METROPOLIS WORLD BULLETIN

Migration and International Protection

METROPOLIS

Migration and International Protection

HOWARD DUNCAN
Metropolis Project

Previous readers of the Metropolis *World Bulletin* will notice a change in the current issue with its longer, more substantial articles. This represents a shift in the original newsletter format of the publication, which dates to June 2000, to one that features expert commentary on migration issues that are of interest to all of us in the field.

For this issue, our authors take a hard look at managing the problem of refugees and displaced persons. The refugee debate is constantly evolving, the flows of refugees and asylum-seekers being as dynamic as the causes of these flows. A decade ago, states were trying to regain control of the international asylum system as its innovative use by economic migrants came to dominate the concerns of governments around the world. In those days, the extent to which economic migrants used the asylum system to gain entry to the West was such that the costs of determining whether refugee claimants had a legitimate case came to exceed the money available to the refugees in camps. As a result, protection was less available to refugees than states would have wanted. Stricter controls over the international asylum system, however, led to a decrease in asylum claims and a subsequent shift in the debate away from the so-called "migration-asylum nexus." This allowed states to return to the pressing issue of protection and the search for the best means for offering it while avoiding a profligate re-emergence of the use of the asylum system by those not in need of protection.

Most striking were the numbers of those in actual need of protection. The extent to which states can offer protection by resettling refugees within their borders is always limited, and it is always questionable whether resettlement offers a satisfactory and durable solution to those who did not leave their countries voluntarily. It was the sheer numbers that were overwhelming. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) now estimates that over 30 million persons are in need of protection, numbers that simply cannot be accommodated by resettlement. Thus, attention turned to the management of refugee camps and to the relentless emergence of new situations where people are displaced. The protracted nature of some wars, particularly civil conflicts, and the re-emergence of ethnic cleansing have meant that millions have been forced to seek safety outside their borders. Although getting these people to places of relative safety is of paramount importance, the protracted lengths of time that persons are spending in the temporary camps have themselves become a critical issue.

At the turn of the 21st century, protracted refugee situations have become one of the dominant issues in refugee management, as attested by a number of articles in this Metropolis *World Bulletin*. Another issue that is drawing attention and has the potential to test states' and the international system's ability to manage is the issue of environmentally caused forced migration. Most often discussed are environmental changes brought about by climate change, many having to do with water, be they draught and desertification or inundation through rising sea levels or massive storms. Not only would large-scale environmentally induced migration bring operational and policy challenges to states, it could bring about a crisis in the international community and in international law, as there are currently few provisions in place to resolve such situations.

Modern management of refugees through the Geneva Convention has involved states willingly ceding sovereignty to the international system and thereby to individuals who wish to enter their territory. The abuse of the system and the extraordinary numbers of persons now in need of protection has states re-examining their ceding of sovereignty. It will take exceptional leadership, commitment and ingenuity to adapt the system to effectively manage the protracted refugee situations of today and possibly the mass migrations brought about by climate change in the future.

The politics of exclusion:
Asylum and the global order

STEPHEN CASTLES
International Migration Institute, University of Oxford

Around the beginning of the 21st century, the governments of the rich countries of North America, Western Europe and Oceania introduced a series of measures to restrict asylum. From the 1980s, anti-refugee sentiments grew among sections of the media, the political elite and the public. By the 1990s, such sentiments had swelled to near-hysteria, with refugees and asylum-seekers being accused of threatening national security, undermining welfare states, and even causing impoverishment and disease. The restrictive measures seem to have achieved their objectives: in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)[1] area as a whole, asylum-seeker inflows fell from 594,000 in 2001 to 298,000 in 2005 (OECD 2007: 321). The United Kingdom had experienced a large increase in asylum applications around the turn of the century, peaking at 103,000 in 2002, but by 2006 the inflow was down to 28,000.

Yet the number of people in need of protection from persecution and violence worldwide has not declined – instead, it is currently on the increase. The "success" of western policies (if they can be called such) consists in excluding endangered people from prosperous countries and concentrating them in poorer regions of the world. Today, it is virtually impossible for a person in need of protection to legally enter the territory of a western state. To make an asylum claim, it is necessary to first become an illegal immigrant, which forces asylum-seekers into the shadow world of smuggling, trafficking and irregularity. As a result, refugee protection has become mixed up with fears about illegal migration.

Why have the rich countries moved away from the relatively open refugee policies of the past? In this article, I will discuss the political background of asylum policies in western countries from the early post-1945 period to the present. There has been a shift from the earlier welcoming attitude, when East-West refugees were celebrated as "heroes of democracy," to one of suspicion and exclusion with refugees[2] and asylum-seekers[3] being seen as threats to security, prosperity and identity. This shift does not primarily result from changes in attitudes, but rather from a global transformation, connected with the worldwide diffusion of the neo-liberal economic model and the political and military dominance of a single super-power.

The reshaping of the international refugee regime

The international refugee regime[4] was originally shaped by the Second World War and the Cold War (Keely 2001). Many of the 40 million displaced persons who left Europe in 1945 were resettled in Australia, Canada and other countries, where they made an important contribution to post-war economic growth. During the Cold War, offering asylum to those who "voted with their feet" against communism was a powerful source of propaganda for the West. Since the "non-departure regime" of the Iron Curtain kept the overall asylum levels low, the West could afford to offer a warm welcome to those few who made it.

Very different refugee situations were developing in the global South (Loescher 2001). The colonial legacy led to weak undemocratic states, underdeveloped economies and widespread poverty in Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the Cold War, proxy wars between the West and

---

1 The OECD is an organization made up of the rich countries of Western Europe, North America, Oceania and Northeast Asia. However, very few refugees are admitted to Japan and South Korea, so these figures are a good indication for western nations.

2 A "refugee" (or Convention refugee) is defined by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as a person residing outside his or her country of nationality, who is unable or unwilling to return because of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." By 2006, 147 of the UN's 192 member states had signed the Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Signatory states undertake to protect refugees and to respect the *non-refoulement* principle (not returning them to a country where they may be persecuted).

3 "Asylum-seeker" refers to a person who has applied for refugee status and whose claim is still pending. Refugee status determination can take several years. During this time, asylum-seekers are often in a state of limbo, with highly restricted rights to employment, welfare, health care, etc.

4 This term designates a set of legal norms based on humanitarian and human rights law, as well as a number of institutions designed to protect and assist refugees. The core of the regime is the 1951 *Geneva Refugee Convention*, and the key institution is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Many other intergovernmental agencies, national government bodies and non-governmental organizations are also involved.

the Soviet Bloc were fought out in the South – at a huge human cost, which led to vast flows of refugees (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989). Western countries and international agencies responded by claiming that such situations were qualitatively different from the individual persecutions for which the 1951 Convention had been designed (Chimni 1998). The solution of permanent resettlement in developed countries was not seen as an appropriate one, except for Indo-Chinese and Cuban refugees who fitted the Cold War mould.

> *By retreating from the principle of providing refuge to people fleeing violence, and by imposing draconian and often humiliating rules on asylum-seekers, the rich nations risk reducing civil rights and democracy within their own countries. This could in the long run rebound on the liberties of citizens, especially those of minority background.*

By the 1980s, increasing flows of asylum-seekers were coming directly to Europe and North America from conflict zones in the South. Numbers increased sharply with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The largest flows of the 1990s were from Albania into Italy, and from the former Yugoslavia during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The result was a politicization of asylum. Extreme-right mobilization, arson attacks on asylum-seeker hostels and assaults on foreigners threatened public order. European states reacted with a series of restrictions. Germany and Sweden – two of the main asylum destinations – led the way: the German Federal Republic amended its constitution to limit the right to asylum, while Sweden changed its liberal asylum laws. As a result, asylum-seeker entries to Western Europe declined in the latter part of the 1990s before increasing again towards the end of the decade.

The UK had relatively few asylum applicants in the early 1990s but by 1999, new applications were running at over 90,000 a year. In February 2003, Prime Minister Blair said he wanted to cut asylum-seeker entries by 30% to 40%. The measures introduced in the UK were similar to those that had heralded the construction of a "Fortress Europe" elsewhere in the mid-1990s (UNHCR 2000a, Keely 2001):

- Changes in national legislation to restrict access to refugee status;

- Temporary protection regimes instead of permanent refugee status for people fleeing wars;

- "Non-arrival policies" to prevent people without adequate documentation from entering Western Europe. Citizens of certain states were required to obtain visas before departure. "Carrier sanctions" compelled airline personnel to check documents before allowing people to embark;

- Diversion policies: by declaring countries bordering the EU to be "safe third countries," Western European countries could return asylum-seekers to these states, if they had used them as transit routes;

- Restrictive interpretations of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, e.g. excluding persecution through "non-state actors" (such as the Taliban in Afghanistan);

- European cooperation on asylum and immigration rules, through the Schengen Convention, the Dublin Convention, and EU agreements;

- "Deterrent measures" designed to make asylum unpleasant, such as mandatory detention, prohibitions on work, reduced welfare benefits, and discriminatory forms of support such as "food vouchers." In the UK, applicants who fail to meet strict bureaucratic rules on application procedures can be denied all forms of welfare support and thus rendered destitute.

At the same time, the UK Government put forward a "new vision" for refugee protection. One key idea was to set up protection areas for refugees in their region of origin so that asylum-seekers could be safely removed from the EU. Another was to set up "transit-processing centres" outside the borders of the EU: asylum-seekers who arrived in the EU would be sent to camps in countries like Libya and Ukraine for determination of their applications (Castles and Van Hear 2005: 118-119). These proposals raised serious human rights concerns and were not implemented in this form, but they helped create a climate in which asylum-seekers were seen as security threats, justifying ever-tighter legal procedures and the increased use of detention and deportation.

Outside Europe, similar trends could be observed. For the United States, admitting refugees and asylum-seekers had always been a part of its foreign policy. The U.S. provided a new home to some 1.3 million people from Indochina after the Vietnam War. An open door policy towards Cubans was introduced in 1959, but restricted in the 1980s, and interdiction at sea commenced in the 1990s. Many Haitians attempting to come to the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s were prevented from doing so. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. temporarily halted its refugee resettlement programme. Stronger detention powers were introduced: in 2006, the

U.S. Government "held 2,000 to 3,000 asylum-seekers in detention on any given day, often in remote areas with limited access to legal counsel" (USCRI 2007).

Australia has for many years resettled refugees in cooperation with UNHCR, but the country's geographic position kept the number of spontaneous asylum-seekers very low until the late 1990s. But entries of "boat people" rose to 4,175 in 1999-2000 and to 4,141 in 2000-2001 (Crock and Saul 2002: 24), leading to a politicization of refugee issues. Strict laws were passed "excising" Australia's northern offshore areas from its "migration zone." As part of the 'Pacific solution," asylum-seekers arriving by boat from Indonesia (mainly Afghans, Iraqis and Iranians transported by smugglers) were to be sent to islands like Nauru and Papua New Guinea to be held in camps. Other asylum-seekers, already in Australia, were kept in grim detention centres in remote areas. Some were detained for several years, and even children were kept behind the wire. The new Australian Labor Party Government elected in late 2007 closed the off-shore camps but has so far retained detention centres in the deserts of South Australia and Western Australia.

Asylum, containment and the global order

Overall, the refugee regime of Western countries has been transformed from a system designed to welcome Cold War refugees from the East and to resettle them as permanent exiles in new homes, to a "non-entrée regime," designed to exclude asylum-seekers coming from the South. The key principle now is "containment," or keeping people displaced through violence from leaving their regions of origin so that they remain either as internally displaced persons (IDPs) within their own countries or as refugees in neighbouring countries.

This reflects a change in public attitudes in the North, but it would be mistaken to see this as the fundamental cause. The old welcoming attitude towards refugees was part of the Cold War, and it was a low-cost generosity because the authorities of the Soviet Bloc could be depended upon to keep refugees to a trickle. Moreover, Cold War refugees (except for those from Indo-China) were mainly white and middle class and were seen as easy to integrate. Today's refugee flows are the result of a new global order, based on neo-liberal economics and on the political and military power of a single super-power. Refugee numbers are larger and their characteristics are very different from those of the past.

Neo-liberal economic doctrines emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the success of labour movements and in improving wages and working conditions of workers in industrial countries. In the 1980s, the principles of a "small state," economic deregulation, free trade and privatization of manufacturing and services were introduced by the

Thatcher government in Britain and by the first Bush administration in the U.S., and became the dominant economic model worldwide. This led to radical economic restructuring, including the export of manufacturing jobs to low-wage economies, the erosion of traditional blue-collar skills, and the weakening of trade unions. Such policies – encapsulated in the "Washington Consensus" of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – then became the blueprint for globalization and the restructuring of the economies of the less-developed countries of the South.

A key ideological legitimation of neo-liberal globalization was that it would increase economic efficiency and help poorer countries catch up with the income levels and living standards of the North. This promise proved hollow: inequality both within and between countries and regions has grown rapidly since the 1980s. The transformation of older modes of rural production precipitated rural-urban migration into burgeoning mega-cities which are unable to create the jobs needed by the growing workforce. In these conditions, impoverishment, violence and lack of human security go hand-in-hand, and many people are forced to seek both refuge and a better life elsewhere.

> *A new approach is needed, and this does not only mean returning to more open asylum policies for people in need of protection. It also means understanding that forced migration is an inevitable result of an increasingly unequal global order.*

Neo-liberal globalization has a paradoxical consequence: the "small state" only applies to the economic and social fields. But the neo-liberal order requires a "big state" when it comes to public order and military capacity. The neo-liberal state takes two forms: first, the core western states – especially the U.S. – and their massive governance apparatus and ability to project military power; and second, the authoritarian states of the South. The former ensure that western economic interests remain dominant and deals with resistance by "rogue states." The latter protect the interests of economic and political elites and multi-national corporations in the areas that provide primary resources, cheap labour and low-cost manufactured products for the North.

This combination of economic inequality and political repression has made it harder than ever before to

disentangle economic migration from asylum. The sharp increase in both labour migration and flight from violence are an integral part of the new global order. The containment policies of the 1990s and early 2000s were designed to "manage" and restrict such flows. At the very moment when the new global system of inequality was bringing about increased population flows, the rich countries of North America, Western Europe and Oceania were eager to close the doors to people fleeing violence.

The crisis of containment

The containment of asylum seemed to be working effectively by the early 2000s. Yet this imposed high costs: by retreating from the principle of providing refuge to people fleeing violence, and by imposing draconian and often humiliating rules on asylum-seekers, the rich nations risk reducing civil rights and democracy within their own countries. This could in the long run rebound on the liberties of citizens, especially those of minority background. Internationally, western claims to moral leadership now ring hollow.

In the meantime, however, even the apparent success of containment seems dubious. The contradiction between the neo-liberal claim to greater freedom and the reality of oppression and violence in the South has become inescapable. After a decline in official refugee numbers at the beginning of the 21st century, the trend reversed in 2006 with refugee numbers jumping to 9.9 million mainly due to the flight of 1.2 million Iraqis to Jordan and Syria. Globally, new asylum applications in 2006 totalled 503,000 (UNHCR 2007). As rich countries become less and less willing to admit asylum-seekers, many are seeking refuge in new destinations like South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Malaysia and Thailand. At the same time, 25 million people are internally displaced by violence and persecution but unable to cross an international border to claim refugee status.[5]

Exclusion and containment policies were a response to the increased forced migration that accompanied globalization and the emergence of a new political and military order. Such policies corresponded to the short-term interests of politicians and officials who wanted to convince the public that they were in control of cross-border flows. Today it seems that these approaches have failed: they bear high costs for western nations and they do not bring solutions to the fundamental global disparities that cause conflict and displacement.

