Cultural Heritage, Identity and Belonging among Transnational 'Communities' and Globalization: Emerging Issues & Challenges

I Introduction

This paper is more in the nature of a series of reflections/questions concerning the developing issues & challenges, particularly from a policy perspective, in the 'developed' or 'industrially advanced' societies of Western Europe (WE) on the one hand and the *immigrant-receiving* ones of North America, Australia and New Zealand (NAANZ) on the other. Obviously situations differ in these broad categories, especially between the first group and the second one, and even between the particular countries within each category, but they face many similar challenges that can be examined collectively.

Similarly, references in the paper to broad categories of people (e.g. of 'European' and 'non-European' origin), and ,within those broad categories, to specific groups (e.g. 'South Asian'),are not meant to deny or gloss over the tremendous diversity these labels cover. They are used here to as a convenient and simple way to analyse some of the broader, more common issues generally shared by people in those categories notwithstanding their diversity.

Third, much of the work on many of the theories and concepts around the complex notions of (cultural) citizenship, globalization, (cultural) heritage, identity and belonging, transnational 'communities' is relatively recent and at an early stage of development, especially as it pertains to the modern era. Thus many of the ideas are novel or exploratory and untested, attempting to describe and analyze relatively new phenomena, and therefore often highly contested. This paper is written in that spirit of exploration and will hopefully make a small contribution.

II Broader Contexts

      1   Demographic changes:

      a) Immigration patterns of last 50 years – from Europe to non-Europe, esp.

Asia

      b) Labor (both skilled & unskilled) shortages?

      c) Aging populations

      d) Projections of population mix (UN- Chamie, others?)

      2   Socio-Cultural Changes:

      a. Colonialism & decolonization

      b. ascendancy of pluralist model and allied human rights ideology

      c. modern technologies

      d. globalization, accelerated pace of change, etc.

      3   Post-September 11 Changes?:

      a) short-term

        - re-ordering of priorities

        - repeat of WW I & II, Cold War(Macarthyism)?

      b)   long-term

        - attitudes & behaviour?

        - impact on *pluralism/multicutural* model?

These changes raise a fundamental question the answer to which will be helpful in addressing the issues. Do these developments (and their nature, pace, quality and quantity in their present-day combination) engender a whole set of new or unprecedented conditions? Or, more relevantly, are the

differences between previous eras and the present one significant enough to allow us to characterize the modern era as, for all practical purposes, relatively distinctive or unparalleled?

The evidence suggests that it is, and so the past may not be a good guide to understanding and dealing with the issues of the modern era, as in the case of the notion of national identity. As John Rex 1996 points out that:

> Until fairly recently, perhaps until thirty or forty years ago, West Europeans and Americans did not talk much about national identity. They thought of their states as serving goals of a universal kind reflected in West European political philosophy…[T]he established nations have been forced to ask whether they have a distinct identity of their own which is challenged by the forces of globalization and migration.

Thus both these forces are having important consequences especially when it comes to the subjects of national identity, cultural heritage, belonging and citizenship. In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, even more attention will be paid to these issues but how they will be addressed is not clear. In the short-term, the pluralist model will likely continue to be overshadowed by security concerns and fear. In the long run, however, it is difficult to see how the negative impacts of these concerns on both the global and national economies, which rely heavily on international movement of human and other resources, can be allowed to continue. Nor is it clear how ethnoculturally diverse societies, especially liberal democracies, can withstand such impacts over an extended period of time without producing or exacerbating social cleavages within them. In the absence of better alternatives, it seems that the pluralist model, with all of its weaknesses, may be the only feasible one that can guide us in addressing the issues of modern societies.

III Conceptual Framework

Much of what follows is based on a useful framework proposed by Gagnon and Pagé (1999 v1:5) "to encompass the multifarious dimensions and components of the different contemporary approaches to citizenship in liberal democratic societies". The framework deals with the concepts this paper borrows to discuss the issues of interest here.

