



National
Defence

Défense
nationale




ADVANCING WITH PURPOSE

The Army Strategy

One Army

One Team

One Vision



ARMY

Canada 

ADVANCING WITH PURPOSE

The **Army**
Strategy

One Army

One Team

One Vision

Foreword



—
THE ARMY
WILL ADVANCE
WITH PURPOSE,
BY CAPITALIZING ON
ITS STRENGTHS
—

The purpose of the military institution is to defend the nation and protect its interests. Given the increasing complexity of the world and the many new global risks that we see emerging, such a task is particularly demanding. The Army is a vital national institution and a critical part of the nation's defence. Preparing it for this demanding future is a significant challenge, and we cannot afford to rest on our tactical successes. If we are to ensure the Army can continue to meet the nation's needs, that work must begin now.

The strategy expressed in this document represents a holistic and balanced approach to preparing the Army for the future, while continuing to perform the tasks that Canadians expect today. It explains how the Army will advance with purpose, by capitalizing on its strengths and overcoming its weaknesses to develop into a truly strategically relevant force.

The Army does not exist in isolation, but works alongside the Navy, the Air Force and the emerging Canadian Forces (CF) Joint capabilities as part of Canada's overall defence capability. In this context the Army's strategy is in unity with the Department and the CF and has been developed in the context of the depart-

mental strategy (*Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*) promulgated in June 1999. However, as a discrete institution and a unique military culture, the Army must evolve if it is to remain relevant and while the Army must be intimately engaged in supporting and executing the departmental strategy, it urgently needs a sound subordinate strategy to guide its own institutional development. This strategy must ensure the sustainment of the Army of Today and the development of the Army of Tomorrow, while ensuring a continued intellectual investment in conceptualizing the Future Army.

The strategy is the product of considerable effort and consultation within the wider Army and defence communities, and I believe it to be an enduring, robust and broadly supported strategy that will guide our way in the decade ahead. The primary target audience of this document is the broad Army leadership. As the strategy articulates, unity of thought, purpose and action is essential to moving the Army forward. It is, therefore, my expectation that this document will be widely read, studied and understood. I trust you will find the document relevant and useful as a guide to our future.

Chief of the Land Staff

Table of Contents

Introduction	3
Part 1 – The Strategic Context	
The Army, a Vital National Institution	4
The State of the Army of today	6
The Status of Army Strategic Planning	7
The Evolving Army: Today, Tomorrow and the Future	8
Departmental Analysis and Direction	10
Summary of Deductions	12
Part 2 – Building the Army of Tomorrow	
Commander's Vision and Intent	13
Centre of Gravity	14
The Relational Facets of Institutional Credibility	15
Decisive Points	16
The Strategic Framework	17
Objective 1 – Connect with Canadians	17
Objective 2 – Shape Army Culture	18
Objective 3 – Deliver a Combat-Capable, Sustainable Force Structure	20
Objective 4 – Manage Readiness	22
Part 3 – Implementation	
General Outline	25
Factors	26
Implementation Concept	27
Performance Measurement	29
Conclusion	30
Annex A – Key Definitions	31
Annex B – Abbreviations	33
List of Figures	
Figure 1: Relational Facets of the Army's Centre of Gravity	14
Figure 2: Relationship Between Ethos and Culture	18

Introduction



The Army has faced significant challenge and change over the past decade. We have seen the withdrawal of our forces from Europe and a shift to more frequent, complex and demanding peace support operations and wars. The Army as an institution has had to deal with personnel and resource reductions, organizational re-engineering and cultural upheaval. The overall high degree of operational success has been accompanied by some notable institutional setbacks. It must also be noted that the pressure of current activities and the uncertainty of the planning environment have constrained the Army's ability to regain the initiative based on a forward-looking strategy. The current strategic

environment now demands a more proactive approach.

The aim of this document is to provide the necessary broad direction to guide the Army into the future. Together with the annual *Strategic Operations and Resource Direction (SORD)* documents, this represents a comprehensive strategy—a unified approach to linking ends, ways and means. This strategy integrates plans to implement the Army role in the

departmental strategy *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020* (hereafter referred to as *Strategy 2020*) with the many other lower level considerations that are driving the requirement for further institutional change. At the outset it should be highlighted that this statement of strategic objectives applies to all components of the Army—Regular, Reserve and civilian and that each of these components were given due consideration when developing the strategic framework.

Part 1 reviews the strategic environment that has been the subject of our analysis—consisting primarily of the current state of the Army (including ongoing

staff planning activities), an overview of departmental guidance, and a brief overview of developments in the armies of key allies. In the interests of brevity, the extensive analysis of the future international and domestic security environments conducted by departmental organizations, including the Army, will not be repeated here, although major deductions will be emphasized.

Part 2 presents the four objectives that constitute the core thrust lines of the *Army Strategy*, including the five and ten-year targets that will be central to its execution. These targets have been selected to complement the departmental *Strategy 2020*, but add the more detailed considerations specific to the Army.

Part 3 addresses the linkage of means to ends by describing an implementation concept. This concept will address the potential constraints and impediments and provide broad guidance for subordinate campaign planning and successive *SORDs*.

Part 1

The Strategic Context

THE ARMY— A VITAL NATIONAL INSTITUTION

In every modern Western democracy, the armed forces are the ultimate guarantor of the state itself. Canadians have been blessed with a geographic position on the globe that is relatively isolated from most of the world's trouble spots. This strategic reality, coupled with our proximity to and friendship with the United States, has resulted in Canada being, for the most part, secure from any land-based threats for almost two centuries. At the same time, Canada's foreign policy has expressed a strong vision of its place in the global community of nations, and the Army, as the ground force component of the CF, has played a major role in projecting that vision and Canadian values in an increasingly unstable and volatile world. In short, the Army is vital to the nation, not only for its traditional role in the defence of Canada, but also as one of the principal instru-

ments for implementing Canadian foreign policy and contributing to the maintenance of global peace, security and stability.