A new approach is needed, and this does not only mean returning to more open asylum policies for people in need

of protection. It also means understanding that forced migration is an inevitable result of an increasingly unequal global order. Forced migration cannot be addressed simply through policies on refugee protection and asylum determination. There is a need for change and policy coherence across the whole range of relationships between the global North and South. Necessary reforms include:

- Fair trade: boosting southern economies by reforming Europe's Common Agricultural Policy, eliminating U.S. farm subsidies and revising discriminatory intellectual property laws;

- An end to arms exports to conflict regions;

- The abolition of structural adjustment policies that damage education, health and welfare in poor countries;

- Development policies that support human rights, good governance and democratization;

- Migration policies that end the stripping of human capital from the South through the "brain drain" and that allow lower-skilled workers to migrate legally and safely;

- More resources for conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

Taken together, these measures add up to serious efforts to reduce North-South inequality. It is easy to say all this, but it would mean reversing the whole thrust of neo-liberal globalization. That is clearly a major political task.

References

Castles, S., and N. Van Hear. 2005. "Developing DFID's Policy Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons." Oxford: Refuge Studies Centre.

Chimni, B. S. 1998. "The Geo-politics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 11, 4, p. 350-374.

Crock, M., B. Saul. 2002. *Future Seekers: Refugees and the Law in Australia*. Sydney: Federation Press.

Keely, C. B. 2001. "The International Refugee Regimes(s): The End of the Cold War Matters." *International Migration Review* 35, 1, p. 303-314.

Loescher, G. 2001. *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

OECD. 2007. "International Migration Outlook: Annual Report 2007." Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

UNHCR. 2007. "2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons." Geneva: United Nations High Commission for Refugees: Division of Operational Services.

USCRI. 2007. "Country Report: United States." Washington DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants.

Zolberg, A. R., A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo. 1989. *Escape from Violence*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

---

5   IDPs are often the most disadvantaged of all forced migrants, because they remain within the country where they have suffered violence or persecution, and it is very difficult for international organizations to provide protection and aid. Despite efforts by some international agencies and NGOs, there is still no effective protection regime for IDPs.

Understanding the Challenge of Protracted Refugee Situations

JAMES MILNER
Department of Political Science, Carleton University[1]

International interest in refugees and asylum issues has, in recent years, been largely focused on populations on the move – either on the arrival of individuals in Western states claiming asylum or on refugee emergencies and the challenge of delivering humanitarian assistance. Some two-thirds of refugees in the world today, however, are trapped in protracted refugee situations. Such situations – often characterized by long periods of exile, approaching decades for some groups – occur on most continents in a range of environments including camps, rural settlements, and urban centres. The overwhelming majority of these situations are to be found in some of the world's poorest and most unstable regions and are proving difficult to resolve.[2]

Refugees trapped in these forgotten situations often face significant restrictions on a wide range of rights, and the continuation of chronic refugee problems frequently gives rise to a number of political and security concerns for host states and other states in the region. As argued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2004b: 2), "the consequences of having so many human beings in a static state include wasted lives, squandered resources and increased threats to security." Taken independently, each of these challenges are of

mounting concern. Taken together, the full significance of protracted refugee situations becomes more apparent.

Notwithstanding the growing significance of the problem, protracted refugee situations have only recently gained prominence on the international refugee agenda. Humanitarian agencies, like UNHCR, have been left both to cope with caring for these forgotten populations and to attempt to mitigate the negative implications of prolonged exile. While essential, these actions do not constitute a solution for protracted refugee situations. History has shown that chronic and recurring refugee populations have been resolved through comprehensive plans of action involving not only humanitarian actors but also a range of political, security and development actors. I would argue that such an integrated and comprehensive approach is needed to effectively resolve the protracted refugee situations that persist today.

An understanding of such an approach is important for both international and domestic debates on refugee protection. Internationally, policy-makers and advocates are preparing for a number of key meetings that relate to protracted refugee situations, including the High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges in Geneva, in December 2008, while additional opportunities have emerged to engage in more holistic and sustained discussions linking refugees, peacebuilding, migration and development. At the same time, domestic policy-makers have become increasingly aware of the changing dynamics of the global refugee population, especially as they affect planning for resettlement programmes. To this end, this article discusses the nature and scope of the problem of protracted refugee situations, their causes and their consequences before outlining the elements of a possible solution.

Nature and scope of the problem

Protracted refugee situations are refugee situations that have moved beyond the emergency phase but for which solutions in the foreseeable future do not exist. They are not always static populations and often involve periods of increase and decrease in the total population as well as changes within the population. More significantly, protracted refugee situations now account for the vast majority of the world's refugee population, demonstrating the importance, scale and global significance of the problem.

In the early 1990s, a number of long-standing refugee populations who had been displaced as a result of Cold War conflicts in the global South went home. While these conflicts were being resolved, new intra-state conflicts emerged and resulted in massive new flows during the 1990s in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, West Africa, Southwest Asia, and elsewhere. The global refugee population mushroomed in the early 1990s and the pressing need was to respond to the challenges of simultaneous mass influx situations in many regions of the world. More than a decade later, many of these conflicts and refugee situations remain unresolved.

Some statistics shed important light on the changing nature of the problem. Using the crude measure of populations of 25,000 or more refugees in exile for five or more years (UNHCR 2004b), there were 27 protracted refugee situations in 1993 with a total population of 7.9 million refugees. By 2003, there were 38 protracted refugee situations with a total refugee population of 6.2 million. While there are fewer refugees in protracted situations today, the number of situations has greatly increased. With a global refugee population of over 16.3 million at the end of 1993, 48% of the world's refugees were in protracted situations. Ten years later, with a global refugee population of 9.6 million at the end of 2003, over 64% of the world's refugees were in protracted refugee situations. In addition, refugees are spending longer periods of time in exile. It is estimated that "the average of major refugee situations, protracted or not, has increased from nine years in 1993 to 17 years at the end of 2003" (UNHCR 2004b: 2) In other words, the average duration of a refugee situation has essentially doubled in the past 15 years.

As illustrated by Table 1, major protracted refugee situations are to be found in most regions of the world.

Causes of protracted refugee situations

Protracted refugee populations, as can been seen in Table 1, originate from the very states whose instability lie at the heart of chronic insecurity in many regions of the world and at the heart of debates on engagement with so-called "fragile states." The bulk of refugees in these regions come from countries where conflict and persecution have persisted for years. More generally, UNHCR (2004b: 1)

Table 1

Major protracted refugee situations, January 1, 2005

COUNTRY OF ASYLUM	ORIGIN	END 2004
Algeria	Western Sahara	165,000
Armenia	Azerbaijan	235,000
Burundi	Democratic Republic of the Congo	48,000
Cameroon	Chad	39,000
China	Viet Nam	299,000
Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo	59,000
Côte d'Ivoire	Liberia	70,000
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Angola	98,000
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Sudan	45,000
Egypt	Occupied Palestinian Territory	70,000
Ethiopia	Sudan	90,000
Guinea	Liberia	127,000
India	China	94,000
India	Sri Lanka	57,000
Islamic Republic of Iran	Afghanistan	953,000
Islamic Republic of Iran	Iraq	93,000
Kenya	Somalia	154,000
Kenya	Sudan	68,000
Nepal	Bhutan	105,000
Pakistan	Afghanistan (UNHCR estimate)	960,000
Rwanda	Democratic Republic of the Congo	45,000
Saudi Arabia	Occupied Palestinian Territory	240,000
Serbia and Montenegro	Bosnia and Herzegovina	95,000
Serbia and Montenegro	Croatia	180,000
Sudan	Eritrea	111,000
Thailand	Myanmar	121,000
Uganda	Sudan	215,000
United Republic of Tanzania	Burundi	444,000
United Republic of Tanzania	Democratic Republic of the Congo	153,000
Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	39,000
Yemen	Somalia	64,000
Zambia	Angola	89,000
Zambia	Democratic Republic of the Congo	66,000

Source: Data from UNHCR 2006: 107.
Note: This table refers to refugee situations where the number of refugees of a certain origin within a particular country of asylum has been 25,000 or more for at least five consecutive years. Industrialized countries are not included. Data does not include Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

argues that "protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses. They are not inevitable, but are rather the result of political action and inaction, both in the country of origin (the persecution and violence that led to flight) and in the country of asylum. They endure because of ongoing problems in the country of origin, and stagnate and become protracted as a result of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement and employment possibilities, and confinement to camps."

In fact, protracted refugee situations are the combined result of the prevailing situations in the country of origin, the policy responses of the country of asylum, and the lack of sufficient engagement in these situations by a range of other actors. Failure to address the situation in the country of origin means that the refugee cannot return home. Failure to engage with the host country reinforces the perception of refugees as a burden and a security concern which leads to encampment and a lack of local solutions. As a result of these failures, humanitarian agencies, such as UNHCR, are left to compensate for the inaction or failures of those actors responsible for maintaining international peace and security.

Consequences

Arguably, the greatest impact of protracted refugee situations is on the human rights of refugees. Many host governments in the global South now require refugees to live in designated camps. This trend has significant human rights and economic implications. Levels of sexual and physical violence in refugee camps remain a cause of significant concern. More generally, the prolonged encampment of refugee populations has led to the violation of a number of rights contained in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, including freedom of movement and the right to seek wage-earning employment. Faced with these restrictions, refugees become dependent on subsistence-level assistance, or less, and lead lives of poverty, frustration and unrealized potential. Prolonged containment of refugees in camps limits their ability to contribute to regional development and state-building (see, for example, Jacobsen 2002). In cases where refugees have been allowed to engage in the local economy, it has been found that refugees can "have a positive impact on the [local] economy by contributing to agricultural production, providing cheap labour and increasing local vendors' income from the sale of essential foodstuffs" (UNHCR 2004a: 3). When prohibited from working outside the camps, refugees cannot make such contributions.

Unresolved refugee situations also represent a significant political phenomenon as well as a humanitarian problem.[3] Protracted refugee situations often lead to a number of political and security concerns for host countries, the countries of origin, regional actors, and the international community. The long-term presence of large refugee populations have been a source of international – mainly regional – conflict through causing instability in neighbouring countries, triggering intervention, and sometimes giving a basis to armed elements within camps that can form a source of insurgency, resistance, and

terrorist movements. The militarization of refugee camps creates a security problem for the country of origin, the host country and the international community. Security concerns such as arms trafficking, drug smuggling, the trafficking in women and children, and the recruitment of child soldiers and mercenaries can and do occur in some of the camps hosting protracted refugee situations.

Some two-thirds of refugees in the world today are trapped in protracted refugee situations, often characterized by long periods of exile, approaching decades for some groups. The overwhelming majority of these situations are to be found in some of the world's poorest and most unstable regions and are proving difficult to resolve.

The prolongation of refugee crises may not only cause such direct security concerns but also have indirect security implications. Tensions between refugees and the local population often arise as refugees are perceived to receive preferential treatment, especially as access to local social services such as health and education becomes increasingly difficult for local populations while such services are widely available in the refugee camps. As donor government engagement for camp-based refugee population decreases over time, competition between refugees and the host population over scarce resources becomes an increasing source of insecurity. In the same way, reductions in assistance in the camps may lead some refugees to pursue coping strategies such as banditry, prostitution and petty theft, which create additional local security concerns.

Towards solutions

The contemporary response to protracted refugee situations stands in stark contrast with the international response to long-standing refugee populations during the Cold War when the geo-political interests of the West led to large-scale engagement with prolonged refugee crises. This engagement resulted in the formulation and implementation of comprehensive solutions drawing on the three durable solutions of repatriation, local integration and third country resettlement. These initiatives were not only supported by humanitarian agencies, such as UNHCR, but by a range of development, and peace and security actors,

---

3   For a more detailed consideration of the political and security implications of protracted refugee situations, see Loescher and Milner 2005.

especially within the UN system. By drawing on the full range of solutions for refugees and by ensuring the sustained engagement of a wide range of actors, the international community was able to resolve refugee situations as complex as the situation of displaced people remaining in Europe long after World War II, of millions of Indo-Chinese refugees, and of the Central American refugee situation in the 1980s. In approaching the protracted refugee situations of today, it is important to remember that by understanding the particular character of each refugee situation, by considering the needs of refugees themselves, and by considering the needs, concerns and capacities of the countries of first asylum, the countries of origin, and the resettlement and donor countries, the international community has successfully resolved the plight of numerous refugee populations in the past 50 years.

Despite the need for a multifaceted approach to contemporary protracted refugee situations, the overall response of policy-makers remains compartmentalized as security, development and humanitarian issues are mostly discussed in separate forums. There exists little or no strategic integration of approaches and little effective coordination in the field. Neither the UN nor donor governments have adequately integrated the resolution of recurring regional refugee problems with the promotion of economic and political development, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace and security.

Meaningful comprehensive solutions for protracted refugee situations must overcome these divisions and adopt a new approach that incorporates recent policy initiatives by a wide range of actors. For solutions to be truly comprehensive, and therefore effective, they must involve coordinated engagement from a range of peace and security, development and humanitarian actors. Recent developments within the UN system, namely the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, may provide additional opportunities for such integrated and sustained responses.

Important innovations are also taking place in individual donor countries, largely motivated by recent thinking on the importance of "joined-up" and "whole of government" responses to peacebuilding in fragile states. For example, Canada has established an Interdepartmental Working Group on Protracted Refugee Situations, drawing together the full range of government ministries and departments engaged in refugee affairs with the goal of developing a government-wide response to the issue. The Metropolis Project has also played an important role by hosting round-table discussions on particular protracted refugee situations that bring together not only policy-makers from different government departments, but also practitioners and researchers. Canada has also played an important role

in ensuring that the issue of protracted refugee situations remains prominent on the agenda of UNHCR's Executive Committee. Similar initiatives in other states will make important contributions to the formulation and implementation of a more effective response to protracted refugee situations.

The success of such an approach will, however, depend entirely on the commitment of the international community to see it succeed. Acting independently, humanitarian actors can only be expected to manage protracted refugee situations, not resolve them. Solutions to protracted refugee situations can only be found through comprehensive solutions that involve the sustained engagement of a wide range of actors. While such responses are challenging, they are also essential. Comprehensive solutions to protracted refugee situations are also the best way to address the concerns of Western states, meet the protection needs of refugees, and respond to the concerns of countries of first asylum. As such, concerted effort to resolve these situations is in the interest of all actors in the international system.

Two-thirds of refugees in the world today are trapped in protracted refugee situations. The average duration of these situations is now approaching 20 years. These are situations that are not resolving themselves. Concerted international action is required to engage with these situations and resolve them. They represent a challenge that can no longer be overlooked.

References

Jacobsen, K. 2002. "Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African Statebuilding." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, 4.

Loescher, G., and J. Milner. 2005. "Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and international security implications." Adelphi Paper No. 375. Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

———. 2006. "Protracted Refugee Situations: The Search for Practical Solutions." In T*he State of the World's Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium*. Edited by UNHCR. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loescher, G., J. Milner, E. Newman, and G. G. Troeller (Eds). 2008. *Protracted Refugee Situations: Human Rights, Political and Security Implications*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

UNHCR. 2001. "Addressing Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa." Africa Bureau. Paper prepared for the Informal Consultations on New Approaches and Partnerships for Protection and Solutions in Africa, Geneva (December).

———. 2004a. "Economic and Social Impact of Massive Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries, as well as Other Countries." Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (February 18). EC/54/SC/CRP.5.

