

Railway Safety Management System Guide

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HOW THIS DOCUMENT IS STRUCTURED

Section 1 outlines the necessary background information on the Railway Safety Management System regulations and Section 2 details the specifics of each System component. Section 3 discusses the record-keeping requirements of the regulations, while initial submission requirements and annual submission requirements are addressed in Sections 4 and 5. The final section outlines the documentation requirements of the regulations.

Appendix A provides the full text of the Safety Management System Regulations for ease of reference while using the Guide. Appendix B provides a list of relevant definitions. Appendix C contains a sample listing of rail safety regulations, rules and general orders as of January 8, 2001. A sample Emergency/Accident Contact List, using telephone numbers for Transport Canada's Ontario region as an example, is provided in Appendix D.

In addition, a list of references and information sources is included at the end of this document. Correspondence can be addressed to:

> Rail Safety Transport Canada Place de Ville Tower C, 10th Floor 330 Sparks Street Ottawa, Ontario K1A ON5

The guide and related publications are available on the Rail Safety web site.

1. INTRODUCTION

This Guide is a companion to the Railway Safety Management System Regulations (Appendix A) pursuant to section 37 and subsection 47.1(1) of the Railway Safety Act. The Guide is intended to assist railways in developing Safety Management Systems that meet the requirements of the regulations. The following sections provide practical advice and suggestions as well as specific examples of methods and approaches that have been adopted by various railways. The Railway Safety Act defines a Safety Management System to be

"a formal framework for integrating safety into day-to-day railway operations and includes safety goals and performance targets, risk assessments, responsibilities and authorities, rules and procedures, and monitoring and evaluation processes."

See <u>Appendix B</u> for additional definitions.

The objectives of the Safety Management System Regulations are to ensure that safety is given management time and corporate resources and that it is subject to performance measurement and monitoring on par with corporate financial and production goals. A Safety Management System will provide a more directed and focused approach to safety. It is anticipated that both increased management attention to safety and an enhanced safety culture within the industry will reduce public and employee fatalities and injuries, reduce property damage resulting from railway accidents, and reduce the impact of accidents on the environment. In addition, a Safety Management System will enable railways to demonstrate – in a concrete and visible manner – their commitment to safety to employees, customers and the public, and will help railways ensure compliance to regulatory requirements.

AN OVERVIEW

The Safety Management System Regulations do not replace any existing rules, regulations or standards. Rather, the requirement for a new systemic approach to managing safety is an addition to the current framework.

An effective Safety Management System will include both management and employee participation. As a result, it is highly desirable to involve employees and their representatives in developing the Safety Management System, in ongoing risk management, audit, and evaluation, and in developing corrective action plans. Existing Health and Safety Committees, established for the purposes of the Canada Labour Code (Part II), could provide a forum for employee involvement, provided that these committees are not diverted from their intended purpose. Alternatively, customized consultation processes could be developed.

The mandate of the Railway Safety Act includes "not only [to] the safety of persons and property transported by railways but also [to] the safety of other persons and other property". While this mandate is relatively broad in scope, typically Safety Management Systems are even broader. A comprehensive Safety Management System would normally include items in addition to those under the jurisdiction of the Railway Safety Act (e.g., programs to meet the requirements of environmental protection legislation, compliance with the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act and regulations, and occupational safety and health programs under the Canada Labour Code (Part II)).


The inclusion of programs to meet the requirements of other legislation in a Safety Management System should help railway companies avoid duplication, meet their regulatory obligations and improve safety. However, this should not be taken to mean that the jurisdiction of the Railway Safety Act extends into these areas or that compliance with the Safety Management System Regulations in any way lessens a railway company's obligation to comply with other legislation. Compliance with the Safety Management System Regulations will be assessed through Transport Canada's compliance monitoring program, which is designed to verify that

- a railway's Safety Management System is in compliance with the minimum regulatory requirements;
- the railway is operating in accordance with the commitments, processes and procedures outlined in its Safety Management System; and
- the Safety Management System is effective in improving safety.

2. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM COMPONENTS

This section of the Guide outlines the required components of a Safety Management System. The box at the beginning of each section contains the statement of the requirement from the regulations. The rest of the section contains suggestions on how to meet the requirement and examples of methods and approaches that have been adopted by various railway companies as well as excerpts from relevant standards and guidelines. Figure 1 shows the key components of a Safety Management System, the relationships between them and the corrective action feedback loops.

Figure 1



SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM COMPONENTS

A) Safety Policy, Annual Safety Targets and Associated Safety Initiatives

2. (a) the railway company safety policy and annual safety performance targets and the associated safety initiatives to achieve the targets, approved by a senior company officer and communicated to employees;

A company's safety policy should:

- demonstrate senior management's commitment to safety;
- set the organization's safety philosophy and guide the establishment of goals and objectives, policies, procedures, and programs;
- be communicated to all employees and to other stakeholders (e.g., customers, the public); and
- be periodically reviewed and revised.

See below for an example of a company's safety policy.

Experience has shown that there is a strong correlation between companies with low accident rates and companies whose senior management are seen to be concerned with safety and who

communicate this concern to employees. To maximize this effect, the safety policy should be approved at the highest possible level within the company.

The safety policy should be communicated to all employees. In some circumstances, it may also be desirable to communicate the safety policy to other stakeholders such as customers, communities through which the railway operates and the general public.

Example 1 – Safety Policy

POLICY

It is company policy to take all appropriate measures to ensure the protection of passengers, employees and the public in general while traveling in railway equipment or while on company property.

In following this policy the company will comply with all existing legislative requirements and will strive to eliminate any foreseeable hazards that may result in fires, damage to property and the environment, security losses, and personal injuries/illnesses.

It is also company policy to sustain continuing programs designed to promote the health and safety of all employees and to co-operate with organizations and associations devoted to safety research and education.

Safety shall be regarded by everyone as a prime consideration in the successful performance of their duties. Management is specifically responsible for the development and implementation of safe practices and procedures.

Managers at all levels will continually monitor situations to identify any sub-standard practices and conditions that may exist so as to provide prompt and adequate corrective action. Health and Safety/Loss Control will be one of the criteria used in assessing management effectiveness.

Employees have the responsibility to perform their duties in a manner that will not jeopardize the safety of customers or adversely affect their own health, safety or physical well-being or that of their fellow workers. Reasonable precaution is also expected from each employee to protect the property and equipment of the company that is under their care.

The company firmly believes that health and safety in the workplace can only be achieved through total commitment on the part of everyone. It is therefore company policy to establish well-organized joint health and safety committees where required throughout the system. This applied philosophy of sharing safety responsibilities will further the foregoing objectives and contribute to a safer work environment.

In addition to a safety policy, the regulations require railways to establish annual safety performance targets and identify initiatives that will be undertaken to achieve those targets. While the ultimate goal is to eliminate accidents, it is useful to have intermediate targets – set annually – against which continual progress toward the ultimate goal can be measured. Annual targets should be associated with planned safety initiatives designed to ensure that the company can meet its safety performance targets. See Example 2 below for safety performance targets. Annual safety performance targets should:

- be measurable, meaningful and realistically achievable;
- promote continual safety improvement;
- be tailored to the needs of the organization; and
- be set at each relevant level in the organization.