The Army's role, mission and tasks are derived from a government defence policy, (*The 1994 White Paper*), a departmental strategy (*Strategy 2020*) and the annual defence planning process. At the fundamental level, almost all nations have an army "to fight and win the nation's wars." In other words, the Army exists to defend the nation against any enemy. However, in the complex world of





the 21st century, threats to peace and security are far more diverse than they have been for much of history. In an increasingly connected global economic environment, instability and conflict in one part of the world may threaten the basic quality of life here in Canada. Given the cosmopolitan nature of Canadian society and our desire for justice, human rights violations and human suffering anywhere in the world demand a response. At home, the threats of international terrorism, asymmetrical attacks and violations of our national sovereignty have all become far more complex and dangerous in recent years. To respond to this array of threats the Army exists first and foremost:

- to protect vital national interests;
- to contribute to international peace and security; and
- to promote national unity and well-being.

Central to the Army's purpose and role is its capability to apply force across the spectrum of conflict and continuum of operations. It must be clear, this includes both the disciplined application of lethal force and the unlimited liability of each and every soldier. It is this capability that guarantees Canadian security and, ultimately, upholds the nation's fundamental values as expressed in constitutional documents:

- democracy and the rule of law;
- individual rights and freedoms;
- peace, order and good government; and
- pursuit of economic well-being.

All of this means that Canada's Army must continue to transform itself to complete the process begun at the end of the Cold War. This *Army Strategy* is focussed on that imperative. At the same time, the nation and the Army must recognize the enduring aspects of war and conflict as the most brutal and lethal of human activities. Although it continues to constitute the nation's "force of last resort," both at home and abroad, the Army has also been used as an instrument of policy and to augment the capabilities of other national institutions. For example, the organization, staff system and unique capabilities of the Army make it a very valuable source of educated and disciplined people, as well as teams trained and experienced in dealing with complex problems such as natural disasters that are often beyond the capacity of local authorities. In the global context, the history of the first post-Cold War decade



has taught the international community that intervention in a troubled area is often far more effective before the situation has degenerated to the point that a force of last resort is the only viable response. Across this range of operations, the use of ground forces is the strongest signal that a nation can send on its level of commitment. Once deployed, land forces are more difficult to withdraw. They share the physical risks inherent in military operations with the population, the belligerents and our allies. In short, it means that Canada and Canadians are willing to employ the military power of the nation, to use lethal force, and to invoke the concept of unlimited liability as a policy choice.



GENERATE AND MAINTAIN
COMBAT CAPABLE,
MULTI-PURPOSE
LAND FORCES TO MEET
CANADA'S DEFENCE
OBJECTIVES

THE STATE OF THE ARMY OF TODAY

The mission of the Army is to *generate and maintain combat capable, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada's defence objectives*. It has been clear for some time that the Army of Today is performing a broad array of current tasks effectively, but at a rate that

is unsustainable given its present structure.

The Army has many strengths, the foremost being the overall quality and motivation of our soldiers and leaders, bound by the important ties of ethos and a sense of common purpose. This strength is grounded in the four precepts of the Army's expression of the military ethos: Duty, Integrity, Discipline and Honour.¹ We have also seen the introduction of superb new equipment such as the Coyote and LAV III, and are on the threshold of a revolutionary leap ahead in our system of command, control and communications (C3). The Army continues to enjoy the use of some excellent training areas. Most importantly, there is broad public support for the Army and its proven ability to respond to domestic and international crises.

There are, however, significant and troubling weaknesses. Physical infrastructure is poor and deteriorating in some areas. The Army is facing significant shortfalls in firepower (both direct and indirect) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. On the personnel side, the burden of incremental taskings imposed by cuts to training establishments, additions to the field force (announced in *The 1994 White Paper*) and a continual high personnel tempo is taking too great a toll on many soldiers. There has been an excessive draw on our pool of Reservists to compensate for gaps in the Regular Force structure. Command and control (C2) is stretched due to staff cuts and the heavy demands of new strategic initiatives. Collective training opportunities are inadequate to maintain formation-level combat capability, and we are experiencing serious skill fade in some areas. Finally, there is concern over the morale of the Army. There is a sense of uncertainty and, not insignificantly, a sense of mistrust of the senior leadership caused by constant change. A lack of unity in thought, purpose and action is too often apparent.

¹ Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, *Canada's Army*, Ottawa, 1998, pp. 33-35.



THE STATUS OF ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Army last conducted a fundamental review of its strategy in 1997 at the Army Senior Officers' Retreat. This important activity resulted in the issue of the *Land Force Strategic Direction and Guidance 1998 (LFSDG 98)*, a comprehensive statement of the necessary direction of change and the outline of a plan to achieve that change. This document was updated in the spring of 2000 (*LFSDG 01*), with the knowledge that a more fundamental review would soon be necessary. Most of the specific goals of the strategy had been largely subsumed into the sustaining agenda, as specific objectives were pursued with more tangible staff activity. For example, a comprehensive systems approach to training is currently being implemented and important progress is being made with quality of life initiatives. Other objectives have either foundered or, given a significant shift in departmental strategic direction since the *LFSDGs* first appeared, have simply been overtaken by events.

As a result, a more fundamental review called the *Army Strategic Refocus* was begun in the fall of 2000. This began with a broad Commander's direction and a series of five Strategic Planning Sessions devoted to option development, the iden-



tification of short-term measures in support of stabilization, as well as discussions on goals, objectives and implementation. This process made use of several analytical tools including Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities Threats (SWOT), and Stakeholder, Portfolio and Strategic Position and Action Evaluation (SPACE) analysis. The review produced the essential underpinnings of a new strategy.