———. 2004b. "Protracted Refugee Situations." Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Standing Committee, 30th Meeting (June 10). EC/54/SC/CRP.14.

———. 2006. *The State of the World's Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Trapped in Exile: UNHCR's Evolving Response to the Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations

ERIKA FELLER
Assistant High Commissioner – Protection, United Nations High Commission for Refugees

Millions of refugees are trapped in exile in situations that drag on for years or even decades without any immediate prospect of being resolved. The refugees concerned are obliged to wile away years of their lives in shabby camps or shanty settlements all over the globe, often in situations where they remain exposed to a wide range of dangers and enjoy very limited rights and entitlements.

The problem of protracted refugee situations is by no means a new one, but it is only in recent years that the issue has found a prominent place on the international humanitarian agenda. As far as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is concerned, the organization's renewed focus on this issue dates back some ten years, when it initiated a wide-ranging evaluation and policy analysis project on this topic[1] and then sought to highlight it through the 2001-2002 Global Consultations on International Protection and the resulting *Agenda for Protection*.[2]

Described as "an ambitious, yet practical programme of action to improve the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers around the world," the *Agenda for Protection* incorporated a Programme of Action based on six key objectives: strengthening implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention; protecting refugees within broader migration movements; sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably; addressing security-related concerns more

effectively; redoubling the search for durable solutions; and meeting the protection needs of refugee women and refugee children (UNHCR 2003).

As the *Agenda for Protection* points out, none of these objectives can be attained without concerted international action to address the situation of people who have lived in exile for many years. "Millions of refugees around the world," it observes, "presently have no access to timely and durable solutions, the securing of which is one of the principal goals of international protection."

The historical context

It is not difficult to explain why the issue of protracted refugee situations has come to achieve a new prominence. The 1990s have been aptly termed a "turbulent decade" for UNHCR (Ogata 2005). During this period, UNHCR was confronted with three enormous and simultaneous challenges.

The first was to facilitate the return and reintegration of the many refugees who had been forced into exile during conflicts that were rooted in Cold War politics, but which had now come to an end, including Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua and South Africa.

The second challenge was to respond to the spate of new crises and refugee exoduses provoked by the instability of the post-Cold War world, including those armed conflicts witnessed in the Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa and West Africa.

The third was to address the rapid growth in the number of people from poorer and less stable parts of the world who were moving to and seeking asylum in the industrialized world, and who were generally unwanted by the receiving states and societies.

---

1   UNHCR documents emanating from this project are collected at <www.unhcr.org/research/46adfe822.html>.

2   The third edition of the *Agenda for Protection* (negotiated with states and finalized in December 2002), dated October 2003, can be accessed at <www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3e637b194>.

A common feature of these three challenges was that they all entailed movements of people that were large and highly visible, and which were therefore prioritized by the international community and media. With their attention and resources focused on these high-profile situations, UNHCR and other humanitarian actors were able to give less attention to those protracted situations in which refugees were moving in no direction at all, but were effectively trapped in camps and settlements. As problems persisted in countries of origin, opportunities for their return remained elusive. Meanwhile, their circumstances attracted few initiatives and routine and long-term "care and maintenance" programmes became the norm, epitomizing the low level of ambition that the international community brought to the problem of protracted refugee situations throughout the 1990s.

UNHCR and its partners, and not least the refugees themselves, are still living with the negative consequences of this collective inertia. To take but one example, it has recently been lamented, in connection with the Afghan refugee situation in neighbouring Pakistan, that "UNHCR now has a mission impossible in Pakistan. It has neither the funding nor the mandate to address the kind of social, economic and human development challenges that emerge within a 27 year old refugee situation. The Afghan refugee issue can be cited as the situation *par excellence* that underlines why 'care and maintenance' becomes a significant part of the problem without substantially addressing refugee needs."[3]

Current concerns

Since the turn of the decade, there have been some significant developments with respect to the demographics of the global refugee situation. The number of asylum-seekers has dropped on an annual basis in many countries and, with the singular exception of Iraq (and to a lesser extent Darfur), new refugee crises have been relatively modest in scope and size. At the same time, progress has picked up in relation to at least some of the more protracted refugee situations. In 2005 and 2006, for example, more than 1.8 million long-term refugees returned to their country of origin, more than a million of them to Afghanistan alone. Substantial numbers of refugees also repatriated in Africa, the largest numbers returning to Angola, Burundi, Liberia and Sudan.

Third country resettlement and local integration have been an important complement in Africa and in parts of greater Asia. In the Americas, for example, no fewer than 20 states have adopted the Mexico Plan of Action, a continent-wide framework that, not least, has opened up

significant new resettlement prospects. In a number of West African host states, it has proved possible for UNHCR to discuss the local integration of those Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees who do not wish to return to their homeland, and to explore the use of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Free Movement Protocol as a means of regularizing their status in countries of asylum.

These conditions have proved favourable for renewing the focus on those refugee situations where there is still no solution in sight (see Crisp 2003). This is imperative for a number of reasons.

> *Donor states and humanitarian organizations have often preferred to focus their attention and resources on high-profile and strategically important operations. Protracted refugee situations that drag on for years, without any immediate prospect of finding durable solutions, are almost invariably neglected and under-funded.*

If the number of protracted situations has declined[4] over the past decade, the number of people trapped in them continues to be unacceptably high. The largest proportion of these long-term refugees are to be found in Asia, while the highest number of protracted refugee situations are in Africa. The problem is thus concentrated in the two regions of the world with the greatest development challenges.

Protracted exile breeds its own particular and serious difficulties. As indicated already, most of the world's long-term refugees are to be found in countries that are struggling to reach the Millennium Development Goals and to meet the basic needs of their own citizens. New global challenges stemming from the current food crisis and rising fuel costs have added to their burden. Often the refugee populations hosted by such countries are located in remote, isolated and least developed areas, which are seriously lacking in livelihood opportunities for both exiled populations and citizens alike. Refugees, especially the large number of children and young people who have spent all of

---

3   Quote from an internal UNHCR memorandum.

4   From 39 in 1998 to 30 today, with a drop also in the overall number of affected refugees, from some 8 million to just over 5 million. For more detailed statistics, see UNHCR 2008b.

their lives in such exile, are unable to make use of or develop their potential. The result is often a high level of personal trauma, social tension and negative survival strategies. Increasingly apparent protection problems include gender and domestic violence, anti-social youth behaviour, prostitution, exploitative employment, illicit livelihood activities, membership of militia groups and irregular onward migration.

Such difficulties have in many cases been exacerbated by the policies pursued by national and international actors. On one hand, the circumstances in many of the countries hosting longstanding refugee populations, whether in camps, rural areas or cities, oblige those people to live under very restrictive conditions, with serious limits placed on their freedom of movement and other rights, including their access to land and the labour market. On the other, donor states and humanitarian organizations have often preferred to focus their attention and resources on high-profile and strategically important operations. Protracted refugee situations that drag on for years, without any immediate prospect of finding durable solutions, are almost invariably neglected and under-funded.

The host states have other genuine concerns stemming from the absence of progress in finding solutions. Community unrest, environmental damage and insufficient resources are among them. So too are camps that may serve as breeding grounds for unrest, conflicts with local populations, or partisan support to still simmering conflicts in neighbouring countries. "Protracted refugee situations represent a significant challenge to both human rights and security" from the perspective of stability in regions and peace-building efforts in countries of origin (see Loescher et al. 2007).

This is a particular danger in situations where states and other actors seek to involve longstanding refugee populations in the pursuit of their political and military objectives. The resolution of protracted refugee situations is thus an objective that goes far beyond the issue of humanitarian concern and has important implications for local, national and regional security.

Unlocking protracted refugee situations

While UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies have played a leading role in focusing new attention on the problem of longstanding refugee situations, it is evident that they are not usually the principal actors when it comes to "unlocking" those situations.

Many refugee situations become protracted because the armed conflicts and human rights violations that forced people to flee have not been resolved, thereby obstructing the primary (and in most cases, the preferred) solution of voluntary repatriation. Indeed, a large proportion of the world's long-term refugees are the product of conflicts characterized by intense ethnic, communal or clan-based antagonisms, high levels of organized violence and destruction, as well as the deliberate displacement of civilian populations.

In many of these armed conflicts, insecurity has been sustained by the fact that certain actors have a vested interest in the continuation of armed conflict, while key players within the international community have not always brought their full influence to bear in efforts to bring armed conflicts to an end and thereby facilitate refugee returns. In some situations, states and non-state actors appear to have deliberately obstructed the search for solutions in order to embarrass their enemies, to retain control over refugee populations and to benefit from the international resources that their presence attracts.

The humanitarian community's ability to resolve protracted refugee situations has also been constrained by the limited availability of alternative solutions. Resettlement numbers are increasing but available places remain relatively scarce, making it impossible to establish the kind of large-scale resettlement programmes that played such a central role in the resolution of the Indo-Chinese refugee situation in the 1980s.

The local integration of refugees has not been regarded very positively by many host states who fear that the permanent presence of large exiled populations might jeopardize their security, upset the ethnic balance of their society, act as a "pull factor" for other refugees and asylum-seekers, take jobs away from nationals and divert development resources that could otherwise be used for the benefit of their own citizens. Indeed, placing severe restrictions on the rights of refugees has in some countries been used as a strategy to prevent integration and promote early (and sometimes premature) repatriation.

It is widely recognized that more equitable burden-sharing through buttressing the capacity of refugee hosting countries is fundamental for improving possibilities for solutions. In particular, there is a need to target development assistance to promote self-reliance and create opportunities for livelihoods to the benefit of refugees and hosting communities alike. The enduring lack of resources directed at achieving solutions for protracted situations is at least partly attributable to the separation of development and refugee issues at the government level in both donor and host states.

The High Commissioner's special initiative

Responding to the circumstances described above, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres has launched a special initiative to focus further attention on protracted refugee situations. The initiative is an effort to stimulate re-prioritization of forgotten situations and new thinking on what to do

about them and to promote support for resolving them both of a material and a political character. It is a partnership building initiative in the first instance, with the aim of encouraging greater commitment on the part of all concerned to coordinate efforts either to resolve the situations entirely or, if this is not yet possible, to at least improve the protection and welfare of the affected populations. The initiative will initially focus on five protracted refugee situations in different parts of the world: Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan; Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh; Bosnian and Croatian refugees in Serbia; Burundian refugees in Tanzania; and Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan.

The initiative is based on a number of understandings.[5] First, it adopts a *diversified approach*, recognizing that protracted refugee situations are varied rather than uniform in their character. Different strategies must consequently be crafted to meet the exigencies of each. It is of particular importance to recognize that while some protracted refugee situations are relatively static, others are highly dynamic and characterized by successive waves of displacement, exodus and return.

There is also a need to draw a distinction between those situations in which an entire refugee population remains in need of a durable solution, and those in which "residual" refugee populations are left behind after solutions have been found for the majority. The relatively small communities of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees remaining in the ECOWAS region provide a good example of the latter phenomenon.

Second, UNHCR's new initiative takes a *comprehensive approach* to the problem of protracted refugee situations. As indicated earlier, efforts to address the issue of protracted refugee situations in the 1990s were constrained by the predominant emphasis placed on repatriation to countries of origin. This meant that the scope for durable solutions was very limited in those situations where continued armed conflict and human rights violations in the country of origin made it impossible for people to go back to their homeland on a voluntary basis. On the other hand, it had the effect of involving UNHCR in a number of repatriation operations, which, according to some critics, were not fully voluntary in nature and were consequently at odds with the Office's own principles.[6]

To avert such scenarios, the High Commissioner's current initiative is founded on a clear recognition of the need to adopt comprehensive approaches to protracted refugee situations, involving a mixture of voluntary repatriation, self-reliance, local integration, resettlement

and migration-related solutions, depending on the opportunities and constraints that exist in any given context.

Third, UNHCR's current effort to address the problem of protracted refugee situations adopts a *realistic approach*. The reality is that it can take many years for a protracted refugee situation to be fully resolved, especially when the country of origin is afflicted by persistent violence, chronic instability, a shattered economy and a fragmented society. When the host state (or states) concerned refuses to consider the possibility of local integration, and when resettlement opportunities do not exist, the options available to UNHCR and its partners are even more limited.

In such circumstances, there is a need to be patient with respect to the pace and potential for durable solutions to be found. That is why long-term efforts to resolve protracted refugee situations should be matched by immediate action to improve the quality of life of the exiled populations: by ensuring that they enjoy adequate protection of, and can exercise, their basic rights; by enabling them to engage in productive activities and establish sustainable livelihoods; and by providing refugees with education and training programmes that will allow them to develop skills that they can use in the future, wherever that might be.

Finally, it is essential to adopt an *analytical approach* to the issue of protracted refugee situations. As indicated earlier, such situations are often less static than they superficially appear to be. Even camps that are unaffected by large-scale influxes or repatriation movements undergo a constant process of socio-economic and demographic change: older refugees die and new members of the population are born, some refugees may move out of the camp to look for livelihood opportunities elsewhere (even if they are formally barred from doing so), while those who have benefited from resettlement will usually send remittances back to their families, thereby changing the size and structure of the community's economy.

Conclusion

The international community can take heart from the fact that in recent years, new opportunities have arisen in relation to the search for solutions to protracted refugee situations. And as explained in a recent UNHCR paper, a number of new partnership opportunities have cropped up, which will support UNHCR's efforts to promote the voluntary return and sustainable reintegration of refugee and displaced populations (UNHCR 2008a). However, such openings need to be capitalized upon now and urgently; they should not give rise to complacency.

This is, though, a task that goes well beyond the mandate and capacity of UNHCR. It is clear that humanitarian assistance alone is not the solution. Protracted situations

---

5   For further details of the initiative, see UNHCR 2008c.

6   The repatriation movements to Myanmar in 1994-1995 and to Tanzania in 1997 are the most commonly cited examples (see Duffy Toft 2007).

are marked by their political contours and require responses at the political level, including when it comes to their causes. As long as the situation in countries of origin remains unresolved, host countries bear the brunt of the burden, a fact that not only needs to be politically acknowledged, but also needs to be responded to through provision of stronger support both to the refugees and to the hosting communities. All three solutions to refugee situations must be part of a coherent strategy for resolving them. The UN family needs to come together as part of a team, in the interests of greater coherence. The collective effort needs to be able to draw upon a wider range of knowledge and expertise than refugee situations can usually command. This team has to combine the efforts of countries of origin and asylum, donor states and resettlement countries, refugees and civil society, and humanitarian and development organizations acting in concert.

Until this happens, the millions of refugees locked into protracted exile will remain no one's priority, a forgotten statistic. This is a fact that has proved extremely difficult to alter – but this is, of course, not a reason not to try.

References

Crisp, J. 2003. "No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa." *New Issues in Refugee Research* 68.

Duffy Toft, M. 2007. "The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation Policy." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24, 2.

Loescher, G., J. Milner, E. Newman and G. Troeller. 2007. "Protracted Refugee Situations and the Regional Dynamics of Peacebuilding." *Conflict, Security and Development* 7, 3 (October).

Ogata, S. 2005. *The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s*. New York: W.W. Norton.

UNHCR. 2003. *Agenda for Protection*. 3rd ed. (October). Available online at <www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3e637b194>.

————. 2008a. "Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy: UNHCR's Role in Support of the Return and Reintegration of Displaced Populations." Informal Consultative Meeting (February 18). Available online at <www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/47ac2e3c2.pdf>.

————. 2008b. "Outline for the Oral Update on Protracted Situations Which Would Benefit from International Support." Standing Committee (March 3). Available online at <www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47d6a6762.html>.