The four *interactive* macro-components along two axes:

Axis A: 1) national identity **(show *Figure 2)*;**

              2) social, cultural and supranational belonging **(see *Figure 3*)**;

Axis B: 3) effective system of rights- note 3.1.4 & 3.2.2; and

              4)   political and civic participation.

While all four macro-components of the framework are important, especially as they interact with each other, this paper will focus on two of them (national identity and social, cultural and supranational belonging), form a largely Canadian perspective As Gagnon & Page note:

> The system of rights (3) and participation (4) regulate, as it were, the relations between the
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> two components of national identity and social, cultural and supranational belonging.

For example, the more equality rights, the more diversity of belonging and less uniformity of national identity; a society can achieve the desired balance by adopting the appropriate system of rights. However, reality does not fit neatly into a theoretical model and determining what the 'right' balance is not easy, ***especially in the post-September 11 era,*** with a major re-ordering of priorities where difference now signals danger.

IV Issues of National Identity and Belonging

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1. National Identity **(Figure 2)**

This macro-concept consists of four key 'mutually complementary' sub-components - civic culture, societal culture, heritage and allegiance and patriotism – which together define national identity.[1] Gagnon & Page (1999 v1, p.9) point out:

> The definition of national identity must, at the very outset, contain the coded elements which define the society as a whole and which have a universal value in that society.

It is these very **'*coded* elements'** which are being put to the test in increasingly ethnically diverse liberal democratic societies. Many of these elements (e.g. societal or public culture and heritage), precisely because they have evolved from and continue to be informed by particular perspective or worldview (i.e. the Christian), do not speak to the growing number of new citizens, whose perspective or worldview is quite different and who, in addition, generally have few if any emotional ties to their new 'nation'. As political philosopher Bhiku Parekh has argued, "full citizenship [includes] the right to shape the public culture" and therefore, to ground the public culture in Christianity is to treat non-Christians as second-class citizens" (quoted in Gagnon and Pagé 1999, v.1: 86).[2]

More seriously, many aspects of such societal culture and heritage (with their Eurocentric and in

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[1] Rex (1996) notes that these terms carry strong 'emotional, moral and sacred' meanings (which the notion of citizenship of itself does not), resulting in invidious distinctions in which one's own nation state and its way of life is considered morally and aesthetically superior to others. The importance of this point becomes clear later.

[2] It is somewhat surprising that Gagnon and Pagé(1999) make no mention of this in their otherwise perceptive analysis, perhaps because they seem to see cultural and religious diversity resulting not so much from immigration as from the freedoms enjoyed in liberal democracies – see Vol. I, p10 and Vol. II.

some cases Anglocentric biases[3]) routinely, but often unwittingly, continue to ignore, distort, ridicule or belittle many of these new citizens' own cultures and heritages.[4]   The vast majority people in these societies, having been socialized directly or indirectly into the dominant perspective which is treated as universally valid, quite understandably take these views for granted and are thus usually unaware of their implications for a pluralistic domestic or global society. As Parekh (2000) observes, 'The general ethos pervading the educational system highlights the glory and uniqueness of European civilization and *underplays or ignores* the achievements and contributions of others' not only to human civilization in general but to European civilization itself' (italics added). Indeed this observation applies not only to the education system, but to virtually *every* area of life.

It is not surprising then that these new citizens' and even their children usually feel unwelcome and excluded from their 'new' societal culture and heritage and find it difficult to identify with, let alone buy into them with any enthusiasm. A more inclusive to national identity would probably lessen such difficulties since:

> ... the more people see their uniqueness reflected in the national identity, the stronger their link with that identity will be. When specific ethnocultural identities are overshadowed or denied by the national identity, people feel excluded and ill at ease in their relationship with the nation, as is the case in France among citizens whose roots lie in the Maghreb. (Gagnon & Page:1999 v.1:.21)

The French example would apply especially to societies which mostly work with either the

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[3] Of course other factors- such as class, gender, etc. - are also important but often in a subsidiary role.