THE EVOLVING ARMY: TODAY, TOMORROW AND THE FUTURE

Army force development uses the commonly accepted three-horizon concept, which is described in more detail in *The Army Strategic Planning Process*. The Future Army is a less constrained conceptual model that reflects analysis of the longer-term (10-30 years) future. The Army of Today is the Army that currently exists and is being managed by the sustaining agenda, through the business planning process. In the shorter term (0-5 years), it is the authoritative basis for entitlement decisions and resource allocation. The Army of Tomorrow fills the mid-term planning horizon (5-10 years) and is the focus of force development work, co-ordinated by the design of two structural models. The first of these is the Army of Tomorrow model that represents intentions for about ten years in the future, and guides longer-term activities such as equipment acquisition and some forms of experimentation. This analysis takes place prior to actual procurement decisions so that a wider range of potential options can be considered, including the addition of new capabilities. The second model is the Interim Army Model, which constitutes a “blueprint” or more concrete description of what the Army will look like in about five years, when authorized plans are implemented. This model is developed in sufficient detail to guide the

necessary changes to the Army of Today and provide a useful starting point for capability gap analysis (which can in turn influence the longer-term Army of Tomorrow plan).

Having briefly addressed the state of the Army of Today at the beginning of Part 1, it is now appropriate to review the status of the Future Army and the Army of Tomorrow.

The Army has recently adopted a *Future Army Development Plan (FADP)* with the aim of enhancing the future focus for force development activities. Since the promulgation of the *FADP* in 1998, considerable progress has been made in advancing this idea. The first phase was a comprehensive analysis of the future security environment, which highlighted deductions for the Army.² This was followed by a thorough consideration of the types of army capabilities and characteristics required for operations in the non-contiguous and non-linear battlespace of the future.³ The third phase identified some of the concepts and technologies required to develop and employ these capabilities. Taken together, the phases of the *FADP*, which link with other allied processes such as the US Army Force XXI, provide a framework within which the Army can address many of the complex questions that confront it as it looks to the future. Some of the means by which this future agenda will be pursued are:

² Directorate Land Strategic Concepts, “Report number 99-2”, *The Future Security Environment*, August 1999, Kingston.

³ Directorate Land Strategic Concepts, “Report number 01/01”, *Future Army Capabilities*, January 2001, Kingston



- exploring aspects of the future environment through Concept Development and Experimentation, by using wargaming and other techniques that will narrow the range of uncertainty;
- developing a network of contacts from within and outside the Army, including thinkers from Central Staff such as the Directorate of Defence Analysis, Joint Staff, other Environment Chiefs of Staff, intra and extra-military academic community as well as allies;
- convening Concept Investigation Teams (CITs) to identify and solve practical problems;
- engaging the science and technology community to identify technological opportunities and barriers; and
- assisting the Army of Tomorrow plan by suggesting an appropriate mix of emerging and legacy systems and providing analysis to avoid false starts or premature lock-in.

Although the Future Army will remain conceptual, the important insights gained through analysis and experimentation will be integrated into the Army of Tomorrow and the Army of Today.

The most recent phase of Army of Tomorrow planning began in earnest with the Army Transformation study directed

by *Defence Planning Guidance (DPG 2000)*. This study was motivated by the twin requirements of modernization and the creation of additional resource flexibility in the Department. It recognized that an interim sustainable force structure model was necessary to lay a firm foundation for the true “transformation” of the Army that would take place over a longer period of time. The Army therefore developed a plan that focussed on the interim “blueprint” that met the immediate demands of staff planning. The staff is now more fully engaged in looking ahead to the 10-year Army of Tomorrow model. This is the timeframe during which more fundamental change is possible, and it needs to be exploited. This will be discussed later in Part 2.

Another Army strategic initiative integral to the Army of Tomorrow is the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR). After several years of work, a strategic plan for LFRR has been approved with the following mission: *to develop, as part of the Army, an effective and credible Army*



Reserve for the 21st century, complementary and supplementary to the Regular Force and relevant to the needs of the nation. In essence, we need to determine the optimum Reserve structure that can both augment the Regular component to meet today’s demands and mobilize for future threats. Phase 2 of the plan will take the Reserves into the Army of Tomorrow timeframe and, as such, will be closely co-ordinated with the overall effort. In practice, the coherence of the Regular and Reserve components of the Army of Today will be achieved through ongoing mobilization planning.



DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSIS AND DIRECTION

Strategy 2020 is the fundamental starting point for the development of Army strategy. The strategic framework in that document consists of eight departmental change objectives designed to add focus to defence decision-making:

- 1 Innovative Path** – Create an adaptive, innovative and relevant path into the future.
- 2 Decisive Leaders** – Develop a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness and trust while improving our leaders' abilities to lead and manage effectively.
- 3 Modernize** – Field a viable and affordable force structure trained and equipped to generate advanced combat capabilities that target leading-edge doctrine and technologies relevant to the battlespace of the 21st century.
- 4 Globally Deployable** – Enhance the combat preparedness, global deployability and sustainability of our maritime, land and air forces.
- 5 Interoperable** – Strengthen our military to military relationships with our

principal allies, ensuring interoperable forces, doctrine and Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I).

- 6 Career of Choice** – Position Defence as a rewarding, flexible and progressive workplace that builds professional teams of innovative and highly skilled men and women dedicated to accomplishing the mission.
- 7 Strategic Partnerships** – Establish clear strategic, external partnerships to better position Defence to achieve national objectives.
- 8 Resource Stewardship** – Adopt a comprehensive approach to planning, management and comptrollership, focussed on operational requirements that prepares us to respond rapidly and effectively to change.

Strategy 2020 also implies that Army capabilities must be multi-purpose and responsive to a wide variety of missions both expeditionary and domestic. While the Army is expected to contribute to all eight objectives, direction in successive versions of *Defence Planning Guidance* and *Defence Plans* has focussed our attention on objectives 3 and 4. The parallel announcement of an “early-in, early-out” deployment policy serves to reinforce objective 4 in particular. Lastly, the recent addition of critical infrastruc-



ture protection to the Defence mission adds a new dimension to domestic operations. Prevention of and timely response to asymmetric cyber and terrorist attack (the latter possibly using Weapons of Mass Destruction) may lead to new Regular Force and Reserve roles and missions.