————. 2008c. "Protracted Refugee Situations: Revisiting the Problem." Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Standing Committee, 42nd Meeting (June 2). EC/59/SC/CRP.13. Available online at <www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/484514c12.pdf>.

Citizenship in the 21st Century: International Approaches

The Fall 2008 edition of *Canadian Diversity / Diversité Canadienne* provides a comparative perspective on international approaches to citizenship, broadly defined in terms of legal status, civic identity and civic practice.

The issue includes articles profiling Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

It also features thematic articles on the relationship between citizenship and transnationalism; multiculturalism and integration; stakeholder citizenship; dual citizenship; non-citizen voting; as well as recent debates about Canadian identity and the "value" of Canadian citizenship.

This issue of *Canadian Diversity / Diversité Canadienne* is the latest in a series of international comparisons on migration and diversity topics. Past issues looked at the Integration of Newcomers, National Identity and Diversity, International Approaches to Pluralism, and Negotiating Religious Pluralism.

To obtain a copy: ➠
www.canada.metropolis.net/publications/publication_form.htm

Protracted Refugee Situations and the Right of Return

HOWARD ADELMAN[1]

According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), protracted displacement situations occur where no durable solution has been found five years after that displacement took place, though the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) describes them as "warehoused" after a period of *ten* years. Protracted refugees and internally displaced peoples (IDPs) are often correlated with protracted violent conflicts over a long period. However, there is no necessary linkage. Tutsi refugees remained in a protracted situation for approximately 30 years, but the violence had ceased almost a quarter of a century before, resuming only in 1990. Bhutanese refugees lived in camps in Nepal for years without a protracted conflict. In protracted situations resulting from forced displacement, in a context of physical and psychological insecurity, most refugees' lives remain on hold confined to refugee camps often in remote, desolate and dangerous border areas in countries of first asylum usually without rights of mobility or employment and very limited opportunities to engage in commerce or trade. Militias and locals often prey on them. In addition to material deprivation, they suffer from psychosocial problems, violence and sexual exploitation. Their sense of self worth is eviscerated by hopelessness and despair. Compassion fatigue often leads to the provision of reduced rations and services.

Approximately 4.5 of 6.2 million refugees under UNHCR protection live in protracted refugee situations, mostly in Africa and Asia. According to a 2004 report by UNHCR, the average duration of protracted situations increased from nine to 17 years between 1993 and 2003. There are now also twice as many IDPs than refugees in protracted situations.

The oldest extant protracted refugee situation in the world is that of the Palestinian refugees. Over 700,000 fled or were forced to flee the hostilities that occurred in 1948 when five Arab armies invaded the new, UN-endorsed, Jewish state. In their 2006 report on the Iraq War for the U.S. Congress, entitled *The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach*, Lee H. Hamilton and former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III recommended addressing the *right of return* to end the conflict. President Bush repeated the centrality of the right of return instead of the formula, a just solution to the Palestinian refugee conflict. What did the settlement of the Iraq War have to do with the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees to homes from which they have fled, in 1948, in what is now Israel? Is there a right of return? Has anything ever been done anywhere at any time to implement it?

The right of return is included in a plethora of international covenants and documents in addition to the myriad of resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly interpreting the original 1948 resolution and urging Israel to permit return following a peace agreement when and if refugees agreed to return in peace. Can a rights-based approach help resolve the problem and find durable solutions for these refugees? Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (July 28, 1951), in Article 1(C), insists

---

1   Howard Adelman is the editor of *Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home*, Ashgate Publishers, which will appear in October 2008. He is also co-author with Elazar Barkan of the forthcoming *Rites of Return*. This article is based on material from these two books.

that only the refugee can freely determine whether or not to return to his home or country. Article 12(4) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides the displaced with a "right to enter his own country." Rights guarantee freedom of movement.

Prior to the 1990s, UNHCR emphasized voluntariness and the exercise of free will by the individual refugee in contemplating return. The exercise of that free will was linked with the disappearance of the sources of the violence that had stimulated the exodus rather than as an exercise of a right. Return was not to be coerced. However, UNHCR's 1996 *Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection*, which can be traced back to UNHCR's September 1993 draft "Protection Guide on Voluntary Repatriation," subsumed voluntary repatriation under the right of return rather than linking return simply with changing conditions, namely reduced violence. Is repatriation as a right the solution for refugees and IDPs in protracted refugee situations?

Currently, there are over 1 million refugees in Zimbabwe; almost 1.5 million IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a similar number in northern Uganda; 750,000 in Côte d'Ivoire; 250,000 in Georgia; over 500,000 in Azerbaijan (though 60,000 Georgian refugees returned to Abkhazia's Gali District where the Georgians constitute the majority); an estimated 4 million plus in Colombia resulting from both the civil and narcotics wars; over 3 million Afghanis who remain as refugees and IDPs; and over 2 million Iraqi refugees and over 2 million Iraqi IDPs as a byproduct of the U.S.-led invasion, the resultant insurgency, internal ethnic and religious wars. Though many will return when the violence stops, it is unlikely there will be returns where the returnees constitute a minority. Look at the historical record.

In the organized return of Indochinese refugees beginning in the late 1980s, no ethnic minorities were returned. In Rwanda, Tutsis returned from almost 30 years in exile in 1994 but only behind the victorious Tutsi-led rebel army and only after almost 1 million Tutsi civilians were slaughtered by Hutu extremists in the worst genocide since the Holocaust. When 1 million Hutus were released from the control of the extremists in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) after the former Rwandan government army and its militia allies in Zaire were defeated, the Hutu refugees returned to Rwanda where they constituted 85% of the population. In addition to Zaire, the Tanzanian government forced an additional 500,000 Hutus to return. In contrast, after the war broke out in the late 1990s between Ethiopia and Eritrea, those of Ethiopian and Eritrean extraction living in the opposite country who were forced or "encouraged" to leave have not been permitted to return.

Following the Dayton Accords, leaders in the West, strongly supported by NGOs and international agencies, were committed to cease ethnic cleansing in Bosnia by repatriating the refugees. The High Representative of the UN Secretary-General had the power to force recalcitrant local officials to follow the policy and remove the obstreperous ones who did not. The international community invested enormous amounts of money to implement this policy. More than half of the 2 million refugees returned and Bosnia was cited as a successful case of repatriation. However, the vast majority were ethnic-majority returns and many cases recorded as minority returns included those who had only returned to reclaim and sell their property. Genuine cases of minority returns

> *Prior to the 1990s, UNHCR emphasized voluntariness and the exercise of free will by the individual refugee in contemplating return. The exercise that free will was linked with the disappearance of the sources of the violence that had stimulated the exodus rather than as an exercise of a right. Return was not to be coerced.*

to majority controlled towns and areas consisted mostly of the elderly who were in no position to restart their lives. Relatively little genuine minority repatriation took place. In the Kosovo war in 1999, the UN Security Council resolution 1239, adopted on May 14, 1999, decreed "the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety and in dignity." NATO military action against Serbia enforced the decree but did far too little to ensure the security and safety of the Serbian minority except in the small enclaves where they were the majority. Consequently, tens of thousands of Serbs fled Kosovo.

Similar events took place during the same period in Asia. Following the withdrawal of the Indonesians from East Timor after the independence movement won the vote, a large return to East Timor took place, but new refugees fled to Indonesia. The Lhotshampa refugees, who were denaturalized and had been chased out or had fled Bhutan in the 1980s, were not reintegrated into Nepal but kept in refugee camps. In October 2006, the U.S. offered to resettle 60,000 Bhutanese refugees, with Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand and

Australia agreeing to pick up the rest who want to resettle. In Burma, there were two separate failed repatriations of the Rohingyas, the first resulting in their wide scale abuse which forced most to flee again and undercut any possibility of the second effort succeeding. The international community never tried to repatriate the large number of Burmese refugees along the Thai border. However, the international community, again led by the U.S., has recently initiated a resettlement policy along with a small effort to integrate some of the refugees into Thailand. In Sri Lanka, after IDPs fled the battle between the Sinhalese-dominated government in Colombo and the Tamil Tigers, Hindu Tamils were resettled to ensure Sinhalese both demographic as well as strategic control of certain areas.

> *The discrepancy between the moral ideals of repatriation and its implausibility in the real world in cases of ethnic conflict has not lead to any re-evaluation of the principles or the language of rights… Insistence on a right of minority repatriation only leads to greater misery for refugees and inhibits the development of more feasible solutions.*

In southern Sudan, a large return movement began after a peace agreement was signed in 2004 between the Khartoum government and the Southern rebels. As a result, refugees began returning to areas where their ethnic group was the majority. Before ink had been put on paper to settle the southern war, a rebellion broke out in the Darfur region of western Sudan, and the government of Khartoum, with the support of nomadic Arab militias, initiated the ethnic cleansing of the African agriculturalists, the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa. Over 2 million were internally displaced and 200,000 fled to Chad. In spite of the presence of large numbers of humanitarian workers, a relatively large peacekeeping force, the widespread condemnation of the actions of the Sudanese government, and the prosecution of Sudanese government officials by the International Criminal Court, there is no sign of return for the displaced, a return that continues to be unlikely unless coercive force is used.

Returning to Europe, in 2004 Kofi Annan proposed a peace agreement for Cyprus endorsed by Greece, Turkey and the EU that called for *non*-repatriation of refugees

and Turkish settlers brought into Cyprus by the occupying Turk power in the north. The Greek Cypriots rejected the deal although practice belies the right of return widely upheld.

The failure to integrate refugees locally or resettle them abroad often produces refugee warriors who continue to destabilize the states from which they fled as well as neighbouring states. Refugee camps become a base from which they wage war, recruit others, or rest, unintentionally abetted by the humanitarian aid available in the refugee camps.

Authorities and donors can ensure that aid meets the basic needs of refugees but this will not resolve the protracted nature of the refugee and IDP crisis. One can follow the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) model to increase the capacity of refugees through education and training programs and to increase the readiness of refugees to seek meaningful and productive employment, for such points in the future when durable solutions are available. Such a policy was made public in the Pre-ExCom Consultations, "Moving Forward: Identifying Specific Measures to End Refugee Warehousing" (September 2004, 29), and in an alphabet soup of partnership programs based on C+, CPA, FDS, DAR, the 4Rs and DCI. But this does nothing to aid the search for durable solutions and nothing to end the protracted situation of refugees.

Another proactive response to protracted situations is a rights-based approach as opposed to a needs-based or capacity-building approach. Instead of *merely* trying to ensure that the standards in the camps meet minimum conditions, and instead of going one step further and trying to build the capacities of those refugees, countries of first asylum are urged to guarantee the rights of refugees to move and seek employment so that refugees can be *economically* integrated even if they are not *politically* integrated, a program consistent with the 1951 Refugee Convention.

There are a number of reasons why countries of first asylum are extremely reluctant to offer more rights to refugees: rising unemployment rates in their own countries could lead to domestic unrest if refugees were given the opportunity to work; such rights would provide a disincentive for refugees to return home and an act as a magnet for others to come; and settlement would not encourage refugee-exporting countries to look for solutions. The policy of local integration, which was the original mandate for UNRWA in dealing with the Palestinian refugees, largely did not work. What about pushing for another set of rights, the right of refugees to return to their homes?

The "right of return" has become a symbol for resolving refugee crises the world over lest ethnic cleansing be

legitimized. On December 23, 2004, the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office in Nepal and the Eminent Persons Group on Refugee and Migratory Movements in Sri Lanka issued a statement calling for solutions to end refugee warehousing that was endorsed by more than 100 organizations and a great number of individuals including refugee law scholars and human rights activists as well as four Nobel laureates, Archbishop Desmond Tutu among them. This right applies despite whether or not the individual or group held citizenship in the state that now controls the territory from which the flight took place. Furthermore, the right has been extended to progeny not born in the country from which the refugees fled. For many, return provides an assumed solution to the refugee crises.

However, a century of historical practice indicates that when ethnic or religious *minorities* are uprooted, the displacement is most often permanent even when the international community makes strenuous efforts, *except when coercive force is used*. The discrepancy between the moral ideals of repatriation and its implausibility in the real world in cases of ethnic conflict has not led to any re-evaluation of the principles or the language of rights. Emphasizing return as a durable solution in cases of minority return perpetuates the plight of refugees and extends the protracted situation while prolonging the misery of refugees and fostering the creation of refugee warriors. Insistence on a right of minority repatriation only leads to greater misery for refugees and inhibits the development of more feasible solutions.

The pre-eminence of ethnicity as a source of violence is not necessarily applicable in cases of ideological conflict as in the case of Afghanistan. The Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and UNHCR signed in Kabul on December 26, 2007, designed to help Afghan refugees return recognized "that the right of all citizens to leave and to return to their country is a basic human right enshrined, *inter alia*, in Article 13(2) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Return was ostensibly based on international human rights agreements guaranteeing that right. But Afghan return was a matter of majority return. Other than the continuing violence of the Taliban, which clearly impeded return, there was no threat to the returnees because of their ethnic identity. This was not a case of minority return and the citation of a right to return was superfluous to the actual repatriation.

Majority return following a political settlement is often successful and does not require the citation of a right to return. Minority repatriation has almost never been implemented successfully, except through force. Citing a right to return has not and will not reverse the reality. If, in cases of ethnic and religious conflict, administrative and political energies are spent holding refugees in "temporary" camps for long periods in the hopes that they can be repatriated when the violent conflict ends, return will remain forlorn and refugees will suffer unnecessarily. Of course, while resettlement with reparations may solve the individual deprivation, it may undermine the contribution of refugees to the self-determination of the group.

The Experiences of Second Generation Canadians

The Metropolis Project, in partnership with the Association for Canadian Studies, has produced a special issue of the magazine *Canadian Diversity* about the experiences of second generation Canadians. The issue (Spring 2008) presents a range of perspectives on the second generation in Canada and includes two articles from international researchers on the experiences of the second generation in Los Angeles, United States, and in Europe. This publication describes issues of diversity, identity and integration as they pertain to and affect those of the second generation, and features an introduction by Audrey Kobayahsi of Queen's University. The publication includes more than 25 articles by knowledgeable policy-makers and researchers.

To order a copy, please contact: ➡
www.canada.metropolis.net/publications/publication_form.htm

Climate Change Displacement:
Problems and Prospects

ANGELA WILLIAMS
Sussex Law School, University of Sussex

Home to more than 90,000 people, the Pacific Island nation of Kiribati consists of 33 island and coral atolls located halfway between Australia and Hawaii. As a low-lying island nation, Kiribati is incredibly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Rising sea levels, erosion caused by flooding, an increased prevalence of storms, and unpredictable weather patterns mean the nation state of Kiribati is in serious danger of being entirely submerged. Recent decades have seen extensive internal migration as people have relocated to Tarawa, the now crowded main island atoll. In light of this, President Anote Tong recently called for international assistance to relocate residents from Kiribati before the country disappears entirely, suggesting that a worse case scenario would see Kiribati become uninhabitable within 50 years. Tong stated "I've appealed to the international community that we need to address this challenge. It's a challenge for the whole global community" (Marks 2008).

Climate change, environmental degradation and displacement

Along with many other small island states such as Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Vanuatu, and the Maldives, Kiribati provides a conspicuous reminder of the impact climate change is having upon the natural environment and its consequences for individuals, communities and, in some cases, entire nations. The climate change-induced environmental degradation suffered by small island states is now well known. Along with rising sea levels, small island states have experienced: increased levels of erosion due to flooding and storm surges which degrade crop production; the bleaching of coral reefs which destroys marine resources; unpredictable weather patterns which affect agriculture and the availability of safe water supplies; and an increase in tropical storms which destroy both natural resources and community infrastructure.

