1. Mahone Bay Heritage and Cultural Society v. Town of Mahone Bay (January 14, 2000, NSUARB-PL-98-31/32)

This appeal was heard by a three member Board. It resulted from the decision of the Council to enter a development agreement to permit the construction of a twenty-four unit residential development on the Town's waterfront.

The property in question is designated as "Industrial Shoreline" and the Appellants argued that the MPS policies concerning the development of uses in this designation prevented Council from entering the agreement. They argued that multi- unit residential development was only allowed in areas designated "Residential" on the Future Land Use Map. The Town argued that the "Industrial Designation ", apart from the industrial uses also permitted commercial uses. The commercial zone also allowed residential uses as permitted uses. Since the proposed development was in fact residential, then it followed that this stacked approach to permissible uses would allow the Council to consider this development agreement.

The board stated that it is clear "that it is possible to have more than one interpretation of an MPS. Thus, the fact that an appellant may put forward an interpretation which is "reasonably consistent with the MPS does not mean the Council's contrary interpretation may not also be "reasonably consistent". The Board noted that "the burden which rests on the Appellants is not to show the "reasonableness" of their interpretation, but rather to establish that the Municipality's decision to enter into the development agreement is not reasonably consistent with the MPS."
The Board found that it was "Council's intent to "permit maximum flexibility " for uses in the area designated Industrial Shoreline, which includes the property in question; permits all uses allowed in the Commercial Zone in the area designated Industrial Shoreline; allows residential uses in the areas designated Commercial; and allows multi-unit residential development (i.e., the type of development proposed here) in areas designated Residential. Thus according to this view, a multi-unit residential is possible in the area designated Industrial Shoreline." The Board then dismissed the appeal and confirmed Council's decision to enter the agreement.

One member of the Board gave a dissenting opinion from the majority decision. This Board Member noted that the ACT requires both the MPS and the LUB to clearly identify the developments that are subject to the development agreement process. The Board Member also noted that there was a clear policy in the MPS that enabled the Council to consider new multi-unit residential uses, by agreement only in those areas designated Residential on the Future Land Use Map. There was no similar policy for areas designated Industrial Shoreline. In the Board Member's opinion the issue in this appeal was "whether there is anything in the MPS which would allow one to conclude that condominiums are permitted in the Industrial Shoreline Designation." The Board Member stated that "The requirement that the property be in an "area designated Residential" is a term or condition that must be complied with. The intent of the MPS is clear and unambiguous. Council's decision does not meet this requirement and is accordingly inconsistent with the intent of the MPS." The Board Member further stated that "In my opinion, Council's decision is not reasonably consistent with the intent of the MPS. I would allow the appeal."

2.Southwest Properties Ltd v. Northwest Community Council of Halifax Regional Municipality (May 26, 2000, NSUARB-PL-00-04)

This was an appeal of Council's decision to enter a development agreement that would allow the parking lot of an existing shopping center to expand. The appellant was the owner of a shopping center across the street. The solicitor for the developer requested a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the Appellant was an "aggrieved person" under the Municipal Government Act.

The Appellants argued that the increased parking capability would disrupt traffic patterns and that sales would decrease because of this. Also, the Appellant felt that customers would be delayed from reaching its shopping center. This would, in the opinion of the Appellant, affect the value of the property.
The developer had a traffic study done which indicated "that the traffic flow will be virtually unaffected by the proposed mall expansion.."

The Board noted that "In order to be accorded the status of an "aggrieved person", a party must show that their interests will "genuinely suffer" or are "seriously threatened". The Board found that based on the evidence "the Appellant has not established that approval of the agreement will seriously threaten its economic interests" The Board then decided that the Appellant was not an aggrieved person and dismissed the appeal.

3. Charles Richardson v. Town of Wolfville (June 1,2000, NSUARB-PL-00-09)

This appeal was from the decision of Council to enter a development agreement to allow for the conversion of an existing building into a lounge, restaurant and micro brewery. The Town requested a preliminary hearing to determine whether the Appellant was an aggrieved person.

The Appellant lives approximately one half mile from the development. He gave evidence that the "quiet enjoyment of his residency depends on many factors, including whether or not his family can live there if the taxes keep increasing." The development agreement required the developer to pay to the Town a sum of $18,000 in lieu of not being able to meet the parking requirements for the new use. He argued that the normal requirement of the LUB would have put that sum at $50,000. This loss of $32,000 would be gone and that would affect everyone in Town.

The Board noted that "In order to be an "aggrieved person", an individual must have a unique status of some sort which sets him apart from all other residents in the area." The Board further stated that he was "not uniquely affected by the approval of this development agreement. By his own admission, he is affected in the same way as all other residents in the Town of Wolfville. As such, the Board finds that the Appellant does not genuinely suffer, or is seriously threatened, with any form of harm prejudicial to his interests." The Board then found that the Appellant was not an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of the MGA and dismissed the appeal.