National Defence / Défense nationale

Ethics *in* Practice

Proceedings of the Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence

Ottawa, 30–31 October 1997

Sponsored by the Defence Ethics Program

Chief Review Services

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Canada

Defence Ethics Program
Programme d'éthique de la Défense

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PROGRAMME D'ÉTHIQUE DE LA DÉFENSE

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N.B. *The opinions expressed in the discussion papers do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces.*

Introduction

Major-General Keith G. Penney

I am pleased to present the Proceedings *of the second Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence, which took place 30–31 October 1997 in Ottawa. This publication captures the formal presentations that were made under the theme of* Ethics in Practice. *Given the considerable interest shown in this area we decided to also include the papers submitted to us by those who wanted to contribute but did not present at the conference.*

In the past decade the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence have undergone significant changes. Society and our environment have changed, people's expectations have changed, and our operational challenges have changed. As a result, in today's context we need to focus more on ethical reasoning, ethical decision making, and ethical behaviour. Not because it is popular, not because our allies are doing it, but because it is the right thing to do.

To address the challenges we face today and in the future, we have to reflect on our history but also we have to look to our young people. We are recruiting bright, energetic people and we must actively listen in order to understand the messages and expectations they have. It is also essential that we have dialogue concerning ethical issues so that we continue to practice ethical decision making. For this reason I am especially pleased that, for the second year in a row, we witnessed excellent presentations and dynamic dialogue between the presenters and the 300 participants at the Conference. I have not yet met with a group that once into a dialogue did not find ample examples of ethical issues within their environment.

It is important that we have a lively debate on ethics in the workplace and in the teaching environments because the worth of the ethics program is only as good as the dialogue in relation to specific issues in specific work environments. All of the terms of reference, framework and statements of obligations of the Defence Ethics Program exist to provide a certain amount of structure, consistency and support to the dialogue. We in the NDHQ program office can facilitate and guide the program, but only you can implement it.

In addition to these *Proceedings*, videocassettes of the Conference are available in both official languages from the Pearkes Library at National Defence Headquarters.

In closing, I would like to sincerely thank those who made this second Defence Ethics Conference a resounding success. Thank you to those who gave presentations, helped organize the conference, contributed through their attendance and active participation in the discussion, and assisted through the production of these *Proceedings*.



Keith G. Penney
Major-General
Chief Review Services

National Defence / Défense nationale

Statement *of* Defence *Ethics*

As members of the Canadian Forces, liable to the ultimate sacrifice, and as employees of the Department of National Defence having special obligations to Canada, we are dedicated to our duty and commited to:

Respect the Dignity of all Persons
Serve Canada Before Self
Obey and Support Lawful Authority

Guided by these fundamental principles, we act in accordance with the following ethical obligations:

LOYALTY

We dedicate ourselves to Canada.
We are loyal to our superiors and faithful to our subordinates and colleagues.

HONESTY

We honour the trust placed upon us.
We value truth and candour, and act with integrity at all times.

COURAGE

We face challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination and strength of character.

DILIGENCE

We undertake all tasks with dedication and perseverance.
We recognize our duty to perform with competence and to strive for excellence.

FAIRNESS

We are equitable in our dealings with others.
We are just in our decisions and actions.

RESPONSIBILITY

We accept our responsibilities and the consequences of our actions.

Canada

Opening Remarks

Ms. Louise Fréchette

General Maurice Baril

Opening Remarks

1. Ms. Louise Fréchette

Ms. Fréchette is Deputy Minister of National Defence. She holds a B.A. from Collège Basile-Moreau (1966) and a Licence-ès-Lettres (History) from the Université de Montréal (1970). Ms. Fréchette has served in a variety of foreign service positions, including Ambassador to Argentina and Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York.

I am very pleased to welcome you to this Conference and to have the opportunity to discuss 'Ethics in Practice', a topic which I believe is a logical and necessary follow-on to last year's Conference. I am also pleased because there is so much to talk about. So much work has been done on such an important and relevant topic.

I want to make one point right away. We can take pride and confidence in the fact that virtually every man and woman in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces performs to the highest ethical standards. And we know that they too take enormous pride in that.

We can also be proud because the Department of National Defence took the lead. We were the first department in the government of Canada to establish a formal ethics program.

Last year at this Conference I said that the Statement of Defence Ethics must be a 'living document'. We have to personalize it and make it our own — whether we are civilian or military — and use it as a tool for helping us in our day-to-day decision-making.

We could have called this Conference: "Bringing the Statement to Life" because ethics are really about the way we live and the practical decisions we make every day. We need to make decisions we can live with. Decisions that we can defend to our families; our colleagues; other Canadians.

I want to examine some of the ways we have brought to life the values and principles in our Statement of Defence Ethics within the Department of National Defence. General Baril will focus his remarks on the other half of the Defence Team, the Canadian Forces.

As I said earlier, we need to answer the question: have we begun to use the Statement of Defence Ethics to guide our daily behaviour? Are we living "Ethics in Practice"?

Part of the answer is found in what Professor Legault of Laval University observed, and I quote, "The term ethics, once the preserve of pure philosophy, has fully entered the language and practice of modern organizations and institutions." I couldn't agree more. We witness the relevance of ethical decisions every day, on many different levels.

First of all, ethics relate to the profound changes we are making to our defence organization. We no longer work in a high-overhead, low-risk environment. We have delegated authority to lower levels, increased responsibility and promoted greater freedom in decision-making. These changes have created new ethical dilemmas for the people working in the Department at all levels.

Second, we are living in a time of unprecedented scrutiny of public organizations. We are living in a time where the right of access to information is so much more important than it was in the past. Although this attention can sometimes make life uncomfortable for us, the public is simply exercising its right and duty to know. It's a fact of life now and we had better get used to it. The public's understanding and awareness of defence is a necessary element of a healthy democracy and scrutiny of the government *and* of government institutions is critical in today's society. And we are not alone. Our efforts are consistent with the approach that other countries have taken in creating structured ethics programs.

Truly, we are in what Kenneth Kernaghan, a scholar of ethics and Canadian public administration, calls "the ethics era": a period of 25 years of sustained interest in the ethical performance of public officials.

I have often heard it asked, "So, what do we really mean by defence ethics and values?"

I believe that ethics are concerned with the best way to live. When we talk about defence ethics, we are really talking about how we in the defence community work and live together. The Defence Ethics Program focuses on the character of our defence community. It states that our character has a lot to do with how we foster common values, both within our defence organization and in our relations with the Canadian public. Defence ethics is about how we face those everyday decisions; how we lead and manage in an ethical fashion; how we lead our lives while working to support the mission of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

The effectiveness of our system — our integrated Defence Team — rests on cooperation and consultation at all levels; mutual confidence and respect of military personnel and civilian employees. While distinct, civilian employees and Canadian Forces members share many of the same values — indeed, their values are quite often complementary. The concept of service before self, for example, is part of the Public Service ethical code.

Our integrated civilian-military system works — and works well. Modern day governance, the complexity of international relations and the need to respond rapidly to developing crises anywhere in the world make it critical that we work together. In all of these situations, civilian and military must show faith in each other's professionalism and work closely to achieve common goals. This partnership also ensures that we reap the benefits of cooperation while ensuring that our organization reflects and practices the values of our society.

We also foster common values between ourselves and the Canadian public. I strongly believe that the primary focus of any defence ethics program in a democratic society is to ensure that the military and civilian elements, as instruments of government, continue to respond to the needs of society.

The values of the Public Service reflect, first and foremost, Canadian values. We live in a democratic, bilingual and multicultural country. We respect the equality of our citizens and we are concerned about their rights and well-being.

Our Public Service model is firmly rooted in these values of Canadian society. Our Public Service values are also demonstrated by loyalty to the public interest; service to Canada and Canadians; honesty, integrity and probity; and what we call "people values", such as fairness and equity.

As the Clerk of the Privy Council recently said, "The values of the Public Service must be preserved. It is essential to maintain a non-partisan and professional public service governed by fairness, integrity and service to Canadians."

We also know that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces function within the bounds of existing laws and government policies — including management, financial administration and personnel policies adopted by Cabinet and Treasury Board and administered by central agencies. We implement, to the best of our abilities, the spirit and the letter of Canada's legislative and policy framework. This includes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Criminal Code, the Financial Administration Act, the National Defence Act and the Access To Information Act, to name a few.

Are we living "Ethics in Practice"? What has the Department of National Defence done in the area of defence ethics?

As I mentioned earlier, we can be proud of the fact that the Department has taken the lead to make sure that these fundamental values are reflected in everything we do. We have demonstrated our commitment to reflecting changes in Canadian society. The Department is determined to uphold the highest standards of fairness and equal-opportunity, to make the working environment equally accessible to and tolerant of all individuals. For example, we have implemented a policy of zero-tolerance for racist conduct; introduced Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) training; improved procedures on the Department's harassment policy; and streamlined the Department's grievance process.

In addition, we are promoting new ways for people to voice their concerns and resolve problems, through Alternate Dispute Resolution, and we will soon introduce an Ombudsman.

But, we need to remember that we are already working in an ethical manner — and, as I said before — this work is to a high standard of excellence. Nevertheless, each one of us, at all levels of the organization, has to be sensitive to new and changing ethical issues.

There are many ways to make the subject of ethics 'personal' and relevant to what each one of us does day-in and day-out. One perspective is that the litmus test for ethical behaviour is to assume that your motives and actions will be completely transparent to your colleagues, your family and the public. Following this test, would you still do it? At this Conference last year, one speaker called this the "Globe and Mail" test. Another author stated "Ethics aren't rocket science; they're as simple as 'do the right thing'". Sounds simple enough. Yet real life seems to be more complicated than that. Ethical issues seem to be open for debate —

at least for some. That is why we have created policies and structured initiatives.

Our Defence Ethics Program was created to help us do 'what is right' — by providing a framework of tools, training, consultation and policies, which help us to conduct ourselves ethically and which guide us as we manage and lead ethically. The effectiveness of the Program rests on the principle of establishing a culture that fosters the highest military, public service and societal ethical values, that are consistent with both military roles and missions and Canadian democratic rights and freedoms.

We have established the Departmental Ethics Advisory Board, chaired by Major General Penney, and which includes representatives from each Group and the Commands. We have also established a network of Ethics Coordinators in each Group and Command. They will help provide strategic guidance, direction and input on the Defence Ethics Program; they will advise their colleagues within their organizations on ethical issues; and they will help ensure the incorporation of an ethics component into business plans, training, orientation and education programs.

However, let me be clear. Our fundamental approach in all of this is to help people make the best possible decisions, using their *own* good judgement and common sense. The values and principles in the Statement of Defence Ethics are our guides to help us take decisions in an ethical manner.

Personal virtue. Common values within our organization and with Canadians. Public Service Values. Canadian values. These are the foundation for ethical decision-making.

I'd like to turn now to some of the ethical challenges that we encounter on a day-to-day basis — those "Ethics in Practice" issues that make the theme for this Conference so timely.

First, what is happening in the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) (ADM (Per)) Group? You have heard me say it before, but I want to emphasize this again: our people are our most important resource. That means our personnel management systems must be driven by the need to be fair, transparent and we must uphold the merit principle at all times.

Some of the ethical issues in this area are related to enforcing the principles of fairness and transparency in competitions. We also must ensure that all managers respect our legal framework and interpret collective agreements correctly while treating employees with respect, humanity and integrity.

We are undergoing change. We are encouraging managers and people working in personnel management to work as partners. And, as managers take on more and more responsibility for personnel issues, they will have new ethical questions to deal with.

Turning to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) (ADM (Mat)) Group. Some of the ethical issues we face are related to our extensive work in contracting and our responsibilities for huge sums of the taxpayer's dollars. Conflict of interest issues can easily arise when one deals with large contracts, with many companies and with so many organizations within and outside government. Probity and public trust are real issues related to our increasing partnership with the private sector. I once read that probity is "Doing what one ought

to do" — that says it all, doesn't it? We all need to do what ought to be done for Canada.

I believe that our work must not only be ethical but it must also appear to be ethical. This has not gone unnoticed. As one journalist said, "Defence procurement officials appear to be going out of their way on the search and rescue helicopter contract to ensure that the process is seen as fair. Aerospace company officials said the project has some of the tightest rules they've seen on a procurement program."

We also face ethical challenges in the management of the Department's infrastructure. These questions often relate to the fact that we are the custodian of huge amounts of land — some 20,000 square kilometers. As we procure, manage and dispose of this property we must consider and balance our short-term needs and the long-term needs of the people of Canada.

We must be responsible for the environment, nuclear safety and the Department's interface with aboriginal people. How do our decisions respect and protect the environment? What are our responsibilities when it comes to negotiations with aboriginal people with regards to land claims?

I know that all of these are complex and challenging questions. You will be examining some of these and other issues closely today and tomorrow with the assistance of some very qualified and exceptional people. Their thoughts on "Ethics in Practice" should provide you with practical and innovative ways to go about your work. Are we living "Ethics in Practice"? The answer is yes. How we do our work is fundamental for the health of our defence organization and our duty as servants of the public.

2. General Maurice Baril

General Baril was commissioned in 1963 and joined the Regular Force in the Royal 22e Regiment in 1964. He has held numerous command appointments within the army and served as Military Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, prior to being appointed Commander of Land Force Command in September 1995. General Baril was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff in September 1997.

I am delighted to have an opportunity to take part in this conference on Defence Ethics in practice.

The importance of the theoretical aspect of ethics cannot be denied, since it constitutes the very foundation of this particular field. Last year, during the First Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence, we enjoyed some very interesting presentations on this topic given by academics who specialize in this area.

For the service men and women among us, however, this aspect may seem somewhat abstract. It is for this reason that I am particularly pleased about the theme selected for this year's conference: 'practice'.

Madame Fréchette has just outlined to us how Defence Ethics translates into practice for the employees of the Department, the other vital members of the Defence Team. I would like to put before you the military perspective on ethics in practice.

In fact, we all sooner or later ask ourselves the following questions: What exactly does the concept of ethics mean to us? How does it translate into military practice and specifically into operational practice? When our responsibilities are changing and everything around us is in a state of flux, how can we ensure that our daily conduct is in line with these ethics? What resources are available to help us identify and resolve ethical dilemmas at our current rank and throughout our career?

It is precisely to answer these questions, and to provide a program of training in ethics that, three years ago, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces announced the Defence Ethics Program, then, one year ago, produced the Statement of Defence Ethics. The Program has evolved since its inception and continues to do so.

The Statement of Defence Ethics

I would like at this point to outline the main points of the Defence Statement of Ethics, which lies at the heart of our Ethics Program.

> *As members of the Canadian Forces, liable to the ultimate sacrifice, and as employees of the Department of National Defence having special obligations to Canada, we are dedicated to our duty and committed to:* respect the dignity of all persons, serve Canada before self, obey and support lawful authority.
>
> *Guided by these fundamental principles, we act in accordance with the following ethical obligations:* loyalty, honesty, courage, diligence, fairness and responsibility.

Because of their abstract nature, we may find it difficult to fully grasp certain basic concepts in the Statement for example, the notion of service. Ethical standards, therefore, may help us to define such notions when they arise in practice.

Indeed, without the concept of loyalty to one's country, how can we explain why a number of Canadian Forces pilots choose to serve Canada rather than their own economic interest, given the substantially greater salaries offered by private carriers? Why is it now necessary to re-examine our policy towards our pilots to ensure that they stay with us in larger numbers? And, in a larger sense, how can we be sure that we have a solid foundation of loyalty from all members of the Canadian Forces?

When we try to answer those questions, we realize that the notion of loyalty itself needs to be clarified, expanded upon and adapted to contemporary realities. More than ever, we must reconcile loyalty to the unit and loyalty to the Canadian Forces as a whole; we must reconcile the good of the community and the good of the smaller group. We must expand the horizons of our loyalty and cultivate "The Canadian Forces spirit". In practice, that means telling ourselves: "I belong to the Defence Team, I am a member of the Canadian Forces."

In other words, we must think Canadian Forces first and foremost.

As the Deputy Minister pointed out, the ethical culture of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is a complex relationship between the Canadian military, the Public Service and Canadian society. In one respect, the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces are integral parts of our democratic society and must reflect its values. Yet, by its nature, national defence involves the controlled use of military force for justifiable cause. That is why, to best ensure ethical decision-making and integrity within these diverse requirements, there is a need to develop a structured and visible approach to Defence ethics, one which is strongly endorsed by the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

The Defence Ethics Program: Context

The Defence Ethics Program provides the focus, framework and processes necessary to guide, measure and improve the ethical conduct of Canadian Forces personnel and Department of National Defence employees. The program clearly articulates expectations and leadership obligations.

As we have seen, the Ethics Program is designed to promote the shared values of contemporary Canadian society. For us, these values are obligations, since the mandate of the Canadian Forces requires us to defend them. And as our society evolves, particularly in the area of human rights, the values embodied in the Canadian Forces must reflect this evolution.

This explains why the Ethics Program does not function in isolation. It forms part of a whole series of measures, all of them ethical in nature, including policies against racism, harassment, and discrimination. It is linked to the notion of the ombudsman, a position whose implementation was recommended in the report submitted by the Minister of Defence to the Prime Minister on 25 March 1997. Scarcely two weeks ago, on 14 October 1997, the Minister of Defence issued a report entitled *A Commitment to Change*.

In this document, which offers a detailed response to the recommendations of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, the Minister indicated his plans to introduce certain changes.

These changes include:

(1) establishing an independent monitoring committee to act as a window through which Canadians can witness the changes being made to our institution;
(2) tabling amendments to the *National Defence Act* to allow for comprehensive change to the military justice system;
(3) naming an independent ombudsman to enhance fairness within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces;
(4) improving the internal grievance process to reduce the number of levels and authorities involved, to speed up decision-making, and to make it more effective;
(5) establishing an independent grievance board;
(6) introducing a mechanism for alternate dispute resolution to help Canadian Forces members and Departmental employees resolve issues and complaints before they become formal grievances;
(7) establishing a Military Police Complaints Commission to investigate complaints about military police conduct and chain of command interference; and

(8) ensuring openness and transparency by making public annual reports by the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Judge Advocate General, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, the Military Police Complaints Commission, the Departmental and Canadian Forces ombudsman, as well as by the independent grievance board.

Some of these changes are now in place, while others will require changes to legislation by Parliament.

Why a Defence Ethics Program?

In their role as peacekeepers over the past few decades, members of the Canadian Forces have earned a world-wide reputation for their professionalism, impartiality, courage and compassion.

They may not have known every detail of the Geneva Convention, yet we were all convinced that we were applying it and "living" it.

But we should never take our professionalism for granted, as we found out when the worst happened and we came to harm Prisoners of War!

How did we come to this?

There are some who say that, more than fifty years after the Second World War, our veterans are no longer among us to transmit their values 'through osmosis', so to speak. But that does not explain everything. The fact is that our service men and women are participating, under punishing, sometimes traumatic, conditions, in increasingly complex operations that are taking place in a new geostrategic environment. It is for this reason that many of our soldiers who have returned physically from long months spent in Bosnia have not yet managed to return psychologically. Canadian society, generally tolerant and peaceful, had not equipped them to be impotent witnesses to barbaric cruelty in a land whose people, only a few months earlier, had been living side by side as good neighbours.

In recent years, during peacekeeping missions when the Canadian Forces were in fact operating under warlike conditions — even if Canada was not at war with anyone —, we began to be aware of the fact that the time had come, not only to reassess our training, but also to formalize our training in the field of ethics. This is one of the most painful lessons we learned in Somalia, and we are going to make sure that the Canadian Forces emerge from this situation stronger and with a heightened awareness of the values they are mandated to defend in every corner of the world.

The answer to the question "why do we need a Defence Ethics Program?" is that ethics have a serious impact on our operations and on our operational effectiveness.

Defence Ethics: Everyone's Responsibility

This is why the Defence Ethics Program takes the concrete approach. Its training component helps us to integrate the values set out in the Statement of Ethics into our daily conduct — regardless of our rank or level of responsibility.

The reason why I am stressing this point is that, even though the restructuring of the Canadian Forces has resulted in greater delegation of authority, responsibility ultimately rests with the senior ranks, hence the importance of quality leadership.

By 'quality leadership' I mean a leadership that is strong, committed, skilled, loyal, compassionate, and has high ethical standards.

Yet ethical behaviour is not the responsibility of leaders alone. Sooner or later every one of us is confronted with an ethical dilemma. One of the basic hypotheses of the Ethics Program clearly explains why: "*Any decision or action which affects or might affect, directly or indirectly, other people has an ethical dimension*."

In other words, given that our activities and decisions all have an impact on someone else, every one of us has ethical responsibilities.

Because the chain of command is the backbone of the Armed Forces, ethics must be cultivated and practiced by every link in the chain. We must all set an example. So, if you have problems, I encourage you to talk them over with your superiors and your colleagues. There are no useless questions, since a problem that is discussed openly is half way to being solved.

The Defence Ethics Program is our program. Take advantage of the dimension of the program which aims to help people make ethical decisions by enhancing their reasoning capability.

As members of the Canadian Forces, we must be 'thinking members', with clear direction and accountability, but also with flexibility and room for creativity and common sense. We must build in ourselves and instill in others the confidence to make the right decision.

The ethical nature of the Defence Team has its foundation in the ethical behaviour of each of its members. This is so because, in the final analysis, ethics is based upon discipline and personal judgment.

Thus, at a particular point in a member's career, he or she will be required to balance the need to obey a superior — essential to the operation of the chain of command — with the moral courage to ask questions regarding orders that he or she might feel uncomfortable executing.

Whether we are attending a professional development session or sitting around a table making decisions, we must not only dare to ask questions, we must also make sure that ethical values are always front and foremost. As each day passes, we will therefore contribute, both as individuals and as part of a team, to the enrichment of the ethical culture of the Canadian Forces.

Measuring and Reinforcing Ethical Behaviour

Ethical behaviour is measurable and will be measured. There have been reports of certain performance-related problems within every element of the Canadian Forces, and as a result a working group has been created tasked with defining and shedding light on these weaknesses.

This task force will suggest innovative solutions to the authorities. Corrective measures have already been implemented in our training schools pending the introduction of the overall ethics plan.

Over the coming year, training in ethics will become mandatory and will be delivered at all levels, from recruits to generals. Greater emphasis will be placed on ethics in the train-

ing programs of the Royal Military College of Canada, the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, and the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. This ethics training will be repeated at various stages in a member's military career.

The concept of a double standard as far as senior officers and junior ranks are concerned will not be tolerated in the future; neither will lack of respect for their subordinates by superiors, any more than lack of respect by subordinates for their superiors. Loyalty and respect are two-way streets. They must flow in both directions up and down the chain of command and I shall personally ensure that it is so.

We have a proud past, a rich tradition and a solid ethos. We must continue to protect the values which our predecessors defended so valiantly and bind the ethos of our Armed Forces inseparably to the democratic values of Canadian society.

Final Message

(1) I am counting on every man and woman in the Canadian Forces — both in the Regular Force or the Reserve — to abide by and promote the values of the Canadian Defence Ethics Program in their day-to-day behaviour, their actions and their decision-making. Only in this way will we be able to fulfill the mandate that has been accorded us.
(2) Rather than regarding the values of the Ethics Program as a burden, I invite you to consider them allies, guideposts to lead you along an arduous road, and as a source of inspiration.
(3) As we have done in the past, we will continue in this way to serve Canada honourably, effectively and ethically.
(4) We will continue to be justly proud of our accomplishments and the way we achieve them.
(5) We will continue to earn the respect and trust of the Canadian people.

I know, without a shadow of a doubt, that the men and women of the Canadian Forces, the members of the Regular Force and the Reserves, are in every respect worthy of this trust.

Ethics: a gift we give ourselves

Mr. Jacques Duchesneau, MPA

Ethics: a gift we give ourselves

Mr. Jacques Duchesneau, MPA

Jacques Duchesneau joined the Montreal Police Department in 1968 and is now the Director of the Montreal Urban Community Police Department. He has a MPA, and has taught at the Maisonneuve and Ahuntsic CEGEPs in Montreal, and the Canadian Police College. Mr. Duchesneau sits on the Board of Directors of nine organizations and his contributions have been recognized by the Société de criminologie du Québec and by being awarded the Order of St. John, and the Order of Canada.

It was with great pleasure that I agreed to speak to you about ethics and I would like to thank the organizers for this opportunity. I have been associated with Canadian Forces personnel for 30 years, and I must admit that my respect for you has never wavered.

Let me say again how pleased I am to be here with you today in this warm and welcoming atmosphere you have created.

During my talk, you will see that I have more questions than I have answers. Why? Because ethics does not recognize simple, comfortable definitions — it demands a collective thought process that cannot be avoided.

Ethics is a matter of choosing moral values

Do you believe that we have ethics problems in our organizations?

My answer is clear: Yes. We have serious ethics problems. We have accomplished a great deal, but much remains to be done.

I recently learned that three of our patrol cars were seen parked in front of a certain restaurant at daybreak. Since when do six police officers take it upon themselves to eat breakfast outside authorized meal periods, when they are being very well paid indeed to protect the public?

Some will see this as an ethics problem. Others will look upon it as a problem of conduct that clearly warrants disciplinary action.

In the early 1980s, a lawyer working for the Montreal Urban Community Police Department (MUCPD) and involved in divorce proceedings used electronic eavesdropping equipment to prove that his wife had a lover. Since when is it permitted to use your organization's equipment to resolve personal problems?

I was also told about how one of our police officers assigned to traffic duty had written up a report on a car accident that never happened. Why?

Because he was in collusion with a garage owner who wanted to get rid of an old blue Oldsmobile that had been damaged in a previous accident. And because his personal ethical standards were obviously low. He was dismissed.

In the case of the Canadian Armed Forces, I have heard that, in the past, senior officers were reimbursed for expenses that were directly related to personal activities. Is it right that it is the Canadian taxpayer who, at the end of the line, pays for such administrative irregularities?

Now, keeping these examples in mind, let me tell you simply what it is in our best interests to remember, it takes 30 years to build a reputation and 30 seconds to destroy one. Ethical issues carry a lot of weight.

Ethics is an abstract concept derived from the Greek word 'ethos'. It refers to the beliefs, moral standards, and rules of conduct that a society lays down in order to elevate its citizens' quality of life. We often associate ethics with the phrase 'professional rules of conduct' — which means 'what has to be done, what must be done.'

Ethics judges morality the way justice judges legality.

We are sometimes thrust into situations in which it is difficult to take action, to make choices. Should I turn a blind eye to the gram of hashish belonging to an informer who might, in return, enable me to charge a much-wanted drug dealer?

When testifying in court, should I smear a bit a member of the Hell's Angels who has killed five people and never been convicted, because of the high-priced lawyers that only he can afford?

In an attempt to make up for the horror of a murdered child, is it permissible to "rough up" the alleged killer a bit?

Faced with these dilemmas, we reflect, we make decisions, and we make choices. It is here that moral reflection begins, when someone asks himself *the* fundamental question of ethics: "What should I do?" To take action is, definitely, to adopt a position and proceed in accordance with a set of values.

My intention today is not to attempt to define ethics with surgical precision. You are as much aware as I am of the controversies stirred up by ethical questions and the problems of conscience that stem from them.

I intend instead to dwell on all the opportunities available to policemen and servicemen to conduct themselves in an unethical manner.

Before getting to the heart of the matter, let me emphasize that 95 percent of all police officers — and the same is surely true of the Canadian Forces — perform well and reflect credit on their organization.

The remaining 5 percent are certainly not of minor significance, because they frequently give us bad publicity.

The Barnabé case

Let me review the example of Richard Barnabé, the 38-year old taxi driver whose photo has been seen all around the world and who has cast doubt on the professionalism of the members of the MUCPD. Let me give you a few details.

On 14 December 1993, Richard Barnabé was pursued by officers of our police department. He had allegedly attempted to gain entry to a church by breaking a window. When the police arrived, he fled.

A police chase ensued, during which Mr Barnabé drove the wrong way down one-way streets,

disregarded all stop signs, ran red lights and drove through residential areas at over 100 km/h.

The police officers managed to stop Mr Barnabé, who put up considerable resistance. Blows were exchanged between Barnabé and the police officers. He was then taken to the police station and put in a cell.

Shortly thereafter, a number of police officers came to remove his clothing on the grounds that he might hang himself with them. Richard Barnabé, who was psychologically disturbed, became very aggressive, screamed, yelled and struggled; six police officers endeavoured to restrain him.

The result? The suspect suffered a heart attack. He was taken to hospital, where he remained in a coma until his death, two and a half years later.

I have no intention of imputing motives to our police officers here. Indeed, in this case, it is no so much the facts that are important as the treatment that they received at the hands of the media.

Throughout this entire affair, which the press and the radio fed on for a long time, six of our police officers were roundly criticized and censured by the court of public opinion. I need not tell you that the reputation of the MUCPD was considerably tarnished.

What is important in this case are the ethical questions silhouetted behind that photograph.

Did our police officers use excessive force? Since Mr Barnabé had been injured, why did they not take him to hospital when he was arrested, instead of putting him in a cell?

Were there too many police officers at the scene of the incident? Had there been only two or four officers at the scene, would they have acted in the same way?

Was it necessary for them to make such a determined effort to remove Mr Barnabé's clothing when he was beside himself? When the suspect became recalcitrant, did the police use force to control his aggressiveness, or to vent their own aggressiveness?

All of these questions are crucial. The Barnabé incident lasted an hour at most, yet it was discussed for months. The Barnabé case quickly became the perfect symbol of police blunders.

It was a real disaster from the standpoint of public relations: we took too long to react. And that policy of inaction dealt us a severe blow. The photograph of Barnabé was shown *ad nauseam*, thereby publicly convicting our police officers before their trial even began.

I am not attempting to downplay the actions of the Police Department or to absolve it of all responsibility. Not at all.

I am merely trying to show that this incident, serious yet isolated, smeared and discredited all of the police officers of the MUCPD, not just the six who were directly involved in the affair.

My real question, then, is this: Did all of the police officers involved in the Barnabé affair act properly from an ethical standpoint?

Judge Greenberg, who heard the case, concluded that neither the actions of the six police officers nor their unfortunate consequences were premeditated, and that they had not acted with

malicious intent. Nevertheless, he observed, and I quote: [Translation] "that the accused committed several errors of judgment and, what is more, they misjudged the degree of force that they were using."

This notion of judgment is fundamental when you are a police officer. The police are supposed to protect the public, safeguard lives, keep the peace and ensure that rights and freedoms are respected. In the Barnabé case, were all of these duties fulfilled? I shall let you be the judge.

For my part, let me say simply that I consider it unspeakable and unacceptable for a prisoner to die while in custody, whether it be in a police facility or, by analogy, in a detention centre or under the protection of military forces.

