afghanistan as well as institution-building support and loan funds. The MISFA currently funds 12 Micro-finance Institutions that in turn provide a range of financial services in Afghanistan, including loans for income generation and enterprise development, savings services, and consumer loans to low-income people, particularly women. This program provides alternative sources of credit for rural Afghans who would otherwise need to borrow against poppy crops. The MISFA also serves as a source of training and technical assistance, as well as a mechanism for networking, sharing information, lobbying, and advocacy on behalf of the industry.

Canada has been playing a catalytic role in the MISFA program. Canada is the lead donor to this microcredit program.

A032440 Alternative Livelihoods Program in North-eastern Afghanistan

Project Budget: \$7,300,000

Project Period: 2005-2008

The impact of the Afghanistan Community Renewal Program - Alternative Livelihoods (ACRP-AL) project is a sustainable reduction in the socio-economic vulnerability of rural communities in north-eastern Afghanistan. The project purpose is to provide effective alternative livelihood options through community-based, integrated rural development in the context of concerted anti-narcotics efforts. The project supports an increased range of licit income generating opportunities for women and men, and increases the capacity of village development committees to resource, implement and sustain a range of community development initiatives. The two main project components are Rural Livelihood Options and Local Capacity Building. The project works towards preventative alternative development in four provinces (Bamyan, Baghlan, Parwan, Samangan) where poppy cultivation is on the rise.

A032445 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

Project Budget: \$109,500,000

Project Period: 2002-2006

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) supports the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in its efforts to re-establish a fully functioning and representative government system. It funds basic public services including education and health that are vital for the development of Afghan society. The ARTF is instrumental in promoting medium and long-term economic growth, making it the main GoA vehicle for outreach and service to the Afghan population.

The Fund covers the government's operating budget, including expenditures on wages, benefits and other payments for government employees, as well as operations and maintenance of line departments. The ARTF is managed by the World Bank in close consultation with the GoA, bilateral and multilateral donors.

A032453 Human Rights Treaty Reporting
Project Budget: \$375,000
Project Period: 2004-2005

This grant is building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to report on the 6 human rights treaties they are party to, beginning with the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Through the provision of technical assistance, capacity building of government staff, and the establishment of a database as a monitoring and controlling instrument for the government, the report will serve as a useful tool for the Government of Afghanistan to better understand the development priorities of Afghans, develop its National Development Strategy, and guide the support of donors.

A032484 Strengthening the Rule of Law
Project Budget: \$6,335,000
Project Period: 2004-2007

The International Development and Law Organization (IDLO) has been active in various different areas of Justice in Afghanistan such as strengthening Legal Aid Capabilities and working with the Ministry of Justice and the University of Kabul Faculty of Law to provide legal aid training for new law graduates.

This project contributes to better access to justice, promoting legal awareness, rendering legal practice more professional and improving court procedures. By strengthening justice and the rule of law, the project aims to establish a legal system with fair, transparent and effective judicial institutions.

A032503 Counter Narcotics Capacity Building
Project Budget: \$1,000,000
Project Period: 2004-2007

This initiative, which is being implemented by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), seeks to increase the capacity of justice professionals to prosecute high-profile traffickers, which will help reduce the level of narcotics trafficking in the short term. It will lay the groundwork for further long-term capacity building of the criminal-justice and law-enforcement systems and help bring drug traffickers to justice.

A032529 Provincial Reconstruction Team Confidence in Government Programme
Project Budget: up to \$6,000,000
Project Period: 2005-2007

The overarching objective of the PRT is to assist Afghan government authorities to promote stability in Kandahar province; this in turn will enable the development efforts of the Afghan Government and Non-Governmental organizations to flourish. CIDA will be working towards this goal by facilitating the improved effectiveness and extended reach of national programs throughout Kandahar province, especially in insecure, remote communities where government lacks presence, trust or both. This will be accomplished through the Confidence in Government

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(CIG) Programme. CIG will also promote the reform of security institutions in the province and support peacebuilding initiatives, through engagement at the institutional, provincial and national levels.

A032531 Making Budgets Work

Project Budget: \$3,000,000

Project Period: 2005-2007

This project improves the capacity of the Ministry of Finance to use the National Budget process as the central co-ordination mechanism for decision-making concerning the allocation of funds to various programs in the country. The objective is to provide efficient and professional budget development and budget tracking services. This project contributes to the process of state building for the Government of Afghanistan. By reinforcing some of primary state budgetary functions, the Government can assume its role as Afghanistan's foremost agent of change.

A032609 National Area Based Development Programme - Phase II

Project Budget: \$14,650,000

Project Period: 2003-2006

This project supports the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD), through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to contribute to the sustainable reduction of poverty and improvement of livelihoods in rural Afghanistan. Phase II of the National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) aims to accomplish this by empowering communities to give voice to their needs and priorities, and by enabling the government to support rural rehabilitation and development in an integrated, people-focused, inclusive and participatory manner.

NABDP Phase II supports the implementation of projects in rural areas and their urban centres in 15 provinces, but in a more targeted and strategic manner within the context of comprehensive rural development and economic regeneration plans and strategies. Besides enabling the poor to overcome extreme poverty and build sustainable livelihoods, this includes addressing the special needs of farmers dependent on poppy cultivation, disarmed militias, returning refugees and the rural vulnerable, including the nomadic Kuchi population.

A032623 Support to Parliamentary Elections

Project Budget: \$13,000,000

Project Period: 2005-2006

This project aims to establish a free and fair parliamentary election process in Afghanistan. It supports national management of future elections, and promotes the sustainability of secure electoral practices.

Activities for which donor funding is requested includes: conducting civic education programs in all provinces; providing operational support to the Interim Afghan Electoral commission (IAEC) and the Joint Electoral management Board (JEMB) Secretariat; delivering public information

campaigns; printing polling ballots and procuring ballot boxes and general polling station materials; training polling station officials and vote counting officers; collaborating with the Ministry of Interior to develop plans for ensuring adequate election security; accrediting and training election monitors and observers; putting in place a security framework to ensure voter turnout (male and female) and their protection; training parliamentary candidates and political parties on the Electoral Law and legitimate campaign processes; arranging management of polling stations on election day; and, arranging collation of all ballots in provinces and their transportation to the counting centre. The planned duration of the Parliamentary Elections initiative is five to seven months to include pre-election, election day, and post-election activities.

A032630 Integrated Alternative Livelihoods Program in Kandahar
Project Budget: \$18,500,000
Project Period: 2006-2009

Afghanistan's trade in drugs is seen as the biggest challenge to its long-term security, development and governance, and according to a 2005 UN survey, the province of Kandahar is the second largest producer of poppies in Afghanistan. This innovative initiative, a pilot conducted in Kandahar (where Canadian provincial reconstruction team is located) by the Afghan Government, seeks to demonstrate that there are viable and sustainable alternatives to poppy production. These alternatives are offered to farmers to allow them to sustain their rural families, while giving up the illegal cultivation of poppies.

The project ensures that vulnerable groups and individuals (women and men) have increased legal livelihood opportunities and local communities have increased access to provincial and regional markets, and to economic and social services.

The project, which is in line with the Government of Afghanistan's Alternative Livelihoods Implementation Plan, is Canada's flagship project in support of counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and could lead to similar approaches elsewhere in the country.

A032660 National Solidarity Program
Project Budget: \$31,000,000
Project Period: 2003-2006

The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is the Government of Afghanistan's primary program for community development. Its aims to reduce poverty through the empowerment of communities, improved governance and increased social, human and economic capital.

Created by the Government of Afghanistan, the NSP develops the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage, and monitor their own development projects. NSP promotes a new development paradigm whereby communities are empowered to make decisions and control resources during all stages of the project cycle. In accordance with government policy, the program is expected to lay the foundations for a long-term strengthening of community-level governance. It also promotes the inclusion of all groups (e.g. women, internally displaced

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persons, returnees, ethnic minorities) within project activities, and provides assistance for the reconstruction and development of communities.

A032703 Kabul Procurement Marketplace

Project Budget: \$340,200

Project Period: 2005-2007

The Kabul Procurement Marketplace project is a brokerage between private sector businesses in Kabul and international organizations providing rehabilitation and development assistance. The project channels the operational spending of international agencies and enterprises into the host economy by creating a secure marketplace where buyers can find local vendors. The marketplace site will also be used as focal point for parallel private sector development programming and training.

The project supports private sector development (PSD) by linking the existing procurement needs of international agencies and companies to local suppliers. The brokerage site also houses PSD training and entrepreneur support programs. By encouraging international agencies to increase their local procurement, reconstruction dollars can be channelled into the host economy. In addition to the developmental benefits of the project, participating United Nations and other international agencies can expect positive spin offs including reduced operating costs and broader internal dissemination of PSD objectives.

A032883 Corrections Advisor to UNAMA

Project Budget: \$245,000

Project Period: 2004-2006

CIDA funds the deployment of a Correctional Officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). The Officer works to develop a distinct correctional service within Afghanistan's justice system, establishing separation of corrections from the police. He also advises UNAMA and the Ministry of Justice on justice issues in general and on correctional issues in particular.

The current advisor is the third officer to be deployed over the last two years. These officers have played a key role in liaising between donors and the Government of Afghanistan on judicial issues. They have been instrumental in the development of the Prisons and Detention Centres Act and assisted the Central Prison Department in the development of priorities for National Programs in the justice sector.

A032956 Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)

Project Budget: \$7,000,000

Project Period: 2005-2008

The disarmament of pre-democracy armed forces has contributed greatly to the overall improvement of the security environment in Afghanistan, however, a significant number of illegal armed groups still exist posing a serious threat to peace and stability in the country.

This initiative supports the Government of Afghanistan's goal to establish a secure environment through disarmament and disbandment of these groups, setting the conditions for good governance and the rule of law, thereby reducing the level of armed violence throughout the country.

CIDA's funding of the DIAG program supports activities for voluntary compliance by armed groups for disarmament. The DIAG program contributes to a more stable, secure enabling environment for the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar.

A03299 5 Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction

Project Budget: \$7,000,000

Project Period: 2006-2009

The Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD) project is part of Canada's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration effort in Afghanistan. Canada has been the lead donor to the APMASD program. Years of conflict have generated war debris across Afghanistan. Explosive remnants of war, including ammunition stockpiles, are a serious security issue because most of the ammunition is stored unsafely with stockpiles having little or no guarding in place. If the ammunition is not collected or destroyed, it can be used as improvised explosive devices by illegal armed groups.

This project supports the Government of Afghanistan in surveying, collecting and destroying the most dangerous stockpiles, and therefore reduces the security risk of illicit use of anti-personnel mines and ammunition. The three primary components are nationwide ammunition survey; transportation, destruction and storage of ammunition; and capacity building for the Ministry of Defence. The project supports strategic policy and planning for peace and stability of Afghanistan and contributes to the establishment of an enabling environment for development activities through the ammunition survey and related stockpile destruction.

A033131 Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF)

Project Budget: \$1,200,000

Project Period: 2006-2009

The CNTF is intended to support all eight pillars of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy: Building Institutions, Public Awareness/Information Campaign, Alternative Livelihoods, Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice, Eradication, Drug Demand Reduction and Treatment of Drug Addicts, and International and Regional Cooperation. The purpose of the CNTF is to mobilize and channel additional resources through Afghan governmental institutions in order to support the efforts of the Government in fighting illicit drug production, and implementing the National Drug Control Strategy in Afghanistan. CIDA's contribution is earmarked to the Alternative Livelihoods pillar of the CNTF.

**BUILDING ON SUCCESS
THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN**

**THE
AFGHANISTAN
COMPACT**

LONDON 31 JANUARY – 1 FEBRUARY 2006

**THE LONDON CONFERENCE
ON AFGHANISTAN**

31 January – 1 February 2006

THE AFGHANISTAN COMPACT

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community:

Determined to strengthen their partnership to improve the lives of Afghan people, and to contribute to national, regional, and global peace and security;

Affirming their shared commitment to continue, in the spirit of the Bonn, Tokyo and Berlin conferences, to work toward a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, with good governance and human rights protection for all under the rule of law, and to maintain and strengthen that commitment over the term of this Compact and beyond;

Recognising the courage and determination of Afghans who, by defying violent extremism and hardship, have laid the foundations for a democratic, peaceful, pluralistic and prosperous state based on the principles of Islam;

Noting the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement through the adoption of a new constitution in January 2004, and the holding of presidential elections in October 2004 and National Assembly and Provincial Council elections in September 2005, which have enabled Afghanistan to regain its rightful place in the international community;

Mindful that Afghanistan's transition to peace and stability is not yet assured, and that strong international engagement will continue to be required to address remaining challenges;

Resolved to overcome the legacy of conflict in Afghanistan by setting conditions for sustainable economic growth and development; strengthening state institutions and civil society; removing remaining terrorist threats; meeting the challenge of counter-narcotics; rebuilding capacity and infrastructure; reducing poverty; and meeting basic human needs;

Have agreed to this Afghanistan Compact.

Purpose

The Afghan Government has articulated its overarching goals for the well-being of its people in the [Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Country Report 2005 – Vision 2020](#). Consistent with those goals, this Compact identifies three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity for the five years from the adoption of this Compact:

1. Security;
2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and
3. Economic and Social Development.

A further vital and cross-cutting area of work is eliminating the narcotics industry, which remains a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond.

The Afghan Government hereby commits itself to realising this shared vision of the future; the international community, in turn, commits itself to provide resources and support to realise that vision. Annex I of this Compact sets out detailed outcomes, benchmarks and timelines for delivery, consistent with the high-level goals set by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The Government and international community also commit themselves to improve the effectiveness and accountability of international assistance as set forth in Annex II.

Principles of Cooperation

As the Afghan Government and the international community embark on the implementation of this Compact, they will:

1. Respect the pluralistic culture, values and history of Afghanistan, based on Islam;
2. Work on the basis of partnership between the Afghan Government, with its sovereign responsibilities, and the international community, with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations;
3. Engage further the deep-seated traditions of participation and aspiration to ownership of the Afghan people;
4. Pursue fiscal, institutional and environmental sustainability;
5. Build lasting Afghan capacity and effective state and civil society institutions, with particular emphasis on building up human capacities of men and women alike;
6. Ensure balanced and fair allocation of domestic and international resources in order to offer all parts of the country tangible prospects of well-being;
7. Recognise in all policies and programmes that men and women have equal rights and responsibilities;
8. Promote regional cooperation; and
9. Combat corruption and ensure public transparency and accountability.

Security

Genuine security remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and development in Afghanistan. Security cannot be provided by military means alone. It requires good governance, justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development. With the support of the international community, the Afghan Government will consolidate peace by disbanding all illegal armed groups. The Afghan Government and the international community will create a secure environment by strengthening Afghan institutions to meet the security needs of the country in a fiscally sustainable manner.

To that end, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and partner nations involved in security sector reform will continue to provide strong support to the Afghan Government in establishing and sustaining security and stability in Afghanistan, subject to participating states' national approval procedures. They will continue to strengthen and develop the capacity of the national security forces to ensure that they become fully functional. All OEF counter-terrorism operations will be conducted in close coordination with the Afghan Government and ISAF. ISAF will continue to expand its presence throughout Afghanistan, including through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and will continue to promote stability and support security sector reforms in its areas of operation.

Full respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty and strengthening dialogue and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours constitute an essential guarantee of stability in Afghanistan and the region. The international community will support concrete confidence-building measures to this end.

Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights

Democratic governance and the protection of human rights constitute the cornerstone of sustainable political progress in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government will rapidly expand its capacity to provide basic services to the population throughout the country. It will recruit competent and credible professionals to public service on the basis of merit; establish a more effective, accountable and transparent administration at all levels of Government; and implement measurable improvements in fighting corruption, upholding justice and the rule of law and promoting respect for the human rights of all Afghans.

The Afghan Government will give priority to the coordinated establishment in each province of functional institutions – including civil administration, police, prisons and judiciary. These institutions will have appropriate legal frameworks and appointment procedures; trained staff; and adequate remuneration, infrastructure and auditing capacity. The Government will establish a fiscally and institutionally sustainable administration for future elections under the supervision of the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission.

Reforming the justice system will be a priority for the Afghan Government and the international community. The aim will be to ensure equal, fair and transparent access to justice

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for all based upon written codes with fair trials and enforceable verdicts. Measures will include: completing legislative reforms for the public as well as the private sector; building the capacity of judicial institutions and personnel; promoting human rights and legal awareness; and rehabilitating judicial infrastructure.

The Afghan Government and the international community reaffirm their commitment to the protection and promotion of rights provided for in the Afghan constitution and under applicable international law, including the international human rights covenants and other instruments to which Afghanistan is party. With a view to rebuilding trust among those whose lives were shattered by war, reinforcing a shared sense of citizenship and a culture of tolerance, pluralism and observance of the rule of law, the Afghan Government with the support of the international community will implement the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Afghan Government with the support of the international community will pursue high rates of sustainable economic growth with the aim of reducing hunger, poverty and unemployment. It will promote the role and potential of the private sector, alongside those of the public and non-profit sectors; curb the narcotics industry; ensure macroeconomic stability; restore and promote the development of the country's human, social and physical capital, thereby establishing a sound basis for a new generation of leaders and professionals; strengthen civil society; and complete the reintegration of returnees, internally displaced persons and ex-combatants.

Public investments will be structured around the six sectors of the pillar on economic and social development of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy:

1. Infrastructure and natural resources;
2. Education;
3. Health;
4. Agriculture and rural development;
5. Social protection; and
6. Economic governance and private sector development.

In each of these areas, the objective will be to achieve measurable results towards the goal of equitable economic growth that reduces poverty, expands employment and enterprise creation, enhances opportunities in the region and improves the well-being of all Afghans.

Counter-Narcotics – A Cross-Cutting Priority

Meeting the threat that the narcotics industry poses to national, regional and international security as well as the development and governance of the country and the well-being of Afghans will be a priority for the Government and the international community. The aim will be to achieve a sustained and significant reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics with a view to complete elimination. Essential elements include improved interdiction, law

enforcement and judicial capacity building; enhanced cooperation among Afghanistan, neighbouring countries and the international community on disrupting the drugs trade; wider provision of economic alternatives for farmers and labourers in the context of comprehensive rural development; and building national and provincial counter-narcotics institutions. It will also be crucial to enforce a zero-tolerance policy towards official corruption; to pursue eradication as appropriate; to reinforce the message that producing or trading opiates is both immoral and a violation of Islamic law; and to reduce the demand for the illicit use of opiates.

Coordination and Monitoring

The Afghan Government and the international community are establishing a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board for the implementation of the political commitments that comprise this Compact. As detailed in Annex III, this Board will be co-chaired by the Afghan Government and the United Nations and will be supported by a small secretariat. It will ensure greater coherence of efforts by the Afghan Government and international community to implement the Compact and provide regular and timely public reports on its execution.

ANNEX I BENCHMARKS AND TIMELINES

The Afghan Government, with the support of the international community, is committed to achieving the following benchmarks in accordance with the timelines specified.

Security

International Security Forces

Through end-2010, with the support of and in close coordination with the Afghan Government, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and their respective Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will promote security and stability in all regions of Afghanistan, including by strengthening Afghan capabilities.

Afghan National Army

By end-2010: A nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced Afghan National Army will be fully established that is democratically accountable, organized, trained and equipped to meet the security needs of the country and increasingly funded from Government revenue, commensurate with the nation's economic capacity; the international community will continue to support Afghanistan in expanding the ANA towards the ceiling of 70,000 personnel articulated in the Bonn talks; and the pace of expansion is to be adjusted on the basis of periodic joint quality assessments by the Afghan Government and the international community against agreed criteria which take into account prevailing conditions.

Afghan National and Border Police

By end-2010, a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable.

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups

All illegal armed groups will be disbanded by end-2007 in all provinces.

Counter-Narcotics

By end-2010, the Government will strengthen its law enforcement capacity at both central and provincial levels, resulting in a substantial annual increase in the amount of drugs seized or destroyed and processing facilities dismantled, and in effective measures, including targeted eradication as appropriate, that contribute to the elimination of poppy cultivation.

By end-2010, the Government and neighbouring and regional governments will work together to increase coordination and mutual sharing of intelligence, with the goal of an increase in the seizure and destruction of drugs being smuggled across Afghanistan's borders and effective action against drug traffickers.

Mine Action and Ammunition

By end-2010, in line with Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Afghanistan's Ottawa Convention obligations, the land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance will be reduced by 70%; all stockpiled anti-personnel mines will be located and destroyed by end-2007; and by end-2010, all unsafe, unserviceable and surplus ammunition will be destroyed.

Governance, Rule Of Law And Human Rights

Public Administrative Reform

By end-2010: Government machinery (including the number of ministries) will be restructured and rationalised to ensure a fiscally sustainable public administration; the civil service commission will be strengthened; and civil service functions will be reformed to reflect core functions and responsibilities.

A clear and transparent national appointments mechanism will be established within 6 months, applied within 12 months and fully implemented within 24 months for all senior level appointments to the central government and the judiciary, as well as for provincial governors, chiefs of police, district administrators and provincial heads of security.

By end-2006 a review of the number of administrative units and their boundaries will be undertaken with the aim of contributing to fiscal sustainability.

By end-2010, in furtherance of the work of the civil service commission, merit-based appointments, vetting procedures and performance-based reviews will be undertaken for civil service positions at all levels of government, including central government, the judiciary and police, and requisite support will be provided to build the capacity of the civil service to function effectively. Annual performance-based reviews will be undertaken for all senior staff (grade 2 and above) starting by end-2007.

Anti-Corruption

The UN Convention against Corruption will be ratified by end-2006, national legislation adapted accordingly by end-2007 and a monitoring mechanism to oversee implementation will be in place by end-2008.

The Census and Statistics

The census enumeration will be completed by end-2008 and the complete results published.

Reliable statistical baselines will be established for all quantitative benchmarks by mid-2007 and statistical capacity built to track progress against them.

National Assembly

The National Assembly will be provided with technical and administrative support by mid-2006 to fulfil effectively its constitutionally mandated roles.

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Elections

The Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission will have the high integrity, capacity and resources to undertake elections in an increasingly fiscally sustainable manner by end-2008, with the Government of Afghanistan contributing to the extent possible to the cost of future elections from its own resources. A permanent civil and voter registry with a single national identity document will be established by end-2009.

Gender

By end-2010: the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan will be fully implemented; and, in line with Afghanistan's MDGs, female participation in all Afghan governance institutions, including elected and appointed bodies and the civil service, will be strengthened.

Rule of Law

By end-2010, the legal framework required under the constitution, including civil, criminal and commercial law, will be put in place, distributed to all judicial and legislative institutions and made available to the public.

By end-2010, functioning institutions of justice will be fully operational in each province of Afghanistan, and the average time to resolve contract disputes will be reduced as much as possible.

A review and reform of oversight procedures relating to corruption, lack of due process and miscarriage of justice will be initiated by end-2006 and fully implemented by end-2010; by end-2010, reforms will strengthen the professionalism, credibility and integrity of key institutions of the justice system (the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the Attorney-General's office, the Ministry of Interior and the National Directorate of Security).

By end-2010, justice infrastructure will be rehabilitated; and prisons will have separate facilities for women and juveniles.

Land Registration

A process for registration of land in all administrative units and the registration of titles will be started for all major urban areas by end-2006 and all other areas by end-2008. A fair system for settlement of land disputes will be in place by end-2007. Registration for rural land will be under way by end-2007.

Counter-Narcotics

By end-2010, the Government will increase the number of arrests and prosecutions of traffickers and corrupt officials and will improve its information base concerning those involved in the drugs trade, with a view to enhancing the selection system for national and sub-national public appointments, as part of the appointments mechanism mentioned earlier in this annex.

Human Rights

By end-2010: The Government's capacity to comply with and report on its human rights treaty obligations will be strengthened; Government security and law enforcement agencies will adopt

corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion and illegal expropriation of property with a view to the elimination of these practices; the exercise of freedom of expression, including freedom of media, will be strengthened; human rights awareness will be included in education curricula and promoted among legislators, judicial personnel and other Government agencies, communities and the public; human rights monitoring will be carried out by the Government and independently by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and the UN will track the effectiveness of measures aimed at the protection of human rights; the AIHRC will be supported in the fulfilment of its objectives with regard to monitoring, investigation, protection and promotion of human rights.

The implementation of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation will be completed by end-2008.

Economic and Social Development

Infrastructure And Natural Resources

Roads

Afghanistan will have a fully upgraded and maintained ring road, as well as roads connecting the ring road to neighbouring countries by end-2008 and a fiscally sustainable system for road maintenance by end-2007.

Air Transport

By end-2010: Kabul International Airport and Herat Airport will achieve full International Civil Aviation Organisation compliance; Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kandahar will be upgraded with runway repairs, air navigation, fire and rescue and communications equipment; seven other domestic airports will be upgraded to facilitate domestic air transportation; and air transport services and costs will be increasingly competitive with international market standards and rates.

Energy

By end-2010: electricity will reach at least 65% of households and 90% of non-residential establishments in major urban areas and at least 25% of households in rural areas; at least 75% of the costs will be recovered from users connected to the national power grid. A strategy for the development and the use of renewable energies will be developed by end-2007.

Mining and Natural Resources

An enabling regulatory environment for profitable extraction of Afghanistan's mineral and natural resources will be created by end-2006, and by end-2010 the investment environment and infrastructure will be enhanced in order to attract domestic and foreign direct investment in this area.

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Water Resource Management

Sustainable water resource management strategies and plans covering irrigation and drinking water supply will be developed by end-2006, and irrigation investments will result in at least 30% of water coming from large waterworks by end-2010.

Urban Development

By end-2010: Municipal governments will have strengthened capacity to manage urban development and to ensure that municipal services are delivered effectively, efficiently and transparently; in line with Afghanistan's MDGs, investment in water supply and sanitation will ensure that 50% of households in Kabul and 30% of households in other major urban areas will have access to piped water.

Environment

In line with Afghanistan's MDGs, environmental regulatory frameworks and management services will be established for the protection of air and water quality, waste management and pollution control, and natural resource policies will be developed and implementation started at all levels of government as well as the community level, by end-2007.

Education

Primary and Secondary Education

By end-2010: in line with Afghanistan's MDGs, net enrolment in primary school for girls and boys will be at least 60% and 75% respectively; a new curriculum will be operational in all secondary schools; female teachers will be increased by 50%; 70% of Afghanistan's teachers will have passed a competency test; and a system for assessing learning achievement such as a national testing system for students will be in place.