The target-setting process should:

- be linked to the railway's risk management process;
- identify the safety initiatives to be undertaken to achieve the targets, the associated time frames and the data that will be collected to measure progress;
- include a plan for an annual evaluation of performance relative to the targets; and
- provide for annual review and revision or reconfirmation of safety performance targets.

	1999	2000	2001	2002
Personal injuries per 200,000 hours				
FRA* personal injuries	3.80	3.50	3.20	3.00
Non-FRA personal injuries	6.10	5.50	5.20	4.80
Train accidents per million train miles				
FRA train accidents (excl. at crossings)	2.50	2.30	2.10	2.00
Road train accidents	1.25	1.15	1.05	1.00
Yard train accidents	1.25	1.15	1.05	1.00
Non-FRA train accidents (excl. crossings)	38.0	36.0	32.0	30.0
Crossing accidents	4.15	4.01	3.89	3.77

Example 2 – Safety Performance Targets

* Federal Railroad Administration

B) Safety Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountabilities

2. (b) clear authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities for safety at all levels in the railway company;

The Safety Management System should include the following:

- identification of a senior manager with overall responsibility for maintaining and implementing the Safety Management System;
- identification of responsibility for annual safety initiatives and for various components of the Safety Management System;
- safety roles, responsibilities, authorities and relationships of all organizational units and all classes of employees who manage, perform or verify work affecting railway safety;
- safety roles and responsibilities of customers, contractors and other parties whose activities may affect railway safety;
- methods of communicating responsibilities;
- procedures for ensuring accountability for these responsibilities; and
- identification of the resources dedicated to ensuring that the responsibilities can be carried out (including people, skills, technology and funding).

Typically, clear authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities for safety can be demonstrated through

- an organization chart that shows both the chain of safety responsibilities and the linkages to ensure that responsibilities are understood and don't "fall through the cracks",
- job descriptions that include safety responsibilities and authorities,
- performance evaluation systems that include safety criteria, and
- reward and recognition programs that reinforce safe behaviours and working practices as well as the achievement of safety objectives.

Example 3 on the following page illustrates some of the circumstances that may contribute to the decreased effectiveness of a Safety Department.

A review of safety and operational issues at an American rail transit system was recently conducted by the safety oversight authority subsequent to a series of fatal accidents. The review found that the organization had not kept abreast with recent developments in system safety. The review also observed that the organization's safety efforts had been weakened by

- frequent changes in the reporting level of the Safety Department,
- staff and budget reductions, and
- a de-emphasis on safety awareness in public and corporate communications.

The Safety Department was moved from place to place in the organization, making its work difficult, its priorities uncertain and its status in the organization marginal. The review found little evidence of the Department's participation in decision making (as required by the organization's own System Safety Program Plan), in the conduct of safety audits and reviews, or in the implementation of public and employee safety awareness programs.

From 1992 to 1996, the Safety Department staff was reduced from 17 to 12 positions. However, at the time of the review, only 8 of the 12 positions were filled. Furthermore, as a result of the Department's movement through the organization, it became responsible for other functions, further reducing its ability to meet its safety responsibilities. These limitations are reflected in, among other things, the absence of strong public and employee safety awareness programs.

C) Employee and Representative Involvement

2. (c) a system for involving employees and their representatives in the development and implementation of the railway company's safety management system;

Experience has shown that a railway company will be markedly more successful in developing a safety culture if employees and their representatives, where applicable, are involved in the development and implementation of the Safety Management System.

Employee and representative participation in drafting the company safety policy is highly recommended. A collaborative approach will help ensure that significant employee concerns are addressed in the policy and will provide an additional vehicle for communicating the railway's commitment to safety to employees. Existing Health and Safety Committees could assist in this process provided that they are not diverted from their intended purpose under the Canada Labour Code (Part II). Alternatively, a customized consultation process could be developed.

Employees and their representatives should also be consulted in setting annual safety targets and identifying the associated safety initiatives. Consulting with employees and linking the targetsetting process with the railway's risk management process will help ensure that the most significant outstanding safety issues and concerns are addressed. Health and Safety Committees may be the most convenient forum for this process, although their purview would have to be expanded to include crossing and trespassing issues as well as the other operational safety concerns that form part of a complete Safety Management System.

Employees and their representatives can make important contributions to each step of the risk management process (as required by component 2(e)). The risk management process should include mechanisms for employees to identify safety issues and concerns on a routine and ongoing basis. These mechanisms should have a high level of visibility and participation to ensure that all risks are captured. Experienced employees may also be a good source of expert judgment for evaluating the probability and severity of safety issues and concerns where quantitative, historical data are not available. Finally, employees and their representatives should be involved in the development of risk control strategies, particularly for risks that they have identified.

Employees should be informed of actions that are being taken or that are planned to address the safety issues and concerns they have identified. Feedback is essential to ensure continued participation.

D) Compliance with Applicable Regulations, Rules, Standards and Orders

2. (d) systems for identifying applicable

- i. railway safety regulations, rules, standards, and orders, and the procedures for demonstrating compliance with them, and
- ii. exemptions and the procedures for demonstrating compliance with the terms or conditions specified in the notice of exemption;

None of the current railway safety framework of rules, regulations and standards is being replaced by the Safety Management System Regulations, and the existing railway safety requirements will continue to apply in their current form. The Safety Management System will provide a framework for identifying legal obligations, monitoring changes to them, and demonstrating and evaluating compliance.

The Safety Management System should include

- procedures to ensure that the organization is aware of its legal obligations with respect to rail safety and to monitor changes;
- procedures for ensuring compliance with these requirements; and
- procedures for evaluating compliance with regulatory requirements, reporting the results of such evaluations and making recommendations.

In addition to the legal obligations contained in rules, regulations, standards and orders, other standards that the railway company has developed or has voluntarily adopted, such as those issued by the Railway Association of Canada (RAC), American Association of Railroads (AAR) or the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Way Association (AREMA), should be documented.

A list of currently applicable rail safety legislation, regulations, rules and standards as well as any exemptions that have been obtained by the company or orders that apply to its operations provides a starting point for meeting this requirement. Appendix C contains a sample listing of rail safety regulations, rules and general orders as of October 15, 1999. Information on new and amended regulations, rules and standards is available from:

- Transport Canada Web site (<u>www.tc.gc.ca</u>)
- Railway Association of Canada Web site (<u>www.railcan.ca</u>)
- Human Resources Development Canada Web site (<u>http://www.rhdsc.gc.ca/</u>)
- Justice Canada Web site (<u>www.canada.justice.gc.ca</u>)
- Government of Canada general Web site (<u>www.canada.gc.ca</u>)

E) Risk Management Process

2. (e) a process for

- i. identifying safety issues and concerns, including those associated with human factors, third parties and significant changes to railway operations, and
- ii. evaluating and classifying risks by means of a risk assessment

Risk management does not mean taking risks, but rather it means identifying risks and working to mitigate or eliminate them. The Safety Management System should include a formal risk management process that includes the following steps:

> Step 1 – Identification of Safety Issues and Concerns

- Mechanisms for employees to identify safety issues and concerns on a routine, ongoing basis that have high levels of visibility and participation
- Input from incident/accident investigations and safety data collection and analysis
- Analytical methods such as failure mode and effect analysis, hazard and operability studies, and fault-tree analysis and event-tree analysis for new equipment, systems, practices and procedures where experience and a safety history are not available
- Special consideration of safety issues and concerns related to human factors, third-party interfaces and the introduction of significant changes to operations
- Feedback from Safety Management System processes such as incident and accident investigation, safety data collection and analysis, proficiency testing, and internal audit
- Safety monitoring technology such as hot box detectors, wheel impact detectors, high water detectors and on-train monitoring systems
- Input from the public (1-800 numbers), customers (complaint monitoring) and regulatory agencies (findings of non-compliance or unsafe situations)

Railways are expected to do a thorough analysis of both new operations and significant changes to existing operations (see Figure 2 on the following page). In the case of new equipment, systems, operations, practices and procedures where experience and a safety history are not available, formal analytical techniques should be applied. These techniques are more demanding in terms of data, time, effort and expertise; however, this extra effort is justified for new equipment, systems, operations, practices and procedures and should be considered a normal part of the process of implementing change.


Examples of significant changes requiring a risk assessment process include

- railway company mergers,
- major organizational transitions,
- the introduction of new technology (e.g., Light Emitting Diodes), and
- major operational changes (e.g., new commuter lines, speed changes).

A complete analysis of existing operations is not required provided that current risk mitigation strategies are documented (see component 2(f)). Input from accident and incident investigation, safety performance data collection and analysis, and complaints, inspections and audits should be used to identify areas of existing operations that require a thorough analysis.

Figure 2





Step 2 – Risk Estimation

Assessment of the probability and severity of the safety issue/concern either qualitatively or quantitatively

Quantitative estimates of the probability and severity of the safety issue/concern can sometimes be developed from safety performance data, illness and injury records, etc. Probability estimates based on historical data assume that future conditions will mirror those of the past. Where no relevant historical data are available, other methods such as fault-tree or event-tree analysis may be used to generate estimates.

Severity is normally measured in terms of the number of deaths or injuries, the value of property damage, or the cleanup costs and environmental impact, either as an average based on the experience of the company or industry over a certain time period or as a range. Other types of losses associated with accidents and incidents that are less easily measurable, such as damage to the company's reputation and degradation of the quality and timeliness of service to customers,

should also be evaluated in assessing the severity of risks. Where quantitative probability and severity estimates cannot be derived due to a lack of relevant data, qualitative estimates based on expert judgment may be substituted.

Step 3 – Risk Evaluation

Evaluate and determine whether the associated risk is tolerable, tolerable with mitigation or unacceptable using a predetermined company risk classification methodology

Risk evaluation is the process of assessing the significance of risks and determining which risks are tolerable, tolerable with mitigation or unacceptable. These decisions should be made using a predetermined risk classification methodology/tool such as the risk resolution matrix (see Example 4), which is adapted from the *Manual for the Development of System Safety Program Plans for Commuter Railroads*, American Public Transit Association.

	SEVERITY					
PROBA BILITY	Catastrophic	Critical	Marginal	Negligible		
Frequent	unacceptable	unacceptable	unacceptable	tolerable with mitigation		
Probable	unacceptable	unacceptable	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable with mitigation		
Occasion al	unacceptable	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable		
Remote	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable		
Improbab le	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable with mitigation	tolerable		

Example 4 - Risk Resolution Matrix

SEVERITY CATEGORIES

- **Catastrophic** = Death or permanent total disability, major property damage, or system loss
- **Critical** = Permanent partial disability, temporary total disability in excess of 3 months, significant property damage or major system damage
- **Marginal** = Minor injury, minor occupational illness, lost workday accident, minor property damage or minor system damage
- **Negligible** = First aid or minor medical treatment, or minor system impairment

PROBABILITY CATEGORIES

- **Frequent** = Likely to occur frequently (individual), Continuously experienced (fleet/inventory)
- **Probable** = Will occur several times in the life of an item, Will occur frequently in fleet/inventory
- **Occasional** = Likely to occur sometime in the life of an item, Will occur several times in fleet/inventory
- **Remote** = Unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of an item, Unlikely, but can be expected to occur in fleet/inventory
- **Improbable** = So unlikely it can be assumed that an occurrence may not be experienced, Unlikely to occur, but possible in fleet

Risk resolution matrices may have varying numbers of probability and severity categories (rows and columns). The number of categories and the category definitions should be established based on company size and experience. Category definitions used by one Canadian railway are shown on the next page (see Example 5). In this case, severity categories have a number of different dimensions and safety issues are assigned the severity category associated with the "highest" severity rating over all dimensions.

	SEVERITY CATEGORIES					
	Minimal	Minor	Marginal	Serious	Critical	Catastrophic
Fatalities					single	multiple
Disabling Injuries (Lost Time)				single	multiple	
Minor Injuries			single	multiple		
Major Yard/Track Disruptions		20 to 60 minutes	1 to 6 hours	6 to 24 hours	24 to 72 hours	1 week
Minor Yard/Track Disruption			6 hours	6 to 48 hours	1 week	1 month
Main Line Disruption		20 to 60 minutes	1 to 6 hours	6 to 24 hours	24 to 72 hours	1 week
Terminal Disruption	20 minutes	a few hours	1 day	2 to 3 days	1 week	1 month
Dangerous Comodities Incident		1 wheel off	derailed, no breach of car	derailed car(s), breached, small quantity of product lost	large product loss, personal	deralied car(s), breached, large product loss, personal injuries, envir. damage, major evacuation
Damage to Property	>\$100	>\$1K	>\$10K	>\$100K	\$1 M	\$10 M

Example 5 - Risk Category Definitions

Probability Categories	How Frequently Does the Event Occur?	Probability of Recurrence
А	Happens often	High
В	Has happened before	High
С	Can happen	Medium
D	Has happened somewhere before	Medium
Е	Hasn't happened before (first time)	Low

The Safety Management System should include

- documentation of the risk analysis;
- procedures for updating the analysis
 - periodically,
 - after a major accident, and

- when safety performance is not improving (as indicated by safety data analysis); and
- periodic review of the analysis by senior management.

F) Risk Control Strategies

2. (f) risk control strategies;

Risk control strategies are required for risks that have been classified as unacceptable or tolerable with mitigation. In generic terms, these strategies can focus on

- eliminating the situation, substance, condition or activity that generates the risk;
- reducing the probability of occurrence; or
- mitigating (reducing) the consequences.

It is expected that railways will identify some or all of the risks included in the table on the following pages as unacceptable or tolerable with mitigation. This list is not exhaustive, but it is intended to exemplify common risks and typical control strategies and to indicate the process each railway company should undertake.

For existing operations, many of the risks will have already been considered and risk control strategies will form part of the railway's current rules, standards, procedures and operating practices. In this case, the risk assessment process would document this link and then focus on the results of accident and incident investigations, safety data analysis, complaint follow-up, inspections, and audits to ensure that the risk is being mitigated to an acceptable level. This analysis should point railway companies to areas where they could undertake initiatives beyond their current practices in an effort to improve their overall safety performance.