The key assumptions and direction in *Strategy 2020* were validated by the departmental leadership in October 2000. It is also worth highlighting that, since the release of *Strategy 2020*, all levels of the Department have become increasingly aware of the overriding importance of people to the CF. The ability of the CF to attract the right kind of recruits and retain highly-skilled officers and non-commissioned members in an increasingly competitive job market will be fundamental to its success in the future.

Other key departmental documents add useful insight and are primary sources of strategic analysis for the Army. The annual DND *Strategic Overview* series highlight the trend among our allies towards developing a greater capacity to intervene rapidly in smaller contingencies; most prominent perhaps is the more deployable Interim Brigade Combat Team of the U.S. Army. Despite the potential for achieving greater effects with smaller numbers of personnel, the robustness required to operate effectively on increasingly com-



plex missions demands well-equipped, well-trained forces. The DND *Military Assessment* publications reinforce the need for flexibility to deal with a wide range of potential missions. The thrust of global engagement in our national strategy will be best complemented in the future by ground forces of high strategic utility, founded on the tenacity and adaptability of the superb soldiers that Canada has historically provided to coalition operations, complemented by the selective leveraging of new technologies.

Over the past few years, the Department has been developing the tools to build a more comprehensive joint view of force development. The use of *Force Planning Scenarios* and the *Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL)* are further described in *Strategic Capability Planning (SCP)* and other more recent documents. The *SCP* has evolved by incorporating a management structure and the overall process is now termed Capability-Based Planning (CBP).

This process emphasizes the importance of a more prominent joint view to assist in developing appropriate CF capabilities for the future. It is a coherent top-down approach enabling the CF to make rational capital investment decisions. This is critical for two main reasons: the pressing requirement for resource efficiency and the more philosophical recognition of the increasing convergence of the land, air, sea and space operating environments.

The departmental process of determining capability goals and assessing the gap between desired and current capability will continue to bring more focus to the Long Term Capital Program (Equipment). The evolutionary implementation of CBP will be of central importance to the Army as it seeks to modernize its capabilities for the future as outlined in *Strategy 2020*.




SUMMARY OF DEDUCTIONS



An analysis of the Army's strategic environment leads to the following key deductions:

- The Army force development process is maturing, but requires more focus on the most difficult area of defining a sufficiently innovative yet still attainable 10-year force structure model.
- The departmental direction on Army capabilities focusses on the attributes of multi-purpose combat capability, modernization, interoperability, deployability, and engagement with Canadians.
- The centrality of CBP demands new thinking on what capabilities need to be resident in the Army structure and those that can be expected from allied or coalition higher formations and other components of the CF.
- The Army needs to be more agile and lethal.
- Regardless of specific force structure and equipment decisions, Army leaders and soldiers need to be imbued with the military ethos. In addition, education, training and professional development systems must be adapted to the new strategic realities.
- The Army of Today (in particular the field force, and the training and support systems) is unbalanced and action must be taken to avoid further institutional deterioration in certain critical areas—quality of life for personnel subject to excessive operational and training demands, formation-level combat capability and the morale of the Army.



Part 2

Building the Army of Tomorrow



COMMANDER'S VISION AND INTENT

This is the Commander's vision for the Army, which serves as a basis for the strategy:

The Army will generate, employ and sustain strategically relevant and tactically decisive medium-weight forces. Using progressive doctrine, realistic training and leading-edge technologies, the Army will be a knowledge-based and command-centric institution capable of continuous adaptation and task tailoring across the spectrum of conflict. The cohesion and morale of our soldiers will be preserved through sharing a collective covenant of trust and common understanding of explicit and implicit intent. With selfless leadership and coherent management, the Army will achieve unity of effort and resource equilibrium. The Army will synchronize force development to achieve joint integration and combined interoperability with the ground forces of the United States, other ABCA countries and selected NATO allies. As a

broadly based representative national institution with a proud heritage, the Army will provide a disciplined force of last resort and contribute to national values and objectives at home and abroad.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

The Army strategy is both **functional** and **relational**. The strategic objectives described in the next section express the functional component; the relational component radiates from the strategy's centre of gravity—institutional credibility. All activities rotate around the centre of gravity. It is the place where objectives relate through a primary source of strength and common purpose. Although steps have been taken to enhance institutional credibility in several areas, the Army's future is predicated upon further refining this important attribute.

For the Army strategy to succeed, relationships with key constituencies need enrichment. The following diagram serves to illustrate the communities engaged and the primary nature of the Army's credibility challenge with them.




Figure 1: Relational facets of the Army's Centre of Gravity

THE STRATEGY'S
CENTRE OF GRAVITY—
INSTITUTIONAL CREDIBILITY

THE RELATIONAL FACETS OF INSTITUTIONAL CREDIBILITY

- **Legitimacy with the Canadian Public.** The Army belongs to the people. It is part of the national fabric. The Army's isolation from Canadians and Canadians' reservations about joining the Army need to be reversed.
- **Relevance to National Leadership.** How does the Army better align with political intent while maintaining combat expertise? The relevance of land combat capability to national leadership needs improvement and explanation.
- **Trust within CF/DND.** Jurisdictional vagueness and administrative encroachment among Army, joint and departmental staffs lead to inefficiencies and mistrust. Mutual understanding, competence and truthful communication engender trust.
- **Identity and the Army.** Reputation attracts recruits, but meaningful experiences in a credible army retain soldiers. Living meaningful experiences needs more emphasis.



- **Expertise Sought by Allies.** Alliances require credible participation. Given the small size of its Army, Canada's contributions are largely qualitative in nature—skilled professionals with modern equipment. Our credibility in the eyes of our allies becomes a performance measure of the Army strategy.



THE ARMY
BELONGS TO ALL CANADIANS:
IT IS THEIR ARMY

DECISIVE POINTS


Capability is the output created by the Army and provided to the CF in the form of combat-capable field forces. This must be produced by maintaining mission focus, that is the quality of current capability on operations cannot be allowed to suffer in our efforts to build a more modernized and effective Army of Tomorrow.