Higher Education

By end 2010: enrolment of students to universities will be 100,000 with at least 35% female students; and the curriculum in Afghanistan's public universities will be revised to meet the development needs of the country and private sector growth.

Skills Development

A human resource study will be completed by end-2006, and 150,000 men and women will be trained in marketable skills through public and private means by end-2010.

Afghan Cultural Heritage

A comprehensive inventory of Afghan cultural treasures will be compiled by end-2007. Measures will be taken to revive the Afghan cultural heritage, to stop the illegal removal of cultural material and to restore damaged monuments and artefacts by end-2010.

Health

Health and Nutrition

By end-2010, in line with Afghanistan's MDGs, the Basic Package of Health Services will be extended to cover at least 90% of the population; maternal mortality will be reduced by 15%; and full immunisation coverage for infants under-5 for vaccine-preventable diseases will be achieved and their mortality rates reduced by 20%.

Agriculture and Rural Development

Agriculture and Livestock

By end-2010: The necessary institutional, regulatory and incentive framework to increase production and productivity will be established to create an enabling environment for legal agriculture and agriculture-based rural industries, and public investment in agriculture will increase by 30 percent; particular consideration will be given to perennial horticulture, animal health and food security by instituting specialised support agencies and financial service delivery mechanisms, supporting farmers' associations, branding national products, disseminating timely price and weather-related information and statistics, providing strategic research and technical assistance and securing access to irrigation and water management systems.

Comprehensive Rural Development

By end-2010: Rural development will be enhanced comprehensively for the benefit of 19 million people in over 38,000 villages; this will be achieved through the election of at least a further 14,000 voluntary community development councils in all remaining villages, promoting local governance and community empowerment; access to safe drinking water will be extended to 90% of villages and sanitation to 50%; road connectivity will reach 40% of all villages, increasing access to markets, employment and social services; 47% of villages will benefit from small-scale irrigation; 800,000 households (22% of all Afghanistan's households) will benefit from improved access to financial services; and livelihoods of at least 15% of the rural population will be supported through the provision of 91 million labour days.

Counter-Narcotics

By end-2010, the Government will design and implement programmes to achieve a sustained annual reduction in the amount of land under poppy and other drug cultivation by the strengthening and diversification of licit livelihoods and other counter-narcotics measures, as part of the overall goal of a decrease in the absolute and relative size of the drug economy in line with the Government's MDG target.

Social Protection

Poverty Reduction

By end-2010, in line with Afghanistan's MDGs, the proportion of people living on less than US\$1 a day will decrease by 3% per year and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger will decrease by 5% per year.

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Humanitarian and Disaster Response

By end-2010, an effective system of disaster preparedness and response will be in place.

Disabled

By end-2010, increased assistance will be provided to meet the special needs of all disabled people, including their integration in society through opportunities for education and gainful employment.

Employment of Youth and Demobilised Soldiers

By end-2010, employment opportunities for youth and demobilised soldiers will be increased through special programmes.

Refugees and IDPs

By end-2010, all refugees opting to return and internally displaced persons will be provided assistance for rehabilitation and integration in their local communities; their integration will be supported by national development programmes, particularly in key areas of return.

Vulnerable Women

By end-2010, the number of female-headed households that are chronically poor will be reduced by 20%, and their employment rates will be increased by 20%.

Counter-Narcotics

By end-2010, the Government will implement programmes to reduce the demand for narcotics and provide improved treatment for drug users.

Economic Governance and Private Sector Development

Financial Management

By end-2007, the Government will ensure improved transparent financial management at the central and provincial levels through establishing and meeting benchmarks for financial management agreed with and monitored by the international community, including those in the anticipated Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). In turn, and in line with improved government accountability, donors will make more effort to increase the share of total external assistance to Afghanistan that goes to the core budget.

Domestic Revenues

Afghanistan's total domestic budgetary revenue – equivalent to 4.5% of estimated legal GDP in 1383 (2004/05) – will steadily increase and reach 8% of GDP by 1389 (2010/11). The ratio of revenue to estimated total recurrent expenditures, including estimated recurrent expenditures in the core and external development budgets, is projected to rise from 28% in 1383 (2004/05) to an estimated 58% in 1389, resulting in a continuing need, in accord with the principles in Annex II, for (1) external assistance to the core budget and (2) increasing cost-effectiveness of assistance that funds recurrent expenditure through the external development budget.

Private Sector Development and Trade

All legislation, regulations and procedures related to investment will be simplified and harmonised by end-2006 and implemented by end-2007. New business organisation laws will be tabled in the National Assembly by end-2006. The Government's strategy for divestment of state-owned enterprises will be implemented by end-2009.

Financial Services and Markets

Internationally accepted prudential regulations will be developed for all core sectors of banking and non-bank financial institutions by end-2007. The banking supervision function of Da Afghanistan Bank will be further strengthened by end-2007. Re-structuring of state-owned commercial banks will be complete by end-2007. State-owned banks that have not been re-licensed will be liquidated by end-2006.

Regional Cooperation

By end-2010: Afghanistan and its neighbours will achieve lower transit times through Afghanistan by means of cooperative border management and other multilateral or bilateral trade and transit agreements; Afghanistan will increase the amount of electricity available through bilateral power purchase; and Afghanistan, its neighbours and countries in the region will reach agreements to enable Afghanistan to import skilled labour, and to enable Afghans to seek work in the region and send remittances home.

ANNEX II

IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID TO AFGHANISTAN

The international community has made a significant investment in the future of a democratic state of Afghanistan since December 2001. This Compact is an affirmation of that commitment. The Afghan Government and the international community are further committed to improving the effectiveness of the aid being provided to Afghanistan in accordance with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), recognising the special needs of Afghanistan and their implications for donor support.

Consistent with the Paris Declaration and the principles of cooperation of this Compact, the Government and the international community providing assistance to Afghanistan agree that the principles for improving the effectiveness of aid to Afghanistan under this Compact are:

1. Leadership of the Afghan Government in setting its development priorities and strategies and, within them, the support needs of the country and the coordination of donor assistance;
2. Transparency and accountability on the part of both the Government and the donors of the international assistance being provided to Afghanistan.

Under these principles and towards the goal of improving the effectiveness of aid to Afghanistan, the Government will:

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- Provide a prioritised and detailed Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) with indicators for monitoring results, including those for Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);
- Improve its abilities to generate domestic revenues through, *inter alia*, customs duties and taxes; and to achieve cost recovery from public utilities and transportation;
- Agree with donors, international financial institutions and United Nations agencies on the benchmarks for aid channelled through the Government's core budget and for the utilisation of such aid; and monitor performance against those benchmarks; and
- Provide regular reporting on the use of donor assistance and performance against the benchmarks of this compact to the National Assembly, the donor community through the Afghanistan Development Forum and the public at large.

The donors will:

- Provide assistance within the framework of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy; programmes and projects will be coordinated with Government in order to focus on priorities, eliminate duplication and rationalise donor activities to maximise cost-effectiveness;
- Increasingly provide more predictable and multiyear funding commitments or indications of multiyear support to Afghanistan to enable the Government to plan better the implementation of its National Development Strategy and provide untied aid whenever possible;
- Increase the proportion of donor assistance channelled directly through the core budget, as agreed bilaterally between the Government and each donor, as well as through other more predictable core budget funding modalities in which the Afghan Government participates, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF);
- Provide assistance for the development of public expenditure management systems that are essential for improving transparency and accountability in the utilisation of donor resources and countering corruption;
- Recognise that, because of the need to build Afghan capacity, donor assistance provided through the external budget will be designed in such a manner as to build this capacity in the Government as well as the private sector and non-profit sector;
- Ensure that development policies, including salary policies, strengthen national institutions that are sustainable in the medium to long term for delivery of programmes by the Government;
- For aid not channelled through the core budget, endeavour to:
 - Harmonise the delivery of technical assistance in line with Government needs to focus on priority areas and reduce duplication and transaction costs;

- Reduce the external management and overhead costs of projects by promoting the Afghan private sector in their management and delivery;
 - Increasingly use Afghan national implementation partners and equally qualified local and expatriate Afghans;
 - Increase procurement within Afghanistan of supplies for civilian and military activities; and
 - Use Afghan materials in the implementation of projects, in particular for infrastructure;
- Within the principles of international competitive bidding, promote the participation in the bidding process of the Afghan private sector and South-South cooperation in order to overcome capacity constraints and to lower costs of delivery;
 - Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on foreign aid flows, including levels of pledges, commitments and disbursements in a format that will enable the Afghan Government to plan its own activities and present comprehensive budget reports to the National Assembly; this covers the nature and amount of assistance being provided to Afghanistan through the core and external budgets; and
 - For external budget assistance, also report to the Government on: the utilisation of funds; its efficiency, quality and effectiveness; and the results achieved.

These mutual commitments are intended to ensure that the donor assistance being provided to Afghanistan is used efficiently and effectively, that there is increased transparency and accountability, and that both Afghans and the taxpayers in donor countries are receiving value for money.

ANNEX III

COORDINATION AND MONITORING

The Afghan Government and the international community recognise that the success of the Afghanistan Compact requires strong political, security and financial commitment to achieve the benchmarks within the agreed timelines. Equally, the success of the Compact relies on an effective coordination and monitoring mechanism.

To this end, and in addition to existing sectoral coordination mechanisms, the Afghan Government and the international community are establishing a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board with the participation of senior Afghan Government officials appointed by the President and representatives of the international community. The Board will be co-chaired by a senior Afghan Government official appointed by the President and by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan. Its purpose would be to ensure overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Compact.

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The Board will have a small secretariat staffed by the Afghan Government and the United Nations. It will be supported by technical experts, as needed. The Board will hold periodic meetings and special sessions as required to review the implementation of this Compact and suggest corrective action, as appropriate.

Afghan state institutions and sectoral coordination mechanisms involved in the implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) will provide inputs to the Board with regard to the implementation of the Compact. In addition, in carrying out its assessments, the Board will consider inputs from the international community, including United Nations agencies, international financial institutions, donors, international security forces and relevant non-governmental organisations and civil society representatives.

Periodic progress reports on the implementation of the Compact prepared by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board will be made public.

ANNEX IV PARTICIPANTS AT THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

Participating Countries

Afghanistan (co-Chair)	Kuwait
Australia	Kyrgyzstan
Austria	Lithuania
Bahrain	Luxembourg
Belgium	Malaysia
Brazil	Netherlands
Brunei	New Zealand
Bulgaria	Norway
Canada	Pakistan
China	Portugal
Czech Republic	Qatar
Denmark	Romania
Egypt	Russia
Finland	Saudi Arabia
France	Spain
Germany	Sweden
Greece	Switzerland
Hungary	Tajikistan
Iceland	Turkey

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India
Iran
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Korea (Republic of)

Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom (co-Chair)
United States of America
Uzbekistan

Participating Organisations

Aga Khan Foundation
Asian Development Bank
European Commission
European Union
Islamic Development Bank
International Monetary Fund

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Organisation of Islamic Conference
United Nations (co-Chair)
World Bank

Observers

Argentina
Chile
Croatia
Cyprus
Estonia
Ireland
Latvia
Macedonia (FYR)
Malta
Oman
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia



Government of Afghanistan

Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan

Public Investment Programme

APPENDIX XII
Minister of CIDA Letter to the Committee

Sub-Programme Objectives, Outcomes and Outputs			
Sub-Programme Objective	Expected Outcomes & Targets for end 1387	Outputs to Support - Achievement of Outcomes for the end of 1384	Output Targets for end 1387
3.6.1 Coordination of Mine Action			
To plan and coordinate mine action in line with the mine action strategy endorsed by the Mine Action CG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fully implemented MAPA 1384, 1385, 1386, and 1387 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased government role in MAPA coordination ▪ Fully funded MAPA ▪ National Mine Action Standards upheld 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximal government role in MAPA coordination ▪ Fully funded MAPA ▪ National Mine Action Standards upheld
3.6.2 Mine and UXO Clearance			
To implement a comprehensive mine-UXO clearance response throughout the country.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 580.8 km2 of land returned to full productive use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Annual clearance of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 50.1 km2 of MF ○ 95.1 km2 of BA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 200.4 km2 of MF cleared ▪ 380.4 km2 of BA cleared
3.6.3 Mine and UXO Survey			
To implement survey activities that assist prioritisation and resource allocation by reducing the areas that remain to be cleared and identifying areas with the highest level of threat.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enhanced Mine Action prioritisation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Annual survey of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 24.3 km2 of minefield (MF) ○ 92.1 km2 of battle area (BA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Completed LIS in full use ▪ 97.2 km2 MF surveyed ▪ 368.4 km2 BA surveyed
3.6.4 Monitoring, Evaluation and Training			
To implement a total quality management system (TQMS) process for mine action in Afghanistan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enhanced Mine Action efficiency and safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quality control of mine-action activities are ensured through quality management inspection teams. ▪ Increase capacity of MAPA IPs through external training ▪ Training, reference and guidance manuals and national mine-action standards are developed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National Mine Action Standards in place ▪ Quality control of mine-action activities are ensured through quality management inspection teams. ▪ Increase capacity of MAPA IPs through external training ▪ Training, reference and guidance manuals and national mine-action standards are developed.
3.6.5 Mine Risk Education			
Reduction of injury and disability caused by mines and UXO in Afghanistan through risk reduction strategies and Mine Risk Education (MRE) targeted at high risk populations living in and travelling through contaminated environments.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 5% reduction in mine/UXO accidents. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approx 10,000 teacher receive training on MRE ▪ Up to one million returnees and IDPs receive MRE ▪ Printed MRE materials distributed ▪ Radio MRE messages aired ▪ Community based MRE materials in use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approx. 30,000 teachers trained ▪ Printed MRE materials distributed ▪ Radio MRE messages aired ▪ Community based MRE materials in use ▪ 500,000 households reached

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3.6.6 Mine Action for Peace/DDR			
<p>To reintegrate demobilised soldiers through the Mine Action for Peace (MAFP) project.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Some two thousand soldiers successfully reintegrated ▪ Support provided towards the fulfilment of MRE, Survey and Clearance output targets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reintegration of some of one thousand demobilised soldiers. ▪ Demobilized soldiers receive vocational skills and literacy training ▪ Permanent marking, clearance, and MRE are carried out ▪ Communities are ready to accept ex-combatants without rancor ▪ Reconciliation among demobilized soldiers are facilitated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Some two thousand demobilised soldiers have gone through MAFP project.
3.6.7 Stockpile Destruction			
<p>Destroy all stockpiled anti-personnel landmines in line with Afghanistan's obligations under the anti-personnel mine-ban treaty.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collect and collate information to determine stockpile destruction needs and to enable the planning and development of the stockpile destruction programme ▪ Afghanistan's stockpile of Anti-personnel (AP) mines destroyed. ▪ Afghanistan has fully developed mine action specific legislation that is in line with Mine Ban Treaty commitments. ▪ Design plans for implementation that will include all phases of the demilitarization cycle, training, equipment and tools, and quality assurance ▪ Design and implement a verification system of the stockpile destruction process to be carried out by independent monitors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Identification and destruction of AP mine stockpiles ▪ Legislation developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All AP mine stockpiles identified and destroyed ▪ Legislation passed
3.6.9 Capacity Building			
<p>1. To build capacity within relevant areas of the government, in order to provide national authorities with the tools and expertise to assume a long term coordination and policy making role for mine action. 2. To develop a detailed transition plan to ensure a smooth and gradual transfer of responsibility for the coordination of mine action to appropriate national authorities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National Transition plan developed and implementation started. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A series of workshops and trainings conducted ▪ Physical infrastructure/equipment set up ▪ Manual in local language developed ▪ Transition plan developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National capacity for coordination and policy making in mine action strengthened.

APPENDIX XIII

Communications Security Establishment (CSE)

The roots of the Communication Security Establishment (CSE) can be traced back to Canada's involvement in code-breaking and signals intelligence in World War II.⁸⁴ The CSE evolved from the Communications Branch of the National Research Council and has been housed within the Department of National Defence since 1975.⁸⁵

The mandate of the CSE is,

- To acquire and use information from the global information infrastructure for the purpose of providing foreign intelligence, in accordance with the Government of Canada intelligence priorities;
- To provide advice, guidance and services to help ensure the protection of electronic information and information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada; and,
- To provide technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies in the performance of their lawful duties.⁸⁶

The CSE has two main functions: to provide foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) in support of Canadian defence and foreign policy and to protect electronic communication and information of the Federal Government.⁸⁷ The former is accomplished through collecting and analyzing information from foreign sources including electronic emissions such as radar and radio emissions.⁸⁸ This foreign intelligence, while initially reported to National Defence, is also reported to Federal Government departments concerned with the security and defence of

⁸⁴ Communication Security Establishment. "The Birth of Canadian SIGINT: Have you ever wondered why and how Canada ever became a spy?" January, 2005. www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/history.html

⁸⁵ Canadian Intelligence Resource Centre. Department of National Defence. Communications Security Establishment. circ.jmellon.com/agencies/cse/

⁸⁶ CSE. FAQ. "What does the CSE do?" www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/faq.html; Justice Canada, The ATA, "ATA in Perspective," canada.justice.gc.ca/en/anti_terr/perspective_page6.html#nda

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Richard Kott. "Reinventing the Looking Glass: Developing a Canadian Foreign intelligence Service". A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies For the Degree of Master of Strategic Studies. Center for Military and Strategic Studies". Calgary, Alberta. April. 2002.

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Canada as well as Canadian foreign intelligence allies such as the UK, US, New Zealand, and Australia.⁸⁹

Protecting electronic communication and information is achieved accomplished through the Information Technology Security Program (ITSP). The aim of this program is to provide the Federal Government with “timely, credible, unbiased insight and the technical leadership required to guide critical IT security decisions”.⁹⁰

The administration of CSE is the responsibility of the Deputy Minister of National Defence, while the agency’s policy and operations are the responsibility of the National Security Advisor. Ultimate accountability for all CSE operations falls on the Minister of National Defence.⁹¹

In 2001, the National Defence Act was amended by the Anti-Terrorism Act to provide the legal authority for the continued establishment of the CSE.

⁸⁹ Ibid, “About CSE: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)”. www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/about_cse/sigint.html, January, 2005.

⁹⁰ Ibid, “About CSE: Information Technology Security Program”. January, 2005. www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/about_cse/its_program.html.

⁹¹ Ibid, “About CSE: Place in Government”. www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/about_cse/place_in_government.html, January, 2005.

APPENDIX XIV

Ballistic Missile Defence Background

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

During the Cold War, the principal ballistic missile threat to North America came from the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of the Soviet strategic rocket forces. The US also had an ICBM force as and to protect their ICBMs, the US considered building and deploying an anti-ballistic missile system in the 1970s.

Some thought that any anti-ballistic missile system was inherently destabilizing because it would disturb the ‘balance of nuclear terror’ that existed at the time. Both of the USSR and US knew that the other had sufficient ICBMs to launch a second, retaliatory strike that, in keeping with the accurate acronym of MAD (mutual assured destruction), ensured that either side could destroy the other, no matter who fired first. An effective anti-ballistic missile system on one side might tip the balance in favour of the owner, who might then think he could get away with launching a first strike, with the false confidence that he could defend against any retaliatory strike and avoid the ensuing destruction. Recognizing this situation, the US and USSR signed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that was intended to set limits on defensive missile systems. That treaty permitted each nation to designate an area to locate their ABM system. The United States selected the area around their retaliatory missile force in North Dakota, but did not pursue the option of building a system. The Soviet Union selected Moscow and built a crude system to protect their capital.

At the time, Canada had at least three direct concerns. First any nuclear exchange between the US and USSR would likely send ICBMs over Canada, in both directions. Second, a US anti-ballistic missile system would not wait for Soviet ICBMs to arrive in American airspace. The US would seek to destroy them as soon after launch and as far away as possible, likely over the Canadian arctic and maybe over more heavily populated areas further south. Third, if the US anti-ballistic missile system was not 100% effective, Soviet ICBMs hitting northern American cities and military installations would also have a devastating effect on Canada. Perhaps more importantly, it was expected that some Canadian cities and military installations would have been directly targeted by Soviet ICBMs.

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980's revived the concept of ballistic missile defence. However, SDI was based on exotic, futuristic space technologies and intended to counter the entire nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union. The initiative was not implemented due to technological challenges, high cost-estimates and the end of the Cold War.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War in 1991, the nature of the ballistic missile threat to North America changed. No longer were Soviet ICBMs the main danger. Now, with the collapse of the USSR, the principal concern became the uncontrolled proliferation of the former Soviet ICBMs in particular, but of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) generally. Responding to the changing strategic environment and the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems, US President Clinton agreed in principle in the mid-1990s to the need for missile defences, and sought to move ahead on the issue while trying to remain consistent with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In 1999, he signed the National Missile Defense Act, which called upon the US to deploy a missile defence system as soon as the technology permitted.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, the ballistic missile threat evolved once again and the central concern, as described by US President George W. Bush, was the possibility of an ICBM being launched at the US by a 'rogue' nation – likely, according to American officials, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. As time went on, the ICBM threat from Iraq has been removed, but Iran and North Korea continue to pursue long range missile technology.

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM (BMDS)⁹²

The increasing proliferation of ballistic missiles is one of the greatest threats facing the world today. As more countries develop sophisticated missile designs, the number of missiles capable of reaching North America increases.

In 2002, in the aftermath of 9/11 and believing that the strategic environment had deteriorated further, President Bush negotiated an end to the ABM Treaty with Russia and expanded the US missile defence system which had been under development. The US also began work on adding components to allow for layered and overlapping missile defence coverage to cover all 50 US states.

⁹² United States Missile Defence Agency *Factsheets* at <http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmbs.pdf>.

On 17 December 2002, President Bush announced that the US would deploy an initial operational ballistic missile defence (BMD) system for the defence of North America by the fall of 2004. He directed the US Department of Defense to field a defensive system capable of countering the near term ballistic missile threat to the US homeland, deployed US forces, allies, and friends.

The BMDS employs multiple sensors and interceptors integrated by a command, control, battle management, and communications network. It uses a "layered" approach to intercept missiles by using land (large interceptor rockets or mobile launchers such as the current US 'Patriot' system), sea ('Aegis' class missile ships), and air (airborne laser) platforms to shoot down incoming missiles. In 2004, the US began the deployment of a limited, ground- and sea-based system employing from six to forty interceptor rockets.

Interceptors destroy their targets by making physical contact with them at extremely high rates of speed. The term "using a bullet to hit another bullet" has been used colloquially to describe ballistic missile defence. Current plans do not call for interceptors to be armed with either nuclear or conventional explosive warheads. Moreover, unlike SDI in the 1980s, the BMDS is intended to defeat only a small number of incoming missiles and are based on existing and evolving technology. Most importantly and also unlike SDI, BMD does not include any plans to place weapons in space.

Air- and sea-based platforms can be positioned close to the launch site of a hostile missile and can intercept it during its "boost phase" (the period just after a missile's launch), whereas land-based platforms are better at intercepting missiles during the "mid-course phase" (the period where the missile is coasting through space or high in the atmosphere) and "terminal phase" (the period where the missile makes its final approach toward its intended target) of a missile's flight path. Current US plans for the defence of the US against missile attack are largely focused on the "mid-course phase" using interceptor sites located in Alaska and California.

Testing of the ballistic missile defence system has had mixed results. Recently, there have been successes against more complex and multiple targets. In 10 intercept tests between 1999 and 2006, five of 10 test targets had been successfully engaged. Successive failures in 2004 and 2005 prompted the suspension of testing so quality controls could be improved. Recently, on 1 September 2006 a successful intercept was conducted when an interceptor rocket launched from California intercepted a target missile fired from Alaska.

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The system currently consists of interceptors in Alaska and California that could be directed to a target by ground- and naval-based radar. By the end of 2006, according to the US Missile Defence Agency, the US plans to have the BMDS deployed and operating as shown in the diagram below.



Ballistic Missile Defense System December 2006



BMD and the North American Aerospace Command (NORAD)

NORAD is a bi-lateral (Canada-US) surveillance, warning and aerospace defence and control organization, established in 1958. Since then, it has been the mainstay of Canada's aerospace defence and control capability. Initially conceived to deal with the strategic bomber threat of the Cold War, the NORAD mission has evolved to include tracking, warning and assessment of attacks against North America by aircraft, missiles, space vehicles and domestic asymmetric threats. At present, NORAD can only counter an attack against North America by manned aircraft.

NORAD has no direct role in the interception of ballistic missiles. There is, however, significant overlap between NORAD's threat tracking and assessment mission and the missile defence mission recently assigned to the US-only Northern Command (NORTHCOM).

INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION

The US has engaged a number of nations and organizations in the pursuit of a BMDS. Categorized as 'framework partners' are Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan and the UK, all of whom are involved with BMDS technology studies and/or are hosting deployed components of the system. In addition, there is continuing activity with Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Turkey and Spain. Some of these countries have accepted the deployment of system sensors and are engaged in further technology studies. Related contact has been made with NATO, Czech Republic, France, India, Poland, Russia, Taiwan and Ukraine.

The UK in particular has been supportive of US efforts to develop BMDS. In 2003, it announced that it had finalized an agreement with the US on the upgrading of the radar site at RAF Station Fylingdales for the purposes of supporting BMDS. In addition, Denmark has allowed the Thule radar site in Greenland to be upgraded for the same purpose.

CANADA AND THE BMDS⁹³

Canada has shown some interest in ballistic missile defence, but has historically preferred to address the problem indirectly, favouring diplomatic approaches to limit ballistic missile proliferation.

⁹³ Department of National Defence. *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence* at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1064.

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Canada shares US and NATO concerns about the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Although the ballistic missile threat to Canada is not currently considered to be high, joint Canadian and American intelligence estimates suggest that in the coming years the range and accuracy of ballistic missile technology available to potential proliferators will improve, weapons of mass destruction proliferation will continue and the threat to Canada and Canadian interests could increase.

Canada's historical approach to ballistic missile proliferation has been based on engaging diplomatically with potential ballistic missile proliferators; promoting multilateral arms control mechanisms; and examining the employment of defensive capabilities. In this way Canada has sought to address the threats posed by the proliferation of WMD and missile technology, in a manner that respects Canada's longstanding policies on arms control and strategic stability – including Canada's opposition to the weaponization of space, as articulated in the April 1999 Government Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.

Canada is a founding member of the Missile Technology Control Regime established in 1987 as a means to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation by controlling the transfer of missile equipment, material and related technologies. Canada was also instrumental in the development of the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation – the first multilateral agreement which establishes principles and confidence building measures regarding ballistic missiles and related activities.