For years, I have been trying to replace the term "law enforcement agencies" with the term "peace officers" which, in my view, better conveys the meaning of the real peacemaking task of our police officers. Unfortunately, I cannot prove my point as long as incidents such as the Barnabé affair continue to occur.

In the Armed Forces, it is also very much in the interest of soldiers to emphasize their role as members of a peace force.

Ethics, A Code of Honour for Professionals

Now I should like to look at ethics from the point of view of professionalism. When you are a police officer, there are certain basic rules that have to be observed, a code of honour that has to be followed, as in all professions.

Doctors have their professional code of ethics, as do architects, accountants and notaries.

In the Air force, an officer who transports drugs along with the cargo is committing a crime and a serious error. A member of the armed forces who takes part in a peace mission when inebriated tarnishes his profession.

These examples clarify a fundamental fact, being a military officer or a police officer is a profession not a job. That said, military and police officers have to agree to fulfill a social contract and to work for the interests of the whole; they must therefore also subscribe to the higher ethical standards that apply when serving society.

The day our police officers no longer appropriately exercise their powers, we will have reason to consider them technicians rather than professionals.

As the Honourable Judge René Marin, Chair of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) External Review Committee, said so well: "technicians have few problems with the ethical aspect of their duties because they simply follow procedures."

If there is to be a police or a military culture, then members who perform the same duties must adopt the same fundamental values. It is through adherence to ethical values that conformity of action is developed, as well as what is considered appropriate, acceptable, and moral behaviour by the profession.

Do you remember the day when you joined the Navy, Army or Air Force? You were probably dreaming of adventure, challenges, outdoing yourself and performing outdoor missions. I imagine that you also wanted to do an important job for the good and the honour of your country.

Today, 5, 10, 15 or even 20 years later, how do things stand? Are the rules of ethics that you set for yourself at the outset still the same? Has seeing extreme poverty in Haiti and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia brought you face to face with a new interpretation of the world and of ethics? I imagine it has.

I believe it essential to be able to review your view of ethics and revise your priorities. Constantly.

Without changes in ethics, there is no possibility of transforming reality, of changing the order of things.

To show you that each era has its own moral values, let us look back and examine certain police practices of the past.

In 1910, the police officers who were the most highly regarded drank heavily to demonstrate their strength and practiced strong-arm methods such as, "On the count of three, we charge. One, two, three…"

Today, the opposite obtains. The public no longer wants a strong-arm police force, that is, a police force that relies on violence. People want crime prevention rather than crime suppression.

In Montreal in the 70s, police officers were firing about 300 shots a year. In 1996, only 12 shots were fired in the course of a million incidents to which the MUCPD responded. This decrease, which is very significant as far as I'm concerned, convinces me of something: in today's professional ethics, police officers are more conscious of the killing power of their weapons.

In the past, high-level police officers did not actually proceed to the scene to observe police operations up close. Today, they do. In fact, I demand that all senior personnel of the Department go out on patrol four days a year, as an ordinary patrolman. Why? Because, in a theatre of operations, it is important to see the actual impact of our decisions, which are often made in a vacuum.

In the past, it was not considered improper to laugh at sexist and racist jokes. Police humour drew upon a stock of low-class jokes. Today, a police officer who ventured to make inappropriate remarks would laugh on the other side of his face upon hearing the disciplinary action that would be taken against him.

One final example. Four years ago, the basic handbook of the Police Department that I inherited contained 926 procedures to be followed, like a little catechism. It was completely mind-numbing, and sometimes completely crazy as well. I should also mention that there was an order that indicated how to arrange orders manuals on sergeants' desks.

As soon as I assumed my duties, I reduced the number of procedures to 75.

Why? By way of an answer, let me quote again from Judge René Marin, whose work I very much admire. Mr. Marin wrote: [Translation] "Are police officers subject to so many 'procedural standards' that they no longer have the opportunity and the obligation to evaluate the ethical aspect of their own actions? Can we really expect that the manuals, despite their number and complexity, can provide for every possible situation and dictate every response?"

Like that eminent thinker, I am convinced that procedures do not embody the spirit and greatness of an organization — rather, its fundamental values do. I do not believe in rules for their own sake, or in the inflexible, rigid mentality that judges men by to how closely they observe existing, immutable rules.

Too many procedures place our personnel in straitjackets, thereby destroying their creativity. We have to trust our people, even if this entails some risk with some of them.

Coherent Actions

Many people tell me we are getting all excited over nothing. What harm does it do if a patrol officer makes up a reason for visiting the local Price Club so as to do some personal shopping while on duty?

The harm is in wearing thin the patience and tolerance of our citizens. It is the aggregation of little daily irritants that makes people lose faith and confidence in an organization.

Citizens are being asked today to be much more responsible, more thoughtful and more active in building our society. In the name of democracy, we insist they try to understand, judge, and decide for themselves. That is all fine and dandy but are we — we police officers — are we making these same demands of ourselves?

I believe police officers must aim to be better than the average citizen and to serve as good examples. They must be impeccable in all respects.

If we do not aim for this ideal, then citizens may simply "dismiss" us, saying the police are no better than any one else, so why bother. This does not mean that the MUCPD is aiming for sainthood! No organization is perfect. But I do want to convince our citizens that they can regard police officers as role models.

In 1990, police officers in Los Angeles arrested a Black man and literally beat him to a pulp. What they did not know was that an amateur camera was trained on them. The next day, the arrest scene was seen around the world.

As Judge Marin explains, and I quote, [Translation] "the facts here are less important than the way they are depicted in the media, particularly on television. There are certainly some significant facts of which I am unaware: like the general public, I know only what has been reported on television and in magazines such as *Time*. The facts are of little importance in this context: what counts is the impact of the coverage on the public."

In organizations as visible as ours (and I would add, as vulnerable as ours, in terms of reputation), it is imperative that we ourselves be consistent.

We advocate social peace, observance of the law and respect for individuals — very well, let us practice what we preach.

I have an ethics problem when one of our police officers issues 15 tickets for speeding in a single day and, when his shifts ends, he drives home as fast as Jacques Villeneuve. How do you explain that to the public?

I have an ethics problem when one of our police officers arrives at the scene of a barroom brawl and, instead of trying to restore order, waits until the worst is over for fear of being hit on the head with a beer bottle.

I have an ethics problem when one of our police officers goes to Tim Horton's or Dunkin' Donuts and expects that his coffee and doughnut will be on the house. Not particularly serious, you say? I say to you: Quite the contrary!

When we try to demonstrate our credibility and efficiency and the public call us doughnut gluttons and worse, we do not find the well-known song, "Bonjour la police!" funny at all. A caricature of a police badge surrounded by a doughnut can do a lot of harm to our image…

In my book, police officers must conduct themselves in such a way as to avoid discrediting or compromising the image of their department. Indeed, their conduct must be exemplary, even when off duty, and they must maintain a position of respect within the community in which they live and provide their services.

Today, when we definitely need the support of the public, police officers and servicemen must also be aware of the importance of treating the public with respect. Being respectful of others means using courteous speech in which the polite form "vous" takes precedence over the familiar "tu", and it also means being impeccably dressed and acting appropriately in every situation.

I should like to add something here — a kind of marginal note, if you like — that I think is important. I have been talking about ethics, but I have not said that I personally do not believe everyone is capable of respecting ethical norms. Just think about the 5% of bad apples and deadwood in our organizations.

In the case of the MUCPD, I have in mind two unfortunately well-know cases. When the two individuals applied to join the police service, our psychologists recommended they not be hired. We did not listen to that advice and we did not thoroughly check the backgrounds of the two candidates. We were wrong.

Today, one of the officers is on a disability pension after accidentally killing a young Black man, who was handcuffed and trying to flee from the police, in the parking lot of a police station. This affair was a hard pill for us to swallow. The second officer was dismissed for the fraudulent use of credit cards.

There is an old adage that says: "Good people don't become bad cops. Bad people become bad cops".

I believe that, for the greater good of our organizations, we need to be much more selective and much tougher in our selection and hiring criteria.

Five values to uphold

To give this presentation a tone that is more practical than theoretical, more concrete than academic, I suggest that because we are short of time, we now take a closer look at the behavioral patterns and the standards of professional conduct that police officers have a moral duty to observe.

I should point out that the five values that I shall describe apply equally to the members of your organization.

(1) Integrity

In the 50s, motorcycle policemen who stopped motorists had only to hold out their gauntlets and demand money in exchange for their silence. This was

corruption at its best. Some police officers took so many bribes in those days that they were able to buy buildings for cash with all the money that they took in.

Today, this sort of practice would result in severe disciplinary action and culminate in dismissal and criminal charges. Integrity is not violated in my police department: no one is above the law, not even police officers.

I am inflexible on this subject. I simply will not tolerate any of our police officers being involved in any act of corruption or blackmail or accepting a favour or benefit that may place them in a conflict of interests or affect their judgment or impartiality.

(2) Impartiality

With regard to impartiality, let me give you a very specific example. A few years ago, one of our police officers on duty was given a traffic ticket for having parked his personal vehicle in a no-parking zone. He was furious and headed for City Hall where, with considerable insistence, demanded that the individual who had issued him the ticket cancel it. That individual naturally refused and the police officer was disciplined.

If a police officer contests a traffic ticket that he deserved, does that mean that a surgeon can have his sister-in-law operated on ahead of all of the other patients who have been on waiting lists for months?

I cannot say it often enough: Police officers must be impartial in order to maintain their credibility, and they have no right whatever to take advantage of their status to obtain something that another member of the public could not get.

Impartiality also refers to the obligation of police officers to act without regard to the status, gender, race, creed or political aspirations of an individual. All members of the public — be they Arabs, drug addicts, disabled people, Jehovah's Witnesses, billionaires or homeless people — must be treated equally and courteously, and their rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Quebec and Canadian charters must be respected.

I can hear your questions from here: Must a police officer treat a dangerous member of a motorcycle gang with the same courtesy as a young mother?

Must a police officer give mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to an individual with AIDS who has been knifed if it will keep him alive until the ambulance attendants arrive? Let your conscience be your guide in answering these questions.

Do not ask me whether all of our police officers are impartial: speaking as a chief of police who is aware of the impact of the human factor, my answer is no. I have some men who refuse to believe that a prostitute can be raped, who are prejudiced against homosexuals and who think that anyone who attempts suicide should never bungle it.

I would like to add that impartiality could also take the form of not holding back an individual's career simply because he does not meet certain criteria of physical

appearance or group membership. There was a time in the MUCPD when a police officer had absolutely no chance of promotion if he had never served as a motorcycle patrolman.

Does it sometimes happen in the Canadian Forces that a service member's or a civilian's abilities come second? Is the fact that the individual is divorced, female, homosexual, short or fat a handicap, as it sometimes is in police forces? The very fact that the question is asked may provide a partial answer…

(3) Confidentiality

Police and military officers must ensure that the information they obtain in the course of performing their duties is kept confidential. It is disturbing to learn that the story of a driver who accidentally ran over and killed a homeless person, which is headline news in all the local papers the following day, has been leaked to a journalist by a police officer.

But that is exactly what happened to Mister René Lévesque when he was Premier of Québec. The story also hit the news on the international stage. Without in any way denying the gravity of the incident, I am nonetheless convinced that it is not up to our police officers to spread the news. That is the work of journalists, not police officers.

It is also disturbing to learn that an individual, angry because promotion is slow in coming, sends an anonymous letter to a high-level officer divulging confidential information about a colleague that is a little too threatening. That, too, is totally unacceptable. Does this happen in the Armed Forces?

(4) Responsibility

Have you noticed that, in recent years, there is an increasing tendency to decentralize power in the businesses that drive our economy?

As managers of an organization that is preparing to enter the next millennium, do not hesitate to direct this power downwards, that is, towards the people who actually do the work, and give them some freedom to make decisions and access to the leadership of the organization. Responsibility means dispensing with the view that the more stripes we have on our shoulders, the more our ideas are sound. No one has a monopoly on genius. Let your employees write their own page of history in your organization, recognize their worth, and give them a chance to be something other than a mere extension of yourself.

The delegation of powers will necessarily result in some honest mistakes. In such cases, remember that we can learn from mishaps.

Since I am speaking to an organization in which careerism has been gaining followers for a number of years — and here again, I am not passing judgment on the Army, because careerism is also on the rise in my own police department — I would like to remind you that some delicate questions of ethics are involved here.

In order to obtain a promotion and look good in the eyes of management, is it acceptable for a high-ranking individual to attend a function accompanied by his wife at the organization's expense? What I mean here is that he obtains reimbursement for his wife's aircraft ticket, hairdresser's bills, meals and clothing. Is this a problem of ethics or

excessive tolerance? A bit of both, I imagine. But then, how do we respond to those who see us going?

Bear in mind that we must not think that people will listen to our good advice yet ignore our bad example.

Is there nothing unusual in the fact that some service personnel, in order to enhance their chances of career advancement, disguise their opinions and say precisely what sounds good to their superiors?

The Statement of Defence Ethics says that members of the Canadian Forces should undertake to place the service of Canada before their own interests. Let us keep this in mind. Let us also not lose sight of the rule of the three Rs that we were taught at the very beginning of our career: respect for oneself, respect for others and responsibility for all one's actions.

Within the MUCPD, I have seen police officers start rumours in order to tarnish a colleague's reputation or even to take credit for someone else's work. I do not believe that it is very professional to attempt to move up by using a colleague's head as a stepping-stone.

(5) The Use of Force

I should like to turn now to the use of force, a very sensitive subject for both our organizations. Let's put our cards on the table — we have our Barnabé affair and you have the case of the young Somali.

Now I am not out to discredit anyone — not my Police Service, not the Armed Forces. Once again, it is the ethical perspective that interests me.

In the Barnabé affair, it would be easy to say that this blot on our copybook was just an isolated incident involving six police officers. But that would be glossing over the case. We need to ask more questions.

Who was supervising those police officers when Barnabé had a cardiac arrest in his cell? Where was the organization when it was time to talk to the media? We were not there. Ethically speaking, we failed.

In the case of the soldier in Somalia, it is also important that there be an honest examination of the situation. Speaking as an ordinary citizen, there is one particular question I should like answered: should the soldiers who were on the Somalia mission be the only ones to bear the blame and public anger? I'll leave the answer to you but the question must be asked.

Deeply held values

I do not wish to be accused of plagiarism, so let me quote to you something said by Laurent Laplante, a career communicator who has distinguished himself as an editorialist, editor-in-chief, moderator and lecturer in several Quebec universities.

I believe that he neatly sums up the gist of what I wanted to say to you today: [Translation] "Ethics comes from within one's own conscience. We do not get ethics from others — we fashion it ourselves."

As you leave this room this morning, no one is going to give you a clear-cut statement of ethics that you will henceforth have to observe. That would be too easy, and man

is too multifaceted and complex to lock himself into a rigid moral framework.

No, as you leave here, simply say to yourselves that you have deeply held ethical values. There are many possible sets of values; every individual has his own. Values are what you deem important in your professional life. They are what is crucial in your attitudes and what determines your behaviour.

As the people who actually do the work in the Department of National Defence, it is incumbent upon you to form your own moral values in all honesty.

Each of you has a duty to devise the contemporary wording that best defines, in your own eyes, integrity, professionalism, loyalty, honesty, courage and fairness. When it comes to ethical obligations, we have no right to dodge the issue.

Do you believe that we have any ethics problems in our organizations?

To that question, I again reply yes. We have serious ethics problems. We have done a great deal, but much remains to be done.

Most of the people here today are performing their duties according to extremely high ethical standards. That does not mean that there is no room for improvement.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence, those of you attending this conference are invited to think about what I have just described. Today and in the future, you will be asked a question that continues to fuel discussions: What role does ethics play?

Ethics makes it possible to pass critical judgment on the things that we do. It is through professional ethics that we can judge ourselves, understand ourselves, mould ourselves and outdo ourselves.

I read in newspapers that with the appointment of General Baril, fundamental reforms will be undertaken to clean up the image of the Canadian Armed Forces and to identify the serious problem of leadership. This will be a painful but necessary exercise.

Perhaps some of you here would have preferred someone other than General Baril. Believe me when I say that the appointment of the head of an organization as important as the Armed Forces will never meet with unanimous approval. That is quite normal. And that I can attest to, based on my personal experience when I was named Chief of Police.

But General Baril has been chosen, therefore you don't have the moral right to let him down. Without your collective support, this leader that I highly esteem will not be able alone to give a new momentum to the Armed Forces.

Some of you will say that this is not a good time to review the Statement of Ethics of the Canadian Forces. On the contrary, it is necessary right now to proceed further along the path of change. New fundamental values, embodying greater integrity and credibility, must be emphasized. The time has come.

LEADERSHIP

Air Commodore (ret'd)
Leonard Birchall, OBE, DFC, CD

Air Commodore (ret'd) Leonard Birchall, OBE, DFC, CD

Air Commodore (ret'd) Birchall graduated from the Royal Military College (RMC) in 1937, and is known as the "Saviour of Ceylon" because of his heroic actions during WWII. Throughout his long and distinguished career, he has received numerous decorations and honourary degrees. He served in command and staff positions in Canada, the United States, and Europe before retiring from the Canadian Forces, in 1967, as the Commandant of RMC. Since that time he has served in various honourary positions and, on 21 April 1996, he became the first member of the CF to ever receive the fifth bar to the CD. Air Commodore (ret'd) Birchall currently resides in Kingston and remains active in the civilian and military communities.

I apologise for my copious notes, but at my age, and this past July I became 82 years young, there are three serious losses which you encounter in your physical capabilities. First your eyesight grows dim, and you will note the rather strong lenses in my glasses. Second, your hearing is not too good, and I admit that I am in great need of a hearing aid. Third … and I'll be damned if I can ever remember what that one is. Thus, I must stick closely to my text or I shall wander all over the place. Actually there is a fourth serious loss in our physical capabilities which we old chaps encounter but we do our utmost not to even think about that one, let alone discuss it, as whenever we do all we do is sit around and cry.

You will note that it is necessary for me to take frequent sips of water and this is due to the fact that during my indoctrination into Japanese culture, which was administered with severity by clubs of various sizes, all too often I would zig when I should have zagged and the damage to my throat has finally caught up with me resulting in my having to have a series of drastic throat operations and intense radiation treatments, leaving me with a perpetual dry mouth and throat, so I ask you to please bear with me.

On 21 April '96 I qualified for the 5th bar to my CD having completed 62 years of undetected crime in the Canadian Services, and hence the greatest part of my life has been spent in the Canadian military. Napoleon once said: "There are no bad men … only bad officers." The question then is have I been a good or bad officer, and here there is no set criteria or standard. Some believe that the best measure of success is the rank you attain, but I do not accept this. Some of the finest men I have met, served with, and held in the highest regard were not necessarily those who were the most senior. One thing I do recognize as a measure of success is leadership, as everyone I have held in high esteem has had that quality and this, I believe, to be essential for success in any walk of life. As a member of the Armed Forces and regardless of rank, the opportunities for development and use of

leadership are immense, and the satisfaction you will derive is equally so. There is still the old adage, however, that you can lead a horse to water but you cannot make him drink. Or the other version, you can lead a horse to drink but you can't make him water. Thus, while you will have these opportunities, the success you will achieve depends entirely on the amount of effort you put forth. Nothing is ever free in this life or handed to you on a plate; the price you must pay is *hard work — total effort — and self-sacrifice*. I would now like to give you my concept of leadership and the reasons for my beliefs.

Incidentally, the most succinct definition of leadership I have ever heard is being able to tell someone to go to Hell and have them look forward to the trip. If you ever have to lead troops into combat, and I pray this will never happen, you will find that you appear before your men/women stripped of all insignia and outward signs of authority to command. Your leadership is judged not by your rank, but by whether your men/women are completely confident that you have the character, knowledge and training that they can trust you with their lives. Now men/women are shrewd judges of their leaders, especially when their lives are at stake, and hence your character and knowledge must be such that they are prepared to follow you, to trust your judgement and carry out your commands.

Let us now examine these two major things which the men/women look for in their leaders. The first is "character", and here I believe that the prime ingredient, the absolute corner-stone, is integrity. Integrity is one of those words that many people keep in the desk drawer labelled "too hard". It is not a topic for the dinner table or cocktail party. You can't buy or sell it. When supported with education a person's integrity can give them something to rely on when their perception seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waiver, and when they are faced with hard choices of right or wrong. It's something to keep them afloat when they are drowning; if only for practical reasons it is an attribute that should be kept at the very top of a young person's consciousness. Without personal integrity, intellectual skills are worthless. As the ancient Roman philosopher Epictetus said in the field manual he produced for the Roman soldiers in approximately the year 50 A.D.: "It is better to die in hunger, exempt from guilt and fear, than it is to live in affluence and with perturbation."

This means that you must demonstrate the utmost honesty in everything you do in your dealings with superiors and subordinates alike, both on and off duty. It is this that inspires your men/women to carry out a similar integrity. When they know your word is your bond, then confidence and trust will permeate the entire unit. The men/women will feel they can come to you, their leader, with the bad news as well as the good news. Never shoot the messenger as this will just discourage others from giving you the honest feedback needed for you to command. You must report the good, the bad, and the ugly up the chain of command to your superiors. There is no substitute for honesty in our profession, what we do is just too important.

Integrity also means having the courage to *take the full responsibility for your actions and those of your subordinates*. Don't quibble, don't try to shift the blame, don't look for scapegoats. If you or your command has fouled up, then fess up, and press on. In doing so, you will set the

right example for your men/women, and earn the respect of your subordinates and superiors alike. Nothing destroys a unit's effectiveness and leadership quicker than the leaders not taking the sole responsibility for their actions, and the first sign of this is usually careerism, the C.Y.A. factor, which very often has the tendency to first appear in the higher headquarters. Once started, it rapidly feeds on itself and spreads like wildfire down through the entire organization. At the first indication of this selfish, self-centred, self-serving attitude, you must take every step possible to root it out and replace it with integrity.

The second major thing which the men/women look for in their leaders is knowledge and training. It is essential that you ensure you have the knowledge, information, and training necessary for you to properly assess and solve the problems that will face you and your men/women. All this must be done to the very best of your ability regardless of the size or importance of the problem. Never accept the second best or mediocre solution because you think the problem is not worth your time and effort. If you don't have the necessary knowledge and information, then go get it by asking for assistance, advice, guidance, doing research, until you are satisfied you have everything you need to reach the best solution. Then carry out that solution with your full out effort and determination.

Another point that the men/women look for in you as their leader is your concern and effort on behalf of the welfare of those who serve under you. You must prove beyond any doubt that you are fair and just in your dealings with them, and that you genuinely like and respect them. In all circumstances you must place their well-being ahead of your own, regardless of the cost to yourself.

And finally, one other and perhaps equally important factor is that once you are accepted as a leader, your men will not only follow you but will also emulate to the best of their ability your character and behaviour. That is why as a leader you must at all times and in all places set and maintain the highest of standards.

Let us now put these bits and pieces into service life and see the results in actual practice. In doing so I would like to use the life as a POW to demonstrate the reasons for my beliefs. The great social historians, the Durants, have said that culture is a thin veneer that superimposes itself on mankind. This is very true, and when men are stripped of this veneer and every other vestige of civilization, are treated and live as animals as we were forced to do as POWs, then the laws of the jungle soon take over. It is in this environment that the true basics of leadership emerged for me.

When I first arrived in Japan, courtesy of the Japanese Navy, I was sent to a special questioning camp under the Japanese Navy at a place named Ofuna, a suburb of Yokohama. This was a special interrogation camp where we were placed in solitary confinement in small cells, no speaking allowed, and we were questioned and beaten every day. We were not considered as POWs, but rather we were still on the firing line and could be killed at any time. I was moved from this camp after six months, when they brought in a U.S. Catalina crew shot down out of Dutch Harbour, and I was sent to the starting up of the working camps in the Yokohama area.

The first working camp I went to was located in a baseball stadium in the centre of Yokohama which had been built by the Standard Oil Company. We were housed in a large indoor

area under one of the grandstands, and I arrived there the same day as the first batch of prisoners from Hong Kong. There were five officers with this group of approximately 300 POWs. In Hong Kong the Japanese had raped and bayonetted nurses, women and children; killed doctors and patients in the hospital wards, operating theatres and recovery rooms; bayonetted, mutilated, shot and beheaded POWs just to amuse themselves; humiliated and degraded them in every way possible; no medical treatment or supplies for the sick and wounded; the lowest possible living conditions and way below starvation diet. We were joined two months later by 75 POWs from the Philippines, and these were some of the survivors from the Bataan Death March where over 16,950 POWs were killed (over 2/3rds of the entire total number of POWs involved). All these prisoners, both the Hong Kong and the Philippine POWs, had then to endure the "Hell Ships" where thousands died enroute from Hong Kong and Manila to Japan. In one ship alone, the Arisan-Maru, out of 1800 POWs, only 8 survived. The Oryoku-Maru started out with 1,619 POWs and only 200 survived that trip.

The order sent by the Japanese Tokyo Headquarters down to Hong Kong and the Philippines camps was to send their best and healthiest prisoners to work in Japan. Now as you well know, when a Commanding Officer gets an order to send his best men, this is when he unloads all his dead-beats, no-gooders, troublemakers, sick, wounded, incompetents, etc. Thus, I now found myself to be the senior POW in this brand new working camp and faced with over 375 very hostile, belligerent POWs. This gave me some concept of how Daniel felt when he walked into that den of lions.

I was the senior POW in all the working camps that I was in, but this was a title in name only, as with no means of physically exerting discipline, you had only the vast inherent responsibilities for the health and well-being of all those in the camp, but no means to enforce your decisions. The nature of military discipline encompasses two basic forms: the imposed discipline and the discipline which the individual decides is necessary, which is self-discipline. Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, in his book "Soldiers and Soldiering", describes this as follows:

> *Discipline makes a man do something he would not do unless he has learnt that it is the right, the proper and expedient thing to do. At its best it is instilled and maintained by pride in oneself, in one's unit, in one's profession and only at its worst by fear and punishment.*

In our case, punishment was completely out of the question. The conditions and environment in which we existed reduced our health to the very razor edge of complete collapse, and we needed every bit of our health, strength, stamina and reserve to barely keep living from day to day. Having to undergo punishment on top of all this would have been tantamount to issuing a death sentence. Thus, the authority we had was only that which the men wished to give us when and if they felt like it.

As officers, we were singled out by the Japanese for special treatment. Every method possible was used to degrade us in front of the men in order to counter any control or discipline we might try to develop. From the men's point of view all officers were under great suspicion. They felt they had been let down and that the incompetence of their officers was responsible

in large part for their being prisoners. Another sad factor was that after being captured, unfortunately a lot of the officer's prime concern had been for themselves. They had taken the best quarters, furnishings, clothing and supplies available, and only after they had taken what they wanted or considered their share as an officer, did the troops get what was left. This was particularly true in the distribution of food. Since the POWs were on a starvation diet, food was of the greatest importance as it meant life or death, and when the officers took more than their equal share of the daily ration per prisoner it not only meant that it drastically reduced the food left for the men, but also the men's chances of survival.

The first night we were in the Yokohama camp, we, the five officers from Hong Kong and myself, decided that we had to share the privations, maltreatment and work at least equally with the men, and that this could only be done by demonstrating that we took on an obviously greater share than the men. We immediately set up a system whereby the food and everything else we received was dished out in full view of the men. If anyone thought he had less than an officer he was free to exchange his share for the officers and no questions asked. The officers were always the last to take up their share. The men tried us on by eating some of their food and then changing it for an officer's bowl, but in no time flat the troops themselves sorted this out and woe betide anyone who tried it. In fact, in a way this backfired as when the Japanese reduced an officer's ration because he was sick or as punishment, the men themselves made certain that the officer still received his fair and equal share, and in some cases more than his share.

Cigarettes became the currency of the POWs, and with the horrible conditions and starvation under which we lived the addiction to tobacco increased beyond belief. It seemed that when you were smoking you could, to a limited degree, blot out reality and ease the continual terrible pangs of hunger. Men who were starving, never without intense hunger 24 hours of the day and every day of the year, knowing that their very lives depended on the small bits of food we got, would still trade away their food for cigarettes. We, the officers, gave up smoking which was no easy task itself, but in this way we removed ourselves from any criticism and were able to put our ration of cigarettes into the ration for the men and also to create a small supply for our doctor to be used in keeping the heavily addicted from trading away their food. Anyone offering to buy or sell food for cigarettes was reported by the men themselves to the doctor who would then talk to those involved and take remedial action. In this way our lives were made much more bearable and many lives were saved.

Another immediate action we took was whenever a Japanese guard started to beat up a prisoner, the closest officer would jump in between them, the prisoner would get lost as quickly as possible and the officer would take the beating. Sometimes the guard would become bewildered to find he was beating the wrong man and would stop, whereas sometimes he would become infuriated and take it out on the officer. We just had to take our chance and hope for the best.

A word about dress and deportment. Clothing was at an absolute premium as we only had what we had with us when captured. The only clothing issue we were given was what the

Japanese had captured and then did not want for themselves or could not use in other ways. Believe me, the pickings were very slim indeed, and we lived in rags and tatters. The clothing issues we were given all went to the men, but again in short order the men made certain that every officer had one good shirt, tie, tunic, trousers and hat to wear whenever we had to parade in front of the Japanese.

We were given one square inch of soap per week with which to do all our laundry and to keep our bodies clean. There was no hot water, and even the cold water was in very limited supply. We were allowed one hot and sometimes only a warm bath once a month. The supply of razors, razor blades, hair clippers, scissors, needles, thread, and all other such normal items were only those which had been brought into the camp by the men after their surrender. It was, therefore, impossible to maintain the normal standards of cleanliness. In addition, we were out of the camp for about 12 hours of the day doing coolie labour on starvation diet. The result was that we were sick, starving, cold, filthy, infested with lice, fleas and bedbugs, but unable to find the time, energy or the means to do very much about it. Despite all this, through the height of ingenuity and improvisation we still managed to keep ourselves as best we could. When we turned out on parade it may have been in rags and tatters, but we were as clean, upright, formidable, proud of our heritage and still as undefeated as we could possibly be.

Here may I quote from Field Marshal Slim in writing about his W.W. II campaign in the jungles of Burma in which he said:

> *At some stage and in some circumstances, armies have let their discipline sag, but they have never won victory until they have made it taut again, nor will they. We have found it a great mistake to belittle the importance of smartness in turn-out, alertness of carriage, cleanliness of person, saluting or precision of movement, and to dismiss them as naive, unintelligent, parade-square stuff.*
>
> *I do not believe that troops can have unshakeable battle discipline without showing these outward signs which mark the pride men take in themselves and their units, and the mutual confidence and respect that exists between them and their officers. It was our experience in a tough school that the best fighting units in the long run were not necessarily those with the advertised reputations, but those who, when they came out of battle, at once resumed a more formal discipline and appearance.*

How true!! How true!! As an indication of what I am saying, may I draw to your attention that as you tread the streets of Ottawa, unfortunately you will see all too often the many instances of the state of dress, or should I say undress of the military, and this causes me very great concern.