[4] For a discussion of this issue, see Parekh (2000) and Patel (2000)

differential exclusion or the *assimilationist* model, such as those of Europe[5], though it would also to some extent apply to NAANZ which generally work with the *pluralist* model. The ignoring of the background of African-Americans but not of 'European'-Americans, with the resultant weaker sense of connection to national identity on the part of the former, provides perhaps an extreme example.

However, how far such inclusion can be taken in reality, particularly when they involve fundamental conflicts (e.g. over cultural practices) and how effective it will be in building 'strong links' to a particular national identity are open questions and will depend on many factors. All of these issues are played out within broader societal contexts and are permeated by power relationships, both of which significantly affect the process and its end results even in societies, such as Canada, which grant official recognition of specific identities. Granting such recognition is one thing, translating it into tangible, significant changes at the grassroots level is another. Greg Baeker's point about Canadian acknowledgment of diversity and advancing of equity is pertinent here:

> Arguably, Canada's approach has placed far greater emphasis on policy development than on policy *implementation and evaluatio*n". (Quoted in Jeannotte et al , p 10)

As he argues, at the end of the day it is institutional structures and not amorphous concepts such as "community" or "nation" (or "national identity") that are needed to work through the inevitable value

conflicts resulting from increased diversity.[6] In a similar vein, Rex (1996:4.6) argues that 'the rhetoric

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[5] The European Union is in a real quandary on the issue of a European identity which, according to Rex (1996), is being in effect defined on the basis of 'colour and religion' since 'the Union is felt to consist of White Christian nations'.

[6]The key role of institutional structures in promoting change (and thus inclusion) is explored in the specific context of racial conflict in Patel 1980

of an egalitarian multi-culturalism conceals the existence of a multiculturalism based upon inequality'.

As noted earlier, these concepts nevertheless do matter to individuals and in a very personal way at the emotional moral and psychological levels, because they relate to the need and desire for 'group' attachment, belonging, identity, acceptance, etc. The key question here is who gets to decide what that 'group' identity is (beyond the formal, legal one) - the individual or some other person(s)?

This difficult question illustrated vividly by a newspaper piece (on the highly prestigious 2002 Booker Prize for English-language fiction) talking about whether three of the six nominees are 'Canadian' since all three were born and/or raised elsewhere.

> They weren't quite Canadian enough for many British journalists, whose published reports repeatedly insisted on qualifying the three writers' Canadian-ness by calling them "foreign-born," or "Canadian-based" or simply "holders of Canadian passports." The implication is that writers not born in Canada are somehow less Canadian than those born in Moose Jaw or Orillia or Glace Bay. How un-Canadian! (Gessell, 2002)

Although Yann Martel (the eventual winner) has lived in many countries both as a child and as an adult, loves Indian food and wrote the winning novel whose plot has only a minor connection to Canada, considers himself thoroughly Canadian:

> *"Of course I am Canadian. This is my point of reference. This is where I come home to. This is where I feel most at ease. This is the place where I speak the languages".*

Gessell notes that Martel believes the problem lies with the British (and European) notion that one's national identity is determined by country of birth and breeding (an idea deemed 'racist' by one

Canadian academic/novelist quoted by Gessell)[7]. Furthermore, it is suggested, Canadians are more difficult to define compared to Australians because "the British think they have Australians pegged, the predominating sentiment being Australians are Australians are Australians" whereas Canadians are "variously perceived as British, American or something in between".

> When you suddenly throw in a "Canadian-based Indian writer," as Mistry has been called,
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> the definition of a Canadian becomes even more complicated, leaving the British flummoxed.

While there is no consensus on this point, some Canadians argue that "young Canadian writers are essentially post-nationalist and should not be contained by nationalist labels". The authors and academics Gessell interviewed

> …felt strongly that there is a recognizable Canadian literature, a particular outlook on the world, a unique set of suppositions, that make Canadian books different from any other literature, even when those books are not set in Canada nor deal with stereotypically Canadian issues. Essentially the consensus was that contemporary Canadian fiction tends to be written from a multicultural – some might say global -- perspective but is still embued [sic] with the traditional modest, peace-loving character of Canada. Canadians don't conquer the world; they admire the world.

