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Task Force on Governance and  
Cultural Change in the RCMP

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Gouvernement du Canada

Groupe de travail sur la gouvernance  
et le changement culturel à la GRC

December 14, 2007

The Honourable Stockwell Day, P.C., M.P.  
Minister of Public Safety  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, ON K1A 0A6

The Honourable Victor Toews  
President of the Treasury Board  
House of Commons  
Ottawa ON K1A 0A6

Rebuilding the Trust

Dear Ministers Day and Toews:

We are pleased to enclose our report, Rebuilding the Trust, on governance and cultural change in the RCMP. This report responds to the issues set out in the July 13, 2007, order-in-council by which we were appointed. It has been a pleasure meeting and working with the thousands of dedicated men and women who proudly serve Canadians from coast to coast to coast.

Respectively submitted,

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Canada

# **REBUILDING THE TRUST**

## **REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GOVERNANCE AND CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE RCMP**

*Submitted to*

*Minister of Public Safety*

*and*

*President of the Treasury Board*

December 14, 2007

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## GLOSSARY

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>Aboriginal Policing</b>	Through Aboriginal Policing, the RCMP promotes the recruitment of Aboriginal people into the Force and develops and evaluates practical and culturally sensitive policing. The Force also consults with national Aboriginal organizations to ensure that policies and programs reflect the needs of Aboriginal communities.
<b>Board of Management (the Board)</b>	The creation of a Board of Management for the RCMP is recommended in Chapter 1.
<b>Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)</b>	CBSA is responsible for providing integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitates the free flow of persons and goods, including animals and plants, that meet all requirements under the program legislation.
<b>Canada Firearms Centre (CFC)</b>	The CFC was created by an order-in-council in 2003 to oversee the administration of the Firearms Act and the Canadian Firearms Program (CFP). In 2007 it was transferred to the RCMP.
<b>Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC)</b>	CPIC is a computerized information system intended to provide all Canadian law enforcement agencies with information on crimes and criminals. It is operated by the RCMP's National Police Services.
<b>Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)</b>	The CRA is responsible for the administration of federal tax programs, as well as certain provincial and territorial tax programs.
<b>Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)</b>	CSIS investigates threats, analyzes information and produces intelligence relative to the national security of Canada.
<b>Civilian Member (CM)</b>	CMs are employed within RCMP establishments across Canada and are governed by the RCMP Act. CMs provide support to front-line policing operations, and are hired for their specialized scientific, technical or administrative skills.

Term	Definition
<b>Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC)</b>	The CPC, which is established under the RCMP Act, is an independent agency which conducts reviews of the RCMP's handling of public complaints.
<b>Commissioner</b>	The highest rank in the RCMP. The Commissioner is appointed by the Governor-in-Council, pursuant to the RCMP Act, and is under the direction of the Minister. The Commissioner is responsible for the control and management of the Force.
<b>Contract Policing</b>	The Government of Canada has entered into arrangements with eight provinces and three territories to have the RCMP provide policing services under contract.
<b>Depot (Training Academy)</b>	Depot, located in Regina, Saskatchewan is the RCMP's primary training facility where all cadets undergo all of their basic training.
<b>Europol</b>	Europol is the European Union law enforcement organisation that handles criminal intelligence to increase effectiveness and co-operation between the authorities of the European Union's (EU) Member States.
<b>External Review Committee (ERC)</b>	The ERC was established under the RCMP Act as an independent agency to review grievances as well as cases of discipline, demotion or discharge of members of the RCMP.
<b>Federal and International Policing</b>	Federal and International Operations (FIO) is a business line of the RCMP that works domestically and globally, to protect Canadians and their institutions, through intelligence-based prevention, detection and investigation, against terrorists, organized criminals, and other criminal activity.
<b>Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP (ICCOR)</b>	ICCOR is the civilian oversight body recommended for the RCMP by the Task Force in Chapter 2.
<b>Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs)</b>	IBET is an intelligence-led cooperative project of the RCMP that supports national security investigations associated to the Canada/US border and investigates cross-border illegal activities, between the ports of entry.



Term	Definition
<b>Integrated Market Enforcement Teams (IMETs)</b>	The IMET project of the RCMP investigates serious Criminal Code capital markets fraud offences.
<b>Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET)</b>	INSET is a project of the RCMP to increase the capacity for the collection, sharing and analysis of intelligence among partners with respect to individuals and entities that are a threat to national security, and is made up of representatives of the RCMP, federal partners and agencies.
<b>Integrated Policing</b>	A philosophy of policing that consists in the collaboration of all levels of police services to exchange intelligence, share tactical and operational knowledge, plan joint actions, benefit from economies of scale, improve service delivery and increase the overall effectiveness of communications amongst law enforcement agencies.
<b>Integrated Proceeds of Crime (IPOC)</b>	The IPOC program is directed at identifying, assessing, seizing, restraining and forfeiting illicit wealth.
<b>INTERPOL</b>	Created in 1923, INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization, with 186 member countries. It facilitates cross-border police co-operation and supports and assists all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime.
<b>Investigative Report</b>	This report was prepared by Mr. David Brown, Q.C., as the Independent Investigator appointed by the federal government to examine matters related to the RCMP pension and insurance plans. In his Report, A Matter of Trust, Mr. Brown recommended the establishment of a task force to conduct a comprehensive review of the governance structure and culture of the RCMP.
<b>Minister</b>	The Minister of Public Safety who is the member of Cabinet with responsibility for the RCMP.
<b>National Police Services (NPS)</b>	NPS provides to over 500 other law enforcement agencies and criminal justice organizations such services as CPIC and Forensic Identification Services.
<b>Police Reporting and Occurrence System (PROS)</b>	PROS provides automated capabilities to store, maintain and retrieve information in respect of criminal activity and the details of corporate proceedings.

Term	Definition
<b>PRIME-BC</b>	PRIME-BC is the software used in British Columbia to connect every municipal police department and RCMP detachment throughout the province and provides access to information about criminals and crimes instantly to all police agencies.
<b>Protective Policing Services</b>	Protective Policing is responsible for all aspects of the RCMP national protective security program for the following individuals and assets which includes: the Governor General with her family and residences; federal Cabinet Ministers; Supreme Court judges; visiting heads of state; foreign diplomats in Canada and their residences; internationally protected persons (IPPs); and persons designated by the Minister of Public Safety Canada as requiring security.
<b>Public Sector Integrity Commissioner (PSIC)</b>	An agent of Parliament, the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner is responsible for the administration of the new Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, which protects public servants who report wrongdoings in the federal government.
<b>Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA)</b>	The purpose of the PSDPA is to encourage employees in the public sector to come forward if they have reason to believe that serious wrongdoing has taken place and to provide protection to them against reprisal.
<b>Public Service Employee (PSE)</b>	PSEs are employees of the RCMP who are public servants but not employed under the RCMP Act.
<b>PWGSC</b>	PWGSC is Public Works and Government Services Canada.
<b>Red serge</b>	The red serge is the formal attire of the RCMP. It consists of a Stetson hat, a scarlet tunic in military dress style and riding breeches with yellow striping down the outside of each leg.
<b>Regionalization</b>	In 1996, operational authority and functions in the RCMP were decentralized under the Deputy Commissioners to the four regions: Pacific, Northwestern, Central, and Atlantic.

Term	Definition
<b>Regular Member (RM)</b>	RMs comprise the bulk of RCMP employees. They are appointed to regular member rank in the Force pursuant to Section 7.(1)(a) of the RCMP Act and are trained as police officers.
<b>Senior Executive Committee (SEC)</b>	SEC members are the Commissioner and all Deputy Commissioners. Advisors to SEC are the Ethics Advisor, Assistant Commissioner of Strategic Policy and Planning Directorate, Senior General Counsel for Legal Services, Assistant Commissioner of Public Affairs and Communication Services, and the Chief Audit Executive. Representatives of the National Executive Committee of the SRR Program are observers to the SEC.
<b>Senior Management Team (SMT)</b>	The SMT is composed of 55 to 60 of the senior managers in Headquarters, regions or divisions – including SEC members and the 14 Divisional Commanding Officers. The SMT meets three times per year on strategic and operations management issues.
<b>Staff Relations Representative (SRR)</b>	The SRR Program is the official labour relations program of the RCMP. It represents RCMP regular and civilian members.
<b>Temporary Civilian Employee (TCE)</b>	TCEs are non-member employees of the Force. They replace RCMP employees who are on leave, off duty sick, away on training or who are seconded to other duties. They are also hired to fill positions that are known or planned to be short-term.



## INTRODUCTION

### Rebuilding the Trust

In June 2007, "A Matter of Trust", the Report of the Independent Investigator into Matters Relating to RCMP Pension and Insurance Plans, was submitted to the Minister of Public Safety and the President of the Treasury Board. That report raised serious issues with the RCMP's culture and governance. On the recommendation of the Investigative Report, the Government of Canada established this Task Force to consider these issues more closely.

The RCMP is a national symbol. The "red serge" has been a source of national pride and is recognized around the world as a symbol of who we are and what living in Canada means. However, in the last few years, trust in the management of the RCMP has been shaken. This has had a stunning impact on the members and employees of the RCMP and on the Canadians they serve. Trust in the management of the RCMP needs to be rebuilt.

At the time of our appointment and throughout the term of our mandate, the RCMP was under intense public scrutiny. In addition to the Investigative Report, Justice O'Connor had recently released his report on the Arar affair and made very significant recommendations. The Air India Inquiry was underway. The death in Vancouver of a Polish man following the use of tasers by RCMP officers had prompted several investigations and inquiries. Tragedy had befallen two members of the RCMP and their families. These circumstances complicated our already difficult challenge.

We took as a given that all Canadians – and most of all, the members and other employees of the RCMP – expect the RCMP to be a world class organization, answerable

to Canadians. However, we felt it was important to listen closely to those people most familiar with the RCMP to understand why the organization is falling short. As we came to understand the scope and depth of the issues, we realized we would have to challenge traditional concepts and practices in order to identify innovative and lasting solutions.

During our consultation and analysis, serious problems affecting the RCMP were brought to the attention of the Task Force. Of these, the issues demanding the most urgent attention related to the impossible demands being placed on members and employees; demands that are compromising their health and safety. We also heard with remarkable consistency about major problems with the discipline system, recruitment, performance evaluations, promotion and personal development. We also witnessed the dedication and consuming pride members and employees have in their Force. All of this led us to conclude that there is a need to radically overhaul the way in which the RCMP is governed. We have also seen that there is a need to improve significantly the accountability of the RCMP to the public, to elected political leaders and to the members and employees of the Force.

This Report begins by outlining two major reforms which we believe are essential for restoring the Force to the positions of confidence and respect that it has enjoyed since its inception. These reforms address the need we have identified for reforms to governance, culture and accountability. Although the need for these reforms now seems obvious to the members of the Task Force, this is not where we started. As we assessed what we had learned and began considering possible solutions, we realized

that merely treating the symptoms would not produce sustainable improvements; a more fundamental approach was required. A new approach to the organization of the Force and its governance structure is essential, and a new independent body is needed for complaints and oversight of the RCMP.

We recognize that many of the issues that have been brought to our attention require immediate redress. Although revitalized governance and recommitment to accountability will help ensure that similar issues will not arise again, we also address some of the most critical issues and recommend steps for the Force to rectify them immediately.

We also recognize that a renewal on the scale outlined in this Report will be difficult and, at times, disruptive. However, in our view, it is necessary for the RCMP and the Government of Canada to take decisive steps and to report on them publicly. A fundamental underpinning of our recommendations, therefore, is the immediate creation of an Implementation Council which will provide leadership and guidance to the renewal process and which will keep the public apprised of its progress. The composition and mandate of the Council is set out in Chapter 5.

Rebuilding the trust is our primary goal. We believe that it can be achieved by ensuring accountability, increasing transparency, strengthening governance, providing greater support to members and employees plus the implementation of many more recommendations that will improve the organization.

### **The Business and People of the RCMP**

The RCMP is arguably the most complex law enforcement agency in the world today. The RCMP provides, under contract, rural

and municipal policing services in all but two provinces, in all three territories and in approximately 200 municipalities and aboriginal communities. It also provides federal and international police services, national police services and protective policing. Federal and international police services operate domestically and globally to protect Canadians and their institutions against terrorists, organized criminals and other criminal activity. The RCMP hosts INTERPOL and Europol for Canada. Many Canadians may not realize that the RCMP provides leadership in police training and stabilization efforts around the world, including in Haiti and Afghanistan. National police services provide crime lab and identification services to over 500 law enforcement agencies and criminal justice organizations and host and manage CPIC. Protective policing is responsible for national protective security for the Prime Minister and the Governor General, their families and their residences, as well as for cabinet ministers, Supreme Court judges, foreign dignitaries and others designated by the Minister as requiring security.

There are currently over 27,000 members and employees of the RCMP comprising regular and civilian members of the Force and public servants. The approximately 17,000 regular members are trained as qualified peace officers, are entitled to wear the uniform and are entitled to carry weapons. There are also approximately 3,000 civilian members of the RCMP who are not trained as peace officers. Civilian members provide specialist support to the Force in areas such as forensic science and technology. Additionally, the RCMP employs approximately 4,700 public service employees who are not members of the Force, but who provide specialized services in key areas such as human resources and financial management. They also provide critical operational and administrative

support in detachments across Canada, in divisional and regional centres and at Headquarters in Ottawa. Finally, the RCMP employs approximately 2,000 temporary civilian employees to perform a range of functions under contracts with a fixed duration. The RCMP is also supported by several hundred municipal employees, auxiliary constables and volunteers.

The RCMP operates with an annual budget of approximately \$4 billion, for which it depends on appropriations from the federal government and on revenues from its contracting provinces, territories and municipalities.

The RCMP is led by the Commissioner appointed pursuant to the RCMP Act. The Commissioner has authority to run the business of the RCMP, under the direction of the Minister. The Force is organized into detachments, which come together under districts and then divisions, ultimately reporting to the Commissioner. Overlaid on this organization is a regional structure which divides the Force into regions for administrative purposes.

Much has been said and written about the complexity of the RCMP given the organization's law enforcement responsibilities in Canada and abroad. It would therefore not be unreasonable to argue that some or all of the solution to issues confronting the Force rests in breaking it up. Such a consideration would require a much broader public policy debate as to the policing model which best suits Canada and best serves Canadians. Such a debate is not within the mandate of this Task Force.

The Task Force believes, however, that the timely implementation of the recommendations in this Report will permit the RCMP, with all of its constituent pieces,

to be governed effectively. Indeed a public policy debate about Canada's policing model would be better informed if the alternatives could be compared to a properly structured and governed RCMP.

## **Structure of the Report**

The mandate given to the Task Force seeks recommendations on matters relating to the governance and culture of the RCMP. A copy of the mandate is attached as Appendix A. Biographies of each of the members of the Task Force are included for reference in Appendix B.

As a first step, the members of the Task Force agreed that it was important to consult widely on these issues both with members of the Force and with other stakeholders. The details of this process are discussed below. What emerged was a variety of consistent themes, many of which touched on more than one of the specific items of the mandate of the Task Force, and many of which, while clearly issues of governance and culture, did not fall squarely within one of the eight listed items in the mandate.

The Task Force realized, however, that the issues raised during these consultations reflect accountability, governance and cultural issues that ran far deeper and were more fundamental to the Force than those described in the earlier Investigative Report. We therefore concluded that a report that sets out the need for fundamental change and then addresses each of these issues in the form in which they were presented to us would provide to the reader a more meaningful analysis and prescription for reform than simply reporting on the specific items listed in the mandate. Each of the mandate items is addressed in our analysis, although they are not specifically referenced in the text.