It was a long hard process for us POWs, but slowly the confidence, faith and self-respect was restored not only in the men but also in ourselves as officers. The first winter in Japan, 1942–43, was the worst as we tried to climatise ourselves to the living conditions, the cold winter in unheated barracks where we had only one blanket each, the daily coolie labour, the starvation diet, and the total absence of any medical treatment. Approximately 35% of all the POWs in the working camps in Japan died that winter, and yet in our camp with its average

of 375 POWs, during the first two years we lost only three men, less than one half of one percent per year, giving ample proof of the success of the efforts made by that entire camp.

Let us now look at the mutual concern for one another, or comradeship which developed and which is such a vital part of leadership. I believe the good book says:

> *"Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."* (John 15:13)

This to me defines the comradeship we developed, and may I give you one example. Medicines were practically non-existent as we were never given any medical supplies whatsoever by the Japanese. The Red Cross medical supplies sent to Japan for use by the POWs were taken by the Japanese military, re-packaged, and sent to their combat troops. After the war the allied forces found warehouses all over Japan filled with Red Cross medical, clothing and food supplies which had been sent for use by the POWs and which had been stored to be used by the Japanese troops in the event of an invasion of their homeland. Our only hope was to pool whatever meager supplies we had in the camp and use them for the maximum benefit of all. This had to be done in complete secrecy as the Japanese confiscated any medical supplies they found and treatment of POWs by our own doctor was absolutely forbidden. This presented a very great problem as everyone hoarded whatever medicines they had. While you may not have the right medicine or drug for whatever illness you encountered, at least you had a chance to barter or trade for the one you did need. On our starvation diet we had no resistance whatsoever to any disease or infection. We suffered at all times from the ravages of malnutrition and its medical consequences, Beri-Beri, pellagra, blindness, gangrene, etc. Once our doctor got going on secret sick parades the men soon believed in us and started to turn in their bits and pieces of medical supplies to the doctor. A detailed account was kept of all our camp medical supplies as to where they came from, who gave them, how much we had, how much was used, and on who. These accounts were available and could be seen at any time by anyone in the camp.

One POW from Hong Kong had smuggled in three morphine pills which he turned in to the doctor, and as these were the only pain killers we had it was agreed that a unanimous vote of the entire camp would be necessary before one could be used. The reason for this was that you never knew when it might be your turn to need such help to get over that last big painful hump, and hence you had better have a say as to how and when they were used. Once they were gone there just weren't any more. Time and time again the doctor would decide to use a pill in such cases as drastic surgery due to gangrene as all this had to be done without any anaesthetic. He also recommended that they be used in the case of the three men we lost just before they died, when there was nothing more we could do for them. In every instance the unanimous decision was obtained from the camp only to have it vetoed by the man who was to receive the pill. I was separated from that camp after two years, but I understand that those three pills were still unused at the end of the war.

A word about our stealing because this was one of the main ways to our survival. Our camp worked at many various jobs each day and it was possible on a lot of the jobs to steal things

which were not only of great benefit to the camp, but also to the Japanese with whom we worked. A good example was an oil factory where they crushed peanuts, coconut, soya beans etc. to make various cooking oils and also lubricant oils from castor beans. This was a gold mine for us as we stole peanuts and coconut for food, and we set up making soap in the boiler plant of the factory by making trays out of old tins, stealing coconut oil and caustic, which we then cooked on top of the boilers. The coolies we worked with knew what we were doing so we marked trays with their name on it. When their tray of soap was done we would cut the slab of soap in half and give them half. We would then smuggle the soap out of the job and back to camp. We were searched inside the factory by the factory guards before we left the job, and then again outside the job by the Army guards before we got on the trucks or were marched back to the camp. At the camp we were searched once again inside the camp by the camp guards. If at anytime in this entire process we were caught we never implicated the Japanese workers and they knew this, so they trusted us even more than they did their own fellow workers. Other items of great value to the Japanese because of strict rationing in addition to the soap, was sugar, salt and cooking oil. These items we stole not only from the factories, but also when we were unloading or loading railway cars, ships and barges. We were able by stealing at one job and trading with the Japanese coolies with whom we worked on other jobs to get a meager supply of drugs available on the Japanese market to supplement our supplies.

As for the men who did the stealing, we set up a system whereby anything of value to the camp such as food, trade goods, etc., the man doing the stealing would notify the officers and an officer would go out to work on the job with him. If the man got caught then the officer would step in and say that he had ordered the prisoner to steal. In this way the officer took the giant share of the bashing, solitary confinement, and other punishment. If the stealing was successful, then half the goods was turned into the camp supplies and used for the sick or to trade with the coolies for medicines. Here again complete records were kept and anyone could see them at anytime to ensure just how the goods were being used.

A few words on the pride and self-respect of the men no matter what their original background or the results of the degradation and environment in which we existed. I was far from being the ideal prisoner, and when one of the Japanese guards consistently beat up the very sick prisoners, I went after him and beat him into the deck. I shall not go into the aftermath of that affair, suffice to say I was extremely lucky to barely survive the punishment and not be killed. When the beatings of the sick started up again, the men said I should try something else as I would never live through that punishment again. So we held a sit-down strike, and after I had received a terrible beating, but also the assurance that the sick would not have to go to work, did I give the order for the men to go to work. My hour of glory was very short lived in that I was removed from that camp within an hour and sent to a severe discipline camp at Omori, Tokyo, to show me the error of my ways.

There I was set up as a very bad example and it was the kiss of death for any other prisoner to even look at me in front of the specially selected sadistic guards. For the first two weeks I worked all day sewing bits of fur together

and then all night in the cookhouse. Here the punishment was to stand on the hot brick ovens in bare feet and holding two large buckets of water. With our painful beri-beri feet this was sheer hell. I slept in little short naps whenever I could, out of sight of the guards. About this time the POW camp of Canadians in Yokohama, which had no doctor and whose senior POW was an RSM, ran into a bad session of sickness. A group of the sick were moved to another camp, but enroute they stopped off at the discipline camp for a few days. The day they arrived they heard that I was in camp and the Canadian Sergeant in charge of them came to see me in the shop where the officers were sewing the bits of fur together. He threw the first salute between POWs that had been seen in that camp and explained that the Canadians had heard about my efforts on behalf of the POWs, and as I was the first Canadian officer they had met since leaving Hong Kong, they would like to hold a parade for my inspection. I tried to explain what this would mean but to no avail. Reluctantly I agreed, and he said they would be formed up in a few minutes. They formed up in the open dirt area which we used for roll calls, parades, and forming of working parties. They were dirty, sick, ragged, starved, some had to be held up by their comrades, but they were all there. As I expected, no sooner had we got started than the storm broke in all its fury and the guards came charging into us like a bunch of raving maniacs, swinging fists, clubs, rifle butts and kicking the daylights out of those who fell down. None of us minded, and when it was all over we crawled back into our huts to lick our wounds and to have a damned good laugh at the Japanese.

I guess one interpretation would be that it was an act of defiance and that may be right. Bear in mind that these men were from the reserve units out of Montreal and Winnipeg, and in the majority of cases their military background was practically nil. All had been reduced to the lowest state of civilization possible by their maltreatment and horrible environment, and yet there was a pride in these men such as I had never seen before or expect to see again. It made me proud to be admitted into their ranks. I might add that news of this parade spread like wild-fire throughout the working camps in Japan and the rise in morale amongst the POWs made life hell for the Japanese guards.

The Ormori discipline camp was on a small island out in the Tokyo harbour, made from the silt and sand dredged up from the Tokyo harbour, and was about 50 ft. from the main-land. There was an anti-aircraft battery on one end and a searchlight battery on the other with our camp sandwiched in between. We were housed in the standard prefabbed single story wood buildings used by the Japanese military, and we were right opposite the main fighter base at Haneda Airport which protected the Tokyo-Yokohama area. With no markings whatsoever to show we were POWs we were extremely vulnerable, and so whenever a single B-29 came over, obviously on a photo recce, we would run out into the open parade area and unbeknownst to the Japanese we would form the letters POW in hopes that this would show up in the photos.

The fire bombings and fire-storms wiped out the entire area around our camp, and the only thing that saved us was the 50 ft. of water separating us from the mainland. The whole area all around us was as flat as a pancake, exactly like our northland after a big forest fire. With no food, water, electricity or places to

work, the Japs started to move some of us out into the outlying areas, and as I was one of the bad actors, I was one of the first to go.

They took a bunch of us from the various camps in the Tokyo area and put us into railway boxcars where we were jammed so that we had to take turns standing and sitting. It was cold, no food, water or sanitation facilities, and we were there for over 48 hours. Many of us had amoebic dysentery or diarrhoea, and life soon became grim to say the least. We were taken up into the mountains northwest of Tokyo and here we ended up on a siding where we were able to get out and lie down on the ground. This was the first opportunity I had to see what prisoners were there, their physical condition, and then the sad realization that once again I was the senior POW. There was a total of 280 POWs, a real mixed bag, and the physical condition was the worst I had ever seen. Some were blind from lack of vitamin A, some had lost a foot or hand from Beri-Beri followed by gangrene. All were skin and bones from prolonged malnutrition. As we were the first batch out of the Tokyo camps, the Commandants had unloaded all their sick, invalids and misfits. We were now jammed onto flatbed trucks and taken off to our camp up in the mountains at a place named Suwa. As it was high in the mountains it was cold, especially at night when we might even have a thin coating of ice on any open water.

The camp was only half built, some of the buildings had no roof, some had no side walls, there was no kitchen, cooking, or sanitation facilities. The wiring consisted of a single line running through the camp with one or two 40 watt bulbs in each building. It was pouring rain, everyone was soaked, cold, miserable, starving and filthy beyond belief. The barracks were of little protection as there was no straw on the bare boards for us to lie on and the floors were just mud.

The next day we tried to fix up the camp. We found that we were on the side of a mountain which was all terraced with rice and vegetable paddies. Our water supply was a small creek which ran down through the paddies and then through the camp. Since the fertilizer they used was human excreta we had to set up a system to at least boil all our drinking water. We tried to make our barracks as airtight as possible with mud, straw and grass as we had no heat whatsoever, and we set up the most basic washing and latrine facilities. The work detail started at once. The prisoners left the camp at 7 am each morning, walked down the side of our mountain and up the side of the next one to get to an open face mine where they dug out the ore which was some kind of white metal. The path between the camp and the mine was all rough broken stone, and with no shoes, only wooden clogs, the number of seriously infected feet went completely out of control. Our food ration was the lowest I had encountered, and with no medicines or medical treatment this was indeed a death camp. The first week three men died, and our number of seriously ill doubled. It was our conservative but well considered estimate that we would be extremely lucky if just one of us would survive the coming winter of 1945.

As the war started to go against the Japanese and the Allies began their island hopping advance toward Japan, the orders had gone out from Tokyo Headquarters to all the military that they were never to retreat but rather fight to the last man even with suicidal attacks. The

Kami Kazi aircraft was a good example of this philosophy. Also the orders were that at the first sign of a landing and attack on their area, they were to kill all the POWs, internees, sick, wounded, incompetents, etc. so that every able-bodied Japanese could fight to the death without hindrance. In the POW camps we had to dig trenches, and machine guns were placed at each end. We were then to be marched into the trenches, doused with gasoline, and set on fire. Anyone trying to escape would be killed by the machine guns. Proof of this policy was more than evident in the Japanese occupied islands which were overrun by the Americans where they found all the POWs, sick and wounded captives, and Japanese, all massacred by the Japanese as they retreated.

With the Japanese surrender we took over our camp to ensure our survival, and concentrated on getting ourselves physically fit enough to get out of there and into the hands of the Allies. We took over all the food we could find and ran the kitchen on a 24-hour basis. We bought a pig, a horse, and a cow which we slaughtered and put into the stew pot. Believe me, everything went in with the possible exception of the skin and hooves. We scoured the countryside for all the medical supplies we could beg, borrow, buy, or just expropriate so that our doctor and his helpers could work day and night to bring the seriously ill back to as good health as possible. We got yellow paint and painted big POW signs on the roofs of our buildings. We made flags out of old bed sheets and coloured them with crayons, we put these up on flagpoles and then we waited. The U.S. Navy planes soon found us and we were showered with bundles from heaven containing clothing, food, medicines, and goodies such as cigarettes and chocolate bars.

When the doctor felt we were as fit as he could get us, we made our move and came out overnight by train to Tokyo. When we couldn't find any Allied forces near the Tokyo railway station we moved over to the station for the electric train and went to Yokohama. Here we went outside the station, sat down, and flew our flags on some bamboo poles we had liberated.

It was not all that easy. You must remember we had some prisoners who were blind, some minus a foot or hand, some unable to walk on painful feet from Beri-Beri, and all of us at the end of our endurance. Thus, we had to commandeer trucks, wagons, bicycle trailers, anything we could lay our hands on, to carry our sick and invalids. The healthiest POWs carried the Japanese guard's rifles just in case we met up with trouble, as once we left the relatively safe confines of our camp we were on our own, and God help us.

We didn't have long to wait outside the Yokohama station before a jeep came by with a U.S. Army officer and a big radio on it. We identified ourselves, the chap got on his radio and we were soon inundated with buses, trucks and ambulances which took us down to a reception centre set up in the Yokohama docks. We were then told to get out and go into the dock area. Next thing I knew our senior POW N.C.O. called the troops to attention, formed them up into marching order, turned the parade over to me, and we marched into the dock area with our home-made flags flying. We were dirty, tired, clothing in rags and tatters, many of the men had to be supported or semi carried, but they were all there, all those who could possibly walk, as defiant, proud, a force that could never be beaten.

The first thing was to strip us of all our clothes and to throw them into an incinerator. Next they removed all our body hair and put us through a de-lousing station. From there into a hot shower with lots of hot water and soap. While stark naked we were confronted by a horde of doctors and nurses who segregated us up into groups depending on our medical condition, then into a room with all the clothes in the world where we could take as much of everything as we wanted. Finally we were given a thorough interrogation by a team of intelligence and war crimes officers. All the time this was going on there were Red Cross girls going around dishing out cigarettes and chocolate bars.

I was taken to the hospital ship, USS Marigold, as I was out on my feet and don't even remember going on board. I do recall that I was taken to a cabin which I had all to myself. This was the first time since being captured that I was all on my own except when I was in solitary. I had pajamas, and clean ones too, the first time in 3-1/2 years, I was really clean and clear of lice, fleas and bedbugs, the first time in 3-1/2 years, and finally I had absolutely no responsibilities for anyone other than myself, the first time in 3-1/2 years.

Our camp was unique in having 100% survival from the instant that war ended until we were recovered by the Americans. This was only due to the full out cooperation and self-discipline of all the men in that camp. By way of explanation, the Americans were very cautious and stayed in the Yokohama dock area until they were certain that the Japanese military and civilians would accept the surrender and not kill the POWs and internees as they had been ordered to do. A large part of the Japanese military would not accept the surrender and vowed to fight to the finish, while a tremendous number of the civilians who had lost members of their families, especially in the fire bombing, were very hostile. For those POWs who were inland such as ourselves, you either had to wait a long period of time to be recovered or try to beat your way out. I am afraid that in the majority of camps it was every man for himself, and in a lot of cases this was fatal. The civilians retaliated as did the military. Some POWs ate poisonous food or drank wood alcohol and died. Others started out on journeys far beyond their physical capability and died enroute to freedom. You must remember that it was most difficult, if not impossible, to control men who had been through 4 years of sheer and utter hell, especially when there was absolutely no way of enforcing any discipline. During the war over 30% of all the POWs and internees taken by the Japanese were either killed or died in the prison camps, and thus never did make it home. Here I think that the epitaph on the memorial in the Allied War Graves cemetery in Kohima, Burma, where over 1,500 Allied servicemen are buried, sums it up very well: "When you go home tell them of us and say, For your to-morrow we gave our to-day."

Catch phrases are wonderful things, and by way of trying to summarise this whole thing, if I had to use one to define my concept of leadership it would be the 3 "Cs".

(1) *Character*: It is my firm belief that the true and solid foundation is Integrity, or as Shakespeare had Polonius say in Hamlet: "This above all else to thine own self be true and it must follow as the night the day thou canst not then be false to any man." Say what you mean which is the

telling of the truth as against the telling of lies, and mean what you say which is integrity. Having the morale fibre to face the issues of right and wrong and then the courage to stand up firm and strong regardless of the consequences to yourself.

(2) *Competence*: Having the necessary knowledge, education, training and judgement, and to make full use of them. No matter how large or small the problem, to ensure that you have given it your fullest consideration. Once you have done this and made your decision then to carry it out to the very best of your ability. Know what you are doing and how to do it.

(3) *Comradeship*: Taking a full out interest in your subordinates. Having true respect and concern for them to the extent that at all times and in all circumstances you put their welfare and well-being ahead of your own, regardless of the cost or inconvenience to yourself.

Once these are firmly in place then the other important aspects such as discipline and self-discipline … pride in yourself and in your unit … self-respect and respect for both your superiors and subordinates … proper dress and deportment at all times … all these will develop and strengthen as they feed on one another until what I call "true leadership" emerges. Live by these precepts and as a member of the Canadian Forces devoted to the well-being of your fellow Canadians and the preservation of our Canadian way of life, you will not only attain true self-respect, but also the respect of everyone with whom you associate. You can never have a better goal in life. Canada needs our Canadian Forces, they who will be the leaders, the protectors and defenders of our country in the years 2000 A.D. It needs their youth, courage and energy, but there is also a desperate need for their self-discipline, their discipline of the mind, their character, their integrity, in short their *leadership*.

As I examine and work with the Canadian Forces I have absolutely no qualms about the future of our services. Admiral "Bull" Halsley, the famous World War II Admiral of the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific, once said: "There are no great men … there are only great challenges ordinary men are forced by circumstances to meet."

As the history of our services proves, there has never been nor will there ever be any shortage of ordinary men and women in our Forces who are ready, willing and most capable to take up the challenges they will be forced to face. If I may borrow the R.C.A.F. motto, *Per Ardua Ad Astra. Through Adversity to the Stars*. This is the heritage which has been entrusted into the hands of our Canadian Forces, may they guard it well, as I have every confidence they will.

Ladies and gentlemen, it has been an honour and a privilege to have shared these thoughts with you, Bonne Chance et Merci Bien.

Ethics in the Real World

Lieutenant-General (ret'd)
George Sammet (USA), MA, MPE

Ethics in the Real World

Lieutenant-General (ret'd) George Sammet (USA), MA, MPE

LGen Sammet (USA ret'd) was on active duty during WWII from 1942–1945 in the European theatre as an artillery officer. He was commissioned into the U.S. regular army in 1946. He has been awarded numerous military decorations, including being knighted by the King of Sweden, and elected to the U.S. Army Ordinance Hall of Fame. He has an MA and a MPE, and after leaving the U.S. Army spent twenty years working in industry for Martin Marietta, FN Manufacturing, and Lockheed Martin. LGen Sammet retired from Lockheed Martin in August 1996 and is currently an adjunct professor at Webster University.

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen: Bonjour, Mesdames et Messieurs. Comment allez-vous? Je suis tres bien, Merci! That is almost as bilingual as I get.

The real world recognizes the importance of China as we look to the future. So, what's new? China, for thousands of years has played an important role. Even in ethics. For example: an old Chinese saying, "To be a person of principle, be first a person of courage." At times it takes courage to raise the truth, especially when management far more would like to hear adulation.

Another Chinese saying: "People who would enjoy the fruit must not spoil the blossom." Change those words to "Accentuate short term goals while subordinating long term goals" and you will recognize many managers who only want to hear quarterly orders, sales, and profits.

Or yet a third saying: "A hundred plowings do not equal one manuring." Why, when praise costs so little do we fail to use it? In fact, it costs nothing. We can walk down the halls conferring some kind of praise on each person we pass. The gain is immense; the cost — nothing.

Now that Toronto and Montreal have big league baseball teams, it's even proper to talk about Chinese Baseball. Originated by a former colleague of mine, Dr. Ralph Siu, he described Chinese baseball as a means the world uses to try to find a universal solution to all imprecise problems. And what better describes an ethical dilemma?

Ralph compared Chinese baseball to major league baseball — the same number of players, the same field, the same bats and balls, and the same method of keeping score. The batter stands in the batter's box. The pitcher is on the mound. The pitcher winds up as usual and zips the ball toward the plate. Now comes the one and only difference between Chinese baseball and conventional big league baseball. After the ball leaves the pitcher's hand, and as long as the ball is in the air, anyone can move any of the bases anywhere. The secret

of Chinese baseball according to Dr. Siu is, "Not only keeping your eye on the ball but also on the bases, and doing some fancy base kicking yourself."

If during this presentation you think I am straying from my stated topic, Ethics In the Real World, think again. Ethics is like an umbrella. Ethics covers everyone in a corporation, or in a government unit.

Here is my *first rule*, one that is inviolate. No matter which umbrella you select, its use must be mandated by the top person — be he/her chairman of the board, general, admiral or country president.

Ethics is like water. It only runs downhill. Ethics in an organization can never start at the grass root's level and run up hill finally engulfing the president. Believe it or not, most employees, be they in commercial companies, military organizations, or government offices, want to get ahead in this world. Even more productive than advanced degrees, is watching those above them. They got there so how did they do it?

If the top banana, figuratively, cheats on his time card, if the top banana pads his expense account, or if the top banana takes all the credit himself, the employees see that. And the light dawns, "If that is what you have to do to get ahead, I'm going to start right now."

There are no unethical organizations, there is only unethical management. As an old Hungarian always put it, the ethics and morals of an organization are the ethics and morals of its head. Or as the Chinese put it, "Fish rots from the head."

Rule number two. Get the right umbrella. There is a very small one called compliance. It is a fine umbrella, thoroughly necessary to keep legally dry, and one that is thoroughly necessary for those whose jobs it is to ensure compliance — contracts types and lawyers.

I like to quote the former head of the Securities and Exchange Commission who put it in a very succinct way:

> *Those managers who define ethics as legal compliance are implicitly endorsing a code of moral mediocrity. It is not an adequate ethical standard to get through the day without being indicted.*
>
> (Breeden, Former Chairman
> Securities and Exchange Commission)

What then is the right umbrella? One that covers every activity of the organization. One that is fabricated from the many values of life. We all understand values. Does anyone not understand honesty? Or loyalty? Or integrity? Or promise keeping? You can name many more. My number one has always been honesty. The opposite is, "You're a liar." There is no in between. One can paint it white, but it's still a lie. One can call it only a half lie, but as an old Yiddish saying put it, "A half truth is a whole lie." Untruths are designed to deceive. Thus, they are patently unethical.

I ask you the question, "If you are not honest with your employees, can you expect them to be honest with you?" Or I will put it more personally, "If you are not honest with your children or your partner, can you expect them to be honest with you?" In both cases, the answer is, you cannot.

You have all heard the phrase "The Naked Truth." It comes from one of the Odes of Horace, and tells about the time Truth and Falsehood went swimming together. Falsehood stole Truth's clothing, and Truth went naked rather than appear in the garments of Falsehood.

Ethics is more than just compliance with the law. It goes beyond the law. Lawyers talk about compliance to the letter of the law. Ethics talks about voluntary compliance with the spirit of the law.

Since I have mentioned lawyers, let me put it more strongly. Lawyers make great barristers. They make great General Counsels. Some of my best friends are lawyers. They are cordial — at least most of them are — they are gregarious and they are above average in intelligence.

But my *rule number three* is, do not make a lawyer a corporate ethicist. The well-respected English barrister, Lord Moulton, defined ethics as the domain of "obedience to the unenforceable. Law in contrast is obedience to the enforceable." The subtle nuance is the idea that ethical obedience is voluntary. Verne Henderson, writing in the Business Ethics Resource pamphlet was more precise in his rejection of lawyers as ethicists.

Among the five reasons Henderson gave as supporting his rejection of lawyers as ethicists is one that he called, "Lawyers tend to create an adversarial rather than a conciliatory atmosphere." His flavorful explanation is worth remembering. "….one lawyer in a small town can't make money but two prosper."

The modern corporation — or government — needs both lawyers and ethicists. But do not confuse the two. The old legal approach that stresses the negative — "Do no harm" — is no longer enough. Also known as the "moral minimum," it is just that. The minimum you must do, not the ethical just.

So, how do you select an ethics officer? *Rule number four.* I am probably a poor choice to answer that question since my experience is based on a universe of one.

Into my office in Orlando, where I was the Vice President for Material and Procurement, walked the President of the Orlando Division. That was unique in itself. He then put his hand on my shoulder and said, "I've got a new job for you." Now, it was doubly unique. "A selection Board at corporate headquarters unanimously selected you as the new corporate VP of ethics" — his hand never left my shoulder — "Will you take it?" I had a choice?

I did ask, why me? He was very forthcoming. He said, "The corporate selection board listed three very important criteria and you fit them all. They were (1) Be very respected throughout the entire corporation, (2) Be very knowledgeable of the entire corporation and (3) Be old enough so that you are no threat to anyone in the corporation." I was then sixty-seven.

What I did or did not know about ethics was not as important as the corporate terms of reference. The appointing memo said: design a program, write the policies, implement the program, manage the program and push the program. What really primed the pump, however, was a hand scribbled footnote in the president's own handwriting at the bottom of the page that said, "George — I also want you to be the champion of the little guy." When

that memo went out to all the divisions, it told them two things, (1) here is the program, and (2) the ethics officer is my guy. And that is the first requirement of an ethics officer. He must be selected by the top person, he must have direct access on ethics matters to the top person, and the rest of the organization must know and understand that.

My first day on the job I made a list of what I should be like — and that list never changed in eight-and-a-half years.

- Be available: if you are not there, you can't help.
- Be accessible: lots of people who are there aren't accessible.
- Be a good listener: Employees come to you to tell their story, not listen to yours.
- Turn nobody down: Employees come to you because they think it's important. After hearing them, then it's your time.
- Protect both the alleger and the alleged.
- Fairness may sometimes be more important than policy.
- Be swayed by the facts, not the emotion.
- A corporation is disciplined by its policies. However, there may be times when policies or procedures must be challenged and the ethics officer must have the nerve to make such a challenge when he believes that to be the case.
- When all else fails, give it the front page of the local newspaper treatment.

Two points on what the ethics officer is not. He/she does not award sanctions. That is the job of Human Relations. The ethics officer only is involved via his responsibility to see to it that sanctions are awarded equitably throughout the corporation. Discipline is a necessary part of any ethical program. Some people need the threat of sanctions.

In my view, a major thrust of any good ethics program is the determination of problems and the eventual correction of those problems. The ethics officer is not involved in the correcting of those problems. That is the responsibility of management. But the ethics officer does follow through on any problems reported through the ethics chain, he makes sure they are reported to the proper agency and also monitors the closure of those problems.

So in summary, the ethics officer is not looking to put people in jail. In fact, he does not have a jail. What he is trying to do through an ethics program is ferret out corporate problems that would not have been exposed through the normal management chain and give the corporation itself an opportunity to fix those problems.

Rule number five. Over eight-plus years, my ethics office managed the investigation of over four thousand ethics cases. Slightly over fifty percent of those cases were activities related to Human Relations — personnel activities. My discussions with other corporate ethics officers revealed they, too, experienced the same high percentages of HR related cases.

That experience did two things for me. First of all it reinforced my rule number two — an ethics program should be based on values. As I look back on my thirty-eight years experience dealing with procurements, eighteen on the government side where I awarded contracts, and then twenty years as a contractor, for the life of me I cannot recall even one contract which told me I had to be fair to people, where I had to respect their dignity, or where I had to be

honest with them. Let alone promise to allow my employees to have a say in how we did things.

Contracts do not look out for the well being of people. Nor does compliance. Values do.

As the corporate ethics officer, I was full time. Most of my one-hundred-plus subordinate ethics officers were part-time. With over two thousand cases involving human relations activities, I soon determined I would rather not have HR personnel as ethics officers. Not that they weren't qualified, but I was putting them into an intolerable position.

As an HR person, they reported to the head of HR. But while working on an ethics case they reported to their president and to me. Investigating an HR related case frequently meant the HR/Ethics Officer would be investigating actions already approved by the head of HR. That does not make his other boss, and the one who ultimately controls his career, very happy.

All good things come in sixes, so now my *rule number six*. One word. *Leadership*. Managers may be leaders, but management is not leadership. What is the old saying, "Managers count beans; leaders make bean soup"?

Ethics programs are not yet joyously accepted by everyone. Sometimes not even by the bosses who appoint them. But let there be no mistake, "One who believes he can do it, often will." He who believes he cannot do it, seldom will. Attitudes impact ethics programs even more than organizational charts or codes of conduct.

Leaders are standard-bearers. They are people who take charge, who have concerns about the people they work with. After all, it's the people who place the mantle of leadership upon the leader. Organization charts cannot do it. Only people can.

In my biased experience, I had the pleasure of working for a person I call a true leader — Norm Augustine, former Under Secretary of the Army, and now Chairman of the Board of Lockheed Martin Corporation. This quotation illustrates both his beliefs in a strong ethics program and his leadership:

> *Some would argue that a corporation's only legitimate purpose is to Produce a profit for its shareholders. Indeed, the Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman once wrote, "There is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits."*
>
> *With all due respect to Dr. Friedman, I believe Lockheed Martin has responsibilities that go far beyond strictly "dollars and cents" issues. A corporation is not simply a balance sheet or a money machine; it is a human enterprise comprised of responsible people who understand that the enterprise impacts others in society…we never know what is feasible until we challenge ourselves to do what is right — not what is merely compliant. Legalities are no substitute for ethics.*

Now for a little melange:

- Laws and policies form an ethical foundation. But the law is the moral minimum. And no law or policy is going to cover every situation. Sooner or late organizations will have to rely on people to make choices when there is no one-point law or policy to follow.

- The best ethics training goes beyond legal compliance. It helps people think about issues in a different manner and make value-based decisions.
- A great person shows his greatness by the way he treats little persons. The most common defense today is, "Everybody does it." Everybody does not do it, so do not accept that as your moral maxim.
- A habitual liar will not change easily. Eventually his lies will entangle you. In fact, you as a listener are already at a crossroads. Your silence gives his lies credibility. So it's not a question, "Should you take a stand," but rather how to take a stand.
- When the standard of ethical business conduct is regulatory compliance rather than responsible decision making, the misdeeds of the past will continue.
- A good organization does not just hire bodies. It seeks valued employees to join the "Family." One invests in people, not just machinery.
- A company should not just "sell" the customer, but rather should "serve" the customer.
- Reputation is fundamental. It represents the future of any organization and no executive should hesitate to take the necessary steps to maintain it. Everyone understands an error. But ethical transgressions are not errors.

