



# Part 3

## Implementation



### GENERAL OUTLINE

The *Army Strategy* has to this point concentrated on ends and ways—the important dimension of means will now be outlined. The Army has a mature business planning process that annually applies available resources to activities. *SORD* establishes priorities and allocates funds across the Army over a five-year planning horizon. This document represents the primary instrument for implementing the strategy in detail. However, there needs to be a general

acceptance that the strategy articulated here is achievable in a very challenging strategic environment, especially in the area of the availability of national resources.

It should also be understood that coher-

ent implementation will occur over three horizons. The linkage between the Armies of Today and Tomorrow will be primarily driven by the needs of the Department and the CF in the context of government policy and budget and major trends in Canadian society. Implementation will occur in a context that will likely see significant changes in command and control, management processes, professional education and support arrangements. The linkage between the Armies of Tomorrow and the Future will be more fundamentally driven by technological change in the context of the global economy and the security framework.



## FACTORS

There are several key factors that could affect the implementation of the Army strategy.

- **Resource Flexibility.** The scarcity of resources allocated by the Department will be enduring. Economies will be sought and risks assumed to sustain core capability and evolve into new capability areas.
- **Public Policy Environment.** Implementation must consider related and competing public policy agendas as well as macro-economic cycles. Simply stated, the Army controls very little of its strategic environment but can influence it.
- **Current Army Structure and Culture.** Unity of effort could be affected by the realities of the Army's geographic and regional dispersion. The demands of operational and personnel tempo and the posting cycle could disrupt continuity. The Regimental system and branch structure, optimized for operations, needs to be managed to achieve Army unity.

results. In response to the inevitable changes in the strategic environment, some targets and related staff activities will be changed or dropped over time and new ones added to build what is in effect an emergent strategy that differs somewhat from the original concept, but not the intent. This is similar to operational planning in that continuous adjustment of the plan is required to achieve success in a dynamic environment.

These realities highlight the need for the strategy to remain agile in execution, while maintaining the necessary consistency of approach to achieve significant



## IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT

The core Army business remains the production of combat capable forces. Generally, investment energy will be focussed where quantum improvements can be achieved. Quality will usually be preferred over quantity in order to produce consistency and mission success, although it is recognized that some



tasks will remain personnel intensive. Both the physical and moral domains of the institution will be addressed. The implementation concept incorporates the principal dimensions of governance, leadership, management, sequencing and resources.

□ **Governance.** Governance is about guiding the processes by which the Army steers itself. Governance also applies to the instruments, regulations and processes that define the “rules of the game” or, in other words, the institutional environment of the Army. The knowledge of governance has application not only in determining the appropriate guiding mechanisms for the Army, but also offers:

- a way of seeing, or co-ordination perspective on the workings of the institution;
- a reference point to clinically probe and repair faltering organizations;
- an analytical framework providing a language of problem reformulation; and
- a tool to generate alternative perspectives to provide insights into new ways to tackle problems of organizational design and social architecture.

□ **Strategic leadership.** Effective strategic leadership is needed at two levels. The first, and more traditional level, is the strategic leadership of the Army as an organization. It is in this realm that the development of the vision and strategy, the allocation of resources and the processes of external adaptation and internal integration occur. The second, and most fundamental level, is the strategic leadership of the Army as a profession. It is at this level that the Army ethos is defined, identity is established and the Army culture is aligned with its ethos. Leadership at both of these levels demands the forging and sustainment of a strong consensus and understanding among all of the internal and external communities depicted in Figure 1.





- **Deliver a Combat-capable, Sustainable Force Structure** – DLSP, DAD, DLSC, DLR, DLFS.
- **Manage Readiness** – DAT, DLFR, DLP.

□ **Sequencing.** Sequencing of related staff activities will be critical for two main reasons: some initiatives will be essential precursors to others and there will be insufficient resources to deal with everything simultaneously. This will be covered in more detail in successive *SORDS*; however there is also a need for a follow-on campaign plan that will establish the necessary synchronization of staff effort.

□ **Resources.** It must be understood that the implementation of the strategy will require resources and these should not be arbitrarily extracted from the current Army program without due consideration of the impact on doing today's important business. The principal tools used in the past to source new staff initiatives have been the Assistant CLS Reserve and the Commander's Accrual List to allocate money and people respectively. Successive *SORDS* will make more explicit the connection between the necessary staff activities required to implement the strategy and the resources allocated.

□ **Management and Processes.** Implementation will exploit management best practices and the integrated information environment. Capability-based planning, activity-based management and performance measurement tools will be improved and exploited. Knowledge management, including the establishment of a learning environment with strong feedback mechanisms, will be fostered. Director General Land Staff (DGLS) will coordinate the activities of the Land Staff and LFDTS to achieve a unified and coherent implementation of the strategic objectives. All of the staff will be engaged—the principal directorate groupings are as follows:

- **Connect with Canadians** – DL Comms.
- **Shape Army Culture** – PD LPS, DLP, DAT, LFCI.



## PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

Feedback mechanisms will be essential for successful strategy implementation. In order to assess the level of success against the Army change agenda and to provide strategic feedback, a new strategic view will be developed and integrated into the current performance measurement framework. Key measures and indicators will be synchronized with the strategic objectives and associated targets. More complex measures should be developed with available resources as the campaign plans are formalized. The following measures should be leveraged early in the implementation process:

- Connect with Canadians** – measures of perception from the Canadian population.
- Shape Army Culture** – measures of ideology, ethos, cohesion, morale, retention, learning, employment equity and linguistic ability.
- Deliver Future Structure** – measures of the suitability and modernization of Army equipment, capability, interoperability and sustainability.
- Manage Readiness** – measures of personnel strength, equipment serviceability, individual and collective training levels.