## **Consultation Strategy**

Tackling all the fundamental issues facing the RCMP today in just five months has been a complicated task that required extensive consultation with people who intimately understand the Force, its responsibilities and operating realities. To do so, we travelled across the country, conducting consultations in every province and territory. This included meetings with thousands of RCMP members and employees at detachments across the country and at Headquarters as well as cadets at Depot Division in Regina. We met with federal departments and agencies currently engaged with the RCMP, including the Canada Public Service Agency, Treasury Board Secretariat, the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, the RCMP External Review Committee and the Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP. We interviewed federal and provincial Solicitors and Attorneys General, Deputy Ministers, mayors and city councillors. We provided Canadians with an opportunity to contribute online, in writing, by phone or by fax. We provided the same opportunity to members and employees, both present and retired. We received over 500 emails and other pieces of correspondence in response.

## **Support for the Task Force**

The Task Force enjoyed a very high level of support from the Task Force Secretariat, led by Executive Director Bill Austin, and which included Louise Forgues, Matt Hopkins, Lisa Khouri, Lauren Meldrum, Sandy McIntosh, Sherry Nowlan and Stephanie Pelletier. We also received a very high level of support from Carol Hansell and her colleagues at Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP.

This Report would not have been completed in the short time we were given without the cooperation of the Commissioner of the RCMP and his team of senior managers. In particular, we wish to commend Commissioner Elliott for establishing a committee to assist the Task Force – a committee that met 15 times over 20 weeks and significantly aided us in acquiring answers and insights to tough questions that were raised. We also wish to thank all the RCMP staff involved in the preparation of technical reports, policy analyses and researching the supporting documentation which informed the work of the Task Force. We are grateful for their assistance in arranging the meetings across the country that allowed us to talk with many members of the Force, provincial and territorial officials, mayors of municipalities, other police services and Canadians. The Task Force would not have been able to visit as many locations across the country (particularly remote detachments) without the logistical support and assistance of the RCMP. These visits were invaluable in understanding the grassroots of the organization. In short, the Force, its management and members could not have been more helpful.

One of the early challenges facing the Task Force was to identify other police forces in Canada and internationally which may have faced and implemented solutions for some of the issues confronting the RCMP. Although we could identify no police agency that provided the same range of services provided by the RCMP, we were aware that best practices are emerging for many of the areas in which it operates. The Task Force was fortunate to identify highly qualified experts both in Canada and internationally who were generous in providing very helpful advice. At our request, some of these experts produced research papers which will be published on



the Department of Public Safety web site ([www.publicsafety.gc.ca](http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca)). In all, the Task Force found this expert support extremely helpful in putting into context the information provided to us during our consultations and for identifying practices currently followed in other police agencies.



## **CHAPTER 1: CHANGING THE RCMP'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT**

### **1.1 The Need for Organizational Reform**

The RCMP's mandate includes provincial and municipal policing services from coast to coast to coast, combined with a broad spectrum of federal and international policing services. The Task Force concludes that the RCMP is poorly positioned to discharge its responsibilities under its current organizational framework. As a statutory agency, the RCMP is subject to a wide array of rules and policies generally applicable across the broader public service. Some of these rules and policies are simply inappropriate for a national police service – many actually compromise the effectiveness of the Force.

Decisive steps need to be taken to equip the RCMP to manage its business as a modern service-oriented entity. In many ways, the RCMP's approach to governance is based on a model and style of policing developed from and for another policing era. Although new priorities and initiatives have been introduced from time to time to try to modernize the Force and make its governance and culture more suitable, many of these initiatives eventually floundered. Organizational change and new approaches proved to be difficult to sustain and institutionalize in such a large, complex and tradition-bound police organization.

Successful change and reform require a much higher degree of managerial competence and sophistication than that which is currently found within the RCMP. The modern RCMP now appears to be a confusing mixture of traditional and modern ideas, philosophies, practices and programs. Only a radical overhaul of the RCMP's governance structure and a re-thinking of its

accountabilities will enable it to successfully address the challenges of reform.

In the following sections, the Task Force makes recommendations to build capacity and reform governance. In Chapter 5, we make recommendations for an implementation plan that will make this transition possible. The issues facing the RCMP make immediate action on these reforms an urgent priority. The Force must have greater authority over human resources, financial management and contracting as well as enhanced capacity to manage these functions. This will help it address the serious systemic problems plaguing the RCMP while clarifying responsibilities and accountability. The Force's ability to provide the services expected of it is dependent upon a successful and timely transfer of these responsibilities to the RCMP and its new governing body.

### **1.2 Effective Management of the Human Resources Function**

#### **1.2.1 Problems Created by a Bifurcated Authority for Human Resources**

The responsibility for staffing the RCMP is split between the RCMP itself and the Treasury Board. Although the RCMP Act vests in the Commissioner the control and management of the Force, the Treasury Board is the actual employer of members and employees of the RCMP. While this bifurcated relationship leaves the RCMP with the ability to direct significant aspects of its human resource policy, it is the Treasury Board (not RCMP management) through its funding approvals that dictates how many members and employees the RCMP will have to deploy and how much

each of them will be paid. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Treasury Board decides how many senior management positions will be available. In the view of the Task Force, this has resulted in confused accountabilities for the proper management of the Force's human resources and has contributed to the failure of the Force to take full ownership of the management of its human resources. Imposing on the RCMP human resource policies of general application across the public service has greatly complicated the Force's ability to manage itself. In many instances, the RCMP simply cannot react in a timely manner to human resource problems in regions or on projects.

### 1.2.2 Importance of People

Like any modern police force, the RCMP is heavily reliant on its human capital. It requires a science-based workforce with a capacity to anticipate and respond to new challenges. Well-trained front line officers, highly skilled scientists, sophisticated intelligence and communications experts, experts in financial management and logistics, competent human resource managers, perceptive and thoughtful trainers and coaches - all are necessary to enable the Force to perform its whole portfolio of different tasks. Yet in every meeting of members and employees that we attended, we heard surprisingly consistent complaints about the Force's management of its people.

### 1.2.3 Elevating the Human Resources Function

Even aside from the difficulties of developing a comprehensive human resources policy when the Treasury Board controls some of the key decisions, we do not think that the Force has embraced the importance of strong and effective human resource management. Human resource

issues have too little impact on policy decisions or on the implementation of new initiatives. In contrast, managers of business enterprises and stewards of many government-owned entities have become increasingly aware of the need to factor human resource issues into their decisions. In most organizations of the size and complexity of the RCMP, the head of human resources is an essential partner with other senior managers in the formulation of policy, strategic planning and change management.

Notwithstanding the challenges presented by the bifurcation of human resource management, the RCMP does not apply the authorities it does have in a manner consistent with modern management practices. We have found this to be the case throughout the organization. Across the Force and at all levels, decisions are made and policies are applied without adequate regard for the impact on the members and employees affected by them. In short, the Force has not accepted full ownership of the management of its human resources.

### 1.2.4 Building Human Resource Capacity

Although it is critical that the Force assume responsibility for its human resource management as quickly as possible; the human resource management failures that we have outlined in Chapter 3 clearly demonstrate that the Force does not currently have the management capacity to do so. Much of the RCMP's human resource function is now performed in unaligned silos that devote time to their individual strategies and agendas instead of using a more integrated approach. Thus, as an urgent priority, the Force must build a much more robust capacity to manage human resources throughout the organization. Adequate resources must be

employed as quickly as possible to examine and rectify the human resource issues identified in this Report.

We understand that there are, within government, human resource experts who could guide or mentor the Force in building its human resource management capacity; seconding one or more of such people to the Force would be an important start. Additionally, human resource professionals from the private sector should be retained. Current members and employees who provide human resource services should be encouraged and supported in building their skills. Building this capacity will require substantial effort on the part of the RCMP and will take considerable time. We urge the Force and the government to make this an urgent priority. In Chapter 5, we recommend that the Implementation Council set reasonable milestones for the development of appropriate human resource capacity within the Force, and that this Council include a status report in its bi-annual reports to the Minister and the Canadian public.

#### 1.2.5 Importance of Separate Employer Status

In order for the reforms we are recommending to succeed, the RCMP must become a separate employer. Once the human resource management capacity described above has been built to appropriate levels, the government must delegate all remaining human resource authorities to the RCMP. The Board of Management described in section 1.4 would be specifically responsible and accountable to the Minister for the oversight of these expanded authorities.

Within the Federal Government there is a range of models by which agencies are staffed. Several of these agencies (notably

CSIS and the CRA) have become separate employers and have gained the consequent additional flexibility to manage their human resources that other governmental agencies do not have. The Task Force believes that these models can be adapted to the unique needs of the RCMP. The RCMP must take ownership of its own human resource management and it must have greater authority to do so. We believe that it is essential for the RCMP to become a separate employer no later than December 31, 2009.

### 1.3 Financial and Contract Management

#### 1.3.1 Funding the RCMP

Spending authority is granted to the RCMP on an annual basis through separate parliamentary appropriations for operating and capital purposes. Appropriately, funds so earmarked cannot be used for any other purpose and funds appropriated for operating purposes cannot be spent on capital and vice versa.

#### 1.3.2 Financial Handcuffs

Financial management is also plagued with confused accountabilities. Indeed, in the view of the Task Force, funding for the RCMP has become so complex and categorized by the Treasury Board that discretionary spending by the RCMP leadership has been reduced to almost zero. The Treasury Board subdivides the Parliamentary votes into separate allotments which fence the funds by specific activity or function. At the beginning of this year, the RCMP had 35 such allotments, primarily attached to its operating funds.

Similar restrictions affect the RCMP's flexibility in managing its contracts. The Force operates in a changing, volatile and unpredictable environment, where rapid

deployment of resources is essential to protect public safety. For many of its requirements, the Force must go through Public Works and Government Services Canada to obtain authority for procurement and contracting for goods and services. During the last year alone the RCMP has been required to obtain over 900 separate approvals from PWGSC to acquire goods and services valued at approximately \$250 million.

In addition, the RCMP may not move available funds from one application to another without obtaining special permission through successive layers of bureaucracy. The approval process is time consuming and increases the workload on those seeking to re-profile the funds. The funding restrictions prevent management from responding to shortages in one area while large surpluses exist in other areas. The RCMP is also not permitted to carry unexpended funds from one fiscal year to the next without the Treasury Board's approval. As a result, over the last three years alone, over \$200 million dollars of funds allocated to particular programs remained unspent and therefore were unavailable to the RCMP, while members all across the country believe they have insufficient resources to do their jobs safely.

### 1.3.3 Building Financial Management Capacity

The Task Force realizes that perceived past failures of financial management may well have justified stricter controls, but the resultant restraints have prevented the Force from effectively and efficiently allocating its resources on a timely basis. As with the issues in the human resources area, the imposition of controls by the Treasury Board has contributed to the Force's inability to assume full responsibility for its financial management. In the view of the

Task Force, this has resulted in confused accountabilities for the proper management of the RCMP's financial resources.

The Force does not have the capacity to assume full responsibility for the management of its financial affairs. The Task Force cannot say whether this is the result of relying upon Treasury Board scrutiny, or whether the scrutiny resulted from the Treasury Board's dissatisfaction with the Force's capability. What we do believe, however, is that the RCMP cannot provide the level of policing services that is expected of it in the dynamic environment in which it operates unless its financial management capacity is improved and it gains a clear sense of accountability for this crucial activity. As with the human resources challenges, we recommend that the Government provide mentoring to the Force, perhaps with one or more secondments. The Force must also obtain the additional expertise, likely from outside the Force, to create this essential capability.

### 1.3.4 Delegation of Financial Management Authorities

The Task Force believes that the RCMP cannot provide the policing services required by Canadians and its contract partners unless it is granted much more authority for the deployment of its financial resources. A more robust financial management team, overseen by the Board of Management described in Section 1.4, will enable the RCMP to manage its finances and third-party contracting in accordance with the standards required by all government entities. Thus, as soon as appropriate financial management capacity is in place, the controls imposed by the Treasury Board on the RCMP's discretion to manage its budget must be removed. Although this removal of controls could be staged over time, the RCMP, under the stewardship of

the Board of Management, should have full authority to develop and manage its own budget by December 31, 2009.

#### **1.4 Board of Management**

We believe that the RCMP can avoid problems discussed in the Investigative Report and those identified by the Task Force if it is equipped with a more effective management structure comprised of knowledgeable leaders with the appropriate skills for managing this complex policing enterprise. The present management structure of the RCMP is a product of the military-bureaucratic policing model. This is characterized by: rank-based authority; management by command and control; management that is formalized and bureaucratic; and insularity. While many of these qualities have defined the RCMP throughout its history, they now seem to be deterrents to the Force's ability to react to the needs of a modern police force. While policing must remain its prime preoccupation, the Force cannot deliver on its mandate without a highly developed infrastructure capable of managing its human and financial resources in the complex environment in which it must operate. Oversight of management is, of course, important, however, it must be at an appropriate level so that management can actually manage. The controls now imposed by Treasury Board and PWGSC greatly restrict management's ability to function effectively.

The Task Force believes that sound internal governance is essential to the successful management of the RCMP. Any governance framework must be for the purpose of supporting the overall productivity of the Force in meeting its legislative mandate. Thus an effective governance framework must operate throughout the organization to deal with the

operational, administrative and functional realities of the Force. Generally, police operational matters must remain the exclusive decision making domain of the police themselves. Creating sound internal governance is not intended to shield the RCMP from public review or oversight nor its accountability to Parliament. In fact it is just the opposite; Parliamentary and public oversight can only be effective if there is reliable internal governance. A sound governance structure provides the conduits through which all accountability becomes a reality.

The RCMP can only address the issues raised in this Report and position itself to meet the inevitable future challenges it will face by enhancing its leadership capabilities and by programming modern management principles into its DNA. Section 1.2.4 sets out the need to build essential capacity in human resource management and to elevate it to the level needed to service a diverse workforce spread across business units and from coast to coast. Section 1.3.3 identifies numerous areas where financial management and contracting capabilities must also be developed.

Policing is an expensive and an expansive public service. There is no reason to predict any future reductions in policing costs. Continuing increases in personnel and technology costs as a result of increased public service expectation, service standardization and integration of police services, ensures that the pressure for increased police expenditures will remain strong. The RCMP budget, close to \$4 billion, has increased significantly over the past few years; yet large segments of the Force believe that it is under-resourced. Indeed, the Task Force has not been able to determine whether there is not enough money or whether resources currently available aren't effectively managed.

Added to the need to improve human resource and financial management is the need for effective strategic planning, succession planning, risk management and communications. These functions are currently provided under a management structure which is informed by a system of rank-based authority and management by command and control. Generally, collaborative decision making and the challenging of decisions are not encouraged.

Over the last decade or so, governance has become a more serious business in both the private, and more recently, the public sector. The role of boards and of the directors who sit on them has become more rigorously defined, their ambit broadened and the fiduciary responsibilities of directors affirmed. The concept of stewardship by boards in both public and private business enterprises has been refined in recent years. There is now clear evidence of the benefits to enterprises derived from a properly constituted and functioning board.

The Task Force believes that a board with a stewardship mandate should be created to assist the RCMP to build and sustain the effective management that it requires. In forming the detailed recommendations that follow, the Task Force has been influenced by the current structure of the CRA and the apparent success that it has achieved. The CRA structure serves as an interesting starting point for the RCMP because it combines a board that has wide responsibility for administrative oversight but is precluded from examining income tax files. A similar exclusion would be necessary for the RCMP board as the Task Force recognizes that the responsibility for police investigations must be the exclusive responsibility of the Commissioner, subject only to direction by the Minister in accordance with the RCMP Act.