A wise old owl sat in the oak tree.
The more he heard, the less he spoke.
The less he spoke, the more he heard.
Why aren't we like this wise old owl?

Thank you.

Ethics and Leadership: The Myth of Infallibility in the Canadian Forces

Captain Claude Beauregard, MA, PhD

Ethics and Leadership: The Myth of Infallibility in the Canadian Forces

Captain Claude Beauregard, MA, PhD

Captain Beauregard enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1983 and has worked as a historian with the Directorate of History. He has a Ph.D. in History from Laval University, currently serves on the board of the Canadian Historical Association, and is a Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Captain Beauregard is presently employed with the Land Staff, Public Affairs Division in Ottawa and is pursuing post-doctoral studies.

For members of the Canadian Forces, 1997 was the year of the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*. The publication of this report was a major event, representing the culmination of several years of work, and its contents left no one indifferent. The title, *A Dishonoured Legacy* made many people see red.[1] This title, however, is no more than an accurate reflection of reality, as there is no doubt whatever that the Somalia affair discredited the Canadian Forces as an institution and, in so doing, cast a long shadow over the magnificent achievements of its members. How could such a thing have happened? This paper proposes two answers. First, Canadians demand exemplary behaviour from the members of their Armed Forces, as these forces symbolize the Nation. Regardless of whether this is merely a pious hope or even an unrealistic demand, it is nonetheless a fully justified expectation on the part of our fellow citizens. The Army must reflect the values which make our country great. This is why Canadians felt it was unacceptable that soldiers would kill a prisoner in their custody. One is shocked, moreover, reading the few pages in the report that deal with the torture and death of Shidane Arone[2] and one wonders how we as an institution could have reached this point. The Somalia Commission of Inquiry was charged with answering this question. It accomplished a remarkable feat, despite the obstacles it encountered.

The second element which contributed to discrediting the Canadian Forces was the serious accusations laid by the Commission against the military leadership. In their search for truth, the Commissioners sought to identify the mistakes committed by those in charge of the debacle. This was the first time that a Commission of Inquiry had questioned the judgment and actions of the chain of command. This is a reflection of our times. The days when Canadians accepted without question the statements of their leaders and ruling classes are long gone. Scepticism, often enough tinged with cynicism, is now the order of the day. The Access to Information Act and universal access to the communications media have profoundly changed the exercise of power in a democracy. Today's citizens demand accountability and the Canadian Forces will have to learn to live with this new reality.

On 1 July 1997, the *Globe and Mail* published a very interesting article by Arthur Schafer, Director of the *Centre for Professional and Applied*

Ethics at the University of Manitoba. Professor Schafer conducted a study of military values for the Somalia Commission of Inquiry[3] and, according to him:

> *If the military is to perform its primary role of protecting society against external threats of violence it must create a very special type of organization: one in which soldiers and officers entrust each other and the organization with their lives. To trust an organization with one's life requires massive confidence in the ability of the organization to minimize risks. It may even require a level of confidence that borders on magical thinking. To sustain such confidence, military organizations strive to create the appearance of infallibility.*[4]

His reasoning continued as follows: no human being and no organization is infallible, but in order to appear infallible, any means, including lies and dissimulation, are acceptable:

> *The myth of military infallibility requires a "zero-error mentality". Commanders are expected never to be guilty of accident, error or mistake. That such impossibly high expectations produce many negative consequences for military performance is unsurprising. For a start, the pretense of infallibility produces hypocrisy at its worst. Dishonesty and dissimulation become the norm rather than the exception. Cover-up becomes a way of life. Careerism displaces professionalism, and moral corruption becomes pervasive.*[5]

According to Schafer's thesis, it is impossible to draw lessons from the mistakes committed if we refuse to recognize, analyze and discuss them. No organization can solve its problems as long as they remain hidden. In this regard, the attitude of the Canadian Forces is hardly impressive. There are two essential preconditions to any attempt to understand its mistakes in order to improve: a willingness to pass judgment on the military as an institution and staff colleges which allow critical faculties to develop. Both these essential conditions are absent from the Canadian Forces. Canada's military history, moreover, provides plenty of evidence that the myth of infallibility is alive and well. The following are a few examples. In October 1941, the Canadian Government responded favourably to a request by the British Government to send a force of 1,975 to Hong Kong. The Japanese attacked the Crown Colony on 8 December and the Canadian troops eventually surrendered on 25 December. The losses were tragic: 290 dead and 493 wounded, while the survivors became Prisoners of War.[6] On 12 February 1942, the Government of Canada asked Judge Lyman Poore to investigate the dispatch of the Canadian Expeditionary Force to Hong Kong. The Inquiry focused on the decision-making (military and political), the selection of units, the training of the troops, equipment and transportation of the Expeditionary Force. The Inquiry was held under exceptional conditions. The public was not invited to attend the testimony and the British Government forbade publication of the communications traffic between it and the Canadian Government. Furthermore, General Crerar, who had recommended sending the troops, was by then in England and, thus, responded in writing to the Judge's questions. The Judge was satisfied with the controversial statements made by the colonels and generals and declared in his report that, the military disaster notwithstanding, Canada should be proud of its expedition to Hong Kong.[7]

A few months later, on 19 August 1942, 4,963 Canadian soldiers took part in the Dieppe raid. 907 of them were killed, 2,460 wounded and 1,874 became Prisoners of War.[8] This operation was depicted as a success by the military and the war correspondents. When the Canadians read the long list of casualties in the newspapers, however, they realized that it had in fact been a monumental fiasco.[9] 50 years were to pass before the Department of National Defence acknowledged responsibility for the failure. In 1992, the historical division published a book entitled *Dieppe, Dieppe*, to mark the 50th anniversary of the operation. Historian Brereton Greenhous, the author of the work, noted the absence of certain documents which would have shed light on how the operation was executed. He added that: "afterwards ego and ambition brought more concealment" to the operation.

> *Some evidence would seem to have been carefully suppressed by the Chief of Combined Operations, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and his naval adviser, Captain John Hughes-Hallet, the eventual Naval Force commander for JUBILEE. And some was certainly destroyed by Sir Bernard Montgomery, the responsible authority for the cancelled Operation RUTTER, who deliberately burned anything that might "incriminate" him and then lied about his part in the planning process, if his official biographer is to be believed.*[10]

Brereton Greenhous does not deal gently with the Canadian generals who approved the plans for the Dieppe raid. He claims that they "were all ambitious men seeking to enhance their reputations and further their careers. To have declined to participate on any grounds other than that of an absurdly and demonstrably unreasonable plan would have been tantamount to professional suicide for Mann, Roberts and Crerar, and would have done McNaughton little good in the public eye, had word of it got out."[11]

When journalists subsequently demanded information on why the operation failed, the military leadership was tight-lipped. General McNaughton recommended that the Minister keep silent and state that the planning had been meticulous:

> *Suggest that it would be most unwise to enter into a public discussion for the reason that this would prejudice our future relations with Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Office … I would suggest that the Minister should confine his statement to the following. Quote. The General Staff in Canada have full information from the Canadian Army and the British Authorities concerned in respect to the planning and conduct of the Dieppe Operation. The unofficial accounts which have been published no doubt in good faith are necessarily based on assumptions, rumours and perhaps on loose talk by those who were not fully informed. My difficulty is that to produce the facts now or even to say wherein these accounts are incorrect would give most valuable information to the enemy, information which he would undoubtedly turn to his advantage against our troops in future operations. I hope therefore that the public will accept my assurance that the full information which we have shows that the planning of this operation was carried out with the greatest care and that there are no reflections on its conduct. Unquote.*[12]

It is acknowledged today that the planning process was utterly neglected by our Generals and many veterans concede that the operation

should never have taken place and that lives were sacrificed for nothing.[13]

In 1946, Dick Malone, who was formally in charge of media relations and commanded 3 Canadian Public Relations Group wrote a book on his memoires of the war.[14] In the introduction he describes how the official history was manipulated:

> *The decision to reduce certain war incidents to paper came after learning of the manner in which some sections of the official war histories were being compiled. For example when a draft had been prepared of certain sections of the history it was frequently submitted to the higher command for approval. Occasionally such drafts might be returned with marginal notes such as "suggest this be deleted as it places so-and-so in a rather bad light."*[15]

A final example involves the Inquiry into the "temporary mutinies" which occurred in the Royal Canadian Navy in 1949. That year, a number of sailors on HMCS *Magnificent*, *Athabaskan* and *Crescent* refused to work for a short time in order to publicize their discontent with living conditions on these ships. The report of the Board of Inquiry shows that there were serious leadership problems in the RCN: "We further observed from the evidence given before us that the relations between the Captain, his officers and crew were far too distant for the good of the ship."[16] It is interesting to note that the Navy leadership had the wisdom not to punish the individuals who took part in these acts of insubordination. In fact, the Navy as a whole was guilty here: guilty of not looking after the welfare of the sailors. The Board of Inquiry blamed no one and put forward a number of recommendations aimed at improving the conditions of service. The question we must ask is why did it take three mutinies (quite apart from the one which occurred on board HMCS Ontario in 1947) and an official investigation to change the Navy?

Concerning our staff colleges, we must ask ourselves how they pass on to officers, who will provide the next generation of Army leadership, the results of internal departmental studies or investigations of all kinds. In November 1996, I was deployed to Germany as part of OPERATION ASSURANCE. I was astonished to find that most members of 1 Division, with whom I was working, were not aware of the work done by NDHQ in Ottawa, despite the fact that it was of prime importance. Thus, the 1995 Employee Feedback Survey by the Phillips and Wyatt Group into the effectiveness of the leadership and organization in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence should have received serious analysis. It states that "less than a fifth of the military (17%) and civilian respondents (15%) expressed confidence in the most senior levels of the department to lead us through these difficult times." More than a quarter (28%) of the military and civilian respondents (32%) expressed no confidence whatever".[17] The authors of the study also state that "fewer than half the military (44%) and the civilian respondents (45%) say that they understand the Department's new direction".[18] These figures provide food for thought about the military as an institution.

Another important study, in July 1996, focused on suicide in the Canadian Forces. It states "that the prevailing atmosphere in the CF discourages soldiers from admitting that they have personal

or psychological problems. Any admission of weakness is considered incompatible with the "macho" image which soldiers are supposed to project."[19] The authors conclude that it "is highly regrettable that members who admit that they are suffering from emotional problems are denigrated and everything should be done to correct this situation."[20] How can a situation such as this be improved if no one is aware of the severity of the problem? It is imperative that Staff colleges pass on this kind of information. These schools were the target of severe criticism in the reports submitted to the Minister in March 1997.[21] In his report, J. L. Granatstein maintains that the teaching method used at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto "is not very effective as a device for conveying information, [and] the syndicate discussions are at a level below that of first-year university tutorials …"[22] Granatstein cites the example of an officer who "… avoided the library for his entire course."[23] This demonstrates the presence of serious weaknesses in our teaching system. This is hardly surprising, as there is a widespread negative attitude in the Canadian Forces towards education, reflection and mental work. This negative attitude may be explained by the officers' low level of education: approximately one quarter of the Canadian Officer corps has only a high school diploma[24] whereas in the United States, 90% of officers have a university degree.[25] Currently, there is no research group in the Land Force which is studying the nature of war and its evolution in a modern context. The level of strategic analysis is deplorable. Instead of willingly accepting modern ideas, the Department of National Defence is inward-looking, which has produced an unacceptable gulf between the Department and Canadian society. The Canadian Forces are without doubt the only institution in the country which depends on outside organizations for self-analysis. If there is no internal process of reflection, no progress is possible under such circumstances.

When the high command requires it, however, the Army is quite capable of passing judgment on its own activities. The report of the Board of Inquiry into Command, Control and Leadership in the 2nd Canadian Battle Group (CANBAT 2) deployed in Bosnia in 1993 provides a very interesting model. The members of the Board undertook an in-depth analysis of the problems and dared to broach sensitive topics. The report even recommended that subsequent investigations be held into command, career management, culture, training and leadership education in the Army.[26] This is a step in the right direction. Other measures must be taken as soon as possible to encourage members of the CF to debate defence issues.

It is absolutely essential that section 19.36 of the Queens Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces be eliminated: these prohibit members of the Forces from speaking out on military matters. As professor Albert Legault wrote, these "rules from the Middle Ages must disappear because they are an insult to public intelligence. One cannot logically ask soldiers to be citizen-soldiers, complying with all civilian laws, while at the same time depriving them of the basic rights and freedoms of democracy."[27] A serious change must take place in the internal dissemination of information. The studies carried out by Chief Review Services should be available on the Departmental web site. It is unacceptable to learn of the existence of these studies through journalists who can obtain copies through the *Access to Information Act*.[28] Information must circulate freely at all levels of the military hierarchy. Personnel management

should also adapt to the demands of the modern world, particularly with regard to education. Why are we waiting to facilitate postings to university research centres or private enterprise? Could we not send military personnel there, with pay, to continue their education in all kinds of ways? Why not facilitate the accumulation of annual leave to allow members to take a sabbatical? We need to show more imagination in this area.

In closing, I would like to point out that the Somalia report should provide not only the Canadian Forces, but all elements of Canadian society, with food for thought. The Commissioners deplored the absence of leadership among departmental management, as well as their refusal to accept that mistakes were committed. Unfortunately, serious ethical problems occur in civilian society at a level which comes close to being indecent. One recently read in the newspapers that "scientific information on the moratorium in the cod fishery, especially the environmental aspects, were appallingly distorted and falsified in response to political imperatives".[29] What are we to think of the behaviour of the Red Cross in appealing a judgment handed down in January by the Federal Court, which allowed the Krever Commission to identify those responsible for the contamination of Canada's blood banks.[30] The 1,200 Canadians who contracted AIDS and 12,000 others who contracted Hepititis C are entitled to the truth. One could also mention the behaviour of the tobacco companies, who are responsible for the deaths of 40,000 Canadians a year and who will not open their archives at any price. Finally, Quebec's Health Minister, Jean Rochon, has still not apologized to those patients who are awaiting lung transplants in his province.[31] His purely political decision to transfer lung transplants from Montreal to Quebec City turned out to be so catastrophic that he was forced to change his mind. Minister Rochon has never admitted that he made a mistake. The myth of infallibility is alive and well, in the Canadian Forces as elsewhere in Canadian society.

Endnotes

1. See J.L. Granatstein, "A Report on the Somalia Commission", *The Globe and Mail*, 4 July 1997.
2. *A Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*, Ottawa, 1997, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, pp. 360–364.
3. Arthur Schafer, "After Somalia: Our Military Needs a New Ethos", *The Globe and Mail*, 1 July 1997.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Patricia Giesler, *Valour Remembered: Canada's Participation in the Second World War*, Government of Canada, Veterans Affairs, p. 13.
7. *Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong*, Ottawa, 1942, p. 8.
8. Brereton Geeenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe*, Montréal, Éditions Art Global in cooperation with the Department of National Defence and the Communications Canada Group, 1992, p. 9 [trans].
9. See Claude Beauregard, "Censure et contrôle de l'information au Canada entre 1939 et 1945", in *La participation des Canadiens français a la Deuxième Guerre mondiale: mythes et réalités*, ["Censorship and control of information in Canada 1939–45" in *The participation of the French Canadians in the Second World War: Myths and realities]* proceedings of the colloquium held on October 6 to 9, 1994, under the direction of Serge Bernier, Robert Comeau, Béatrice Richard, Claude Beauregard and Marcel Bellavance, Bulletin d'histoire politique, Spring/Summer 1995, vol 3, N^{os} 3/4, Association québécoise d'histoire politique/Septentrion, p. 248.
10. Brereton Greenhous, *Dieppe, Dieppe*, Montréal, Éditions Art Global in cooperation with the Department of National Defence and the Communication Canada Group, 1992, p. 10.

11. *Ibid*, p. 46.
12. National Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol 12329, dossier 4/Dieppe/1 Press Arrangements — Dieppe Operations 19 Aug 1942, — 87/5, Message for Stuart from McNaughton, 13 March 1943.
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A Proposal for Practical Military Ethics

Corporal Andrew J. Yu

A Proposal for Practical Military Ethics[1]

Corporal Andrew J. Yu

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Why study Military Ethics?

Recent events aside, there is ample rationale to support an interest in Military Ethics. As one of very few professions allowed by society to administer lethal force, and being uniquely able to employ mass destruction when authorized, ethical decisions made in the military environment may mean the difference between life-and-death for many. A significant number of the thought experiments used by philosophers, though extreme in civilian life, may be realistic and relevant in military operations. It is therefore of paramount importance that Military Ethics be investigated thoroughly and the lessons learned in the process be disseminated throughout the profession.

Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&O) 19.015 states, "Every officer and non-commissioned member shall obey lawful commands and orders of a superior officer." The accompanying notes roughly define "lawful commands" as that which are not "manifestly unlawful" to "a person of ordinary sense", which, being a circular statement, does not add any further information to the QR&O. Implicitly, the onus is on every member of the Canadian Forces to be able to justify any command he/she followed, for "merely following orders" is not an acceptable justification, both in the public eye and in war crimes tribunals. Therefore, it is necessary for all members of the CF to be familiar with the criteria for ethical behaviour.

Why be ethical?

> *"Justice is what is advantageous to the stronger, while injustice is to one's own profit and advantage."* (Thrasymachus, ancient Greek sophist)[2]

> *"Dennis Rodman is a good example. Head butts a referee, you know, has a wild lifestyle, but as long as he can snatch 60 rebounds, he's cool. I mean, people are cheering for him. The kids are wearing the Rodman shirts, you know. You look at Tyson."* (Bob Raceman, New York Daily News columnist)[3]

Prior to exploring the field of Military Ethics, one must be convinced that such an inquiry is worthwhile. Why should one pursue any goal other than that of pure self-interest? A more sophisticated argument can be offered by an imaginary careerist officer, reasoning as follows: the current democratic system of government rewards style rather than substance, so there is no incentive to truly be good instead of merely appearing to be good. If profitable but immoral conduct is not detected by others, is there a reason not to act immorally?

One response is as follows: it is necessary for the careerist to be an actor in his work. Clearly, the above mentioned officer is not fully dedicated, but he may act as if he is. This sets up an internal tension of knowing one's behaviour is inconsistent with one's ideals. The careerist is thus committed to continually project a false image of himself, and to expend all efforts to do so. Compared to the authentic officer, the careerist carries this extra burden in his mind.

The careerist can object by saying, "look at my gains". To answer this, one should ask: what are the supposed gains of careerism, and what are its costs? Presumably, careerism yields wealth and power, but the cost is the acquisition of poisonous attitudes and habits such as conspiracy and mistrust. A careerist can expect no true vocational companions, only allies in profit whose allegiance disappear when the careerist no longer has political value. Thus, Plato (428–347 B.C.) asks, "how can we maintain or argue…that injustice, licentiousness, and doing shameful things are profitable to anyone, since, even though he may acquire more money or other sort of power from them, they make him more vicious?"[4]

It should also be noted that the fruits of careerism are vulnerable: money can be lost in an act of crime or a stock market crash, while power can be easily usurped by the next careerist in line. "For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out."[5] In comparison, the ethical character is immune to any human or natural peril; in order to have a vicious soul, one must voluntarily choose to be vicious. Good people may also experience suffering, but if they maintain their ethical character, they undergo suffering with a more positive attitude and are more likely to maintain hope until the end. The Biblical story of Job is a good example. Another historical example would be first century-A.D. Christians who remained happy even when experiencing severe persecution, as they know the principles they are following are ethical and justified.[6,7]

What is the nature of Ethics?

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), one of the most influential philosophers this century, made the following comment on ethics:

> *Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said "Well, you play pretty badly" and supposed I answered "I know, I'm playing badly but I don't want to play any better," all the other man could say would be "Ah then that's all right." But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said "You're behaving like a beast" and then I were to say "I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better," could he then say "Ah, then that's all right"? Certainly not; he would say "Well, you* ought *to want to behave better." Here you have an absolute judgement of value, whereas the first instance was one of a relative judgment.*[8]

In other words, ethics concerns what ought to be done. As an absolute value judgement, it is not qualified by any factor and is applicable at all times for all people.

What is the basis of Ethics?

How do we know what ought to be done, i.e., what is the basis of ethics? To answer this, we must address some common misinterpretations of what constitutes ethical behaviour.

First, what is ethical is not identical to what is legitimate. There are legitimate acts that are unethical, such as the former law that forces native children to abandon their culture and attend residential schools. Not all ethical acts are legally binding, either: Canada has no Good Samaritan Law, but to not lend help in an emergency is still deemed unethical. Philosophy professor Dr Michael Fox of Queen's University explains this dichotomy while discussing violence:

> Justified *violence is not necessarily the same thing as* legitimate *violence, or violence that is legally sanctioned. Violence that is legitimated by the state, other levels of government, societal norms, or revolutionary regimes may still be morally reprehensible and, as in the case of unjust laws, there must always remain an extralegal, extrainstitutional, moral standpoint from which it is possible to make such judgments.*[9]

U.S. civil rights leader Dr Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968) made this comment:

> *A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law…We can never forget that everything Hitler did in Germany was "legal"… It was "illegal" to aid or comfort a Jew in Hitler's Germany. But I am sure that if I had lived in Germany during that time I would have aided and comforted my Jewish brothers even though it was illegal.*[10]

Thus, while legally legitimate acts are usually morally justified and vice versa, it is not necessarily the case at all times.

Another common mistake is to equate ethics with "common sense". For "common sense" may be nothing but expressions of social norms at the current time; it fluctuates between cultures and generations. In some countries, for example, it is "common sense" to practice female genital mutilation;[11] in medieval Europe it is "common sense" to burn women labelled as "witches". "Common sense", then, clearly fails as a basis for ethical standards that are to transcend time and culture.

Also, the principles of ethics cannot be discovered through empirical scientific inquiry. Physical science can tell us how things can be done, but can never say if something should be done. For example, scientific experiments can teach us how to build and deploy nuclear land mines, but do not show us if such mines should be made and used, or not.

Contemporary moral philosophy offers two main theories in ethics: consequentialism and deontology. A consequentialist believes the motivation for moral behaviour can be derived from the preferred consequences it brings, while deontologists maintain there are values outside of consequences that should guide ethical decision-making.

In the military environment, one can find expressions of both schools of thought. On the consequentialist side, in any mission the achievement of the objective is seen as the only goal, and all means are to be employed towards this end. Deontology expresses itself in so-called "military values" — such as honour, loyalty, dedication to duty — values that should not be compromised under any temptation of expediency. We praise those who are victorious (such as in the Battle of Vimy Ridge) at the

same time as those who, despite great effort and no trace of incompetence, failed to achieve their military objectives (such as in the defence of Hong Kong in the Second World War).

Upon further investigation, however, consequentialism falls short as a basis for Military Ethics. For praise is not unanimously and unequivocally given to successful operations when there is uncertainty over whether those carrying out the operation did so justifiably; in other words, the rightness of the ends is considered separately from the rightness of the means.[12] For example, while the pilots who dropped the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were instrumental in ending the Second World War, they have not been bestowed the same praise as they would have had they done so using conventional means. Recent experiences of the CF also illustrates this point: while the former Canadian Airborne Regiment may have achieved all its objectives in Somalia, not all members of the Regiment are deemed deserving of the Somalia Medal.

From these and other examples in history, one can see that it is better to fail honourably than to succeed disgracefully. But this gives rise to another question: how does one know the deontological principles of ethics?

What are the principles of Ethics?

There are three faculties within a person that can give rise to behaviour: physical needs, emotion, and reason.[13] That physical needs have no role in moral decision-making should be evident; we do not consider some form of eating, for example, to be "praiseworthy", and indeed we usually see physical needs as something to be controlled in light of ethical principles.

Emotion can also be rejected as the basis of ethics. When two people's feelings over an issue collide, there is no means in emotion-based principles to resolve such a dispute. For example, a thief may feel like stealing, while a store owner will likely feel otherwise. There is nothing based on emotion that would make either party's feelings more justifiable. Thus, emotion cannot form the basis of moral decision-making.[14]

Reason, the remaining faculty of human behavioural motivation, uniquely has a demonstrable process for justification through logic. A moral decision based on logic is one that can be agreed upon by all observers if the same information and process were used. The justification of a moral choice is objective and unbiased.

However, a consequentialist may object: why not build a system of ethics based on the more noble aspects of human nature instead? Could virtue simply be more aesthetically pleasing than vice? In this line of reasoning, David Hume (1711–1776) writes: "extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue, and all disgust and aversion to vice…and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions."[15] John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) proposes that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."[16] A.J. Ayer (1910–1989) asserts: "… in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong … I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments."[17] In other words, perhaps morality's function is to make us feel good about ourselves.

This line of reasoning should be rejected as it does not give an impartial, unbiased means of

determining which option is the ethical one. For example, one person may feel deep sympathy towards the pain and suffering of animals and thus advocate vegetarianism passionately; another person, however, may have equally deep sympathy towards meat farmers and thus advocate increased meat consumption, also passionately. While no conflict would result if the two people are ordering their own meals, shall they be jointly planning a banquet there will be no civil means of resolving what the entrée will be. Morality, then, should not be seen as a matter of taste and preference if we are to seek an impartial solution to ethical problems.

Furthermore, among the three faculties which motivate behaviour, humans share the faculty of physical needs universally with all beings, and possibly share the faculty of emotion with certain sentient species. Humans alone, however, are capable of rational thought and making moral choices based on the notion of right or wrong. As such, among all organisms on this planet, humans are the only ones considered as "moral agents", i.e., those for whom morality and ethics can possibly be relevant. Though we may call a pet canine "bad" for satisfying certain physical needs on the carpet, we consider the act a result of insufficient behaviour conditioning instead of the dog having made some deliberate choice of soiling the rug.

So, the basis of morality must only be that of reason, the unique characteristic of humans. To base one's ethics on anything else would be to equate oneself with animals, and the resulting "ethics" would not be ethics at all.

Traditional military values are, in fact, products of reason. Loyalty, honour, dedication, and other such values appeal to reason and reason's desire for justification. A credible military institution must possess such values or it would be a contradiction of its raison d'être of being a guardian of sovereignty and other fundamentals of society.

The adoption of reason as the basis of morality necessitates that one must be autonomous. It is of little value if one's ethical decision cannot be translated into action. In addition, coercion of any form suggests that emotion and/or physical needs may have influenced the decision, as coercion acts on these two faculties. A rational person must then pay the highest respect to his/her autonomy. She/he will also respect the autonomy of others, as there is no justification for denying it to another rational being while preserving it for herself/himself.

The principle of universal application is also a natural conclusion of adopting reason-based ethics. A rational person always applies the same rules to oneself as to others. The 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) calls this the Categorical Imperative, the most famous version being "never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law."[18] In other words, the principle behind any action ought to be that it would be good if the principle is adopted universally.

The Categorical Imperative goes deeper than the so-called "golden rule", i.e., do unto others what you will to have done to you. Under the Imperative, even if an action would have been welcomed had it been done unto oneself, for example, if my bank were to give me huge sums of money for no good reason, it would nonetheless not be justified because the principle behind it, that of "banks should give money to their clients for no good reason," should not become

a universally-adopted principle; the resulting collapse of the banking system would destroy an essential institution in society. Besides, the principle itself is irrational, stating that an action should be done without justification.

Another formulation of the Categorical Imperative is "act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means,"[19] i.e., in all things act such that persons are not being used to further another cause, but as the cause itself. This easily follows from the previous form of the Categorical Imperative, for to treat a person as merely a means would be to disregard his/her autonomy and rational nature.

It should be noted that, under Kant's system, there is no basis to discriminate against another person based on gender, race, or any other factor than has no bearing on rationality. Harassment, which is "conduct exhibited once or repeatedly, that offends, demeans, belittles or humiliates another person,"[20] is a judgement on a person using criteria other than rationality, and is thus unacceptable under the Categorical Imperative.

Some military applications of Kantian ethics

The following imaginary scenarios can serve to further illustrate the above principles:

1. **Issuing of unlawful orders**
   The Categorical Imperative implies that a lawful order will be one based on reason, and which is made while treating all persons as autonomous, rational beings. This gives rise to an argument against the issuing of unlawful orders by a superior: one is certain that upon issuing any order, it would either be followed or it would not be followed (a "tautology"). If the order was unlawful, i.e., it was not ethically justified, but the subordinates still followed it out of their own free will, they would have acted irrationally, for they should have not obeyed an unlawful order. However, had the order been disobeyed, the superior would have been acting irrationally, for an order-giver who gives an order that is justifiably ignored is a contradiction in terms. Since both cases are shown to be unjustifiable outcomes, the issuing of unlawful orders is universally unjustified, despite a lack of explicit mention in the QR&Os.

2. **Baiting a thief**
   Suppose, in an operational theatre, there are instances of theft of supplies. Given the unavailability of surveillance cameras, is it justified to set out some supplies as an easy target so as to form a trap to catch thieves?

   The answer is no, as the encouragement of crime in order to prevent crime is a contradiction in terms. For a bait to be useful it must be easily taken; therefore, baiting in fact encourages the act of theft. However, the final goal of the baiting is to end the activity of theft, which is contrary to the effect of setting a bait. Besides, it is unclear if the thief caught by the bait is really the thief who has been stealing, for the person caught may not have decided to steal until the bait appeared.

3. **The enemy headquarters in a hospital**
   The enemy has established their headquarters in a hospital where civilians and Canadian POWs are treated (a clear violation of the Geneva Convention, but

such is the enemy's ways). No additional fortifications have been made. Should the hospital be attacked?

The enemy obviously sees an advantage in locating its headquarters in a civilian hospital, otherwise it would not have done so. The fact that this headquarters is within range of an attack shows the enemy expects us to not attack it even though we have the capability to do so. The only indication of the source of this sense of security would be the fact that non-combatants and POWs are in the same building. Obviously, if we were to attack the building the surprise element would enhance the chance of victory, but in doing so we would have used the non-combatants as a means towards the goal of victory, which makes the act unjustifiable.

However, if the purpose of the attack is not simply to end enemy operations in said headquarters, rather it is a logically-planned rescue mission of the POWs and non-combatants, the attack would be justified. For in this case the persons in the hospital are the ends of the mission, while any damage inflected on enemy property would be the means. Assuming competent troops, the commander must be satisfied that the weight of evidence, given available information, points to a successful rescue mission, in order for the mission to be counted as a reasonable venture.