Complementing these efforts to halt the proliferation and use of missile delivery systems, Canada remains active in working to control the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that could be employed as warheads for such weapons. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty forms the foundation of Canada's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy. Canada has also been very active in the development, universalization and implementation of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. More recently, Canada has provided considerable resources to support the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Canada and the US established a BMD Bilateral Information Sharing Working Group that has met twice a year since 2000. In addition, Canada placed a Canadian Forces Liaison Officer with the US Missile Defense Agency in early 2001 for the purpose of supporting the ongoing consultation and information gathering process. Canada is also involved with short-range missile defence efforts that have been underway in NATO since the early 1990s.

In January 2004, Defence Minister David Pratt exchanged letters with US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in which they stated that in light of the growing threat involving the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the two Governments might explore further cooperation in ballistic missile defence, as an appropriate response to these new threats and as a useful complement to our non-proliferation efforts.⁹⁴ In August 2004, the Canadian government agreed to allow the NORAD warning system to be used by the US BMDS when the two countries agreed to renew the NORAD agreement.

Further Canadian participation in the BMDS became a political issue throughout 2005 and was not well explained to Canadians. In February 2006, contrary to what many had expected, the Canadian government officially decided against participating in the BMDS programme.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)⁹⁵

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by one of two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of deterrence according to which the deployment of strong weapons is essential to threaten the enemy in order to prevent the use of the very same weapons. The strategy is effectively a form of Nash Equilibrium, in which both sides are attempting to avoid their worst possible outcome — Nuclear Annihilation.

Theory

The doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with

⁹⁴ US Reply to Canadian note on the renewal of the NORAD agreement August 2004 at http://www.fac-aec.gc.ca/department/note_0095-en.asp.

⁹⁵ Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutually_assured_destruction

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equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate escalation resulting in both combatants' total and assured destruction. It is now generally assumed that the nuclear fallout or nuclear winter would bring about worldwide devastation, though this was not a critical assumption to the theory of MAD.

The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side will launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with secondary forces (second strike) resulting in the destruction of both parties. The payoff of this doctrine is expected to be a tense but stable peace.

The primary application of this doctrine started during the Cold War (1950s to 1990s) in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the two power blocs while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. It was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike capability. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990's and today (2006) the US and Russia (former USSR) are on relatively friendly terms, the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction certainly continues to be in force although it has receded from public discourse.

Proponents of MAD as part of U.S. and USSR strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive (as a functioning state) a full scale nuclear exchange. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles. This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear missile bunkers, ballistic missile submarines and nuclear bombers kept at fail-safe points) and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

This MAD scenario is often known by the euphemism nuclear deterrence. The term deterrence was first used in this context after World War II; prior to that time, its use was limited to legal terminology.

APPENDIX XV

Programs of the Joint Space Project

Major Initiatives of the Joint Space Project

To date, nine projects have been established by the Canadian Forces in partnership with the Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) and/or the Canadian Space Agency under respective Technology Demonstration Programs (TDP):

- RADARSAT 2 Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) Nearing completion; Launch 2007
- SAPPHIRE: Surveillance of Space capability. Launch 2006/07;
- Partnership in NORAD Space Surveillance Network (SSN);
- POLAR STAR: Geospatial Intelligence;
- Joint Space Support Project (JSSP): Support to military operations Provide space capability to deployed operational and tactical formations;
- CAESAR. Demonstration of space-based moving target indicator (MTI) using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) in a coalition environment fused with multiple air borne Radar sensors;
- Weather and Oceanographic Service (WOS): Complete Direct access to weather and meteorological information; and
- POLAR EPSILON: Joint Space-Based Wide Area Surveillance and Support. Emphasis on wide-area surface surveillance of approaches to North America, including Arctic Zone. CF Northern Area support and support to deployed Maritime Canadian Task Group

Potential follow on projects in the near future could include the following: partnership with Canadian Space Agency (CSA) in developing an HSI sensor, partnership in Ballistic Missile Defence for North America, should the Canada decide to participate; a follow-on sensor for the surveillance of space – SAPPHIRE

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project, if Canada is to continue to partner in the NORAD aerospace warning mission under the NORAD Agreement ; and partnership in the NORAD Space Based Radar concept, should this requirement be approved and funded in the USA. Canada would be well positioned to partner in the latter project given that Canada is a world leader in space-based synthetic aperture radar technology, radar imagery processing, and in moving target detection.

APPENDIX XVI

Description of Coast Guard Cutter and Icebreakers **Recommended by the Committee**

Canadian Coast Guard – Heavy Arctic Icebreakers, the Cutter Recommended by John Dewar and the United States Coast Guard Option

This appendix briefly discusses the requirements for a new Heavy Arctic Icebreaker that would enable the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) to break ice year-round in Canada's Arctic waters and discusses in depth the specifications of a new cutter that would enable the CCG to police and protect Canada's coasts.

Heavy Arctic Icebreaker

The Committee believes that the CCG, which has an extensive experience in the icebreaking business, should have the capacity to ensure that marine traffic can move safely through and around ice in Polar waters year round.

However, of the CCG's 19 icebreakers,⁹⁶ only two are Heavy Arctic Icebreakers which are only capable of sustained operations in the Canadian Arctic for the period of early June to mid-November.⁹⁷

The Committee believes 3 Heavy Arctic Icebreakers; able to operate in Polar waters year-round would provide the CCG with the capacity to provide safe passage for marine traffic through Arctic water.

Dewar's Vessel:

On 2 June 2003, Mr. John Dewar testified to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence that Canada should purchase a corvette-sized ship, also called a 'cutter,' for use by the navy in the performance of law enforcement functions.

⁹⁶ Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canadian Coast Guard "Icebreaking Program," http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/ice-gla/overview_e.htm Last visited September 26, 2006.

⁹⁷ Fisheries and Oceans Canada, "Commissioned Vessels, Aircraft, and Hovercraft," http://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/fleet-flotte/vessels-navires/main_e.asp Last visited September 25, 2006.

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He recommended a vessel measuring 75 meters that was able to operate in a high sea-state, move quickly (25 knots minimum using diesel propulsion), and remain at sea for 30 days. He said that a landing deck or hanger for a large maritime helicopter like the Sea King is essential. A helicopter would assist in the identification of ships and extend the visible range from the vessel. Typically, sailors can see 6-10 nautical miles from their ship, but most maritime helicopters have a range of 150 nautical miles.

Comparison with Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Cutters:

CCG cutters do not meet the criteria outlined by Dewar. The Gordon Reid and Tanu are not as fast or large. The Gordon Reid is 50 meters long and has a top speed of 16.5 knots, and the Tanu is 50.1 meters long and has a top speed of 13.5 knots.

The Sir Wilfred Grenfell, Leonard J. Cowley, and Cape Roger are large enough, but are too slow. The Sir Wilfred Grenfell is 68.5 meters long and has a maximum speed of 16 knots, the Leonard J. Cowley is 72 meters long and has a maximum speed of 15 knots, and the Cape Roger is 62.5 meters long and has a top speed of 17 knots.

In addition, of the CCG's five multi-task cutters larger than 50 meters, two (the Cape Roger and Tanu) are at least 25 years old and should therefore be replaced.

Dewar estimates that the vessel would cost CDN \$ 55-100 million per unit. Since it would be used for law enforcement, commercial construction and procurement practices could be adopted to lower the per unit price. Civilian sources could be relied upon for service support throughout the life of the vessel, further reducing the cost.

The main factor in the vessel's cost would be the sophistication and density of its radar, sensors, communications equipment and weapon systems. There is a wide variation in the types of sensors and radars. A working group should be convened to determine the specific requirements so that the right balance between affordability and capability can be found. A consultancy process is necessary because of the number of government and departmental jurisdictions involved.

APPENDIX XVI
Description of Coast Guard Cutter and Icebreakers
Recommended by the Committee

Keeping the size of the cutter roughly as specified is important because the vessel needs good sea-keeping ability. The size of a ship is not directly proportional to its cost. The ship's physical dimensions are a small part of its total cost, but they have a significant impact on performance. Dewar testified before the Committee that the cutter should be around 75 metres long in order to conduct boardings and have the desired sea-keeping capability.

Dewar believes the capabilities needed for the law enforcement function are:

- The ability to operate in high sea states
- A high maximum speed for positioning and pursuit
- High endurance to maximize deployment time
- The ability to operate a large helicopter (e.g. CH124)
- The ability to transport and deploy boarding parties
- Ice tolerance (first year ice)
- Sophisticated sensors (e.g., radar, ESM, electro-optic, sonar)
- The ability to participate in network-centric command and control regimes
- Sophisticated communications capability
- Armament commensurate with enforcement functions (e.g., small arms, machine guns (e.g., 50 Cal), medium calibre weapon (e.g., 57mm or 76mm) and close-in self-defence weapon system (e.g., Phalanx)

Dewar recommends that the vessel have these specifications:

Length (waterline):	minimum 75m
Beam:	minimum 12m
Displacement:	minimum 1600T, desirable 2000T
Propulsion:	Twin Shaft, 2 x Medium Speed Diesel
Maximum Speed:	minimum 25 knots
Time on Station:	30 Days
Complement:	maximum 40 (mixed gender)
Accommodation:	for 40 more personnel (boarding teams, etc.)
Helicopter:	Large helicopter (e.g., CH124) - minimum landing deck, hangar desirable
Estimate cost:	\$55M - \$100M per unit (ROM)

United States Coast Guard (USCG) Alternative:

The USCG is implementing an Integrated Deepwater System Program. Under this major multi-year fleet upgrade and recapitalization program, an Offshore Patrol Corvette (OPC) with specifications and capabilities similar to the vessel recommended by Mr. Dewar will be constructed. The OPC will join the USCG fleet in 2013.

The price of the ship has not been determined. The USCG and the defence contractor (which is Integrated Coast Guard Systems, a joint venture established by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman) do not know the cost at this time. The per-unit cost could be decreased and the construction timetable advanced if countries like Canada decided to purchase the vessel (Israel already has).

Canada could buy into the OPC production line as a straightforward military purchase. It could also enter into a co-operative agreement with the US to acquire a Canadianized version. It would not be difficult to equip the OPC with less sophisticated systems than the US model in order to reduce cost. Canada would pay for the Canadianized features it wanted, and the US would do the same. The cost for the standard elements would be shared.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, Appendix XI," October 2003, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep17oct03-e.htm>

APPENDIX XVII
Legal Opinion on the Northwest Passage

Donat Pharand O.C., Q.C., S.J.D.
Professor of Law Emeritus

November 11, 2005

BY HAND

The Honourable Colin Kenny, Chair,
Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence,
The Senate
Ottawa
K1A 0A4

Dear Senator Kenny,

This letter responds to your request for an overview of the subject of Canada's arctic sovereignty and ways in which Canada can both establish and maintain it. I have prepared and am also remitting to you a longer paper, with two maps attached, entitled "Canada's Arctic Sovereignty" (November 2005); it supports in greater detail the opinions expressed in this letter.

I will first canvass the meaning of sovereignty and the status of Canada's sovereign rights in the Arctic. I will then list some of the measures that Canada could take to assert sovereignty and mention some risks that could arise from failure to do so.

The Meaning of Sovereignty

Sovereignty is a State's exclusive right to exercise, to the exclusion of every other state, the functions of a state within its boundaries.

It must be noted, however, that "the sovereignty of each State is always subject to the supremacy of international law" (*Declaration of Rights and Duties of States*, 6 Dec. 1949). All United Nations member states have accepted the limitations imposed upon them by the UN Charter. In addition, States sometimes limit their sovereignty by giving rights to other States, such as the right to fly through their airspace. In contemporary international law, absolute sovereignty no longer exists, as it would mean the very denial of an international legal order.

Sovereignty applies mainly to land, but it may also apply to certain water or sea areas. These areas are called "internal waters".

Canada's Acquisition of Sovereignty in the Arctic

Leaving aside conquest, there are three ways to acquire territorial sovereignty: effective occupation, cession and acquisitive prescription. All three have much less importance to-day than they once had. Effective occupation presumes that the territory is a "*res nullius*", belonging to no-one. A State must exercise exclusive control over the claimed territory. However, the necessity of proving that control will depend mainly on two factors: the remoteness of the territory and whether it is contested by another State (see the *Eastern Greenland Case*, 1933 and *Western Sahara Case*, 1975). Cession is a simple transfer of title from one State to another, such as was done in the 1867 Treaty, whereby Russia transferred sovereignty over Alaska to the United States. As for acquisitive prescription, the requirements are basically the same as in both the Common Law and Civil Law systems. However, no international case has been decided on the basis of that principle alone, although it has been mentioned along with others such as effective occupation and consolidation of title.

Canada acquired sovereignty in the Arctic in 1870 and 1880, by cession from Great Britain, which transferred all its territorial rights in the northern territories and the Arctic by orders in council.

The Present Status of Canada's Sovereignty in the Arctic

Since acquiring sovereignty in the Arctic, Canada has consistently claimed and exercised it. With respect to the present status of Canada's sovereignty over its arctic regions, I hold the following views:

- Canada's sovereignty over the entirety of its northern continental land mass is indisputable;
- Canada's sovereignty over the islands of the Canadian Arctic archipelago is secure. The only dispute is with Denmark over Hans Island located outside the archipelago in Nares Strait.
- Canada's has sovereign rights over its Arctic Continental Shelf, subject only to a delimitation dispute with the United States in the Beaufort Sea and a delimitation dispute with Denmark, and possibly Russia, in the Lincoln Sea;
- Canada's claim to sovereignty over the internal waters within its Arctic Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, is solid, despite protests from the United States and certain European countries; and
- Canada needs to take appropriate control measures to protect its claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage and prevent it from becoming an international strait.

Establishing and Maintaining Sovereignty

As noted above, the vast majority of Canada's arctic sovereignty is undisputable and undisputed. Where sovereignty is not in dispute, its exercise through effective occupation and exclusive control maintains it. Indicators of such occupation and control could include a civil, economic or military presence; having the public sector stewardship of resources; providing governmental services such as navigation and search and rescue services, and social services such as health care; and regulating passage through the area.

In international law, where territorial sovereignty is not admitted but disputed, both Parties attempt to substantiate their claim by pointing to State activities, including official declarations, that indicate an intention to act as sovereign.

In the case of Hans Island dispute, relevant State activities, among others, include: claiming discovery, claiming the name, raising the flag, erecting stone cairns, visits by frigates or coast guard ships, visits by Government officials such as the Minister of Defence and official mention of the magic word "occupation".

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In the case of the Beaufort Sea delimitation dispute, Canada's case rests on the notoriety of its use of the 141st meridian for various legislative and administrative purposes. Canada would obviously wish to maintain this practice.

In the case of the Lincoln Sea delimitation dispute, Canada's objection is a legal one about the appropriateness of using a few small islands in the Lincoln Sea (in particular Beaumont Island) as base-points for the baselines. Little more can be done to promote Canada's sovereignty other than to affirm its legal position.

With respect to its internal arctic waters, Canada established its straight baselines in September 1985, shortly after the passage of the US Polar Sea. It did so under the customary law of the *Fisheries Case*. In addition to having the required geography to use the straight baseline system, Canada can invoke, as was done in the *Fisheries Case*, "certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage" (I.C.J. Rep., 1951 at 133; this optional criterion was retained in the Conventions of 1958 and 1982). The Court allowed Norway to rely on the traditional fishing rights, reserved for its local inhabitants in certain large basins, to support the validity of their enclosure by straight baselines. Similarly, Canada can invoke the vital needs and economic interests of its Inuit population. In particular, these interests may be relied upon to reinforce the validity of the baselines across Lancaster Sound, on the east side of the Archipelago, and Amundsen Gulf, on the west side. It is well established that the Inuit have been fishing, hunting and trapping in the waters and on the ice of most of the Archipelago for some 4000 years. These vital historic rights and interests can surely be relied upon to consolidate Canada's title to the enclosed waters (On this point, see Donat Pharand, *Canada's Arctic Waters*, 1988, at 163-177).

The Special Case of the Northwest Passage

Canada and the United States maintain diametrically opposed views on the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Canada considers the Passage as a national sea route, in the same way as Russia views the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route, requiring its consent for foreign use. The United States considers the Passage as an international strait, in which the new right of "transit passage" applies (LOS Conv., 1982, Art. 38).

To weigh the claims by reference to international law, one must look to the two criteria applied by the International Court in the *Corfu Channel Case* of 1949. The first, the geographic criterion, merely requires that there be an overlap of territorial waters. The second is a functional criterion, namely that the strait has been a “useful route for international maritime traffic” (*I.C.J. Rep.*, 1949, at 28). In its 100-year history, the Northwest Passage has seen only a small number of foreign crossings and these were mainly by American ships. Nearly all of them have taken place with the consent of Canada, albeit that occasionally the consent might not have been completely voluntary.

Because of the remoteness of the Northwest Passage, a considerably lower threshold of use than that which existed in the *Corfu Channel Case* might be sufficient. Nevertheless, by no stretch of the imagination could the Passage be presently classified as an international strait. The position of the United States is obviously based on a criterion of potential use rather than one of actual use. This explains why it objected during the Third Law of the Sea Conference to a definition proposed by Canada, which would have required a “traditional” use.

However, with the thinning and shrinking of the ice pack presently taking place, Canada must envisage an eventual use of its Passage for foreign commercial navigation. Not that it would wish to prevent such use, but it must take appropriate measures to exercise effective control over the Passage. Such control would be necessary to insure the protection of its national interests with respect to a number of matters such as the fragile marine environment, the traditional way of life of its Inuit, and the general security and defence of its territory and population. Appropriate control measures would fall in two main categories: information and enforcement. Canada must be kept fully informed of the activities taking place in that huge area over which it claims both territorial and maritime sovereignty. It must also have the enforcement capability to prevent or terminate activities deemed to be contrary to either its national laws or international law, or both. A tentative list of control measures which Canada could take would include:

- 1- Make NORDREC mandatory, requiring all vessels to give pre-arrival information and obtain clearance before entering Canada’s Arctic waters.

- 2- Insure that all Canadian Coast Guard ships have the necessary pollution prevention and control equipment, and qualified personnel to deal with emergencies.

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- 3- Develop a submarine detective and control capability, such as the installation of sonar systems at the entrances of the Northwest Passage.
- 4- Build a Class 8 icebreaker or equivalent, such as had been authorized in 1985, to enable Canada to operate year-round in all of its Arctic safety control zones.
- 5- Develop a full range of sea and land based services required for safe navigation in ice-covered waters, such as those being completed along the Northern Sea Route.
- 6- Develop radar coverage beyond the North Warning System to cover all of Canada's airspace.
- 7- Improve and increase the number of long-range patrol aircraft.
- 8- Increase the number of Canadian Rangers and improve their training.
- 9- Have a small presence of Canadian Security and Intelligence personnel to work in cooperation with the local RCMP.
- 10- Develop an adequate search and rescue capability, as air and sea traffic increases.

Should Canada fail to take the necessary control measures and the Northwest Passage become an international strait, the new right of "transit passage" would apply. This right is one of freedom of navigation and overflight, virtually as on the high seas. The 1982 Convention provides that in international straits: "all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded" (Art. 38). The new right benefits warships and submarines "in their normal modes of... transit" (Art. 39). This result obtains in spite of a provision which specifies that "the regime of passage through straits used for international navigation... shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits" (Art. 34). While Article 34 sounds satisfactory in theory, it is quite obvious that, in practice, Canada's sovereignty over those waters would be completely amputated.

Canada's Cooperation with Other Arctic States

As industrial development and international navigation increase on both sides of the Pole, the need for cooperation among Arctic States will also increase proportionately. Cooperation arrangements will be absolutely necessary in such matters as the following: protection of the fragile marine environment, conservation of flora and fauna, prevention of Arctic ozone depletion, management of Arctic resources, taking of measures against possible terrorism, and adoption and enforcement of a polar navigation code (already in development).

To insure the enforcement of such measures, Arctic States should preferably establish a treaty-based regional organization. Beginnings of institutional cooperation have already been made through the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996, the Northern Forum, the Institute of the North, the International Arctic Science Committee and other similar agencies. Whatever the mode adopted for international cooperation, it is crucial for its success that the indigenous populations in the Arctic be given a strong participation.

Canada's Internal Government Structure

As the second largest Arctic State, Canada must have a strong voice in all matters relating to the Arctic. Having a lead department to secure adequate cooperation among a dozen or more government departments and agencies may not be adequate. Canada should seriously consider establishing a new federal Department of Northern Affairs with the necessary jurisdiction.

Yours truly,

Donat Pharand

Donat Pharand O.C., Q.C., S.J.D.
Professor of Law Emeritus

CANADA'S ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

by Donat Pharand (11 Nov. 2005)

- 1- Meaning of Sovereignty
- 2- Canada's Sovereignty over Arctic Islands
 - (1) Modes of Acquiring Territorial Sovereignty
 - (2) Sovereignty over Islands of the Archipelago
 - (3) Sovereignty over Hans Island
- 3- Canada's "Sovereign Rights" over the Continental Shelf
 - (1) Delimitation in the Beaufort Sea
 - (2) Delimitation in the Lincoln Sea
- 4- Canada's Sovereignty over Arctic Waters
 - (1) Historic Waters
 - (2) Straight Baselines
- 5- Canada's Sovereignty over the Northwest Passage
 - (1) Present Status of the Northwest Passage
 - (2) Possible Internationalization of the Northwest Passage
- 6- Canada's Cooperation with Other Arctic States

1- Meaning of sovereignty

Max Huber, the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Case of 1928, gave what has become the classic definition of sovereignty as follows: “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State”. To put it simply, sovereignty represents the totality of jurisdiction which a State may exercise within its boundaries. Such jurisdiction extends not only horizontally, but vertically. In the words of the Roman law expression, it extends “ursque ad coelum et ad inferos”.

It must be noted, however, that “the sovereignty of each State is always subject to the supremacy of international law” (Declaration of Rights and Duties of States 6 Dec. 1949). All UN member States have accepted the limitations imposed upon them by the Charter. In addition, States sometimes limit their sovereignty by giving rights to other States, such as the right to fly through their airspace. In contemporary international law, absolute sovereignty no longer exists, as it would mean the very denial of an international legal order.

Sovereignty applies mainly to land, but it may also apply to certain water or sea areas. These areas are called “internal waters”.

2- Canada’s Sovereignty over Arctic Islands

(1) Modes of Acquiring Territorial Sovereignty

Leaving aside conquest, there are three ways to acquire territorial sovereignty: effective occupation, cession and acquisitive prescription. All the three have much less importance to-day as they once did. Effective occupation presumes that the territory is a “res nullius”, belonging to no-one. A State must exercise exclusive control over the claimed territory. However, the necessity of proving that control will depend mainly on two factors: the remoteness of the territory and whether it is contested by another State (see cases of Eastern Greenland, 1933 and Western Sahara, 1975). Cession is a simple transfer of title from one State to another, such as was done in the 1867 Treaty, whereby Russia transferred sovereignty over Alaska to the United States. An equivalent transfer of title took place in 1870 and 1880 when Great Britain transferred to Canada, by way of imperial orders in council, all its territorial rights in the northern territories and the Arctic. As for acquisitive prescription, the requirements are basically the same as in both the Common Law and Civil Law systems. However, no international

case has been decided on the basis of that principle alone, although it has been mentioned along with others such as effective occupation and consolidation of title.

(2) Sovereignty over the Islands of the Archipelago

Since the transfer from Great Britain, Canada's title to the Arctic Islands has been questioned on two occasions only, once by Denmark and the other, by Norway. In 1920, the Canadian government requested that Denmark restrain its Eskimos from killing musk-oxen on Ellesmere Island because it feared their extinction. The Danish government stated in its reply that it thought it could subscribe to the view, expressed by the Danish explorer Rasmussen, that Ellesmere Island was "no man's land". This resulted in an appropriate communication being sent to Denmark by Great Britain, on behalf and at the request of Canada, and Denmark did not pursue the matter.

As for Norway, the problem related to the Sverdrup Islands, west of Ellesmere, which had been explored by its national O. Sverdrup. A reservation of rights over the islands was expressed, in 1928, in a letter by the Norwegian consul in Montreal. Talks between Canada and Norway ensued and resulted in Canada paying a modest sum to the widow of the Norwegian explorer, representing the expenses for his scientific research on the islands. The matter was closed by an Exchange of Notes on August 1930, whereby Norway recognized Canada's sovereignty over the islands. Norway specified, however, that its recognition was "in no way based on any sanction whatever in what is named the 'sector principle'". (Canada Treaty Series, 1930, No. 17, at 3).

Since 1930, there has never been any challenge to Canada's sovereignty over any of the islands comprised in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

(3) Sovereignty over Hans Island

In December 1973, Canada and Denmark concluded an Agreement delimiting their continental shelf between the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and Greenland. This was done on the basis of the median line (with the occasional adjustment) as far north as the Lincoln Sea, with the exception of a small area around Hans Island. This small island or rock (about 1.3 sq.km) is located in the middle of Nares Strait, and its sovereignty is claimed by both Canada and Denmark. It is not known to this

writer what exactly is at stake, Fish stocks? Marine mammals? Petroleum or mineral resources? With respect to the latter, the Agreement provides that “in view of the inadequacies of existing hydrographic charts... neither Party shall issue licences for exploitation of mineral resources in areas bordering the developing line without the prior agreement of the other Party...”(Art. III). It also provides that “if any single geological petroleum structure or field... or of any other mineral deposit...extends across the dividing line...the Parties shall seek to reach an agreement...”(Art.V).

Since it is a dispute as to territorial sovereignty, both Parties attempt to substantiate their claim by pointing to State activities, indicating an intention to act as sovereign. The State activities include, among others: raising the flag, erecting stonecairns, visit by a Minister of defence, visit by a frigate or a coast guard ship, official mention of the magic word “occupation”, claim of discovery, alleged naming of the Island after one Hans Hendrik, a Moravian missionary (or was it an Inuit from Greenland?), etc.

Numerous disputes over islands have been settled by third party procedure, including uninhabited ones such as Hans Island. Those cases make one thing clear: the more remote the island, the less a State has to show by way of effective occupation and manifestation of State activities. Actually “effective” can become rather fictitious. In the case of Hans Island, an arbitral tribunal or the International Court would have to balance the State activities and official declarations of both Parties, and decide which ones prevail. This was done in the Eastern Greenland Case of April 1933, between Denmark and Norway (PCIJ, 1933, Series A/B, No. 53, 22-147).