# Conclusion



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THE STRATEGY  
IS REALISTIC AND WORKABLE

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The strategic framework represents an outline plan to produce a more capable Army of Tomorrow. This will be followed by an energetic, coordinated campaign and business planning to produce the detail necessary to implement this broad direction. The growing capacity for activity coordination within the Land Staff will be central to this effort.

The objectives and targets in this strategy have been carefully developed to ensure that progress can be measured. Progress reports on the strategy produced by a proactive and newly automated performance measurement system will be reviewed and discussed often by Army leadership. More measures will need to be developed.

The strategy is realistic and workable. It will guide our work over the next decade and should not be readily changed on a whim. It will be subject to immense pressures but above all, it must not be left on a shelf while we attempt to get on with the shorter-term issues of the day. Active engagement by all levels of the Army, supported by external constituencies, will be required to ensure that this strategy succeeds. We owe this to our soldiers and to our nation.



# Annex A



## KEY DEFINITIONS

**Medium Force (medium-weight force - MWF).** An Army of Tomorrow concept, a MWF exploits technology to achieve the high levels of lethality and protection formerly provided by weight, to enhance strategic responsiveness and operational and tactical agility and combat power. Mass in weapon systems and sustainment requirements is reduced through the use of a technologically advanced information system and communications network enabling the application and support of an effects-based, precision targeting system. The high level of combat power inherent in a MWF is derived from both its integral capabilities and its ability to make full use of coalition assets making it employable across the spectrum of conflict. The reduction in physical mass enhances deployability facilitating the exploitation of future strategic airlift and surface vessels.

**Heavy Weight Force (HWF).** A HWF is characterized by large physical mass, particularly in its major weapon systems. Such a force is most suitable for show of force and area suppression tasks due to its ability to deliver large volumes of fire. Due to its large physical mass, a HWF is not designed for rapid deployment.

**Light Weight Force (LWF).** A LWF is designed for rapid deployability. A LWF maximizes strategic deployability and responsiveness in order to compensate for a relative lack of combat power. LWF can be employed across the spectrum of conflict and the continuum of operations, albeit in specific roles.

**Knowledge-based.** The Army has adopted the notion of "cognitive hierarchy" (the sequence of data, information, knowledge, and understanding) as a means to assist commanders in more fully understanding situations that confront them. Artificial intelligence software and other tools will assist in the conversion of data into knowledge that will better support decision-making by commanders. Better situational awareness will magnify the combat power of smaller, more agile forces. Due to the rapid growth in information sources, knowledge management will be a key to success on the future battlefield.



**Command Centric.** Command comprises calculated command (logic-based) and intuitive command (based on human belief). The level of command most able to influence the opponent's centre of gravity will continue to be central to decision-making and will have priority on knowledge. Operating in a future battlespace that is likely to be more chaotic, however, all levels of command will have to adapt and act more quickly, and therefore require access to the appropriate level of knowledge.

**Multi-purpose.** A combat-capable force able to operate successfully in a variety of force planning scenarios.

**Personnel Tempo.** The frequency and quantity of time spent on military duties away from home. (The accumulation of absences from home can be due to overseas deployments, individual or unit-level

training, or incremental tasking. Personnel Tempo is therefore not just a phenomenon experienced by CF members on deployed operations.)

**Asymmetric Threat.** A threat by an opposing party to attack a nation by avoiding strengths, exploiting vulnerabilities, and employing unexpected or unusual techniques.

**Asymmetric Warfare.** Warfare conducted using asymmetric means.

**Capability-based Planning.** A force development process to achieve capability requirements.

**Capability Requirement.** Capability required by the CF to meet Defence policy, Defence objectives, and Defence commitments.

**Force Planning Scenario.** A scenario designed to provide a situation illustrative of those in which military forces might be involved. (It is a tool for strategic planning purposes; as such, it does not reflect a Canadian position on the likelihood of any or all of these situations arising, or on the future employment of the CF.)

**Long-term Capital Program (Equipment).** The Long Term Capital Program (Equipment) is that portion of the Defence Services Program containing approved

capital equipment projects judged to be affordable. It covers all equipment, material and/or services valued at more than \$5 million.

**Task Tailoring.** Colloquialism for grouping, which is defined as: Forming a temporary grouping of units/formations, under one commander, for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.

**Cohesion.** Tendency to remain united. (*Concise Oxford Dictionary*). (In a military context, cohesion has been defined as "the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission.... Cohesion exists in a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual soldier, of the small group with which he identifies, and of unit leaders are congruent with each other—by giving his primary loyalty to the group so that it trains and fights as a unit with all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective." Henderson, W.D. *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat*, 1-26. Washington: National Defence University, 1985.)

**Readiness.** The measure of capability of forces at a given point in time to execute their assigned missions.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military Agency for Standardization. Brussels: NATO, 2000. 1 v.; AAP-6(V).



# Annex B

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>DL COMMS:</b>	Director Land Communications
<b>PD LPS:</b>	Project Director - Land Personnel Strategy
<b>DLP:</b>	Director Land Personnel
<b>DAT:</b>	Director Army Training
<b>LFCI:</b>	Land Force Chief Inspector
<b>DLSP:</b>	Director Land Strategic Planning
<b>DAD:</b>	Director Army Doctrine
<b>DLSC:</b>	Director Land Strategic Concepts
<b>DLR:</b>	Director Land Requirements
<b>DLFS:</b>	Director Land Force Structure
<b>DLFR:</b>	Director Land Force Readiness