4. **Information inquiry**
You have knowledge of certain inappropriate acts in the Department. Your superior (or the media, through the Access of Information Act) inquires about the subject. Should the facts be told?

Truth-telling is of fundamental importance in Kantian ethics, in fact Kant wrote a special essay devoted to the topic.[21] Kant is opposed to lying in any form; in order for a lie to be functional, everyone else must tell the truth, since if lying were the norm no one would believe in lies. So, the liar does not want the practice of lying to become a universally-adopted principle, and thus lying is irrational and unjustified. While revealing the facts may bring undesirable consequences, this has no bearing on Kantian moral decision-making.

How can Military Ethics be taught?

Unless ethics can be taught, there is no use in investigating the subject as the conclusions would have no effect on human society. However, the obvious fact that most people did grow from babies with no sense of morality to adults with a general sense of right or wrong demonstrates that ethics can be learned. Since ethics can be summed up in general principles as described above, it is possible to educate people on such principles and how to apply them in real life.

It remains the choice of the person whether to live ethically or not. If the latter is chosen, society should reject the person as irrational and respond accordingly by denying him positions of authority and leadership. If the irrationality is constant and threatens the autonomy of others, the person should be punished and/or receive medical treatment, as appropriate.

For those who do adopt the ethical way of life, the remaining challenge is to learn how to apply the principles. As rational thought is based on logic, an essential skill to be taught by institutions would be that of critical thinking. While there is no need for the layperson to be

proficient in the usage of logic symbols and notation, everyone should be taught the basic skills of identifying logical fallacies and what constitutes a cogent argument, skills key to all problem solving. While ideally this should be done by the educational system, failing that the CF can incorporate such skills in the General Military Training and Basic Officer Training teaching plans.

Students in Royal Military College should be encouraged to take advantage of the student exchange program between Queen's University and RMC to enrol in courses such as Philosophy 157 (Moral Issues), 158 (Critical Thinking), and 159 (An Introduction to Ethics). Expanding the exchange program to permit the participation of second-year RMC students will assist interested officer cadets in attending advanced courses in ethics and moral philosophy, such as Philosophy 257 (Moral Philosophy), 347 (Contemporary Moral Philosophy), and 456 (Current Topics in Moral Philosophy and Theory of Action).

Just as with any other military skill, one becomes better in the application of ethical principles through practice. Units should devote time to the discussion of scenarios requiring moral decision-making, in the same way that field units conduct tactical exercises. It is only by regular practice that personnel can become able to respond to actual situations ethically.

Leadership is also essential. For a leader to talk about ethics but to exclude her/his own actions from the scrutiny of ethical principles is hypocritical, unjustified, and irrational. Ethical leaders help in the ethical development of their subordinates by being role models of ethics in action.

Open communication is implied in ethical leadership. To treat one's subordinates and the Canadian public as rational beings is to allow them as much knowledge as possible about the situation at hand. A truly rational leader has no need to hide the basis of his/her decisions, as they would have been made through reason and can be justified objectively and logically.

Some controversies of Kantian Ethics

In some circumstances, the application of Kantian ethics may appear unacceptable. Two of these scenarios follow:

1. **Self-sacrifice**
   Suppose two soldiers were caught in a chemical weapon attack, and one was rendered unconscious but not with a life-threatening injury. There is only one antidote to the weapon available, formed by combining two substances of which each soldier holds one (the attack destroyed part of each soldier's kit). If soldier A, the conscious one, were to take the antidote, the unconscious soldier B will die. If A gives the antidote to B, B will survive but A will die. What should A do?

   This seems to pose a dilemma to Kant: If A were to take the antidote, she/he will have lived at the expense of B, thereby using B as an means to her/his own survival. On the other hand, if A gives the antidote to B, then B would have lived at the expense of A, this time A being the means to B's ends. Indeed, suicide is condemned by Kant.[22] Military values suggest that A should save B at the expense of her/his own life, but can Kant offer an explanation?

A Kantian response would be as follows: altruistic sacrifice should not be seen as suicide, as the maxim followed is different from that of a depressed person taking his own life. In the example, the maxim followed by A should be to save another rational being from death where possible, so A should give B the antidote. Soldier A never intended to take her/his own life, so A's death is only a consequence of altruism, which Kant rejects as a factor in moral consideration.

It should be noted, though, that if A were to give the antidote to B because she is a coward and sees this as a way out of the war, then A would have committed suicide and this action would be condemned by Kant. The motive behind A's action is the determining factor on whether the action is ethical or not.

2. Does Kantian ethics necessitate pacifism?

It appears that soldiers under Kantian ethics will be unable to apply lethal force in battle, for the taking of a life for the goal of winning a war is to use another person as a means. This would contradict a fundamental role of a warrior.

To respond to this challenge, one must first investigate the logical nature of war. In a war of two parties, either one or both sides must be unjustified in their cause; if both their causes are justified through reason, there would not be a conflict between them, given that conflict arises only when the cause of war for the two sides contradict each other: if the justification of each side for going to war were equally cogent, they would both be statements of truth; given that two statements of truth cannot contradict each other (known in logic as the "Law of Non-Contradiction"), it is necessarily the case that at least one side's motivation for war is unjustified.[23] Without going into the details of when a war is justified (which is a vast field of investigation all by itself), it should be clear that a just war is a rational one, and an unjust war an irrational one. Thus, a rational person would not participate in a unjust war; an order to fight an unjust war is an irrational and unlawful order and should be dismissed. Shall a soldier fight an unjust war, he would have placed himself as a means towards irrationality. Then it would be the moral duty of all rational persons to stop this means of irrationality from advancing; lethal methods would thus be justified if there are no non-lethal alternatives. The moral blame is to the soldier who participated in the unjust war, and his death would only be a consequence from the arrest of irrationality.

Military use of deception can also be justified by the above reasoning. If deception is necessary to advance the cause for the just side in the war, it should be seen as a consequence of the war being fought, and the moral blame is to be laid at the unjust side.

It is thus essential that leaders ensure the cause of war is justified prior to engagement, and present the justification to all ranks, in keeping with open communication in leadership as described earlier.

KANTIAN ETHICS
TYPE: ETHICS OF DUTY (DEONTOLOGICAL THEORY)

Central doctrine: The rightness or wrongness of an act is determined by the nature of the act itself, that is, by a consideration of the intrinsic features of the act, considered apart from its consequences.

Kant claims that all right acts are acts that spring from a good will, that is, one which is motivated by duty or respect for the moral law alone. One ought always to do one's duty, which is required to be adhered to in an exceptionless manner.

The supreme moral principle, from which all subsidiary principles as well as all right acts are derivable, he styles as the categorical imperative. It may be expressed in various ways:

1. So act that you could will the maxim (rule or principle) of your conduct to be a universal law for all rational beings.

2. Act *only* on that maxim on which you can will that everyone should act.

3. Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your choice a universal law of nature.

4. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only (the so-called principle of respect for persons).

Kant's theory provides a strong foundation for rights talk.

Handout for the Presentation of Corporal Andrew Yu

Handout From Queen's University, Philosophy 202 (Philosophy of Peace), Fall 1997, Instructor: Dr. Michael A. Fox

Conclusion

As those involved in defending the nation, we are morally and legally obligated to ensure all our actions are justified by reason. Moral decisions must be made logically, and its principles applied universally.

Kant and Universalizability (Application of the Categorical Imperative)

According to Kant, the question we are to ask ourselves whenever we want to put the ethics of our conduct to the test is: "What if everybody did that?" And we are to reflect on the state of affairs thus envisioned. (We might also say, "I will it to be a universal maxim of conduct that everyone should act as I propose to act.")

This, he insists, is *not* a question about consequences but rather one about the rationality of my act, and whether it is an act that expresses my autonomy (my nature as a free, mature, responsible agent) while at the same time treating others with respect.

Take the case of false promises (making a promise that you know you won't keep). A false promise is a wrongful act because it is *irrational*, and this can be demonstrated in three ways:

a) The promise I make is contradicted by my real intention. ("I will pay my friend back the money I owe her" *vs.* "I do not intend to pay her back.")
b) If everyone behaved in this way, inconsistent conduct would be the norm and no promise would ever be believed, which would make promising a self-defeating or self-negating act.
c) I will that everyone should keep their promises, on the one hand, while exempting myself, on the other hand, from the class of "everyone" by my intention to disregard the universal principle of promise-keeping that I've just posited. My being able to take advantage of others by breaking my promises whenever it suits me to do so *depends on everyone's* adherence to the very principle I intend to violate. What this amounts to is the following absurd and *non*universalizable principle (maxim): "Everyone who makes a promise should be able to expect others to trust them to keep it, whether they intend to keep it or not."

In general, everyone who makes a promise expresses the intention to keep it as part of the act of promising. Therefore one cannot consistently both promise and form the intention not to keep the promise at the same time.

This analysis works quite well for certain kinds of moral/immoral behaviour, less well for other kinds. Compare the following (all of which involve an element of *trust*):

- respecting others' property/stealing
- being truthful/lying
- avoiding harm/injuring
- being kind or charitable/being unkind or uncharitable
- respecting life/killing
- helping others in need/being indifferent to the plight of others

Endnotes

1. I would like to thank Shaun Maxwell and Dr David J. Bakhurst of the Department of Philosophy, Queen's University (names listed in reverse alphabetical order), for providing helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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3. "He Said, She Said", *Dateline NBC* 23 September 1997: p. 10.
4. Plato, 591a.
5. Holy Bible, 1 Timothy 6:7 (NKJV).
6. Lawrence S. Apsey, "How Transforming Power has been used in the past by Early Christians", *Nonviolence in Theory and Practice*, ed. Robert L. Holmes (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 1990), p. 27.
7. The appeal to religion is consistent with the conclusion of Immanuel Kant, whose ethical system is presented in this paper. Kant formulated the "moral argument for the existence of God", namely that the possibility of ethics presupposes the existence of God. Kant's presentation of this argument can be found in *Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings*, ed. William L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright, 2nd ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), pp. 176–185. A contemporary presentation of the same argument can be found in Ravi Zacharias, *Can Man Live without God* (Dallas: Word, 1994), although Zacharias rejects Kantian metaphysics. For a dissenting view, see Jonathan Berg, "How could ethics depend on religion?", *A Companion to Ethics*, ed. Peter Singer, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 525–533.
8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Wittgenstein Reader*, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 290.
9. Michael Allan Fox, "Ecofeminism and the Dismantling of Institutional Violence", *Institutional Violence*, ed. Deane Curtin and Robert Litke, Philosophy of Peace Special Series (Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, in press), p. 6.
10. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from the Birmingham City Jail", *The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy*, ed. James Rachels, the Heritage Series in Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989), pp. 242–244.
11. For a discussion on female genital mutilation as an example of transcultural moral judgment, see Stacy G. Kelly, "Are Transcultural Moral Judgments Possible?: an Interpretive Analysis of Ritual Female Genital Operations", *Queen's Anti-Racism Review*, 1 (1996): pp. 45–63.
12. In Just War Theory, for example, *jus in bello* (justice in a war) is deemed as important as *jus ad bellum* (justice of a war).
13. This follows Plato's tripartition of the soul in 435c–441c.
14. Even theorists who propose a cognitive view of emotion, i.e. that emotions have a rational basis, admit that there are characteristics of emotion that make it unsuitable as a basis of ethics. Robert C. Solomon writes, "emotions are 'blind'; more accurately, they are *myopic*". See his "Emotions and Choice", *Explaining Emotions*, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 265.
15. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 15.
16. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ed. George Sher (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), p. 7.
17. Alfred Jules Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1952), p. 107.
18. Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. James W. Ellington, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 402.
19. Kant, p. 429.
20. CFAO 19–39 para 3.
21. Immanuel Kant, "On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns", supplement to Kant, pp. 63–67.
22. Kant, p. 422.
23. From this, one can see that if everyone in the world acted in a fully rational manner at all times, human conflict is impossible. In 1795 Kant wrote on how such permanent peace can be achieved; see his "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp. 107–143.

Lessons From Thermopylae and Waterloo: Military Ethics for the 21st Century

Mr. Roger Todd, MA, MPA

Lessons From Thermopylae and Waterloo: Military Ethics for the 21st Century

Mr. Roger Todd, MA, MPA

Mr. Todd has a Masters degree in Political Science and a Masters in Public Administration. He has been an employee of the Federal Public Service since 1978 and has worked with the former Canada Employment and Immigration Commission. Mr. Todd is a member of the Manitoba Executive for the Institute of Public Administration of Canada and is currently in the Review and Corporate Services Branch, of the Operational Headquarters for the Air Force in Winnipeg, specializing in performance management.

Ladies and gentlemen, my presentation today deals with the lessons that one can draw from the past. I would also like to offer some suggestions that could aid us in better dealing with our continuously changing environment.

In the history of the Persian Wars, written by Herodotus, the Greek historian, we are told of the heroism of the Spartan warriors who delayed the Persian advance until the Persian fleet could be defeated at Salamis. A monument was later raised to the Spartans with the inscription:

> *Tell them in Sparta, passerby, that here, obedient to their orders, we lie.*

Our culture is filled with tales of military heroism and self-sacrifice, that are too numerous to list here. Our views may differ, depending on our background, as to which exploits are the most laudable, but the common denominator involves self-sacrifice or the sacrifice of one's own personal interests for the greater good.

In the past, our culture had a double standard between those who are deemed to adhere to high military ethical standards out of a sense of honour and duty, and those of whom these virtues are not expected.

Before the battle at Waterloo, in the movie *Waterloo*, Christopher Plummer, as the Duke of Wellington, referred to his men as "scum" and later said, in reference to his troops:

> *I don't know what they'll do to the enemy, but by God they frighten me!*

Wellington's attitude, as presented in the movie, reflected the old social dichotomy between "gentlemen", i.e., the upper class, from whom were drawn the officer class, and the unwashed masses, of whom one could not expect ethical behaviour or obedience to a code of honour. This paradigm is out of place today. As well as displaying a double ethical standard, this archaic, class-ridden attitude is at variance with our ethical maxim of "mutual respect".

In this paper I will argue that in the 21st Century, the Canadian defence establishment must, in its entirety, adhere to the highest ethical standards, and has no room for a second-class morality, as Christopher Plummer, as Wellington, suggested in the film. Rather, the ethical system embraced by military and civilians in the Department of National Defence must more closely approximate that of the Spartans at Thermopylae for a number of reasons. Many of these reasons are more practical in nature than a product of pure idealism.

A great many of the principles in the Statement of Defence Ethics have a lot in common with the behaviour displayed by the Spartans, principles such as:

> *Serving Canada before self;*
>
> *Being loyal to our superiors and faithful to our subordinates and colleagues;*
>
> *Showing courage and facing challenges, whether physical or moral, with determination and strength of character.*

Previous generations of people who served in the defence of Canada had family traditions of honour and military service guiding their behaviour. With the last war in which large numbers of Canadians served now being more than 50 years in the past, and fast receding, this ethical basis for our behaviour is becoming less and less significant.

What are the pressures or constraints now on us to guide our behaviour? Other than punishment by our superiors, unfortunately, a lot of them have to do with the glare of media exposure. Although the technology is different, the consequences for the individual and the institution are nothing new. The stocks in the old medieval marketplace have merely been replaced by 30-second clips of videotape on the television news, or a headline in the daily newspaper screaming about the latest moral pratfalls of those of whom the public has very high ethical expectations.

We would be foolish to deny that these expectations exist. They are part of our culture. And it is probably wise that they are there. For, if Canada's young people are to have examples to emulate, should there not be some institution that embraces the "eternal" societal virtues that just about every human culture has arrived at after generations of painful experience?

Those of us who work in the Department of National Defence are here, or should be here, because we accept the burdens of public expectations that go along with our status, in or out of uniform, as public servants in this department. Those of us who work in this department, or the Canadian government, for that matter, and who do not accept the ethical or moral responsibilities that such employment entails, perhaps should not be here. It might be observed that nothing so quickly undermines the credibility of an institution as the spectacle of its members violating the ethical expectations that the society holds of that institution. An organization that tolerates or indulges violation of these standards will not survive for long. The same might be said of the society whose institutions, supposedly the repository of the highest ethical principles, are seen to be corrupt.

Being afraid of the spotlight, however, is hardly a noble reason to practice ethical behaviour,

for the danger is that, once the spotlight is removed, we are free to fall back into our old patterns of behaviour.

I think that a better approach to institutional ethics or morality is to accept the fact that our lives are better, as a society, if we behave ethically. This would provide us with, as Aristotle put it, the Good Life. Immanuel Kant, in his categorical imperative, stated the principle in a different way:

> *Act as if the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a general natural law.*

In other words, we should behave, in our own lives, as if everybody else was to do what we choose to do.

Those of us in the Department of National Defence, as I have pointed out, have a particular function in our society, not only as defenders of the physical security of our country, but also as paradigms of ethical virtue. Although in this we may have inherited the societal role of the old European nobility, like it or not, we must abide by high ethical standards both while on and off duty. And the media, as the Fourth Estate in our society, when it expresses the social conscience, is right to criticise us.

We, however, should rather act as a check on ourselves, and using principles, such as those contained in the Statement of Defence Ethics, and using considerations such as Kant's categorical imperative, should police our own behaviour appropriately. Thus, we no longer have the luxury of maintaining a double standard, such as that observed upon by Plummer/Wellington and of having a set of ethics for *gentlemen* and another for so-called *lesser breeds*. For society makes no discrimination between us as individuals, and the shoddy behaviour of any member of this institution reflects upon the integrity of the institution as a whole.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention. If you have any questions, I will answer them as best I can.

Command Chiefs' Perspectives

Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer J.C. Parent, MMM, CD
Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Terry Meloche, MMM, CD
Chief Warrant Officer Maurice Dessureault, MMM, CD
Chief Warrant Officer Gilles Guilbault, CD

Command Chiefs' Perspectives

1. Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer J.C. Parent, MMM, CD

CWO Parent enrolled in the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1964, receiving training as a Search and Rescue Technician at the Canadian Forces Survival Training School (CFSTS). He was the School Warrant Officer at CFSTS, a Search and Rescue Advisor to Chief of Air Doctrine and Operations at National Defence Headquarters, and the Base Chief Warrant Officer for Canadian Forces Base Summerside. CWO Parent was appointed Air Command Chief Warrant Officer in July 1992, and was appointed to his present position as Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer in July 1995.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here today. My colleagues and I are here to share some of our views on the ethical challenges experienced by non-commissioned officers throughout their careers. It is obvious by our positions, and not by our looks, that we collectively bring many (90+) years of military experience.

In National Defence, we are exposed to different ethics that coexist under one ethos. The environmental work context and structures affect the perception, prioritization and application of values within a specific arm of the service, or headquarters directorate. In some cases even the vocabulary differs and the same word has a different meaning. The following example, although not related to ethics, illustrates my point. During a joint operation three contingents of the army, air force and navy were tasked to "secure" a building. As you would expect, the results were quite different; the army took the building by force, the air force investigated the real estate and decided to lease rather than buy, and the navy locked it up and went home.

The command chiefs of the navy and the air force will present their views concerning the ethics in practice of their respective commands (an unfortunate death in the family has prevented CWO M. Dessureault from participating in this morning's panel, but the text of his presentation on army ethics will be made available for inclusion in the publication of the proceedings). For my part, as my responsibilities transcend the command lines, I would like to concentrate on a more generic service value; "our loyalty".

There is no doubt that it is particularly hard, during these days of constant change, to continue to be loyal to our country, our armed forces, our branches and occupations, and our family responsibilities. The introduction of new structures, the erosion of some of our traditions, and the economic challenges are not easy to face. In my mind loyalty is entrenched in a concept of belief and identity, in believing in what we do, and in believing in what we are. By accepting one's status, as we transit in rank within the framework of an organization that we have joined voluntarily, we adopt its values and norms and recognize that its members are not infallible.

You could say that there exists a hierarchy of loyalty that spans from believing in Canada as a citizen, which includes accepting its laws and respecting appointed authorities, to representing the Canadian Forces with pride and, finally, being loyal to our respective environmental commands, branches, and occupations. Our loyalty changes its focus as we progress in rank, since our career profile takes us from loyalty to Canada and the Forces during our initial training down to loyalty to our trade or occupation, in the early days of our career, and finally back to the top, as we take on superior posts and deal with the big picture.

At this particular juncture it is important to realize that our loyalty can no longer be to our branches or environmental commands, but rather must be to the Canadian Forces in general. It is also evident that we face ethical dilemmas that create conflict between our military duty and our families. Unfortunately this situation does not generally improve, since our family responsibilities usually grow in parallel with our military responsibilities. The ethical challenges we face, and issues of loyalty in particular, are largely due to the constant adjustment of our value system, throughout our career, as we undertake responsibilities outside our environment, branch, or trade. Promotions force us to leave behind friends and colleagues and pledge our trust and support to a new structure of subordinates, peers, and superiors. When promotions are few and far between, as they are now, this bond with the old guard is that much harder to break. Our loyalty, however, demands that we do take the step and fully accept our new status.

Loyalty to our own rank is an important and often neglected value. The insignia we wear on our shoulders or sleeve is symbolic in nature, but it gives us an authoritative responsibility in the chain of command of the armed forces. It simply means that the responsibility lines are transparent, and that all who are subordinate to us by rank are our responsibility. This is referred to, in the text books, as rank authority. This particular facet is often ignored in our everyday routine. This attitude is responsible for the perception that if a subordinate is not in our own organization his/her welfare, conduct, dress, and deportment is not of our concern. The true relevance of rank authority is best described by the old Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) motto "never pass a fault", to which I would humbly suggest the addition of, "and never pass an opportunity to be of service."

Loyalty to our rank also applies within the context of the way we conduct ourselves while in uniform. Although symbolic in nature, the rank insignia is the first graphic identification of a member's status in the leadership hierarchy. People will respect the rank because they believe in the merit process, but they will not respect an individual who wears the rank while displaying a poor example. This may range from a blatant infraction of the dress orders and deportment, to outright embarrassing behaviour. People have earned their rank as a mark of recognition for their service and leadership capabilities, and to denigrate that rank is unprofessional and certainly unethical. Our subordinates, who by nature are seeking to emulate qualities of good leaders, do not easily dismiss infractions of the code of conduct and discipline by people who are their superiors in the chain of command.

Loyalty to our positions or appointments is another dimension that needs addressing. I refer

here to the inherent responsibility of a superior to represent his/her subordinates' and to advise on issues or adverse policies that are being developed for implementation. This is an important area, since we need to be seen as bringing forward our subordinates' concerns. Loyalty, however, demands that we protect the integrity of command by accepting that, in those cases where our advice is not accepted for the greater good of the organization, we as professionals support the decisions of the chain of command and be seen as doing so following implementation.

To be loyal is to believe in who we are, in what we do, and in what is expected of our rank, our occupation, our branch, our command, and our Canadian Forces. I believe that our country is one of the best to live in, and that our forces are among the most professional in the world. Our environmental services and their support organizations have excelled in mission in the Gulf War, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. If that is not enough to convince me to believe in what we do, then our biggest challenge is not ethics but faith.

Allow me to close by suggesting a quote on general ethics in practice. This comes from an article published in the *Armour Bulletin* issue on ethics and leadership, which I highly recommend. It goes like this: "if you are about to do something, and the whole world is watching you, and knows the reason why you are doing it, would you still do it?"

2. Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Terry Meloche, MMM, CD

CPO Meloche joined the Royal Canadian Navy as an Ordinary Seaman Electrician's Mate in 1965. In his 32 year career he has served on both the east and west coasts in many HMC ships, with shore postings to Fleet Maintenance Group (Atlantic), Naval Engineering Unit (Atlantic), and Canadian Forces Fleet School (Halifax). CPO Meloche has been Fleet School CPO, the Fleet CPO for Maritime Forces Atlantic, and is currently the Command CPO for Maritime Command.

Navy Values

Our navy values may be defined as, "the beliefs and customs that are held to be important to the navy." They have been determined by hundreds of years of practical experience and are the result of ethical and moral reasoning. Navy values are at the heart of all traditions, customs, policies, orders or actions that are found in the Canadian navy. They are always consistent with the values of Canadian society. These are the values that navy personnel have sworn to uphold in carrying out their duties in defence of the nation. Among these values are the principles of justice, and the standards of conduct that promote equality, integrity and concern for others.

Important Navy Values

The following are important navy values, with a few words of definition:

Integrity: Wholeness, soundness, uprightness, honesty.

Loyalty: Loyal temper or conduct (Loyal: true, faithful to duty, faith in alliegiance to sovereign, government or country). Up, down, peer, self.

Courage: Bravery, boldness, valor.

Responsibility: Being responsible (Responsible: liable to be called upon to account, answerable, morally accountable for actions).

Duty: Behaviour due to deference; expression of respect; moral or legal obligation; what one is bound or ought to do; binding force of what is right.

Honour: High respect, glory, reputation, good name, nobleness of mind. Allegiance to what is right or to conventional standard of conduct.

Pride: Preventing one from doing an unworthy thing. Being proud of person, thing or doing.

Humanity: Having/showing the qualities distinctive of man.

Competence: State of being competent; fitness; suitableness; adequate; ability; properly qualified (professionalism).

Two questions can now be asked. Are these values required in today's navy? And more importantly, are they resident in today's navy? The answer is: *affirmative*!

Being a Seaman

Young people, with a taste for adventure, have been running away to sea since ships were first built. The oceans and seas take up about 70 percent of the earth's suface, so it is no wonder our curiosity has been stirred by the sea. The sea that may be as gentle as a lamb or as terrible as a hungry tiger, that in any case is unpredictable and must be conquered before it is any use, has fascinated us for centuries.

We must realize that there is a great deal more involved in being a seaman than meets the eye. There is an intangible something that makes a seaman different, because life at sea is a world apart from that ashore. A seaman is under the influence of a cooperative group of fellow sailors — the ship's company.

There is no room for passengers in a warship. Everyone onboard has a job to do as the situation dictates. If one pair of hands or one brain in a ship is idle when it shouldn't be, that ship is running less efficiently than it should be.

By tradition and by necessity sailors are jacks-of-all-trades, but in this age of sophisticated equipment and systems it has become necessary for a sailor to be master of one trade. A ship is organized in such a way that the personnel of all trades work together to form a team that provides the efficiency of a warship.

Besides their own maintenance and operational responsibilities everyone onboard is trained in fire-fighting, damage control, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, and first aid. So, as you can see, everyone has the responsibility to ensure that the ship can *move*, *fight*, and *float*.

Ships

Our navy revolves around putting ships to sea. It is the "product" that we provide to Canada. The product of the navy is a seaworthy ship: (a) that can cope with modern weapons; (b) that is

instantly ready to go into action; (c) that will be reasonably inexpensive to build, run and maintain; and (d) whose members will be smart and a credit to Canada. The navy obtains a hull from a shipyard, and it is just a hulk until it gets a good captain and an efficient ship's company. Then it suddenly becomes a live ship.

Ethics in Practice

The navy values that are introduced at the beginning of one's career are put into practice immediately upon joining the ship. The most junior person on the harbour duty watch is given the position of roundsman. This individual is responsible for checking every open compartment in the ship for flood, fire, or any other danger that may jeopardize the safety of the personnel onboard, and take corrective action. One only has to review the nine values I mentioned earlier and realize that each and every one is required in the conduct of this duty.

The same is true for the most junior officers onboard since, upon completion of officer training, the first qualification sought is that of bridge watchkeeper. This individual, upon successful completion of this qualification, while on watch, is wholly responsible for the life of the ship's company and the billion dollars worth of hardward entrusted to him/her by the people of Canada.

Ethical Dilemmas

The following are examples that illustrate that those who go to sea in ships do not have to be in a time of conflict to face tough ethical decisions. For instance, there was the rescue of the 30 people from the MV Mount Olympus by HMCS Calgary a few years ago. On this occasion one of our frigates was returning across the Atlantic in a storm, low on fuel, when a distress call came in. Due to the leadership, teamwork and coordination on the part of the ship and staffs ashore, not to mention the bravery of MCpl Fisher, there was no loss of life.

Furthermore, one only has to think back to Friday, October 24th 1997 when the bulk carrier MV Vanessa sank in the North Atlantic. All the crew members had not been rescued but one of the survivors was seriously injured and required medical attention that was only available on ashore. The dilemma was: should they steam towards the oil rig to get into helicopter range to transfer the injured seaman, even though this would also mean abandoning the search for the still remaining two missing crewman? We all read the newspaper reports and the results of this successful rescue are now history.

Leadership

Leaders have an important role in moral development in that it is essential that the navy be manned by true professionals who hold the navy's values to be their own. Those in leadership positions have attained this level of professionalism. Their job now is to guide and assist their subordinates in achieving the same level of moral maturity. The highest stage of moral development, "concern for people", is the level of maturity each leader should encourage in their subordinates.

Conclusion

I hope this insight into the life of a seaman at sea has provided an understanding of navy values, and I welcome any questions from my colleagues in the Army and Air Force.

3. Chief Warrant Officer Maurice Dessureault, MMM, CD

CWO Dessureault joined the Canadian Forces in 1964 and has served in a variety of regimental positions in all three battalions of the 22e Regiment, including postings in Werl and Lahr, Germany, Valcartier, and Cyprus. He was the Regimental Sergeant-Major of 1 Batallion R22eR, including participation in the UN peacekeeping mission to Yugoslavia, where he was the first Regimental Sergeant-Major to be deployed with a Canadian battle group since Korea. He has been the CWO for Land Force Quebec Area and, since June 1996, CWO Dessureault has been the CWO of Land Force Command.

I regret that I am unable to deliver this message in person, but circumstances beyond my control prevented my being with you during this conference on ethics.

Introduction

The Land Force has come a long way in the past few years and, I must admit, the way has been difficult in many respects. I have performed various tasks, and filled various positions, at many stages along the way, with many of our members. At one point, I had an experience that I found very rewarding from the standpoint of ethics. Let me share with you a personal experience that I had during a court-martial dealing with a peremptory plea regarding freedom of expression which took place in Valcartier, Quebec, in the spring of 1996.

Accreditation of the Witness

In February 1996, I was called upon to testify as an expert witness in the following fields:

(a) overview of the general responsibilities of non-commissioned members in the CF;
(b) personal characteristics and attributes essential to members of the CF, including the measures intended to develop them;
(c) role and importance of discipline in the CF;
(d) consequences of the erosion of that discipline; and
(e) role and importance of the chain of command.

Because my duties were to serve as advisor to, and spokesman for, the Commander Land Force on matters such as the discipline, dress, drill, morale, deportment, well-being, quality of life and professional development of non-commissioned members, my testimony would probably enlighten the members of the court.