3- Canada’s “Sovereign Rights” over the Arctic Continental Shelf

The continental shelf of a State is “the natural prolongation of its land territory” under the sea (Continental Shelf Convention, 1982, Art. 76). As a rule, it extends to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of territorial sea is measured, but it may extend further depending on the geology. The coastal State does not have sovereignty over the continental shelf, but only “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources” (Art. 77).The absence of sovereignty in the full sense means that the legal status of the superjacent waters and air space are unaffected, and the freedom of navigation continues to apply.

The law governing delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts simply provides that “the delimitation...shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law... in order to achieve an equitable solution” (Art. 83). If no agreement is reached, an international tribunal will decide on the basis of a number of equitable criteria and methods. These have been developed since the North Sea Case in 1969 and are still being developed as new cases are decided. Among the many criteria and methods already accepted are the following: the general direction of the coast, special configurations (convexity, concavity, exceptional projections), length of coast, equidistance, historic usage, geological data, and off-shore islands.

Canada has two delimitation problems in the Arctic, one with the United States in the Beaufort Sea and the other, with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea.

(1) Delimitation in the Beaufort Sea

The Canadian position is based mainly on Article III of the 1825 Convention of St. Petersburg between Russia and Britain, which would have the maritime boundary follow the 141st meridian. In effect, it is simply a seaward extension of the land boundary. The American position is based on equidistance from the termination of the land boundary on the 141st meridian, which is to its advantage because of the concavity of Canada’s coast. The notoriety of Canada’s use of the 141st meridian for various legislative and administrative purposes is invoked in support of its position. Whether this historic usage is such as to put the United States in a situation of acquiescence or estoppel remains a question.

(2) Delimitation in the Lincoln Sea

Canada and Denmark have agreed to use the equidistance method in the Lincoln Sea, but there is a slight disagreement as to what should be the precise positioning of certain straight baselines. In particular, Canada objects to Denmark using a few small islands in the Lincoln Sea (in particular Beaumont Island) as base-points for the baselines, which has the effect of pushing the equidistance line on the Canadian side. It seems that there are two relatively small areas in dispute, each being a little more than 30 square nautical miles. As well, there could also be a “seaward limit” problem with Russia, if it should turn out that the Lomonosov Ridge crossing the Arctic Basin is a geological continuation of the continental

shelf in the Lincoln Sea. There would then be a three-way delimitation problem between Russia, Denmark and Canada.

4- Canada's Sovereignty over the Arctic Waters

There are two possible legal bases for Canada's claim of sovereignty over the waters within its Arctic Archipelago: an historic title and straight baselines, both resulting in internal waters. Canada has chosen to rely on an historic title and draw straight baselines around the archipelago to delimit the extent of historic waters.

(1) Historic Waters

Although the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention recognizes the validity of historic waters, it does not define them. The requirements for the acquisition of such title, resulting in maritime sovereignty or internal waters, are similar to those pertaining to territorial sovereignty. They are: (i) exercise of exclusive State jurisdiction; (ii) long usage; and (iii) acquiescence by foreign States, particularly those whose interests are primarily affected. The burden of proof of such title is a heavy one, since it represents an exception to the status which the waters in question would normally have. Without the historic title, they would be territorial waters, exclusive economic zone or high seas.

After a thorough study, including an examination of British explorers' journals at the Scott Polar Institute in Cambridge, it is strongly believed that Canada cannot discharge its heavy burden of proof. The main reasons are: (i) neither British nor Canadian explorers ever took possession of any part of the Arctic waters, especially not those of the Northwest Passage; (ii) the first official claim that the waters of the Canadian archipelago were historic internal waters was made only in 1973; (iii) as soon as Canada delineated its claim of historic waters, by drawing straight baselines around the Archipelago, the United States and Member States of the European Union sent Notes of protest; and (iv) Canada has not succeeded in subjecting all foreign ships to prior authorization to enter the Northwest Passage, in particular American ships. The United States agreed in 1988 that it would request prior authorization for its icebreakers, but on the express understanding that it would not affect its refusal to recognize Canada's claim. In addition, the 1988 Agreement does not cover the rights of passage of commercial vessels or warships other than icebreakers (see Dep't Foreign Affairs, Communiqué No. 010, Art.4, 11 Jan.1998)

The conclusion that Canada is unable to establish an historic title does not prevent it from using history to justify some of Canada's straight baselines, thus consolidating its title to the enclosed waters where there is proof of long usage by the Inuit.

(2) Straight Baselines

The rules governing the use of straight baselines were first formulated by the International Court in the Fisheries Case of 1951. Similar rules were then incorporated in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention (Art. 3) and retained in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (Art. 5).

When Canada established its Arctic straight baselines in September 1985, shortly after the passage of the US Polar Sea, it did so under the customary law of the Fisheries Case. In that case, the Court formulated the geographical requirements as follows: "Where a coast is deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern Finmark, or where it is bordered by an Archipelago such as the "skjaergaard" along the western sector of the coast here in question, the base-line becomes independent of the low-water mark, and can only be determined by means of a geographical construction" (I.C.J. Rep., 1951,128-9). In other words, there are two basic geographical situations where the geometrical construction of baselines may be used. The first is a deeply indented coast and the second, an archipelago bordering a coast. These two geographical situations are referred to as "basic", because the Court did not limit the use of the baselines to those two situations. For the deeply indented coast, it added "as is that of Eastern Finmark" and, for a bordering archipelago, it continued similarly "such as the skjaergaard". More specifically, Eastern Finmark and the skjaergaard were given as the kind of special geography where the baseline method may be used. It seems clear that the Court envisaged the applicability of straight baselines to other deeply indented coasts and coastal archipelagos (such as the Canadian Arctic Archipelago), possessing similar characteristics, but not necessarily the same.

There were two main advantages in proceeding under customary law. The first is that the geographical requirements are less stringent than under the Conventions. These limit the use of straight baselines "in locations where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in the immediate vicinity" (emphasis added). The second advantage is the

absence of the right of innocent passage in the new enclosed internal waters, whereas it applies under the Conventions.

In addition to having the required geography to use the straight baseline system, Canada can invoke, as was done in the Fisheries Case, “certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage” (I.C.J. Rep., 1951 at 133; this optional criterion was retained in the Conventions of 1958 and 1982). The Court allowed Norway to rely on the traditional fishing rights, reserved to its local inhabitants in certain large basins, to support the validity of their enclosure by straight baselines. Similarly, Canada can invoke the vital needs and economic interests of its Inuit population. In particular, these interests may be relied upon to reinforce the validity of the baselines across Lancaster Sound, on the east side of the Archipelago, and Amundsen Gulf, on the west side. It is well established that the Inuit have been fishing, hunting and trapping in the waters and on the ice of most of the Archipelago for some 4000 years. These vital historic rights and interests can surely be relied upon to consolidate Canada’s title to the enclosed waters (On this point, see Donat Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Waters, 1988, at 163-177).

The conclusion is that, in spite of the protest on the part of the United States and certain European countries, Canada’s baselines are valid under customary international law. There exist at least three specific reasons to support this conclusion. First, Canada was perfectly entitled to proceed under customary law, not being a Party to the 1958 Convention. Second, the provisions of that Convention had not become part of customary law in 1985 through State practice, the latter lacking the necessary general uniformity. Third, Canada did not become a Party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (which entered into force in November 1994) until 2003, nearly twenty years after drawing its baselines. These baselines being valid under customary law, the enclosed waters are strictly “internal”, including those of the Northwest Passage. However, the Northwest Passage could still become what is normally called an “international strait” if the necessary control measures are not taken.

5- Canada’s Sovereignty over the Northwest Passage

(1) Present Status of the Northwest Passage

Canada and the United States maintain diametrically opposed view on the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Canada considers the Passage as a national

sea route, in the same way as Russia views the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route, requiring its consent for foreign use. The United States considers the Passage as an international strait, in which the new right of “transit passage” applies (LOS Conv., 1982, Art. 38). This right is one of freedom of navigation and overflight, virtually as on the high seas. It may be exercised by all ships, including warships in general and submarines in particular, in their normal mode navigation.

Following the US Polar Sea incident of 1985, when the United States refused to ask permission for its westerly crossing, the two countries concluded a Cooperation agreement in January 1988. It provides for Canada’s prior consent, but it has two important limitations: first, it applies to icebreakers only and, second, it does not change the respective legal positions of the Parties. The difference of opinion is caused by the complete absence in the 1982 Convention of any definition of a strait “used for international navigation”. Consequently, one must look to the two criteria applied for the International Court in the Corfu Channel Case of 1949. The first or geographic criterion simply requires that there be an overlap of territorial waters. This was the case in Barrow Strait of the Northwest Passage before 1985 and, according to the United States, is still the case to-day. The second is a functional criterion, namely that the strait has been a “useful route for international maritime traffic” (I.C.J. Rep., 1949, at 28). In that case, the Court found that the Corfu Channel had been a very useful route for seven States and had seen some 2,844 crossings over a 21-month period, counting only ships which had put in port and had been visited by customs. In other words, the actual use had been quite extensive.

In its 100-year history, the Northwest Passage has seen only a small number of foreign crossings and these were mainly by American ships. Nearly all of them have taken place with the consent of Canada, albeit that occasionally the consent might not have been completely voluntary. It must also be remembered that, because of the remoteness of the Northwest Passage, a threshold of use considerably lower than existed in the Corfu Case might be sufficient. Nevertheless, by no stretch of the imagination could the Passage be presently classified as an international strait. The position of the United States is obviously based on a criterion of potential use rather than one of actual use. This explains why it objected during the Third Law of the Sea Conference to a definition proposed by Canada, which would have required a “traditional” use.

(2) Possible Internationalization of the Northwest Passage

APPENDIX XVII
Legal Opinion on the Northwest Passage

With the thinning and shrinking of the ice pack presently taking place, Canada must envisage an eventual use of its Passage for foreign commercial navigation. Not that it would wish to prevent such use, but it must take appropriate measures to exercise effective control over the Passage. Such control would be necessary to insure the protection of its national interests in respect of a number of matters, such as the following: the fragile marine environment, the traditional way of life of its Inuit, and general security and defence of its territory and population.

The control measures would fall in two main categories: information and enforcement. Canada must be kept fully informed of the activities taking place in that huge area over which it claims both territorial and maritime sovereignty. It must also have the enforcement capability to prevent or terminate activities deemed to be contrary to either its national laws or international law, or both.

What follows is a tentative list of some of the control measures which could be taken by Canada.

- 1- Make NORDREC mandatory, requiring all vessels to give pre-arrival information and obtain clearance before entering Canada's Arctic waters.
- 2- Insure that all Canadian Coast Guard ships have the necessary pollution prevention and control equipment, and qualified personnel to deal with emergencies.
- 3- Develop a submarine detective and control capability, such as the installation of sonar systems at the entrances of the Northwest Passage.
- 4- Build a Class 8 icebreaker or equivalent, such as had been authorized in 1985, to enable Canada to operate year – round in all of its Arctic safety control zones. At the moment Canada has only five or six ships operating in the Arctic for a few months of the year. The most capable icebreaker being a Class-4, the Louis St-Laurent. By contrast, Russia had six operational nuclear icebreakers at the end of 2000, one of which the Yamal made the 28th voyage to the North Pole in 1999 (37 Polar Record, 2001, at 329). The construction of a new Russian nuclear icebreaker is expected to be completed by the end of 2006 (Institute of the North, Vol. I, Issue 29, 5 Oct. 2005).
- 5- Develop a full range of sea and land based services required for safe navigation in ice-covered waters, such as those being completed along the Northern Sea

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Route. This completion follows a six-year study (1993-1999) directed by the Fridtjof Nausen Institute in Norway, with the cooperation of Russia and Japan, resulting in 167 working papers and several books.

6- Develop radar coverage beyond the North Warning System to cover all of Canada's airspace.

7- Improve and increase the number of long-range patrol aircraft (see Pierre Leblanc, Canada and the North, 8 April 2001, for this and other suggestions).

8- Increase the number of Canadian Rangers and improve their training.

9- Have a small presence of Canadian Security and Intelligence personnel to work in cooperation with the local RCMP.

10- Develop an adequate search and rescue capability, as air and sea traffic increases.

Should Canada fail to take the necessary control measures and the Northwest Passage becomes an international Strait, the new right of passage would apply. In such straits the 1982 Convention provides that "all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded" (Art. 38, emphasis added). The new right benefits warships and submarines "in their normal modes of... transit" (Art. 39). This result obtains in spite of a provision which specifies that "the regime of passage through straits used for international navigation... shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits" (Art. 34). It sounds satisfactory in theory but it is quite obvious that, in practice, Canada's sovereignty over those waters would be completely amputated.


(6) Canada's Cooperation with Other Arctic States

As industrial development and international navigation increase on both sides of the Pole, the need for cooperation among Arctic States will also increase proportionately. Cooperation arrangements will be absolutely necessary in such matters as the following: protection of the fragile marine environment, conservation of flora and fauna, prevention of Arctic ozone depletion, management of Arctic resources, taking of measures against possible terrorism, and adoption and enforcement of a polar navigation code (already in process of development).

To insure the enforcement of such measures, Arctic States should preferably establish a treaty-based regional organization. Beginnings of institutional cooperation have already been made through the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996, the Northern Forum, the Institute of the North, the International Arctic Science Committee and other similar agencies. Whatever the mode adopted for international cooperation, it is crucial for its success that the indigenous populations in the Arctic be given a strong participation. As the second largest Arctic State, it is most important for Canada to have a strong voice in all matters relating to the Arctic. To do so, it might not be sufficient to simply have a lead department to secure adequate cooperation among a dozen or more government departments and agencies. Canada should seriously consider establishing a proper Government Department of Northern Affairs, with all the necessary jurisdiction. Actually, such a department, with exactly that name, was established by the St-Laurent government in 1953. The difference would be in the extent of its jurisdiction.

APPENDIX XVIII

Map of Areas of Responsibility of the RCMP, the Coast Guard and the Canadian Navy



APPENDIX XIX

Glossary

Here are several acronyms which appear in the report above which might require clarification:

ANSTATS	Annual statistics
ATL	Advanced Training List
AWOA	Absent Without Authority
BTL	Basic Training List
CC	Component Command
D Cdts	Director Cadets
DAPPP	Director Accounts Processing, Pay and Pension
DHRIM	Director Human Resource Information Management
DPGP	Director Personnel Generation Policy
DPGR	Director Personnel Generation Requirements
DRES	Director Reserves
FTP Ad-Hoc SRR	File Table Protocol Ad-Hoc Supplementary Ready Reserve
GOL	General Officer List
H Svcs Gp	Health Services Group
HR	Human Resources
IM	Information Management
MAT	Materiel
OPI	Office of Primary Interest
PARRA	Production Attrition Recruiting Retention Analysis
PSR	Projected Status Report
RPSR	Revised Pay System for the Reserve
SPHL	Service Personnel Holding List
SUTL	Subsidized University Training List

14 Wing: The Air Force wing based at Greenwood NS. This wing provides both maritime patrol and search and rescue capabilities to Canada's Atlantic region.

Aircraft Update: A major modernization of aircraft systems designed to replace obsolete systems and/or add new capabilities. Used to extend the life or “time in service” of the aircraft as an alternative to replacement.

Antonov AN-124: Large strategic transport aircraft dating from the Soviet era. Several are now operating commercially and are occasionally chartered by the CF in support of CF overseas operations.

Arcturus: The Canadian name for a Lockheed P-3 not fitted with the anti-submarine warfare equipment. Used for training and maritime surface patrol. The remaining 2 of these aircraft will be taken out of service with the CF in 2007.

Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer: The Arleigh Burke-class is considered to be the U.S. Navy’s most capable and survivable surface combatant. It was the first U.S. Navy ship designed to incorporate shaping techniques to reduce radar cross-section to reduce their detectability and likelihood of being targeted by enemy weapons and sensors.

Asymmetric Cuts: Refers to the fact that, for various reasons, the Air Force was required to provide a significantly larger percentage of the personnel cuts than the other two services.

Asymmetrical Threat: Describes a condition where the opposing force appears disproportionately larger or smaller than your own. Commonly used today when talking about the considerable conventional military might of the United States verses the apparently modest and mostly invisible capability of al Qaeda and the like.

Asymmetric Warfare: Term that describes a military situation in which two belligerents of unequal strength interact and take advantage of their respective strengths and weaknesses. This interaction often involves strategies and tactics outside the bounds of conventional warfare.

Aurora: The Canadian name for the Lockheed P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. Used for anti-submarine warfare and maritime surface patrol. 18 of these aircraft are in service with the CF.

Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ships (AOR): These ships replenish Task Groups at sea with food, munitions, fuel, spare parts and other supplies. They also have large medical and dental facilities. Using their large capacity and extended range, our Task Groups can stay at sea for longer, and go further.

Base: The home location for Canadian Forces units. Usually made up of infrastructure (housing, hangers, garages, runways, etc.) and an organization designed to provide a full range of support services to the unit(s) housed there.

Blue water navy and brown water navy: *Blue water Navy* - a navy that has a credible and balanced (deep ocean) power projection capability.

Brown Water Navy - is a term in American naval jargon referring to actions in near shore and river environments. Small gunboats and patrol craft are the ships used by a brown water force.

BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence): The defence against an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack by using defensive missiles to shoot down the incoming ICBMs.

Boeing 707: An obsolete airliner no longer in service with the CF. Replaced by the A-310 Airbus (Polaris).

Bow-wave: The wave that forms at the bow of a boat when it moves through the water. The size of the bow wave is a function of the speed of the boat, ocean waves, and the shape of the bow. A boat with a large draft and a blunt bow will produce a large wave, while boats that plane over the surface of the water or boats fitted with a bulbous bow will create smaller bow waves. In the context of this report, the “bow wave” is a large accumulation of costs over time that results from a continually deferring infrastructure maintenance.

Buffalo: Twin engine light transport aircraft used by the CF for search and rescue on the mountainous west coast. 6 of an original 15 remain in service pending the purchase of a replacement.

Canada Command: Canada Command is the operational headquarters from which the CF will conduct routine domestic operations treating Canada as one area of operations. Canada Command will eventually command six regional commands throughout Canada. The creation of Canada Com means that for the first time, a unified and integrated chain of command at the national and regional levels will

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have the immediate authority to deploy maritime, land and air assets in their areas of responsibility in support of domestic operations.

Canada Command will be headquartered in Ottawa but will not be co-located with National Defence Headquarters at 101 Colonel by Drive.

Canadian Forces: The armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consisting of one Service with called the Canadian Armed Forces.

Canadian Rangers: Part-time members of the Canadian Forces Reserve who provide a military presence in remote, isolated and coastal communities of Canada. Formally established in 1947, Canadian Rangers are responsible for protecting Canada's sovereignty by reporting unusual activities or sightings, collecting local data of significance to the Canadian Forces, and conducting surveillance or sovereignty patrols as required.

CANFORGEN: Canadian Forces General Order

Canadianizing: A coined term that refers to the program to replace equipment aboard British-built VICTORIA-class submarines with equipment already in use in, or compatible with, Canadian naval vessels.

CC-130 Hercules: Four-engine military cargo aircraft in service with the Canadian Forces since the 1960's. 32 of these remain in the CF inventory.

CEFCOM: Under the new CF structure, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) is the unified command that is responsible for all Canadian Forces (CF) international operations, with the exception of operations conducted solely by Special Operations Group (SOG) elements. Similar to the integrated chain of command put in place under Canada Command (Canada COM), the CF's operational command headquarters responsible for domestic operations, CEFCOM will bring together under one operational command the maritime, land and air force assets to conduct humanitarian, peace support or combat operations wherever they are required internationally. Headquartered in Ottawa, CEFCOM will also be responsible for setting the standards for integrated training and final certification of assigned forces – ensuring that all units and personnel selected to conduct overseas duties are fully trained and ready to do so

CH-148: The Canadian designator for the new maritime helicopter that will eventually replace the Sea King.

Challenger: Small passenger jet aircraft. Used by the government's executive flight service for the transport of senior officials (4 aircraft) and by the Air Force (2 aircraft) for light transport and medical evacuation. All aircraft are operated by the Air Force and maintained by Transport Canada.

Chief of Defence Intelligence: A military officer at the rank of Major-General or Rear Admiral whose responsibility is to provide intelligence services to DND and the CF in support of defence planning and military operations and to support other government departments as it relates to the security of Canada.

Chief of Defence Staff: The Chief of the Defence Staff has primary responsibility for command, control and administration of the Canadian Forces and military of the Canadian Forces and advises the Minister on all these matters - including military requirements, capabilities, options and the possible consequences of undertaking or failing to undertake various military activities. Whenever required, the Chief of the Defence Staff advises the Prime Minister and Cabinet directly on major military developments. The CDS is thus the senior military advisor to the Government as a whole.

The Chief of the Defence Staff implements government decisions involving the Canadian Forces by issuing appropriate orders and instructions. The CDS is accountable to the Minister for the conduct of CF activities, as well as for the condition of the Forces and their ability to fulfill the military commitments and obligations undertaken by the government.

Chinook: Large, twin-rotor helicopter typically used to transport equipment, troops and supplies around a theatre of operations. No longer in the CF inventory.

CFB - Canadian Forces Base: See "base" above.

Coastal Defence Vessels: Are multi-role minor war vessels whose primary mission is coastal surveillance and patrol. Coastal surveillance involves general naval operations and exercises, search and rescue, law enforcement, resource protection and fisheries patrols. The ships are very flexible -- inter-changeable modular payloads can be fitted for route survey, bottom object inspection and mine hunting and countermeasure.

Command and Control Capability: The ability to collect, analyze and communicate information, plan and coordinate operations, and provide the capabilities necessary to direct forces to achieve assigned missions.

Cormorant: The new search and rescue helicopter acquired by the CF over the past five years. 15 are in service with the CF based at Comox, BC, Trenton, ON, Greenwood NS and Gander NFLD.

Counter-intelligence: Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

Coyote: Light armoured reconnaissance vehicle.

DART – Disaster Assistance Response Team: A military organization designed to deploy rapidly anywhere in the world to crises ranging from natural disasters to complex humanitarian emergencies. It:

- responds rapidly, in conjunction with national and regional governments and non-governmental agencies, to stabilize the primary effects of an emergency or disaster;
- provides purified drinking water and medical aid to help prevent the rapid onset of secondary effects of a disaster; and
- gains time for the deployment of national and international humanitarian aid to facilitate long-term recovery in a disaster-stricken community.

Datasets: A logically meaningful grouping or collection of similar or related data. Data having mostly similar characteristics (source or class of source, processing level and algorithms, etc.).

DCDS: Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff – Plan, direct and support DND and CF operations (force employment – national and international); The mission of the DCDS Group is to excel in the conduct of contingency operations through Joint Force Planning, Generation, Enhancement and Development

Defence Capabilities Plan (DCP): The Defence Capabilities Plan (DCP), is a Canadian Forces generated externally directed Government of Canada (GoC)

document that articulates the Department of National Defence capability investment plan in response to GoC policy, direction. It outlines how DND will implement GoC direction within the resources provided by the Government.

Destroyer: A destroyer is a fast and manoeuvrable yet long-endurance warship intended to escort larger vessels in a task or battle group and defend them against smaller, short-range attackers (originally torpedo boats, later submarines and aircraft).

Defence Capabilities Plan: a plan to give the military what it will need to conduct the missions the Government assigns it. It is intended to be a roadmap for acquiring the equipment required over the decade.

Defence Policy Statement: This document articulates the Defence segment of the Canada's global engagement. It was released publicly in April 2005.

DIR (Defence Intelligence Review): The DIR is directly linked to the command and control requirement. The DIR was a recent review of all aspects of defence intelligence to increase the capacity and capability of the National Defence Command Centre (NDCC) and enhance defence intelligence in general. The review reflects today's complex operating environment, which requires improved situational awareness and net-centric responses. The DIR has also highlighted the need to better co-ordinate intelligence activities across departmental and functional components.

Environment: This term designates the naval, land and air components of the Canadian Forces.

Expenditure Review Committee: The Committee was a cabinet-level committee created in 1993 responsible for reviewing all federal spending. It was chair by the President of the Treasury Board and composed of senior government Ministers. It was designed to ensure that government spending remains under control, is accountable, is closely aligned with the priorities of Canadians, and that every tax dollar is invested with care to achieve results for Canadian

Fiscal Year: The financial or accounting year of an organization, which may or may not coincide with the calendar year. An organization may find it convenient to end its accounting year at a time when inventory stocks are down. The fiscal year of Canada's federal and provincial governments runs from April 1 to March 31.

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Frigate: A warship intended to protect other warships and merchant marine ships and as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combatants for amphibious expeditionary forces, underway replenishment groups, and merchant convoys. Canada has 12 general purpose frigates of the HALIFAX-class. Incorporating many technological advances, including an integrated communications system, a command and control system, and a machinery control system, these vessels' weapons, sensors and engines form a formidable platform of defensive and offensive capabilities. They are quiet, fast, and have excellent sea-keeping characteristics.

FWSAR: Fixed-wing search and rescue as the name implies is that portion of the SAR mission conducted by conventional aircraft as opposed to helicopters. Fixed-wing resources tend to be used in the initial phases of the search to locate the distressed ship or aircraft and helicopters to perform the rescue. With limitations, both have some capability to perform the other's role.

Geomatics: a field of activities that uses a systematic approach to integrate all means used to acquire and manage data obtained from sources in space.

Force generation: The principles, fundamentals and process that dictate how forces will be created that include equipping, training and otherwise preparing for operations.

Force projection: The ability to project the military element of national power from Canada, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment.

GMTI (Ground Moving Target Indication): A method of tracking moving vehicles through their changes in relative position on the ground by radar.

Griffons: Light utility helicopter used to transport small groups of troops and light equipment around the battlefield. 75 of 100 purchased in the 1990's are in service with the CF.

GTS (GTS Katie): GTS refers to a Gas Turbine Ship and the GTS Katie was a 750-foot, roll on/roll off cargo ship.

Halifax-class Frigates: please see Frigates.

Huey: Light utility helicopter used to transport troops and light equipment around the battlefield. Replaced by the Griffon in the CF inventory.

HUMINT: A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. 2. Intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

Imagery: A collective term that means the representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media.

Impact Statement: A written statement to the Chief of Defence Staff and Deputy Minister by a Level One senior manager that indicates what the impact will be on his or her organization should the full allocation of requested funds not be provided for the coming Fiscal Year.

Information Technology: The scientific, technological and engineering disciplines as well as to the management technologies used in information handling, communication and processing, their applications and associated software and equipment and their interaction.

Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs): Integrated Border Enforcement Team program is a multi-faceted law enforcement initiative comprised of both Canadian and American partners. This bi-national partnership enables the five core law enforcement partners involved in IBETS to share information and work together daily with other local, state and provincial enforcement agencies on issues relating to national security, organized crime and other criminality transiting the Canada/US border between the Ports of Entry (POE). IBET partner agencies from Canada and the US are: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), US Customs and Border Protection/Office of Border Patrol (CBP/OBP), US Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the US Coast Guard.

Interoperability: The capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those units.

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Interoperability of materiel: Many believe that it can make a major contribution to the smooth running of multilateral operations through interoperability of materiel and common command, control and communications arrangements.

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force. The ISAF in Kabul, Afghanistan is UN mandated and NATO led.

Joint Marine Security Patrols: A new initiative which combines the RCMP and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) resources to enhance maritime patrols on the Great Lakes and the St Lawrence Seaway. The RCMP's role in Canada's marine security is to enforce laws dealing with offences relating to national security, organized crime and other federal statutes, such as those involving smuggling, illegal drugs and immigration. The CCG will be responsible for the acquisition, operation and maintenance of the vessels. While the vessels are predominately staffed by RCMP and CCG personnel, provincial and municipal police officers will also play key roles onboard the vessels.

Joint Space Project (JSP): A Department of National Defence project that combines a number of different projects under one umbrella and project team. Projects are normally in the areas of surveillance from space, surveillance of space, joint space support to military operations, and intelligence.

Joint Support Ship: The Joint Support Ship will provide three distinct capabilities to provide better support to both naval and land forces during joint, national and international operations. It replaces the current AOR. Its roles are:

- a) Underway Support to Naval Task Groups – Underway support is the term used to describe the transfer of liquids and solids between ships at sea. This underway support also includes the operation of helicopters and a second line maintenance capability for helicopters, as well as a task group medical and dental facility;
- b) Sealift – To meet a range of possibilities in an uncertain future security environment, three Joint Support Ships together will be capable of transporting 7,500 lane metres of vehicles and stores. This will provide for the transport of an army battle group. The capability will also include a flexible self load and unload function; and
- c) Afloat Support to Forces Deployed Ashore – This capability will provide a limited joint force headquarters at sea for command and control of forces deployed ashore.

JTF-2: The Joint Task Force Two (JTF 2) of the Canadian Forces is a Special Operations Forces unit that is responsible for federal counter-terrorist operations. The mission of JTF 2 is to provide a force capable of rendering armed assistance in the resolution of an incident that is affecting, or has the potential to affect, the national interest. The primary focus is counter-terrorism (CT), however, the unit can expect to be employed on other high value strategic tasks. JTF 2 was created on April 1, 1993, when the Canadian Forces (CF) accepted responsibility for federal counter-terrorism operations from the RCMP. Since its inception, the unit has continuously evolved to meet modern-day threats. As the events of 11 September 2001 have shown, the threat of terrorism comes from an elusive, sophisticated and determined enemy. In order to maintain an edge in this operational environment, JTF 2 is continuously developing new capabilities, technologies, and tactics. The year 2001 marked an important milestone in the history of JTF 2. The unit was committed to the international Special Operations Forces coalition in Afghanistan, completing its operations there in November 2002. This deployment was the first time JTF 2 was used in a major combat role outside Canada. The unit played a critical role in coalition Special Operations Forces and earned the respect of Canada's allies for its professionalism.

Kiowa: A small helicopter used primarily for battlefield reconnaissance. No longer in service with the CF.

Labrador Helicopter: A twin-rotor helicopter formerly used by the CF for search and rescue. Replaced by the Cormorant.

“Level One” Manager: Senior military officers or senior civilian executives who hold Assistant Deputy Minister status and occupy key positions in DND at the level just below Chief of Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister.

Littoral: The coastal sea areas and that portion of the land which is susceptible to influence or support from the sea, generally recognized as the region which horizontally encompasses the land-watermass interface from 100 kilometres (km) ashore to 200 nautical miles (nm) at sea, and extending vertically into space from the bottom of the ocean and from the land surface

Low altitude attacks: A method of dropping bombs from a fast moving aircraft. The aim of low altitude attacks is to fly below the radar capabilities of an enemy, thereby entering the threat area undetected.

Major Crown Projects: Major Crown Projects (MCP) have cost estimates that exceed \$100 million and that the Treasury board would assess as high risk. The Treasury Board may also direct that certain projects, with a total cost of less than \$100 million but considered to be high risk, be designated as a MCP. There can be projects exceeding \$100 million, but that have not been assessed as high risk or designated as a MCP.

Medium Lift helicopter: Name given to a larger category of utility helicopter than is currently in the CF inventory. Would be used to transport larger groups of troops and their equipment around the battlefield. Consideration for acquiring this capability is underway but actual specifications have not yet been determined.

Mid-life refit: In a naval sense, a refit consists of preventive, corrective and unique maintenance activities that are undertaken at the half-way point of a vessel's designed life. Major overhauls of heavy machinery and the replacement of obsolete electronic systems and/or sub-systems are typically undertaken.

Militia: Army component of the Primary Reserve.

Mine-hunting: The technique of searching for, or clearing mines using mechanical or explosion gear, which physically removes or destroys the mine, or produces, in the area, the influence fields necessary to actuate it.

MODEX (Moving Object Detection Experiment): An experiment conducted by Defence Research and Development Canada that will use data from the RADARSAT 2 satellite to improve capability to track moving objects on the earth's surface.

NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement): The North American Free Trade Agreement is a free trade agreement among Canada, the United States of America, and Mexico, based on the model of the European Communities (today: European Union). NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994.

National Interests: The concept of the security and well-being of the state, used in making foreign policy. A national interest approach of foreign policy demands realistic handling of international problems, based on the use of power divorced from moral principles and values. Conflicts of national interest in the state system are resolved through diplomacy, international law, international institutions or,

ultimately, through war. The national interest concerns the defence and maintenance of the social, political and economic stability of Canada and, thereby, the security of the nation.

Network-Enabled Operations (NEOps): NEOps increases the effectiveness of an armed force by improving intelligence collection, analysis and information sharing between its various elements, including land, sea and air forces. Consequently, the implementation of NEOps is key to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations and increased security of our forces in the field.

NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command): A bilateral defence agreement between the United States and Canada to defend against all aerospace threats to the North American continent. Agreement has been in place since 1958.

NYALA: The RG-31 Nyala is multi-purpose mine-protected vehicle that can accommodate 10 personnel. The vehicle's V-shaped steel hull and high suspension are designed to resist a blast equivalent. This vehicle is being used by the CF in Afghanistan to provide protection against roadside bombs.

ODA (Overseas Development Aid / Official Development Assistance): The nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), made up of the developed nations of the world, have committed to providing a certain level of development assistance to underdeveloped countries. This is called Official Development Assistance (ODA), and is given by governments on certain terms, usually as simple donations. It is given by governments through individual countries' international aid agencies (bilateral aid), and through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank.

OP Apollo: Operation APOLLO was Canada's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism from October 2001 to October 2003.

OP Connection: Op Connection is a new effort to reform recruiting started by the Chief of the Defence Staff that pushes the individual environmental commands to redirect their awareness and recruiting efforts from their own specific environments and to refocus on promoting the CF as a whole.

Operational Tempo: Ops Tempo normally refers to unit activity and Pers Tempo refers to individual activity.

Managing Turmoil

Overseas Rotations/ROTO: The frequency by which military units are rotated between Canada and overseas theatres. ROTO is a colloquial term for rotation.

Personnel tempo: The frequency and quantity of time spent on military duties away from home.

Note 1: The accumulation of absences from home can be due to overseas deployments individual or unit-level training or incremental tasking. Personnel tempo is therefore not just a phenomenon experienced by Canadian Forces members on deployed operations.

Note 2: As with virtually all other NATO nations, the CF and DND are experiencing two converging demands. The first is that the general level of operational commitments have increased over the last ten years while the second is that the demands made on personnel during non-operational times have also augmented. The latter factors include obvious indicators such as the ice storm or flood relief efforts (with Y2K yet to come) and frequent retraining due to Military Occupational Structure (MOS) Review driven changes and new general purpose courses (Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP), ethics, environmental, etc). These also encompass the Quality of Life (QOL) dissatisfiers of reduced cost moves, lack of promotions, uncertainty over future ASD or downsizings, and potential pension amendments as well as the growing reality that continued reductions of non-operational positions is making postings to bases and HQs highly stressful. While Ops Tempo normally refers to unit activity and Pers Tempo refers to individual activity, the real concern is the cumulative effects of what could be considered "career tempo" have the potential, particularly for the CF, to reduce commitment, increase burnout and contribute to elevated unscheduled attrition.

Platform: Refers to a ship, aircraft or vehicle on which a weapon system is mounted.

Polaris: Canadian designator for the A-310 Airbus used by the CF to transport passengers and bulk freight. Two are being modified to function also as tankers to provide air-to-air refuelling. 5 are in service with the CF.

RADARSAT: A sophisticated earth observation satellite that uses synthetic aperture radar to monitor environmental changes. It was launched in 1995 with an anticipated life of five years. It continues to send useful data to operations centers.

Realty Replacement Cost (RRC): An objective measure of the value of our realty assets, excluding land. It represents the estimated cost to replace each realty asset with a new realty asset, built to today's standards while still serving the same function and meeting the same capacity as the current RA realty assets.

RECCE - Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

Recognized Maritime Picture: A plot compiled to depict maritime activity on each of Canada's coasts is referred to as a Recognized Maritime Picture. The term "recognized" is used to indicate that the picture has been analyzed and evaluated prior to its dissemination. In other words, rather than having observing stations or units simply pass data among themselves, there is a central authority to whom data is forwarded for compilation, evaluation and dissemination as a *recognized* picture – a Commander's evaluation of what is happening in a given area.

Regular Forces: Component of the Canadian Forces that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service.

Reserve Force: Component of the Canadian Forces that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service. The Primary Reserve comprises the Militia, the Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve and the Communications Reserve. Other sub-components of the Reserve Force are: the Supplementary Reserve, the Cadet Instructors Cadre and the Canadian Rangers.

Risk Management: A logical step-by-step process to protect, and consequently minimize risks to, the government's property, interests and employees. Risk includes the chance of damage to or loss of government property, and the chance of incurring second- or third-party liability to non-government entities.

ROE - Rules of Engagement: Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

Managing Turmoil

Route survey: Involves the detailed collection of ocean bottom information in order to provide a "before" picture of the ocean bottom. A multibeam side scan sonar is used. Collected information includes; Bathymetry (underwater topography), Sediment Classification, Object Positioning and Identification and Mine Burial Impact Assessment. Although the primary focus is to compile and catalogue acoustically derived imagery beneath pre-determined shipping routes, Route Survey also works with Other Government Departments (OGDs) through various Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), providing Aid to Civil Power.

Rust-out: The physical deterioration of a real property or moveable asset, causing a degradation in the asset's performance, which may cause increased operating and maintenance costs, decreased economic life, and a negative impact upon service delivery.

SAR: Search and Rescue.

Sea King: A medium-sized maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare helicopter. These operate both from ashore and from Canada's naval ships at sea. In service since the 1960's, it is scheduled to be replaced. 29 remain in service with the CF.

Sealift: To transport (personnel or supplies) by sea.

Side-scan sonar: A category of sonar system that is used to efficiently create an image of large areas of the sea floor. This technique is used for a wide variety of purposes, including creation of nautical charts and detection and identification of underwater objects and bathymetric features. The sensor emits pulses down toward the seafloor across a wide angle perpendicular to its path through the water, which may be towed from a surface vessel or submarine, or mounted on the ship's hull.

"Sign off and Aircraft": Certify that maintenance work completed on the aircraft has been done correctly and that the aircraft is ready to be flown.

Signals Intelligence: Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the gathering of intelligence through the interception of radio signals.

SITREP - Situation Report: A report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit or formation.

Six Pack: Refers to a deployment package of 6 CF-18 aircraft along with the crews and other essentials required to operate away from home.

Special Forces: Canadians served with distinction in several types of Allied Special Forces units during the Second World War. One such unit was the legendary U.S. and Canadian combined 1st Special Service Force or, as it was commonly known, "the Devil's Brigade." It achieved a sterling combat record despite overwhelming odds. While tactics, weapons and technology have changed, today's JTF 2 soldiers are perpetuating the basic qualities that define such units.

Special Operations Group (SOG): As articulated in the 2005 Defence Policy Statement, the operational transformation of the Canadian Forces will focus on the establishment of new joint organizations and combat structures that can meet the Government's expectations for effectiveness, relevance and responsiveness. A key element of this transformation is the creation of a Special Operations Group (SOG) that will be capable of responding to terrorism and threats to Canadians and Canadian interests around the world.

The SOG will be composed of Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), the Canadian Forces' special operations and counterterrorism unit; a special operations aviation capability centred on helicopters; a Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company ; and supporting land and maritime forces. The SOG will be capable of operating as an independent formation but its primary focus will be to generate Special Operations Forces (SOF) elements to support Canada Command (Canada COM) and the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). Integrating special operations forces in this manner will increase their impact in operations, as well as the range of options available to the government in the deployment of the Canadian Forces.

Squadron: The basic operating unit of (usually) an air force. Typically consists of about 10 to 20 aircraft, crews and support equipment designed to operate as an entity.

Standing Contingency Task Force [SCTF]: A concept first outlined in the Defence Policy Statement of 2005. This Task Force will respond rapidly to emerging crises.

Steady-state: An equilibrium level.

Strategic airlift: The type of airlift used to haul large quantities of materiel (and personnel) over long distances, usually from home to a marshalling point in the theatre of operations. Usually large aircraft with long unrefuelled range.

Strategic Capability Investment Plan (SCIP): The Strategic Capability Investment Plan is the long term plan of the Canadian Forces. In its final form, it will address the equipment required to project and apply military power, the human resources required to operate and sustain the equipment at full capacity, and the infrastructure (properties, works and support systems) needed to sustain the system of defence capabilities in garrison and on operations, both domestic and international. For completeness, this new planning regimen will include more strategic level coordination of Science and Technology investments and Concept Development and Experimentation planning.

Strategic (plan): A plan for the over-all conduct of a war. A long-range plan that includes the major objectives of an organization and how they are to be attained.

Submarines: Self-propelled submersible types regardless of whether employed as combatant, auxiliary, or research and development vehicles which have at least a residual combat capability. Canada has four of the VICTORIA-class that are combatants provide the Navy with formidable defensive and offensive capabilities, along with a valuable anti-submarine (ASW) training asset. They are extremely quiet and stealthy, and well suited for current naval defence roles. Important amongst these is support to other federal government departments, including participation in fisheries, immigration, law enforcement and environmental patrols.

Sustain forces deployed: To provide for the needs of forces conducting operations away from home to include food, housing, medical care, fuel, ammunition, spare parts reinforcements etc. In short everything the force requires to continue to operate.

T-33: A fighter aircraft from the 1950's used until recently by the Air Force for combat support missions (training, towing gunnery targets, etc.). No longer in service.

Tactical airlift: The type of airlift used to carry personnel and materiel over shorter distances within a theatre of operations. Usually smaller, somewhat more agile aircraft with some capability to defend against attack.

Tactical (plan): A detailed and relatively short-range plan describing the immediate goals, their order of priority, their completion dates, the precise means to be employed and the coordination required.

Tracker: A smaller twin-engine maritime patrol aircraft formerly used for fisheries and other inshore maritime patrol. No longer in service with the CF.

Trained and effective personnel and technicians: Personnel who have been fully trained and qualified to perform their assigned function and who are otherwise available (medically fit etc.) to perform it.

Trinity / Athena: TRINITY and ATHENA are organizations within Maritime Forces Atlantic and Maritime Forces Pacific respectively. Among their responsibilities are administering the Maritime Operations Centres that are being augmented by representatives from six other government departments (Transport Canada, the RCMP, the Canadian Border Service, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and the Canadian Coast Guard) to create the new Maritime Security Operations Centres that will “fuse” data from each department’s units to create an improved Recognized Maritime Picture.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Unmanned (sometimes called Uninhabited) Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are remotely piloted or self-piloted aircraft that can carry cameras, sensors, communications equipment or other payloads. They are used in reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence-gathering roles including combat missions.

V Corps: The US Army formation that was in Iraq in 2003

Victoria-class submarines: The Victoria-class submarines are modern, conventionally-powered boats with vastly more evolved hydrodynamic features and advanced marine engineering systems, as well as better habitability and endurance. The boats are able to 'snort' (through an extendible air-breather) while at periscope depth and can remain deeply submerged for extended periods at slow speed. Operating depth is over 200m. The hulls are covered with 22,000 anechoic rubber tiles specially designed to absorb sonar transmissions and make the submarines hard to detect. The boats are designed to operate for 7 years between overhauls. There is a five-person diver lockout chamber in the fin.

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Vessels of Interest: Any seagoing vessel that is traveling in or near Canada's territorial waters that may be of interest for any number of reasons that are of interest to Canada.

Wing: An air force structure consisting of a number of squadrons and other units designed primarily to conduct operations. A Wing will usually specialize in providing a single capability such as a fighter force or airlift.

Winter Warfare School: Training centers that specialize in teaching military operations and survival skills in northern climates.

Yakolev-42: Soviet era Russian airliner similar in appearance to a Boeing 727.

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Abbas, Mr. Leo
Mayor
Town of Happy Valley Goose Bay
February 3, 2005

Adams, Mr. John
Commissioner
Canadian Coast Guard
May 5, 2003

Addy, Major General (ret'd) Clive
National Past Chairman, Federation of Military and
United Services Institutes of Canada
October 15, 2001

Alarie, Master Corporal Bernadette
Canadian Forces Dental Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Allan, Major Murray
Deputy Commanding Officer
Royal Regina Rifles
January 27, 2003

Allen, Mr. Jon
Director General, North America Bureau
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
January 28, 2002, March 17, 2003

Anderson, Colonel N.J.
National Defence
May 2, 2005

Arcand, Chief Warrant Officer Gilles
5th Combat Engineer Regiment
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Atkinson, Ms. Joan
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Program Development
Department of Citizenship and Immigration
January 28, 2002

Adams, Superintendent Bill
Federal Services Directorate
RCMP
June 9, 2003

Adams, Corporal Terrance
CFB Borden Technical Services
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Addy, Major General (ret'd) Clive
Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa)
June 27, 2005

Alexander, Dr. Jane
Deputy Director
U.S. Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
February 4, 2002

Allard, The Honorable Wayne
Ranking Member (Republican – Virginia), U.S.
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 5, 2002

Amos, Chief Warrant Officer Bruce
423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron, 12
Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Andrash, Mr. P. (Duke)
Sergeant 481, Vancouver Police Department
November 18-22, 2001

Atkins, Chief Superintendent Ian
Criminal Operations Officer, H Division, RCMP
January 22-24, 2002, September 22-23, 2003

Audcent, Mr. Mark
Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel
Senate of Canada
December 2, 2002

Managing Turmoil

Avis, Captain Peter
Director of Maritime Policy, Operations and Readiness
Department of National Defence
April 7, 2003

Badger, Captain Chris J.
Vice President, Operations, Vancouver Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Baker, Mr. Mike
Vice-President, Corporate Management
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
November 25, 2002

Baker, Phillip
Director General, Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka Div.
Canadian International Development Agency
May 29, 2006

Baltabaev, M.P., Mr. Tashpolot
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Bariteau, Lieutenant-Colonel François
Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces
Leadership and Recruit School
National Defence
June 1, 2005

Barrette, Mr. Jean Director
Security Operations, Safety and Security Group
Transport Canada
November 27, 2002 / December 2, 2002

Basrur, Dr. Sheela
Medical Officer of Health
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Bastien, Commander Yves
Formation Administration Officer
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Bax, Ms. Janet
Director General, Programs
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency
Preparedness
October 20, 2003

Axworthy, Dr. Thomas
Chairman, Centre for Study of Democracy
Queen's University
September 29, 2003

Baird, Master Corporal Keith
Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Baker, Lieutenant-Colonel Roy
Wing Logistics and Engineering Officer
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Balnis, Richard
Senior Research Officer
Canadian Union of Public Employees
November 18, 2002

Barbagallo, Lieutenant Jason
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Barrett, Major Roger R.
Operational Officer, 2 RCR
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Bartley, Mr. Alan
Director General, Policy Planning and Readiness, Office of
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency
Preparedness
July 19, 2001

Bastien, Major-General Richard
Deputy Commander of Air
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Baum, Major Nigel
J4
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Beare, Brigadier-General Stuart A. Commander, Land Forces
Western Area
National Defence
March 7, 2005

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Who the Committee Heard From

Beattie, Captain Davie
Canadian Parachute Centre Adjutant
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Beattie, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark
Senior Staff Officer, Canadian Forces Support Training Group,
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Beers, Master Corporal Robert
Canadian Forces School of Electrical and Mechanical
Engineering
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Begley, Inspector J.J. (Jim)
Federal Policing Service
RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

Bell, Lieutenant-Commander John
Commander, HMCS Queen
National Defence
March 9, 2005

Belzile, Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Charles
Chairman
Conference of Defence Associations
October 15, 2001

Bernier, Warrant Officer Michel
5th Military Police Platoon
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Berthiaume, Lieutenant-Colonel Philip (Res)
Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment
December 1, 2004

Bildfell, Mr. Brian
Director, Ambulance Services
City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Bishop Jr., The Honorable Sanford D.
(Democrat – Georgia)
U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence
February 5, 2002

Beazley, Chief Frank
Halifax Regional Police
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Begin, Mr. Robert
Regional Director, Quebec
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency
Preparedness
October 27, 2003

Belcourt, Chief Warrant Officer Mario
12th Canadian Armoured Regiment
5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Bell, Mr. Peter
Intelligence Analyst
Organized Crime Agency of B.C.
November 18-22, 2001

Bercuson, Dr. David J.
Director, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies
University of Calgary
April 19, 2004 and March 8, 2005

Berry, Major David
Canadian Parachute Centre Training Officer Commander
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Berthiaume, Mr. Tim
Deputy Fire Chief
City of Windsor
February 10, 2003

Bilodeau, Mr. Ronald
Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, Deputy Minister to the
Deputy Prime Minister and Security and Intelligence
Coordinator, Privy Council Office
February 24, 2003

Bissonnette, Captain J.R.A.
Commander, 5th Military Police Platoon
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Managing Turmoil

Black, Mr. Bob
Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Blackmore, Mr. David
Director of Building and Property, Emergency Operations
Centre Manager City of St. John's
March 31, 2003

Blair, Master Warrant Officer Gérald
Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Blanchette, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael
Commander, Canadian Parachute School
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Blight, Master Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Bloodworth, Ms Margaret
Deputy Minister
Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Canada
February 15, 2005

Bolton, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce D
Commanding Officer
The Black Watch, Royal Highland Regiment of Canada
November 5-6, 2001

Bonnell, Mr. R.J. (Ray)
Superintendent, Officer in Charge, Protective Services
Branch, RCMP
December 2, 2002

Bouchard, Major-General J.J.C
Commander, 1 Canadian Air Division
National Defence
March 10, 2005

Black, Lieutenant Colonel Dean C.
Commanding Officer, 403 Squadron
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Blair, Colonel Alan
12 Wing Commander
National Defence
May 5, 2005

Blanchard, Master Corporal Piette
Canadian Forces Dental Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Bland, Professor Douglas
Chair of Defence Management Program, School of Policy
Studies
Queen's University
October 29, 2001 / May 27, 2002 / June 27, 2005

Blondin, Colonel Yvan
Wing Commander, 3 Wing Bagotville
National Defence
June 1, 2005

Boisjoli, Lieutenant-Commander André
Commanding Officer, HMCS Glace Bay, Maritime Forces
Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Bon, Mr. Daniel
Director General, Policy Planning, Assistant Deputy Minister,
Policy
Department of National Defence
July 18, 2001

Boswell, Lieutenant-Colonel Brad
Acting Director of Army Doctrine
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Boucher, Mr. Mark
National Secretary Treasurer
Canadian Merchant Service Guild
February 2, 2005

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Who the Committee Heard From

Boulden, Ms Jane
Canada Research Chair in International Relations and Security
Studies
Royal Military College of Canada
November 29, 2004

Boutilier, Dr. James A.
Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces, Pacific Headquarters
Department of National Defence
June 9, 2003

Boyer, Colonel Alain
Commander 15 Wing Moose Jaw
National Defence
March 9, 2005

Brandt, Mr. Brion
Director, Security Policy
Transport Canada
May 5, 2003

Brochet, Inspector Pierre, Chief of Operation,
Planning Section, Montreal Police Service, City of
Montreal
September 26, 2003

Brooks, Captain Melissa
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Bryan, Mr. Robert
Emergency Planning Coordinator City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Buck, Vice-Admiral Ron
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
National Defence
December 6, 2004

Bugslag, Mr. Bob
Executive Director, Provincial Emergency
Program
Government of British Columbia
March 1, 2005

Bourgeois, Mr. Terry
District Chief, Rural District 3, Communications, Fire and
Emergency Service, Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Bowes, Lieutenant-Colonel Steve
Armour School
C.F.B. Gagetown
National Defence
January 31, 2005

Bramah, Mr. Brian
Regional Director
Transport Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Bradley, Corporal John
Imagery Technician
17 Wing Imaging and Associate Air Force Historian, 17 Wing
Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Brodeur, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Nigel
As an individual
March 1, 2005

Brown, Major Chris
424 Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Buck, Vice-Admiral Ron
Chief of the Maritime Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001, August 14, 2002, April 7, 2003

Buenacruz, Corporal
Wing Administration
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Bujold, Mr. Guy
Assistant Deputy Minister
Infrastructure Canada
February 7, 2005

Managing Turmoil

Bullock, Ms. Margaret
Manager, Security Awareness, Policy and Regulatory
Corporate Security, Air Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Burke, Mr. Sean
Research Associate, National Security Studies, Council
on Foreign Relations
February 4, 2002

Burrell, Mr. Bruce
Assistant Deputy Chief Director, Halifax Regional Fire
Service
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Calder, Mr. Kenneth
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy
Department of National Defence
November 26, 2001, August 14, 2002, April 26, 2004,
October 25, 2004

Cameron, Captain Keith
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Campbell, Lieutenant-General Lloyd
Commander of Air Command and Chief of the Air Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Camsell, Lieutenant-Colonel J.F.
36th Service Battalion
February 2, 2005

Capstick, Colonel Mike
Director, Land Personnel Strategy
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
March 10, 2005

Caron, Lieutenant-General Marc
Chief of Land Staff
National Defence
February 7, 2005