As for defining a Canadian, Gessell points out that the current Governor General of Canada, 'that most Canadian of all Canadians', was born in Hong Kong, "is based in Canada and holds a Canadian passport".

Self-definition is certainly important but it is by no means the only or, in many situations, the most important one. Other people's definition, particularly significant 'others' -including those in

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[7] This becomes even clearer in the discussions in the European Union on the definition of a supranational 'European identity' (see footnote 4 above) and in the reactions to the 'Parekh Reort" (.

authority, is also important, often even decisively or vitally so, because it has a crucial impact on the individual's life[8]. Obviously, there is a constantly changing interplay of varying degrees between the two. There is a need, however, to determine a person's national identity for various purposes, like addressing some important societal issues such as development of remedial policies and programs for disadvantaged groups (e.g. affirmative action/employment equity). The only practical way of doing this, short of official designation, seems to be self-identification.

As the above discussion indicates, the notion of national identity is currently undergoing major change and this is posing a major challenge at the conceptual as well as well as the policy levels. A major catalyst in this in this process has been the migrations of people, especially in the last 30 years, and the resultant questions concerning belonging and attachment.

2. Social, cultural and supranational belonging **(Figure 3)**

This component includes, according to Gagnon and Page (1999, v.1), the various forms that diversity of belonging can assume in a society composed of members of diverse origins who retain their attachment to and display these origins to varying degrees. This diversity of belonging engenders demands for "recognition" from constituent groups. Of particular interest here are the poles of belonging, especially cultural and linguistic minorities (2.1.2); religious minorities (2.1.3); supranational belonging (2.1.6) and dual nationality (2.1.7). These poles are at the heart of some acrimonious debates on a whole range of critical issues in NAANZ – integration, multiculturalism, dual/multiple citizenship, national identity, etc.

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[8] The discussion on European identity mentioned earlier in footnote 4 above provides a good example of this.

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As noted before, unlike the preceding waves, most migrants of the last 30 years come from cultural, religious and historical backgrounds that generally are *significantly* different from those of their receiving societies. While the earlier waves faced many similar problems, their difficulties stemmed more from differences in **degree** than in *kind*. After all they shared the same Judeo-Christian heritage and background and much of the same European culture and they were expected to jettison the traits that differentiated them from the majority, including their names (luckily color was not a problem). In addition, they did not have at their disposal pervasive modern high-speed global communication, information and transportation technologies that would have allowed them to maintain contact with their countries of origin (Patel 1999).

More recent migrants, on the other hand, often belong or have a sense of belonging or attachment to more than one country and to various localities where extended family members[9] live or to ethnocultural groups both within and outside a particular country, a process immensely facilitated by the revolutions in technologies. As Rex 1996 has noted, these:

> ...individuals are conscious of ethnic boundaries. In all likelihood, moreover, they will reinforce these boundaries by marking the crises of family life, birth, marriage and death, within the framework of religious organizations and in their own churches, temples or mosques.[10]

He also notes that such a community is organized for the struggle for equality within a modern nation state and believes that it will provide a 'psychological and emotional home' for *several* generations

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[9] Both Patel 2000 and Rex 1996 point out that the extended family is the basic unit to which many of these migrants, in contrast to their hosts in the receiving countries in the West, feel attached and thus is of prime importance to them.

[10] It is important to note that not only is the extended family is usually included in these 'markings', but also that individuals will often travel halfway around the world to participate in many of them, reinforcing the transnational linkages in the process.

thus essentially perpetuating such attachments for some time. There are other reasons too for these issues of attachments and belonging to continue to be important. From all accounts, recent trends in migration are expected to persist even expand, thus providing a constant supply of new citizens with such attachments and belongings. Furthermore, as some argue, globalization is blurring the distinctions between national cultures and societies - particularly in the area of popular culture as characterized by such terms as "MacDonaldization" or "Coca-Cola culture". This will however be a long, slow, difficult process as people will not want to change or give up elements of their national cultures, developed over centuries of hard struggle and bloodshed, which they believe define who they are and which are intimately linked to their own particular place and space in this world.