During my first day on the witness stand, I described to the members of the court-martial the 32 years that I have devoted to the Army and the Canadian Forces. The hours spent explaining to the members of the court the duties and the role that I performed in each rank and the salient experiences in each of those roles served to qualify me as an expert witness.

Testimony

While making my preparations in the evening and when I appeared in court the following day, all the statements of ethics, all these principles, all these values were transformed from the

written word into practice in the true sense of the word. *Discipline*, *Dedication*, *Loyalty*, *Knowledge*, *Integrity* and *Courage* — I had stocked up on them and intended to give the court some vivid examples of the fact that one cannot separate one from the other without violating the code of ethics that guides us and sometimes saves our lives. Everything that I said or could express to the members of the court that day, I did so in relation to the "mission".

The role and responsibility of each of us as non-commissioned members is to carry out to the best of our ability, the tasks and duties that we are requested or ordered to perform, and for which we have been trained and prepared, in support of the mission. However, this role and these responsibilities cannot be fulfilled without drawing on the values mentioned above.

There is discipline, without which an army is non-existent. I see it as being the foundation upon which the fundamental principles are based. The discipline of which I am speaking is that which we impose upon ourselves, and it is also our contribution to the discipline of the group. Commanders at all levels rely on it to make prompt decisions, because they know that their orders will be carried out. When discipline is absent, danger arises. In peacetime, a live-fire exercise could not be planned if very strict discipline were not observed in everything we do. Applying the rules of engagement in an operational theatre demands a very high standard of self-discipline.

There is also dedication, which means placing the interests of the institution before your own. In the Army, dedication cannot be explained — it is an integral part of every day's activities. The section commander who sees to the well-being of his personnel after a long march — that is dedication. Volunteers who, while serving abroad, give of their free time to the community — that is dedication. Dedication to the community, to selflessness — that is also the point to which many of our comrades have taken their dedication, to the sacrifice of their lives for their country. As I raised my head after a moment of reflection at Vimy, I understood the meaning of dedication…

There is loyalty to one's country which, in my view, must take precedence over all else and must be practiced throughout the entire chain of command. In both peacetime and wartime, it requires a keen sense of duty and respect for the established order, so that none of our actions interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. It has often been said that this loyalty should be practiced both upwards and downwards. In my view, this is an artificial debate. Rather, it is a function of leadership to help subordinates to express this loyalty upwards and to understand the meaning of it. Loyalty involves a responsibility towards one's peers and subordinates.

Knowledge is the measure of a serviceman's effectiveness and ability. Of course, this knowledge is very closely linked to his/her role. A soldier acquires much of this knowledge while attending school in a society such as ours. He/she obtains it through formal training, during his initial training at the Recruit School and through ongoing training (both theory and practice) in the occupation that he has chosen. He/she also obtains it through personal experience or through the experience of others, and finally, through the training that missions require. This knowledge enables the

appropriate authorities to properly structure the many teams and organizations needed by the Canadian Forces.

Integrity is the ability to make decisions and accept the consequences of those decisions. It is also the ability to admit to your mistakes and learn from them, and to put honesty foremost in your actions at all times. Integrity is the refusal to put your personal interests before those of the group.

Courage is the deep-seated desire to defend the values in which you fervently believe. It is putting yourself at the service of others for whom you have assumed responsibilities. It is overcoming your fear in difficult situations. Courage can be found in the performance of routine duties and in exceptional circumstances. General Baril, who is facing up to the people of Canada and, especially, to his troops, admitting to our leadership problems within the Army and announcing measures to rectify them — that is courage. Sergeant Forest, who dismounted from his vehicle during a fire fight in Sarajevo to save an individual's life — that is courage.

The interrelationship between these attributes is indisputable. If there is any situation in peacetime in which the realism of training comes closest to that which obtains in an operational theatre, it is certainly a live-fire exercise. In the preliminary briefings preceding such exercises, the chain of command is clearly indicated to everyone and safety measures are taken to establish the climate of confidence required for the exercise. Discipline is essential in the field, as regards orders, regulations and the strict compliance with fire orders. This discipline is also indispensable to the efficient operation of the chain of command. The knowledge required by the participants, whether about weapon handling or what action to take in case of malfunction, is also essential. Whatever his task on the firing range, each individual must observe the established order and show loyalty to the existing hierarchy, so as not to adversely affect the conduct of the exercise or endanger his life or the lives of others. In an operational theatre, and particularly when performing humanitarian assistance or humanitarian relief tasks on behalf of individuals in danger, it is difficult to conceive that these attributes are not related. These values all stand out in everything that we do.

The chain of command and control plays a key role in the application, observance and promotion of these basic principles. Indeed, it is the mandatory channel through which constituted authority must itself apply them and ensure that others apply them, and take steps to ensure that these values are and will remain an unequivocal commitment on the part of all military personnel. It is also through the chain of command that individuals must express their views. The consequences of neglecting these values can be disastrous. Ultimately, human lives can be lost. A single public outburst expressing a point of view or criticizing authority will sow doubt and confusion in the ranks. We all know very well that such confusion reduces operational effectiveness precisely because of the doubt sown regarding the decision-making process. In short, it reduces cohesiveness because a climate of doubt is established between peers.

Conclusion

It is very difficult in a few pages to make you appreciate the important experience that this court-martial was for me and the emotions that all of this involved. The media, which

at the time gave the events broad (indeed, excessive) coverage in their own way, did not necessarily have the same interpretation of the subject that some of us did. The fact remains that this sort of breach of discipline profoundly attacks the values of the military ethos and even more, the vehicle that should serve to foster them, namely, the chain of command. If my contribution to the court-marital was beneficial to anyone at all, I am delighted. But beyond that, it is up to each of us to defend these values of ours.

4. Chief Warrant Officer Gilles Guilbault, CD

CWO Guilbault joined the CF as a Military Policeman in 1969. He served in Military Police positions in La Macaza, Quebec, Comox, BC, and Lahr, Germany. CWO Guibault was Senior Investigator and Operations Warrant Officer in the Special Investigation Unit at St. Hubert, Quebec, the Command and Security Military Police Chief Warrant Officer, and the Wing Chief Warrant Officer of 4 Wing. Since July 1997 he has been the Air Command Chief Warrant Officer.

Introduction

The topic of ethics has certainly been one, which has taken the CF by storm lately. What we do, how we acquit ourselves in the eyes of the public, and the transparency within which we effect our work, are all being hotly debated in all walks of society and are the subjects of daily newspaper articles. Leadership is under constant scrutiny from all fronts, as we downsize, re-engineer and re-organize, to meet a budget which has been shrunk to an all time low. At the same time, the operational tempo has remained at an all time high. What we do, who we are, our values are constantly questioned. The Air Force is certainly no stranger to these scenarios.

In July this year, I completed a three year tour as the Wing Chief Warrant Officer (WCWO) of 4 Wing Cold Lake, and I have not only seen the effects of these changes, but have heard both the negative and positive vibes from all rank levels. And yes, I must admit, there is some discontent and confusion out there over the volume of changes, affecting our organization. However, one thing has not changed, it is our dedication to the task, and, our belief in the Air Force core values: *Professionalism*, *Excellence* and *Teamwork*.

Ethics in the Air Force

Let me start by quoting a few excerpts taken from the publication *Handbook for Air Force Non-Commissioned Member (NCM)*. Published in 1992, this booklet reflects the identity, the customs and traditions of the Air Force and its people, as well as their role and responsibilities within the Air Force family. While ethics is defined as the discipline that considers the justification people offer for the principles they value and hold, ethos refers to the characteristic spirit and beliefs of a group or community.

Although published in 1992, these beliefs have been around for as long as I can remember, and are integrated in the teachings of our personnel.

Ethos Excerpts

- We accept that it is essential for all members to clearly display loyalty, first to the country then to group, and finally to each member in the chain of command, both senior and junior to them before taking thought to themselves
- We accept that teamwork is essential to the survival and success of a military unit … We accept the challenge to nurture our subordinates and allow them to develop into future leaders
- We accept these responsibilities in memory of those comrades who died in the service of their country and must ensure that their memory and ideals are not forgotten.

All this to say that ethics and ethos are well understood within our culture.

Our Challenges

I am not here to tell you that everything is rosy out there, and that we need not worry about the state of morale. On the contrary, as I indicated previously, the cut backs, lack of pay, numerous changes, and negative publicity have provided fertile grounds for the current identity crisis we are facing. Today, more than ever, we need to strengthen the bond of trust at all levels of leadership. Everyone has to be an integral part of the Air Force Team if we are to succeed.

Flight Plan 97

Flight Plan 97 was instituted by our current Commander in January, 1996. Its aim was to "stabilize the course", return to basic Air Force values, and communicate the leadership commitment. This three day course invited the local leaders (Wing Commander & WCWO), to attend the opening and closing of each course, while encouraging personnel to "get engaged" in the process of restructuring our Wings and Air Force. We learned valuable lessons through this venue, and numerous cost savings initiatives were developed as a result of this initiative. It provided ample opportunity for frank and open discussions across the spectrum of rank and addressed numerous shortfalls and false perceptions. While I would be naïve to think that everyone is on board and double standards have gone away, these exchanges were invaluable in laying the way ahead.

For me personally, it reinforced the belief that our commitment as a group is very much alive and well at all levels of the chain of command. Our people are taking charge.

While searching for material for this presentation I came across a publication which, pays tribute to the 50 years of search and rescue in Canada. An article I read struck me as a good example of ethics in the air force, and I am sure the other elements. Let me share with you the contents of this article called *John Wayne Never Rode No Buffalo* by MCpl (now Sgt) Al Banky, a search and rescue technician.

> *I remember as a child growing up just north of the BritishColumbia/Washington State border, my heroes were larger than life figures I saw on American TV. John Wayne was the biggest one of them all. My formative years were filled with news stories about "The Duke's" yacht, an ex-navy minesweeper, being sighted*

on its way north for another fishing trip. In my early teens, I began to realize that what I watched on the tube wasn't reality. Heroes didn't cruise the Inside Passage on teak-decked yachts; instead British Columbia's real heroes flew Air-Sea rescue missions out of Comox, where they were "The Snakes" of 442 Squadron.

My fascination with 442 Squadron began in 1975. On 30 March of that year, Master Corporal Bill Wacey gained media attention as the lone Rescue Specialist on a Labrador helicopter responding to numerous distress calls in the Vancouver area. In 30 to 35 knot winds with 20 to 30 foot waves, Bill was hoisted 12 times from the helicopter to four sinking boats and two separate medical evacuations; he treated injured patients, recovered two bodies from the water and two survivors from the shore. By the time he took off his wet suit at the end of the day, he and the Labrador crew had saved 15 people and one dog. Bill's only comment was that he was "rather weary"; the duke couldn't have said it any better. Bill was awarded the star of courage; I am surprised they never made a movie about him.

The late 1970s were filled with missions much like Bill's. September, 1976 saw MCpl Chuck Clements responsible for the safe recovery of 17 survivors of a twin Otter crash 50 kilometers east of Bella Coola. The story about Chuck brewing up a cauldron of morphine soup to treat the injured during a night in the woods has persisted to this day. During a rescue mission a year later, Chuck perpetuated the image of the Hollywood hero when he fell 90 feet to the ground and broke or dislocated 82 bones. True to form, within a year, he was again parachuting and was fully operational by March 1979.

Sgt Banky goes on with a few more tales of his experiences before he concludes as follows:

> *Since 1989, as a member of 442 Squadron, I have seen that part of what is portrayed in the movies is real; there is drama in real life. Unlike Hollywood, real life heroes aren't all huge muscle-bound monsters. They fix planes, fly them, hang below them and do paperwork that keeps them running. When I turn on the tube at night and see one of those old western movies, it only takes me a few seconds to remember that John Wayne never rode no Buffalo.*

I am not implying that this type of scenario makes up the every day life of every member of the Air Force, but to me, these stories illustrate the fundamental belief we all strive for: service to our country. Doing the right thing, not out of heroism or search for fame, but because it is the mission.

This is true of the Corporal aircraft technician who resists the pressures of superiors and does not sign-off the aircraft until it is safe to fly. His focus is the safety and the lives of the personnel whose mission it is to fly the aircraft.

It is also true of every member of the Air Force team, regardless of rank. Whether it is the supply technician who provides the part to keep the plane flying, the F18 pilot who ventures in hostile territory to perform his mission over Bosnia, or the Hercules which flies into Zagreb to drop off supplies or pick-up personnel while being shot at. Where danger lies, lives are on the line and people are called to make sacrifices. Every day, we witness the talent and excellence of the people who are the fabric of our Air Force family and whose dedication we

have come to take for granted. Professionals at work doing the right thing.

While I realize that we can't have the formula for perfection in ethics, I am an eternal optimist. I strongly believe that if we use *honesty and integrity* as the two building blocks to our leadership foundation, we will have an excellent recipe for success. These two elements form the basis of trust. From trust comes respect and loyalty, which in turn stimulates communication. Is this not the very essence of leadership?

Over the past three years, I have seen an unprecedented effort and commitment on the part of our leadership, to build this trust, enhance the communication net, and to invite representation and transparency at all levels.

I have seen the pride and dedication of our ground crews and aircrews in their expertise and ability to compete with the best in the world. I saw a definite understanding that the "team" concept is the only road to success. This was prevalent in the unprecedented success obtained during the much-publicized William Tell competition, which saw our team take the majority of the awards. A feat never before accomplished by any nation, and a true example of team before self.

The case of Captain Cletus Cheng, a young military policeman who lost his life while competing for the Air Force at an international event. He gave more than he had to give.

The efforts of 17 Wing during the flood in Winnipeg and the 3 Wing response to the flood disaster in the Saguenay, are other true examples, which demonstrate our beliefs and dedication. People doing the right thing, self sacrifice for the good of others.

No matter how trying the times, we have reason to be proud of the fact that our people are our most precious resource. There is no doubt in my mind that when the chips are down, the Air Force is there to serve, and true to its maxims:

At all times, professional
In all things, ethical
To all people, respectful

Some Practical Suggestions…

Major (ret'd), The Reverend Arthur E. Gans, CD, ThM

Some Practical Suggestions…

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Major (ret'd) the Reverend Gans received his theological education at the Pacific School of Religion and Church Divinity School of the Pacific, was ordained in the Episcopal Church, and entered the Chaplaincy of the U.S. Army. In 1978 he joined the Canadian Forces as a Chaplain, and has served in Gagetown, Moose Jaw, Valcartier, Toronto, and Esquimalt. In 1991 Padre Gans received a Masters in Theology with first class honours in ethics, from the Toronto School of Theology.

Good Morning ladies and gentlemen. I am very happy to have been invited to share with you in this second Defence Ethics Conference. I have been deeply interested in military professional ethics for many years. I have been asked to address the area of practical steps.

Ethics is nothing new in the military. The first attempt that I have found outside of certain instructions found in the Old Testament dates to approximately 500 BC in Athens. [slide 1]. When you look at it, there is nothing in that ethical code that couldn't be applied just as well today. And I doubt that there is a soldier, sailor or airman who wouldn't generally agree with its sentiments. But despite a long history, ethics remain a problem for the military, whether uniformed or civilian members of the department.

I have divided my presentation into four areas. They are:

The Commander sets the Climate
What You Rate is What You Get,
How Do You Teach Ethics? and
Who Should Be the Teacher?

The Commander Sets the Climate

The ethical climate of an organization or unit is made up of the standards and practices of that unit that relate the way it performs its functions. Is honesty encouraged? What about personal and unit integrity. Are standards clear? But there are really two ethical climates in any

I will not disgrace the soldier's arms,

Nor abandon the comrade at my side,

But whether alone or with many,

I will fight to defend things sacred and profane.

I will hand down my country not lessened,

But larger and better than I receive it.

Slide 1
Athenian Soldier's Oath (Ca. 500 BCE)

organization; the first is the ideal, the second is the actual. All of us are familiar with the difference. Honesty is the ideal, but CYA is a fact of life.

One classic example of an ethical climate that went wrong was the "Zero Defects" program in the Maintenance world of the US Army a number of years ago. The idea was that every unit would have no maintenance defects in any of its equipment. Regular checks were performed by higher headquarters to ensure that the units had zero defects, and, of course, the result was that soon there was massive integrity problems in the areas of reporting. Commanders insisting upon zero defects without consideration being given to whether it was truly possible or not led to maintenance officers and personnel lying on reports. Why? Well, Personnel Evaluation Reports (PERs) depended upon good ratings in the zero defects program. And you can guess what happened.

Commanders need to set realistic ethical parameters for their units or organizations. These parameters should be high enough to challenge but must also be possible to achieve. This is one of the problems with what we might call "zero" games. There are certainly some ethical issues where "zero tolerance" is legitimate. Sexual and racial harassment or abuse would be among these. Others would be lying and theft. But when commanders are setting their standards room needs to be made for honest mistakes.

Let me share an example from my own experience. I was serving in a tank battalion in Germany in the early sixties. I had received a lot of complaints about the Mess Hall and made several visits. One of the things that I noticed was that there were an extraordinary number of cracked bowls and cups, something I had never seen in an army mess before. Unfortunately in my inexperience, I did not do a complete investigation. I went off, half-cocked, and spoke to one of the doctors. He went in the next morning and did an inspection and closed our battalion mess hall on the very day that my Commanding Officer (CO) was to receive a plaque from the division commander for having the best mess in the division.

When I heard what had happened, I immediately went to the CO's office and asked to see him. I went in, gave my best high five, and proceeded to tell him what had happened. He just sat there and didn't say a word. When I finally ran out of steam, he looked up at me and said, in words I have never forgotten: "Chaplain, in the 2d/32d we wash our own dirty linen. Dismissed." I walked out of that office feeling about an inch high. But that is not the end of the story. Three weeks later I was back in his office to sign my PER. It was particularly high. "This is an officer of the highest integrity who tells you himself when he has made a mistake." There was also a recommendation for immediate promotion, which happened at the next board, ahead of my class. That particular commander is still in my book of great CO's not only because of that PER but because for as long as I knew Colonel Jamison, he always made his standards known and recognized that there were times when people would make mistakes. And he used those occasions as teaching occasions to help his soldiers learn. Oh, by the way, the reason for the cracked cups and bowls was that the supply system had a glitch and there were none available in Europe at the time.

So how does a commander go about setting the ethical climate. Much of what I am going to say

is not new. Beginnings are important. When you come to a unit, set the standard in clear terms. And always remember those unforgettable words: "What you do, speaks so loudly, that I cannot hear what you say."

Enforce your standards when that is necessary, but remember that rewards and praise will often do more to change behaviour than punishment. In the military the Code of Service Discipline is always there, but good commanders know that positive reinforcement will often achieve the same end and simultaneously will improve the unit morale and climate.

There is another element that I would suggest bears upon the ability of the commander to establish the ethical climate. It is what I would call "posting turbulence". Over the years it has become the norm to have two year command postings. I believe that this is too short because it does not encourage the kind of analysis necessary to bring about the ethical changes we have been speaking of. The extension of a year, or even two, though it would mean fewer individuals holding senior command positions, would encourage both waiting to make changes until one had experienced the unit as it is, and allow the orderly introduction of change in training. It would also benefit the commander by allowing him or her to see the results of the changes and make necessary adjustments, and would benefit the troops by reducing the turbulence created by too frequent changes. Reduction in the number of available command positions might also result in even greater care being given to the selection of commanders. It would additionally give seniors the chance to observe juniors for somewhat longer periods, allowing for the development of a true mentor relationship.

What You Rate Is What You Get

One of the hottest topics in the business world today is the problem of corporate culture. I do not believe in the maxim of a Secretary of Defence during the Eisenhower years who stated that "what is good for General Motors is good for the army." But some of the material being published about business today has a direct relation to other forms of corporate culture like the military. [Slide 2]

> *In order to function at all, however, the group must have (1) a common language and shared conceptual categories; [just as an editorial*

1. The decision does not indicate partiality or favouritism to your own position.
2. The decision is universalizable.
3. The reasons or justification must be consistent with other standards, rules, principles and organizational values.
4. The decision will produce some action aimed at resolving the situation.
5. The decision sets an example for others.
6. The decision shows an appreciation for moral rules and principles.

Slide 2
Elements of a Good Decision

> *note, I am not advocating the abolishment of bilingualism here.] (2) some way of defining its boundaries and selecting its members, a process typically embodied in the recruitment, selection, socialization, training, and development systems of the organization; (3) some way of allocating authority, power, status, property, and other resources; (4) some norms for handling interpersonal relationships and intimacy, creating what is often called the style or climate of the organization; (5) criteria for dispensing rewards and punishments; and (6) some way of coping with the unmanageable, unpredictable, and stressful events, a problem usually resolved by the development of ideologies, religions, superstitions, magical thinking and the like.*[1]

Looking at the above definition, I am sure that any member of the Department of National Defence (DND) can recognize that all of the above elements are found within our organization. In other words, despite the different missions, all of us share in a corporate culture, indeed, a more formal corporate culture than most businesses.

Dr. Edgar Schein of the Michigan Institute of Technology (MIT), in a work for the Office of Naval Research, Organizational Effectiveness Group, whom I have just quoted, goes on to suggest that the way that we learn any organizational culture is through two methods, anxiety and pain, which he calls the social trauma method, and positive reward and reinforcement, which he calls the success method[2]. Both of these methods are used in our rating system. A bad rating, as we all know, produces trauma, a good rating, encourages success. When you want to change a corporate culture, as it appears that we do, then one of the major tools to accomplish this is the rating system.

Some might suggest that using the rating system to change an individual's ethics won't work. But let me remind you that is how every one of us developed our ethical system in the first place. Remember back to your childhood. What happened when you did something that was not in accord with the corporate culture of your family. In my family, depending upon the seriousness of the infraction, a number of sanctions could be applied, ranging from loss of privilege, through a spanking, to the most serious and dreaded of all, a visit to my father's study for a *talk*. Some of those talks still burn in my memory. And that was over fifty years ago.

Within the military we have had a method of giving response to behaviour ever since people first banded together and threw rocks at the neighbouring tribe. I haven't seen one, but I'd be willing to bet that Julius Caesar had some form of a PER for his commanders and staff. He also had an equivalent of the Code of Service Discipline. It would seem to me therefore that with our historical experience it should be relatively easy for DND to develop a rating system that strongly encourages ethical behaviour and discourages unethical behaviour.

One way would be to make concrete some form of evaluation of the individual's ethics. Another would be to use the instructions to suggest that ethical behaviour be explicitly considered for inclusion within the PER. Ethical behaviour is as capable of measurement as leadership or job performance. By incorporating it explicitly within the context of the PER one would find attention being called to both good and bad forms with the result that changes would occur in the individual's performance.

Some might suggest that by including ethical behaviour in the PER we might be crossing the lines of personal beliefs or privacy. I do not agree. We have long made judgements about various individual's behaviours as they affect their ability to perform the job. Ethical behaviour is no different. A lack of integrity in an officer or soldier is just as damaging to his or her ability to perform as is an over-indulgence in alcoholic beverages, probably more so. The same could be said of an individual's habit of taking supplies, or making sexually explicit remarks, or any of a number of other behaviours which fall under the general rubric of "ethical".

One recent example was the near appointment of General Ralston as Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Ralston's appointment was derailed when, in the wake of the Lieutenant Flinn affair, it was discovered that General Ralston had an adulterous affair while he was attending the National War College as a colonel. This is perhaps a classic example of the old proverb, "The higher up the tree the monkey climbs, the more he shows his ass." It is also indicative of why senior officer misbehaviour of any form attracts such public interest. When people are entrusted with the use of lethal weapons the society holds them to a higher standard than others, whether they be soldiers, sailors, airmen or police. We want to know that those to whom we have entrusted decisions of life and death meet the highest standards.

How Do You Teach Ethics?

In my experience there are two major tools for teaching military professional ethics. You can teach in the classroom, using a decision-making model and scenarios, or you can incorporate it into other training by including ethical problems in the training situation. Both these methods work on the premise that the more often that a situation is met and dealt with, the more likely the individual will deal with it successfully under stress in real time. [slide 3]

In a world where hard ethical decisions involve conflicts of values, the military commander is not uniquely involved in such conflicts, but he is more openly involved than most people. And he stands peculiarly in a situation of temptation. Often the incentives that influence people generally — professional advancement, public acclaim, the approval of peers — are in his case related to achievement in war. The temptations are great to forget that the ultimate mission of the military is "not to promote war, but to preserve peace."

(Roger L. Shinn)

Slide 3

The slide on the screen now represents my own editing of the Military Ethical Decision-making Model developed by the US Army Task Force on Ethics in the early 80's. The way it works is as follows: An ethical problem is proposed [it can be any kind of action], we think about what we are going to do, and a decision is reached. Affecting our decision are various value structures. These value structures provide the base for our ethical reasoning. My edit added the area of cultural-linguistic values to the model, recognizing the fact that in our country there

are some profound differences in reasoning patterns which are related to differences in official languages and founding cultures.

In the classroom we use scenarios which depict realistic situations. Preferably this is done in syndicates of six to eight students with a facilitator. Solutions are proposed and critiqued with the facilitator working to involve all. An important factor is that there are no school solutions to these problems. The point is to encourage the students to reason through the scenario and to be able to defend his or her reasoning. I have included two examples of such scenarios with the handout. One deals with a procurement problem, the other a combat situation involving an infantry section. Obviously, the more realistic the scenario, the more difficult it will be to arrive at a solution. I usually try to have several steps in the ones I use so that more information is provided, further focussing the ethical problem.

The other major means of teaching is the exercise. I am firmly convinced that ethical training should be included in every form of exercise conducted in the Canadian Forces (CF). Such problems would include but not be limited to questions of targeting, prisoner handling, and other examples of both rules of engagement and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Umpires should be asking questions of individual soldiers to ensure their comprehension of both their rules of engagement and of the rules of IHL that relate to their positions. The importance of adequate IHL training cannot be overstressed. During the Gulf War, for example, a number of our pilots were unaware that a red crescent was the mark of an ambulance or hospital in Muslim countries.[3] Imagine the resultant publicity had one of those pilots targeted a convoy of ambulances or an Iraqi Field Hospital. In a CNN war such an incident could seriously damage the force responsible.

Who Should Be the Teacher?

One does not have to be an academic ethicist to teach ethics. As I pointed out earlier, many of us have taught ethics in our own families. But there are some guidelines for those who would enter upon this particular endeavour in the military.

The first is to recognize that you will be dealing with ambiguity. There are no right answers, no school solutions. Perhaps there are some situations that are black and white but, by far, most real ethical problems involve shades of gray. A teacher, a commander, must be able to deal with these shades of gray in a positive manner or the teaching will be ignored. Of course a commander has the power to enforce his or her solution. But then we are no longer talking about teaching or perhaps not even ethics.

One of the most important gifts that an ethics teacher can have is the ability to be able to tolerate disagreement and a willingness to use suggestion rather than authority. When I have tried to develop scenarios to use in teaching, I have always looked for the ambiguous, the gray shade. For it is when we are confronted with a situation that has more than one answer that our ethics are truly tested. And it is important to remember that "I was only following orders" may be a mitigation, but it has had no standing in law since Nürnberg. Canadian military law, like that of both Great Britain and the United States, only requires the obedience of "lawful orders". And lawful orders include only those orders that obey International Humanitarian

Law which is treaty law in Canada. Abuse or killing of prisoners, mistreatment of civilians, destruction of hospitals or architectural and historical monuments are all covered by IHL. In other words, if you do any of these things you must be prepared to show military necessity and that demonstration may well come at a court martial.

There are some professional resources available to the teacher of military ethics. Some chaplains and some lawyers have special skills in this area. This is because their professional training has often included the case study methodology. Others, as well, may have made ethics a particular study during their training.

The CF has a course, sponsored by the Judge Advocate General (JAG), on International Humanitarian Law. I would strongly recommend it as a source of persons to help in ethics training. If someone has completed their Officer Professional Development Program (OPDP) 7 on War and the Military Profession they will have had enough introduction to profit from this more "in depth" course. The course too, would benefit from having more "operators" in attendance to offer a bit more realism to the discussions.

I have already suggested that in courses the syndicate method is probably the best methodology. I have also said that I believe that the inclusion of ethics training in training exercises would be an important step forward. To do this umpires must be prepared in advance to raise questions both during the exercise and in the debriefing. Commander's policies must be clearly stated so that they become part of the testing process. Rules of engagement also play an important part in such exercises. In this kind of training, senior commands must develop standardized rule sets, which, if necessary can be modified in predeployment training to fit particular situations. None of these suggestions should come as a surprise to anyone. However my experience in the CF tells me that many of them have been honoured more in the breach than in the keeping.

Also, in this section, I would include specific ethics training in all officer and

When we examine ethical instruction in the Canadian Army what should our goals be in planning this instruction? Formal instruction in military ethics is a relatively new discipline. Formerly, because of the congruence between the ethical values of the Canadian society and those of the Canadian military, the instruction that occurred was largely of an informal nature and conducted within the context of the regiment or units. As was shown in Chapter 1, the situation has changed substantially, and much of the previously assumed values base is no longer there. I believe that it is therefore necessary to implement a formal programme to ensure a common professional ethic which most scholars in the field of military leadership agree is necessary for success in combat.

Slide 4
Where Do We Go? What Do We Do? Methods and Programmes for Instruction in Military Ethics



Slide 5
Influencing Forces

The model was originally designed by the U.S. Army Ethics Task Force and Modified for Canadian use by Major A.E. Gans.

Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) courses with the view of increasing the cadre of available instructional personnel. Such training should be directly related to the course subject matter, for example in artillery and gunnery courses, targeting, in infantry courses, prisoner handling, in sea courses, law of the sea, in fighter courses, target identification, to include forbidden targets. The same kind of thing would be found in other areas as well, such as contract ethics in supply and logistics courses, ethics of the workplace in personnel and administration courses, and so on. The use of our own senior officers and senior NCOs to develop scenarios should be encouraged. But one should not ignore the experiences of other militaries either. Specifically I would point to the U.S. Army materials developed since the Viet Nam war and some of the "Innere Führung" materials from the Bundeswehr.

Canada has been a part of the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE) for a number of years. The papers given at that conference over the past nineteen years are a gold mine for the military ethicist. Members of our Forces, particularly those working in this field, should be encouraged to both attend JSCOPE and to submit papers to it. It is my hope that we will continue our association with this international group even as we build our own conference here. Two other resources should also be encouraged. Many officers attending the

Command and Staff College in Toronto have chosen to do their "New Horizons" paper on ethical issues. These should be collected, and made more readily available than they are presently. A specialist in military professional ethics should be appointed to the faculty of that institution with the purpose of acting as both a teacher in the field and a mentor for those wishing to expand their knowledge of the area. Finally, publications like the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* should be encouraged to publish both articles in this area and reviews of books. I believe that the Canadian experience has something special to offer the wider military community in this field, but for too long we have seemed to discourage its discussion and made it difficult for those interested in the subject to bring it forward.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have tried in this short period to cover a lot of material, from commander's and individual's responsibilities to "how to's". Much of it is not new, but I hope that all is useful. Thank you for your attention. I will be happy to answer any questions.