The Task Force recommends that the RCMP Act be amended to create a Board of Management of the RCMP with the following essential characteristics:

#### 1.4.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Generally, the Board would have oversight (stewardship) of the organization and administration of the RCMP and the oversight of the management of its resources, services, property, personnel and contracts. Its responsibilities would include:

- human resource management, policies and practices
- resource allocation
- budgeting and financial management
- strategic planning and oversight of implementation
- risk identification and management
- succession planning
- internal and public communications
- establishment of objectives for senior management and performance measures for those objectives

The Board should be informed by the independent considerations and decisions of the Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP, which we recommend be established in Chapter 2. The Board would be responsible to ensure appropriate communications with the ICCOR.

The legislation would specify that the Board may not give directions to the Commissioner or any other person on any matter relating to police investigations or related matters. It is recognized, however, that the Board's



responsibilities to oversee human resource and financial management will indirectly affect the Commissioner's ability to conduct investigations. Care must therefore be taken in expressing this exclusion in the legislation to give the Commissioner and the Board as much guidance as possible to resolve issues at the margin. The Task Force also recognizes that the appointment of the Commissioner must remain the exclusive purview of the Government. As with other agencies with a similar imperative, the Task Force would hope that an appropriate process for consultation with the Board or its Chair could be developed.

The Board would be accountable for the matters within its responsibility to the Minister and through him or her, to Parliament. The Commissioner would also be accountable to the Minister for the policing and law enforcement matters and would remain subject to written direction from the Minister with respect to these matters. The Commissioner would also be responsible to the Board for the organization and administration of the RCMP.

#### 1.4.2 Board Composition and Appointment

The Board should be comprised of appropriately qualified Canadians of outstanding reputation and chaired by an eminent Canadian who has the necessary expertise. Appointment to the Board should be made by the Federal Government; because of the critical importance of this Board to the ongoing operation of the RCMP, the government should ensure that the Board has a full complement at all times. The calibre and experience of people appointed to the Board will be a critical determinant of its success. The nominating process must be designed to appoint people who, collectively, have the characteristics and attributes necessary to provide guidance

in addressing current issues and guiding the Force into the future.

Since the Provinces and Territories have a major stake in the successful operation of the RCMP, there should be representation on the Board of people with a perspective of their needs. The Task Force believes, however, that a Board of 12 people is optimal. Thus the Task Force would encourage development of a formula that would permit the Provinces and Territories to identify candidates with these perspectives while ensuring that other essential attributes are present. In the Task Force's view, there must be opportunity for appointment to the Board of people with broad private sector experience in the oversight of management of large, complex business organizations. The legislation should clarify, however, that once appointed, Board members have a fiduciary duty to the RCMP. Members of the Board of Management should not be members of the Senate, the House of Commons, or a provincial or territorial legislature; and should not be employed on a full-time basis in the Public Service of Canada or of a province or territory.

#### 1.4.3 Board Chair

The Board Chair should also be appointed by the federal government and should be a person with a demonstrated capacity both to lead the Board and to represent the Board before the Minister and the public service agencies with which the RCMP must interact.

#### 1.4.4 Delegation of Additional Powers

Once the Board is in place and the RCMP has developed appropriate capacity in human resources, financial and contract management, it is essential that the

additional authorities in these areas identified in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 be delegated to the RCMP under the oversight of the Board. The transition of these additional powers could be phased in over time as the requisite capacity is developed.

The goal is to transform the RCMP in an orderly manner into an entity separate from government; an entity which is a separate employer with full authority to manage its financial affairs within spending authorities approved by Parliament.

#### 1.4.5 Advantages to Be Derived from a Board of Management

The Task Force believes that the creation of the Board of Management with the accountabilities by the Board and the Commissioner set out above will achieve the following benefits:

- more intensive and informed oversight of the Force than at present and a more rigorous and balanced accountability regime better suited to the nature of the organization
- more meaningful oversight by the Minister who can interact with the Board on organizational and administrative matters more freely than in the past
- a source of advice to the Commissioner on strategic issues
- constructive independent advice to senior RCMP management regarding administration of the Force
- a more exacting performance management process for the Commissioner personally
- strengthening of the Force's ability to undertake strategic planning and to

participate in policy issues at the federal and provincial levels

- greater administrative flexibility in managing resources, both human and financial
- providing encouragement to the Force to be on the forefront of developments in the policing environment.

#### ***Recommendation 1 – Conversion of the RCMP to a Separate Entity***

*The RCMP should become a separate entity with separate employer status and should be granted full authority to manage its financial affairs within spending authorities approved by Parliament.*

#### ***Recommendation 2 – Board of Management***

*Legislation should be enacted by the Parliament of Canada as soon as possible to establish a Board of Management of the RCMP responsible for the stewardship of its organization and administration including the oversight of the management of its financial affairs, resources, services, property, personnel and procurement.*

### **1.5 Periodic Review of the Board of Management**

The Task Force believes that it will be important for the Board of Management, its mandate, composition and method of operation described in this Chapter 1 to be independently reviewed with reports on its effectiveness made to the Minister and the Canadian people. The Auditor General of Canada currently has a mandate to review aspects of the RCMP, and that mandate should be continued. In addition, we believe

that the amendments to the RCMP Act establishing the Board of Management should contain provisions for review five years after its proclamation by an independent *ad hoc* committee established by the Minister. The committee would be asked to review the effectiveness of the Board and make recommendations for any changes in its mandate, composition or operation that would improve its effectiveness. The legislation should also provide that new review committees would be formed on each of the fifth anniversaries of the reports of previous committees.



## CHAPTER 2: PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

### 2.1 Background

During the Task Force's consultations and deliberations, it became apparent that radical changes were required in the way that the RCMP accounts to the public, to elected officials and to its members and employees. Several factors converged to produce this conclusion.

The Task Force heard numerous concerns about the handling of discipline and grievance matters. Members do not have recourse to an independent adjudicative process that is binding on the Commissioner. Instead, in those prescribed categories of appeals that may go to external review, that review body's comments are only advisory. With respect to the repeated concerns about the length of time experienced by the members throughout their grievance and discipline process, there appears to be little accountability. Additionally, we heard of no consolidation or analysis of information generated from these processes for the purpose of assessing trends or identifying areas in need of further training.

The Task Force did hear concerns respecting the handling of public complaints. We heard of a need for heightened awareness and more accessibility around the lodging of a complaint as well as improved communication with the complainant. Transparency and timeliness in the complaint process were identified as being beneficial to both the members of the Force and members of the public. Members want to be accountable for their actions and welcome an opportunity to have situations reviewed. The public, as well as the members, want to have confidence that complaints are dealt with in a way that is fair and efficient. Concerns surfaced

relating to the lack of independence of investigations which undermines the confidence in the complaint process.

Additionally, we heard that an oversight role of a body independent from the RCMP would provide valuable consideration of matters in a broader policy context. We heard numerous issues surrounding planning and implementation of new programs, inadequate resourcing and the failure to provide for follow-up, training or an assessment of success. An independent body should be able to consider issues of importance to the RCMP. These factors have led the Task Force to conclude that a renewed and strengthened commitment to accountability and transparency will be essential to rebuilding the trust in the RCMP of its members and employees, the public and elected officials.

We believe that the Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP described below will accomplish these objectives.

#### 2.1.1 The CPC and the ERC

When the RCMP Act was amended in 1986, two separate agencies were created for handling complaints involving the RCMP: the RCMP Public Complaints Commission (CPC) became operational in 1988 and has the responsibility to review RCMP handling of complaints made against individual members of the Force by the public and make recommendations to the Commissioner. The RCMP External Review Committee (ERC) became operational in 1986 and reviews and makes recommendations to the Commissioner on certain types of grievances made by members as well as the appeals of formal discipline and discharge or demotion actions

made by management. The CPC may self-initiate complaints and hold a public inquiry into complaints but its work over the years has related overwhelmingly to the review of complaints after the fact when the complainant is not satisfied with the disposition of the complaint by the RCMP.

Except for one attempt in 1992 to merge these two agencies, they have remained essentially unchanged for the past two decades. They have separate frameworks for handling complaints that distinguish only the originator of the complaint.

These agencies resulted from the work of the Marin Commission (1974-1976) which recommended the establishment of a public complaint system within the RCMP that would operate independently of the disciplinary system; however, Justice Marin did not recommend the creation of two separate organizations. Rather, the Marin Commission recommended a single authority at the independent review stage that was referred to as the Federal Police Ombudsman, which would review and make recommendations on matters of public accountability, internal discipline and grievances.

The Marin Commission was well informed from a series of contemporary reviews being conducted into the Ontario complaint systems. One of the most notable was prepared by Arthur Maloney, who was also the inaugural Ontario Ombudsman (1975). In addition to Mr. Maloney's work into police complaint systems, at least four other significant reviews, including a Royal Commission, were undertaken in Ontario during 1974-1979.

## 2.1.2 Inadequacy of the Bifurcated Complaints System

The Task Force believes that the current bifurcated system for handling complaints against the RCMP is inadequate in three respects:

- the conclusions reached by either body on any particular issue are only recommendations that are not binding on the Force; the final determination rests with the Commissioner who can accept or reject the advice from the CPC or ERC;
- neither system is sufficiently transparent to provide confidence to the public or the members or employees of the Force that the complaints have been properly and fairly dealt with;
- there is no certainty that information and experiences gained through the current processes will inform future decisions or actions of the RCMP.

Individual complaints, which can serve as indicators of broader issues, can provide the information necessary to identify widespread problems. Complaints, like behaviours, are often indicators; they can provide insight and information which can be valuable in preventing problems and improving performance.

Police are vested with extraordinary powers. They have long been held to account for the use of their powers through the courts, internal discipline and review bodies as well as media. With evolving public expectations, growing distrust and calls for greater transparency and accountability, the Task Force believes that there is a need to strengthen the current legislative scheme for dealing with complaints against the RCMP.

## **2.2 The Culture of Policing**

Police work is stressful, complex and often a dangerous occupation where one officer relies on the other for his/her life and well-being, knowing that in return he/she is also relied upon by his/her partner. Police are routinely in contact with those who break the law and who in many cases are not strangers to violence. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that there is a common bond amongst police officers that leads to a unique perspective on a relationship between the law which they feel they represent and the civilian population that they are sworn to serve. That unique perspective shapes not only the way in which they perform their duties but also the way in which they have a natural inclination to react negatively to complaints about their conduct.

This common bond, or "culture of policing", is, to a certain extent, an important factor in effective and responsible policing.

Although commentary indicates that the majority of internal police investigations are reasonable and appropriate, and are conducted with professionalism, thoroughness and objectivity, public perception is often otherwise. The Task Force believes that confidence by the public and the RCMP family in these results can only be achieved through full civilian oversight.

## **2.3 Provincial Public Complaint Processes**

The Task Force has had the benefit of considering recent reports, background papers and studies relating to the review of public complaint processes in several provincial jurisdictions. These recent reviews underline that the public is demanding accountability from its policing institutions all across the country, not only

from the RCMP. Police, as guardians of our civil liberties, are being asked to be responsible to the public they serve.

All provinces have legislation establishing a framework for a system to review complaints about police. They vary in features from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but all provide for independent review. Several legislative schemes have undergone recent study and changes.

Five provinces, Ontario being the most recent, provide their established civilian oversight body with an investigative role in the determination of complaints. The *Ontario Independent Police Review Act* was passed on May 15, 2007. It creates an independent and transparent police complaints system administered by a new civilian organization, and led by an Independent Police Review Director.

## **2.4 Necessary Features of a Public Complaints Process**

The Task Force encourages a direct and positive involvement of the RCMP in the complaints process. Response by the RCMP to complaints is a key factor in the relationship between the community and the RCMP. A system that encourages the RCMP members and employees themselves to take pride in resolving complaints to the satisfaction of citizens is more effective than one based solely on deterrence through punishment or oversight. Ideally, the RCMP should attempt informal resolution of a complaint as early as possible. If a complaint is not resolved by the RCMP, however, an effective public complaints body must have complete authority to oversee, monitor, review, initiate and, if necessary, investigate complaints.

Where complaints relate to policy or service issues, they should be referred directly to a public complaints body for consideration and response. Complaints relating to actions of a police officer or the performance of an officer's duties should be referred initially to the head of the Force.

The RCMP, like other policing institutions, will be strengthened and its credibility enhanced by civilian oversight and review of police conduct. In order for citizens to have confidence in their police, they must have confidence in those who ensure accountability of police to the public. There must be strong elements of civilian oversight and independence in the public complaints process in order to safeguard the public perception that the process is legitimate.

## **2.5 A New Independent Body - ICCOR**

The Task Force believes the creation of an Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight for the RCMP (ICCOR) is necessary. This new body would incorporate both the CPC and ERC but provide expanded responsibilities and authorities. It would have the ability to review on its own initiative or at the request of the Minister, the Commissioner or the Board of Management any incident or aspect of the operations of the RCMP. The ICCOR would be the central and single collection and processing point for all complaints against any member of the RCMP, whatever the origin. The consolidation of all complaints at the ICCOR will serve a broader purpose than simply co-ordinating the processing and oversight of complaints. It will allow for the tracking and evaluation of complaints, discipline and grievances in order to identify systemic issues, trends or deficiencies in policies and procedures; once identified, they may be addressed and improved through focused training

programs, increased awareness or new policies or procedures. The findings of ICCOR relating to discipline or grievance situations would be binding on the Commissioner. Recommendations relating to policy or police operations would be made public but be for consideration only by the Commissioner or the Board of Management.

The proposed review body would have as its goal the enhancement of public confidence in the RCMP and bring under one independent civilian umbrella:

- a complaints process including an investigations unit with access to experienced investigators with special investigative capacity plus a dispute mediation unit
- a complaint evaluation and data collection unit that would also monitor progress and timelines respecting complaints and publish appropriate reports
- a separate external review function for grievance and discipline appeals, whether or not they arise out of a complaint against the member
- a mandate to review any aspect of policing operations including operational reviews and make recommendations to the Commissioner and the Board of Management

### **2.5.1 ICCOR Legislation**

The Task Force recommends that the ICCOR would be established by legislation under the RCMP Act and be responsible to the Minister. It would be presided over by a chair and would be comprised of five individuals (including the chair) appointed by the Governor-in-Council for a term of



five years (initially two members for three years to allow for managed rotation) whose expertise and ability make them credible and well-respected in their role of police review and oversight.

### 2.5.2 Incorporating the Features of an Ombudsman

Many of the responsibilities and authorities vested in the ICCOR reflect those of the role of ombudsman. The Task Force received recommendations for the establishment of an ombudsman and is of the view that the ICCOR will provide that function, plus additional ones, without the necessity of creating a second separate office. For example, the Task Force recommends that the ICCOR have official independence, be established by legislation, report publicly on recommendations and findings, have the capacity in appropriate circumstances to consider complaints and conduct investigations in private, initiate investigations and have the power to summon witnesses and compel testimony, all features of a typical ombudsman system.

### 2.5.3 Handling of Complaints

The ICCOR's complaint handling process must be accessible notwithstanding geographic, cultural and language challenges and must record and track all complaints. It should encompass complaints relating to members even though the member may have retired, resigned or joined another police service. Accessibility to the complaints process must be easy and include appropriate communication to the complainant. Complaints should be accepted regardless of the source so long as there is some connectivity of interest between the action complained of and the complainant. Complaints made in bad faith or those that are frivolous or vexatious should be dismissed and there must be established a time limit within which complaints must be made. We would

recommend six months from the incident complained of unless the ICCOR approves an extension where circumstances warrant. In appropriate circumstances, where the public body recognizes that the public complaints process is being abused for the purpose of disrupting police operations, the body should have the ability to recommend that the offender be prosecuted.