Sustainability is the foundation for the generation of Army field forces. This must be based on an appropriate balance between all elements of the institutional Army—command and control, field forces, training and support. Resource flexibility must also be created to proceed with essential modernization and other strategic initiatives, while retaining sufficient flexibility to deal with the unexpected. This decisive point incorporates the notion of managed readiness to ensure the long-term physical and moral health of Army personnel and the effective delivery of capability over longer periods of time.

Unity is the essential pivot in the leveraging of capability on the foundation of sustainability. Unity of thought, purpose and action is necessary to achieve higher levels of Army capability. This does not mean unanimity of thinking, which would of course be stifling, but it does mean intellectual discipline in the development

of ideas, inclusiveness and sound communications. Unity is also dependent on trust, which must be rebuilt between senior Army leadership and soldiers, based on better transparency in the decisions that affect soldiers' lives and greater predictability of employment. Central to unity is effective command, which must consist of clear top-down guidance, appropriate analysis and consultation, timely decision-making and prompt execution at all levels.

These three decisive points mutually reinforce each other to produce resolute and focussed (Unity) multi-purpose operational effectiveness (Capability) that can be current and relevant across time (Sustainability). With all three of these elements, Army credibility is strengthened.



THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The framework that follows comprises four strategic objectives. The order in which they are listed is not meant to indicate priority. As stated earlier, there are numerous activities in the sustaining and change agendas, which consume considerable staff resources and must continue. However, experience has reinforced the need to focus on the “critical few” in any strategy to effectively prioritize staff effort and achieve success. It is also worth emphasizing at the outset that there is no specific objective relating specifically to the human dimension, although the overriding importance of this issue has been alluded to several times earlier in this document. People issues are contained in all four objectives, further highlighting the critical contribution of the human element to institutional success.

OBJECTIVE 1 — CONNECT WITH CANADIANS

This objective supports the *Strategy 2020* objective of Strategic Partnerships. The Army will support and complement the wider Defence effort to engage Canadians on security and defence issues at all levels. The Army is uniquely positioned to contribute to this dialogue at the regional and community level given its extensive presence in the form of Regular and Reserve units across the country. Although polling shows considerable public support for Army activities, there is a continuing need to promote a more balanced and deeper public understanding of what the Army is doing and where it is going. Image must reflect reality. At the same time, the Army must improve its understanding of the national and international institutions that affect its environment and with which it works. It must also listen more carefully to Canadians. It is by interacting more closely with the people of Canada that the Army will achieve its goals of being more reflective of and better understood by the nation. The aim is to ensure a well-informed national discussion on Army activities and issues, and to contribute to an understanding that the Army is a part of the national fabric. The Army belongs to all Canadians: it is *their Army*.

10-YEAR TARGET

- Create an open, outward-looking Army environment that seeks opportunities to communicate its successes and failures and actively engages the public in meaningful dialogue.

5-YEAR TARGETS

- Establish a focussed stakeholder program for national leaders and opinion makers.
- Establish an Army-focussed security and defence conference program to encourage the development of academic discourse.
- Establish deliberate and structured relationships based on exchanges, liaison officers, and secondments with relevant organizations outside the Army.
- Establish effective community links in every geographic location the Army has a presence.

OBJECTIVE 2 — SHAPE ARMY CULTURE

This objective is closely linked to aspects of the previous objective and aligns with three *Strategy 2020* Objectives – Innovative Path, Decisive Leaders and Career of Choice.

Important shifts in societal attitudes towards war and conflict, the ambiguities of post-Cold War military operations and the volatile security environment demand that soldiers perform their duties within the context of a strong military ethos and an equally robust Army institutional culture. At the same time, Canadian society itself continues to be shaped by important changes in individual attitudes and values, the evolution of a “rights culture,” and a diminished tolerance for hierarchy and authority. The Army must adapt to these realities or build a credible case for exceptions and, at the same time, strengthen its combat capability and readiness.

“Ethos” and “culture” are complex ideas that cannot be easily described. However, it is incontrovertible that both are prerequisites to the continued development of an army able to deal with the kind of complex security environment described in this document. The Army’s expression of the military ethos is described in *Canada’s Army*. It is a statement of the Army’s core values and con-

stitutes an ideal vision of the institution. Culture, on the other hand, provides a way of analyzing how policies and practices either support the military ethos or detract from it. Figure 2 provides a

graphic representation of the relationship between these two concepts.

In simple terms then, the ideal Army culture would be one that exactly mirrors

Army Ethos and Culture-Relationship





Figure 2: Relationship between Ethos and Culture.



the Army ethos. Although it is unlikely that this degree of congruence could ever be realized (in any organization), it is equally clear that aligning “how things are done” with the idea of “how things should be” is an essential function of Army leadership. To assist in the attainment of this strategic objective, CLS has established a Land Personnel Strategy project with a mandate to examine the full range of issues associated with this objective.

10-YEAR TARGET

- Reinforce the Army ethos and culture, in harmony with and supportive of stated Canadian values, to emphasize the Army’s basic purpose—combat and the conduct of operations. This will entail building on historical success, the strengths of the Regimental system, and an innovative, adaptive approach to the conduct of operations.

5-YEAR TARGETS

- Reformulate the Army ethos to recognize the social, strategic and operational realities of the 21st century. This is to be reflected in the next revision of *Canada’s Army*.
- Renew Army leadership doctrine and practices to reinforce the Army ethos and contribute to the development of an appropriate Army culture.
- Formulate a modernized concept of Army professionalism that differentiates the Army’s unique place both within Canadian society and the CF. Develop an Army Personnel Strategy that reinforces the Army ethos and the social contract. It must also be designed to strengthen the essential bonds of trust required for combat effectiveness. The Army’s role, soldiers’ obligations and the concept of

unlimited liability must be clearly, precisely and directly expressed to Canadians, potential recruits and our own soldiers.

THE IDEAL
ARMY CULTURE
WOULD BE ONE
THAT EXACTLY MIRRORS
THE ARMY ETHOS

OBJECTIVE 3 — DELIVER A COMBAT-CAPABLE, SUSTAINABLE FORCE STRUCTURE

This objective supports three *Strategy 2020* objectives: Modernization, Interoperability and Effective Resource Stewardship.