Endnotes

1. E.H. Schein "How Culture Forms, Develops, and Changes" in Kilmann, Saxton, Serpa & Associates, *Gaining Control of the Corporate Culture* [San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1985] p. 20.
2. *Ibid*, p. 24.
3. Reported to me in conversation with Cdr William Fenrick, who was at the time Director International Humanitarian Law at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).

First Step Exercise: Conference Attendees Ethics Survey

Colonel Paul Maillet

First Step Exercise: Conference Attendees Ethics Survey

Colonel Paul Maillet

Colonel Maillet joined the Department of National Defence in 1967 after graduating from Royal Roads Military College and Royal Military College. He has served as an Aerospace Engineering officer in appointments relating to aircraft maintenance, armament engineering, CF-18 fleet management, quality assurance and capital project management. His previous job was Fighter Group Chief of Staff. Colonel Maillet is currently a Senior Principal in NDHQ Chief of Review Services and is responsible for a variety of projects, notably the Defence Ethics Program.

At the second Defence Ethics Conference, October 30–31, entitled *Ethics in Practice*, attendees were asked to complete an exercise which would indicate, in a few words, what they felt was the most serious ethical concern relating to the CF, DND, their own profession or operational element, or their current work environment. Respondents were asked to limit their answers to 25 words or less, to select only one concern, and write 'none' if they had no concerns.

- Aim: To sensitize this group of people to its own ethical concerns. An additional aim of this exercise was to take advantage of an opportunity to solicit ethical concerns from a large cross section of DND and the CF, in order to gain a better understanding of the issues that will need to be addressed as the Defence Ethics program evolves.
- Number of returns: 181
- Target sample description: All military ranks from all major groups and CF operational elements, including civilian employees of DND
- Possible bias: This survey involved personnel attending an ethics conference and who have an interest in the subject of Defence ethics. Only those people who attended were surveyed and they may not be representative of the entire DND/CF population.

Results

The results breakdown is as follows:

LEADERSHIP	**76**
Double standards	(18)
Careerism/Self-interest	(17)
Abuse of authority/power/privilege	(5)
Fairness	(5)
Trust/Confidence crisis	(4)
Taking care of people while accomplishing the mission	(3)
Distrust of leaders morality/ethics	(3)
Impartiality	(3)
Esprit de corps	(2)
General aspects	(16)

VALUES	**28**
Loyalty	(9)
Accountability	(8)
Integrity	(7)
Honesty	(4)
PROCUREMENT/ RESOURCE MANAGEMENT/ DOWNSIZING	**18**
Fraud, Procurement	(7)
Fiscal constraints/Downsizing	(5)
Waste	(4)
ASD, Contractors	(2)
TRAINING/EDUCATION	**13**
SOCIAL	**8**
Diversity	(2)
Harassment	(2)
Equal treatment practices	(1)
Multiculturalism	(1)
Sexuality	(1)
Religion	(1)
COMMUNICATION	**8**
Open Dialogue (Internal and External)	(7)
Public approval versus duty	(1)
RULES/LAW/POLICE	**6**
MISCELLANEOUS	**19**
Dichotomy between political platitudes and actions	(2)
Responsibility of institution for its members	(2)
Department not capable of dealing with criticism	
Acceptance of incompetence	
Ethical cleansing as a short-term solution	
Unlimited liability	
Military/Business interaction	
Subordinates have ethical responsibilities too	
Temptation	
Total force	
Reprisal protection	
Lack of seriousness about ethics	
Canada should be loyal to its military	
Media controls CF/DND	
A minority of people control the majority	
Civilianization of military	
Younger generation has not experienced war	
NONE	**5**

Analysis

The results of this survey clearly indicate that there are several themes that can be seen regarding the ethical concerns of this group of people. These include issues of leadership, values, procurement/resource management/ downsizing, training/education, communication and rules/law/police. There were 19 single issues that were classified under a miscellaneous category and five people indicated that they had no ethical concerns.

The percentage breakdown is as follows:

Leadership 42%
Values 15.5%
Procurement 10%
Training/Education 7.2%
Social 4.4%
Communication 4.4%
Rules/Law/Police 3.3%
Miscellaneous 10.5%
None 2.8%

Comment

Although this exercise entailed only a small survey of a specific population group, the results indicate that concerns do exist. The DEP, during its implementation and development, will need to continually monitor and validate such concerns, prioritize them, and encourage the formulation of action plans to address them. It is considered that DND/CF leadership, the Defence Ethics program, and other related initiatives (i.e., Alternate Dispute Resolution, Ombudsman) will face similar issues in the future as dialogue on defence ethics becomes more widespread.

Ethics and the Performance Evaluation System

Mr. S.C. Alford

Ethics and the Performance Evaluation System

Mr. S.C. Alford

Mr. Alford is an environmental staff officer with 1 Canadian Air Division. He graduated in 1989 from the University of Manitoba with a Bachelor of Science in Engineering. He is currently a registered Professional Engineer and a member of the Canadian Institute of Management.

Aim

To recommend changes to the Performance Evaluation Report (PER) process that would reinforce the importance of ethical behaviour.

Background

Delegation of authority has provided individuals with increased decision making flexibility. In addition, recent high profile events have brought into question the ethical conduct of DND/CF personnel and has resulted in a high level of public scrutiny of our actions. As such, there is a need to develop an effective framework to raise awareness and reinforce ethical behaviour.

Ethical behaviour is conduct that meets expected standards in accordance with generally accepted moral principles. This broadly defined description encompasses a number of subject areas where the Federal Government has specific expectations of DND/CF and its members. Referred to as Mandated Common Objectives (MCOs) in the Defence Planning Guidance, these include environmental stewardship, safety, employment equity and official languages. While performance in these areas can be influenced by many factors, the choice to act in accordance with the MCOs often comes down to an ethical decision on the individual's part.

Discussion

As illustrated below there are three general factors that affect ethical decision-making. These are discussed in the following paragraphs as they pertain to MCOs.

1. Stage of Moral Development

The capacity to judge what is morally right will depend to a large degree on an individual's value system. Given the wide diversity of the DND/CF workforce, it can be expected that value systems and moral development would vary greatly.

Altering an individual's value system is difficult, as values are learned over long periods of time, based on a wide variety of personal influences. However, if individuals are better informed about the ethical issues associated with their duties, it would improve their capacity to judge their actions against their own current moral standards.

Considerable effort within the department is devoted to raising awareness and providing education related to ethical behaviour. This is being undertaken in a general sense through the Defence Ethics Program and also on a topic specific basis by staff within various functional areas (environment, safety, etc.).



Factors Affecting Ethical/Unethical Decision-Making Behaviour

Based on S. Robbins, *Organizational Behaviour*, 1995

2. Locus of Control

Locus of control refers to the degree to which individuals believe they are responsible for the events in their lives. Individuals with an external locus of control (people who tend to attribute their behaviour to outside factors beyond their control) may tend to find "excuses" that allow for unethical behaviour. Personality traits, such as locus of control, are extremely difficult to change particularly at the organizational level. It may be possible to improve the overall make-up of the workforce in this regard, through better screening during recruiting/hiring. This is beyond the scope of this analysis.

3. Organizational Environment

This refers to the employee's perception of organizational expectations. The organizational environment is extremely complex given the size and diversity of the department and its workforce. It is unlikely that personnel have a clear and consistent understanding of the organization's expectations. The following is a brief summary of some of the mixed messages that individuals must interpret with respect to the ethical standard of behaviour.

Positive Reinforcers of Ethical Behaviour

- Policy directives, messages and awareness/ training programs which support and emphasize the importance of ethical behaviour and MCOs.
- Senior leadership has allocated significant resources to support ethical behaviour programs and MCOs.

Negative Reinforcers of Ethical Behaviour

- Cultural emphasis within DND/CF on ends not means (ethics is general, and MCOs in specific, are related to the *process* by which the Department will achieve its overall mission, it is not part of the mission itself).
- Ethics and MCOs are not clearly factored into the performance evaluation system.

As can be seen, the organization is sending out important signals that de-emphasize the importance of ethical behaviour and in essence counteract the affect of the proactive programs that have been undertaken.

The organizational culture that emphasizes results, reflects the nature of military operations and is beneficial to the organization as a whole. It would not be advisable to attempt to change this aspect of the DND/CF culture.

The PER process is the primary method of evaluating the performance of individuals. It is a systematic, regularly scheduled process that affects all personnel. Based on certain performance criteria, it provides for both the reward and punishment of personnel through praise/criticism and through its direct impact on promotion and posting decisions. It is one of the most important formal systems which shapes behaviour in our workplace.

Although ethical behaviour and MCOs may be evaluated in PERs, clear and consistent evaluation is not likely under the present system. The current PER forms and instructions make no mention of assessing ethical performance or the MCOs (with the exception of Official Languages, which is covered under second language profile). Although ethics in general can be covered to some degree under the Military Conduct (NCM PER) and Integrity (Officer PER) factors, specific evaluation of performance with respect to MCOs is unlikely for most personnel under the present system.

Conclusions

While DND/CF claims that ethics and MCOs are important, the failure to evaluate and reinforce this through the PER process sends a very strong message to personnel that ethics and MCOs are not important.

Inclusion of ethics/MCO criteria in the PER system would provide for consistent and periodic reinforcement of the importance of ethical behaviour for those personnel with applicable responsibilities. Given the competitive nature of the PER process, even a relatively low weighting factor may substantially improve departmental performance in this area.

Recommendation

As part of the Defence Ethics Program, the Chief of Review Services should examine this issue in conjunction with ADM Per. A revision to the PER form and/or instructions should be made to include appropriate assessment of an individual's performance with respect to ethics and MCOs.

Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Authority and Leadership in the Canadian Forces

Major R.M. Lander

Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Authority and Leadership in the Canadian Forces

Major R.M. Lander

Major Lander joined the CF as a soldier in 1977 and has served with combat arms units in Canada, Germany and Cyprus. He has been a Base Security Officer, Commanding Officer of the International Military Police Platoon with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and an instructor at the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security. He is presently the area Provost Marshal for Land Force Central Area where he is also working part-time on a Masters in Strategic Studies.

> *Never have I seen such faith, no not in all Israel* (Jesus to the Centurion)

The quality of leadership and the nature of authority within the Canadian Forces have come under increasing scrutiny over the last few years. This increased scrutiny has caused both those within and exterior to the Canadian Forces to question every aspect of the current disciplinary system and authority structure. As a result, the very core of military professionalism in Canada has been subject to intensive and repeated review. This paper is an attempt to examine some aspects of these very topical issues.

In any attempt to understand the issues related to leadership and authority, one can pose many questions: What makes a good leader? What makes a bad one? Why do soldiers generally do as they are told by superiors and why do they choose to disobey on occasion? What does obedience to authority really mean, and what are or should be the ramifications of disobedience to authority? These and many other questions arise, with no simple or obvious answers. In addition, there are many approaches available leading to a discussion of the subject of leadership and authority: psychological, sociological, ethical, legal and moral — to name just a few. Each of these disciplines offers some insight, but it is felt that an interdisciplinary approach is required for the most comprehensive understanding. Furthermore, as the subject area is so large, some focus is required in order to allow for a meaningful examination. As a result, this paper, based on an interdisciplinary approach within the Canadian context, will be centred around discussion of the question: What makes soldiers do as they are told?

As a starting point, it is clear on *prima facie* evidence that soldiers tend to do as they are told because they are part of a hierarchical structure, based in law and accepted by long practice, known as the chain of command. Generally speaking, this structure allows subordinates and superiors to recognize each other and delineates (legally and administratively) the scope and degree of relative authority and responsibility. It is also clear, however, that this structure can only provide a framework, or reference point for a discussion concerning leadership and authority.

Throughout both his careers as an officer and an academic, the American S.L.A. Marshall, struggled to understand what made soldiers choose to fight, often at great risk to themselves.[1] He found that the factor of obedience to lawful authority was a relatively minor one, especially when it came to life and death situations. John Keegan, another well known student of military matters noted that since antiquity it has not necessarily been lawfully constituted authority which makes soldiers obey, but the leadership qualities of individuals. Using Alexander the Great as an example, Keegan describes how he used all manner of approaches in an attempt to keep his army obedient to his wishes: paying off his soldiers' debts, feeding them well, consoling the wounded, recognizing the valorous, heroic personal example, etc.[2] Both Marshall and Keegan found, however, that even heroic leadership had its limitations, and that the answer to what motivates soldiers to obey authority and fight while risking their own lives lies within the realm of small group dynamics:

> *…ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves, in life-and-death situations, as subordinate members of whatever formal military organization it is to which authority has assigned them, but as equals within a very tiny group — no more than six or seven men. They are not exact equals, of course, because at least one of them will hold junior military rank and he — though perhaps another, naturally stronger character — will be looked to for leadership. But it will not be because of his or anyone else's leadership that the group members will begin to fight and continue to fight. It will be, on the one hand, for personal survival, which individuals will recognize to be bound up with group survival, and, on the other, for fear of incurring by cowardly conduct the group's contempt.*[3]

These findings, supported by others as will be seen later on, provide some insight into the behaviour toward authority of lower ranking soldiers, especially in combat situations. Officers, on the other hand, especially at the junior levels tend not to be grouped together and are required to provide the formal leadership while standing as very visible symbols of the authority they represent. Their motivation cannot be exactly the same as described by Keegan above. In addition, Keegan's focus was on combat oriented, life and death related situations — what of routine obedience to authority?

Though the theme of the "ultimate sacrifice" will be woven throughout this examination, there are many occasions when authority is obeyed and leadership displayed in peacetime, or in garrison situations within conflicts. Perhaps the answer to what makes soldiers do as they are told in these situations can be found in the theories of S.P. Huntington, who closely studied military professionalism and the links to civilian authority in 1957 in *The Soldier and the State*.[4] For the purposes of this paper, the assumption is made that Huntington was essentially correct, in that full time members of the military are professionals with a special authority from and responsibility to the state. In 1957, he characterized officers as falling firmly within the definition of professional, and made an argument that perhaps non-commissioned personnel were not quite, but were advancing in that direction due to the demands of more sophisticated weaponry and increasing technology. It is probably safe to say now that this

transformation is complete and that the tendency is to accept all members of the Canadian Forces as professional within Huntington's definition of the term.

Is it professionalism that makes soldiers do as they are told? Broadly speaking, in the sense of fulfilling a "contract" with society as Huntington describes, this would seem to supply part of the answer. But though members of the military may be termed "professional", there are fundamental differences which exist between the military profession and other professions. According to Gabriel, the military is unique:

> *The military profession is distinguished from professions in civil society by four characteristics:* scope of service, level of responsibility, extent of personal liability, and monopoly of practice. *With regard to scope of service, the responsibility of the military profession is simply greater than that of any other profession. Unlike other professions, the military is responsible for the very survival of the state and its society … With regard to level of responsibility, no other profession … has the awesome responsibility of … spending the lives of others in order to render its service. [As for extent of personal liability] no civilian profession* requires *(my emphasis) the sacrifice of one's life in its service … [this] clause of unlimited liability separates members of the profession of arms from* all *other professions … [and] the military's monopoly on the skills it practices … [means] … one must either belong totally to it or not practice one's skills at all.*[5]

This uniqueness, largely based on the "unlimited liability" clause implicit in military service, affects the authority structure and requirements of leadership in any armed force, regardless of whether one is discussing peacetime or war/combat related situations. The "clause", even when its enaction may be perceived to be relatively remote, is fundamental to understanding authority and leadership in the military. This point too, will be returned to again and again throughout every aspect of this examination.

Accepting that the military as a profession differs from civilian professions and that underlying the authority system used by the military is the clause of unlimited liability; how are authority and responsibility generally viewed? In the military context, authority and responsibility are intimately intertwined, in that you cannot have one without the other. From a linguistic point of view, responsibility generally means liability for punishment or reward, but additionally can be viewed as referring simply to causality, with no reference to sanctions or intentions. However, as Kelman and Hamilton have pointed out: "The expectations of a social role may color how a person's actions are perceived…actions are evaluated against a backdrop of what should have been done."[6] From this they have formulated the equation "roles × deeds = liability for sanctions"[7] as a description of responsibility.

Authority, on the other side of the coin from responsibility, can be described as a power or legally constituted right to take specific action or to give orders and make others obey. As Kelman and Hamilton have observed: "Authority is associated with relatively strict liability for relatively diffuse expectations."[8] They also acknowledge, however, that in organizations such as the military, where superiors can reasonably expect that their orders will be carried out, responsibility for resultant actions increases.[9]

Authority and responsibility as understood within the context of a professional military can provide part of the answer as to why soldiers do as they are told, at least from a structural point of view. For insight on how the individual soldier decides to obey or not, it is necessary to turn to the field of psychology. From a psychological perspective, one way of describing how an individual decides to act is based on what has been termed the appraisal process. This is the process through which soldiers must psychologically progress in order to adapt to or cope with any stimulus. This process is key to understanding how leaders can influence their subordinates' reactions. Ben Shalit identifies seven steps in this process (other researchers have used fewer steps). A schematic representation of this process is depicted at Schematic 1.[10]

The first step in the appraisal process is that something must happen, some sort of change or stimulus occurs. This is followed by a form of "structure" appraisal, wherein cognition takes place and an individual's perception of the stimulus forms the basis for further evaluation. The next step is "motivation" appraisal, whereby the stimulus' relevance is appraised. The stimulus can be appraised as positive, negative or irrelevant. This is one of the stages where a leader's influence can have a significant impact. If a subordinate has been convinced that a stimulus will be positive, negative or irrelevant by a leader before it occurs, the subordinate's assessment of its relevance will be a foregone conclusion. For example, if subordinates have been convinced that a dirty weapon is bad because it could have a negative impact, the discovery of dirt on a weapon would be perceived as a negative stimulus. It is vital to note, however, that the explanation provided to convince subordinates that a dirty weapon is a negative situation must be functional. If it is not, and the subordinates are not convinced, their reaction will probably not be the desired one. The enforcement of weapon cleanliness may be perceived as the negative stimulus, rather than the dirty weapon itself with subordinates reacting accordingly, thereby creating the potential for a disciplinary problem.

The next step in the appraisal process is identified by Shalit as "coping" appraisal. This step involves an assessment of the actual, relative nature of the stimulus or threat toward the subordinates. The question asked will be: Is it possible to do something? The answer in a combat situation for example, will be either that the stimulus can be handled or not, depending on the perceived relative skills of the subordinates as compared to those of the enemy. A negative appraisal at this stage could be overcome by either increasing the subordinates' motivation, skills, and/or abilities, or by decreasing their perception of those of the enemy. The leader can also play a vital role at this stage by influencing perceptions of relative strengths or by increasing motivation. Coping appraisal is followed by "status" appraisal, wherein current status is assessed. It is at this stage in the process where if a decision to react is not made, no reaction is likely to occur. Response up until this point has been conceptual only. If a decision to react is made, the next stage in the process is reached. Shalit has labelled this stage as psychological readiness for adaptive behaviour.

Psychological readiness for adaptive behaviour results in potential action. Ultimate performance depends on objective constraints, but at this point subordinates are prepared, psychologically, to cope with whatever had presented itself as the original stimulus. The seventh step

is the coping behaviour or (re)action itself. Once coping behaviour has been initiated, reappraisal will occur and the cycle of the appraisal process repeats itself. Indeed, at any point in the process, new or unrelated stimuli will occur and affect all or some of the stages in this dynamic process.[11] Individual soldiers must progress through the appraisal process in order to react to any change or stimulus, from the presence of a previously undetected enemy, to such mundane events as a routine order or direction from a superior. A decision is then made on whether to react or not, and in which manner.

As described then, the appraisal process illustrates how individual soldiers decide to react to direction from superiors. However, a military grouping is more than a collection of individuals, and more than simply the sum of its constituent parts. Individual behaviour is strongly affected by group norms and expectations. Various psychosociological terms have been used in reference to unit and sub-unit behaviour in the military, such as: esprit de corps, morale and cohesion. Regardless of which terminology is employed, it appears clear that the development of group cohesion plays a key role in determining individual behaviour:

> *The small group develops strong rules of behaviour and expectations about individual conduct on the basis of face-to-face relationships and thereby becomes the immediate determinant of the soldier's behaviour. In a unit that is properly led and controlled by its leaders, all other influences become secondary.*[12]

Group, or unit cohesion may be a fact in the military, but its desirability may not be so apparent. Why is it necessary for units to develop and foster cohesion? Once again a return to consideration of the unlimited liability clause is necessary:

> *Military systems, especially the small unit sub-systems that are expected to bear the burden of killing, are categorically unlike anything in the business world. No one truly expects anyone to die for IBM … but the expectation that the soldier will … live up to his "clause of unlimited liability", is very real in the military. Consequently, … the circumstances under which the obligations of the soldier must be met are extremely different from those of corporate executives.*[13]

The "clause", though invoked relatively infrequently, especially in peacetime, sets the entire tone for interpersonal relationships and thus, cohesion within a unit. Each individual must trust that everyone else is competent and willing to carry out their respective functions for the good of the unit as a whole. The interface between unit or group values and norms and organizational objectives is achieved through leadership. Leaders must influence unit norms congruent with organizational objectives through personal relationships, rather than through an impersonal managerial style. The dynamics of the unlimited liability clause demand nothing less.[14] A close relationship exists between the level of unit cohesion, the standard and type of leadership and the requirement and willingness to risk death for the unit in support of organizational objectives:

> *Military organizations that are successful in withstanding combat stress require high levels of individual identification with community goals to compel individual action. This*

belonging and uniqueness define a truly cohesive unit, and motivate the individual soldier to stand and fight and to risk death in the service and protection of his comrades.[15]

It must be emphasized that effective cohesion in a unit is not a one way street. It must also satisfy the psychosociological needs of the soldier. For soldiers to expect to, and to be expected to routinely obey their superiors (especially in life threatening circumstances), they must identify with their leaders and they and the unit must satisfy the soldiers' physical, emotional, security and social needs, becoming in effect, a support organization.[16] This relationship, resulting in cohesion, can be a very significant factor in a soldier's decision to obey or not.

As has been seen, leaders play a vital role in preparing their subordinates to be psychologically ready to obey an order or directive, and in building the group cohesion necessary for every member of the group to trust that every other member is also ready, capable and willing to carry out their functions. Whether we are discussing formal or informal leaders, leadership is a term much discussed but difficult to define with any degree of precision. It is much easier to talk about leadership, than it is to pin down exactly what is meant by the term. There are, however, definite ideas about what constitutes a good (or bad) leader, held by both those within and without the Canadian Forces.

One soldier's ideas about the minimum requirements for an effective leader come from Franklin Miller, an American who spent six straight years in Vietnam as an NCO, much of it with the Special Forces, all of it with combat units. During his time in Vietnam Miller was awarded the Medal of Honor, the Silver Star, two Bronze Stars, an Air Medal and six Purple Hearts. Miller believes:

If you want a soldier's respect and loyalty, especially in a combat environment, you must demonstrate two things. First, you must show that you know more than the soldier you are leading. Your subordinate must be aware that you have knowledge he does not possess, and that you are trying to teach him. The second thing you must demonstrate is a genuine concern for his safety and well- being. The concern must be real, because a young soldier can spot a faker a mile away. If your concern for him is genuine — and he knows it — then you can rest assured that he will follow you into the jaws of death.[17]

Miller's explanation of what is required of someone to be a good leader can be broken down into two main themes. First a leader must be competent. The leader must have the appropriate level of knowledge and skill to perform the required functions, and this level of knowledge and skill is presumably not present in any of the subordinates (though they are being trained and taught to eventually achieve that level). This competency aspect is usually the concern of the organization as a whole and an individual leader's own superiors. Though if it is clear to a unit or sub-unit that their formally appointed leader is manifestly incompetent, myriad formal and informal means exist to have that fact recognized by the appropriate level of command and eventually have that individual removed from a leadership position. The assumption, for the purposes of this examination, is that any leader placed in a position should have clearly demonstrated the requisite level of competence. If this is not the case, the organization has serious flaws, the

discussion of which, however, is outside the parameters of this paper.

Miller's second main point is that leaders must be genuinely concerned about the welfare of their subordinates. This relates back to the previously described requirement of leaders to form a support network for the soldiers, in order to build and foster unit cohesion. Miller emphasizes, however, the fact that soldiers can detect insincere concern easily, and will not extend loyalty to those leaders lacking genuine concern. The requirement for leaders to be concerned with the welfare of their subordinates is obviously so paramount to achieving cohesion and the loyalty of subordinates that those who are not genuinely concerned are willing and/or forced to feign concern in an attempt to achieve desired ends. This point revolves around the obligations of soldiers and their leaders to one another and centres on the issue of ethics. There would appear to be a requirement for honest, ethical behaviour in the military in order to build up the necessary levels of trust:

> *Crucial to the ability to bond units together under stress is the need for ethics. There must be clear evidence among men…that their peers and superiors are living up to their obligations if the soldier is to live up to his. In an environment filled with common horror, a belief in the values of the profession becomes central to psychological survival.*[18]

Ethical behaviour then, is seen to be a key prerequisite for effective leadership in the military. Within the Canadian Forces the subject of ethics is both a timely and a controversial one. Recent revelations have highlighted certain events which have called into question the behaviour of some members of Canada's military:

> *It [the Somalia Inquiry] has evolved into an examination of a host of issues ranging from military ethics, to leadership, to civil control of the military, to the very process of government itself … From the various reports of military incidents in the past three or four years, one could come to the conclusion that the military has a discipline problem and conducts itself in a manner inconsistent with the standards of Canadian society.*[19]

There appears to exist the perception that in addition to the requirement for ethical behaviour on the part of leaders at all levels for intrinsic, military reasons; there is also a higher standard of conduct expected of members of the Canadian Forces by Canadian society at large. During a recent conference on defence ethics, this issue was discussed:

> *The conference addressed the question of whether those who "serve" in DND and the CF should be expected to have a higher standard of ethical behaviour than those in general society. The answer was provided by an "outsider", Professor Gilles Paquet from the University of Ottawa. The Canadian public vests in us, military member and civilian employee alike, the burden of office. The burden comes with a moral contract with Canadian society that insists we exercise our vital responsibilities with the utmost care. At the same time, we have a moral contract with those we lead to ensure [that] they are well led in situations that could enact the "unlimited liability clause" in the "contract".*[20]

This requirement by military personnel to act ethically has led to the discussion of what exactly

constitutes ethical behaviour. As what is to be considered ethical behaviour is open to interpretation, in most cases what is created is a list of general guidelines or parameters (see for example General Maxwell Taylor's,[21] or General Sir James Glover's[22] reproduced at Lists 1 and 2 respectively, or DND's recently released *Statement of Defence Ethics*[23]). Although such lists are useful as practical guidelines, for a more complete understanding of military ethics, it is necessary to return to the basics of ethical theory.

If a minimum standard of ethical behaviour is both something required within the military for effective leadership and something imposed upon the military by the society from which it is drawn, an appreciation of basic ethical theory is necessary in order to understand military leadership and authority systems. In addition, though studying ethics will not enable soldiers to always know right from wrong, it can help sensitize them to the ethical dimensions of their profession, and assist in the development of general principles for application when difficulties arise.[24] Finally, if military moral attitudes are learned within the social group, as theorized by some in the fields of anthropology and social psychology, it would seem critical that those doing the teaching should be aware of what it is they are indoctrinating in the newer members.[25]

A good place to start in a review of ethics is with Thomas Hobbes' theories of "psychological egoism". Hobbes felt that all individuals are essentially selfish, and that even acts that may appear on the surface to be altruistic, are actually done because they benefit the individual doing them. This approach denies that there is any objective value to terms such as "wrong" or "right", as everyone will be attempting to do what is best for them. This "Hobbesian" approach has largely been discounted by other ethical theorists who have shown that genuinely unselfish acts are possible.[26] A simple military example of this would be the numerous historical incidents of soldiers who have sacrificed themselves in order to protect their comrades by falling on a grenade just before it explodes.

Another ethical theory has been termed "determinism". This theory, which goes back to Democritus circa 460–360 B.C., but whose modern exponent was the Baron d'Holbach in the 18th century, is based on the idea that individuals have no real choice about how to behave. Determinists believe that people are forced to behave as they do by hereditary and environmental constraints, therefore, there is no requirement for ethics or guiding principles. Some determinists (known as "soft" determinists), allow for the impact of free will in some cases, though "hard" determinists do not. Determinism is not a very practical ethical theory, as it would be difficult to hold people morally responsible for their actions if they have no choice but to behave as they do.[27] As a result, an indeterminist ethical theory is felt to have better application for the military.

The theory of "ethical relativism" is centred around the principle that there are no universal ethical norms. Ethical relativists believe that each culture defines what is right or wrong for it, so that what may be right for one culture may be wrong in another. Ethical absolutists, on the other hand, believe that there are universal and objective moral principles which should be applied cross-culturally. In light of practices such as human sacrifice, racial genocide

and terrorism, which have all been accepted in some cultures, it would seem that ethical relativism has limited utility as a practical ethical theory for the military.[28] It must be emphasized, however, that this does not mean that soldiers should ignore cultural differences while on international operations.

To be useful, an ethical theory should address the question: What ought I to do? Theorists since Socrates/Plato/Aristotle have attempted to develop a theory which "analyzes and assesses the potentialities that are open to human beings, and seeks to provide guidance for humans when they are confronted by competing, alternative potentialities."[29] One such theory is that of "utilitarianism". Basically utilitarianism, as developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, holds that acts should be judged on the basis of how much good they generate for the greatest number of individuals. Though Mill and others thought that utilitarianism could be used to develop principles to guide human behaviour, it does have some limitations. For example, there is the question of competing values. Is it acceptable to repress a minority because it benefits a majority? Should society deprive one individual of dignity in order to provide pleasure for society as a whole? This type of question prompted Immanuel Kant, among others, to develop the "deontological" (or duty based) theory of ethics.