The characterization of complaints about police behaviour in provincial jurisdictions ranges from public trust complaints to those resulting in serious injury or death. The essence of such characterization relates to the recognition that, depending on the nature and result of the behaviour complained of, varying degrees of explanation, investigation, resolution or review are appropriate. For example, the scope of the process relating to an isolated complaint by an individual that he received a speeding ticket unfairly would be different than a complaint by an individual hospitalized as a result of alleged excessive use of force. An effective oversight body would have established criteria as to when investigations would be mandatory and to ensure fairness and thoroughness of investigations.

The ICCOR would in most cases attempt an informal resolution of a complaint. However, for serious complaints or where the ICCOR believes that mediation would not be successful, it could proceed directly to an investigation. The ICCOR would determine if the RCMP should investigate, if another police service should investigate or if the ICCOR itself would investigate. The ICCOR would also determine whether or not a monitoring role is appropriate, either performed by itself, another force or the RCMP, depending on who is doing the investigation. Investigations would be carried out in accordance with criteria established or approved by the ICCOR to ensure impartiality and thoroughness of investigations.

#### 2.5.4 Investigation Role

In monitoring an investigation, if the ICCOR believes the investigation is not being appropriately conducted, it could direct changes or take over the investigation. This feature is one not typically found in other oversight bodies. Absent this power to direct changes to the course of the investigation, the monitoring role would be limited to reporting only on the steps taken. Although this knowledge may be helpful when involving or communicating with a group to keep it informed, the oversight role, to be effective, should also have the power to provide advice and direction with respect to further investigative steps necessary to ensure that a thorough and complete investigation is conducted.

The 2007 Woods Report on the Review of the Police Complaint Process in British Columbia states that:

"the power to order a further investigation by an external police department is a poor remedy for an initial investigation that is flawed, and the power to order a public hearing is an equally poor remedy for an erroneous disposition in the case of a complaint that does not raise issues that meet the high public interest standard required to justify engaging that seemingly complex, expensive and generally unsatisfactory process."

#### 2.5.5 Provincial Involvement

The ICCOR would also have the ability, where other jurisdictions agree, to participate in the co-ordinated handling of complaints arising during integrated policing

operations. Where one incident which is policed by multiple police agencies gives rise to a complaint, there should be a way to have one timely, thorough and competent investigation that serves all jurisdictions. Additionally, the ICCOR would have the ability to establish an advisory body comprised of experts and others with important perspectives on the work of the ICCOR. While only advisory, it would provide a forum for consultation and consideration of a variety of issues relating to the oversight activity of the RCMP as carried out by the ICCOR.

#### 2.5.6 Panel of Arbitrators

With respect to the independent external review of the ICCOR, the ICCOR would appoint experienced arbitrators to provide a third party appeal of grievances and discipline issues. The Task Force believes that third party adjudication is essential to the restoration of public confidence, particularly when police discipline arising from citizen complaints is involved. As it is essential to protect the principles of natural justice and fairness, it would be necessary to ensure that the adjudication is separate and not involved in any way in the investigation or prior discussion or consideration of matters coming before it. The ICCOR would provide the administrative support for the review function, but reviewers would operate separately and discretely from other activities of the ICCOR.

#### 2.5.7 Disciplinary Appeals

Police discipline hearings arising from public complaints must be timely, competently performed and fair to all participants. While initial determination of appropriate sanctions may be the responsibility of the Commissioner, an appeal to an independent third party is appropriate in most cases, and particularly

those with significant sanctions. Depending on the nature of the appeal, it might merit a full hearing process with witnesses and cross-examination. In other instances, a paper review may be appropriate. Likewise, with matters grieved by RCMP members, the independent third party review is the necessary balance and check for a full and fair process. The Task Force is of the view that all matters of grievance and discipline appeals may be referred to the ICCOR. The ICCOR process should provide expedited decision making if the member chooses.

#### 2.5.8 Resources of the ICCOR

It is important that the ICCOR have sufficient human and financial resources to enable it to perform effectively the four components of its mandate. Thus, if the confidence of the public and the members and employees of the RCMP in the complaints process is to be restored and maintained, the ICCOR must have qualified staff to triage complaints and assess the desirability of the RCMP, another police service, or the ICCOR itself, to investigate the complaint. It must have qualified investigative staff capable of performing its own comprehensive investigations and assessing the investigative work performed by others. It must be able to assemble and maintain a panel of qualified independent adjudicators. And it must be able to employ communications professionals as well as a capable administrative staff headed by a senior public servant with strong managerial skills.

#### 2.5.9 Costs of the ICCOR

The creation and operation of the ICCOR will entail significant costs. However, the Task Force believes that the goal of restoring and maintaining confidence of the public and the members and employees of the Force justifies the expense. We also

note that there will be offsetting cost savings from the current budgets of the CPC and the ERC. We believe that a fully operational ICCOR will eliminate the need for *ad hoc* special investigations and public enquiries which themselves are very costly.


### 2.6 Periodic Review of the ICCOR

The Task Force believes that it will be important for the ICCOR, its mandate, composition and method of operation, as described in this chapter, to be independently reviewed, with reports on its effectiveness made to Parliament and the Canadian people. The legislation establishing the ICCOR should contain provisions for review five years after its proclamation by an independent *ad hoc* committee established by the Minister. The committee would be asked to review the effectiveness of the ICCOR and make recommendations for any changes in its mandate, composition or operation that would improve its effectiveness. The legislation should also provide that new review committees would be formed on each of the fifth anniversaries of the reports of previous committees.


***Recommendation 3 – Creation of an Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP***


*Legislation should be enacted by the Parliament of Canada as soon as possible to establish an Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP having the attributes outlined in Chapter 2; the ICCOR should be established and commence operation as quickly as possible following legislative enactment.*


# Reporting Relationship



# Complaints Process











## CHAPTER 3: ISSUES REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION

Our two major recommendations are intended to provide lasting solutions to the crises in governance, culture and public accountability that we believe are at the root of the problems facing the RCMP today. In this section, we outline a number of the key problems which led us to conclude that these solutions are required. These issues were consistently reported to the Task Force during our meetings with members and employees of the Force. We consider them to be very important and in need of urgent attention.

These issues have led us to a number of conclusions. First, the RCMP's operating model is not sustainable. Demands on the RCMP to provide an expanding range of policing services, combined with mounting administrative requirements, have left the Force increasingly unable to satisfy its obligations. Second, the pressure on the RCMP to continue to meet its obligations, notwithstanding its lack of resources, has put untenable pressure on its members. Third, the workplace issues at the RCMP that have existed for some time must be addressed by a management team that is fully in control of the organization's agenda. Fourth, that same fully-equipped management team must acquire the ability to develop the potential of the RCMP personnel who have committed to a career in the Force. Finally, the RCMP must learn to stand tall in its interaction with its stakeholders. It must take pride in its accomplishments and humbly accept its shortcomings. It must accept accountability.

Set out in this part of the Report are highlights of certain of the key issues that have come to our attention.

### 3.1 Demand that Exceeds the RCMP's Capacity

The Task Force has heard repeatedly that the RCMP does not have the capacity to satisfy its obligations. Notwithstanding its contractual commitments to the provinces, municipalities and territories and its federal policing obligations, the RCMP never operates at full capacity. In every detachment we visited, there were unacceptable vacancy rates (often in the order of the magnitude of 25-30%). Still, the Force seems to accept every new request – whether or not it has the financial or human resources to follow through. The Force seems incapable of saying no. Members and employees are expected to cover their own work, the work not done by others due to vacancies and the work required to fill ever-increasing administrative demands.

#### 3.1.1 Systemic Vacancies – Now and in the Future

Management can predict from the demographic profile of its current workforce when it will be faced with vacancies. However, budget constraints have prevented the RCMP from recruiting and training new cadets to meet anticipated future needs. Where an increasing workload dictates a need for new resources, contracting partners typically respond; "why should we provide funding for new positions when you can't fill the existing vacancies" – making a bad situation worse. In any event, once a requirement for a new position is identified, a recruit must be found, trained and posted before the new position is actually filled. Accordingly, the creation of a new position today will in reality not be filled for two years.

Unplanned vacancies are also contributing to the vacancy issue. At any time, certain members of the Force will not be available for active duty – whether as a result of parental leave, long term disability, secondment to special projects or in connection with disciplinary action. The contractual policing arrangements of the RCMP do not allow for replacement personnel when members are absent for a protracted period of time. Units and divisions deal with these temporary vacancies depending on a number of variables. If there is a vacancy in a particular municipality, for example, the RCMP may try to maintain service by drawing on resources from other areas to compensate. In urgent circumstances, where the RCMP does not have the resources to satisfy a commitment with a particular province, the RCMP may be permitted to bring in members from another jurisdiction.

Staffing isolated and northern posts presents a particular problem, with most being in danger of being seriously understaffed in the near future. In addition to the physical challenge of these locations, separation from families and loved ones makes it difficult for the RCMP to attract members and employees to those locations. Those members who bring families with them to these posts face other challenges in assisting their families to adapt to the remote environment. In many cases, these environments are so rugged that other professionals, such as nurses and teachers, will not locate there unless RCMP personnel are on site. However, the policies affecting these northern postings seem designed to discourage rather than encourage people to take on these challenges. Housing allowances, vacation allowances and other incentives are being eroded. The impression that one gets is of an unsympathetic Treasury Board, treating the RCMP like any other federal department, without regard to

the fact that the challenges (and living conditions) appear to be much more demanding, unique and urgent.

The Force continues to meet its commitments only because its members are prepared to work too long and too hard to compensate for the lack of resources.

This method of operating is not sustainable. It is inevitable that the Force will not be able to continue to attract new recruits to this way of life – particularly in the face of the opportunities for policing careers in environments that offer a better work/life balance. For those members who continue to be prepared to make personal sacrifices to compensate for a lack of resources, a career in the RCMP will simply wear too many of them down. Additional financial resources must be allocated immediately to enable the Force to meet its commitment without unreasonable pressures on its members. If the inability to fill vacant positions is the result of insufficient funds, then the RCMP management, the federal government and the contract partners must re-examine the RCMP's priorities. If an activity is a priority, it should be funded. If it cannot be funded, it should be discontinued. In the immediate term, systems must be put in place to provide replacement personnel when extended absences place unreasonable demands on others in a detachment.

***Recommendation 4 – Capacity to Meet Commitments***

*The organizational needs of the RCMP must be assessed against its current and future commitments. The RCMP must have the financial resources to satisfy all of its current contract and federal policing responsibilities and the ability to commit resources to satisfy those responsibilities within a reasonable planning horizon.*

***Recommendation 5 – Northern Allowances***

*In respect of northern and isolated postings, we urge the Force to work with the Treasury Board to make sure that treatment of members who are prepared to serve in these areas is fair and appropriate.*

3.1.2 Responding to the Call of Duty

When faced with a request for assistance, the natural impulse of the RCMP as an organization and of its individual members is to respond. We have heard the expression "no call too small". As a result, particularly for those officers in small detachments and in remote areas, the workday never ends.

The Task Force has heard that RCMP management has continually agreed to major new initiatives without properly assessing the resources it has available to dedicate to the new initiative. In some cases, resources have to be diverted from other areas. There are a number of integrated projects that fall into this category, including the IMETS, IPOC, INSET and Shiprider projects. We were told that before agreeing to these projects and others, the RCMP had inadequate information about how they would be funded, what type of training would be involved and what the indicators

of success would be. In the face of resource shortages, members questioned the merit of RCMP participation in peacekeeping operations and the Air Protection Officers program.

***Recommendation 6 – Commitments to New Services***

*The RCMP should implement measures to ensure that no commitment to deliver a new service or modify an existing service is made without assurance that the necessary human resources and equipment can be deployed without compromising the ability of the Force to fulfill its existing responsibilities. Alternatively, the existing priorities must be reordered accordingly.*

3.1.3 RCMP Officers Mired in Administration

The administrative burden imposed on the regular members of the RCMP – legal developments and technological changes - have seriously restricted the time available for front line police work.

Legislative changes and court decisions have led to a dramatic increase over the last 30 years in the complexity, formalization, police resources and time required to process routine investigations. Thirty years ago, on average, a break and enter offence took an hour to conduct an initial investigation. By 2005, the investigation could take at least five hours and up to 10 hours. The time required to investigate a domestic assault increased from an hour to 10 to 12 hours and driving under the influence increased from one to five hours.

The issue here is not with the public policy underlying the judicial decisions or legislative changes referred to above. The

issue is with ever-increasing demands being placed on the RCMP without regard to the capacity of the RCMP to meet those demands. These changes are driving RCMP officers out of communities and into offices and are requiring longer and longer unpaid hours of overtime that must be devoted to administrative matters related to investigations and record keeping.

Technology has also changed the face of law enforcement. In order for the technology to operate, someone must input the data. We have heard from members across the country about the implementation difficulties of the new data collection systems. In many cases, adequate technology has not been made available to allow members to work with the new systems effectively. Slow connections and lack of access make the process of entering the data tedious and time consuming. We have heard from many officers that they spend four to five hours of a 10 hour shift in front of computers (much of this being "voluntary" overtime). Some officers may be tempted to overlook violations they might otherwise pursue at the end of a shift because of the prospect of having to enter a report at the end of that shift.

Unfortunately, these demands have not been met with additional resource allocations. In particular, regular members have been provided with too little administrative and clerical support to allow them to carry on with their core policing activities at the same time as allowing the RCMP to comply with evolving legal requirements. Solutions are emerging in some areas, but more needs to be done.

***Recommendation 7 – Efficiency Study***

*The RCMP should immediately launch an efficiency study to determine whether trained employees are performing functions that are best performed by employees with specific skills, with a view to ensuring that employees are using their training and experience in the most efficient manner.*

***Recommendation 8 – Administrative Support***

*The RCMP should immediately make available administrative resources to enable members to devote more time to core policing.*

3.1.4 Fair Compensation

The men and women of the RCMP are overworked. Expecting members to continue to provide the level of service currently demanded of them is exploiting their commitment to Canadians to provide exemplary policing services.

As described above, detachments are already understaffed and must deal with long-term absences. With no surplus members to deploy to detachments, other members must pick up the workload. Administrative requirements add significantly to a burdensome work environment. Because the RCMP is part of the fabric of the communities in which it operates, there is an expectation that the members, and often members of their families, must play a role by participating in community activities well outside the narrow definition of law enforcement. The result is members are paying a price including the risk of burn-out, errors in judgment and consequent public complaints. The impact on family relationships can be enormous.

Unfettered time off must become a reality. The Task Force recognizes, however, that overtime and on-call requirements are a reality of all law enforcement agencies, including the RCMP.

Currently, the RCMP does pay for a portion of overtime worked by members, limited by budget constraints. Similarly, members are compensated to a degree when obliged to remain on call and available to receive calls and return to duty. The RCMP also has developed concepts entitled "voluntary overtime" and "voluntary on-call", which serve to allow detachment commanders to discharge their law enforcement responsibilities while remaining within established budgets. The reality is that members in fact must volunteer for these extra duties. While we recognize the importance of cost controls, the Task Force is of the view that members and employees should be paid for time worked.

***Recommendation 9 – Fair Compensation for Hours Worked***

*Members and employees of the RCMP must be compensated for any time worked outside of or in addition to established hours on duty.*

3.1.5 Safety

The safety of RCMP personnel is the highest priority of the Force. However, the Task Force believes that there are opportunities to better support this priority through training, mentoring, care for the individual and Force-wide policies.

A significant danger to member safety is overwork. Fatigue and burn-out will inevitably lead to challenged judgment and exposure to greater danger. RCMP

management – but also the members themselves – must accept that member safety must be paramount. The culture must not reward – even implicitly – work habits that do not promote good mental and physical health.