However, it is not only small island states that are suffering from climate change. Low-lying coastal communities face similar problems and the consequences are drastically accentuated in countries like Bangladesh, where a 45 centimetre rise in sea levels would displace an estimated 5.5 million people (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001: 569). Unpredictable weather patterns have significant impacts on the availability of clean water supplies, threaten food security, and can foster the spread of vector-borne diseases. Further problems are created in mountainous regions such as the Himalayas, where the melting of glaciers creates large unstable lakes that threaten downstream communities, infrastructure, agriculture and natural resources.

While climate change results in environmental degradation on a global scale, such symptoms are most severely felt in developing states that lack sufficient resources and capacity to adapt. Current estimates anticipate that somewhere between 50 million and 200 million people will be displaced as a result of climate change by the year 2080 (Nicholls 2004). There continues to be ongoing debate as to the credibility of these estimates due to questions regarding the appropriate scientific methodology being adopted – a lack of baseline data regarding, for example, rising sea levels makes estimations difficult and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has adopted, to date, a conservative approach. There are also issues concerning

the isolation of climate change as the primary motivating factor for displacement (distinguishing from, for example, economic migrants). Nonetheless, climate change currently has a direct and significant impact on community displacement and forced migration and, with no foreseeable solution to the global climate change problem, it will most likely persist and escalate in future years.

Current international protection for "climate change refugees"

Most discussion regarding how those displaced by climate change should be recognized within the international legal system has been channelled through the "environmental refugee" discourse. As environmental degradation is the primary contributing factor to climate change displacement, the notion of a "climate change refugee" has often been considered a subset of the broader "environmental refugee" category. However, this approach has proven to be problematic, partly due to a lack of any meaningful definition or recognition of environmental refugees within international law. The concept of environmental refugee has been in wide circulation for more than 20 years with various attempts to define the term based on the duration of the migration (temporary or permanent), the specific reason for migration (rising sea levels, desertification, changing weather patterns, and so on), and migration in relation to state borders (internal or transborder). Most recently, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defined "environmental migrants" as "persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad." The problem of climate change displacement could easily fall within the IOM definition, or indeed many of the other categories of environmental refugees identified over the years. However, a lack of consistency or international endorsement of any one approach indicates the international legal community remains reluctant to accept and promote environmental refugee terminology.

The 1951 Refugee Convention

Attempts have been made to argue that those displaced by environmental degradation fall within the existing international refugee legal framework. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention) was created in response to migration flows in post-war Europe and guarantees legal rights to those who come within its definitional scope. Article 1(A) states that the Convention will apply to those who "…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for

reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." This definition clearly does not extend to those displaced by environmental degradation. Despite numerous attempts to argue such individuals should (or already) fall within the Refugee Convention definition, it is highly unlikely that such an approach would be accepted by the international legal community. Moreover, state parties remain reluctant to extend the scope of the Refugee Convention so as to include those displaced by environmental factors, since such a move would lead to the

> *There remains a lacuna within the international legal system for the recognition and protection of those displaced as a result of climate change, be it internally, or across borders.*

imposition of additional responsibilities and obligations. There is also an argument to suggest that the Refugee Convention is an inappropriate forum for climate change refugees to be recognized within, given the specific nature of the Convention and the rationale for its inception.

It is unlikely that attempting to wedge a new category of refugee into a pre-existing framework (and notably a framework that was created for a very different and specific purpose) would result in a successful outcome for those suffering climate change displacement. Moreover, the fact that refugee law has been created in order to address transborder displacement means that those suffering the same displacement problems, but not moving across state borders, are not entitled to recognition under this legal regime. Thus, the Refugee Convention remains largely ineffective in offering any support for those affected by climate change displacement.

Internally Displaced Persons

Another possible option for securing protection for those suffering climate change displacement is found within the law and policy relating to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees recognizes that there are significant numbers of people suffering displacement who do not move across state borders and, in response, concluded the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The definition for IDPs is much wider than that included in the Refugee Convention as it includes "persons who have been forced

or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or *natural or human-made disasters*, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border" [emphasis added]. Accordingly, those displaced as a result of climate change could be recognized within the IDP framework. In accordance with the Guiding Principles, all authorities and international actors must "prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons" and moreover, guarantee that "every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced" (Principles 5 and 6(1)).

> *The negotiation of a new post-Kyoto agreement to enter into force in 2012 represents, at the very least, an ideal opportunity to specifically recognize the problem of climate change displacement and encourage regional development of law and policy.*

It is important to note, however, that rather than operating as a binding international legal agreement, the IDP Principles are instead a set of guidelines to be adopted and implemented by national governments. In this way, the IDP Principles allow for a more organic bottom-up approach enabling states to engage and develop relevant and appropriate mechanisms (although there are inevitably issues regarding effective implementation and enforcement of non-binding measures such as these). However, limitations exist in the form of the potential for states to merely demonstrate a token expression of support (rather than properly engage with the Principles), and in the same way that the Refugee Convention is limited in its applicability to transborder displacement, the IDP Principles only apply where no international state border has been crossed. Therefore, there remains a lacuna within the international legal system for the recognition and protection of those displaced as a result of climate change, be it internally, or across borders. Continued attempts to manipulate existing legal frameworks so as to respond to and incorporate climate change displacement remain ineffective. Instead, what is required is a fresh analysis of the situation whereby new and emerging trends of climate change displacement are identified so that specific and effective recognition and protection can be afforded to affected individuals.

Resolving the protection gap

The recognition of inadequacies within the current protection regime highlights the need for a new framework within which climate change displacement can be effectively managed. It remains highly unlikely a new global agreement in the form of an international treaty would be accepted. States generally remain very reluctant to agree to new and additional responsibilities and associated legal obligations (one need only consider the enormous challenge of securing a global binding agreement on climate change). Moreover, there are various social, cultural and economic consequences involved with displacement which suggest this issue may be much better addressed by adopting a bottom-up policy approach rather than the more prescriptive top-down approach.

In this way, it may be possible to pursue a system of regional cooperation whereby states build bilateral and regional agreements in order to recognize and manage the problem of climate change displacement, under the auspices of an international framework. The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Climate Change Convention) already promotes regional policy development by highlighting the value of adaptation with respect to climate change, which would conceivably extend to issues of displacement (Article 4(1)(b)). Moreover, the Nairobi work programme has been established under the auspices of the Climate Change Convention to assist state parties in improving their understanding and assessment of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 2005). Accordingly, there currently already exists an international framework within which regional cooperation is encouraged as a mechanism for addressing climate change problems.

A system of regional agreements would allow for existing geopolitical and economic relationships to be further developed. Moreover, a regionally orientated system encourages states to participate and engage with climate displacement law and policy based upon each individual states' relative capacity and in response to the specific displacement challenges experienced in that region rather than attempting to adopt a global template for adoption by all states. Nevertheless, because the regional system would operate within an international framework, there remains scope to ensure some consistency and guidance in terms of appropriate definitions, rules on recognition, protection, and so on. Furthermore, while inherently a problem of international importance, the very nature of climate change displacement will mean impacts are felt regionally in the first instance, as displaced individuals, communities and nations migrate across neighbouring borders. Not only does transborder migration appear the easiest option in many situations, but it is likely that those subject to forced displacement will seek similar social, cultural and

environmental conditions which often, although not always, will be found in neighbouring states. Accordingly, there exists both substantive and logistical rationale for adopting a regional response to climate change displacement.

Finally, while the current climate change framework already provides for some international coordination by way of adaptation measures, there remains scope for greater development in this area. The negotiation of a new post-Kyoto agreement to enter into force in 2012 represents an ideal opportunity to, at the very least, specifically recognize the problem of climate change displacement and encourage regional development of law and policy. By not seeking a binding definition, but instead merely recognizing the challenges posed by climate change displacement, states do not threaten their sovereignty or create new binding obligations. Furthermore, it may be possible at the international level to conclude a non-binding Plan of Action (outside the ambit of the post-Kyoto agreement) that provides states with an opportunity to develop more practical strategies and techniques for implementing regional initiatives. Indeed, it could be that the development of regional agreements in response to climate change displacement may well, over time, create new rules of customary international law that do inadvertently become binding on states in future years.

For a more detailed discussion of the issues raised in this article, see Williams, A., "Turning the Tide: Recognising Climate Change Refugees in International Law," in *Law and Policy* 30, 4 (forthcoming October 2008).

References

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2001. *Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marks, K. 2008. "Paradise Lost: Climate Change Forces South Sea Islanders to Seek Sanctuary Abroad." *The Independent* (June 6). Accessed on August 5, 2008 at <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/paradise-lost-climate-change-forces-south-sea-islanders-to-seek-sanctuary-abroad-841409.html>.

Nicholls, R. 2004. "Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss in the 21st Century: Changes Under the SRES Climate and Socio-economic Scenarios" *Global Environmental Change* 14, p. 69-86.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2005. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eleventh session. Accessed on August 5, 2008 at <unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/05a01.pdf>.

Immigration Futures

The Summer 2008 issue of *Canadian Diversity / Diversité canadienne* looks at the future of immigration with articles that focus on migration trends and patterns, and on new migration phenomena. This edition stems from a Metropolis inter-conference seminar on Immigration Futures hosted by the Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements and held in Prato, Italy, in May 2006. Articles are drawn from this event, as well as from the 12th International Metropolis Conference in Melbourne, Australia. Contributions to this issue thus examine future immigration flows, the trend toward circular and return migration, the increased feminization of migration, the growth of Asia as a migration competitor, migration and the environment, and the ethics of migration. With an introduction by Demetrios Papademetriou of the Migration Policy Institute, this issue of *Canadian Diversity / Diversité canadienne* provides researchers, policy-makers and practitioners with a wide range of perspectives on what the future of immigration may look like.

To obtain a copy: ⟾
www.canada.metropolis.net/publications/publication_form.htm

Waiting for What? The Humanitarian Dilemma of Protracted Refugee Situations at Home and Abroad

JENNIFER HYNDMAN
Department of Geography, Syracuse University

Waiting among refugees has become the rule, not the exception. The United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) reports that there were 8,525,000 refugees in limbo for 10 years or more at the end of 2007 (USCRI 2008). According to the same source, the number of refugees resettled in 2007 was 76,700, less than 1% of the number of refugees from protracted situations and far less than 1% of all refugees worldwide. Clearly, resettlement is only one small part of a comprehensive solution to the intransigence of protracted refugee situations but it has become an increasingly important tool for leveraging additional durable solutions for refugees. This short article touches on protracted refugee situations in relation to Canada, but the lessons it draws are relevant to other resettlement states and to those considering increased refugee resettlement as a policy prospect.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) (2006: 106) defines a protracted refugee situation as "one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo, [where] their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile." UNHCR arbitrarily defines a protracted refugee situation as a refugee population of 25,000 persons or more, most of which are based in developing countries. This critical mass cut off, however, occludes smaller groups who have waited just as long for some kind of permanent legal status. Another term, "refugee warehousing" has also been used to describe the plight of those refugees who live in camps or are waiting in confined quarters (USCRI 2008, UNHCR, 2006). Warehousing, however, connotes a "warehouser," and there is rarely a single actor or factor that keeps refugees in camps. By definition, refugee camps are only meant to be stop-gap measures. In practice, however, they can and do remain in place for years at a time.

Verdirame and Harrell-Bond (2005: 335) argue that by "viewing countries of asylum as 'waiting rooms' before repatriation, UNHCR has virtually given up on [local] integration, choosing instead to coerce refugees to the margins of host societies and to segregate them in camps." The pressing problem of refugees waiting in camps, or without legal status or rights to employment for decades in some cases, is not simply UNHCR's fault. Protracted refugee situations are symptomatic of a geopolitical landscape that no longer values refugees in the same way it did during the Cold War. Local integration in a first country of asylum requires hefty incentives and negotiation with host governments that are often struggling to provide education, health care, jobs and infrastructure for their own systems, let alone the refugees who live among them. Jacobsen (2005) proposes local integration as a viable solution for refugees, especially if services for refugees do not duplicate those for citizens but rather are integrated themselves and have funding from international donors to make additional services possible. UNHCR and its partners in Uganda have moved in this direction, addressing refugee and host populations together as a "refugee-affected area" (Kaiser 2005). While local integration may seem viable from the perspective of the global North, scarce resources and a lack of jobs for

citizens in countries of first asylum make permanent legal status politically and economically difficult.

Why should academics, activists and policy-makers care about protracted refugee situations? First of all, they bring us all into conversation with one another by traversing the spectrum of practice, politics, policy and research.

Protracted refugee situations from a policy and practice perspective

Whether or not resettling large numbers of refugees from protracted situations is good government policy remains to be seen; little research on the topic is yet available (Yu et al. 2007). People from such situations are likely to have more health issues, higher educational deficits (or delays) and, possibly, a more difficult adaptation to a new host country, given the extraordinarily basic infrastructure and services in a great number of refugee camps (Eggers 2006).

From a national perspective, the decision to bring in refugees from long-term situations has direct settlement implications. Refugees from protracted refugee situations tend to have greater medical needs because they have been "in limbo" in camps or detention centres, often without basic health care, for many years (McLean, Friesen and Hyndman 2006). Since the passing of the Canadian *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (IRPA) in 2002, refugees are chosen more on the basis of *protection* needs than on their "ability to establish" in Canadian society. Pressé and Thomson (2007) state that the IRPA underscores protection for refugees first and foremost, and that all resettled refugees are exempt from certain medical requirements that apply to other immigrant groups. This policy shift has resulted in a refugee population with much higher medical and other settlement needs. Additionally, "given that some of these groups come from entirely different political, economic and social contexts, many refugees now have settlement needs that include special requirements arising from years of trauma or torture followed by years in camps" (Ibid.).

Canada has announced that it will select and settle 3,000 to 8,000 refugees from long-term protracted refugee situations over the next five years. Up to 5,000 of these will be Bhutanese refugees from Nepal (CIC 2007). The rationale for this decision appears to be extraordinarily humanitarian in character. However, many also view it as *strategic*. "In addition to the humanitarian imperative, Canada has a strategic interest in helping refugees find lasting solutions – because the longer refugee populations languish without access to durable solutions, the greater the risk they could pose to stability in their region, resulting in more refugee outflows" (Pressé and Thomson 2007). Furthermore, if used strategically, the resettlement of refugees from protracted situations has the potential to improve camp conditions as well as to unlock durable

solutions for those refugees who remain in camps.

Pressé and Thomson (2007) outline the evolution of Canada's current focus on the resettlement of refugees from protracted situations. In 2000, UNHCR launched its Global Consultations on International Protection to revitalize the international refugee regime. Throughout the 1990s, resettlement had fallen to the bottom of the preferred list of UNHCR's durable solutions (the other being voluntary repatriation and local integration). The consultations led to the publication of the *Agenda for Protection*, which listed resettlement as an important solution and called on states to 1) increase their settlement numbers; 2) diversify the kinds of refugee groups accepted for resettlement; and 3) introduce more flexible criteria in order to secure more options for durable solutions, especially for refugees from protracted situations.