As noted elsewhere (Patel 2000), the children of recent migrants (especially those born and/or raised in the new society) who will have been exposed to, if not socialized into, their parents' heritage and related attachments, are likely to maintain such attachments and hence some sense of belonging to more than one country, albeit not in the same way as their parents. How many of them will jettison, lose or maintain weak forms of these links and at what level and intensity will vary depending on, among other things, the individual's desire and circumstances[11]. What little evidence exists suggests that once the rebelliousness of teenage years, with its rejection of everything parents stand for, has passed, the 'roots' phenomenon surfaces in post-adolescence engendering a search for understanding, acceptance and even pride in their heritage. In any case, ost end up with dual or even multiple identities, since they grow up with their heritage culture *and* mainstream culture, learning to become comfortable with both. As Ballard (1994:34) observes in the British situation

Young British Asians may indeed be just at much at home in their parents' world as they are

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[11] Data on this group is very limited and needs to be collected urgently for several important reasons. One of the most important is that disproportionately large numbers of its members are emerging from post-secondary institutions - not just with degrees in science or engineering like most of their parents, but in all major disciplines - and they will constitute a significant portion of the professional cadres in these societies, especially NAANZ.

among their white peers, but at the same time they are actively and creatively engaged in carving out *new* styles of interactions among themselves.....[They] are best understood as extremely mobile in linguistic, religious and cultural terms, and often taking delight in drawing eclectically on every tradition available to them....[They] are acutely aware of how much they differ both from their parents *and* from the surrounding white majority, and as a result are strongly committed to ordering their own lives on their own terms. Just what those terms will be, and how they will rejig and reinterpret and reinvent the premises on which they choose to organise their lives is yet to be seen.

One of the most critical of these concerns exogamous relationships which have major long term implications. For one thing, such relationships, specially with 'mainstream' partners from the dominant groups, are likely to lead to severe erosion of such attachments. Lessard 2001 notes that Canadian census data suggest that such relationships are uncommon among immigrants, often occurring between individuals from similar ethnic or social group, although they increase with passing generations. Exogamy rates are lowest - around 10% - among those of South and East Asian (including Chinese) origin , and highest - ranging from 45-75% - for those of Northern and Western European origin. It is too early to tell whether the former groups will approach the levels of the latter.

Similarly, whether subsequent generations will follow the pattern of the descendants of earlier European immigrants and not retain any kind of attachments to their ethnic heritage beyond the purely symbolic will depend on many factors. With the unprecedented ascendancy of the pluralism/ multiculturalism model (together with exclusionary practices within it) and modern technologies that make maintenance of more substantial attachments so much easier than ever before, it would be imprudent to assume that the past patterns will repeat themselves in the case of non-European migrants. Besides, the same technologies are allowing, as already noted, the creation of cross-cultural

pollination and the creation of hybrid and mixed (popular) cultural forms, at the national and the global level, that are shared by increasing numbers of individuals from diverse ethnocultural backgrounds. What the impact of such longer-term developments will be on issues of citizenship (cultural and other), identity, belonging, etc., also remains to be seen.

Rex (1996) contends that the notion of 'a new kind of amalgam' superceding national culture has 'superficial credibility' given by new elements occurring and becoming part of the national culture. He cites the example of the impact of aspects of immigrant culture - cuisine (curry in the UK), literary, artistic, sports - but holds that

> This does not mean, however, that the main institutions of the economy and the polity, and the pressure for equality within them, are likely to be changed significantly. They cannot be without the modernizing nation state ceasing to exist.

In terms of the immediate future, however, some of the more difficult questions which need to be addressed, at both the conceptual as well as the practical levels, revolve around the issues of dual or multiple citizenships (legal, political, social, cultural), reasonable accommodation of differences, social cohesion, 'rights of the majority', etc. The active 'transnational' or 'supranational' belongings or attachments[12] are relatively new phenomena, at least in terms of magnitude, and have tremendous implications for the traditional notions of citizenship, national identity, etc. that govern peoples' lives the world over. These concepts need to be modernized and new one developed to meet the new realities.