The RCMP is recognized worldwide for its excellent cadet training program at the Depot, where new recruits receive intensive training. The Task Force observed this excellence first-hand; we were impressed. The complete training program comprises six months in the Depot plus an additional six months in the field under the direct supervision of a trained and experienced field coach. However, this ideal is not always achieved due to scarcity of experienced field coaches.

Outside of the formal field training program, there is an expectation that inexperienced members will receive guidance from experienced officers. With the changing demographics of the Force, this is now and will become increasingly difficult. Moreover, the culture of getting the work done without complaint does not support RCMP policies such as the backup policy. A young officer properly trained and aware of RCMP policies may feel that commitment to the RCMP requires him or her to take risks that are contrary to those policies. They might not, for example, call upon a colleague for backup out of compassion for the workload of that colleague.

***Recommendation 10 – Field Coaching***

*The importance of the field coaching policy must be reinforced and complied with without exception.*

***Recommendation 11 – Backup Policy***

*We support the RCMP’s recent announcement in respect of its backup policy and we would encourage the Force to complete the implementation as soon as possible.*

*Families: Needs Assessment”*. This report confirmed that the RCMP is failing those individuals and their families. It is important that the RCMP recognize and take into consideration the impact on families resulting from members and employees suffering from any form of disability. There must be no exceptions. It is important therefore that the RCMP embrace all current initiatives in respect of these concerns that are taking place elsewhere in the Government of Canada in an urgent way, including the recommendations contained in their own report.

3.1.6 Health and Wellness

Member and employee wellness must be central to all decision making. The RCMP's record of caring for its members' physical and mental health is not an admirable one. A 2003 survey conducted by Dr. Linda Duxbury of RCMP employees showed that over half of respondents report high levels of job stress (double the level with high stress in the Canadian workforce more generally). Just over one in five of the survey respondents missed more than three days of work in a row due to physical or mental health problems. One in five respondents missed work due to physical or mental fatigue. The conclusion drawn in this Report is that the employees at the RCMP do not cope well with the stresses they face. To meet demands at work, they work harder, cut back on sleep, and let things slide at home. Most do not delegate or ask for help from others.

The Task Force heard numerous complaints about the failure of the RCMP to adequately address the needs of some of the members and employees who have become disabled on the job. In June 2006, the RCMP issued a report called “*The Future of Disability and Services for RCMP Members and Their*

***Recommendation 12 – Health and Wellness***

*The RCMP should ensure that member and employee health and wellness be an essential consideration in policy and operational decisions at all levels.*

***Recommendation 13 – Disability***

*The RCMP must move quickly in every instance where a member or employee has become injured on duty or disabled and thereby unable to return to full duty. In these circumstances, every effort must be made to facilitate a return to duty as early as possible, and in the interim, to provide adequate financial and other support. Where a return to duty is not possible, every effort must be made to assist the member or employee to re-enter the workforce either within the RCMP or elsewhere.*

**3.2 Workplace Issues**

3.2.1 Ethics

The Investigative Report addresses the actions taken by the RCMP in response to improprieties in the management of the

pension and insurance plans. The Investigative Report also reported on the conviction on the part of many that the Force's values – honesty, integrity, compassion, respect, accountability and professionalism – were too often disregarded by management. RCMP members and other employees also commented to the Task Force that management does not "walk the talk" when it comes to the ethical values of the organization.

The RCMP has a clear and relevant statement of its mission, vision and values and a well-understood Code of Conduct. It also has a number of the other tools that are required for an organization to deal with ethical breakdown, including audits, risk assessment, finance, procurement and human resources management. The RCMP also has an Office of the Ethics Advisor (OEA), which has been operating for a decade.

Senior management should be supported by a properly resourced OEA function. However, it must be recognized that the responsibility for establishing and maintaining values and ethics in the RCMP, including their explicit integration into the regular operations of the Force, is the responsibility of senior management.

The value that is ascribed to ethics should be reflected in the Force's education programs. The case study and ethical reasoning approaches used at the Depot, which the Task Force observed, should be integrated into all supervisory, management and leadership training. This can close the gap that exists between the stated principles of the RCMP and their perceived absence from the management of its organization.

#### ***Recommendation 14 – Ethics in Practice***

*Senior management of the RCMP must ensure that ethics principles underpin all management and administrative functions and are an integral part of all policing activities.*

#### ***Recommendation 15 – Ethics Education***

*The methodology applied to ethics training provided to recruits at the Depot should be extended throughout the organization and should be continually reinforced and refreshed.*

### 3.2.2 Discipline

The RCMP's discipline system is designed to correct an officer's improper conduct and maintain high standards of performance throughout the Force. The Code of Conduct of the RCMP defines improper behaviour and dictates the range of remedies, all of which are enshrined in the RCMP Act.

In our view, the disciplinary scheme (to a lesser extent the grievance process) has become an overly legalistic and procedural system. Because the scheme is enshrined in the RCMP Act, it has been difficult to adapt it to ensure that its processes, including time limits, remained accountable, timely and effective. It has not been able to respond to developments in labour relations practices and is not responsive to a modern policing organization.

In support of this contention, the Task Force received numerous complaints about the discipline process from members of the Force. In the view of many members, it has become overly formalistic and adversarial. Disciplinary matters, even for relatively minor breaches of the Code of Conduct,

become protracted with a consequent disruption in the lives of those charged and a strain on the detachment where the member serves. Time limits designed to expedite the process are frustrated by tactical delays by both parties.

The Task Force noted that the Australian Federal Police approaches disciplinary matters on the basis of managerial and administrative discretion rather than relying on adversarial and punitive processes. They emphasize embracing and practising principles of a learning organization that accepts and learns from honest mistakes at the individual and organizational level.

In order for discipline to be effective in an organization, it must be integrated in organizational plans and processes, reporting structures and roles and responsibilities. There should be an emphasis on active involvement by the supervisor to address disciplinary matters at an informal level. Supervisors should be trained, encouraged and evaluated on their management of discipline issues. Behaviour-driven conduct requires a culture that values learning and performance. Disciplinary processes should not be purely punitive, but should be reactions to a failure to embody the organization's values, and more importantly, should be done on a timely basis.

The issue of the one year limitation period has been identified. The RCMP Act provides that formal disciplinary proceedings may only be initiated within one year from the time the Commanding Officer has learned of the contravention and identity of the member. The Task Force is of the view that there are very few instances that would merit an investigation taking more than six months. Investigations need to be thorough, but, if protracted, will have a detrimental impact on not only the member

who is the subject of an investigation but those who work with the member and those associated with the incident under investigation. The Task Force found almost universal agreement that the one year time limit should not be extended. Indeed, the common sentiment was that there is little or no excuse beyond those rare investigations when criminal charges are being contemplated or have been laid, or other exceptional circumstances, that should prevent the conclusion of a complete and thorough investigation of any matter within one year.

The RCMP should take all reasonable steps to abbreviate the time taken to resolve matters of discipline, employing every opportunity to resolve matters in an informal way. In achieving this end, the RCMP should not feel constrained by any current precedents, bearing in mind the standard of proof is one of the balance of probabilities and not the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

The RCMP management has long been aware of the problems plaguing its disciplinary system. There have been at least five studies (including the Lordon Report) aimed at improving the effectiveness of the management of both the discipline framework and its delivery model. Meaningful changes have yet to be effected. The Lordon Report seems to have gained wide-spread acceptance and is currently being evaluated by management. We have been told that the recommendations in the Lordon Report will address the issues we have outlined above.



***Recommendation 16 – Immediate Amendments to Disciplinary System***

*The RCMP should implement immediately the recommendations of the Lordon Report (with whatever amendments management feels are appropriate) that would result in making the processes less adversarial and more timely.*

***Recommendation 17 – Centralized Disciplinary Authority***

*The RCMP should establish immediately a centralized disciplinary authority to ensure integration, planning, monitoring and accountability.*

***Recommendation 18 – Eliminate Backlogs***

*The RCMP should eliminate the serious backlogs existing currently in the disciplinary system.*

***Recommendation 19 – Expeditious and Informal Resolution***

*The RCMP should commit at the highest level of management, the discipline principles that require expeditious and informal resolution at the lowest possible level.*

***Recommendation 20 – One Year Time Limit***

*The RCMP should establish reasonable time frames for the commencement and completion of investigations that reflect the relative complexity of the matters at issue. Only in rare circumstances should these time frames exceed six months. The Task Force does not recommend that any changes be made to the existing one year time limit subject to the ability of the RCMP to apply to the ICCOR for an extension in order to facilitate a contemporaneous criminal investigation.*

***Recommendation 21 – Internal Processes***

*When amendments are made to the RCMP Act to create the ICCOR, consequential amendments should be made to streamline the grievance and discipline process.*

3.2.3 Workplace Disclosure

During the investigation into matters relating to RCMP pension and insurance plans, it was learned that whistleblowers often risked their job security. The Investigative Report spoke to organizations having a duty to protect individuals in those instances. As the report highlighted, even with assurance of protection, people will only come forward if they believe action against the exposed wrongdoing will be taken. The issues of workplace disclosure addressed in the Investigative Report relate to periods of time prior to the implementation of the *Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act* (2007) (PSDPA). It appears that this legislation addresses the major issues of concern in the Investigative Report.

The PSDPA applies to members and public service employees of the RCMP. The PSDPA provides for the disclosure, investigation and public reporting of wrongdoing that takes place in the federal public sector, and protects those who report possible wrongdoing in accordance with the Act. Wrongdoing in the public sector is defined as: "...a contravention of any Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province; a misuse of public funds or a public asset; gross mismanagement; an act or omission that creates a substantial and specific danger to the life, health or safety of persons, or to the environment; a serious breach of a code of conduct; and knowingly directing or counselling a person to commit a wrongdoing".

The PSDPA also contains provisions particular to the RCMP in order to deal with the potential confusion and overlap that could exist between the disclosure of wrongdoing regime in the PSDPA and the process to report breaches of the RCMP Code of Conduct. In particular, it clarifies how the reprisal protection measures in the PSDPA will work alongside the RCMP's disciplinary system for members in instances where reprisal is claimed.

Recent legal and institutional changes provide the RCMP with new and better ways to deal with complaints of possible wrongdoing and the risk of reprisal. The challenge for the RCMP will be to ensure: that its own internal systems for reporting, investigating and dealing with wrongdoing are credible and safe; that they are coordinated with the internal disciplinary system; and that members and employees are aware of the options available to them and have confidence that the system works. However wrongdoing is identified, the goal should be to ensure common communication to all members and employees that there is "no wrong door" for those who want to raise concerns.

***Recommendation 22 – Workplace Disclosure***

*The RCMP should embrace the spirit and intent of the PSDPA, enforcing it throughout the organization, harmonized and properly resourced to be effective for the RCMP. Once established, the Board of Management should monitor the effectiveness of those processes and remediate as necessary to meet the objectives of the statute.*

### 3.2.4 Labour Relations

The SRR Program (the official labour relations program of the RCMP) was developed as a result of a Force-wide consultation in 1974 and has undergone a number of changes since that time. It is designed to provide members of the RCMP with a formal system of representation to ensure their participation in the decision making process and a voice in matters that affect their welfare, dignity and operational effectiveness. RCMP members are prevented by the RCMP Act from collective bargaining and do not have the right to strike.

Members of the RCMP (both regular and civilian) are elected as staff relations representatives (or SRRs) for a two year term. SRR is a full-time position and the member is therefore not available to perform his or her regular duties. If a member is elected for a second consecutive term, he or she becomes subject to a special promotion system reserved for SRRs. There are currently 37 SRRs across the country, as well as 150 sub-representatives who act as "shop stewards" while continuing on with their regular duties. Two of the members of the NEC liaise with the Commissioner on operational issues and attend all meetings of the SEC as non-voting members. (The director of the SRR program office, who is a civilian, liaises with the Commissioner's office on administrative matters.)

The Task Force heard a number of comments about the effectiveness of this program. As it has evolved, the SRR Program may have inadvertently confused accountability in some areas and displaced NCOs in the chain of command. The SRRs need to refocus on their *raison d'être* – labour relations.

The Task Force believes that operational NCOs need to be given a much more visible and active role in the development of policies that will impact their responsibilities at the detachment level. Indeed, giving a real voice to this group of highly experienced and talented middle managers will energize the entire renewal process and give valuable insight into service delivery issues. Further, there should be on some management committees senior "line" NCO representation, such as making the RCMP Corps Sergeant-Major a Member of the SEC. (His/her equivalent in the Canadian Forces now sits as a full member of the Armed Forces Council).

Representations were made to us by police associations and others that advocate the establishment of a union for RCMP members. During our meetings with members and employees across the country, we received limited and localized comments on the need for a union.

While one might argue that the reason for this was fear of management reaction, we note that there was no lack of criticism of a variety of management attitudes and policies. It seems unlikely that this is the one point on which they felt intimidated. Moreover, there were avenues available for us to receive anonymous submissions by members who might have been anxious to see unionization on the table; we received none.

Some officers have said that they are not sure what happens to their concerns after they give them to the SRRs – it is not clear whether they have been passed on by the SRRs at all, or whether management has decided not to act on them.

There is room for improvement in the SRR program. Over time, the SRRs have become part of the chain of command of the RCMP organization. We believe that more distance

from management is appropriate. In the first instance, the SRRs should not attend SEC meetings. It is important to maintain the distinction between management and employees. SRRs cannot be expected to be credible with employees when they sit at the management table. Their participation as observers at the SEC table, where decisions are being made, gives the impression that they have concurred with those decisions. That makes it difficult for them to objectively represent a member who may disagree with a particular decision. (The principle expressed above applies equally at the division level.)

Furthermore, the SRR program we believe best serves the interests of the members of the Force by ensuring that the representatives bring new and current issues for consideration based on their recent involvement in law enforcement activities. The Task Force heard that, by virtue of the fact that there is no end date to the length of time that an SRR can remain in office (assuming that he/she continues to be re-elected), some SRRs lose their perspective in respect of issues important to the membership given their own lengthy absences from active policing. The Task Force does not assume any lack of professionalism or dedication on the part of any SRR, yet it is recognized that the above observations can have merit in a program that does not have as part of its operating procedures, a built in assurance of reasonable turnover allowing for refreshing insights. The Task Force recognizes that some change in the membership of the SRR program does occur by chance through a variety of events such as retirement or an SRR not seeking re-election. The Task Force thinks, however, that renewal and being refreshed is such an important aspect of any staff relations program that it should not be left to chance but rather should be built into the program.

**Recommendation 23 – SRR Role**

*The SRRs should focus entirely on labour relations and thus be independent from management. They should not sit as observers at the SEC. Members should serve for no more than two terms as SRRs, after which time they should return to regular duty.*

**Recommendation 24 – NCOs**

*Operational NCOs must be given a formalized opportunity to participate in the leadership and management of the RCMP through contributions to policies affecting the delivery of police services.*

3.2.5 Civilian Personnel Issues

Regular members of the Force provide direct policing services, but also perform certain other functions that support the policing function. Not all of these functions currently performed by regular members require peace officer status. This would include, for example, many head office functions.

Civilians who work for the RCMP fall into three categories: public service employees, civilian members and temporary civilian employees. Whatever the original intent was for these categories of employees, there has been over time and for a variety of reasons, a blurring of the roles within each to the point that in many cases it is impossible to determine why a position is categorized as an RM position and not a CM. Similarly, it is difficult to discern why a CM position exists when the duties and responsibilities are indistinguishable from those of a PSE.