> *While local integration may seem viable from the perspective of the global North, scarce resources and a lack of jobs for citizens in countries of first asylum make permanent legal status politically and economically difficult.*

Canada's commitment to taking in thousands of refugees (such as the Karen from Burma now living in Thailand, the Rohingya from Burma now in Bangladesh, and the Lhotshampas from Bhutan now in Nepal) is all the more remarkable given Canada's limited experience in settling these groups (CIC 2008). A major policy and research question emerges from this move: what are the links between these challenges of settlement and integration and the more international conditions and geopolitics of protracted refugee situations? How can research conducted in the global South where most long-term refugee situations exist inform, if at all, refugee resettlement in the global North? And vice versa, how does knowledge and practice about settling refugees from long-term camps, for example, inform our analysis and treatment of the conundrum of protracted refugee situations?

One example of such connections comes from a recent report on the politics of resettlement among Bhutanese refugees of Lhotshampa background living in Nepal under the auspices of UNHCR (Banki 2008). The research outlines the extremely sensitive nature of the politics of resettlement, where those who wish to pursue resettlement options are harassed, harmed and, in one case, killed by

those who view such options negatively. The screening of refugees for resettlement in and near refugee camps has led to violence and the involvement of Nepali police, leading to a clear deterioration of the security environment for those living there. And yet, as large numbers of refugees depart from the camps, common resources (such as firewood) will be more readily available and camp facilities less overcrowded. At the same time, the likely depletion of educated, skilled and experienced workers could reduce the quality of camp services, particularly in the health and education sectors (Ibid.).

This is but one example of how national policy decisions about refugee resettlement from protracted situations have implications for those left behind, both in terms of access to resources and security.

> *When does the long-term suspension of human rights among refugees waiting in protracted situations become a human rights violation? And who is responsible for the negligence? Or is the waiting done by refugees in the "temporary" spaces of UN-sponsored camps simply* neglect *in legal terms?*

Another question worth probing from a research perspective is the impact of prolonged waiting on refugees: physically, mentally, socially and economically speaking. Research methods to capture and analyze such nuanced effects are difficult to develop but can also link challenges of resettlement with the conditions experienced by the refugees prior to their arrival. One example of such research is that conducted by the Immigrant Social Services of British Columbia refugee settlement agency (ISS) which, in conjunction with the refugee-serving Bridge Clinic in Vancouver, kept meticulous statistics on the number of health visits that Acehnese refugees from Indonesia made upon landing in Vancouver. Members of this group had spent three to five years in detention in Malaysia before coming to Canada. The data collected was staggering: deferred medical conditions, eye care, and mental health concerns led to multiple visits by most of the 100 odd refugees who arrived in 2004. Each visit required accompaniment by an interpreter, creating a huge workload for the ISS and its staff. This spike in health needs and settlement resources was not expected, and was in large part attributable to delayed or unavailable health services while in detention.

A separate research project conducted with this same group offered openings for constructive comments on the resettlement process and the services received upon arrival. One of the biggest obstacles faced by refugees upon their arrival was the language barrier. Several refugees suggested that official language learning (in this case, English) in the detention centre *after* their selection by Canada was finalized would have helped ease this transition. Such training could likely be provided at a lower cost than it is once refugees have arrived in Canada (McLean, Friesen, and Hyndman 2006).

A legal perspective on protracted refugee situations

People in protracted refugee situations face "permanent temporariness" and the suspension of basic human rights (to work, to move) over years, even decades. Refugee camps are only intended to be stop-gap measures but they have proven to be very persistent. The average waiting time for refugees has increased from nine years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003 (UNHCR 2006). When does the long-term suspension of human rights among refugees waiting in protracted situations become a human rights violation? And who is responsible for the negligence? Or is the waiting done by refugees in the "temporary" spaces of UN-sponsored camps simply *neglect* in legal terms? These are big and difficult questions, and finding their solutions would require teams of intergovernmental organizations (like UN agencies), lawmakers, lawyers, policy-makers and frontline workers. Technically, signatory states to the 1951 Refugee Convention are not responsible for asylum-seekers or refugees outside their territory, but if 71% of the world's refugees and asylum-seekers are located in the global South, a humanitarian imperative remains salient.

Legally speaking, Durieux and McAdam (2004) have argued that "there is ample documentation of the sub-standard conditions under which many of the larger groups of refugees in the world continue to live, even after a decade or more in exile, and notwithstanding the constant reaffirmation of the applicable legal framework." Under international law, state obligations in terms of broader human rights instruments that apply to refugees in temporary camps are not being met. So, while the national legal framework in Canada, for example, does not require that the Government address refugees and asylum-seekers beyond its territory, exactly what obligations do signatory states to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol have towards people "captured" in protracted refugee situations?

While camps and temporary status provide a refugee with short-term protection based on the supposition that one will not be returned to one's country of origin until it

is safe (protection against *refoulement*), refugees pay a very high price for this one measure of protection at the expense of forfeiting others. "While some rights and restrictions may be justifiable during the initial emergency phase of a mass influx, protection should, in the spirit of the Convention, improve over time rather than stagnate or deteriorate" (Durieux and McAdam 2004: 4). For those in protracted refugee situations, waiting shrinks humanitarian space over time, as basic human rights are suspended indefinitely.

A colleague and I recently argued that the perceived protection needs of people in protracted refugee situations, however, are generally viewed in public discourse as *more legitimate* than those of people who make refugee claims at the Canadian border or at a port of entry (Hyndman and Giles, in progress); a point to which I will return below. In effect, Canada has two streams of refugee entrance: 1) via asylum claims made upon arrival at the border or an airport which are covered by its *legal obligations* to international refugee law as codified in the IRPA; and 2) via resettlement programs organized by the Government of Canada, which are based largely on voluntary pledges made on *humanitarian grounds*. "While signatory states to the Refugee Convention have promised not to *refoule* asylum-seekers at their borders, they have not committed to accept refugees for resettlement" (Laubman 2007).

A theoretical perspective on protracted refugee situations: "Real Refugees Stay Still"

Refugees in protracted situations are often cast as *bona fide*, immobile and passive (USCRI 2008, UNHCR 2006). Unlike people who just show up at the border and make a refugee claim, which could be unfounded, refugees in long-term crises are understood as more of a social rather than political problem. Paternalism and alarmism can easily emerge from these representational strategies.

No matter our position as policy-makers, academics or settlement workers, the way in which we understand and represent refugees has "produced" them as particular subjects in the work we do. None of the former refugees I have known who have had a choice of another legal status has continued to refer to themselves as refugees. It is a category of "otherness," a reference to "noncommunities of the excluded" (Hyndman 2000). Anthropologist Liisa Malkki's work on the ways in which Western norms about asylum assume a sedentarist bias is important: to stay put is the normal order of things and refugees are an aberration of this order (Malkki 1992). Certainly, the very vocabulary of "settlement," "integration," and "immigration" is steeped in a state-centric discourse of becoming part of a society defined by a particular territory (Hyndman and Walton-Roberts 2000). And yet, "integration" looks far preferable to "refugeeness" from a policy perspective in Canada.

Nyers (2006) puts it another way: "The state logic that runs throughout the discourse of refugeeness can also be understood as a power of capture: subjects of the classification regime of 'refugeeness' are caged within a depoliticized humanitarian space." I do not think that refugees see themselves as captured in any particular way, but the very frames of reference used to represent them – in the form of statistics, profiles, classes – serves to render them a population to be managed. In all fairness, governments need to know whom they govern and serve, and how best to achieve the aims of settlement, integration, and societal participation. The real challenge remains doing this without *reproducing* the protracted refugee situation as a place of passive residents. Expanding resettlement programs opens new doors and has the potential of transforming "irregular" migrants who get themselves smuggled to Canada or elsewhere into genuine refugees.

> *As large numbers of refugees depart from the camps, common resources will be more readily available and camp facilities less overcrowded. At the same time, the likely depletion of educated, skilled and experienced workers could reduce the quality of camp services, particularly in the health and education sectors.*

Refugees in protracted situations are often represented as just that: under a "care and maintenance" regime operated by UNHCR and are dependent on the intergovernmental supra-state for social assistance. Studies of protracted situations, such as that of the Lhokshampa Bhutanese refugees cited above (Banki 2008), help to "emplace" displaced people in context, elaborating the struggles they face at the prospect of resettlement and using anecdotal evidence to embody the abstract numbers that leach the history and agency out of those affected. The sedentarist bias identified by Malkki also explains how "real" refugees who stay put in large camps are seen as more benign or acceptable compared with those who move, seeking asylum in a better place.

Protracted refugee situations constitute a humanitarian crisis of significant proportion, yet their resolution has been slow in coming. The legal, political, practical and even representational stakes in this issue require a comprehensive approach that keeps the tent of actors

large. Canada has taken an admirable lead on this front. Let us hope that others will follow.

Canada can use resettlement strategically, both to "share the burden" of providing durable solutions for refugees and to leverage commitment from other states in the global North that might prefer to fund local integration (through the provision of integrated services and other incentives to host governments in developing countries) rather than resettling refugees on its own shores. UNHCR

> *The legal, political, practical and even representational stakes in this issue require a comprehensive approach that keeps the tent of actors large. Canada has taken an admirable lead on this front. Let us hope that others will follow.*

should raise – and it has already begun to do so – the number of refugees requiring resettlement to reflect the numbers of people stuck in protracted refugee situations. Equally important, research on the specific challenges and focused interventions required to make integration from protracted refugee situations successful must begin just as the refugees arrive. Longitudinal research based on basic data kept by settlement agencies will be key to analyzing the outcomes of protracted refugee resettlement. At the moment, there is little to go on except for small "snapshot" studies conducted with specific groups in particular places, such as Acehnese refugees in Vancouver (Hyndman and McLean 2006).

Echoing Laubman (2007) and others, "resettlement and *non-refoulement* must be complementary tools of protection." The humanitarian, "don't die" standards of refugee camps are low: yes, they guarantee non-refoulement, but not much more; the on-going suspension of so many other human rights in the context of protracted refugee situations is not warranted simply because protection against non-refoulement is provided. To continue to ignore this neglect will create grounds for negligence and complicity.

References

Banki, S. 2008. "Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Anticipating the Impact of Resettlement." Austcare Briefing Paper. Accessed June 30, 2008 at <www.austcare.org.au/media/56970/arcnepalbp-lowres.pdf>.

Canada. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 2007. "Canada's New Government to Accept 5,000 Bhutanese Refugees." Accessed August 19, 2008 at <www.cic.gc.ca/ENGLISH/department/media/releases/2007/2007-05-22.asp>.

———. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 2008 "Canada to Welcome 1,300 more Karen refugees." Accessed August 19, 2008 at <www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2008/2008-06-19.asp>.

Durieux, J.-F., and J. McAdam. 2004. "*Non-Refoulement* through Time: The Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies." *International Journal of Refugee Law* 16, 1, p. 4-24.

Eggers, D. 2006. *What is the What*. New York: Vintage.

Hyndman, J. 2000. *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

Hyndman, J., and W. Giles. In progress. "Waiting: Linking Protracted Refugee Situations to Asylum Policies in the Global North." *Gender, Place and Culture*.

Hyndman, J., and M. Walton-Roberts. 2000. "Interrogating Borders: A Transnational Approach to Refugee Research in Vancouver." *Canadian Geographer* 44, 3, p. 244-258.

Jacobsen, K. 2005. *The Economic Life of Refugees*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Kaiser, T. 2005. "Participating in Development? Refugee Protection, Politics and Developmental Approaches to Refugee Management in Uganda." *Third World Quarterly* 26, 2, p. 351-367.

Laubman, S. 2007. "Resettlment's Renaissance: A Cautionary Advocacy." *Refuge* 24, 2, p. 35-47.

Malkki, L. H. 1992. "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees." *Cultural Anthropology* 7, 1 (February), p. 24-43.

———. 1996. "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization." *Cultural Anthropology* 11, 3, p. 377-404.

McLean, J., C. Friesen, and J. Hyndman. 2006. "The First 365 Days: Acehnese Refugees in Vancouver." *RIIM Working Paper* No. 06-07.

Pressé, D., and J. Thomson. 2007. "The Resettlement Challenge: Integration of Refugees from *Protracted Refugee Situations*." Refuge 24, 2, p. 48-53.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 2006. *The State of the World's Refugees*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) 2008. "Warehoused Refugee Populations." *World Refugee Survey* 2008. Accessed June 30, 2008 at <www.refugees.org/uploadedFiles/Investigate/Publications_&_Archives/WRS_Archives/2008/warehoused%20refugee%20populations.pdf>.

Verdirame, G., and B. Harrell-Bond. 2005. *Rights in Exile: Janus-faced Humanitarianism*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Yu, S., E. Ouellet, and A. Warmington. 2007. "Refugee Integration in Canada: A Survey of Empirical Evidence and Existing Services." *Refuge* 24, 2, p. 17-34.

Migrants and Refugees on the Fringes of Europe: Transit Migration, Mixed Flows and New Policy Challenges

FRANCK DÜVELL
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford

Applications for asylum in the old European Union (EU) member states have decreased considerably from the height reached during the 1990s; countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France have recorded the lowest number of applications in years and even decades. At the same time, according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), an increase in applications has been recorded in southern Europe, Scandinavia, and also in the new member states in the east (UNHCR 2008). Countries previously known for large-scale emigration – notably Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania in the East, and Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal in the South – are now experiencing the arrival of both migrants and refugees. Some are filling the gaps left by emigrants by filling positions in construction companies and service industries while others are lodging asylum claims in the first safe EU country they reach. Even countries that were long known for producing refugees, such as Turkey, now receive considerable numbers of refugees themselves.

These phenomena are in one way or another related to the expansion of the EU. Membership in this highly successful economic and political club normally spurs foreign investments and leads to economic growth. Consequently, thriving businesses within member states require more workers, of which immigrant labour can be a substantial source. EU membership also requires adaptation to EU immigration laws. Notably, under such laws, refugees are required to make their application in the first safe country they enter such as Spain, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia or Poland. Finally, while EU membership and, in particular, membership in the Schengen Agreement, allow freedom of movement within the region, they also necessitate tougher immigration and external border controls. As a result, the frontlines of migration control have now shifted from the core EU countries to its fringe countries and those states on the other side of its external borders. This article will highlight and discuss some of the consequences and implications of this phenomenon.

Changing migration coordinates and mixed flows

It is often assumed that the EU is a quasi-natural destination for labour migrants and refugees. Meanwhile, it is also the case that certain neighbouring countries of the EU are attractive or at least alternative destinations for all types of migrants and refugees. For example, Russia is a prime destination for many millions of labour migrants from various regions of the world including India, Turkey, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and Vietnam (Molodikova 2007) and for refugees from post-Soviet countries (namely Uzbekistan, Georgia and Azerbaijan), the Middle East (Syria, Iraq and Palestine) and various African countries (Congo and Nigeria). This can to some extent be explained by the oft-overlooked relationship between the former Soviet Union and the group of so-called friendly states. This relationship has continued to drive distinct migration networks and systems, Kazakhstan being one such example as a result of its oil-derived wealth.

Alternatively, some countries are simultaneously sending migrants to the east and the west. For instance, Ukraine, as well as Moldova and Armenia, are major suppliers of

irregular migrant workers to both Russia and Europe. At the same time, other sending countries, such as Ukraine, are experiencing a significant inflow of migrants and refugees from many parts of the world including China, India and Nigeria. Turkey has already undergone a migration transition and is now not only a country of emigration, but also of immigration and transit. In the south, Libya, an oil-producing country with a small population, is another destination for labour migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt and for refugees from Sudan and other countries. Even Morocco is receiving small numbers of migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the European and Mediterranean migration space consists of several major and minor gravitation points making it much more complex than is commonly assumed.