For new operations, or for changes to technology, staffing levels, types of operation or other areas where a railway company lacks historical data and experience, a formal risk management process as described in component 2(e) should almost always be undertaken.

The Safety Management System should include procedures for the development of the required strategies, approval at an appropriate management level and effective implementation. Employees and their organizations should be involved in the development of risk control strategies, particularly for risks that they have identified, and they should be informed of the actions that are being taken or that are planned.

Area	Risks	Risk Control Strategies
Train and	-derailments	-uniform, coordinated development and
Equipment	-collisions	implementation of operating rules and procedures
Operations	-human reliability	-periodic review and revision of operating rules and
	(alertness, ability to use	procedures
	equipment and follow	-training programs
	procedures)	-monitoring of employees and supervisors
	-unintended movements	-rules violation monitoring
	(runaways)	-human factors analysis
	-missed or misunderstood	-work process mapping
	communications	
	-failure to follow rules or	
	procedures	
	-failure to see/obey	
	signals	
	-changes in timetable	
	speeds	

Risks and Risk Control Strategies

	-1	
	-changes in frequency or	
	times of operation	
Equipment,	-equipment failures	-inspection and maintenance standards and
Infrastructure	leading to collisions,	procedures, including cycles, record-keeping
and Facilities	derailments and/or	procedures, and corrective action and
	employee injuries	implementation monitoring procedures
	-unsafe equipment	-design and construction standards and procedures
	-safety appliances	-modification review and approval process
	-passenger cars	-procedures for the review and approval of
	-infrastructure failures	modifications to equipment, systems, infrastructure,
	-rail failures (broken,	etc.
	spread)	-procedures to document changes to equipment and
	-track condition (ties,	systems, including on as-built drawings
	ballast, cross -level,	-procurement procedures to prevent the introduction
	spirals, tight rail)	of defective or deficient materials and supplies or
	areas of recent work	unauthorized hazardous materials
	-bridge failures	-relevant safety policies, requirements and standards
	-slope failures	communicated to suppliers through purchasing
	-washouts	documents or specifications
	-flooding	facility inspection procedures, including a hazard
	-avalanches	identification and elimination process, cycles,
	-impact of significant	record-keeping procedures, and corrective action
	changes to operations	and implementation tracking procedures
	(type of service, speed,	-safety technology
	frequency, weight)	-devices on the right-of-way (hot box detectors,
	-signal system failures	wheel impact load detectors, acoustic detectors,
	-crossing automatic	thermal imaging detectors, transponders for use in
	protection failures	Advanced Train Control Systems, washout and
	-unsafe facilities	slide detectors)
	-passenger stations	-devices on railway equipment (suspension bearing,
	-shops	detectors (locomotives), wheel and bearing
		detectors (railway cars), train information braking
	dangerous goods (diesel	systems (TIBS), proximity detection devices, voice
	fuel, methanol, propane,	data recordings, locomotive event recorders, reset
	etc.)	safety control devices)
	-pipelines and pipe	-rail traffic control boards and computer systems
	crossings	-signal and traffic control systems
		· ·
Grade	-collisions with vehicles	-grade crossing construction and maintenance
Crossings	(deaths, injuries,	standards
	derailments, equipment	-inspection frequencies and procedures
	damage)	-crossing safety assessments, including assessment
	-pedestrian deaths and	frequencies (traffic volumes,
	injuries	traffic types, sight lines, crossing surface, frequency
	-near misses causing	of obstruction, protection of pedestrians)
	emergency brake	-application of the risk management process to
	application	crossing hazards and the development of
	-crossing blockages	appropriate location-specific controls
	impeding emergency	-a public awareness/education program with respect
	services	to crossing safety that involves road authorities and
	-condition of crossing	other affected parties
	causing accidents not	-number posted at crossings
	involving trains	
	-risk to personnel such as	
	flagmen	
<u> </u>	L9	I

		
	-impact of noise from	
	crossings on local	
	residents	
	-impact of anti-whistling	
	prohibitions	
	-changes in train or	
	roadway speeds	
	-changes in frequency or	
	time of operation	
Trespassing	-deaths and injuries to	-a process for identifying problem locations
	trespassers	-application of the risk management process to
	-trauma to train crews	trespassing hazards and development of appropriate
		location-specific risk controls
	near misses	-a public awareness/education program with respect
	-equipment damage and	to trespassing
	runaway equipment from	-involvement of local authorities
	vandalism	
		-fencing and physical barriers
	-objects on track	-provision of alternatives crossings
	-changes in train speed	-keeping right-of-way free of debris
	-changes in frequency or	
	time of operation	
Interface with	-collisions	-a process to ensure safe interface between railways
Other Railways	-unauthorized track/yard	and between the railway and customers
and Customers	occupancy	-methods of ensuring that other railways and
	-equipment left foul	customers are aware of their safety responsibilities
	-failure to be qualified in	-procedures to assess the training and qualifications
	or to follow standard rules	of customers and other parties whose activities may
	and procedures	directly affect railway safety
	-receiving or delivering	-supervision and proficiency testing
	defective equipment	
	-operation on	
	infrastructure not	
	maintained to minimum	
	standards	
	-restricted clearances	
Caratara at ann		
Contractors	-failure to understand or	-a process to ensure that contractors are trained in
		the organization's safety procedures and are
	procedures	familiar with safety equipment requirements and
	-failure to provide or use	their safety responsibilities
	safety equipment	-ensuring that safety requirements are included in
	-failure to coordinate	contractors' statements of work and competency
	activities with company	requirements
	personnel/train operations	-selection, control and performance review of
	-failure to use specified	contractors, taking into account contractor ability to
	materials, equipment or	meet safety requirements and follow safety
	procedures	procedures
		-taking action when contractors do not comply with
		the organization's safety procedures
Employee	-deaths	-an employee safety program and health controls
Safety	-injuries	that meet the requirements of the Canada Labour
Sarcey	-incidents (near misses)	Code (Part II)
	-fitness for duty	-a process for feedback on risk control actions,
	-unsafe conditions not	1 ·
1	Funsate conditions not	safety performance and safety audit results to