Castillo, Corporal Marvin
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Burke, Captain (N) Greg
Chief of Staff, Maritime Forces Atlantic
Department of National Defence
January 22-24, 2002

Burr, Ms Kristine
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy
Transport Canada
February 7, 2005

Butler, Mr. John
Regional Director, Newfoundland and Labrador
Canadian Coast Guard
February 2, 2005

Cameron, Colonel Scott
Director of Medical Policy on the staff of the
Director General Health Services (DGHS)
Department of National Defence
December 10, 2001

Campbell, Anthony
Vice-President, Canadian Association for Security
and Intelligence Studies
June 3, 2002

Campbell, Master Corporal Steve
426 Training Squadron, 8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Caouette, Sergeant Denis, Operational Planning
Section, Montreal Police Service, City of Montreal
September 26, 2003

Caron, Corporal Denis
National Support Arrangements Coordinator, Coast
and Airport Watch National Coordinator, Organized
Crime Branch, RCMP
April 7, 2003

Carroll, Lieutenant-Commander Derek HMCS
Tecumseh
National Defence
March 8, 2005

Castonguay, Staff Sergeant Charles
Unit Commander, RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

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Who the Committee Heard From

Cellucci, H.E. Paul
Ambassador
Embassy of the United States of America to Canada
August 15, 2002

Chapin, Mr. Paul
Director General, International Security Bureau,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
February 23, 2004

Chartier, Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel Victor G., OMM, CD.
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Chow, Lieutenant Commander Robert
Commanding Officer, HMCS *Unicorn* (Saskatoon)
January 27, 2003

Cirincione, Mr. Joseph
Senior Director, Non Proliferation Project, The
Carnegie Foundation
February 5, 2002

Clark, Captain Robert
CO BW No.2497 Cadet Corps
Head Librarian, Law Library
McGill University
November 5-6, 2002

Clarke, Mr. Shawn
Acting Regional Director, Prince Edward Island,
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Preparedness
October 27, 2003

Cohen, Mr. Andrew
Associate Professor, School of
Journalism and Communications
Carleton University
March 21, 2005

Connolly, Mr. Mark
Director General, Contraband and Intelligence Services
Directorate, Customs Branch
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
February 10, 2003, September 22, 2003

Cessford, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael
Acting Commader, Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group,
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Charette, Mr. Serge
National President
Customs Excise Union Douanes Accise
January 22-24, 2002

Chartrand, Lieutenant-Commander Yves
Acting Commanding Officer, HMCS Huron
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Christie, Mr. Ryerson
Researcher, Centre for International and
Security Studies
York University
March 21, 2005

Clapham, Superintendent, Ward D.
Officer in Charge
RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

Clarke, Master Corporal James
Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Coble, The Honorable Howard
Ranking Member (Republican, North Carolina)
U.S. House Judiciary Committee
February 7, 2002

Collenette, P.C., M.P., The Honourable David
Michael
Minister of Transport
December 2, 2002

Connolly, Mr. Mark
Head, Customs Contraband, Intelligence and
Investigations
Canada Border Services Agency
February 23, 2004

Managing Turmoil

Conyers, Jr., The Honorable John
Ranking Member Democrat-Michigan, U.S. House
Judiciary Committee
February 7, 2002

Corcoran, Mr. James
Former Deputy Director, Operations
Canadian Security and Intelligence Service
October 1, 2001

Cormier, Captain Michael P.
Deputy Harbour Master
Vancouver Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Côté, Master Corporal Claude
Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Côté, Mr. Yvan
Investigator, Organized Crime Task Force, Montreal
Urban Community Police Department
November 5-6, 2001

Couture, Lieutenant-General Christian
Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources-Military)
Department of National Defence
December 10, 2001

Creamer, Mr. Dennis
Vice-President, Finance and Administration
Halifax Port Authority
January 22-24, 2002

Crosbie, Mr. William
Director General, North America Bureau
Foreign Affairs Canada
April 11, 2005

Croxall, Corporal Kevin
CFB Borden Administration Services, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

D'Avignon, Mr. Michel
Director General, National Security, Policing and
Security Branch, Solicitor General Canada
July 19, 2001

Cooper, First Officer Russ
Toronto Representative, Security Committee
Air Canada Pilots Association
November 4, 2002

Cormier, Master Seaman Michael
Canadian Forces Military Police Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Côté, Mr. Bertin
Deputy Head of Mission
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 4-7, 2002

Côté, Brigadier-General Gaston
Commander, Land Forces Quebec Area
National Defence
June 1, 2005

Coulter, Mr. Keith
Chief, Communications Security Establishment
February 24, 2003

Crabbe, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Ray
Royal Military Institute of Manitoba (RMIM)
March 10, 2005

Crober, Mr. Paul
Regional Director for B.C. and Yukon,
Emergency Mgmt. and National Security Sector, Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
March 1, 2005

Crouch, Dr. Jack Dyer
Assistant Secretary of Defence, International
Security Policy
Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defence
February 6, 2002

Cushman, Dr. Robert
Chief Medical Officer of Health, City of Ottawa
February 3, 2003

D'Cunha, Dr. Colin
Commissioner of Public Health, Chief Medical
Officer of Health, Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care, Ontario
October 30, 2003

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Daigle, MSC, CD, MGen. Pierre
Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff
Department of National Defence
March 17, 2003 / February 23, 2004

Daniels, Private Jason
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Davies, Ms. Krysta M.
Intelligence Analyst Specialist
KPMG Investigation and Security Inc.
October 01, 2001

DeCastro, Second Lieutenant. Rod
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Deemert, Mr. Rob
Cabin Security, International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers
August 15, 2002

Dempsey, Mr. Lawrence
National Secretary Treasurer
Canadian Merchant Service Guild
September 22, 2003, February 2, 2005

De Riggi, Mr. Angelo
Intelligence Officer
Organized Crime Task Force - RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

Desrosiers, Chief Warrant Officer Christian
5th Canadian Light Artillery Regiment
September 24, 2003

deVries, Nicolaas C.W.O. (Ret'd)
Military Bands
January 31, 2005

Dewitt, Mr. David
Director, Centre for International and
Security Studies
York University
December 2, 2004

Dallaire, Gabriel
Gulf Squadron, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Davidson, Rear-Admiral Glenn V.
Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
Department of National Defence
September 22, 2003

Dawe, Mr. Dick
Manager, Personnel Support Programmes, Maritime
Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

DeCuir, Brigadier-General Mike
Deputy Regional Commander
Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters
November 18-22, 2001

Deering, Richard
Chief of Police
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
February 3, 2005

Dempster, Major-General Doug
Director General, Strategic Planning
National Defence
April 11, 2005

Deschamps, Col. André
Director, Continental Operations
Department of National Defence
May 6, 2002

Devlin, Mr. W.A. (Bill)
Manager, Hub Development, Vancouver
International Airport
Air Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Dewar, Captain (N) (Ret'd) John
Member, Maritime Affairs
Navy League of Canada
May 12, 2003, June 2, 2003

Dickenson, Mr. Lawrence T.
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and
Intelligence
Privy Council Office
October 29, 2001 / February 24, 2003

Managing Turmoil

Dietrich, Chief Warrant Officer Dan
Chief Warrant Officer
One Canadian Air Division
November 18-22, 2001

Ditchfield, Mr. Peter
Deputy Chief Officer
Organized Crime Agency of B.C.
November 18-22, 2001

Douglas, Lieutenant-Colonel Brian
Artillery School
C.F.B. Galetown
National Defence
January 31, 2005

Downton, Master Corporal Doug
426 Training Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Droz, Superintendent Pierre
Criminal Operations
RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

Dufour, Major Rénaud
Commander, 58th Air Defence Battery
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Duguay, Mr. Yves
Senior Director
Corporate Security Risk Management
Air Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Duncan, Mr. Mark
Vice-President, Operations
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
November 25, 2002

Durocher, Captain Pascal
Deputy Commanding Officer,
2EW Squadron, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Edmonds, Captain (N) David
Chief of Staff Personnel & Training, Naval Reserve
Department of National Defence
September 25, 2003

Dion, Corporal Yves
Canadian Forces Fire Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Doge, Ms. Trish
Director, Risk and Emergency Management, City of
Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Dowler, Chief Petty Officer First Class George
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Doyle, Lieutenant Colonel Bert
Commanding Officer, 402 Squadron
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Duchesneau, Mr. Jacques
President and Chief Executive Officer
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
November 25, 2002

Dufresne, Corporal
Canadian Forces Postal Unit
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Dumais, Lieutenant-General Marc J.
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
National Defence
June 27, 2005

Dunn, Major General Michael
Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy
The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

Earnshaw, Commander Paul F.
Commanding Officer TRINITY, Joint Ocean
Surveillance Information Centre
Department of National Defence
September 22, 2003

Elcock, Mr. Ward
Director
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
August 14, 2002, February 17, 2003

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Elliott, Mr. William
Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group
Transport Canada
November 27, 2002, December 2, 2002, May 5, 2003

Ellis, Captain Cameron
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Ellis, Ms. Karen
Assistant Deputy Minister (Infrastructure and
Environment), National Defence
June 6, 2005

Erkebaev, M.P., The Honourable Abdygany
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Evraire, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard J.
Conference of Defence Associations
April 19, 2004

Fadden, Mr. Richard
Deputy Clerk, Counsel and Security Intelligence
Coordinator
Privy Council Office
October 29, 2001, January 29, 2002, August 14, 2002

Fagan, Mr. Wayne
Regional Vice-President
Union of Canadian Transportation
Employees (UCTE)
February 2, 2005

Falkenrath, Mr. Richard
Senior Director
U.S. Office of Homeland Security
February 7, 2002

Farmer, Mr. Rick
Area Manager, Ontario East Port of Entries
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
May 7-9, 2002

Ferguson, Mr. Brian
Assistant Deputy Minister, Veterans Services
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Elliott, QC, William J.S.
Associate Deputy Minister
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
June 19, 2006

Ellis, Colonel Jim
2nd in Command, Operation Peregrine
National Defence
March 1, 2005

Enger, Inspector T.G. (Tonia)
Operations Officer
RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

Evans, Ms. Daniela
Chief, Customs Border Services
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Fagan, Mr. John
Director of Intelligence and Contraband, Atlantic
Region
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Falconer, Captain Vic
Formation Drug Education Coordinator, Formation
Health Services (Pacific)
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Fantino, Chief Julian
Toronto Police Service
May 6, 2002

Farr, Mr. Bruce
Chief and General Manager, Toronto Emergency
Medical Services
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Fergusson, Mr. James
Centre for Defence and Security Studies
Department of Political Studies
University of Manitoba
March 10, 2005

Managing Turmoil

Fernie, Iain

Regional Security Operations Manager
Air Canada
June 24, 2002

Fields, Fire Chief Dave

Fire Department
City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Fisher, Captain Kent

J8
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Flagel, Mr. Brian

Director, Airport Operations
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Flynn, Commander Steven

U.S. Coast Guard and Senior Fellow
National Security Studies, Council on Foreign
Relations
February 4, 2002

Forcier, Rear-Admiral J.Y. Commander, MARPAC

National Defence
February 28, 2005

Forgie, Mr. John

Enforcement Supervisor, Vancouver
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
November 18-22, 2001

Foster, Lieutenant-Colonel Rob

Acting Commanding Officer, 8 Air Maintenance Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Fox, James

Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Bilateral Relations
Foreign Affairs Canada
May 29, 2006

Frappier, Mr. Gerry

Director General, Security and Emergency
Preparedness and Chair of Interdepartmental Marine
Security Working Group, Transport Canada
April 7, 2003, June 2, 2003, February 25, 2004

Ferris, Mr. John

Faculty of Social Sciences,
International Relations Program
University of Calgary
March 8, 2005

Fisher, Second Lieutenant Greg

The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Flack, Mr. Graham

Director of Operations, Borders Task Force
Privy Council Office
March 17, 2003, February 23, 2004

Fleshman, Larry

General Manager, Customer Service Toronto, Air
Canada
June 24, 2002

Fonberg, Mr. Robert

Deputy Secretary to the cabinet, Operations
Privy Council Office
March 17, 2003

Forcier, Vice-Admiral J.C.J.Y.

Commander, Canada Command
National Defence
May 8, 2006

Fortin, Lieutenant-Colonel Mario

Acting Commanding Officer, 426 Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Fox, Mr. John

Member
Union of Canadian Transportation Employees (UCTE)
February 2, 2005

Francis, Warrant Officer Charles

Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Frappier, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean

Commander, 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment,
5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade, CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Fraser, Rear-Admiral Jamie D.
Commander
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Frederick, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Fries, Mr. Rudy
Emergency Management Coordinator, London-
Middlesex Community
City of London
March 31, 2003

Gadula, Mr. Charles
Director General, Fleet Directorate, Marine Services,
Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada
April 7, 2003

Gagnon, Major Alain
Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre,
Montreal
June 25-27, 2002

Gardner, Major Craig
Mechanized Brigade Group
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Garnon, Lieutenant-Commander Daniel
Comptroller, National Defence
September 25, 2003

Gauthier, Lieutenant-General J.C.M.
Commander, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command
National Defence
May 8, 2006 / May 29, 2006

Gauvin, Commodore Jacques J.
Acting Assistant Chief of the Maritime Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Gibbons, The Honorable Jim
Member (Republican – Nevada)
U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence
February 6, 2002

Fraser, Ms. Sheila
Auditor General of Canada
December 10, 2001, December 6, 2004

Frerichs, Private Travis
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Froeschner, Major Chris
Acting Commanding Officer, 429 Squadron
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Gagné, Major M.K.
Officer Commanding Administration
Company, 2nd Battalion Princess
National Defence
March 10, 2005

Gagnon, Mr. Jean-Guy, Deputy Director,
Investigations Department, Montreal Police Service,
City of Montreal
September 26, 2003

Garnett, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Gary L.
National Vice-President for Maritime Affairs
Navy League of Canada
May 12, 2003

Gauthier, Corporal
2 Air Movement Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Gauvin, Major Bart
Directorate of Army Training 5
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Giasson, Mr. Daniel
Director of Operations, Security and Intelligence
Privy Council Office
January 8, 2002 / January 29, 2002

Giffin-Boudreau, Ms. Diane
Acting Director General, Atlantic Region,
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
September 22, 2003

Managing Turmoil

Gilbert, Chief Warrant Officer Daniel
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Gilkes, Lieutenant-Colonel B.R.
Kings Own Calgary Regiment
National Defence
March 8, 2005

Gimblett, Mr. Richard
Research Fellow
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Dalhousie University
February 21, 2005

Giroux, Master Corporal
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Gludo, Colonel J.D.
Commander, 41 Canadian Brigade Group of Canada,
National Defence
March 8, 2005

Goetz, Captain J.J.
Mechanized Brigade Group
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Goss, The Honorable Porter
Chair (Republican - Florida)
U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence
February 6, 2002

Goupil, Inspector Pierre
Direction de la protection du territoire, Unité
d'urgence, région ouest, Sûreté du Québec
November 5-6, 2001

Graham, Erin
Manager Safety, Capital District Health
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Gilbert, Staff Superintendent Emory
Operational Support Services, Toronto Police
Services, City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Gilmour, Wendy
Director, Peacekeeping and Operations Group, Stabilization
and Reconstruction Task Force
Foreign Affairs Canada
May 29, 2006

Girouard, Commodore Roger
Commander, CANFLTPAC
National Defence
February 28, 2005

Glencross, Captain, Reverend Bruce
Regimental Padre Minister
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Goatbe, Mr. Greg
Director General, Program Strategy Directorate
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 28, 2002

Goodall, Superintendent Bob
Bureau Commander, Field and Traffic Support
Bureau
Ontario Provincial Police
October 30, 2003

Gotell, Chief Warrant Officer Peter
Operations
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Graham, Master Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Granatstein, Dr. Jack
Chair, Council for Defence and Security in the 21st Century
May 27, 2002, April 28, 2004

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Grandy, Mr. Brian
Acting Regional Director, Atlantic Region
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Gray, P.C., Right Honourable Herb
Chair and Commissioner, Canadian Section,
International Joint Commission
March 29, 2004

Grégoire, Mr. Marc
Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security Group
Transport Canada
February 25, 2004

Grue, Superintendent Tom
Edmonton Police Services
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Guindon, Captain (N) Paul
Submarine Division
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Gupta, Lieutenant-Colonel Ranjeet K.
Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering, C.F.B.
Gagetown
National Defence
January 31, 2005

Haack, Lieutenant Colonel Ken F.
Commandant of Artillery School IFT
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Hamel, MWO Claude
Regimental Sergeant-Major Designate
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Hansen, Superintendent Ken
Director of Federal Enforcement
RCMP
April 7, 2003, June 9, 2003

Grant, Captain Timothy J.
Commander, 1 Canadian Mechanized
Brigade Group
National Defence
March 7, 2005

Green, Major Bill
Commanding Officer, Saskatchewan Dragoons (Moose Jaw)
January 27, 2002

Gregory, Leading Seaman
Wing Administration Human Resources Department
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Guevremont, Benoît
Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Gutteridge, Mr. Barry
Commissioner, Department of Works and
Emergency Services
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Haché, Colonel Mike
Director, Western Hemisphere Policy
National Defence
April 11, 2005

Hall, Major Steve
Deputy Commandant, Canadian Forces School of
Communications and Electronics
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Hammond, Major Lee
Artillery
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Hapgood, Warrant Officer John
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Managing Turmoil

Harlick, Mr. James
Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical
Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness,
National Defence
July 19, 2001, October 20 & 27, 2003

Hart, Corporal
Wing Administration Human Resources Department, 8 Wing
Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Haslett, Lieutenant Adam
Logistics Officer & Course Commander, The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Haydon, Mr. Peter T.
Senior Research Fellow, Center for Foreign Policy
Studies
Dalhousie University
April 28, 2003, February 1, 2005

Hearn, Brigadier-General T.M.
Director General, Military Human Resources Policy
and Planning
Department of National Defence
December 10, 2001

Heinbecker, Paul
Former Ambassador to the U.N.
As an individual
February 21, 2005

Heisler, Mr. Ron
Canada Immigration Centre, Halifax
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
September 22, 2003

Hendel, Commodore (Ret'd) Hans
Consultant, Canadian Forces Staff College
April 28, 2003

Henneberry, Lieutenant-Commander, HMCS
Nanaimo
Maritime Air Force Command Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Henschel, Superintendent Peter
Federal Services Directorate
RCMP
June 9, 2003

Harrison, Captain (N) R.P. (Richard)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, Maritime
Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Harvey, Lieutenant-Commander Max
Commander
H.M.C.S. Cabot
February 2, 2005

Hatton, Commander Gary
Commanding Officer, HMCS Montreal
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Hazelton, LCol Spike C.M.
Commandant of Armour School C2 SIM, CFB
Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Hébert, Barbara
Regional Director, Customs, Canada Customs and
Revenue Agency
June 24, 2002

Heimann, Dr. Alan
Medical Officer of Health
City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Henault, General Raymond R.
Chief of the Defence Staff
National Defence
December 3, 2001

Henderson, Major Georgie
Deputy A3
CFB Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Henry, Dr. Bonnie
Associate Medical Officer of Health
City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

Herbert, Mr. Ron
Director General, National Operations Division
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Hickey, Mr. John
MHA, Lake Melville
House of Assembly of Newfoundland and Labrador
February 3, 2005

Hildebrand, Sergeant F.D. (Fred)
“H” Division, Criminal Operations Branch, RCMP
September 22, 2003

Hill, Mr. Dave
Chair, Capital Region Emergency Preparedness
Partnership
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Hillmer, Dr. Norman
Professor of History and International Affairs.
Carleton University
November 1, 2004

Hines, Colonel Glynne
Director, Air Information Management, Chief of the
Air Staff
National Defence
July 18, 2001

Hooper, Jack
Deputy Director (Operations)
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
May 29, 2006

Hornbarger, Mr. Chris
Director
U.S. Office of Homeland Security
February 7, 2002

Howe, Corporal Kerry
CFB Borden Technical Services
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Hunt, Mr. Baxter
Embassy of the United States of America to Canada
August 15, 2002

Hupe, Master Corporal Bryan
426 Training Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Hickey, Captain (N) Larry
Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Operations
(Maritime Forces Atlantic)
National Defence
June 16, 2003

Hildebrandt, Captain Gerhard
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Hillier, General Rick
Chief of the Defence Staff
National Defence
May 30, 2005 / June 21, 2006

Hincke, Colonel Joe
Commanding Officer
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Holman, Major-General (Ret'd)
Fraser Canadian Forces College Toronto
June 27, 2005

Horn, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Hounsell, Master Corporal Scott
Canadian Forces School of Electrical and Mechanical
Engineering, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Huebert, Dr. Rob
Professor, Dept. of Political Science
University of Calgary
March 8, 2005

Hunter, The Honorable Duncan
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Military
Procurement (Republican – California)
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 6, 2002

Hynes, Major A.G.
Air Reserve Coordinator (East)
1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters
February 1, 2005

Managing Turmoil

Iatonna, Mr. Mario
Municipal Engineer
City of Windsor
December 1, 2004

Inkster, Mr. Norman
President, KPMG Investigation and Security Inc.
Former Commissioner, RCMP
October 1, 2001

Irwin, Brigadier-General S.M.
Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian
Forces Housing Agency
National Defence
June 6, 2005

Jackson, Major David
J3
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Janelle, Private Pascal
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Jean, Mr. Daniel
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Program
Development, Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Canada
March 17, 2003

Jeffery, Lieutenant General (ret'd) Mike
June 27, 2005

Jestin, Colonel Ryan
Commander, C.F.B. Gaagetown
3 Area Support Group
National Defence
January 31, 2005

Johns, Fred
General Manager, Logistics and Processing Strategies
Canada Post
August 15, 2002

Johnson, Captain Wayne
J7, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Idzenga, Major Ray
Commanding Officer, Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Innis, Captain Quentin
Instructor, Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Issacs, Sergeant Tony
Search and Rescue Technician
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Jackson, Ms. Gaynor
Manager, Military Family Support Centre, Maritime
Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Jarvis, Vice-Admiral Greg
Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources Military)
February 21, 2005

Jeffery, Lieutenant General M.K.
Chief of the Land Staff
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001 / August 14, 2002

Jenkins, Wilma
Director, Immigration Services
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
June 24, 2002

Job, Mr. Brian
Chair, Institute of International Relations
University of British Columbia
March 1, 2005

Johnson, Captain Don
President
Air Canada Pilots Association
November 4, 2002

Johnston, Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Bruce
As an individual
April 28, 2003

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Johnston, Chief Cal
Chief of Police
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Jolicoeur, Mr. Alain
President, Department of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Canada
Canada Border Services Agency
February 23, 2004, April 11, 2005

Joncas, Chief Petty Officer First Class Serge
Maritime Command Chief Petty Officer
National Defence
December 3, 2001

Jurkowski, Brigadier-General (ret'd) David
Former Chief of Staff, Joint Operations
Department of National Defence
October 1, 2001

Kavanagh, Paul
Regional Director, Security and Emergency Planning
Transport Canada
June 24, 2002

Keating, Dr. Tom
Professor, Department of Political Science
University of Alberta
March 7, 2005

Kelly, Mr. James C.
As an individual
May 26, 2003

Kelly, Lieutenant Colonel W.J.
Force Planning and Program Coordination, Vice Chief
of the Defence Staff, National Defence
July 18, 2001

Kennedy, Mr. Paul
Senior Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, Solicitor
General of Canada
January 28, 2002, February 24, 2003

Keyes, Mr. Bob
Senior Vice-President, International
Canadian Chamber of Commerce
December 1, 2004

Johnston, Mr. Kimber
Director General, Strategic Policy
Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Canada
February 15, 2005

Jolicoeur, Alain
President
Canada Border Services Agency
June 19, 2006

Judd, Jim
Director
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
June 19, 2006

Kasurak, Mr. Peter
Principal
Office of the Auditor General of Canada
December 10, 2001, December 6, 2004

Keane, Mr. John
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs
U.S. Department of State
February 06, 2002

Kee, Mr. Graham
Chief Security Officer
Vancouver Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Kelly, Chief Warrant Officer Michael
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Kennedy, Mr. Paul E
Senior Assistant Deputy Solicitor General, Policy
Branch, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
Canada
February 15, 2005

Kerr, Captain Andrew CD
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Khokhar, Mr. Jamal
Minister-Counsellor (Congressional Affairs)
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 04, 2002

Managing Turmoil

Kiloh, Insp. D.W. (Doug)
Major Case Manager, RCMP
November 18-22, 2001

King, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) James
As an individual
May 12, 2003

Kloster, Mr. Deryl
Emergency Response Department
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Koch, Major Pat
J5, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Knapp, Corporal Raymond
CFB Borden Technical Services
June 25-27, 2002

Krause, Lieutenant Colonel Wayne
423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Kubeck, Commander Kimberley
Naval Control of Shipping Intelligence, Department of
National Defence
September 25, 2003

Kurzynski, Major Perry
Search and Rescue Operations Centre
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Lachance, Mr. Sylvain
A/Director General, Fleet
Canadian Coast Guard
February 17, 2003

Lacroix, Colonel Roch
Chief of Staff, Land Force Atlantic Area
National Defence
May 6, 2005

King, Lieutenant-Colonel Colin
Commanding Officer, Royal Regina Rifles (Regina)
January 27, 2003

King, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Jim
Vice-President, Atlantic
CFN Consultants
May 5, 2005

Kobolak, Mr. Tom
Senior Program Officer, Contraband and Intelligence
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
April 7, 2003

Koop, Mr. Rudy
Research Adviser, Canadian Section
International Joint Commission
March 29, 2004

Kneale, Mr. John
Executive Coordinator, Task Force on
Enhanced Representation in the U.S
Foreign Affairs Canada
April 11, 2005

Krueger, Master Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Kummel, Colonel Steff J.
Wing Commander, 17 Wing Winnipeg
National Defence
March 10, 2005

Kwasnicki, Corporal Anita
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Lacroix, Colonel Jocelyn P.P.J.
Commander, 5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, CFB
Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Laflamme, Mr. Art
Senior Representative
Air Line Pilots Association, International
August 14, 2002

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

LaFrance, Mr. Albert
Director, Northern New Brunswick District
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Laing, Captain (Navy) Kevin
Director, Maritime Strategy, Chief of Maritime Staff,
National Defence
July 18, 2001

Lalonde, Major John
Air Reserve Coordinator (Western Area)
National Defence
March 8, 2005

Landry, LCol (Ret'd) Rémi
International Security Study and Research Group
University of Montreal
June 2, 2005

Langelier, Mr. André
Director, Emergency and Protective Services, City of
Gatineau
February 3, 2003