An anomaly has developed with the position of TCEs. The TCE position is contemplated in the RCMP Act as a means to hiring a person under contract for a specific function and for a specified period of time. The individual is hired under contract and typically is employed in an area of responsibility newly assigned to the RCMP or for the specific purpose of completing a task or research assignment within the RCMP. The original intent was that it would allow for the hiring of (generally) support persons to an assignment that would have a predetermined beginning and finish date. In addition to the issue of uncertain or inadequate funding, the TCE approach is seen as a means to avoid the time consuming and perceived delays in creating permanent positions which require approval at various levels, classification and a competitive staffing process. We were told that there are approximately 2,000 TCEs within the RCMP.

The use of this category of employee has been abused over time with individuals remaining as TCEs for five or more years and as temporary employees, not having the certainty of full-time employment, not enjoying the privileges of either regular or civilian members or indeed public servants. They are in limbo with few benefits.

Over the past 20 years or so there have been several attempts to clarify and regularize the current situation beginning with a Categories of Employees study which began in 1995. Following SEC approval of the findings of the Categories of Employees study, an Alignment Task Force was created in 1999. We were informed that there remain only about 200 positions to be reviewed in an effort to determine the category in which those positions should fall. We applaud this effort by the RCMP. We believe however, that the Force should also focus on what more can be done to

civilianize areas of work within the RCMP, thus making available highly (and expensively) trained RMs for deployment to law enforcement activities and reducing the vacancy pattern described elsewhere in this Report.

The RCMP has studied a number of ways to collapse the categories of civilian employees. Whatever the approach, we can find no justification in today's modern RCMP for two categories of civilian employees. We recognize that hiring constraints have on occasion led to the use of more expeditious means to create and fill clerical and other support functions. We also received advice that in some instances the creation of a CM position was preferred as the person filling that position would not be unionized. Whatever the rationale, however, the result has been a blurring of distinctions as between many PSE and CM functions resulting in a lack of clarity between the roles and responsibilities, confusion and disparity in respect of pay and benefits and, as a result, an unnecessarily disgruntled workforce. In Chapter 1 we make recommendations for granting separate employer status to the RCMP. This would facilitate collapsing CMs and PSEs into a single category.

***Recommendation 25 – RM Categorization***

*The RCMP should move from study to action in the streamlining of the civilian function at the RCMP. Only those positions which have a clearly demonstrated need for peace officer status, peace officer training and peace officer experience should be classified as RM positions. All remaining positions should be classified for and filled by a person without the background of a peace officer.*

***Recommendation 26 – Combining Civilian Categories***

*The RCMP should seek to determine whether there is a continuing need for two categories of civilian employees within the RCMP.*

***Recommendation 27 – Temporary Civilian Employees***

*The RCMP should immediately take action to examine the issue of those who appear to be caught permanently in the TCE category and continue to work in the RCMP without any of the protections afforded to other employees.*

**3.2.6 Workplace Issues Specific to Headquarters**

For reasons that we suspect are related to cost reduction measures and the establishment of regionalization a number of years ago, the position of the Commanding Officer Headquarters was eliminated. The unforeseen outcome of this decision is that members in Headquarters do not have the same approaches available to them to resolve discipline and grievance matters as do members outside of Headquarters. In addition, there is no one person responsible

for all of the administrative matters that are necessary in the day-to-day running of Headquarters (security, transportation, building maintenance and personnel issues). In short, there is no one person to whom someone employed at Headquarters can turn to resolve issues such as those suggested above. As one member pointed out, some dispute resolution policies oblige the member to consult with the senior person in charge. In the case of Headquarters, that would be the Commissioner; however, these matters should be dealt with by someone junior to the Commissioner.

***Recommendation 28 – CO Headquarters***

*We recommend the re-creation of the position of CO Headquarters.*

**3.3 Human Resources Development**

Many of the failures and weaknesses that have been identified elsewhere in this Report are a result of the lack of proper leadership and training. We have observed that the current system of performance evaluation, promotion and succession planning is not adequate to identify, prepare and nurture the future leaders of the RCMP.

**3.3.1 Recruitment**

Historically, the RCMP has recruited very young men and women out of high school. For many of them, their six months of initial training at the Depot is the only post-secondary education they will receive. The needs of the Force must all be met through the complement of regular members whose entire careers have been with the RCMP and who received all of their training at the RCMP. The leadership of the Force is also drawn from this group. Notwithstanding the enormous contributions that have been made

by members who joined the Force on this basis, we do not believe that this will sustain the Force in what is an increasingly knowledge-based environment.

Recruiting and training generalists is inconsistent with the need for specialized human resources. The RCMP culture supports the idea that any member can learn any trade – even very specialized ones. The corporate/administrative needs of the organization are also largely satisfied by simply moving people from operations into head office functions without the proper structure to ensure that candidates develop theme-appropriate skills and expertise. Career streaming is not strategic – there is no evidence that senior officers are groomed or that any solid apprentice programs exist. For example, there is no organized effort to expose potential leadership candidates to the federal bureaucracy before bringing them into key senior positions in Headquarters.

The RCMP does not pay cadets during their training at the Depot. Most other police forces, the military and the private sector compensate new employees during their initial training. We heard a number of stories of qualified recruits who would have chosen the RCMP over other career opportunities had there been financial support during the training.

The RCMP must compete with police services from across the country for the same finite pool of qualified applicants. This pool is shrinking relative to the population and becoming more diverse. As this pool of possible new members continues to shrink the competition for these scarce resources is intensified.

Finally, we heard a number of anecdotes about qualified applicants receiving delayed responses to their applications or having their training sessions cancelled at the last

minute. This does little to enhance the reputation of the RCMP as a prospective employer.

***Recommendation 29 – Recruitment***

*The RCMP needs to streamline its recruitment process and be more responsive and transparent with those who show an interest in joining the Force as a recruit.*

***Recommendation 30 – Paying Cadets***

*To remain competitive, the RCMP should pay its cadets during their six month training at the Depot at a level that is competitive with other policing organizations.*

3.3.2 Educating and Training  
Future Leaders

The development of future leaders in any organization requires continuous learning.

The Task Force does not believe that the RCMP places sufficient value on higher education. This has the potential to rob the organization of the benefit of improving practices through exposure to new ideas and the development of critical thought. This may ultimately contribute to the difficulty the RCMP has with promoting a challenge function within its decision making processes.

The RCMP no longer provides its future leaders with management training, higher education or exposure to other job experiences in the larger public and private sector. We understand that programs of this nature did exist until the mid-1990s but were eliminated to meet reduced budget targets. As a result, only limited training and education opportunities were made available

to a generation of RCMP officers who now occupy very senior management positions.

The need to meet reduced budget targets also resulted in the elimination of the RCMP's research and development branch in the Canadian Police College. As a result, the Force's ability to remain abreast of changes in modern police methods has been compromised. We note that police services in, for example, Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa, the OPP and Toronto all have active research and planning components.

We are also concerned that the RCMP does too little to identify and nurture future leaders. We agree with the suggestions we have heard that the RCMP should consider the creation of a commissioned officer cadre which could be done in a way that reinforces recognition to high-potential members from within the Force or from outside. It should be emphasized that achievement, capability and potential must be combined with knowledge, skills and capabilities commensurate with identified leadership competencies such as ethical and other behavioural and leadership skills all of which should be the litmus test for senior officer appointments.

The Canadian Forces has recently revamped its own education and professional development program. It has expressed a willingness to provide the RCMP with key staff and student positions in the Canadian Defence Academy and the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College to help "kick start" the RCMP process.

***Recommendation 31 – Education Prerequisite***

*The RCMP needs to demonstrate greater openness and willingness to accept lateral entry into the Force in order to provide needed specialized skill sets and experience. In the longer term, the Task Force believes that the RCMP should also make a post-secondary degree a condition for all new recruits*

***Recommendation 32 – Education and Training***

*The RCMP must recommit to education and training that will equip its officers for senior responsibilities. Leadership training should be a continuum throughout the member's career. The RCMP should identify deserving members with potential for further education and support them in seeking post-secondary education.*

***Recommendation 33 – Research***

*The RCMP must rebuild its research capability in order to provide members of the Force with an opportunity to explore developments in law enforcement outside of the RCMP and stay abreast of modern policing methods.*

***Recommendation 34 – Leadership Competency***

*The RCMP should ensure that specific and detailed competency profiles are in place for all senior leadership positions and are current and reflect modern policing responsibilities.*

years. The system currently in place incorporates assessment based on the competency profile of the position, addressing both the organizational and functional competencies of the position. In our meetings with the RCMP held across the country, members of all ranks advised the Task Force that although they are familiar with the program, they found little or no benefit of going through the exercise as supervisors, managers and senior management does not appear to be required to do evaluations. We understand that only 13% of the performance evaluations were completed and recorded for the 2006-2007 fiscal year.

Even if evaluations were done annually, the utility of the evaluations is limited since the information does not form a meaningful part of other processes such as the promotion process, succession planning or career planning. The focus in the RCMP is too often on what people do wrong, not what they do right.

***Recommendation 35 – Performance Evaluations***

*Effective immediately, all members and employees of the RCMP must receive annual performance evaluations. These should include not only what was achieved, but how it was accomplished. The results of the performance evaluations should be used to identify opportunities for additional education and training, to identify future leaders and make promotion decisions.*

***Recommendation 36 – Accountability for Completing Performance Evaluations***

*All members with managerial responsibility should be assessed on their completion of performance evaluations for all members under their command.*

3.3.3 Performance Evaluations

The performance evaluation system has changed a number of times in the last ten



### 3.3.4 Promotion System

The Task Force heard numerous complaints about the promotion system, which is viewed almost universally as being ineffective, unfair and opaque. It relies on self-assessments of one's own competencies. This is both time consuming and encourages self-promotion rather than teamwork. Results of performance evaluations are not a determining factor in the promotion system.

The exam, which must be written in connection with applying for promotion at the NCO level, is regarded with a great deal of cynicism. It is seen as very subjective, with a grading system that is unrealistic. The difference of a few points in score can eliminate candidates for consideration for promotion for two years. There is also a perception that those members of the Force who are busy do not have time to prepare the written materials required to compete for a position, while those in administrative positions do have the time. While many agree that an exam is an appropriate part of the promotion system, there is a strong feeling that it should be only one component. It should be used to confirm command of a certain range of knowledge, but should not be used to rank candidates. The promotion process must measure not only knowledge, but must take into account performance, skills and abilities and must have the capability of assessing a candidate's potential for new responsibilities.

The promotion system does not intersect with the need for specialized skills to develop within the Force. With the need for development of special skills within the Force, members are not available for promotion while they are engaged in training for a particular area. Once their training is complete, they must often move out of their area of specialization in order to

secure a promotion. Not only is this not professionally satisfying for the members, it makes it difficult to retain the required competencies in specialized areas of the Force, particularly in federal law enforcement. We heard from Forensic Science and Identification Services, for example, that it takes up to five years to train members in their area, but they often then lose those resources to promotion opportunities outside the specialty.

#### ***Recommendation 37 – Fixing the Promotion System***

*As an urgent priority, the RCMP must replace its existing promotion system with one that is based on performance, knowledge, skill, ability and the potential to assume future responsibilities. The criteria for promotion must be clearly explained and transparently applied.*

#### ***Recommendation 38 – Pass/Fail Exams***

*Exams should be administered on a pass/fail basis, with decisions relating to promotion formulated on a broader range of accomplishments and capabilities.*

### 3.4 Communications

In the course of its consultations, the Task Force became aware of many examples of an organizational unwillingness or an inability to respond pro-actively to issues or to communicate effectively. Our impression is that the RCMP has been unable to balance legitimate privacy and liability concerns with the need for openness and transparency. The Force confines its communications to progress reports and the results of investigations into public complaints, with little effort to ensure that the public and stakeholders are truly

engaged and informed. Negative press about the RCMP and its activities which is met with no response or correction by the Force is eroding public respect for the Force and hurting the morale of members and employees.

Internal communication at the RCMP is also flawed. Policy decisions of senior management are poorly communicated to members and employees. The chain of command does not see internal communications as a "core" responsibility and there is little or no accountability for effective communications with staff. Members and employees must feel confident that they are well informed.

Communications must become an integral part of policy formulation, decision making and the delivery of services. Recent incidents have highlighted systemic weaknesses in RCMP communications including: slowness of response; lack of transparency; and inaccurate information. The current reactive posture has fuelled uncertainty and eroded the trust of the public and the members alike.

The Task Force believes that the RCMP should engage in a complete review of the RCMP public affairs and communication function. We encourage the RCMP to embrace a public affairs approach where members, employees and Canadians are appropriately informed. A crisis management process should also be developed with a view to improving the timeliness and quality of information to senior management for decision making and quick and accurate responses to the media and Canadians.

***Recommendation 39 – Public Affairs Plan***

*The RCMP should review and further develop its public affairs function, implementing a public affairs plan that contains a comprehensive internal and external communications strategy that keeps stakeholders appropriately informed. It should also include a crisis management strategy that will permit quick and accurate responses to the media and Canadians.*

***Recommendation 40 – Responsibility for Internal Communication***

*The Force should ensure that, throughout the chain of command, internal communication is a fundamental responsibility for every person in a leadership position.*

## CHAPTER 4: BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT

There are a number of barriers to effective management at the RCMP. These barriers are both cultural and structural.

### 4.1 Cultural Barriers to Effective Management

We have observed a number of attitudes and values in the RCMP that affect the way in which decisions are made. For example, we heard more than once that the culture is one of fear and intimidation and that some who are in a position of command use their authority to intimidate others. This has several results. Employees who are concerned about being criticized would prefer to do nothing – or to pass responsibility on to someone else – rather than make a decision which could attract criticism. It also means that bad news does not travel up in the organization. Senior management is not in a position to address developing problems because they are insulated from them by people who do not want to deliver bad news. We agree with the sentiment expressed by former Commissioner Busson that the only thing worse than getting bad news is not getting it!

We also observed very little in the way of a challenge function in the organization. In the first instance one might think that this is simply a necessary feature of a paramilitary organization. We recognized that control is necessary where certainty of action is paramount. However, in many instances in the RCMP, the culture of control is choking off the development of collaborative decision making. We have learned, however, that similarly structured organizations such as the Canadian Forces have been successful in encouraging constructive challenge as part of the decision making process.

### 4.2 Structural Barriers to Effective Management

#### 4.2.1 Operations

The Task Force heard consistently both in detachments and in other operational units that those in charge had insufficient authority to make normal course decisions. As a result, valuable time was spent seeking authority up the chain of command often all the way to the Headquarters. The frustration and delays seriously compromise their ability to deliver effective policing services.

In our view, operational decision making should be lodged at the point closest to where the action is, where effective decision making is possible. In other words, as much decentralization as possible, but as much centralization as necessary for best performance. Those closest to operational police activity must have the requisite authority to make operational decisions in a timely manner. We believe that the following principles provide guidance for making the determination about where authority for any particular decision should reside:

- delegation of authority and decision making must take into account a reasonable assessment of the risks involved while recognizing that not all risks will be apparent
- decisions must be made in accordance with thoroughly considered and approved policies and protocols
- lines of accountability must be clear and unequivocal
- a recognition that from time to time errors in judgment may occur; when

reasonable errors do occur, they should be treated as a learning opportunity for the individual and not as a reason to increase the bureaucracy around the decision making process or to move the decision making authority to a more senior level

- where a pattern of errors occurs, the policies should be reviewed to determine their adequacy and/or the individual responsible should be provided with remedial training/assistance

In the RCMP's two major lines of business – federal policing and contract policing – the Task Force concludes that operating decisions are often being made at the wrong level. There is too much central control over contract policing and too little centralized consistency with respect to federal policing

#### 4.2.2 Application to Contract Policing

With respect to contract policing, we believe that more operational authority needs to be devolved to local commanders at the divisional level. Headquarters policies in respect of resource deployment, particularly as they relate to policing priorities, must be delegated to the lowest possible level. We are confident that those in command positions are highly experienced and responsible individuals who will function within the rules. For the few who do not, remedial steps are available. Timeliness, immediate need and urgency are all factors that confront those on the front line and therefore they must be free to make reasonable decisions while remaining within the parameters of delegation. The irony is that members on the front line make life or death decisions every day but are not entrusted with simple administrative authorities.