	identified or corrected	employees
	-failure to identify,	-formal job briefings
	provide or use safety	-safety awareness and promotion programs
	equipment	-a workplace hazardous materials program meeting
	-hazardous materials in	the Workplace Hazardous Materials Information
	workplace	System (WHIMIS) requirements
		-safety training, particularly with respect to new
		equipment, processes and procedures
		-a recognition and rewards system that recognizes
		the right behaviours and safe working practices
		-a safety ombudsman
Dangerous	-risk to employees from	-knowledge of and compliance with the applicable
Goods and	spills, leaks and container	standards, rules and regulations
Hazardous	failures	-procedures for identifying and feeding back
Materials	-risk to the public and	containment failure data and maintenance
Transportation	communities from large-	deficiencies to the shippers of the dangerous goods
	scale accidents and	-procedures for integrating the organization into
	incidents	industry and community awareness and emergency
	-receiving or delivering	response (CAER) programs
	defective or leaking tank	-criteria for identifying and activating external
	cars or containers	resources for dangerous occurrences
	-negative public	-procedures for liaison with and management of
	perceptions adversely	external resources at dangerous occurrences
	affecting operations	-participation in the Canadian Chemical Producers Association "Responsible Care" initiative
Environmentel	damaga ta tha	
Environmental Impact	environment from	-knowledge of and compliance with the applicable standards, rules and regulations
impaci	ongoing operations	standards, rules and regulations
	-damage to the	
	environment from	
	accidents, including	
	dangerous goods and fuel	
	spills	
	-noise and fumes	
Vandalism,	-risk to employees and	-identification of risks (threat assessments) and
Terrorism and	operations from deliberate	development of security plans and procedures (with
Sabotage	malicious acts	the appropriate confidentiality)
	-objects on right-of-way	-staff training and familiarity with security risks and
	-misaligned switches	procedures
	-disabled signals and	security exercises
	crossing protection	links with security agencies
	-thrown objects	
	-runaway equipment	
	-sabotaged equipment	
	-bomb/sabotage threats	
Emergencies	derailments	emergency preparedness and response

G) Accident and Incident Reporting, Investigation and Analysis

2. (g) systems for accident and incident reporting, investigation, analysis and corrective action;

The Safety Management System should include

• procedures for internal and external accident and incident notification and reporting, including third-party reporting;

- procedures, formats and approaches (e.g., site protocol) for investigations (e.g., environmental, employee injuries, transportation of dangerous goods);
- a formal link to the risk management process; and
- procedures for reporting and documenting findings, conclusions and recommendations, and for ensuring implementation of recommendations and corrective actions.

See Example 6 below for a list of the elements to be included in a comprehensive railway accident investigation process. Example 7 (on the following page) details the role of accident cause finding and corrective actions in accident prevention.

Appendix D provides a sample emergency/accident contact list, using telephone numbers for Transport Canada's Ontario region as an example. This could be used as the basis for developing similar lists for other locations.

Example 6 – Elements of a Comprehensive Railway

Accident Investigation Process

- Introduction
- Investigation and Reporting Process
 - investigating team
 - forms and materials
 - preliminary data gathering
 - weather information
 - arriving at site
 - dealing with government agencies
- Cause-finding Process
- Inspecting Cars
- Inspecting Locomotives
- Inspecting Track
- Operational and Human Factors
- Track Car Dynamics
- Train Dynamics
- Billable Accidents
- Appendices
 - Train Accident Investigation and Reporting Process
 - Train Accident Costing Policies
 - Fact Finding and Accident Forms
 - Train Accident Cause
 - Explanation of Selected Train Accident Causes
 - Track Standards

Example 7 – The Role of Accident Cause Finding and Corrective Actions in Accident Prevention

Most (train) accidents can be prevented. Finding the cause of each accident, regardless of how minor, is critical to preventing a recurrence. The Investigating Team must recommend a cause (or causes) as well as preventative actions to the Train Accident Prevention Chairperson, who is responsible for implementing the required corrective actions. There are two categories of preventive actions: immediate protection and long-term correction.

The purpose of immediate protection is to the reduce the immediate risk of another similar train accident. Examples are a 10 mph temporary speed restriction at the site when the cause was a track geometry defect or a 40 mph speed restriction on a type of car that appears to be unstable at

higher speeds. The immediate protective actions, when required, must be implemented by the Investigating Team before operations are resumed.

Once the cause of an accident is known and all relevant conditions and failures have been identified, long-term corrections may be appropriate. The purpose of these actions is to reduce the likelihood of a similar train accident recurring in the future. Examples of long-term corrective actions would be the accelerated removal of straight plate wheels and the overhaul of trucks on a specific class of car.

Source: Train Accident Cause Finding Manual (Train Accident Prevention and Testing)

H) Skills, Training and Supervision

2. (h) systems for ensuring that employees and any other persons to whom the railway company grants access to its property, have appropriate skills and training and adequate supervision to ensure that they comply with all safety requirements;

The Safety Management System should include

- identification of required position qualifications;
- identification of required qualification and training of customers, contractors, other railways and other third parties whose activities may directly affect railway safety;
- periodic reviews of qualification requirements that take into account the results of proficiency testing, compliance evaluations, risk assessments, accident/incident investigations and safety data analysis;
- procedures for ensuring that employees have received the necessary training and certification and that qualifications are kept current;
- procedures for keeping records of training and certification requirements as well as the status of employees relative to these requirements;
- procedures for compliance and proficiency testing in all disciplines and for record keeping and follow-up corrective action such as additional training;
- procedures for communicating to employees any changes to safety policies, work procedures, practices, requirements, rules and standards;
- supervisor job descriptions that identify responsibilities, including coaching and direct field observation;
- systems for ensuring accountability for these responsibilities; and
- adequate resources for supervision.

Example 8 details the importance of supervision in preventing accidents due to "operational and human factors".

Example 8 – The Role of Supervision in Preventing Accidents Due to Operational and Human Factors

Inappropriate operating practices, judgment errors and failure to comply with rules may cause an accident. A rules violation, while serious, is not necessarily the cause of the accident. Similarly, compliance with rules or accepted operating practices does not automatically remove the cause from the "operational and human factors" group of train accident causes. The other two groups are "equipment" and "track".

Supervisors and employees must accept the principle that most accidents can be prevented. Supervisors must properly manage their people in order to prevent these causes. The employee must be educated on how to do the job and clearly instructed on what to do. Formal rules examinations, efficiency tests and observations during daily contact must be used to verify job knowledge and compliance. The employee must be given additional education after a deficiency is detected.

Source: Train Accident Cause Finding Manual (Train Accident Prevention and Testing)

I) Safety Performance Data Collection and Analysis

2. (i) Procedures for the collection and analysis of data for assessing the safety performance of the railway company;

The Safety Management System should include

- identification of the safety data to be collected to assess performance with respect to the company's annual safety targets and to meet other analytical requirements;
- systems to collect data on accidents and safety-related incidents;
- procedures for periodic analysis of the data and feedback into the risk management process;
- analysis of safety data to assess safety performance relative to the organization's annual targets and to identify safety trends using appropriate statistical techniques;
- and periodic senior management review of safety data analysis.

Safety performance should be measured through a range of indicators designed to ensure accurate reporting (see Example 9 on the following page for a sample listing of activity measures). Safety performance indicators should be

- simple and easily understood;
- clearly defined and consistently applied; and
- in the form of a rate, where possible, to facilitate year-to-year and place-to-place comparisons.

Safety performance data can be captured by automated techniques or through inspection activities and reporting systems. Modern technology such as test cars, impact detectors and crossing systems has greatly expanded the type and quantity of safety data that can be captured at a reasonable cost.