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[12] These are attachments "outside or above the level of the nation-state. Supranational belonging is a form of identity that transcends the nation by producing belonging based on shared interests, ethnic origins or other ties, while transnational belonging refers to a sense of belonging to more than one nation". (Jeannotte et. al. 2002:13)

V Challenges

1. Conceptual

Challenges which need to be addressed in this area are two-fold. The first relates to the development of appropriate theoretical and conceptual tools to adequately identify and understand these phenomena. These tools can in turn be employed to inform the development of relevant policies and associated instruments necessary to address the issues.

As argued elsewhere (Patel 1980), at the most basic level, one's theoretical/conceptual framework/ perspective informs and guides one's understanding, approach and focus, and ultimately the answer(s) Thus it is important to consider the framework/perspective used to study a particular phenomenon. The basic weakness of the frameworks currently employed to analyze and understand the issues of diversity is that they are built on a Eurocentric foundation.

In his seminal work, "ReOrient*: Global Economy in the Asian Age*", political economist Andre Gunder Frank (1998:28) forcefully argues that

> Received classical social theory from "Marx Weber" and their disciples is vitiated by its ingrained Eurocentricism, a bias that is not usually admitted or, perhaps, self-perceived. That bias distorts all perception of, indeed even blinds us from seeing, the reality of the world outside the West. Moreover that same Eurocentricism also prevents or distorts any realistic perception even of Europe and the West itself. Eurocentric social theory is innately incapable of coming to terms with the (economic/systemic) reality of a single world......So the real issue is not really whether Marx or Weber or anybody else, are [sic] right or wrong about this or that part of the world system. The real theoretical issue is that none of them have so far even sought holistically to address the systemic global whole, and the real theoretical

challenge is to do so.[13]

This challenge, he insists, must be met if we are to address the issues in the twenty-first century in which "Asia promises to rise - again". It is also a century where what Parekh (2000) calls 'deep and defiant diversity' will need to be accommodated and new concepts will have to be developed or old ones radically redefined.

His basic argument is that we need to come to terms with the fact that almost all societies today are multicultural and integrally bound up with the immensely complex process of economic and cultural globalization. This puts us in a shared universal historical predicament that, if approached in what he calls the 'spirit of multiculturalism', can also become 'a source of great creative opportunities'. He argues that the notion of multiculturalism is best seen 'neither as a political doctrine with a programmatic content nor as a philosophical theory...but a perspective on human life'. Since no one theory, doctrine or vision can encompass 'the immense complexity of human existence and the problems involved in holding societies together and creating sensitive, sane, and self-critical individuals', none of them can be the sole basis of the good society. The most promising is a 'dialogically constituted' multicultural society that keeps the dialogue going between its constituent parts. He admits that it is a formidable political task to find ways of reconciling the conflicting demands of unity and diversity. And no multicultural society so far has succeeded in tackling it.

Nevertheless, many people both in Canada and elsewhere think that perhaps Canada is ahead of most countries in this respect. Its policies to accommodate diversity (Aboriginal, Official Languages, Multiculturalism) policies are seen as models that others want to learn more about and perhaps adapt

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[13]   Others have made similar observations in varying forms and degrees - e.g.Van der Veer (1995); Basch, et al (1994); Meyer and Geschiere (1999); Cohen (1997), Ludden (1999) , Chase-Dunn (2000), Rohatynskyj (2000), Richardson (2000)

to their own case[14]. Others like Parekh argue that such policies, while commendable, are inadequate because they do not go far enough. He explains that there is a tendency 'to equate multiculturalism with minorities, especially non-whites, and to see it as a revolt of the restless natives asserting their dubious cultural values and demanding special rights'. To him (and to an extent others like Kymlicka, 1998) multiculturalism is about 'the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities' where the norms governing their respective claims are derived from an open and *equal* dialogue.