There is plenty of evidence that responsibility for operational decisions at a much more local level than is the case at the RCMP is consistent with modern policing practices. For example, the issues and challenges facing the RCMP in the contracting jurisdictions mirror those faced by local law enforcement organization such as Halifax and Calgary and the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Unlike their counterparts in these jurisdictions, detachment commanders in the RCMP do not have the authority to make many of the day-to-day decisions which would allow them to respond in a timely manner. Although, we recognize that it is often the Commissioner and his senior officers who are being held to account for local events, we are satisfied that Headquarters is too remote from the local issues to be making many of the decisions that they currently do. There are means and mechanisms to allow for Headquarters to be kept informed and where necessary to intervene.

We also believe that there should be greater involvement on the part of provincial and local authorities in the establishment of policing objectives in the contracting jurisdictions. The Task Force heard that they are rarely a party to any discussion with representatives of the RCMP Headquarters in Ottawa in respect of policing and policy discussions which would impact their respective areas of responsibility. More often, they are simply told what has been decided.

We talked at length with local authorities about their relationship with the local Commander. We found that the relationships between the minister/mayor and the local Commander ranged from good to excellent. They each emphasized the importance of open, honest, and respectful dialogue to ensure that relationships function smoothly and in the best interests

of the taxpayer. The importance of these local relationships has convinced us that provincial/local officials should have significant input into the selection of the RCMP members who fill key roles at the division, district and detachment levels. We saw an example of this on the lower mainland of British Columbia. The RCMP created a list of candidates it felt would be appropriate for the position. Local officials then interviewed each candidate and selected the officer that they felt best met the needs of the community in terms of interest, experience and other key factors.

***Recommendation 41 – Delegation of Decision Making with Respect to Contract Policing***

*The RCMP should examine and review its approval authorities to ensure that those closest to operational police activity have the requisite authority to make decisions in a timely manner.*

***Recommendation 42 – Contract Partner Participation***

*Headquarters should give greater weight to the views and priorities of contracting authorities and should involve them in a more meaningful way in decisions that have an impact on their jurisdictions.*

departments. In those cases, members of the RCMP need to be able to commit and act quickly as events unfold and as full participants of any task force. This means, of course, that policies and direction from Headquarters must take into account the variety of investigative and reporting imperatives which exist in the federal policing area which could result in a variety of accountabilities.

In other cases, less delegation is appropriate. In respect of national security offences, for example, it is appropriate that closer scrutiny be given to those investigations by Headquarters. A further example is the creation and operation of the IMET teams. The report of Nick Le Pan, Special Advisor to the Commissioner, dated October 25, 2007, recommended greater oversight by senior management of these teams.

***Recommendation 43 – Delegation of Decision Making with Respect to Federal Policing***

*The RCMP should examine and review its delegation policies to ensure that those responsible for the RCMP's participation in integrated task forces involving federal policing services have the appropriate authority to commit the resources of the RCMP in a timely manner and within carefully articulated national policies.*

#### 4.2.3 Application to Federal Policing

Federal policing is a much different business from contract policing. We have, however, seen issues relating to insufficient delegation of authorities in this area of the RCMP's business, just as we did in contract policing. The investigation of drug offences and biker gangs are often undertaken in a task force arrangement with other local police

### 4.3 Administrative Decision Making

#### 4.3.1 Headquarters

During the consultations, the Task Force heard numerous complaints about Headquarters. Comments reflected general complaints that Headquarters was too remote, disconnected and out-of-date with challenges faced on the front lines.

Members believe that Headquarters is rules-bound and risk averse. We heard that there was a lack of policy coordination and integration of policies across functional areas of the Force and an inability to follow through on the implementation of new policies and programs. In particular, we heard numerous instances of new programs being launched with inadequate implementation planning. In short, members do not understand the role of Headquarters and do not believe that it adequately supports their policing activities. Many of these concerns are shared by the people who work in Headquarters themselves. We recognize that the tendency in any organization is to complain about head office; however, the consistency with which we heard these complaints leads us to believe that they must be addressed.

It is clear that one of Headquarters' central responsibilities is to establish policies that will apply across the entire RCMP organization. It is not apparent however that there is sufficient coordination across the spectrum of policies for which Headquarters is responsible. This has led to inconsistent if not conflicting policy direction, much to the frustration of members in the field. We have also heard many examples of new initiatives being introduced with little regard for their implications for the member at the detachment level and without the resources for implementation. The rollout of the PROS system was the most frequently cited example.

While general, high level direction from the centre can be given, the task of putting Headquarters' policies into practice needs to be left to the divisions, districts and detachments that must ensure that the spirit and intent of direction from Headquarters is respected. Division Commanding Officers, District Commanders and Detachment Commanders need to be given the requisite

authority to interpret and apply Headquarters' policies in a way that addresses and accommodates local conditions. A system of periodic reviews of local directives will ensure the necessary degree of consistency. Where the intent of Headquarters' policy has been misinterpreted or ignored, corrective means are available.

Moreover, there needs to be a way for Headquarters to be more easily refreshed allowing members from the field to move into Headquarters' positions, and apply their recent skills and experience after which they return to the field.

Headquarters would benefit from a better definition and understanding of its roles and responsibilities which should be set out in a written document available throughout the RCMP. This document should also define the relationship between Headquarters and its divisions. This practice is common in large private sector organizations.

***Recommendation 44 – Roles and Responsibilities of Headquarters***

*The RCMP should develop a written mandate defining the roles and responsibilities of Headquarters and its relationship with its divisions.*

#### 4.3.2 Regionalization

Across the country, RCMP members and employees at all levels, as well as representatives of provincial and territorial governments, raised concerns with the Task Force about the aspect of the RCMP's organizational structure known as "regionalization". With a few exceptions, the strong consensus was that regionalization in its current format simply does not work. We agree.

The administrative support staff in each region was placed under the command of a Deputy Commissioner, the second highest rank in the Force. Each regional Deputy Commissioner then required a support network and offices which brought added and in some cases not insignificant, overhead costs.

Many subdivisions were combined into districts which resulted in Detachment Commanders being distanced from the guidance of senior and sometimes more experienced persons and a diminution of specialty services often needed at the detachment level in complicated and highly sensitive cases.

Similarly, in some instances the presence of a regional Deputy Commissioner has confused or made more complicated the relationship between the Commanding Officer and the provincial minister/authorities, particularly in those situations where the Deputy Commissioner has a physical presence in the province. In those provinces where the Deputy Commissioner is not physically present, there is a lack of clarity as to the role the Deputy Commissioner is to play in provincial policing matters.

The Task Force did not receive a delineation of the costs of regionalization as those costs are included in a variety of budgets and difficult to discern. Most with whom we have spoken, however, believe that regionalization has not resulted in any cost savings or improved management.

The RCMP is organized into four regions each of which functions differently. Over the approximately nine years that regionalization has been in place, it has never been evaluated.

#### ***Recommendation 45 – Regionalization***

*We recommend that the regional structure within the RCMP be evaluated by senior management to determine whether it is the most cost effective and efficient way of managing an organization with the diversity and complexity of the RCMP.*

#### 4.3.3 Committee Structure Supporting the Commissioner

The main source of advice and consultation for the Commissioner is the SEC. The eight Deputy Commissioners are members of the SEC as are certain other members of management (including the ethics advisor, Assistant Commissioner of strategic policy and planning directorate, senior general counsel for legal services, Assistant Commissioner for public affairs and communications services and the chief audit executive). The representatives of the national executive committee of the SRR program have observer status.

Although the SEC has a formal mandate and meets regularly, the Task Force was told that it suffers from a lack of organizational support and a lack of focus in its decision making. We were also told that presentations made to the SEC are not reviewed for consistency or quality of content, often lacking thorough analysis. Nor do presentations routinely tie recommendations to the RCMP's overall strategic plan. Ultimately, it appears that decisions taken by the SEC often are not implemented.

The effectiveness of the SEC would benefit from the establishment of a secretariat responsible for ensuring that the SEC is in a position to discharge its mandate. The Secretariat would ensure that the

information being provided to the SEC is relevant, accurate and consistently presented. It would also ensure that the results of SEC decisions are tracked and progress is reported back to the SEC.

***Recommendation 46 – Secretariat***

*The RCMP should establish a permanent secretariat to provide greater support to the SEC.*



## CHAPTER 5: IMPLEMENTATION

### 5.1 A Vision to Move Forward

During the course of our work, it became apparent to us that a modern-day RCMP must become a separate entity. This demands an RCMP led by a professional management team and with accountability to Canadians through independent civilian oversight. The RCMP must set its own priorities with a clearly defined set of responsibilities. Every request made of the RCMP is legitimate – but only the RCMP itself can assess whether it has the funds and personnel to support any new responsibility. New requests must be accompanied by new resources or decisions to reduce existing commitments. An RCMP with clear accountabilities will be able to eliminate the time it spends balancing complex demands and focus on critical policies that protect citizens, police officers and the integrity of the RCMP.

The retooled and revitalized RCMP we envisage will continue to attract new, young recruits with a passion for service to their community and country. It will equip them with education and training throughout their careers and will demonstrate commitment to the safety and wellness of its members and employees. It will develop leaders trained in strong management and ethics. Current leaders of the RCMP and those who emerge in the future will run the RCMP as a world-class organization, combining good policing, good governance and good business.

A modern-day RCMP must be more than an aspiration. It must be a deliverable entity to which the Force and all of its constituents are prepared to commit within the shortest possible period of time. In this Report, we offer a plan to make fundamental changes in the governance, culture and accountability

of the RCMP. We believe that these changes can rebuild trust in this institution.

### 5.2 Implementation Council

This Report outlines fundamental changes to the governance structure of the RCMP and its accountability framework. The Task Force believes that a rapid but orderly implementation of each of these recommendations is essential to enable the RCMP to provide the effective policing services expected of it. The scope of the changes is substantial. New entities must be created and new capacities must be built within the RCMP to manage its human resources and financial affairs. New authorities must be delegated from existing governmental entities to the RCMP. Many of these changes will require legislative change, itself a process that requires careful management through established processes.

Over the past decade members have been subjected to countless change initiatives. Some have been successful, but many floundered and others were abandoned. Although many of them seem, in hindsight, to have been well conceived, they were introduced without adequate plans or resources, for implementation. The Task Force believes that the RCMP in its current structure is not a change-ready organization. Preparing the RCMP for change will require the engagement of members and employees at all levels plus an alignment of processes, key infrastructures, organizational culture and leadership. The implementation of change will require careful planning with the commitment and active participation by both the RCMP and the federal government.

Time is also an issue. Although the change process involves many steps which must be carefully thought through and properly

sequenced, the issues facing the RCMP, its members and employees must be addressed quickly.

The Task Force believes that external assistance is necessary to guide and drive the change process while guiding it to timely success. We recommend, therefore, that an Implementation Council be formed as quickly as possible with a mandate to advise the government and the RCMP on all aspects of the change process.

The Council's mandate would, as a minimum, contain the following elements:

- establishment of a timetable for reform, with milestones and expected completion dates for each essential step in the change process
- advice to parliamentarians, public servants and the RCMP on the required changes to the RCMP Act and other federal legislation
- advice and assistance to the RCMP in building the capacity outlined in Chapter 1 and addressing the issues outlined in Chapters 3 and 4
- advice and assistance in forming and empowering the Board of Management
- advice on the delegations of authorities described in Chapter 1
- advice and assistance in the formation of the ICCOR and the orderly transfer to that body of the existing operations of CPC and ERC
- development and execution of an implementation plan
- periodic reporting to the Minister, to the Commissioner and the Canadian public

on progress in implementing each of the recommendations in this Report.

The Task Force recommends that the Implementation Council be comprised of no more than seven Canadians who have the background, expertise and stature to lead the change management process. The Commissioner or his delegate should be a non-voting *ex officio* member of the council.

We would recommend that the appointments to the Council be until the earlier of December 31, 2009, and the availability of the Board of Management to assume responsibility for overseeing the remaining changes.

Although the Task Force would leave to the Council responsibility for determining its reporting dates, we believe that its first progress report should be issued to the Canadian public no later than June 30, 2008 and that subsequent reports follow no less frequently than every six months.

***Recommendation 47 – Implementation Council***

*The government should immediately appoint the Implementation Council having the composition, mandate and other attributes set out in Chapter 5.*

**5.3 RCMP Change Management Team**

The Task Force is conscious of the fact that implementing changes of the scope recommended in this Report will add further stress to an organization which is already stretched beyond its capacity. But the issues on which we report were brought to our attention by the members and employees themselves. People at all levels, from the

smallest detachment to Headquarters, are demanding change. Everywhere we went, people came out to share their visions for improving the RCMP, sometimes forcefully, sometimes with great passion. We believe that this energy can be harnessed to implement the changes we recommend, and more. People throughout the organization are ready to be engaged, but it will take leadership and sheer determination from leaders at all levels.

From our discussions with Commissioner Elliott and the executive steering team which he formed to assist us with our work, we know that senior management shares our sense of urgency; that they are prepared to address this challenge.

The Task Force therefore believes that the RCMP should establish an internal change management team comprised of members and employees engaged full time during the period of transition. Although leadership must come from senior management, the engagement of members and employees at all levels will be essential. The change management team will work closely with the Implementation Council and government leaders in the formation of timetables and milestones and the development and execution of a plan of implementation.

With all of these parties working together, these changes will become a reality!

***Recommendation 48 – RCMP Change Management Team***

*The RCMP should form an internal change management team comprised of members and employees to be engaged full time in planning, coordinating and implementing the changes recommended in this Report. Although leadership will necessarily be provided by senior management, continuous engagement of members and employees at all levels will be essential.*

**5.4 Interim Funding**

Implementation of the recommendations in this Report may require additional, one-time funding from the federal government. Although the Task Force was apprised of numerous areas where lack of funding is curtailing the effective delivery of services, we weren't able to conclude whether the overall funding of the Force is adequate, nor whether surpluses could be released to fund the necessary change process.