Example 9 - Activity Measures for Rail Safety Analysis

- Million Train Miles (Canada) Monthly, Annually
- Million Train Miles (Provincial) Monthly, Annually
- Train Miles by Service Corridor Quarterly
- Miles of Track Annually Canada, Annually Provincial
- Density Reports (gross tons per subdivision) Annually
- Yard Lead Locomotive Switching Miles Monthly by Yard, Annually by Yard
- Fuel Consumption Monthly, Annually
- Employee Hours (per 200,000) Annually
- Employees Employed by Occupation Category Annually
- **Subdivisions** Annually (Listing of subdivisions sold and active subdivisions with start and end mileage)
- Accidents/Incidents Causes related to each accident/incident, Monthly, Annually

J) Safety Audit and Evaluation

2. (j) procedures for periodic internal safety audits, reviews by management, monitoring and evaluations of the safety management system;

Safety audits and evaluations of the Safety Management System are important mechanisms for ensuring that all of the organizational elements, functions and procedures in the Safety Management System are working well. Internal audits and evaluations are one of the key feedback loops for identifying required changes to the system.

The Safety Management System should include

- periodic audits of the performance of the components of the organization's Safety Management System, including audit frequencies, methodologies, responsibilities and reporting processes;
- audits by suitably qualified personnel who are impartial and objective;
- use of recognized audit methodologies that include validation through interviews, random spot checks, etc.;
- audit reports that include recommendations for corrective action;
- reporting of audit results to senior management;
- retention of audit reports for review by Transport Canada;
- periodic evaluations of the Safety Management System to ensure the continued suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the policy, annual safety targets, procedures and other components of the System, taking into account changing circumstances and the results of compliance evaluations, risk assessments, accident/incident investigations, safety performance analyses and audits;
- feedback gathered from employees and other relevant stakeholders; and
- consideration and approval of evaluation reports as well as the resulting recommendations by senior management.

Audit and evaluation frequencies are expected to vary depending on the size and complexity of the railway, the risks involved, and the railway's safety performance history. One major Canadian railway audits every component annually and conducts ongoing safety assessment activities through Health and Safety Committees. Larger railway companies will likely have the staff and expertise necessary to establish auditing processes and teams, although they may choose to hire external resources to obtain specific skills or assistance. Smaller companies that may not have the resources to conduct an audit program internally may be able to obtain assistance from a variety of sources, including senior railways with which they interchange, consultants and professional auditors.

K) Corrective Action Development, Approval and Monitoring

2. (k) systems for monitoring management-approved corrective actions resulting from the systems and processes required under paragraphs (d) to (j);

The key to the effectiveness of a Safety Management System is the feedback loops that ensure that corrective action is taken. The need for corrective action may be identified through the following:

- evaluation of compliance to regulations, rules and standards (component 2(d));
- the risk management process (component 2(e)), particularly step 1 identification of safety issues and concerns;
- risk control strategies (component 2(f));
- accident and incident investigation (component 2(g));
- reviews of skills and training requirements and the results of supervision and proficiency testing (component 2(h));
- safety performance data analysis (component 2(i)); and
- safety audits and evaluations of the Safety Management System (component 2(j)).

The Safety Management System should include

- procedures for developing corrective action plans that focus on ensuring that the problem, incident or accident does not recur;
- procedures for obtaining the appropriate management approvals of recommended corrective actions; and
- procedures for formal monitoring of the implementation of and compliance with the corrective actions approved by management.

L) Documentation

2. (1) consolidated documentation describing the systems for each component of the safety management system.

The Safety Management System should be documented and the applicable sections readily available to those with defined responsibilities in the System. Procedures for updating and distributing the documentation should be specified. The documentation should show how each of the requirements is being met, including references to process and procedure documents, standards, guidelines, manuals, job descriptions, organization charts, etc., the current edition number or date, and the locations where these documents can be found. For a large company, the Safety Management System document may be a summary document that describes how the company is meeting its obligations in each area, while referencing other documents that describe the specific process and procedures that form the System.

3. RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS

3. (1) A railway company shall maintain records of the following information for the purposes of assessing its safety performance:

- a. accident and incident investigation reports and a description of the corrective actions taken for accidents and incidents that meet the reporting criteria (see Definitions); and
- b. accident rates expressed as follows:
 - 1. employee deaths, disabling injuries and minor injuries, per 200,000 hours worked by the employees of the railway company, and
 - 2. train and grade crossing accidents that meet the reporting criteria, per million train miles.

(2) At the request of the Minister, a railway company shall collect, maintain and submit to the Minister specified performance or safety data for the purpose of monitoring the effectiveness of its safety management system and its safety performance.

In addition to maintaining information on "reportable" accidents/incidents, railway companies are encouraged to maintain records of investigations along with descriptions of the corrective actions taken for "non-reportable" accidents and incidents. Indeed, to accurately assess safety performance, railway companies should maintain information on all accidents and incidents. Annual safety performance targets and the associated safety initiatives to achieve the targets should be linked to this data.

4. INITIAL SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS

4. (1) A railway company shall submit to the Minister the following information in respect of its safety management system:

- a. the name, address and position of the person responsible for the safety management system;
- b. a description of the railway company's operations and rail network;
- c. the railway company's safety policy;

- d. the railway company's safety performance targets and the associated safety initiatives to achieve the targets for the calendar year in which the submission is made;
- e. information showing the reporting structure and safety relationships of positions and departments in the company, including organization charts;
- f. a list of the applicable railway safety regulations, rules, standards, orders and exemptions;
- g. a description of the railway company's risk management process and risk control strategies;
- h. a list of the railway company's training and qualification programs, including those of external sources;
- i. a description of the data being collected by the railway company for the purpose of assessing its safety performance;
- j. a description of the railway company's internal safety audit program; and
- k. a list of the titles and dates of all documents in the railway company's safety management system that describe how the railway company is meeting its obligations with respect to each safety management component set out in section 2.
- (2) The information shall be submitted
 - a. in respect of a railway company that is in operation on March 31, 2001, before April 30, 2001; and,
 - b. in any other case, at least 60 days before the railway company begins operations.

A railway company shall not operate unless it has a Safety Management System in place that meets the requirements of these regulations.

It is understood that the information listed above in subsection 4(1) of the regulations will be made available to employee representatives.

The initial Safety Management System submission required by the regulations is intended to provide preliminary assurance to the Department that the railway company has developed and implemented a Safety Management System that meets regulatory requirements. The Safety Management System documentation required by component 2(l) should be much more comprehensive. Transport Canada audits will scrutinize the system and its documentation in detail to verify adequacy and effectiveness.

The description of the company's actual or projected network (owned or leased) and operations (item 4(1)(b)) should include

- miles of track;
- location of sub-divisions (from to) and the maximum allowable speed;
- number of employees;
- number of revenue car loads generated;
- type of operation(s) (e.g., passenger, freight, transportation of dangerous goods);
- interconnections with other railroads; and
- a list of railways operating over the host railway.

5. ANNUAL SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS

5. (1) Not later than March 1 of each year following the year in which a railway company submits the information required pursuant to subsection 4(l), the railway company shall submit to the Minister the following information in respect of the preceding calendar year:

- a. any revisions made to the information referred to in subsection 4(1);
- b. its safety performance relative to its safety targets; and
- c. its accident rates expressed as required in section 3(1)(b)

(2) The railway company shall include in the information its safety targets for the calendar year in which the submission is made.