In any case, we certainly need to go beyond both the Eurocentric perspectives discussed earlier and what Vertovec and Cohen (1999) call the 'overly economistic' rational choice model to include the 'non-conscious acts' and socio-cultural dimensions of behaviour. We need in effect to adopt a more holistic approach as Parekh, Frank and others urge us to. The growing importance of Asia in the world economy and of communities (especially of Asian origin) with transnational attachments primarily residing in western societies makes adoption of such an approach and the subsequent development of related conceptual frameworks important.

2. Policy Development

As noted at the beginning, although many of these societies face similar challenges, there are significant differences between them, especially between the societies of western Europe on the one hand and the *immigrant-receiving* ones of North America, Australia and New Zealand (NAANZ) on the other. The former are burdened with their comparatively much longer history of nationalisms and nation-states and an even older heritage of sharper and stronger ideological divisions that are necessitating much more soul-searching and engendering more acrimonious debates. They would

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[14]Canadian scholars like Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, and others are sought after by other countries for their views on Canada's apparently successful approach to diversity. See Grey (2000) and Zacharyy (2000)

therefore seem to face more formidable challenges than the latter. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, NAANZ cannot escape some of the same challenges, albeit in a less problematic and more temperate mode, precisely because they share some the same history and consequently the same heritage and culture.

There are two sets of *inter-related* policy issues of interest here which these societies have to deal with in the immediate future. The first revolve around the questions of citizenship, culture, heritage, identity and belonging and attachment within the context of the nation-state and globalization; and the second around questions concerning transnational and supranational 'communities', including those whose members are highly mobile and who, as Parekh (2000) notes, 'no longer place much emphasis on their political identity of privilege it over all others' .

The basic question in both cases is what policies and institutions are required to address these issues in the context of the new realities discussed in this paper and the search for answers will in turn require the examination of long-held, fundamental beliefs and assumptions. The questions that, for example, Gagnon & Page(1999) observe Australians asking themselves as a result of migration and globalization ("What does it mean to be Australian? Does belonging to a community necessarily involve allegiance to a single country?") are also being asked in other countries.

Different countries of course will produce different answers depending on their specific circumstances. Thus, as Jayasuriya,(quoted in Gagnon & Page 1999:75) notes for example,

> ...In Canada, multiculturalism and equality rights were integrated into the definition of citizenship through the1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms....In contrast the Australian approach is much more on the level of social policy: the special needs of ethnic groups are recognized, but the measures taken to deal with them are essentially concerned

with welfare, education or services for individuals[15].

Similarly, at the global level, Stephen Castles (2000) points out that 'global and regional governance is rapidly gaining in significance, yet transnational democratic institutions hardly exist' and that the growth of transnational communities makes it necessary to transform institutional frameworks to correspond with new forms of social identity. This would particularly apply to the model of single and exclusive nation-state citizenship:

> Differentiated forms of state membership may be needed to recognize the different types of
> relationships transmigrants have with different states - such as political rights in one place,
> economic rights in another and cultural rights in a third.

 Some of these changes are already happening, albeit in a ad hoc manner (e.g. residency, employment, welfare rights for specific immigrant groups). Indeed, he argues that 'we need to think about transnational form of democratic participation - not just for members of transnational communities, but for all citizens affected by the rapid shift in the location of political power'.

VI Conclusion

These are difficult issues made even more difficult, at least in the short term, by the events of 9/11 and its aftermath. Hopefully its effects will not last too long and the long-term fall-out is not so damaging as to impede the important work that needs to be done. For the moment though it looks

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[15]It is interesting to note that 83% of Canadians surveyed in 2002 placed 'respecting rights and freedoms' as the top item in a list describing Canadian citizenship while 'feeling Australian' was the top one for 95% of Australians. Also, 70% Canadians chose 'respecting diversity'. (Adsett 2002:59 and Gagnon & Page(1999:71)

as if we will be living with Meyer and Geschiere (1999) observation that " in a world characterized by flows, a great deal of energy is devoted to controlling and freezing them: grasping the flux often actually entails a politics of 'fixing'- a politics which is, above all, operative in struggles about the construction of identities".

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