The Army structure will produce combat ready forces capable of operating in the land environment for domestic and expeditionary imperatives. The force structure must be sustainable, based on realistic tasking levels and an efficient resource balance among all organizational components of the Army. It must leverage technological advances in key areas to permit sufficient modernization to remain strategically relevant and tactically decisive on the future battlefield.

Force structure is always a contentious issue. A field force is made up of sub-units and units grouped into formations. The *Force Planning Scenarios* engage the Army's resources in a wide range of potential responses to various contingencies, and often the degree of risk and mission complexity help determine the size of the land component that will frame the response. The Army has responded recently with sub-unit based contributions as in Ethiopia-Eritrea where the Canadian sub-unit was inte-

grated into an allied unit, to units as in Bosnia or Afghanistan, or to formation deployments such as the initial response for Implementation Force (IFOR). Each of these task-tailored capability packages represented a Tactically Self Sufficient Unit (TSSU) as defined by the departmental lexicon for employment overseas.


In Canada, formations are needed as the basis for force generation in its widest context. This includes training and administering units, as well as creating TSSUs through the grouping of capability sets that the formations control. These formations include the brigades and brigade groups as well as the regional headquarters and the Combat Training Centre.

The Land Force must optimize its resources to facilitate the continued development of a formation-based structure and its associated level of expertise to establish the long-term basis for continued success across the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, it must ensure that the structures at both the formation and unit levels remain flexible and adaptable so that task tailoring for specific missions is possible, practical and efficient.



10-YEAR TARGETS

- Transform into a medium-weight, information-age army. An information-age army is one that, through continuous modernization, remains an agile, lethal, and survivable force. The force should be capable of using the five operational functions of sense, act, command, shield and sustain across the spectrum of conflict. Transformation should include the alignment of Regular, Reserve and civil components of the Land Force. Focussing on a medium-force structure does not negate the potential role and missions that could be assigned outside of this capability to operate in unique environments.



- Achieve interoperability with allies at NATO Degree 3 (Seamless Sharing of Data involving the automated sharing of data between systems based on a common exchange mode) in the field of C3. Achieve appropriate and practicable joint integration and combined interoperability at brigade level with the forces of the U.S., other ABCA (American, British and Australian) countries and selected NATO allies.
- Understand and pursue selected Future Combat Systems (FCS) and other allied initiatives across the combat functions.
- Maximize capital efficiency across the Army's geographic footprint:
 - Engage central agencies to enable rationalization to achieve balanced resources.
 - Divest non-essential property to other agencies.
 - Further consolidation of facilities where practical. (The goal is to align the force structure with the infrastructure needs integral to operational readiness. This effort will support the corporate DND goal of reducing realty assets holdings by 10% over the next five years.)

5-YEAR TARGETS

- Stabilize the current structure and develop appropriate doctrine.
- Establish a command support capability that builds on the synergy offered by ISTAR and digitization in an appropriate structure.
- Subject to funding, achieve the Phase 2 goals for LFRR relating to change and growth:
 - Improve challenge and interest in training.
 - Introduce new capabilities, relevant to homeland defence and the asymmetric threat.
 - Reach the recruiting and manning levels of 18,500.
 - Increase productivity and relevance to Army objectives.
 - Rationalize training requirements and methodologies⁴ and the Army Reserve Funding Model (ARFM).
- Enhance experimentation capability:
 - Align the Army Tier 3 capability (Army Simulation Centre) with the Tier 1 and 2 capabilities of the CF Experimentation Centre.

- Achieve instrumentation of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC).
- Adapt Army force development processes to better align with the emerging Departmental CBP processes, and describe these in a revised Army Strategic Planning Process (ASPP).
- Stabilize the resource envelope for garrison support:
 - Evaluate requirements.
 - Evaluate C2 requirements related to the above requirements.

⁴ Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-008/FP-001, *Training Canada's Army*, Ottawa.



OBJECTIVE 4 — MANAGE READINESS


This objective supports the *Strategy 2020* objective of global deployability. The Army has, over the past decade, attempted to keep all units at a uniform, relatively high-level of readiness. With a higher operational tempo and fewer available resources, this has produced an unacceptable strain on our people, threatening cohesion as a result of a shrinking team-focussed collective training programme. The implementation of a managed readiness approach must produce the required levels of capability and readiness, allowing the Army to meet its assigned tasks, but also build-in sufficient recuperation time for individuals and units. This will reduce flexibility at some levels, but this more disciplined approach should ensure greater predictability for all soldiers.

Institutional predictability similarly aids the introduction of other Army initiatives and reforms, assisting the smooth management of change. Some of the “heavier” parts of the force structure can be moved to a lower readiness posture because of the reduced likelihood of their use, under the reasonable assumption of some strategic warning for major crises. The capabilities resident in the Regular and Reserve components will tend to

become less distinct as some specialized, largely Reserve capabilities in demand for current operations such as civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) are actually at a higher state of readiness than some regular units. This prioritization will also be required to improve deployability and capitalize on improved CF strategic lift resources, thereby serving to enhance the Army’s strategic utility.

10-YEAR TARGETS

- In accordance with departmental direction, contribute to deployability through improved combat readiness of the vanguard (one battle group) and main contingency forces (MCF) (the remainder of a brigade group) to be in an offshore theatre of operations within 21 days and 90 days respectively, using enhanced strategic lift.
- Achieve enhanced inter-operability and joint warfare capability consistent with the provisions of the Strategic Collective Training Plan.



5-YEAR TARGETS

- Establish a cyclically managed readiness system that permits Army, Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS), area, brigade and unit commanders to forecast, up to six years in advance, the usage and readiness of all Army units and allocate resources to attain the prescribed readiness levels. Inherent in this programme is the recognition that the burden of streamlining of individual training and education is addressed in the broader context of the training requirements of the field Army.
- Adopt an approach to training at the brigade-group level that rebuilds and maintains an acceptable level of collective skills and formation level readiness for the more demanding MCF missions, while generating high readiness units and ensuring the long-term institutional health of the Army through the ongoing transfer of skills and knowledge.
- Enhance personnel retention by improving the predictability of operational and training activities.
- Optimize use of equipment and expenditures of ammunition, fuel and other resources by matching resource allocations to specified readiness standards.