The annual Safety Management System submissions required by the regulations are intended to provide assurance to the Department that the railway company is maintaining an up-to-date Safety Management System that meets regulatory requirements. The record keeping and annual reporting of safety performance relative to safety targets and accident rates allow the railway company to assess the results/effectiveness of its Safety Management System. In addition, the annual submissions will better enable Transport Canada to provide assurance on the continuing state of railway safety in Canada.

6. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

To enable a railway safety inspector to monitor compliance with these Regulations, a railway company shall keep readily available all documents that are mentioned in its safety management system.

At any time after the initial submission, and with reasonable notification, a Railway Safety Inspector may require a railway company to produce for inspection any of the documentation referenced in the Safety Management System for the purpose of compliance monitoring.

APPENDIX A: RAILWAY SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REGULATIONS

http://www.tc.gc.ca/railway/SMS_Regulations.htm

APPENDIX B - DEFINITIONS

Disabling Injury – has the meaning assigned in section 15.1 of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health Regulations and section 11.1 of the On-Board Trains Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (*Blessure invalidante*)

Employee Representative – refers to an employee who does not exercise managerial functions and who has been selected from among those employees; where employees are represented by a trade union, it refers to the person selected by the trade union (*Représentant des employés*)

Human Reliability Analysis – identifying likely occurrences of human errors in system components (e.g., matching machine to human capability) (*Analyse de fiabilité humaine*)

Human Factor Analysis – applying human psychological, social, physical and biological characteristics in the design, operation or use of products or systems (*Analyse du facteur humain*)

Minor Injury – has the meaning assigned in section 15.1 of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health Regulations and section 11.1 of the On-Board Trains Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (*Blessure légère*)

Railway Safety Inspector – any person designated by the Minister as such under section 27(1) of the RSA (*Inspecteur de la sécurité ferroviaire*)

Reporting Criteria –

(a) in respect of an accident, the criteria set out in the definition "reportable railway accident" in subsection 2(1) of the Transportation Safety Board Regulations; and

(b) in respect of an incident, the criteria set out in the definition "reportable railway incident" in subsection 2(1) of the Transportation Safety Board Regulations (*Critères à signaler*)

Resources – the means to achieve an end or fulfill a function (e.g., people, money, material, tools, equipment) (*Ressources*)

Risk – the chance of injury or loss measured as the probability and severity of an adverse effect on health, property, the environment, or other things of value (*Risque*)

Risk Control Strategy – a course of action intended to reduce the frequency or severity of injury or loss, including a decision not to pursue the activity (*Stratégie de contrôle du risque*)

Safety Initiative – a proposed plan, project or course of action designed to achieve a specific safety target (*Initiative de sécurité*).

Safety Management System – a formal framework for integrating safety into day-to-day railway operations and includes safety goals and performance targets, risk assessments, responsibilities and authorities, rules and procedures, and monitoring and evaluation processes (*Système de gestion de la sécurité*)

Safety Targets – quantitative or qualitative safety improvements to be achieved (*Objectifs de sécurité*)

APPENDIX C LIST OF RAIL SAFETY REGULATIONS, RULES AND ORDERS*					
TITLE/SUBJECT	NUMBER	ТҮРЕ	DISCIPLINE	EXE MPTI ON	
Air Reservoir Rule	TC 0-10	Rules	Equipment		
Bulk Storage, Ammonium Nitrate	GO 0-36	Regulations	Equipment		
Bulk Storage, Anhydrous Ammonium	GO 0-33	Regulations	Equipment		
Bulk Storage, Chlorine Tank Car	GO 0-35	Regulations	Equipment		
Bulk Storage, Flammable Liquids	GO 0-32	Regulations	Equipment		
Bulk Storage, Liquefied Petroleum Gases	GO 0-31	Regulations	Equipment		
Cabooseless Ore Trains Operations	R-40691	Order	Operations		
Cabooses, Marshalling of Occupied	R-40809	Order	Operations		
Canada Labour Code - Part 2	OSH 2CLC	Regulation	Supplementar y		
Canadian Rail Operating Rules	TC 0-01	Rules	Operations	Yes	
Clearance Standards - Minimum	TC E-05	Standards	Engineering		
Control and Prevention of Fires on Railway Rights-of-Way	TC E-06	Rules	Engineering		
Crossing, Highway at Grade	CTC 1980-8 RAIL	Regulations	Engineering		
Crossing, Highway Protective Devices	GO E-06	Regulations	Engineering		
Crossing, Pipe Under Railways	GO E-10	Regulations	Engineering		
Crossing, Wire and Proximities	GO E-11	Regulations	Engineering		
Ditch Lights Installation (amending R- 38525)	R-39613	Order	Operations		
Ditch Lights Installation - CN & AMTRAK	R-39244	Order	Operations		
Ditch Lights Installation - CN & VIA (amended by R-38525)	R-39243	Order	Operations		
Ditch Lights Installation - CN & VIA (amending R-39243)	R-39398	Order	Operations		

Ditch Lights Installation - CN (amending R- 38525)	R-39245	Order	Operations	
Electric Sparks, Prevention of	CTC 1982-8 RAIL	Regulations	Engineering	
Employee Minimum Qualification Standards	CTC 1987-3 RAIL	Regulations	Operations	
Event Recorders Installation - CN	R-40614	Order	Operations	
Event Recorders Installation - CP	R-40340	Order	Operations	Yes
Event Recorders Installation - VIA	R-39921	Order	Operations	
Freight Car Safety Rules (revised 94/10/25)	TC O-06.1	Rules	Equipment	
Gateway Inspection	R-31780, R- 41089(112R)	Order	Operations	
Hours of Work, Maximum, for Railway Operating Employees	MO 93-01	Ministerial Order	Operations	
Locomotive Inspection and Safety	TC 0-13	Rules	Equipment	Yes
Locomotive Lights and Lamps	GO 0-14	Regulations	Equipment	
Locomotive, Engine Bell and Whistle	GO 0-25	Regulations	Equipment	Yes
Mandatory Off-duty Time for Railway Operating Employees	TC 0-04	Rules	Operations	Yes
Mining Near Lines of Railway	TC E-03	Regulations	Engineering	
Non-Smoker's Health Act and Smokers Regulations		Regulations	Supplementar y	
Notice of Railworks (revised 94/11/01)	TC E-02	Regulations	Engineering	
Occupational Safety and Health, Committees and Representatives Regulations	OSH 86	Regulations	Supplementar y	
Occupational Safety and Health, MOU - Labour Canada and TC	OSH-MOU	MOU	Supplementar y	
Occupational Safety and Health, On Board Train Regulations	OSH 95	Regulations	Supplementar y	
Passenger Car Inspection & Safety Rules	TC 0-12.1	Rules	Equipment	
Radio Communication Rule	TC 0-09	Rules	Operations	Yes
Rail Grinding Equipment Operations	R-37621	Order	Operations	
Rail Service Equipment Cars	CTC 1986-9 RAIL	Regulations	Operations	Yes
Relevant Associations and Organizations	MO 97-01	Ministerial Order	General	
Reset Safety Control System - CN	R-40950	Order	Equipment	Yes
Reset Safety Control System - CP	R-40951	Order	Equipment	Yes
Reset Safety Control System - VIA	R-40537	Order	Equipment	
Safe Containers Convention Act and Regulations	SCCAR	Regulations	Supplementar y	
Safety Appliance Standards	GO 0-10	Regulations	Equipment	Yes
Safety Critical Positions	MO 92-03	Ministerial Order	Operations	
Signal and Traffic Control System Standards	TC E-07/08	Standards	Engineering	Yes
Switch Locks Installation - CN	R-39612	Order	Operations	