> *Class appears to be a major determinant of migrants' and refugees' trajectory. Those with sought-after skills and sufficient funds may be able to obtain visas and travel both legally and risk-free. However, those who possess neither of these may only be able to travel as far as their money takes them.*

Nevertheless, despite the geographic, linguistic or cultural proximity of non-EU countries, migrants and refugees sometimes find that conditions are not conducive to an extension of their stay (Düvell 2006). As a consequence, the EU again becomes the most promising alternative and thus remains a top destination for mobile populations. However, labour migrants and refugees face serious obstacles to entering the EU, ranging from strict visa requirements to tough border controls. Many simply accept that they cannot enter and will stay where they are or return to other countries. Others may try to circumvent controls and regulations and enter illegally. A significant proportion of those who attempt to enter illegally fail to get through and end up "stuck" or "stranded" in the EU's neighbouring countries (Dowd 2008). There they may become *de facto* involuntary immigrants, they may return to their home country, they may be deported or they may attempt repeatedly to enter EU territory until they are successful. This migration consists of labour migrants and refugees from countries as diverse as Uzbekistan and Iraq, China and Cameroon, Somalia and Ivory Coast, as well as both regular and irregular migrants. They are often treated indifferently by authorities and are assumed, most of the time, to be in transit. Indeed, both categories take the same paths and have the same means of transportation, they both turn to the same irregular travel agents (or "human smugglers") and they often concentrate in the same neighbourhoods and live and work in the same places.

Often little effort is made to determine the status of the individual migrant and importantly, to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants. Frequently, neither access to refugee status determination procedures nor access to any other status or permit is available, even in cases where they would be eligible. As a result, these flows are usually lumped together and considered "illegal migration." At best, and largely due to the diverse nature of this phenomenon, such movements are occasionally dubbed as "mixed flows." Few services, if any, are available for these migrants and no policies have been designed to facilitate their integration into the labour market and society. These migrants and refugees, due to unfavourable conditions in countries such as Ukraine, Turkey and Morocco, but also Greece, Hungary and Slovakia, are often driven further north and west.

Bottlenecks, hubs and transit zones

It is estimated that every year, between 50,000 to 100,000 people cross the Mediterranean Sea illegally while another 50,000 to 100,000 enter the EU clandestinely across the Aegean Sea, through the Evros River between Turkey and Greece, the Carpathian Mountains between Ukraine and its EU neighbours, or the forests between Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. Sea journeys can be particularly hazardous and it is believed that more than 10,000 migrants and refugees have lost their lives over the past decade or so as a result. No such tragedies have been reported from the land borders in the east.

Transit migration can be identified with transit zones, notably in the Maghreb, the Middle East and some newly independent countries in Eastern Europe. Four quadrants of transit migration can be identified: the Eastern quadrant (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan), the South East European quadrant (Turkey, Cyprus, the Balkans), the Central Mediterranean quadrant (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Malta) and the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic quadrant (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania) (Düvell et al. 2008). Further to this, there are neighbouring countries in the second line, such as Niger, Yemen, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Once inside the EU, migrants often keep on travelling either because conditions in their first EU country of arrival are hostile, or because they have other concrete reasons for travelling to another country, such as wanting to join family members. Evidence shows that virtually all EU countries are part of migrant and refugee transits, for example from Greece to Italy, from Italy to

Switzerland, from Hungary to France, from Austria to Portugal, from Spain to France or Germany, from France to the UK, and so on. Finally, there are significant secondary movements of asylum-seekers and refugees, such as from Hungary to various western countries, from Spain to France or from the Netherlands to the UK.

Further to this point, the geography of transit migration in and around the EU suggests that certain hubs are emerging as significant crossroads. Examples include Moscow and Saint Petersburg in Russia; Kiev, Uzhgorod and Mukachevo in Ukraine; Van, Cesme and Istanbul in Turkey; Tamanghasset in Algeria; and Tangier and Rabat in Morocco. Some islands also seem to be in the forefront, notably the Canaries, Malta, and the Greek island of Lesbos. Other regions identified with this type of migration are certain refugee reception centres (notably Debrecen in Hungary, Humenne in Slovakia), certain detention centres (Edirne in Turkey, Pavchino in Ukraine), street markets where migrants and refugees work to earn a living and sometimes finance onward migration (Shulavska in Kiev), or improvised camps (Oujda in Morocco, Patras in Greece).

Irregular agents (or human smugglers) are important actors in these zones and hubs. They often collaborate with corrupt authorities, travel agents and transportation businesses to determine where there is a demand for informal services. They offer a whole range of provisions, from simple advice to falsified documents, and from cheap walking directions and low-budget guides for crossing international borders to extensive travel packages that arrange journeys from start to finish. Some are reliable but often expensive, while others are cheap but may well abandon irregular immigrants en route or send them off in unsuitable floating devices.

Criss-crossing Europe

Migrants and refugees bound for Europe frequently change direction and means of transportation. Journeys are complex and involve planes, trains, trucks, cars and walking through several countries. Research found that journeys can take anywhere between a few months up to two years (Düvell 2007). Often journeys involve extended stays in places such as Moscow, Kiev, Istanbul, Tripoli or Rabat before they can continue. Those with no clear destination or who fail to find somewhere to settle sometimes drift around Europe and other countries in search of favourable conditions and, as a result, can remain mobile for extended periods of time that may reach ten years or more.

For instance, a Palestinian IT specialist spent two years of his life on Kiev building sites, in Ukrainian detention centres and in Hungarian refugee reception centres until he was finally granted refugee status. It remains to be seen whether he will ever be able to re-enter the labour market and continue his profession. Similarly, since 2002, a young Nigerian man has remained in Ukraine (Kiev, Odessa and Kharkiv) in search of a livelihood. While the authorities refuse to grant him any kind of a status, he continues to dream of a promising life in Western Europe; we must wonder whether an otherwise promising talent is being wasted (Düvell 2007).

Class appears to be a major determinant of migrants' and refugees' trajectory. Those with sought-after skills and sufficient funds may be able to obtain visas and travel both legally and risk-free. However, those who possess neither of these may only be able to travel as far as their money takes them. Some have had to work their way through Europe and have fallen into the hands of cheap but dangerous smugglers.

> *Irregular agents are important actors in these zones and hubs. They often collaborate with corrupt authorities, travel agents and transportation businesses to determine where there is a demand for informal services. They offer a whole range of provisions, from simple advice to falsified documents, and from cheap walking directions and low-budget guides for crossing international borders to extensive travel packages that arrange journeys from start to finish.*

Violent conflicts over entry and stay

Concerns over the treatment of migrants and asylum-seekers have heightened lately due to the release of several reports. UNHCR published a critical report on the asylum regime in Ukraine. PRO ASYL, a German human rights organization, revealed severe refugee rights violations by Greek coast guards; the Helsinki Committee in Istanbul pointed to critical conditions in Turkish refugee reception and detention centres; Human Rights Watch (HRW) revealed concerns over Libya's migration control practices; and the Hungarian authorities received equally disturbing reports on refugees rights violations in Romania and Bulgaria. These reports point towards cases of violence and torture, of arbitrary arrest and large-scale unlawful return of refugees (*refoulement*), of inadequate asylum procedures and corrupt authorities, and of insufficient conditions in

refugee camps and detention centres (see HRW 2006). In some cases, boats full of people have been pushed back into the open sea, in other cases peoples' valuables were confiscated or they found themselves in unbearable conditions. Quite simply, these conditions seem to amount to punishment for reaching European shores.

> *Non-EU countries must accept that they too are destination countries for migrants and refugees. As such, they are required to properly implement international law and introduce adequate national legislation and provisions. Traditional immigration countries need to encourage and support [them] in this task.*

The reports listed above highlight the current conflicts over borders and entry into the EU. Indeed, while migrants and refugees are turning to desperate measures, authorities are become increasingly violent in fighting largely unwanted immigration. These conflicts have most often taken the form of skirmishes, as has been observed in Ceuta, a Spanish exclave in Morocco. The reports also illustrate how some countries have neither the capacity nor the political will to adequately deal with migrants and refugees. Instead, conditions are so poor that they deter migrants from staying and force them on to other countries. In response to these conditions, riots have become frequent in various detention camps in Cyprus, Turkey and Malta.

Summary and policy implications

So far, efforts to reduce unwanted migration to Europe have alleviated neither the root causes nor the magnitude of migration. Instead, migrants have been driven into dangerous situations, have taken unwanted migration paths, have remained mobile for years at a time, and have been stranded in countries just outside the EU where they often find themselves in a permanent state of uncertainty. In these countries, they experience the effects of a lack of legal status: little access to public services, poor working conditions and poverty, corrupt and abusive authorities, brutal police, racial violence, and a radical form of social exclusion. These conditions expose them to high levels of exploitation, betrayal and violence. Certain categories of migrants and refugees also seem to have fallen into a protection gap as no international law, not even the various human rights conventions, seem to be able to alleviate the

situation of people en route. The drama and tragedy that continues to unfold on the doorsteps of the EU can hardly be ignored. To date, various policy proposals have been on the table to address this dilemma.

Inevitably, non-EU countries must accept that they too are destination countries for migrants and refugees. As such, they are required to properly implement international law and introduce adequate national legislation and provisions. Traditional immigration countries need to encourage and support new destination countries in this task, otherwise they may be perceived as merely shifting the burden and dumping unwanted migrants on their neighbours. Migration barriers that do not allow those in need of international protection to claim asylum, that drive them into the hands of unscrupulous agents or force them on deadly trips across seas and deserts are simply unethical. Mechanisms must be designed to allow refugees to reach safe countries. Similarly, as long as conditions are both unfavourable and dangerous in transit countries, other safe countries should accept responsibility for migrants and refugees. A possible remedy for the most vulnerable migrants, such as minors, single mothers and families, could be to offer avenues for them to legally apply for resettlement in a safe country.

References

COMPAS. 2008. Documents from the "(Irregular) Transit Migration in the European Space: Theory, Politics, and Research Methodology" conference, Istanbul (April 18-19). Accessed on July 25, 2008 at <www.compas.ox.ac.uk/events/past_conferences_events.shtml>.

Dowd, R. 2008. *Trapped in Transit: The Plight and Human Rights of Stranded Migrants*. Research paper No. 156. Vienna: UNHCR.

Düvell, F. 2006. *Crossing the Fringes of Europe: Transit Migration in the EU's Neighbourhood*. Working paper. Oxford: COMPAS. Accessed July 25, 2008 at <www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/Working%20papers/WP0633-Duvell.pdf>.

———. 2007. "Between Scylla and Charybdis: Asylum Seekers and Migrants Trapped Between Insufficient Protection Regimes in Ukraine and Inaccessible Safe Countries in Western Europe." Paper presented at the Oxford Refugees Study Centre Conference on Forced Migration/Refugee Studies, University of Oxford (December 7-8).

Düvell, F., M. Collyer, and F. Pastore. 2007. *Transit, Migration and Politics. Trends and Constructions on the Fringes of Europe*. COMPAS Policy paper. Oxford: COMPAS.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2006. *Ukraine: On the Margins Rights Violations against Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union*. London: HRW.

Molodikova, I. 2007. "Transformation of Migration Patterns in Post-Soviet Space: Russian New Migration Policy of 'Open Doors' and Its Effect on European Migration Flows." *Review of Sociology* 13, 2, p. 57-76.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 2008. *Asylum Levels and Trends in 47 Industrialized Countries, 2007*. Geneva: UNHCR.

Exploring Migration's Linkages with Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: IOM Activities

PHILIPPE BONCOUR, ALINA NARUSOVA AND KRISTIINA LILLEORG
Migration Policy, Research and Communications, International Organization for Migration

Environmental factors have long had an impact on global migration flows. The scale of such flows, both internal and cross-border, is expected to rise dramatically over the next decades as a result of climate change. Interactions between these phenomena are complex and include not only the impacts of environmental factors on migration, but also the effects of migration on the environment.

A consensus is emerging on the need to study, plan for, adapt to and mitigate the processes and effects of environmental change for human mobility. This growing recognition prompted the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to revive the discussion on the links between these fields, which started, for IOM, more than 15 years ago when it co-organized with the Refugee Policy Group a conference on "Migration and the Environment." Today, IOM seeks to build on its earlier initiatives in this sphere in order to move towards closing the existing knowledge gap between environmental issues and their migration implications (and vice versa) and to facilitate planning and coherence between them. To this end, IOM together with a range of partners held several events in 2007 and 2008 on the issue of environmental change and migration.

In February 2007, IOM and the United Nations Population Fund co-sponsored an Expert Seminar on Migration and the Environment[1], which was held in Bangkok, Thailand. The seminar brought together experts from various constituencies working in the spheres of migration and the environment, including governments, non-governmental organizations and academia. The seminar explored the two-way association between migration and the environment as well as their interaction with security. Its key objectives were to improve the understanding of issues at hand, to identify the main obstacles for policy-makers and practitioners, to more effectively manage the cross-section between migration and the environment, and to contribute to a more comprehensive research and policy agenda in this area. The main issues discussed included: definitional challenges and possible solutions, lack of reliable data and assessment tools, and the need to identify and promote promising practices in policy and programmatic activities. There was a broad agreement that closer multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary cooperation is necessary if progress is to be made in addressing environmentally induced migration and its consequences.

The Expert Seminar on Migration and the Environment paved the way for the high-level panel on "Migration and the Environment"[2] held in Geneva in November 2007 as part of the 94th session of the IOM Council. Based on the outcomes of the abovementioned seminar, IOM developed and presented a framework for analyzing the migration and environment nexus, which included a working definition of environmental migrant and a series of scenarios[3] illustrating the two-way relationship between the two phenomena and related policy challenges. Speakers from a range of governments highlighted the following issues: the need to better understand migration as an adaptation strategy to environmental change; the importance of considering the linkages between migration and the environment in the context of broader sustainable development strategies; possible consequences of unplanned migration for the environment and the need to question the effectiveness of traditional development; and security and humanitarian aid models in relation to the environmental causes and consequences of migration. The proposed policy responses to the challenges of environmental migration included: promoting the migration and development nexus; developing comprehensive and coherent policies; facilitating and regulating migration; improving the quality of data in this field; and enhancing bilateral and regional cooperation and multi-stakeholder partnerships. It was concluded that effective management of environmental migration is essential to ensuring human security, health and well-being and for facilitating sustainable development.

The human security implications of environmental degradation, climate change and migration were the focus of the Conference on "Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration: Addressing Vulnerabilities and Harnessing Opportunities,"[4] which was organized jointly by IOM and the Greek Government (in its capacity of Chair of the Human Security Network) in Geneva in February 2008. The overall objective of the Conference was to increase political and public awareness of the risks of climate change, environmental degradation and migration to human security and the need for further research and concerted action in this area. Speakers emphasized that new security risks require creative thinking, increased cooperation among all relevant stakeholders and further research for more reliable data.

---

1   All materials from the seminar can be found at <www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/eventGLOBAL/cache/offonce?entryId=13112>. IOM's *International Dialogue on Migration No. 10 – Expert Seminar: Migration and the Environment* (2008), which includes all the seminar documents, an be found at <www.iom.int/publications>.

2   All materials from the "Migration and the Environment" panel of the 94th IOM Council can be found at <www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/1915>.

3   In the "Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment" of its 94th session, the IOM defined environmental migrants as "persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad." The document also offers more information on the environment and migration scenarios and can be accessed at <www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/evolving_global_economy_2728112007/MC_INF_288_EN.pdf>.