Laroche, Colonel J.R.M.G.
National Defence
May 2, 2005

Last, Colonel David
Registrar
Royal Military College of Canada
November 29, 2004

LeBoldus, Mr. Mick
Chief Representative at the NATO Flight Training
Centre
Bombardier Aerospace
March 9, 2005

Lefebvre, Denis
Assistant Commissioner, Customs Branch
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 6, 2004, February 10, 2003

Legault, Mr. Albert
Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)
February 21, 2005

Lafrenière, Major Luc
Commander, Headquarters and Signal Squadron
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Lait, Commander K.B.
Commander, Directorate of Quality of Life,
DQOL 3 - Accommodation Policy Team Leader, National
Defence
June 6, 2005

Landry, Chief Warrant Officer André
1st Battalion, 22nd Royal Regiment
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Landry, Inspector Sam
Officer in Charge, Toronto Airport Detachment
RCMP
June 24, 2002

Laprade, CWO Daniel
Headquarters and Signal Squadron
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Larrabee, Mr. Bryan
Emergency Social Services Coordinator, Board of
Parks and Recreation, City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Leblanc, Ms. Annie
Acting Director, Technology and Lawful Access
Division, Solicitor General of Canada
July 19, 2001

Lefebvre, Mr. Denis
Executive Vice-President
Canada Border Services Agency
February 7, 2005

Lefebvre, Mr. Paul
President, Local Lodge 2323
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers
August 15, 2002

Leighton, Lieutenant-Commander John
J1
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Managing Turmoil

Lenton, Assistant Commissioner W.A. (Bill)
RCMP
January 28, 2002, June 9, 2003

LePine, Mr. Peter
Inspector, Halifax Detachment
RCMP
September 23, 2003

Leslie, Major-General Andrew
Canadian Forces
November 29, 2004

Lester, Mr. Michael
Executive Director, Emergency Measures Organization
Nova Scotia Public Safety Anti-Terrorism Senior
Officials Committee
September 23, 2003

Lichtenwald, Chief Jack
Regina Fire Department
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Loeppky, Deputy Commissioner Garry
Operations
RCMP
October 22, 2001 / December 2, 2002

Loschiuk, Ms Wendy
Principal
Office of the Auditor General of Canada
December 6, 2004

Lucas, Major General Steve
Commander One Canadian Air Division, Canadian
NORAD Region Headquarters
November 18-22, 2001

Luloff, Ms. Janet
A/Director, Regulatory Affairs, Safety and Security
Group, Transport Canada
November 27, 2002, December 2, 2002

Lyrette, Private Steve
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Leonard, Lieutenant-Colonel S.P.
Royal Newfoundland Regiment
(1st Battalion)
February 2, 2005

Lerhe, Commodore E.J. (Eric)
Commander, Canadian Fleet Pacific
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Lessard, Brigadier-General J.G.M.
Commander, Land Forces Central Area
December 2, 2004

Levy, Mr. Bruce
Director, U.S. Transboundary Division
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
January 28, 2002

Lilienthal, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark
Senior Staff Officer
Canadian Forces Support Training Group
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Logan, Major Mike
Deputy Administration Officer, Canadian Forces Support
Training Group
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Lucas, Brigadier-General Dwayne
Director General – Aerospace Equipment Program
Management
National Defence
June 27, 2005

Luciak, Mr. Ken
Director, Emergency Medical Services City of
Regina
January 27, 2003

Lupien, Chief Petty Officer First Class R.M.
Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer
Department of National Defence
December 3, 2001

Macaleese, Lieutenant-Colonel Jim
Commander
9 Wing (Gander)
February 2, 2005

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Macdonald, Lieutenant-General George
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Department of National Defence
January 28, 2002, May 6, 2002, August 14, 2002,
February 23, 2004

Mack, Rear Admiral Ian
Defence Attaché
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 4, 2002

MacKay, Major Tom
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

MacIsaac, Captain (N) Roger
Base Commander, CFB Halifax
National Defence
May 6, 2005

MacLaughlan, Mr. Craig
Executive Director, Emergency
Measures Organization
Province of Nova Scotia
May 6, 2005

MacLeod, Colonel Barry W.
Commander 3 Area Support Group
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Macnamara, Brigadier-General (ret'd) W. Don,
President, Conference of Defence Associations
Institute
May 3, 2004

MacQuarrie, Captain Don
J6
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Magee, Mr. Andee
Dog Master
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Maillet, Acting School Chief Warrant Officer Joseph
Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics,
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Macdonald, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) George
CFN Consultants Ottawa
June 27, 2005

MacKay, The Honourable Peter
Minister of Foreign Affairs
May 29, 2006

MacKenzie, Major-General (Ret'd) Lewis
As an individual
May 3, 2004, December 6, 2004

MacLaughlan, Superintendent C.D. (Craig), Officer
in Charge, Support Services ``H" Division, RCMP
September 22, 2003

MacLean, Vice-Admiral Bruce
Chief of Maritime Staff
National Defence
February 14, 2005

Macnamara, Mr. W. Donald
Senior Fellow
Queen's University
November 29, 2004

Maddison, Vice Admiral Greg
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
National Defence
May 5, 2002, February 14, 2005

Maher, Lieutenant Earl
4 ESR
CFB Gagetown
January 21-24, 2002

Maines, Warren
Director, Customer Service
Air Canada
June 4, 2002

Managing Turmoil

Maisonneuve, Major-General J.O. Michel
Assistant Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
October 22, 2001

Malec, Mr. George
Assistant Harbour master
Halifax Port Authority
January 22-24, 2002

Mandel, Mr. Stephen
Deputy Mayor and Councillor
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Manson, General (Ret'd) Paul D.
Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa)
June 27, 2005

Marcewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel
Base Commander, CFB Edmonton
National Defence
March 7, 2005

Martin, Ms Barbara
Director, Defence and Security Relations
Division, Foreign Affairs Canada
April 11, 2005

Mason, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave
Commanding Officer, 12 Air Maintenance Squadron, 12 Wing
Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Mason, Ms. Nancy
Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs
U.S. Department of State
February 06, 2002

Matheson, Corporal
2 Air Movement Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Mattie, Chief Warrant Officer Fred
12 Air Maintenance Squadron
12 Wing Shearwater
January 22-24, 2002

Malboeuf, Corporal Barry
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Mallory, Mr. Dan
Chief of Operations for Port of Lansdowne
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Manning, Corporal Rob
CFB Borden Technical Services
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Manuel, Mr. Barry
Coordinator, Emergency Measures Organization, City of
Halifax
May 6, 2005 / September 23, 2003

Marsh, Howie
Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa)
June 27, 2005

Martin, Mr. Ronald
Emergency Planning Coordinator
City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003, March 1, 2005

Mason, Mr. Dwight
Joint Chief of Staff, U.S. Chair, Permanent Joint
Board on Defence
The Pentagon
February 6, 2002

Massicotte, Ms Olga
Regional Director General/Atlantic
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Matte, Colonel Perry
14 Wing Commander
National Defence
May 5, 2005

Mattiussi, Mr. Ron
Director of Planning and Corporate Services
City of Kelowna
March 1, 2005

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Maude, Master Corporal Kelly
436 Transport Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

McCoy, Chief Warrant Officer Daniel
Support Unit, 430th Helicopters Squadron
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

McDonald, Corporal Marcus
Canadian Forces Medical Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

McInenly, Mr. Peter
Vice-President, Business Alignment
Canada Post
August 15, 2002

McKerrell, Mr. Neil
Chief, Emergency Management Ont.
Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services
October 30, 2003

McKinnon, Lieutenant-Colonel DB
P.E.I. Regiment
February 1, 2005

McLellan, The Honourable Anne, P.C. M.P.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness
February 15, 2005 & April 11, 2005

McLeod, Mr. Dave
Lead Station Attendant
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
August 15, 2002

McNeil, Rear-Admiral Dan
Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
National Defence
May 6, 2005

McNeil, Commodore Daniel
Director, Force Planning and Program Coordination,
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
Department of National Defence
July 18, 2001

McAdam, Lieutenant-Colonel Pat
Tactics School, C.F.B. Gagetown
National Defence
January 31, 2005

McCuaig, Mr. Bruce
Assistant Deputy Minister
Policy, Planning and Standards Division
Ontario Ministry of Transportation
December 1, 2004

McIlhenny, Mr. Bill
Director for Canada and Mexico
U.S. National Security Council
February 7, 2002

McKeage, Mr. Michael
Director of Operations, Emergency Medical Care
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

McKinnon, Chief David P.
Chief of Police
Halifax Regional Police Force
January 22-24, 2002

McLean, Corporal
Wing Operations
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

McLellan, Mr. George
Chief Administrative Officer
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

McManus, Lieutenant-Colonel J.J. (John),
Commanding Officer, 443 (MH) Squadron,
Maritime Air Force Command Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

McNeil, Commodore Daniel
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Department of
National Defence
July 18, 2001

McRoberts, Mr. Hugh
Assistant Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General of Canada
December 6, 2004

Managing Turmoil

Mean, Master Corporal Jorge
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and
Engineering
June 25-27, 2002

Melançon, Lieutenant-Colonel René
Infantry School
C.F.B. Gagetown
National Defence
January 31, 2005

Mercer, Mr. Wayne
Acting First Vice-President, Nova Scotia District Branch,
(CEUDA)
January 22-24, 2002

Michaud, Mr. Jean-Yves, Deputy Director,
Administrative Support Directorate, City of Montreal
September 26, 2003

Miller, Lieutenant-Colonel
Commander,
10th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA
National Defence
March 9, 2005

Milner, Dr. Marc
Director, Military and Strategic Studies
Program
University of New Brunswick
January 31, 2005

Mitchell, Mr. Barry
Director, Nova Scotia District
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
January 22-24, 2002

Mogan, Mr. Darragh
Director General, Program and Service Policy
Division, Veterans Services
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Morris, Ms. Linda
Director, Public Affairs
Vancouver Port Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Meisner, Mr. Tim
Director, Policy and Legislation, Marine Programs
Directorate
Canadian Coast Guard
February 17, 2003, April 7, 2003

Melis, Ms. Caroline
Director, Program Development,
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
March 17, 2003

Merpaw, Ms. Diane
Acting Deputy Director, Policy Development and
Coordination
Citizenship and Immigration Canada
April 7, 2003

Middlemiss, Professor Danford W.
Department of Political Science
Dalhousie University
May 12, 2003, May 5, 2005

Miller, Mr. Frank
Senior Director, President's Adviser on Military
Matters
U.S. National Security Council
February 7, 2002

Minto, Mr. Shahid
Assistant Auditor General
Office of the Auditor General of Canada
December 10, 2001

Mitchell, Brigadier General Greg
Commander
Land Forces Atlantic Area
January 22-24, 2002

Morency, André
Regional Director General, Ontario Region,
Transport Canada
June 24, 2002

Morton, Dr. Desmond
Professor
University of McGill
November 15, 2004

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Moutillet, Lieutenant-Commander Mireille
Senior Staff Officer Policy
National Defence
September 25, 2003

Mundy, Lieutenant-Commander Phil
Executive Officer
H.M.C.S. Queen Charlotte
February 1, 2005

Munroe, Ms. Cathy
Regional Director of Cutsoms for Northern Ontario
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Murray, Ms. Anne C.
Vice President, Community and Environmental
Affairs, Vancouver International Airport Authority
November 18-22, 2001

Murray, Admiral (Ret'd) Larry
Deputy Minister
Veterans Affairs Canada
January 22-24, 2002

Narayan, Mr. Francis
Detector Dog Service
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Neumann, Ms. Susanne M.
Compliance Verification Officer
Customs – Compliance Mgt. Division
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
November 18-22, 2001

Newberry, Mr. Robert J.
Principal Director, Territorial Security
The Pentagon
February 06, 2002

Niedtner, Inspector Al
Vancouver Police, Emergency Operations and
Planning Sector
City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Noël, Chief Warrant Officer Donald
5th Field Ambulance
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Mulder, Mr. Nick
President, Mulder Management Associates
June 9, 2003

Munger, Chief Warrant Officer JER
Office of Land Force Command
Department of National Defence
December 03, 2001

Murphy, Captain (N) R.D. (Dan)
Deputy Commander, Canadian Fleet Pacific
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Murray, Major James
Commandant, Canadian Forces Fire Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Mushanski, Lieutenant Commander Linda
Commanding Officer
HMCS *Queen* (Regina)
January 27, 2003

Nelligan, Mr. John Patrick
Senior Partner, Law Firm of Nelligan O'Brien Payne
LLP, Ottawa
December 2, 2002

Neville, Lieutenant-Colonel Shirley
Wing Administration Officer, Acting Wing
Commander, 17 Wing
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Newton, Captain John F.
Senior Staff Officer, Operations
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Nikolic, Mr. Darko
District Director, St. Lawrence District
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Nordick, Brigadier-General Glenn
Deputy Commander, Land Force Doctrine and Training
Systems, CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Managing Turmoil

Norman, Mr. Mark
President of Daimler-Chrysler and Chair of the Infrastructure
Committee
Canadian Automotive Partnership Council
December 1, 2004

Normoyle, Ms. Debra
Head, Immigration Enforcement
Canada Border Services Agency
February 23, 2004

Nymark, Ms. Christine
Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
Transport Canada
January 28, 2002

O'Donnell, Mr. Patrick
President
Canadian Defence Industries Association
November 22, 2004

O'Shea, Mr. Kevin
Director, U.S. General Relations Division, Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
January 28, 2002

Orr, Major Ken
Senior Staff Officer, Attraction Canadian Forces Recruiting
Group
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Ouellet, Chief Warrant Officer J.S.M.
5th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Ouellette, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard
Commander, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Royal Regiment,
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Parks, Lieutenant-Commander Mike
Directorate of Army Training 5-4
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Normoyle, Ms. Debra
Director General, Enforcement Branch
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
April 7, 2003

Nossal, Dr. Kim Richard
Professor and Head, Political Studies
Department
Queen's University
November 29, 2004

O'Bright, Mr. Gary
Director General, Operations
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Emergency Preparedness
July 19, 2001, October 20, 2003

O'Hanlon, Mr. Michael
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution
February 5, 2002

Olchowiecki, Private Chrissian
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Ortiz, The Honorable Solomon P.
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Military
Readiness (Democrat – Texas)
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 06, 2002

Ouellet, Major Michel
Acting Commanding Officer, 5th Canadian Service
Battalion
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Parker, Major Geoff
Infantry
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Parriag, Ms Amanda
Centre for Research and Information on
Canada
December 6, 2004

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Pasel, Mr. William
Emergency Measures Coordinator, Hamilton
Emergency Services Department, City of Hamilton
March 31, 2003

Paulson, Captain (N) Gary
Commanding Officer of HMCS Algonquin
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Pearson, Lieutenant Colonel Michael
Commandant of Infantry School SAT
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Pelletier, France
Legislative and Regulatory Affairs, Airline Division
Canadian Union of Public Employees
November 25, 2002

Pennie, Lieutenant-General Ken
Chief of Air Staff
National Defence
February 7, 2005

Pentland, Mr. Charles
Political Studies, Centre for International
Relations, Queen's University
November 29, 2004

Peters, Colonel William
Director, Land Strategic Planning, Chief of the Land
Staff
National Defence
July 18, 2001

Pettigrew, Master Corporal Robert
Canadian Forces School of Administration and Logistics, CFB
Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Pichette, Mr. Pierre Paul, Deputy Director,
Operational Management Department, Montreal Police
Service, City of Montreal
September 26, 2003

Pataracchia, Lieutenant (N) John
Representing Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces
Recruiting Centre, Halifax
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Payne, Captain (N) Richard
Commanding Officer, Fleet Maintenance Facility
Cape Scott
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Pellerin, Colonel (Ret'd) Alain
Executive Director
Conference of Defence Associations
October 15, 2001, April 19, 2004 / June 27, 2005

Penner, Lieutenant-Colonel Doug
Commanding Officer, North Saskatchewan
Regiment (Saskatoon)
January 27, 2003

Pennie, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Ken
June 27, 2005

Pentney, Mr. Bill
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice Canada
February 15, 2005

Petras, Major-General H.M.
Chief, Reserves and Cadets
National Defence
June 6, 2005

Pharand, M. Pierre
Director, Airport Security
Montréal Airports
November 5-6, 2001

Pichette, Mr. Pierre-Paul
Assistant Director, Montreal Urban Community
Police Department
November 5-6, 2001

Managing Turmoil

Pigeon, Mr. Jacques
Senior General Counsel and Head, Department of
Justice, Legal Services
Transport Canada
December 2, 2002

Pile, Commodore Ty
Commander, Canadian Fleet Atlantic
National Defence
May 6, 2005

Pilgrim, Superintendent J. Wayne
Officer in Charge, National Security Investigations
Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, RCMP
July 19, 2001

Pilon, Mr. Marc
Senior Policy Analyst, Security Policy Division, National
Security Directorate
Office of the Solicitor General
February 24, 2003

Plante, Master Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Polson, Captain (N) Gary
Commanding Officer
HMCS Algonquin
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Poulin, Corporal Mario
Canadian Forces Military Police Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Préfontaine, Colonel Marc
Comd 34 Brigade Group Executive
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Primeau, M. Pierre
Investigator
Organized Crime Task Force – RCMP
November 5-6, 2001

Pigeon, Mr. Jean François
Acting Director, Security
Montréal Airports
November 5-6, 2001

Pile, Captain (N) T.H.W. (Tyron)
Commander, Maritime Operations Group Four,
Maritime Forces Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Pinsent, Major John
Canadian Parachute Centre, 8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Pitman, Mr. B.R. (Brian)
Sergeant, Waterfront Joint Forces Operation,
Vancouver
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
November 18-22, 2001

Poirier, Mr. Paul
Director, Intelligence and Contraband Division
Northern Ontario Region
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Potvin, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Preece, Captain (N) Christian
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Proulx, Asst. Commissioner Richard
Criminal Intelligence Directorate
RCMP
October 22, 2001

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Purdy, Ms. Margaret
Associate Deputy Minister
Department of National Defence
August 14, 2002

Quick, Mr. Dave
Co-ordinator, Emergency Planning
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Raimkulov, M.P., Mr. Asan
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Rapanos, Mr. Steve
Chief, Emergency Medical Services
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Read, Mr. John A.
Director General, Transport Dangerous Goods,
Transport Canada
February 25, 2004

Reed, The Honorable Jack
Chair (Democrat – Rhode Island), U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee
February 05, 2002

Reid, Chief Warrant Officer Clifford
Canadian Forces Fire Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Reid, Warrant Officer Jim
Air Defence Missile
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Richard, CWO Stéphane
5th Canadian Service Battalion
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Richter, Dr. Andrew
Assistant Professor, International Relations and
Strategic Studies
University of Windsor
December 1, 2004

Puxley, Ms Evelyn
Director, International Crime and Terrorism
Division, Foreign Affairs Canada
April 11, 2005

Quinlan, Grant
Security Inspector
Transport Canada
June 24, 2002

Randall, Dr. Stephen J.
Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Calgary
March 8, 2005

Rathwell, Mr. Jacques
Manager, Emergency and Protective Services, City
of Gatineau
February 3, 2003

**Reaume, Mr. Al, Assistant Chief of Fire and Rescue
Services, Fire Department, City of Windsor**
February 27, 2003

Regehr, Mr. Ernie
Executive Director
Project Ploughshares
March 21, 2005

Reid, Lieutenant Colonel Gord
Commandant, Canadian Forces Air Navigation
School (CFANS)
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Renahan, Captain Chris
Armour
CFB Petawawa
June 25-27, 2002

Richmond, Mr. Craig
Vice President, Airport Operations
Vancouver International Airport
November 18-22, 2001

Riffou, Lieutenant-Colonel François
Commander, 1st Battalion, 22nd Royal Regiment,
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Managing Turmoil

Rivest, Master Corporal Dan
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and
Engineering, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Robertson, Mr. John
Chief Building Inspector
City of Vancouver
January 30, 2003

Rochette, Colonel J.G.C.Y.
Director General Compensation and
Benefits
National Defence
June 6, 2005

Rose, Mr. Frank
International Security Policy
The Pentagon
February 6, 2002

Ross, Mr. Dan
Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management), National
Defence
February 14, 2005

Ross, Master Warrant Officer Marc-André, 58th Air
Defence Battery
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Rostis, Mr. Adam
Federal/Provincial/Municipal Liaison Officer
Province of Nova Scotia
May 6, 2005

Rudner, Dr. Martin
Director, Centre for Security and Defence Studies,
Carleton University
June 3, 2004 / December 13, 2004

Rurak, Ms. Angela
Customs Inspector
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 7-9, 2002

Rutherford, Master Corporal Denis
Canadian Forces Fire Academy
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Robertson, Rear-Admiral Drew W.
Director General, International Security Policy
Department of National Defence
February 23, 2004, April 11, 2005

Robinson, Second Lieutenant. Chase
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2001

Romses, Brigadier-General R.R.
Commander
Land Forces Atlantic Area
National Defence
January 31, 2005

Ross, Major-General H. Cameron
Director General, International Security Policy,
National Defence
January 28, 2002

Ross, Dr. Douglas
Professor, Faculty of Political Science
Simon Fraser University
March 1, 2005

Rossell, Inspector Dave
Inspector in charge of Operations-Support Services,
Windsor Police Services City of Windsor
February 27, 2003

Rousseau, Colonel Christian
Commanding Officer, 5th Area Support Group
National Defence
June 1, 2005

Rumsfeld, The Honorable Donald
U.S. Secretary of Defense
February 06, 2002

Russell, Mr. Robert A., Assistant Commissioner,
Atlantic Region, Canada Customs and Revenue
Agency
September 22, 2003

Rutherford, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul
Commander, 73 Communication Group
National Defence
March 9, 2005

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Salesses, Lieutenant Colonel Bob
Logistics Directorate for Homeland Security, The
Pentagon
February 6, 2002

Samson, Brigadier-General P.M.
Director General, Intelligence
National Defence
October 22, 2001

Saunders, Corporal Cora
16 Wing
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Savard, Lieutenant-Colonel Danielle
Commander, 5th Field Ambulance
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Scofield, Mr. Bruce
Director, Refugees Branch
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
March 17, 2003

Scott, Captain John
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Shadwick, Mr. Martin
Research Associate, Centre for International and Security
Studies, York University
December 2, 2004

Sharapov, M.P., Mr. Zakir
Kyrgyz Republic
May 12, 2003

Sheridan, Norman
Director, Customs Passenger Programs
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
June 24, 2002

Simmons, Mr. Robert
Deputy Director, Office of European Security and
Political Affairs
U.S. Department of State
February 6, 2002

Samson, Chief Warrant Officer Camil
2nd Battalion, 22nd Royal Regiment
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Sanderson, Mr. Chuck
Executive Director, Emergency Measures Organization,
Province of Manitoba
March 10, 2005

Saunders, Captain Kimberly
Disaster Assistance Response Team
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Schmick, Major Grant
Commanding Officer, Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre,
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Scott, Dr. Jeff
Provincial Medical Officer of Health
Halifax Regional Municipality
September 23, 2003

Sensenbrenner, Jr., The Honorable F. James, Chair
(Republican – Wisconsin)
U.S. House Judiciary Committee
February 07, 2002

Shapardanov, Mr. Chris
Counsellor, Political
Canadian Embassy (Washington)
February 04, 2002

Sheehy, Captain Matt
Chairman, Security Committee
Air Canada Pilots Association
November 4, 2002

Sigouin, Mr. Michel
Regional Director, Alberta, Office of Critical
Infrastructure Protection and Emergency
Preparedness
October 27, 2003

Sinclair, Ms. Jill
Director General, International Security Bureau,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade
March 17, 2003

Managing Turmoil

Sinclair, Ms. Jill

Acting Assistant Deputy Minister, Global Security
Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade

January 28, 2002 / August 14, 2002

Skelton, The Honorable Ike

Ranking Member (Democrat Missouri), U.S. House
Armed Services Committee

February 6, 2002

Skidmore, Colonel Mark

Commander, 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, CFB
Petawawa

June 25-27, 2002

Smith, Corporal

Canadian Postal Unit
8 Wing Trenton

June 25-27, 2002

Smith, Mr. Bob

Deputy Chief, Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services,
City of Vancouver

January 30, 2003

Smith, Mr. Doug

Engineering Department
City of Vancouver

January 30, 2003

Snow, Master Corporal Joanne

Canadian Forces School of Administration and Logistics, CFB
Borden

June 25-27, 2002

Spraggett, Ernest

Director, Commercial Operations
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

June 24, 2002

Stairs, Dr. Denis

Professor, Department of Political Science
Dalhousie University

May 5, 2005

Stark, Lieutenant-Commander Gary

Commanding Officer, HMCS Whitehorse, Maritime
Forces Pacific

November 18-22, 2001

Sirois, Lieutenant-Colonel Sylvain

Commander, 5th Combat Engineer Regiment, CFB
Valcartier

September 24, 2003

Skidd, Officer Cadet. Alden

The Black Watch

November 5-6, 2002

Slater, Ms. Scenery C.