- Strengthen the cyclically managed readiness system by aligning operational tasks to current, existing structures.
- Align personnel management with managed readiness. The attainment of this target must be performance-measured annually.
- Generate troops from low-readiness forces for mature Peace Support Operations.

- Conduct regular, consistent brigade group-level field training exercises where battle groups are trained in a formation context.
- Achieve a learning environment based on:
 - Adoption of the After Action Review Process.
 - Complete incorporation of the Lessons Learned Process.
 - Comprehensive confirmation and validation.
 - Annual, *SORD*-based training direction.



INSTITUTIONAL PREDICTABILITY

SIMILARLY AIDS

THE INTRODUCTION OF OTHER ARMY INITIATIVES

AND REFORMS, ASSISTING THE

SMOOTH MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE



Part 3

Implementation



GENERAL OUTLINE

The *Army Strategy* has to this point concentrated on ends and ways—the important dimension of means will now be outlined. The Army has a mature business planning process that annually applies available resources to activities. *SORD* establishes priorities and allocates funds across the Army over a five-year planning horizon. This document represents the primary instrument for implementing the strategy in detail. However, there

needs to be a general acceptance that the strategy articulated here is achievable in a very challenging strategic environment, especially in the area of the availability of national resources.

It should also be understood that coher-

ent implementation will occur over three horizons. The linkage between the Armies of Today and Tomorrow will be primarily driven by the needs of the Department and the CF in the context of government policy and budget and major trends in Canadian society. Implementation will occur in a context that will likely see significant changes in command and control, management processes, professional education and support arrangements. The linkage between the Armies of Tomorrow and the Future will be more fundamentally driven by technological change in the context of the global economy and the security framework.



FACTORS

There are several key factors that could affect the implementation of the Army strategy.

- **Resource Flexibility.** The scarcity of resources allocated by the Department will be enduring. Economies will be sought and risks assumed to sustain core capability and evolve into new capability areas.
- **Public Policy Environment.** Implementation must consider related and competing public policy agendas as well as macro-economic cycles. Simply stated, the Army controls very little of its strategic environment but can influence it.
- **Current Army Structure and Culture.** Unity of effort could be affected by the realities of the Army's geographic and regional dispersion. The demands of operational and personnel tempo and the posting cycle could disrupt continuity. The Regimental system and branch structure, optimized for operations, needs to be managed to achieve Army unity.

These realities highlight the need for the strategy to remain agile in execution, while maintaining the necessary consistency of approach to achieve significant

results. In response to the inevitable changes in the strategic environment, some targets and related staff activities will be changed or dropped over time and new ones added to build what is in effect an emergent strategy that differs somewhat from the original concept, but not the intent. This is similar to operational planning in that continuous adjustment of the plan is required to achieve success in a dynamic environment.



IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT

The core Army business remains the production of combat capable forces. Generally, investment energy will be focussed where quantum improvements can be achieved. Quality will usually be preferred over quantity in order to produce consistency and mission success, although it is recognized that some tasks will remain personnel intensive. Both the



physical and moral domains of the institution will be addressed. The implementation concept incorporates the principal dimensions of governance, leadership, management, sequencing and resources.

□ **Governance.** Governance is about guiding the processes by which the Army steers itself. Governance also applies to the instruments, regulations and processes that define the “rules of the game” or, in other words, the institutional environment of the Army. The knowledge of governance has application not only in determining the appropriate guiding mechanisms for the Army, but also offers:

- a way of seeing, or co-ordination perspective on the workings of the institution;
- a reference point to clinically probe and repair faltering organizations;
- an analytical framework providing a language of problem reformulation; and
- a tool to generate alternative perspectives to provide insights into new ways to tackle problems of organizational design and social architecture.

□ **Strategic leadership.** Effective strategic leadership is needed at two levels. The first, and more traditional level, is the strategic leadership of the Army as an organization. It is in this realm that the development of the vision and strategy, the allocation of resources and the processes of external adaptation and internal integration occur. The second, and most fundamental level, is the strategic leadership of the Army as a profession. It is at this level that the Army ethos is defined, identity is established and the Army culture is aligned with its ethos. Leadership at both of these levels demands the forging and sustainment of a strong consensus and understanding among all of the internal and external communities depicted in Figure 1.



- **Management and Processes.** Implementation will exploit management best practices and the integrated information environment. Capability-based planning, activity-based management and performance measurement tools will be improved and exploited. Knowledge management, including the establishment of a learning environment with strong feedback mechanisms, will be fostered. Director General Land Staff (DGLS) will coordinate the activities of the Land Staff and LFDTS to achieve a unified and coherent implementation of the strategic objectives. All of the staff will be engaged—the principal directorate groupings are as follows:

- **Connect with Canadians** – DL Comms.
- **Shape Army Culture** – PD LPS, DLP, DAT, LFCI.

- **Deliver a Combat-capable, Sustainable Force Structure** – DLSP, DAD, DLSC, DLR, DLFS.

- **Manage Readiness** – DAT, DLFR, DLP.

- **Sequencing.** Sequencing of related staff activities will be critical for two main reasons: some initiatives will be essential precursors to others and there will be insufficient resources to deal with everything simultaneously. This will be covered in more detail in successive *SORDs*; however there is also a need for a follow-on campaign plan that will establish the necessary synchronization of staff effort.

- **Resources.** It must be understood that the implementation of the strategy will require resources and these should not be arbitrarily extracted from the current Army program without due consideration of the impact on doing today's important business. The principal tools used in the past to source new staff initiatives have been the Assistant CLS Reserve and the Commander's Accrual List to allocate money and people respectively. Successive *SORDs* will make more explicit the connection between the necessary staff activities required to implement the strategy and the resources allocated.



PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

Feedback mechanisms will be essential for successful strategy implementation. In order to assess the level of success against the Army change agenda and to provide strategic feedback, a new strategic view will be developed and integrated into the current performance measurement framework. Key measures and indicators will be synchronized with the strategic objectives and associated targets. More complex measures should be developed with available resources as the campaign plans are formalized. The following measures should be leveraged early in the implementation process:

- **Connect with Canadians** – measures of perception from the Canadian population.
- **Shape Army Culture** – measures of ideology, ethos, cohesion, morale, retention, learning, employment equity and linguistic ability.
- **Deliver Future Structure** – measures of the suitability and modernization of Army equipment, capability, interoperability and sustainability.
- **Manage Readiness** – measures of personnel strength, equipment serviceability, individual and collective training levels.

Conclusion



THE STRATEGY
IS REALISTIC AND WORKABLE

The strategic framework represents an outline plan to produce a more capable Army of Tomorrow. This will be followed by an energetic, coordinated campaign and business planning to produce the detail necessary to implement this broad direction. The growing capacity for activity coordination within the Land Staff will be central to this effort.

The objectives and targets in this strategy have been carefully developed to ensure that progress can be measured. Progress reports on the strategy produced by a proactive and newly automated performance measurement system will be reviewed and discussed often by Army leadership. More measures will need to be developed.

The strategy is realistic and workable. It will guide our work over the next decade and should not be readily changed on a whim. It will be subject to immense pressures but above all, it must not be left on a shelf while we attempt to get on with the shorter-term issues of the day. Active engagement by all levels of the Army, supported by external constituencies, will be required to ensure that this strategy succeeds. We owe this to our soldiers and to our nation.

Annex A

KEY DEFINITIONS



Medium Force (medium-weight force - MWF). An Army of Tomorrow concept, a MWF exploits technology to achieve the high levels of lethality and protection formerly provided by weight, to enhance strategic responsiveness and operational and tactical agility and combat power. Mass in weapon systems and sustainment requirements is reduced through the use of a technologically advanced information system and communications network enabling the application and support of an effects-based, precision targeting system. The high level of combat power inherent in a MWF is derived from both its integral capabilities and its ability to make full use of coalition assets making it employable across the spectrum of conflict. The reduction in physical mass enhances deployability facilitating the exploitation of future strategic airlift and surface vessels.

Heavy Weight Force (HWF). A HWF is characterized by large physical mass, particularly in its major weapon systems. Such a force is most suitable for show of force and area suppression tasks due to its ability to deliver large volumes of fire. Due to its large physical mass, a HWF is not designed for rapid deployment.

Light Weight Force (LWF). A LWF is designed for rapid deployability. A LWF maximizes strategic deployability and responsiveness in order to compensate for a relative lack of combat power. LWF can be employed across the spectrum of conflict and the continuum of operations, albeit in specific roles.

Knowledge-based. The Army has adopted the notion of "cognitive hierarchy" (the sequence of data, information, knowledge, and understanding) as a means to assist commanders in more fully understanding situations that confront them. Artificial intelligence software and other tools will assist in the conversion of data into knowledge that will better support decision-making by commanders. Better situational awareness will magnify the combat power of smaller, more agile forces. Due to the rapid growth in information sources, knowledge management will be a key to success on the future battlefield.





Command Centric. Command comprises calculated command (logic-based) and intuitive command (based on human belief). The level of command most able to influence the opponent's centre of gravity will continue to be central to decision-making and will have priority on knowledge. Operating in a future battlespace that is likely to be more chaotic, however, all levels of command will have to adapt and act more quickly, and therefore require access to the appropriate level of knowledge.

Multi-purpose. A combat-capable force able to operate successfully in a variety of force planning scenarios.

Personnel Tempo. The frequency and quantity of time spent on military duties away from home. (The accumulation of absences from home can be due to over-

seas deployments, individual or unit-level training, or incremental tasking. Personnel Tempo is therefore not just a phenomenon experienced by CF members on deployed operations.)

Asymmetric Threat. A threat by an opposing party to attack a nation by avoiding strengths, exploiting vulnerabilities, and employing unexpected or unusual techniques.

Asymmetric Warfare. Warfare conducted using asymmetric means.

Capability-based Planning. A force development process to achieve capability requirements.

Capability Requirement. Capability required by the CF to meet Defence policy, Defence objectives, and Defence commitments.

Force Planning Scenario. A scenario designed to provide a situation illustrative of those in which military forces might be involved. (It is a tool for strategic planning purposes; as such, it does not reflect a Canadian position on the likelihood of any or all of these situations arising, or on the future employment of the CF.)

Long-term Capital Program (Equipment). The Long Term Capital Program (Equipment) is that portion of the Defence

Services Program containing approved capital equipment projects judged to be affordable. It covers all equipment, material and/or services valued at more than \$5 million.

Task Tailoring. Colloquialism for grouping, which is defined as: Forming a temporary grouping of units/formations, under one commander, for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.

Cohesion. Tendency to remain united. (*Concise Oxford Dictionary*). (In a military context, cohesion has been defined as "the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission....Cohesion exists in a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual soldier, of the small group with which he identifies, and of unit leaders are congruent with each other—by giving his primary loyalty to the group so that it trains and fights as a unit with all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective." Henderson, W.D. *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat*, 1-26. Washington: National Defence University, 1985.)

Readiness. The measure of capability of forces at a given point in time to execute their assigned missions.⁵

⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military Agency for Standardization. Brussels: NATO, 2000. 1 v.; AAP-6(V).

Annex B

ABBREVIATIONS

DL COMMS:	Director Land Communications
PD LPS:	Project Director - Land Personnel Strategy
DLP:	Director Land Personnel
DAT:	Director Army Training
LFCI:	Land Force Chief Inspector
DLSP:	Director Land Strategic Planning
DAD:	Director Army Doctrine
DLSC:	Director Land Strategic Concepts
DLR:	Director Land Requirements
DLFS:	Director Land Force Structure
DLFR:	Director Land Force Readiness