***Recommendation 49 – Interim Funding***

*Sufficient resources must be dedicated to the implementation of these recommendations so that no additional burden is placed on an already overburdened workplace of the RCMP.*



## **APPENDIX A: MANDATE**

Whereas *A Matter of Trust: Report of the Independent Investigator into Matters Relating to RCMP Pension and Insurance Plans*, dated June 15, 2007, made certain recommendations related to the RCMP's handling of reports of mismanagement or irregularities in the administration of the RCMP's pension and insurance plans;

And whereas the Independent Investigator recommended the establishment of a Task Force to examine governance and cultural change issues as they relate to the RCMP;

Therefore, Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, pursuant to paragraph 127.1(1)(c) of the *Public Service Employment Act*, hereby appoints to the position of special adviser to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and to the President of the Treasury Board, David A. Brown, Q.C., of Kettleby, Ontario, as Chair of the Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP, to hold office during pleasure for a term ending on December 31, 2007, and specifies the following as the mandate of the Task Force:

(i) to review and consider the challenges faced by the RCMP as set out in the *Report of the Independent Investigator into Matters Relating to RCMP Pension and Insurance Plans*; and make recommendations on the following issues:

(A) the internal management structure of the RCMP including committees and branches, and ways to better ensure they are properly mandated according to modern governance principles of accountability and transparency;

(B) means by which a challenge and oversight function could be introduced into the internal management of the RCMP, including how such functions could be effectively integrated into the structure and culture of a modern police organization;

(C) means to ensure that senior management is held appropriately accountable;

(D) identifying a process to better ensure that the Commissioner and senior management establish and maintain an appropriate ethical structure based on the RCMP's Mission, Vision and Values;

(E) ensuring that the RCMP's workplace disclosure policy is appropriate, that mechanisms are in place to ensure protection from reprisal, and that appropriate, clear and decisive corrective measures are taken;

(F) ensuring compatibility between an effective workplace disclosure policy and the process for reporting possible breaches of the Code of Conduct;

(G) ways to improve the accountability, timeliness and effectiveness of the RCMP disciplinary scheme in the RCMP Act and Regulations, including possible changes to the Code of Conduct and the one-year limitation period; and

- (H) considering ways of fostering a constructive partnership between civilian and public service employees and regular members at the executive level of the Force;
- (ii) to adopt any procedures for the expedient and proper conduct of the Task Force, including reviewing all relevant records, and consulting senior officials from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Treasury Board Secretariat, the RCMP, and others as appropriate;
- (iii) to submit a report in both official languages to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and to the President of the Treasury Board which will provide the recommendations of the Task Force, including any recommendations to amend the RCMP Act and RCMP Regulations.

**APPENDIX B:  
BIOGRAPHIES OF TASK FORCE MEMBERS**

**DAVID BROWN, Q.C.**

David Brown, Q.C. is currently Counsel with the firm Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP, where he returned after serving seven years as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). Prior to joining the OSC, he spent 29 years as a senior corporate law partner with a predecessor firm to Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg, focussing on mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance and reorganization.

Mr. Brown has played a significant role with several national and international regulatory bodies. Most recently, Mr. Brown was appointed Independent Investigator to review the RCMP's handling of reports of mismanagement or irregularities in the administration of the RCMP's pension and insurance plans.

Mr. Brown received his Bachelor's degree in Civil Engineering from Carleton University in 1963 and his LL.B from the University of Toronto in 1966. He was appointed Queen's Counsel in 1984 and was awarded a honorary doctorate of laws from McMaster University in 2005.

**LINDA BLACK, LL. M.**

Linda Black currently serves as a member of the Law Enforcement Review Board of Alberta, an independent quasi-judicial body responsible for hearing appeals from citizens with police-related complaints. Ms. Black was also General Counsel with the University of Calgary and has held several senior positions with the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. She is active on a number of boards, including the Board of Governors of Mount Royal College and the Alberta Board of Certified Management Accountants.

Ms. Black undertook undergraduate studies in economics at Memorial University of Newfoundland, and received a Bachelor of Laws from Dalhousie University and a Masters of Laws in legislative drafting from the University of Ottawa. She is a member of the Law Societies of Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador.

**RICHARD DROUIN, C.C., O.Q., Q.C.**

Richard Drouin is Counsel in the law firm of McCarthy Tétrault, LLP. He is the Chairman of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and, until recently, was the Chairman of the Board of Abitibi-Consolidated Inc and Stelco Inc. He is also the former Chairman and CEO of Hydro-Québec. Prior to joining Hydro-Québec, Mr. Drouin was in private law practice, in Québec City and Montréal, specialising in commercial, corporate law and industrial relations.

He has held several significant positions with international bodies involved in electricity and other utilities. He is also a member of the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy and a Governor of the Council of Canadian Academies.

Mr. Drouin obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree at the Université de Montréal and a law degree from l'Université Laval in Québec City. Mr. Drouin is a Companion of the Order of Canada and an officer of l'Ordre national du Québec.

### **NORMAN INKSTER, O.C., LL.D**

Norman Inkster is President, Inkster Incorporated which provides a broad range of consulting services. He is a recognized expert in national and international law enforcement and forensic investigations, and has directly led or managed hundreds of investigations worldwide.

Mr. Inkster had a distinguished 36-year career in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, rising through the ranks to become Commissioner. Mr. Inkster also served as President of INTERPOL.

Mr. Inkster has directed efficiency and security reviews of major law enforcement agencies, corporations and international organizations. He acted as a Special Advisor to the Auditor General of Canada, and following the events of September 11, 2001, he was appointed as a Special Advisor on matters of security to the Government of Ontario.

Mr. Inkster holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of New Brunswick, where he studied sociology and psychology. He was also awarded a Doctor of Laws (Honourary) by the same university. In 1995, he was made an Officer of the Order of Canada.

### **LARRY MURRAY**

Larry Murray has held a number of senior positions in the Canadian Forces and Public Service.

Following graduation from Carleton University, he served at sea in a variety of ships including as Commanding Officer of HMCS CHALEUR, MIRAMICHI and IROQUOIS and Commander of the First Canadian Destroyer Squadron. He subsequently served in a variety of appointments including as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Commander of Maritime Command, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and finally, Acting Chief of the Defence Staff from October 1996 until September 1997.

Mr. Murray retired from the Canadian forces as a Vice Admiral and joined the Public Service as Associate Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. He was appointed Deputy Minister (DM) of Veterans Affairs in August 1999 and DM of Fisheries and Oceans in April 2003. He retired from that position in August 2007.

Mr. Murray was invested as a Commander of the Order of Military Merit in 1993.



**APPENDIX C:  
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

***Recommendation 1 – Conversion of the RCMP to a Separate Entity***

*The RCMP should become a separate entity with separate employer status and should be granted full authority to manage its financial affairs within spending authorities approved by Parliament.*

***Recommendation 2 – Board of Management***

*Legislation should be enacted by the Parliament of Canada as soon as possible to establish a Board of Management of the RCMP responsible for the stewardship of its organization and administration including the oversight of the management of its financial affairs, resources, services, property, personnel and procurement.*

***Recommendation 3 – Creation of an Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP***

*Legislation should be enacted by the Parliament of Canada as soon as possible to establish an Independent Commission for Complaints and Oversight of the RCMP having the attributes outlined in Chapter 2; the ICCOR should be established and commence operation as quickly as possible following legislative enactment.*

***Recommendation 4 – Capacity to Meet commitments***

*The organizational needs of the RCMP must be assessed against its current and future commitments. The RCMP must have the financial resources to satisfy all of its current contract and federal policing responsibilities and the ability to commit resources to satisfy those responsibilities within a reasonable planning horizon.*

***Recommendation 5 – Northern Allowances***

*In respect of northern and isolated postings, we urge the Force to work with the Treasury Board to make sure that treatment of members who are prepared to serve in these areas is fair and appropriate.*

***Recommendation 6 – Commitments to New Services***

*The RCMP should implement measures to ensure that no commitment to deliver a new service or modify an existing service is made without assurance that the necessary human resources and equipment can be deployed without compromising the ability of the Force to fulfill its existing responsibilities. Alternatively, the existing priorities must be reordered accordingly.*

***Recommendation 7 – Efficiency Study***

*The RCMP should immediately launch an efficiency study to determine whether trained employees are performing functions that are best performed by employees with specific skills, with a view to ensuring that employees are using their training and experience in the most efficient manner.*

***Recommendation 8 – Administrative Support***

*The RCMP should immediately make available administrative resources to enable members to devote more time to core policing.*

***Recommendation 9 – Fair Compensation for Hours Worked***

*Members and employees of the RCMP must be compensated for any time worked outside of or in addition to established hours on duty.*

***Recommendation 10 – Field Coaching***

*The importance of the field coaching policy must be reinforced and complied with without exception.*

***Recommendation 11 – Backup Policy***

*We support the RCMP's recent announcement in respect of its backup policy and we would encourage the Force to complete the implementation as soon as possible.*

***Recommendation 12 – Health and Wellness***

*The RCMP should ensure that member and employee health and wellness be an essential consideration in policy and operational decisions at all levels.*

***Recommendation 13 – Disability***

*The RCMP must move quickly in every instance where a member or employee has become injured on duty or disabled and thereby unable to return to full duty. In these circumstances, every effort must be made to facilitate a return to duty as early as possible, and in the interim, to provide adequate financial and other support. Where a return to duty is not possible, every effort must be made to assist the member or employee to re-enter the workforce either within the RCMP or elsewhere.*

***Recommendation 14 – Ethics in Practice***

*Senior management of the RCMP must ensure that ethics principles underpin all management and administrative functions and are an integral part of all policing activities.*

***Recommendation 15 – Ethics Education***

*The methodology applied to ethics training provided to recruits at the Depot should be extended throughout the organization and should be continually reinforced and refreshed.*

***Recommendation 16 – Immediate Amendments to Disciplinary System***

*The RCMP should implement immediately the recommendations of the Lordon Report (with whatever amendments management feels are appropriate) that would result in making the processes less adversarial and more timely.*

***Recommendation 17 – Centralized Disciplinary Authority***

*The RCMP should establish immediately a centralized disciplinary authority to ensure integration, planning, monitoring and accountability.*

***Recommendation 18 – Eliminate Backlogs***

*The RCMP should eliminate the serious backlogs existing currently in the disciplinary system.*

***Recommendation 19 – Expeditious and Informal Resolution***

*The RCMP should commit at the highest level of management, the discipline principles that require expeditious and informal resolution at the lowest possible level.*

***Recommendation 20 – One Year Time Limit***

*The RCMP should establish reasonable time frames for the commencement and completion of investigations that reflect the relative complexity of the matters at issue. Only in rare circumstances should these time frames exceed six months. The Task Force does not recommend that any changes be made to the existing one year time limit subject to the ability of the RCMP to apply to the ICCOR for an extension in order to facilitate a contemporaneous criminal investigation.*

***Recommendation 21 – Internal Processes***

*When amendments are made to the RCMP Act to create the ICCOR, consequential amendments should be made to streamline the grievance and discipline process.*

***Recommendation 22 – Workplace Disclosure***

*The RCMP should embrace the spirit and intent of the PSDPA, enforcing it throughout the organization, harmonized and properly resourced to be effective for the RCMP. Once established, the Board of Management should monitor the effectiveness of those processes and remediate as necessary to meet the objectives of the statute.*

***Recommendation 23 – SRR Role***

*The SRRs should focus entirely on labour relations and thus be independent from management. They should not sit as observers at the SEC. Members should serve for no more than two terms as SRRs, after which time they should return to regular duty.*

***Recommendation 24 – NCOs***

*Operational NCOs must be given a formalized opportunity to participate in the leadership and management of the RCMP through contributions to policies affecting the delivery of police services.*

***Recommendation 25 – RM Categorization***

*The RCMP should move from study to action in the streamlining of the civilian function at the RCMP. Only those positions which have a clearly demonstrated need for peace officer status, peace officer training and peace officer experience should be classified as RM positions. All remaining positions should be classified for and filled by a person without the background of a peace officer.*

***Recommendation 26 – Combining Civilian Categories***

*The RCMP should seek to determine whether there is a continuing need for two categories of civilian employees within the RCMP.*

***Recommendation 27 – Temporary Civilian Employees***

*The RCMP should immediately take action to examine the issue of those who appear to be caught permanently in the TCE category and continue to work in the RCMP without any of the protections afforded to other employees.*

***Recommendation 28 – CO Headquarters***

*We recommend the re-creation of the position of CO Headquarters.*

***Recommendation 29 – Recruitment***

*The RCMP needs to streamline its recruitment process and be more responsive and transparent with those who show an interest in joining the Force as a recruit.*

***Recommendation 30 – Paying Cadets***

*To remain competitive, the RCMP should pay its cadets during their six month training at the Depot at a level that is competitive with other policing organizations.*

### ***Recommendation 31 – Education Prerequisite***

*The RCMP needs to demonstrate greater openness and willingness to accept lateral entry into the Force in order to provide needed specialized skill sets and experience. In the longer term, the Task Force believes that the RCMP should also make a post-secondary degree a condition for all new recruits*

### ***Recommendation 32 – Education and Training***

*The RCMP must recommit to education and training that will equip its officers for senior responsibilities. Leadership training should be a continuum throughout the member's career. The RCMP should identify deserving members with potential for further education and support them in seeking post-secondary education.*

### ***Recommendation 33 – Research***

*The RCMP must rebuild its research capability in order to provide members of the Force with an opportunity to explore developments in law enforcement outside of the RCMP and stay abreast of modern policing methods.*

### ***Recommendation 34 – Leadership Competency***

*The RCMP should ensure that specific and detailed competency profiles are in place for all senior leadership positions and are current and reflect modern policing responsibilities.*

### ***Recommendation 35 – Performance Evaluations***

*Effective immediately, all members and employees of the RCMP must receive annual performance evaluations. These should include not only what was achieved, but how it was accomplished. The results of the performance evaluations should be used to identify opportunities for additional education and training, to identify future leaders and make promotion decisions.*

### ***Recommendation 36 – Accountability for Completing Performance Evaluations***

*All members with managerial responsibility should be assessed on their completion of performance evaluations for all members under their command.*

### ***Recommendation 37 – Fixing the Promotion System***

*As an urgent priority, the RCMP must replace its existing promotion system with one that is based on performance, knowledge, skill, ability and the potential to assume future responsibilities. The criteria for promotion must be clearly explained and transparently applied.*

### ***Recommendation 38 – Pass/Fail Exams***

*Exams should be administered on a pass/fail basis, with decisions relating to promotion formulated on a broader range of accomplishments and capabilities.*

***Recommendation 39 – Public Affairs Plan***

*The RCMP should review and further develop its public affairs function, implementing a public affairs plan that contains a comprehensive internal and external communications strategy that keeps stakeholders appropriately informed. It should also include a crisis management strategy that will permit quick and accurate responses to the media and Canadians.*

***Recommendation 40 – Responsibility for Internal Communication***

*The Force should ensure that, throughout the chain of command, internal communication is a fundamental responsibility for every person in a leadership position.*

***Recommendation 41 – Delegation of Decision Making with Respect to Contract Policing***

*The RCMP should examine and review its approval authorities to ensure that those closest to operational police activity have the requisite authority to make decisions in a timely manner.*

***Recommendation 42 – Contract Partner Participation***

*Headquarters should give greater weight to the views and priorities of contracting authorities and should involve them in a more meaningful way in decisions that have an impact on their jurisdictions.*

***Recommendation 43 – Delegation of Decision Making with Respect to Federal Policing***

*The RCMP should examine and review its delegation policies to ensure that those responsible for the RCMP's participation in integrated task forces involving federal policing services have the appropriate authority to commit the resources of the RCMP in a timely manner and within carefully articulated national policies.*

***Recommendation 44 – Roles and Responsibilities of Headquarters***

*The RCMP should develop a written mandate defining the roles and responsibilities of Headquarters and its relationship with its divisions.*

***Recommendation 45 – Regionalization***

*We recommend that the regional structure within the RCMP be evaluated by senior management to determine whether it is the most cost effective and efficient way of managing an organization with the diversity and complexity of the RCMP.*

***Recommendation 46 – Secretariat***

*The RCMP should establish a permanent secretariat to provide greater support to the SEC.*

***Recommendation 47 – Implementation Council***

*The government should immediately appoint the Implementation Council having the composition, mandate and other attributes set out in Chapter 5.*

***Recommendation 48 – RCMP Change Management Team***

*The RCMP should form an internal change management team comprised of members and employees to be engaged full time in planning, coordinating and implementing the changes recommended in this Report. Although leadership will necessarily be provided by senior management, continuous engagement of members and employees at all levels will be essential.*

***Recommendation 49 – Interim Funding***

*Sufficient resources must be dedicated to the implementation of these recommendations so that no additional burden is placed on an already overburdened workplace of the RCMP.*