Switch Locks Installation - CP	R-39910	Order	Operations	
Switch Locks Installation - VIA	R-39611	Order	Operations	
Track Safety Rules (revised 97/12)	TC E-04.1 TC E-04.2	Rules	Engineering	Yes
Track Units and Track Work Protection (revised 95/11/01)	TC 0-02	Rules	Operations	
Train Brake Rules (revised 94/10/25)	TC 0-07.1	Rules	Equipment	Yes
Train Speed on CN's Weston and York Subs. (for DC)	NTA 1988- R-915	Order	Operations	
Train Speed on CP's MacTier, Galt, North York and Bellville Subs. (for DC)	NTA 1988- R-916	Order	Operations	
Train Speeds on Smith Falls and Brockville Subs. (amended by R-36977)	R-36883	Order	Operations	
Train Speeds on Smith Falls and Brockville Subs. (amending R-36883)	R-36977	Order	Operations	
Train Speed Restriction - Show Cause	R-36550	Order	Operations	
Train Speed, CN Rail (amended by R- 39611)	R-38525	Order	Operations	
Train Speed, CP Rail (amended by R- 39611)	R-38524	Order	Operations	
Vision and Hearing Examination (amended by CTC 1985-3 RAIL)	GO O-09	Regulations	Operatio ns	Yes

* Railway Safety Handbook, Transport Canada - Revised October 15, 1999

APPENDIX D SAMPLE EMERGENCY/ACCIDENT CONTACT LIST

This matrix was developed for use in Ontario to assist railways in understanding the role and reporting requirements of government agencies that may be involved in train accidents. There will be differences in roles and reporting numbers in other provinces, but this list should provide a guide as to who to contact.

Federal	24-hour	Mandatory	Also Gets Reports	Attends Accident
Agency	Number	Reporting	on/from	to
1)Transportat	Canutec	Dangerous goods	Fire and Police	Protect public
ion of	613-996-	accidents and spills	Departments	safety under
Dangerous	666		Environment Canada	sections 17 and 19
Goods Act			and the Provincial	of the Act
Transport			Ministry of the	Analyze container
Canada			Environment	failures or
Headquarter			Transportation Safety	imminent releases
s: Dangerous			Board	Assist in the
Goods				provision of
Directorate				emergency
Region:				response resources
Surface				from industry
Group				mutual aid groups
Dangerous				(TEAP, LPERC
Goods				CHLOREP,
Section				COMPGEAP, etc.)
(TC Remedial				Monitor the
Measures				effectiveness of

Specialist or				federally registered
TC				emergency
Dangerous				response assistance
Goods				plans
Inspector)				Gather evidence
2) <i>Canada</i>	Refusals to	Refusals to work must be	Deports of amplexies	
2)Canada Labour Code		reported to a Safety	Reports of employee deaths and serious	Investigate the cause and
	Ontario	1 2		circumstances of
Transport Canada	613-990-	condition has been	injuries are passed	
			through from the TSB Jurisdiction over all	-
Headquarter	4544 Other	investigated by the		employee death or
s: Railway Safety	Provinces:	employer with a member of the Health and Safety	on-board crews and over Maintenance of	serious injury Issue directions or
Directorate				
	TC regional office	Committee present and a refusal still exists	Way employees	seek assurances of
Region:		refusal still exists	while operating	voluntary
Surface	during		equipment	compliance Gather evidence
Group	working		TRAVELING on rail but not at a work site	Gauter evidence
	hours (off		out not at a work site	
Section	hours: 613-			
`	990-4544,			
1	which will			
Equipment	be forwarded			
Officer)				
	to Canutec)			
3)Railway	None,		A criteria for serious	Review the
	reports are		~	circumstances
Transport	currently		been provided to the	surrounding
	received		TSB, which notifies	accidents
Headquarter	-		the Rail Safety	Gather information
s: Railway	Transportati		Directorate or	to be used in
Safety	on Safety		Canutec during off	issuing Notices or
Directorate	Board		hours	Orders under
Region:				Section 31 of the
Surface				RSA
Group				Act as a Minister's
Engineering,				observer to the
Operations				Transportation
or Et				Safety Board
Equipment Sections				investigation of the accident
Sections				
(A TC Boilwoy				Gather evidence
Railway Safety Officer				
from the				
relevant				
discipline)				
	810.007			Investigate the
Transportati	819-997- 7887	All railway accidents and		Investigate the cause and
on Safety Boord		incidents, as per TSB		
Board		regulations		circumstances of
				the accident and
				make
				recommendations
				to prevent a
<u> </u>				recurrence

Human	Closest	All refusals to work and		Investigate the
	regional	employee accidents		cause and
Development	U U	causing a death or serious		circumstances of
Canada		injury other than to a		accidents involving
(the old	West	train crew member (T&E		employee death or
Labour	905-542-	· · · ·		serious injury
		employee) performing		Issue directions or
Canada)		any of his duties related		
		to train movement,		seek assurances of
	East	switching etc., or a		voluntary
		Maintenance of Way		compliance to
		employee operating his		prevent a
	Toronto	equipment and		recurrence
	North to	TRAVELING on rail to		Monitor the work
	۰ v	and from a work site		at the accident site
	416-954-	(these are covered by		for compliance
	5902Londo	Transport Canada under		with Canada
		an agreement)		Labour Code
	519-645-			requirements
	4406			Gather evidence
	Ottawa			
	613-998-			
	9803			
	Northweste			
	rn Ontario			
	807-345-			
	5474			
	Manitoba			
	Region			
	204-983-			
	6375			
	Quebec			
	Region			
	514-283-			
	1385			
	514-283-			
	6250			
Environment		All spills (chemical and	Environment Canada	Protect the
Canada	Action	- ·	Emergencies Centre	environment
Canada Ontario		fuel) affecting the environment	819-997- 3742	(representatives
		environment	017-77/- 3/42	could be federal,
Ministry of	(800) 268-			
the Environment	6060			provincial or both)
Environment				Investigate spills
				(can prosecute)
				Assist provincial
				authorities
				(primarily air
	<u> </u>			monitoring)
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		All dangerous	Canutec	Protect life
Ontario	numbers, as	occurrences under the		Control the scene
Provincial	appropriate	Transportation of		Coordinate
Police, Fire		Dangerous Goods Act		evacuations
Department		Accidents with		Fight fires
		community impact		Contain spills
				1 1

v		Emergencies affecting	Take charge under
		the community	the authority of the
Local	escalates		Emergency Plans
Municipality	from a		Act, Ontario
	police/fire		
	issue to a		
	community		
	threat		

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