4   All materials from this conference can be found at <www.iom.int/hsnconference>.

Project and Partner Updates

The Shared Societies Project:
Building a World Safe for Difference

Why are social division and intercommunity tension so rife in the world today? And why do political and other leaders often chose to ignore them and hope they will go away? Why do so many leaders not recognize that building a socially cohesive state is better socially, economically, politically and in terms of human security? Or do they recognize it and fail to act on the knowledge? Again why? The Club of Madrid (The Club), while acknowledging the contribution being made by organizations such as Metropolis, believes that the issue of social division and intercommunity tension is not high enough on the political agenda. With increasing diversity in the world's nations and communities, and at a time when the pressures of economic uncertainty, energy and climate change crises, and food emergencies threaten social stability, leaders must take action against social exclusion and work to improve social cohesion. The Club has taken up the challenge of how to increase commitment to tackle the problems and build socially cohesive societies and has established the Shared Societies Project whose focus is "Building a world safe for difference".

The Club of Madrid (www.clubmadrid.org) is made up of former heads of state and government of democratic countries (70 at the present time) that want to use their experience and status to both raise the prominence of key issues facing the world today and engage with current leaders in finding solutions. The Club of Madrid Members have decided that social division is one such issue. Accordingly, the Shared Societies Project is one of their major projects in 2008 (the other being Energy and Democratic Leadership). The Project is working at many levels. Because the Members are former leaders and have access to current leaders, it particularly involves challenging leaders to accept their responsibility with respect to social cohesion. Even though many other elements play a part in creating dissention or building community, there is a failure of leadership if states or cities are divided. The Club Members are able to meet and talk with some of the leaders who face, and in some cases have ignored, the need and the

opportunity to build social cohesion in their own state or community.

The Club is also looking at problems of social divisions in various contexts: between indigenous and settler communities; within societies divided on racial or ethnic lines; between immigrants and their host community and so on. We believe that similar dynamics are often at work in these different situations – the creation of the sense of "them" and "us"; the competing interests that motivate these groups; the mutual fear where each group distrusts the other; the lack of communication; and the growing disparities between the more established section of society and the marginalized others. We do of course also have to recognize the importance of context and that one cannot find one solution that fits every situation.

The Club is preparing a set of materials that do not attempt to prescribe a solution but are intended as guides for leaders and for those working with leaders, as do the Club Members, on the issues and opportunities that arise when confronted with social division. It will also be useful to civil society leaders working to bring change to the policy environment, both directly within communities and through their work with other leaders. As a whole, these materials form a "Portfolio of Policies and Practices to Promote a Shared Society." Like the portfolio of an artist or architect, they provide examples of existing work that shows what can be done and what has been done. As such, it is a resource or toolkit from which people can draw examples, which they may adapt and apply to their own situation. It provides:

- A **Statement of Commitment** by the members of the Club;
- A **Vision** of what constitutes a shared and socially cohesive society;
- A **Rationale** for building social cohesion;
- The **Principles and Assumptions** which guide our concept of social cohesion;
- A set of ten **Commitments**, all of which a society would need to take up in order to build social cohesion;

- **Examples** of policies and practices that have been implemented in various states to show what can be done in relation to each Commitment, but not saying that they should be applied in the same way elsewhere.

These materials are short, simple and direct and easy to assimilate quickly. They are also accompanied by a commentary, which fills out some of the underlying thinking. Although they are working documents, the Statement, Rationale, Assumptions, Principles and Assumptions, and Commitments have already been adopted by the Club of Madrid and can be viewed at the Project's dedicated Website at www.thesharedsocietiesproject.clubmadrid.org. Examples of policies and practices are currently being collected and will be added over the coming few months. They will be presented at the First Global Forum on Leadership for Shared Societies, November 12-14, 2008, which represents the Project's next major step.

This Forum is being hosted by the Club of Madrid and the City of Rotterdam, with the support of Madrid's Regional Government. High-level and emerging leaders from government, politics, civil society and other decision-shaping institutions will identify and share the motives, incentives and benefits that drive leaders to act for social cohesion and celebrate the commitment of leaders and communities working towards that goal. At the same time, it will be an opportunity to endorse the policies and practices that reduce identity-based conflict and build shared futures where diversity is celebrated and drawn upon for the economic and social betterment of all.

While the Portfolio as a whole will be launched at the Forum, it will remain open for additional contributions of examples of creative initiatives. The Club is keen to work with other organizations and initiatives that are working on related issues. It is important to share knowledge and information and to build a broad-based debate on the topic, highlighting that social cohesion must be promoted and that it can be promoted. This can be achieved if a number of organizations make similar arguments. Everyone is invited to visit the Website and use the materials. Also, please contact us (cmccartney@clubmadrid.org) if you have ideas or examples you think should be included and shared. We look forward to hearing from you and working with you.

Metropolis North America:
A New Policy-Research Initiative

On June 24, 2008, Metropolis took a major step in expanding its network. Following a two-day dialogue of experts on labour mobility and migration, which took place in Mexico City, a collaborative agreement was signed with the representatives of the three countries in order to create Metropolis North America. The Metropolis Project Secretariat at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)/Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte (CISAN), and Citizenship and Immigration Services of the United States Department of Homeland Security were the signatories to the agreement, through which they commit to co-operate on a policy-research initiative on labour mobility and migration within North America. The dialogue will be captured in a report that will be released in the autumn along with a policy-research agenda that is now being developed by the members. Both documents will be available on the Metropolis website. Metropolis North America is a welcome addition to the international Metropolis family, and we are looking forward to the results of the work in this surprisingly neglected field of study.

For more information:
➡ **www.metropolis.net**

Worldwide Urban Population Change:
Our Future Will Be Urban

SABINE HENNING
Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations*

The world's demographic future will be urban. According to the latest United Nations estimates and projections of urban areas, in 2008 – for the first time in history – more than half of the world's human population (3.4 billion people) will be living in urban areas. Over the next 43 years, the total population in the world is projected to grow from 6.7 to 9.2 billion people. Most of this growth will be absorbed by the cities and towns of less developed regions.

Worldwide urbanization has been taking place for a long time, but its current speed and scale have no parallel in history. The urban population reached 1 billion in 1961 and had tripled by 2003. As Figure 1 shows, the urban population is projected to increase to 6 billion people over the next 42 years. In other words, between 2007 and 2050, the world will have about four more cities of 1 million inhabitants every three weeks. While the rural population will also continue to increase in the foreseeable future, it is expected to reach a maximum by 2018 and then start to decline.

The different urbanization patterns and trends observed in the major regions of the world (the more and the less developed) are the result of the varying experiences that characterize the areas and countries of each region. In 2007, Africa and Asia were the least urbanized regions of the world (39% and 41% respectively). A large starting population combined with a relatively high rate of projected urban population growth over the next 40 years will result in a marked increase of the urban populations of both continents. Hence, Africa's urban population will grow from 0.4 billion persons in 2007 to 1.2 billion in 2050, while Asia's urban population will increase from 1.6 billion to 3.5 billion persons between 2007 and 2050. Consequently, Asia will rank first and Africa second in terms of urban dwellers worldwide. Indeed, in 2050, seven out of every ten urban residents worldwide will be living in Asia or Africa.

Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, North America and Oceania were already highly urbanized in 2007; all of

them with more than 70% of their populations living in urban areas at the time. The proportion of urban population in these major areas will continue to increase, but will be less pronounced than in Asia and Africa. Given their smaller population size and their lower rates of urbanization, the urban population in these major regions is not expected to change significantly in the years to come.

The urban population is not evenly distributed among size categories of urban settlements. In 2007, roughly 52% of all urban residents in the world resided in cities of less than 500,000 inhabitants. Cities ranging from 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants accounted for almost 10% of all urban residents. Medium-sized cities, with more than 1 million but less than 5 million inhabitants accounted for 23% of the urban population worldwide. Large cities with populations of 5 million to 10 million inhabitants were the homes of approximately 7% of the urban population, while mega-cities with more than 10 million inhabitants accounted for about 9% of the urban population.

Interestingly, despite numerous media reports and general public perception, mega-cities only account for a relatively small share of the urban population. However, their emergence in the 20th century has been without parallel. In 1950 there were only two mega-cities worldwide: New York and Tokyo. By 2007, the number of mega-cities had increased to 19, with only four of them in developed countries: Tokyo, New York, Los Angeles and Osaka. By 2025, the number of mega-cities is projected to reach 27, with only six of them located in developed countries.

Internationally agreed development goals, such as those set out in the Millennium Declaration and the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), aim at the improvement of human welfare and promotion of sustainable development. Most future population growth will occur in the urban areas of the world, and cities will be the nexus of such initiatives. Urbanization is a process that is intrinsically related to development, but actions to capitalize on its opportunities and to address its challenges must be prompt and sustained so that properly managed urbanization can help alleviate poverty, inequality and environmental degradation.

References

United Nations. 2008. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.* Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. CD-ROM Edition. Data in digital form POP/DB/WUP/Rev.2007.

For more information on the 2007 Revision of the World Urbanization Prospects, see: www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm

Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare

The Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM), in Sweden, is a joint university research institute established at Malmö University in January 2007. Issues of migration, ethnic diversity and welfare are central to MIM's research strategies and can be linked with research programs in urban studies, education, health, sports and the media, all of which are represented at Malmö University.

MIM's overall research programme can be divided into three themes, all of which include local, transnational, and global aspects:

- Migration and politics;
- Migration and diversity;
- Migration and welfare.

The starting point in addressing these themes will be a study on the Öresund and Scania Region, with a particular focus on Malmö, where relevant. A study of this region will serve as a useful case study for MIM, it will allow for comparative perspectives in the international context, and it will foster a better understanding of the transnational aspects of local migration effects.

MIM focuses on the contemporary societal processes of inclusion and exclusion as related to politics, policies, places and institutions, as well as people's everyday lives. Subject fields thus include:

- Democracy, citizenship, nationalism, populism and xenophobia;
- Ethnic diversity in regions, cities and organizations;
- Institutions and professions in education, leisure, sports and health;
- Transnational practices at institutional and grassroots levels.

MIM aims to integrate this wide spectrum of subject fields in a fruitful way, developing synergies, expanding networks and creating channels that will facilitate research and the dissemination of research results nationally, internationally and beyond the traditional academic sphere. The establishment of MIM as a joint research institute at Malmö University and the subsequent establishment of the Guest Professorship in International Migration and Ethnic Relations in Memory of Willy Brandt at MIM will help the institute achieve its goal of becoming an international leader in research on migration, ethnic diversity and welfare.

For more information:
➡ **www.mah.se/mim**

Events

Integration Futures Conference
Prato, Italy, October 22-24, 2008

The past decade has seen a shift in policies and discourse on immigrant integration. From the earlier emphasis on settlement services and employment, the new focus of integration in many countries seems to be the preservation of social cohesion, a mainstream national identity and culture, and mainstream core values.

In a forward-looking manner, the distinguished international panellists of Integration Futures explore several aspects of this theme, including:

- **The Impact of Immigration and Citizenship Policies on Integration**
  (Aristide Zolberg, Kay Hailbronner, Andrew Jakubowicz, Deborah Tunis)
- **The Relationship between Integration and Multiculturalism Policies**
  (Marie McAndrew, Randall Hansen, Stepan Kerkyasharian, Rabin S. Baldewsingh)
- **The Integration of the Second Generation: Education, Labour Market and other Outcomes**
  (Jock Collins, Richard Bedford, Maurice Crul)
- **Political Integration – The Ultimate Indicator?**
  (Jim Jupp, Meghnad Desai, Jan Rath)
- **Globalization, Transnationalism and Integration**
  (Graeme Hugo, Nana Oishi, Ravindra Kumar, Marie Price)
- **Religion, Secularism and Integration**
  (Rajeev Bhargava, Andrew Markus)
- **Integration – From Settlement to Social Engineering?**
  (keynote address by Rainer Bauböck)

The panellists' presentations will form the basis of future special issues of the publications *Around the Globe* (Monash University) and *Canadian Diversity* (Metropolis).

Integration Futures is the third in a series of successful Metropolis inter-conference events, following Multicultural Futures in 2004 and Immigration Futures in 2006. Integration Futures is organized and sponsored by the International Metropolis Project (Canada), the Australian Multicultural Foundation and the Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements (Australia).

For further details, please visit:
➠ **www.integrationfutures.com**

14ᵗʰ International Metropolis Conference
Migration and Mobility: National Responses to Cultural Diversity

The 14ᵗʰ International Metropolis Conference will take place September 14 to 18, 2009 at the Copenhagen Congress Center – Bella Center in Copenhagen, Denmark. The Conference is a means of engaging policy-makers, researchers, practitioners and other interested stakeholders in an examination of key issues related to migration and diversity. It will include a number of plenary sessions, an impressive range of workshop sessions as well as study tours that highlight immigration and cultural diversity in Copenhagen. Registration is open to everyone, and a call for workshop proposals will be issued Fall 2008.

For further details, please visit:
➠ **www.integrationfutures.com**

13th International Metropolis Conference

Mobility, Integration and Development in a Globalised World

The 13th International Metropolis Conference will take place from October 27 to 31, 2008 at the World Conference Center in Bonn, Germany. The Conference will bring together researchers, policy-makers, practitioners and the media to discuss issues related to migration management, future trends, and the links between migration, integration and development. Plenary topics include:

• Mobility, Integration and Development – A Roundtable Discussion
• Mobility versus State Sovereignty
• Convergence or Divergence? National Perspectives on Integration
• Immigrant Germany: Policies and Perspectives for the Future
• Circular and Temporary Migration
• Transnational Diaspora Networks, Integration and Development
• Integration of the Second Generation in Europe
• Gender Dimensions of International Labour Migration, Development and Integration
• The Environment's Impact on Migration

In addition, there will be a program of more than 100 workshop sessions, which were selected by an adjudication committee following an open call for proposals. The workshop program provides delegates with an opportunity to delve more deeply into key topics and to benefit from international and multi-sectoral perspectives. Sessions will examine a broad range of issues related to migration management and control; immigrants' social, economic and civic outcomes; diversity and citizenship; migration and development; migration flows and patterns; diasporas and transnationalism; policy-research links; and data and methodological issues in the field of migration. Study tours will showcase Bonn and surrounding areas and will provide delegates with a better understanding of immigration and integration to the region.

The conference will be hosted by the Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration of the State of North-Rhine-Westphalia, in cooperation with the City of Bonn.

For further details, please visit:
➡ **www.international.metropolis.net**

11th National Metropolis Conference
Frontiers Of Canadian Migration

The Prairie Metropolis Centre will host the 11th National Metropolis Conference from March 19 to 22, 2009 in Calgary, Alberta – a city poised to become one of Canada's major immigrant-receiving cities. Recognizing the growing interconnectedness of the local with the national and the global, the conference is a good opportunity for national and international participants to discuss issues related to immigration, integration and cultural diversity while considering the direction of policy-relevant research associated with these topics.

Conference delegates will participate in plenary discussions, workshops and roundtables focused on the six policy priority areas of the Canadian arm of the Metropolis Project: 1) Citizenship and Social, Cultural and Civic Integration; 2) Economic and Labour Market Integration; 3) Family, Children and Youth; 4) Housing and Neighbourhoods; 5) Justice, Policing and Security; and 6) Welcoming Communities: The Role of the Host Communities in Attracting, Integrating and Retaining Newcomers and Minorities.

For further details, please visit:
➡ **www.metropolis2009.net**

MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

14TH INTERNATIONAL METROPOLIS CONFERENCE
Copenhagen,14 -18 September 2009

**NATIONAL RESPONSES TO
CULTURAL DIVERSITY**

METROPOLIS
Copenhagen - Denmark