District Program Officer

Metro Vancouver District

Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

November 18-22, 2001

Smith, Captain (N) Andy

Commanding Officer, Fleet Maintenance
Facility, National Defence

May 6, 2005

Smith, Mr. Bill

Chief Superintendent

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

February 3, 2005

Smith, Master Corporal Terry

436 Transport Squadron

8 Wing Trenton

June 25-27, 2002

Sokolsky, Dr. Joel

Dean of Arts and Professor of Political Science, Royal
Military College of Canada

November 22, 2004

Stacey, Corporal Derrick

CFB Borden Administration Services
CFB Borden

June 25-27, 2002

Starck, Mr. Richard

Senior Counsel, Quebec Regional Office,
Department of Justice

November 5-6, 2001

St-Cyr, Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre

Commander, Support Unit, 430th Helicopters
Squadron, CFB Valcartier

September 24, 2003

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Stevens, Pipe-Major Cameron
The Black Watch
November 5-6, 2002

Stewart, Mr. James
Civilian Human Resources
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Stiff, Mr. Bob
General Manager, Corporate Security
Canada Post
August 15, 2002

St. John, Dr. Ron
Executive Director, Centre for Emergency
Preparedness and Response Health Canada
February 10, 2003

St-Pierre, M. Jacquelin
Commanding Officer, Post 5, Montreal Urban
Community Police Department
November 5-6, 2001

Sullivan, Colonel C.S.
Wing Commander, 4 Wing Cold Lake
National Defence
March 7, 2005

Summers, Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Ken
Naval Officers Association of Vancouver
Island
February 28, 2005 / June 27, 2005

Taillon, Mr. Paul
Director, Review and Military Liaison
Office of the Communications Security
Establishment Commissioner
June 2, 2005

Tarrant, Lieutenant-Colonel Tom
Deputy Director of Army Training
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Taylor, The Honorable Gene
Subcommittee on Military Procurement U.S. House
Armed Services Committee February 6, 2002

Stewart, Warrant Officer Barton
Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics,
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Stewart, Chief William
Fire Chief and General Manager, Toronto Fire
Services, City of Toronto
October 30, 2003

St. John, Mr. Peter
Professor (retired), International Relations,
University of Manitoba
November 25, 2002

Stone, Master Corporal
Canadian Parachute Centre
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Stump, The Honorable Bob
Chair (Republican – Arizona)
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 6, 2002

Sully, Mr. Ron
Assistant Deputy Minister, Programs and
Divestiture, Transport Canada
February 7, 2005

Szczerbaniwicz, LCol Gary
Commanding Officer, 407 Squadron
Maritime Air Force Command Pacific
November 18-22, 2001

Tait, Mr. Glen
Chief, Saint John Fire Department, City of Saint
John
March 31, 2003

Tattersall, Lieutenant-Commander John
Directorate of Army Training 3
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Taylor, Mr. Robert
Inspector
Vancouver Police Department
November 18-22, 2001

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Taylor, The Honourable Trevor
Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture
and Minister Responsible for Labrador
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador
February 3, 2005

Thibault, Master Corporal Christian
Gulf Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Thomas, Mr. John F.
Partner
BMB Consulting
June 9, 2003

Tracy, Ms Maureen
Acting Head, Customs Contraband, Intelligence and
Investigations, Enforcement Branch, Canada Border Services
Agency
February 7, 2005

Tremblay, Colonel Alain
Commander, Canadian Forces Recruiting Group, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Tremblay, Captain (N) Viateur
Deputy Commander, Naval Reserve
Department of National Defence
September 25, 2003

Trottier, Lieutenant-Colonel Ron (Res)
Windsor Regiment
December 1, 2004

Tulenko, Mr. Timothy
Political-Military Officer, Canadian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State
February 6, 2002

Verga, Mr. Peter F.
Special Assistant for Homeland Security, The Pentagon
February 6, 2002

Villiger, Lieutenant-Colonel F.L.
Calgary Highlanders
National Defence
March 8, 2005

Theilmann, Mr. Mike
Acting Director, Counter-Terrorism Division,
Solicitor General Canada
July 19, 2001

Thomas, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Charles
As an individual
March 1, 2005

Thompson, Ms Susan
Former Mayor of the City of Winnipeg
As an individual
March 10, 2005

Tracy, Ms. Maureen
Director, Policy and Operations Division
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
April 7, 2003

Tremblay, Lieutenant-Colonel Eric
Commander, 5th Canadian Light Artillery Regiment,
CFB Valcartier
September 24, 2003

Trim, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron, 8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Tse, Hau Sing
Vice-President, Asia Branch
Canadian International Development Agency
May 29, 2006

Ur, Corporal Melanie
16 Wing, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Verner, The Honourable Josée
Minister of International Cooperation
May 29, 2006

Wainwright, Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.
Commander, 16/17 Field Ambulance
National Defence
March 9, 2005

APPENDIX XX

Who the Committee Heard From

Wamback, Lieutenant-Commander A.
Commanding Officer, HMCS Windsor
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Ward, Officer Cadet. Declan
Student
McGill University
November 5-6, 2002

Ward, Master Corporal
Wing Operations
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Wark, Professor Wesley K.
Associate Professor in the Department of History,
Trinity College, University of Toronto
October 1, 2001 / May 5, 2003 / June 27, 2005

Warren, Mr. Earle
Director General, Major Projects Design and Development
Directorate, Customs Branch
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
February 10, 2003

Watts, Chief Warrant Officer Ernest
3 Area Support Group
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Weldon, The Honorable Curt
Chair, Subcommittee on Military Procurement
(Republican – Pennsylvania)
U.S. House Armed Services Committee
February 6, 2002

Werny, Colonel W.S.
Commanding Officer, Aerospace Engineering
Test Establishment
National Defence
March 7, 2005

Whalen, Private Clayton
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

White, Lieutenant (N) Troy
J2
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Ward, Master Corporal Danny
Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Technology and
Engineering, CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Ward, Colonel Mike J.
Commander Combat Training Centre
CFB Gagetown
January 22-24, 2002

Wareham, Corporal
8 Air Maintenance Squadron
8 Wing Trenton
June 25-27, 2002

Warner, The Honorable John
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Armed Services
Committee
February 5, 2002

Watt, Major John
Commanding Officer, Bravo Squadron
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Weighill, Mr. Clive
Deputy Chief of Police
City of Regina
January 27, 2003

Wells, Corporal Corwin
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Westwood, Commodore Roger
Director General – Maritime Equipment Program
Management
National Defence
June 27, 2005

Whitburn, Lieutenant Colonel Tom
Squadron 435
17 Wing Winnipeg
November 18-22, 2001

Wicks, Major Brian
Commander, 103 Search and Rescue Squadron
(Gander)
February 2, 2005

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Williams, Mr. Alan
Assistant Deputy Minister (Material)
National Defence
November 1, 2004

Williams, Col. Richard
Director, Western Hemisphere Policy
Department of National Defence
May 6, 2002, March 17, 2003

Wilson, Mr. Larry
Regional Director, Maritimes
Canadian Coast Guard
September 22, 2003

Wingert, Colonel Douglas
Director Land Equipment Program Staff
National Defence
June 27, 2005

Wolsey, Chief Randy
Fire Rescue Services, Emergency Response
Department
City of Edmonton
January 28, 2003

Woods, Corporal Connor
Canadian Forces Medical Services School
CFB Borden
June 25-27, 2002

Wright, Robert
Commissioner
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
May 6, 2002

Wynnyk, Colonel P.F.
Area Support Unit Commander
National Defence
March 7, 2005

Young, Brigadier-General G.A. (Res)
Deputy Commander, Land Forces Central
Area
December 2, 2004

Young, Major Marc
J4
CFB Kingston
May 7-9, 2002

Williams, Captain (N) Kelly
Former Commanding Officer, HMCS *Winnipeg*,
National Defence
September 22, 2003

Wilmink, Mr. Chuck
Consultant
November 4, 2004

Wing, Mr. Michael
National President, Union of Canadian
Transportation Employees
September 22, 2003

Winn, Mr. Conrad
President and CEO
COMPASS
December 2, 2004

Woodburn, Commander William
Submarine Division
Maritime Forces Atlantic
January 22-24, 2002

Wright, Mr. James R.
Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security
Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade
February 23, 2004

Wright, Mr. James R.
Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security
Policy, Privy Council Office
February 23, 2004

Yanow, Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) Robert
As an individual
March 1, 2005

Young, Dr. James
Assistant Deputy Minister, Public Safety and
Commissioner of Public Security, Ontario Ministry
of Community Safety and Correctional Services
October 30, 2003

Zaccardelli, Commissioner Giuliano
Royal Canada Mounted Police
May 8, 2006 / May 29, 2006

APPENDIX XXI

Biographies of Committee Members



The Honourable NORMAN K. ATKINS, Senator

Senator Atkins was born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey. His family is from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where he has spent a great deal of time over the years. He is a graduate of the Appleby College in Oakville, Ontario, and of Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, where he studied economics and completed a Bachelor of Arts programme in 1957. Senator Atkins subsequently received an Honourary Doctorate in Civil Law in the Fall of 1999 (DLC), from Acadia University, his old “alma mater”.

A former President of Camp Associates Advertising Limited, a well-known Toronto-based agency, Senator Atkins has also played an active role within the industry, serving, for instance, as a Director of the Institute of Canadian Advertising in the early 1980’s.

Over the years, Senator Atkins has had a long and successful career in the field of communications – as an organizer or participant in a number of important causes and events. For instance, and to name only a few of his many contributions, Senator Atkins has given of his time and energy to Diabetes Canada, the Juvenile Diabetes Foundation, the Dellcrest Children’s Centre, the Federated Health Campaign in Ontario, the Healthpartners Campaign in the Federal Public Service as well as the Chairperson of Camp Trillium-Rainbow Lake Fundraising Campaign.

Senator Atkins was also involved with the Institute for Political Involvement and the Albany Club of Toronto. It was during his tenure as President in the early 1980’s that the Albany Club, a prestigious Toronto private club, and one of the oldest such clubs across the country, opened its membership to women.

Senator Atkins has a long personal history of political involvement. In particular, and throughout most of the last 50 years or so, he has been very active within the Progressive Conservative Party – at both the national and the provincial levels. Namely, Senator Atkins was National Campaign Chair in the federal elections of

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1984 and 1988 and has held senior organizational responsibility in a number of Provincial election campaigns and he has served as an advisor to both the Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney and the Rt. Hon. Robert L. Stanfield, as well as the Hon. William G. Davis Premier of Ontario.

Norman K. Atkins was appointed to the Senate of Canada on June 29, 1986. In the years since, he has proven to be an active, interested, and informed Senator. In particular, he has concerned himself with a number of education and poverty issues. As well, he has championed the cause of Canadian merchant navy veterans, seeking for them a more equitable recognition of their wartime service. Senator Atkins served in the United States military from September 1957 to August 1959.

Currently, Senator Atkins sits as an independent Progressive Conservative member, and is on the National Security and Defence Committee and the Veterans Affairs Subcommittee. He is also the Honourary Chair of the Dalton K. Camp Endowment in Journalism at Saint-Thomas University in Fredericton, New Brunswick and Member of the Advisory Council, School of Business at Acadia University.



The Honourable TOMMY BANKS, Senator

Tommy Banks is known to many Canadians as an accomplished and versatile musician and entertainer. He is a recipient of the Juno Award, the Gemini Award and the Grand Prix du Disque.

From 1968 to 1983 he was the host of The Tommy Banks Show on television. He has provided musical direction for the ceremonies of the Commonwealth Games, the World University Games, Expo '86, the XV Olympic Winter Games, various command performances and has performed as guest conductor of symphony orchestras throughout Canada, the United States, and in Europe.

He was founding chairman of the Alberta Foundation for the Performing Arts. He is the recipient of an Honourary Diploma of Music from Grant MacEwen College, and Honourary Doctorate of Laws from the University of Alberta, and of the Sir Frederick Haultain Prize. He is an officer of the Order of Canada, and a Member of the Alberta Order of Excellence.

Tommy Banks was called to the Senate of Canada on 7 April 2000. On 9 May 2001, Senator Tommy Banks was appointed Vice-Chair of the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban issues.

He is currently a member of the Committee on National Security and Defence, Chair of the Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources, and chair of the Alberta Liberal Caucus in the Parliament of Canada.

A Calgary-born lifelong Albertan, he moved to Edmonton in 1949 where he resides with Ida, as do their grown children and their families.



The Honourable Larry W. Campbell, Senator

One of Vancouver's best-known and most admired citizens, Larry W. Campbell has served as mayor since 2002 after a distinguished and high profile career primarily in law enforcement and death investigation. Larry W. Campbell moved to Vancouver in 1969, working for the RCMP and later becoming a member of the force's Drug Squad. In 1981, he began work for the Government of British Columbia's Ministry of Attorney General and was instrumental in the establishment of the first Vancouver District Coroner's office, acquiring the position of Chief Coroner in 1996. His experiences in this role led to his participation in the development of the "Four-Pillar Approach" to Vancouver's east-side drug problem. His experiences as the city's Chief Coroner inspired him to become a scriptwriter for the Gemini award-winning television series *Da Vinci's Inquest*, which is loosely based on his own career. Larry W. Campbell has a Master's of Business Administration and currently lives with his family in Point Grey. He sits in the Senate as a member of the Liberal Party of Canada.



The Honourable JOSEPH A. DAY, Senator

Appointed to the Senate by the Rt. Honourable Jean Chrétien, Senator Joseph Day represents the province of New Brunswick and the Senatorial Division of Saint John-Kennebecasis. He has served in the Senate of Canada since October 4, 2001.

He is currently a Member of the following Senate Committees: National Security and Defence; the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, National Finance and Internal Economy Budgets and Administration. Areas of interest and specialization include: science and technology, defence, international trade and human rights issues, and heritage and literacy. He is a member of many Interparliamentary associations including the Canada-China Legislative Association and the Interparliamentary Union. He is also the Chair of the Canada-Mongolia Friendship Group.

A well-known New Brunswick lawyer and engineer, Senator Day has had a successful career as a private practice attorney. His legal interests include Patent and Trademark Law, and intellectual property issues. Called to the bar of New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario, he is also certified as a Specialist in Intellectual Property Matters by the Law Society of Upper Canada, and a Fellow of the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada. Most recently (1999-2000) he served as President and CEO of the New Brunswick Forest Products Association. In 1992, he joined J.D. Irving Ltd., a conglomerate with substantial interests in areas including forestry, pulp and paper, and shipbuilding, as legal counsel. Prior to 1992 he practiced with Gowling & Henderson in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ogilvy Renault in Ottawa, and Donald F. Sim, Q.C. in Toronto, where he began his career in 1973.

An active member of the community, Senator Day recently chaired the Foundation, and the Board of the Dr. V.A. Snow Centre Nursing Home, as well as the Board of the Associates of the Provincial Archives of New Brunswick. Among his many other volunteer efforts, he has held positions with the Canadian Bar Association and other professional organizations, and served as National President of both the Alumni Association (1996) and the Foundation (1998-2000) of the Royal Military Colleges Club of Canada.

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Senator Day holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering from the Royal Military College of Canada, an LL.B from Queen's University, and a Masters of Laws from Osgoode Hall. He is a member of the bars of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick.



The Honourable COLIN KENNY, Senator

Career History

Sworn in on June 29th, 1984 representing the Province of Ontario. His early political career began in 1968 as the Executive Director of the Liberal Party in Ontario. From 1970 until 1979 he worked in the Prime Minister's Office as Special Assistant, Director of Operations, Policy Advisor and Assistant Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau.

Committee Involvement

During his parliamentary career, Senator Kenny has served on numerous committees. They include the Special Committee on Terrorism and Security (1986-88) and (1989-91), the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (1994), the Standing Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce, the Standing Committee on National Finance, and the Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration.

He is currently Chair of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. The Senator is also currently a member of the Steering Committee of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural Resources.

Defence Matters

Senator Kenny has been elected as Rapporteur for the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Prior to that he was Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future Security and Defence Capabilities and Vice-Chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Subcommittee on the Future of the Armed Forces.

EMAIL: kennyco@sen.parl.gc.ca

Website: <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/ckenny>



The Honourable MICHAEL A. MEIGHEN, Q.C., Senator

Appointed to the Senate in 1990, the Honourable Michael Meighen serves on various Senate Standing Committees including Banking Trade and Commerce, Fisheries, National Security and Defence, and chairs the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs. He has also served on the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy and the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada.

In his private career, Senator Meighen practiced litigation and commercial law in Montreal and Toronto. He is Counsel to the law firm Ogilvy Renault, and was Co-Legal Counsel to the Deschênes Commission on War Criminals. He sits on the Boards of Directors of Paribas Participations Limited, J.C. Clark Ltd. (Toronto), and Sentry Select Capital Corp. (Toronto).

Senator Meighen's present involvement in community service includes the Salvation Army (Past Chair), Stratford Festival (past Chair), Atlantic Salmon Federation - Canada (Chair), University of King's College (Chancellor), McGill University (Chair, McGill Fund Council and Governor).

Senator Meighen is a graduate of McGill University and Université Laval and was awarded Honorary Doctorates in Civil Law from Mount Allison University in 2001 and from University of New Brunswick in 2002. He lives in Toronto with his wife Kelly and their three sons.



The Honourable WILFRED P. MOORE, O.C., Senator

Senator Moore was appointed to the Senate on September 26th, 1996 by the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien and represents the province of Nova Scotia (Stanhope St./Bluenose). The Senator graduated from Saint Mary's University with a Bachelor of Commerce degree in 1964 and in 1968, with a Law degree, from Dalhousie University.

The Senator was a Halifax Alderman from 1974 to 1980 and served as Deputy Mayor from 1977 to 1978. He was Chairman of the Halifax Metro Centre as well as the Social Assistance Appeal Board for Halifax and Dartmouth. He served as a member of the Board of Governors of Saint Mary's University for 10 years, including the Advisory Committee to the President.

Senator Moore served as a member of the Economic Committee of the Atlantic Liberal Caucus. This Committee was responsible for the policy paper for the Atlantic Provinces entitled "Catching Tomorrow's Wave." This initiative became government policy in 2000 under the program name of "Atlantic Investment Partnership" which committed \$700 million into research (including post-secondary education), community economic development, small communities investment, trade and investment, entrepreneurship and business skills development, and tourism.

In March, 2001, the Senator commenced an Inquiry in the Senate on the role of the federal government in the financing of deferred maintenance costs in Canada's post-secondary education institutions. This inquiry, after being considered by the Senate Standing Committee on National Finance, resulted in the federal government providing assistance of \$200 million in its 2002 budget for Canada's post-secondary education institutions for the indirect costs of research, which included maintenance of the buildings of those institutions. This financial assistance has continued in every subsequent federal budget.

Currently, the Senator sits as a member of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Banking Trade and Commerce, as well as the Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations. He is vice-chair of the Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group and is chair of the Senate's internal Artwork

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Advisory Working Group. He is also a member of the Liberal Party's Post-Secondary Education and Research Caucus

He has sat on both the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance (1996-2003) and Legal and Constitutional Affairs (1996-2003). He is a Vice-Chairman of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, and is a member and director of the Canada-Ireland Interparliamentary Friendship Group.

The Senator's community and volunteer involvement is wide-ranging. In particular, from 1994 until 2006, Senator Moore was volunteer chairman of the Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society, a not-for-profit registered charity organization, whose fundraising efforts over the winter of 1994-95 enabled the restoration and full operational and sailing status of the historic schooner, *Bluenose II*, one of Canada's beloved national icons. More recently, the Senator, along with the then President of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design (NSCAD) and the Town of Lunenburg, initiated a studio residency program, in Lunenburg, for NSCAD. This facility will give graduates of the University an opportunity to gain professional experience, develop their work for an exhibit or graduate school, or make preparations for an entrepreneurial endeavour." Concurrently, this initiative strengthens the existing artistic community in Lunenburg.

Senator Moore was born in Halifax, Nova Scotia on January 14th, 1942. He lives with his wife Jane and their two children, Nicholas and Alexandra in Chester, Nova Scotia.



The Honourable Marie-P. (Charette) Poulin

A native of Sudbury, the Honourable Marie-P. (Charette) Poulin was called to the Senate of Canada in September 1995, and is designated as a representative of Northern Ontario.

She is a member of the Senate Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration as well as the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. Previously, she served on the Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce. A former chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, she also headed a late-1990s Subcommittee that explored Canada's international position in communications and telecommunications, including an examination of the impact of cyber technology on Canadian culture.

She became the first woman to chair the Senate Liberal Caucus, and the first senator to chair the Northern Ontario Liberal Caucus.

Prior to her appointment, Senator Poulin worked at the deputy ministerial level in the Government of Canada following a career in broadcasting. She was the founding Chairperson and CEO of the Canadian Artists and Producers Professional Relations Tribunal, a federal agency for self-employed workers.

She served as Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet at the Privy Council Office, responsible for overseeing all government communications and consultations. At the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, she held a variety of Vice-Presidential positions: Human Resources and Industrial Relations; Secretary General to the Board; French Regional Radio and Television Broadcasting Operations.

Before joining the public broadcasting headquarters in Ottawa, she was founding Director of the Corporation's Northern Ontario French Services which included launching Sudbury's radio station *CBON* and establishing more than 30 re-transmitter antennae in Northeastern and Northwestern Ontario. In her early career, she was a radio program producer, researcher and university lecturer.

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Over the years, Senator Poulin's professional achievements and involvement with various charitable and community organizations earned her national and international recognition. Among her awards are *Prix Marcel Blouin* for the best radio morning program in Canada (1983), the *Médaille du Conseil de la vie française* (1988), the *Ordre de la Pléiade* (1995), an honorary Doctor of Law degree from Laurentian University (1995), the insignia of *Officier de l'Ordre national de la Légion d'Honneur de la France* (2003) and the insignia of the Order of St. John (2004).

She has served on the Bell Globemedia board of directors, as well as on several hospital boards, university and college boards, chambers of commerce, arts and culture boards, and United Ways campaigns.

Among her efforts to promote the francophonie, she was a member of the Implementation Committee for enacting French-language rights in Ontario (Bill 8) and a founding director of *La Cité collégiale* and the *Regroupement des gens d'affaires* (RGA). She was the first woman to chair the RGA.

Senator Poulin currently sits on the board of the ACTRA Fraternal Benefit Society and the *CEO of the Year Award* in addition to being the past-Canadian president of the *Fédération Canada-France*. As Co-Chair of the Canada-Japan Inter-Parliamentary Group, she is affiliated with the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum.

Senator Poulin obtained her Bachelor of Arts degree at Laurentian University in 1966 and was graduated from the University of Montréal in 1969 with a Master's degree in Social Sciences.

She is married to international portrait artist Bernard A. Poulin. They have two adult daughters, Elaine and Valerie.

APPENDIX XXII

Biographies of the Committee Secretariat



**Major-General (Ret'd) G. Keith McDonald, Senior
Military Advisor**

MGen McDonald grew up in Edmonton, attended College Militaire Royal in St. Jean and Royal Military College in Kingston (RMC), graduating in 1966 and being awarded his pilot wings in 1967.

MGen McDonald operationally flew the Tutor, T-33, CF5, CF104 and CF18 aircraft accumulating over 4000 hours of pilot in command throughout his 37-year career in the Air Force, Canadian Forces.

He held staff positions at the Royal Military College, in Baden Soellingen Germany, at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and at the North American Aerospace Command in Colorado Springs. Command positions include CF18 Squadron Commander, Base and Wing Commander in Baden Soellingen, Germany.

Major General McDonald ended his military career as the Director of Combat Operations at Headquarters North American Aerospace Defence Command at Colorado Springs, USA.

After leaving the military in 1998, General McDonald served a period of “conflict of interest” prior to joining BMCI Consulting as a Principal Consultant in the Aerospace and Defence Division. He left BMCI in 2002 to set up his own consulting company, KM Aerospace Consulting.

Major General McDonald has a degree in Political and Economic Science (Honours Courses) from the Royal Military College. He has completed Canadian Forces staff school, the Royal Air Force (England) Staff College, the National Security studies course, Post Graduate Courses in Business at Queens University, Electronic Warfare Courses at the University of California Los Angeles, the Law of Armed Conflict at San Remo, Italy, and numerous project management courses.

General McDonald is married to the former Catherine Grunder of Kincardine, Ontario, and they have two grown daughters, Jocelyn and Amy.



Barry A. Denofsky, National Security Advisor

Barry Denofsky recently retired after having completed 35 years with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Mr. Denofsky joined the RCMP in January 1969 and worked as a peace officer in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Quebec. In 1972, he was transferred to the RCMP Security Service where he was involved in a variety of national security investigations. With the creation of CSIS in 1984, Mr. Denofsky maintained his interest and involvement in matters of national security with the new Service.

Mr. Denofsky held a variety of operational and senior management positions with CSIS which have included the following: Chief, Counter Intelligence, Quebec Region, Deputy Director General Operations, Ottawa Region, Deputy Director General Counter Terrorism, Headquarters, Ottawa, and Director General Counter Intelligence, Headquarters, Ottawa. On retirement from CSIS, Mr. Denofsky was the Director General, Research, Analysis and Production, Headquarters, Ottawa. In that capacity, he was responsible for the production and provision to government of all source analytical products concerning threats to the security of Canada

Mr. Denofsky also represented CSIS for many years at meetings of the NATO Special Committee in Brussels, Belgium. The Special Committee is an organization of security and intelligence services representing all member nations of NATO. In 2002, Mr. Denofsky was the Chair of the NATO Special Committee Working Group.

Mr. Denofsky is a graduate of the University of Toronto, and holds a graduate Diploma in Public Administration from Carleton University in Ottawa. He is a member of the Council of Advisors, the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies, (CSIS), Carleton University. He is married and has two children.

Steven James, Analyst



Steven James joined the Parliamentary Information and Research Service of the Library of Parliament in July 2005. He serves as a Research Officer for the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

Mr. James received his Bachelor of Arts (Psychology and Sociology) from the University of Alberta and a Masters in Military and Strategic Studies from the Center for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

Mr. James' recent studies have focused on Canada's counter-terrorism framework, specifically, federal, provincial and municipal responses to and prevention of terrorist-related incidents.

Previous to joining the Committee, Mr. James served as a Police Officer for the both the Ontario Provincial Police (1994 - 1998) and the Toronto Police Service (1998 - 2001).

Jodi Turner, Committee Clerk

Jodi Turner joined the Committees Branch of the Senate in January 2005. She serves as the Co-clerk for the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

Ms. Turner received a *cum laude* Double Honours Bachelor of Arts (French and Political Studies) and a *cum laude* Masters in Public Administration (specialization in Canadian Politics), from the University of Manitoba.

Previous to joining the Committee, she served as Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the Senate from 2002 – 2005; and was Vice-President of Research for Western Opinion Research in Winnipeg, Manitoba from 2000 – 2002.



Barbara Reynolds, Committee Clerk

Barbara Reynolds has worked with Canadian parliamentarians for 30 years in various capacities. Trained as a sociologist, she worked for 10 years as a research officer for the Library of Parliament, assisting committees involved in the area of social affairs. During this time she served for three years as Director of Research for the House of Commons Committee on Disabled Persons that produced the landmark report entitled *Obstacles*.

An associate of the Parliamentary Centre for 15 years, she organized fact-finding visits for legislators to and from the United States as well as study tours to Canada for legislators from African and Southeast Asian countries. She coordinated professional development programs for legislators and their staff, and wrote guidebooks on the operation of parliamentarians' offices in Ottawa and in their constituencies. In addition, she served as the director of the Parliament, Business and Labour Trust, a program under which legislators spend up to a week with major corporations and trade unions.

From 1985 to 2000 she also served as adviser to the Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the worldwide organization of legislators that serves as the parliamentary wing of the United Nations.

In April 1998, she joined the Senate Committees Directorate as a Committee Clerk. Her committee assignments have included: Security and Intelligence; Boreal Forest, Fisheries; Transportation Safety; Veterans Affairs; and National Security and Defence. In June 2002, she received the Speaker's Award of Excellence for her work in the Senate.