Deontologists believe that humans are rational and capable of making ethical judgements. They hold that the consequences of an act should not be the measure of its rightness or wrongness, but that individuals should do the right thing out of a sense of ethical duty, because it is the right thing to do. For example, Kant even went so far as to say that because telling the truth is always the right thing to do, one should tell the truth even if it would result in the death of another. Critics of this approach, such as W.D. Ross, point out that conflicting duties may force individuals to be more flexible. If, for example, someone promises to meet a friend, but by breaking that promise can save the life of someone else, that is what should happen. The greater duty to save a life forces the relatively minor duty to keep a promise to give way. The key ethical question is no longer: What ought I to do? but rather: What ought I to do in this instance?[30]

Again it is emphasized that a brief review of some of the major ethical theories cannot provide answers to all the ethical issues which face individual soldiers and the Canadian Forces as a whole. It is, however, only through education and training in ethics that an understanding of how to behave under specific circumstances can be formulated. Even leaving aside the professional and leadership aspects of acting ethically, such behaviour is laudable in and of itself:

> *If we are looking for a purpose broader than our own interests, something which will allow us to see our lives as possessing significance beyond the narrow confines of our conscious states, one obvious solution is to take up the ethical point of view.*[31]

When it comes to the ethical requirements of professionalism and leadership in the military, an even more stringent standard has long been recognized as necessary: "Honor, which is simply ideal conduct though often codified into

fantastic form, is his [the soldier's] Muse."[32] Further, in the military:

> *…followers depend upon the leader to be trustworthy — honest, consistent, equitable, and humane. Of all the modern organizations, there is none so dependent on the bonds of trust as the military.*[33]

In order to be trusted, leaders have to behave ethically in order to earn and keep the trust of their subordinates. "An effective leader must have integrity…[subordinates] can see through a phony" is the type of statement repeated again and again throughout the literature.[34] Truly effective leadership requires that leaders be accepted by their subordinates, rather than simply formally appointed. This acceptance is what constitutes real authority within the military:

> *The leader also must be ever sensitive to the distinction between* power *and* authority. *Power is the strength or raw force to exercise control or coerce someone to do something, while authority is power that is accepted as legitimate by subordinates.*[35]

In this manner, military leaders provide not only formal, legally constituted leadership, but also moral leadership.[36]

It is felt by many that this type of genuine authority and moral leadership is being eroded by the adoption of managerial practices and philosophies in various armed forces, including Canada's:

> *The managerial ethic has fostered a bureaucratic culture that minimizes imaginative capacity and the ability to visualize purposes and to generate values at work, all important attributes of leaders who interact with followers.*[37]

The introduction of such management concepts as "Business Planning" and "Total Quality Management" has helped armed forces plan and control the expenditure of increasingly scarce resources, but they may have also contributed to a move away from critical leadership values which set the military apart from civilian society. The difference between the leadership desired and required in the military and that in the civilian sector has been described as the difference between "transactional" leadership and "transformational" leadership:

> *They [organizational behaviour theories] looked good on paper, but they really did not address the things that attracted soldiers to their profession, such as patriotism, selfless service or duty … These theories had missed the* heart *of leadership … sometimes [these theories are] collectively called "transactional" theories, because they suggest that leadership is essentially a transaction between the follower(s) and the leader … The transformational leader gets followers to transcend their own self-interest for the sake of the leader, team, unit or organization.*[38]

Transformational leadership, as described by Donohue and Hong, requires that leaders behave ethically at all times and place the welfare of the unit and their subordinates ahead of themselves at all times. Again this is not a new concept, but one which cannot be emphasized enough:

> *This self-sacrificing attitude adds to the trust the followers have in the leader, since they may*

> *have more faith in a leader who advocates a strategy that shows more concern for the soldiers and unit than for the leader's self-interest. Anyone can "talk the talk", but soldiers pay attention to the leader who "walks the talk".*[39]

Walking the talk of moral leadership is often difficult, as William Douglas Home discovered as a Lieutenant in the Second World War when he publicly refused to participate in what in his view was an immoral action, and spent a year in prison for his belief.[40] General Matthew B. Ridgway, among others, also saw military leadership as requiring distinct characteristics, calling character, courage and competence the main ingredients of leadership.[41]

If ethical behaviour is necessary for effective leadership and genuine authority in the military, as suggested, an ethical framework is still required for practical application. Ethical relativism has been shown to be wanting, and utilitarian ethics alone are not enough, as soldiers are not always in a position to judge the "greatest good for the greatest number" of their potential actions. Deontology appears to be the easiest theory upon which to build an ethical framework for the military, but rules are not always easy to apply and the problem of conflicting duties still exists. Major Reed Bonadonna, of the U.S. Marine Corps has developed a concept that appears to be a practical solution to this dilemma:

> *When making decisions of ethical importance we are probably guided by all three criteria: the rules, the consequences, and our own traits … In practice, decisions of ethical importance are often made on utilitarian grounds, with rules serving as a kind of "fail safe". But virtue ethics may be said to provide both the underpinnings of these decisions and to pick up where other approaches leave off. I make this claim for virtue ethics for three reasons: (1) their adaptability to situations, (2) their ability to provide a motive (and not just a rationale) for ethical behaviour, and (3) their ability to impel us to doings that are supererogatory, i.e., more than duty.*[42]

This type of approach not only addresses the leadership and authority requirements of the military, but also helps individuals acquire the habit of virtue by repeated action. This in turn aids the military in "…one of its significant concomitants: the instilling of character, not only as a means to an end, but as an end desirable in itself."[43]

In this discussion, the subject of leadership and authority has been examined on an interdisciplinary basis, within the Canadian context. An attempt has been made to supply answers to the question: What makes soldiers do as they are told? It is obvious from the preceding discussion that there is no one reason which would compel a soldier to obey a superior in any given circumstance. Small group dynamics and unit cohesion play a significant role; as does the psychological readiness of the individual soldier to adapt to any new stimulus. The clause of unlimited liability within the military also forces a unique bond of trust, with authority and responsibility on opposite sides of the same coin; so that each soldier is convinced that his superiors and peers are ready and willing to effectively perform their assigned functions. This trust is based on the understanding that first of all the military superior is competent to carry out that role, and secondly that the superior will behave ethically at all times.

It is only in this way that soldiers are willing to put their lives in another's hands and follow that person, even unto death. Superiors who are not genuine in their concern for their unit and subordinates, who put their own safety or careers first, will not enjoy genuine authority in the military. They may exercise statutory authority, but they will never be leaders in the true sense of the term and in the best interests of the military or the country they serve.

The Canadian Forces are in a crisis, but it is not a crisis of leadership as some have claimed. The military has not lost its "moral compass" as is often discussed, though it may be temporarily misplaced. The crisis which does exist relates to the fact that the Canadian Forces have stopped emphasizing the significant aspects of professionalism that have always been present, but have been forced into the background by competing values and demands. In order to eliminate this crisis all that is required is a return to an emphasis on leadership based on competence and ethical and moral conduct. Leaders at all levels should be manifestly competent for the roles they are expected to perform in what may be termed a ruthless meritocracy. Honesty, veracity, integrity, sincerity, fidelity and loyalty all need to be reinforced and encouraged as positive traits in and of themselves. In this way the Canadian Forces can withstand external and internal scrutiny and its leaders can uphold their moral contract with society and the soldiers they lead.

LIST 1

Always do their duty, subordinating their personal interests to the requirements of their professional function. Duty here is understood both in the sense of response to immediate, specific requirements established by the organization — direct orders — and in the sense of the overarching responsibility for the security of the state under the Constitution.

Conduct themselves as persons of honour whose integrity, loyalty, and courage are exemplary. Honesty, courage, and integrity are essential qualities on the battlefield if a military organization is to function effectively. Reports must be accurate. Actions promised must be performed. Virtues claimed must be possessed in fact. Failures in these areas mean lost battles and lost lives.

Develop and maintain the highest possible level of professional skill and knowledge. To do less is to fail to meet their obligations to the country, the profession, and the individual soldiers they serve.

Take full responsibility for their orders.

Strictly observe the principle that the military is subject to civilian authority and do not involve themselves or their subordinates in domestic politics beyond the exercise of basic civic rights.

Promote the welfare of their subordinates as persons, not merely as soldiers.

Adhere to the laws of war in performing their professional function.

Taylor, General Maxwell D., "A Do-it yourself Professional Code for the Military" in *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, Edited by Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989) p.136

LIST 2

PROFESSIONALISM

The need for professionalism is clear. It breeds, or should breed, the thinking man. But if the soldier is left to his own, he can misinterpret the rationale behind his orders. He may then react stupidly or blindly or, because his conscience is aroused, he may even refuse to act at all. It was to overcome this very weakness that Sir John Moore in 1809 introduced the British Army to the concept of the "thinking, fighting man." and today the *Bundeswehr* ideal of the "Citizen in Uniform," or "*Innere Fuhrung*," reflects a similar philosophy. Its origins are the same; it too was born in a revolt against rigid, unthinking military obedience. But its aims, to develop an army of morally self-determining soldiers, is far more ambitious.

JUDGEMENT

The taking of risks is innate to the soldier. Indeed we probably put our consciences at risk more so than others — but we are not therefore less sensitive as a result? Similarly, are our consciences not sometimes dulled by the sheer professional challenges and by the hectic tempo of operations? Both can erode our judgment, and we must beware.

WILLPOWER

The ultimate test of willpower surely is the ability to dominate events rather than be dominated by them. I refer to the leader who can stand his ground, coolly and imperturbably, when chaos surrounds him. A strong will is the function of a sound conscience. And judging from my own limited experience, the prime flaw in those commanders who have cracked under pressure has usually been a lack of willpower to stand up to the pressures of people and events — or possibly an inability to relax.

COURAGE

Bravery is the quintessence of the soldier, and it is a quality that happily runs richly through both the American and the British armies. But moral courage — the strength of character to do what one knows is right regardless of the personal consequences — is the true face of conscience. Sacking your best friend, facing up rather than turning the blind eye, accepting that the principle at stake is more important than your job…such actions demand moral courage of a high order. Yet courage is no longer the product of an empty mind. In particular, *effective* moral courage is now more dependent on intellectual prowess than in the past. This applies as much, in a way, to the higher echelons of command striving to maintain an army in an era of stringent economy as it does to junior commanders striving to master the intricacies of an antitank plan.

INTEGRITY

And so to the greatest of the virtues on my list, one without which the leader is lost. Integrity, of course, embraces much more than just simple honesty. It means being true to your men, true to your outfit, and above all true to yourself. Integrity of purpose, loyalty upward and loyalty downward, humanity, unselfishness — these are its components. They come more easily to a man of conscience.

Glover, General Sir James, "A Soldier and his Conscience" in *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, p.146

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Lifestyle Leadership: Ethics in Practice

Major C. Cooley

Lifestyle Leadership: Ethics in Practice

Major C. Cooley

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Introduction

In 1989, the *Canadian Forces Health and Lifestyle Survey* indicated that the majority of Canadian Forces personnel are regularly impacted by values and behaviour that are different from those traditionally espoused by the Canadian Forces. However, our soldiers, sailors and airmen come from the community, Reservists in particular still live in the community, and are daily challenged by these values. Since one of the responsibilities of the Chaplain is to advise the Commander regarding the moral(e) and spiritual welfare of members in the command, Lifestyle Leadership became one way of providing practical advice on issues that regularly challenge leadership.

Aim

Lifestyle Leadership developed as a conscious effort to incorporate ethics into the training program of 39 Canadian Brigade Group (39 CBG). It did not consist of classes, workshops or seminars entitled "Ethics", except at the command level. Instead it viewed CF policies such as "harassment" or "racism" as necessary, not because they were mandated but because we had an ethical responsibility as leaders to address them. Lifestyle is an inclusive term that covers a multitude of issues that may not necessarily be mission-oriented but do affect values. For commands that are only now incorporating ethics as a component of training here is one way to put it into practice.

Lifestyle Leadership for All Ranks

In May 1993, when I was appointed Acting Brigade Chaplain (at that time British Columbia District Chaplain Land Force Western Area (LFWA)), I still served as 12 Service Battalion Chaplain to Lieutenant Colonel Wil Watkins, CD. Together with the Training Officer, Captain Beth Brown, we embarked on a monthly Padre's Hour. This was a real challenge. We already had a full training schedule. With Trades training, the Warrior Program, and the heavy Maintenance requirements, could we really afford another hour a month out of a Thursday night? The answer from the Commanding Officer was a resounding, "Yes! Be creative!"

Together with the Training Officer, we looked at the growing training and administrative requirements that had "values", "morale", "ethics", and "loyalty" written all over them. The list included Alcohol Abuse, Racism, Harassment, Finances, Drug Misuse, Stress and Fitness, to

name a few. Some of these were part of full-blown programs that required semiannual or annual reports (e.g., Drug and Alcohol Prevention Program). We took our training schedule from September to June, slotted these various topics into a monthly schedule, and called it, for lack of a better term, Lifestyle Lecture (also known as Padre's Hour). This was scheduled on the last Thursday night of each month for two reasons: Commanding Officer's Parade and Pay Parade. It didn't actually mean that the Chaplain was the only lecturer, presenter, or discussion leader.

For example, we scheduled "Managing Your Finances" for February and asked one of the junior officers, who taught finances in High School to present the lecture. Now I can hear some of you asking, "but what does this have to do with ethics?" It is simple, Canadian Forces personnel have limited financial resources. We "do right" when we provide good advice on managing finances. It is a small price for happier soldiers, greater retention, and it is proof that we care.

Lifestyle Leadership for Non-Commissioned Officers

In September 1994, Colonel Ron Johnson, CD, became the new District Commander. At the Change of Command Ceremony he emphasized *integrity*, *professionalism* and *pride*. At our first interview, he asked me to work with the District Sergeant Major (SM) and develop a Lifestyle Leadership package for the annual Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) Conference to be held in January 1995. He backed that request up with appointment as the District Chaplain and a promotion to Major. Together with the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Don Chipman, CD, and District Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM), Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Tom Holland, CD2, and District SM, Master Warrant Officer (MWO) Larry Jackson, CD, we developed a three hour presentation, which included a lecture on ethics, syndicate discussion of six ethical issues, and syndicate presentations.

The Non-Commissioned Officers Conference was held in three different locations on successive weekends to maximize attendance. I was the presenter of the "Ethics" package in Vancouver, British Columbia; Captain Don Harrison Chaplain (Protestant) in Vernon; and Captain James Short Chaplain (P) in Victoria.

In a review of the Lifestyle Leadership Lecture portion of the NCO Conference, the following was reported to G1 LFWA: "The overall response of attendees was excellent and the general thrust of gaining experience in making ethical decisions was successful. British Columbia District staff were impressed with the willingness of experienced NCOs to make adjustments in their personal values when dealing with ethics."

The format of the NCO Training Conference was repeated in January 1996, with an "Ethics" package again being included in the conference schedule. This time Captain Archie Pell Chaplain (P) prepared the training material and presented in Vancouver, Captain Short in Victoria, and myself in Trail. The emphasis was on racism and harassment. The response was equally enthusiastic, but the need for a different venue was also apparent.

Lifestyle Leadership for Commanders

In March 1997, Colonel Bill White, CD, took over command of British Columbia District and

the newly designate 39 Canadian Brigade Group. Together with the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Crober, CD, and Brigade RSM, CWO Kevin Cmolik, CD, it was determined that we had to take ethics to the next and most obvious level — the Commanders. The annual Commanders Conference was scheduled for 3–4 May 1997, and one full day was planned for an Ethics Seminar. Dr. Philip Smith-Eivemark, a consultant from the Skald Group in Edmonton, Alberta was brought in as guest lecturer. Dr. Smith-Eivemark had previously provided an ethics lecture for LFWA HQ. In attendance at our Conference were the Commanding Officers of all BC units together with their Regimental Sergeant Majors.

The ethics seminar consisted of five sessions: (1) Value Awareness; (2) the Nature of Dilemmas; (3) Developmental Model; (4) Ethical Systems; into Your Organization. The general format was lecture, followed by syndicate discussion and syndicate presentation.

At the end of the seminar, one of the attendees asked Colonel White what follow-up was planned. The answer was again simple, on the part of 39 CBG HQ "none", on the part of the unit commanders "everything". It was incumbent on commanders to foster and promote ethical leadership at every level and on every issue. More importantly, it is not a topic that can be pushed off to junior officers, non-commissioned officers or even chaplains.

Conclusion

Lifestyle Leadership in 39 CBG is not a program or policy of the Brigade, rather it has developed as a response of leaders at all levels to issues that impact members, units and the Canadian Forces. Rather than the usual from the top-to-the-bottom approach, it has actually developed from the bottom up. Perhaps this is positive testimony to the character of the individual members of the CF and the quality of leadership and the unit level.

The Statement of Defence Ethics calls us to act in accordance with these obligations: *Loyalty*, *Honesty*, *Courage*, *Diligence*, *Fairness*, and *Responsibility*.

Loyalty is up and down the chain-of-command. Addressing lifestyle issues that affect Privates, Seamen and Airmen, as well as Colonels, Admirals and Generals, evoke personal obligations one to the other.

Honesty in dealing with issues with which we may personally agree or disagree, ensures an arena of openness that eliminates cover-up and maintains public support.

Courage learnt in making unpopular, but correct, decisions in garrison will prepare our Canadian Forces for even more difficult challenges in the field.

Diligence calls for a willingness to learn and a determination to follow through at every level.

Fairness means that we act in the best interests of both the new recruit and the career member. This is particularly challenging as the cultural background of new members is changing dramatically.

Responsibility may begin with the Commander, but it goes to every level as officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted ranks reflect on their oath to Queen and Country.

Finally, for better or worse, Lifestyle Leadership is one command's effort to put ethics into practice: not because we were ordered to do so, but because we saw the need and used our initiative. I am sure that someone has a better approach, but this has worked for us. The key is for officers and non-commissioned officers to take the initiative and address relevant needs. As a Chaplain I remember the words of Evangelist Dwight L. Moody, when he was criticized by a young seminarian, "I like my faulty method of doing evangelism better than your method of not doing it."

Bureaucracy Versus Ethics: Striving for "Good Order and Discipline"

Lieutenant (Navy) P. Richard Moller

Bureaucracy Versus Ethics: Striving for "Good Order and Discipline"

Lieutenant (Navy) P. Richard Moller

Lieutenant (Navy) Moller joined HMCS CATARAQUI as a University Naval Training Division (UNTD) Maritime Surface and Sub-Surface (MARS) Officer in 1985 and has served in a variety of positions with the Naval Reserve, including Executive Officer of HMC Ships FORT STEELE and PORT QUEBEC. He currently serves as HMCS CATARAQUI'S Training Officer and owns and operates Fashions by P.R. Moller, a founding company in the Canadian Designers Cooperative.

A Look At The Past

In 1764 the Marquis de Bourcet opened the first staff college in Grenoble. This staff school and the others that followed shortly afterward were developed with the idea of creating a professional officer corps that would make the successful undertaking of war technically and materially possible. This, in theory, freeing the commanders to fight the war. Napoleon, however, changed all that.

The lesson learned from the Napoleonic era,

> *"… was that the combination of professionalism with genius created dangerous men. Genius suddenly appeared to be the enemy of stability, even though the central justification for creating an army based upon the principles of reason was to harness that genius in the service of the nation. Abruptly the authorities inverted the purpose of professionalism and used it as a structure designed to eliminate genius. That is, they removed professionalism's very reason for existence — the creation of soldiers who can win — and reduced it to a talent for bureaucratic organization.*[1]

Add to this the subordination of military leaders to Government (as opposed to State) authorities, and it meant that the important battles to the generals were now not on the battlefield, but in the backroom. Backroom victories became the only way for generals to increase their prestige, or to assure themselves of a civil service position after retirement. However, this also meant that the civil staffs had a vested interest in encouraging mediocrity in the military staffs, thus making it easier for them to be compromised. This was best stated by Guibert in his *General Essay on Tactics*:

> *If by chance, there appears in a nation a good general, the politics of the ministers and the intrigues of the bureaucrats will take care to keep him away from the soldiers in peacetime. They prefer entrusting their soldiers to mediocre men, who are incapable of training them, but rather are passive and docile before all of their whims and beneath all of their systems … Once war begins, only disaster can force them to turn back to the good general.*[2]

Guibert identified this problem over 200 years ago, and we have done little to counteract the effect since.

The evolution of the staffs that were created did not lead to greater professionalism, but

to a dangerously limiting form of bureaucratic logic. The staff schools developed a shared vocabulary among themselves and their students, and this vocabulary has had the effect of reinforcing errors by providing a collective means of action while eliminating either singular or collective questioning of the status quo, or the morality of a decision. Thus the "bureaucracy, safely repeating today what it did yesterday, rolls on as ineluctably as some vast computer, which once penetrated by error, duplicates it forever"[3] — or until the programing is rewritten.

Our staff schools have given our officers the intellectual tools — shared method; shared, self-serving vocabulary; predigested arguments; and the superior air of professionals — to prove, even when surrounded by self-generated disaster, that they are right. The standard defence being that it was the circumstances that were at fault, not their, or the system's, actions.

This system of military doctrine serves a useful purpose in that it provides a framework for the initial education of neophyte military thinkers, but may make it difficult to change our organization. After this initial introduction reliance on a doctrinal system hinders the building of an intellectually strong, powerful, creative, and ethical officer corps. So how do we develop more ethical leadership in our officer corps of the future?

Examining The Present

In my engineering studies I learned that the best way to start an examination of a problem was to go back to first principles. Notwithstanding documents such as *Statement of Defence Ethics* the foundation of ethics and morality in the military is rooted in the following quotation:

> *We, reposing especial trust and confidence in your loyalty, courage and integrity do by these presents constitute and appoint you to be an officer in Our Canadian Armed Forces. You are therefore carefully and diligently to discharge your duty as such in the rank of Sub-Lieutenant or in such other rank as We may from time to time hereafter be pleased to promote or appoint you to, and you are in such manner and on such occasions as may be prescribed by Us to exercise and well discipline both the inferior officers and men serving under you, and use your best endeavor to keep them in good order and discipline, and We do hereby Command them to obey you as their superior officer, and you to observe and follow such orders and directions as from time to time you shall receive from Us, or any your superior officer, according to Law, in pursuance of the trust hereby reposed in you.*

Yes, that is the text of our commissioning scroll. That is what sets the officer apart from the non-commissioned member. While every member of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence has an individual responsibility to act in an ethical manner, our officers have the added obligation of ensuring that their subordinates act in such a manner. This means that they must accept the burden of responsibility for their own actions, as well as the actions of their subordinates. If we fail to accept this responsibility we are breaching the fundamental command given to us by our State: To use our best endeavor to keep our subordinates in good order and discipline.

Before we try to come up with new slogans to teach people, we must ensure that we are living up to the existing standards. The problem is,

how do we do this? Before we answer that question we need to know our starting point.

Although, many officers claim that they are part of a Profession, the Canadian Forces Officer Corps is missing one of the fundamental requirements to qualify as one. That is, we lack the checks and balances that other professions have. Specifically, we lack a review committee that has the authority to strip an individual of their professional standing; *independent* of the chain of command. This body would be the equivalent of The College of Physicians and Surgeons, the various provincial Law Societies, or Engineering Societies. These bodies have disciplinary powers over people in the profession that extend outside of federal or provincial statues or the companies or organizations that they work for. In short they can strip a doctor, lawyer, or engineer of their professional status even if there are no criminal charges laid, or civil proceedings started.

Therefore, for our Officer Corps to truly become a Profession we must have an independent professional review committee of some kind. The establishment of this committee is more problematic for the military because of the specific idiosyncracies of the defence structure. However, if we keep the committee responsible to the State (as opposed to the Government) there should be little difficulty.

The distinction between State and Government is one that is slowly being lost in Canadian Society at large. Even our past Chief of the Defence Staff confused it, when he stated in front of the Somalia Inquiry that the Prime Minister is the Commander in Chief of the Canadian Forces. This distinction, however, is vital to the Forces. The Canadian public must see that the Canadian Forces is loyal to the country, not simply to the government of the day. When we attest our loyalty on enrollment we do so to the monarch (the Head of State) not to the Prime Minister (the Head of Government). As the Governor General is our Commander in Chief, and he is the issuing authority for officers commissions, he should also be the one (on advice) that revokes them.

Therefore the establishment of an ethics committee, chaired by the Governor General with representation from all commissioned ranks, elements and components, and that operates independently of the chain of command, is quite plausible.

Setting Our Sights

The inclusion of the Governor General is imperative. This is the only way to ensure there is no confusion that the military responds solely to the State. This body must have the power to investigate all things dealing with officer professionalism, and have the authority to strip an individual of their commission, even if no charges are laid under the National Defence Act or any other act.

The nine person board must represent all levels of the chain of command in order to be seen as independent and thus should have the following make up:

- The Governor General (Permanent Chair)
- Two Flag Rank/General Rank Officers,
- Three Senior Officers, one each of:
  - Captain(N)/Colonel,
  - Commandr/Lieutenant Colonel,
  - Lieutenant Commander/Major, and

- Three Junior Officers (at least one being a Sub-Lieutenant/Lieutenant or Acting Sub-Lieutenant/Second Lieutenant.)

The members must represent a balanced background. The following breakdown is suggested:

- Sea Element, one regular force and one reserve force
- Land Element, one regular force and one reserve force
- Air Element, one regular force and one reserve force
- Two discretionary

The inclusion of reservists on this board is an important component. On some para-military organization's review boards, like the police, there are civilian representatives. The inclusion of these people often leads to conflict in the board because there is not an in-depth understanding of the mileau that the people work in. This problem would be even greater for the military. The reservists on this board would provide a strong link to the civilian community, thus lending the board legitimacy in the eyes of the public, while ensuring that all members of the board have an understanding of the situations that they will be examining.

To lay out all the policies and procedures would require far more depth than can be covered in this paper, however there are some fundamental issues that must be clarified.

- To provide continuity, board members should be appointed for a fixed term of four years, with a staggered rotation of two new members per year.
- To maintain independence, the board must have sole authority for naming its replacements.
- As the board is independent of the chain of command, appointment to it should be considered a secondary duty.
- In cases of revocation proceedings there should be a requirement for a two thirds majority vote. As with other such bodies, decisions should be appealed through the court system.
- To eliminate any real or perceived threats, no member of the board should be able to initiate an investigation or proceedings against anyone in their direct chain of command.
- The cost of establishing and running the committee should be borne by all serving officers in the form of annual professional dues.

Striving For The Future

We are at a time in history when doctrine and bureaucracy have taken over our organization. It is time to remind ourselves what it means to wear the uniform of Canada.

We must, at all times, remember that while we are wearing this uniform we represent the government and the people of Canada, as well as the element whose uniform we wear. Whatever we do reflects, for better or for worse, on ourselves, our element, and on the people of Canada. We have been entrusted with the responsibility of upholding the honour of our uniform, and all that it represents. The whole world will judge this uniform and Canada on our conduct while we wear it.

We must, therefore, comport ourselves on all occasions, and in all circumstances, in such a manner as to reflect credit upon our element,

our government, and our country. Our every act must encourage all people to have confidence in this uniform, and what it represents.

We must be mindful that fine men and women have died wearing the uniform of Canada, and that we are accountable to their memory. We must be proud of our element, but remember that no one element has a monopoly on courage, conviction, and sacrifice.

We must remember that our rank and our uniform do not excuse us from the responsibilities of behaving like civilized, respectable, and responsible members of Canadian society. In all our actions we must be guided by common sense. To use the words that Sun Tzu wrote twenty-five hundred years ago: "When you see the correct course, act; do not wait for orders."[4]

The Canadian Forces have recently gone through what some have described as a crisis in leadership and morality. While some may not be willing to go as far as defining the last couple of years as a crisis it has certainly been an unfortunate period, and has pointed out to even the most casual observer that there are some problems that must be addressed. We can not allow ourselves to be lulled into inaction simply because that task seems to daunting. In the words of Winston Churchill, "We must learn from misfortune the means of future strength."

We are currently faced with a wide open window of opportunity for dramatically improving how we as an organization operate. If we fail to take advantage of it, and remain with the status quo, we run the real risk that our Canadian Forces will be but a footnote in the history of Canada. To prevent this, we must look forward not back. We do not need to *return* to an era of moral leadership, we need to *discover* one. Making all our military leaders accountable to an independent ethics committee will be a huge step in that transition.

Endnotes

1. Saul, John Ralston. *Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West*, Penguin Books, Toronto, 1993, p. 193.
2. Comte de Guibert, *Écrits Militaires 1772–1790*, préface et notes du Général Ménard (Paris: Editions Copernic, 1976), p. 192. "Si par hasard il s'élève dans une nation un bon général, la politique des ministres et les intrigues des courtisans ont soin de le tenir eloigné des troupes pendant la paix. On aime mieux confier ces troupes à des hommes médiocres, incapables de les former, mais passifs, dociles à toutes les volontés et à tous les systèmes…. La guerre arrive, les malheurs seuls peuvent ramener le choix sur le général habile."
3. Tuchman, Barbara W. *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam*. Ballantine Books, New York, 1984, p. 386.
4. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Griffith, Samuel B. Oxford University Press Paperback, New York, 1971, p. 112.

Ethical Principles

Padre Timothy P. Nelligan, CD

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Whenever we embark upon a discussion of ethical principles, it is important to be fully aware of the background against which these principles are painted. To eliminate the diversity this topic can have, let us therefore speak from a semi-scientific point-of-view.

In its most basic context, ethics comprises two elements:

(1) Human Conduct, and
(2) Rightness/Wrongness/Oughtness.

and can be affected by the following:

(3) Modifiers of Responsibility
(4) Principle of Double Effect

What we do and the means by and through which we do them, are direct reflections on our personal character. Every person desires to be seen as an ethical person, particularly when we hold high profile positions such as Commanding Officer or Regimental Sergeant Major. The decisions we make and the lives those decisions affect, run parallel to whom we are as ethical persons. The job we hold is merely the greater context in which the decisions are made and the atmosphere that shapes our conduct. Let us then, take a closer look at our two elements. We will begin with Human Conduct.

1. Human Conduct:

Human conduct is the subject matter of ethics. Unlike behaviour, which is generally understood in a psychological sense and as such finds application equally within the animal kingdom, conduct remains strictly human. To understand this further, we should look briefly at the two different types of human acts, *voluntary* and *involuntary*:

(a) *Voluntary Acts* are those that we consciously control and deliberately will and are held responsible for. These acts constitute human conduct in most scenarios.
(b) *Involuntary Acts* are those that a person happens to perform but does not consciously control or deliberately will, and therefore does not have responsibility for them.

> These acts do not necessarily constitute human conduct and do not usually have any ethical bearing.

With this in mind we can eliminate the involuntary, since acts such as these, the ones we commit in infancy, sleep, delirium, or insanity, do not bind us to ethical or moral laws. What we must concentrate on are our voluntary acts, acts we willingly choose for whatever reason.

> *Man is master of his actions through his reason and will, whence too the free will is defined as the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions of a man, but not properly human actions, since they are not proper to man as man.*[1]

Humans are the only beings in this world who can think, but if a person's thoughts simply run along by association without his or her conscious direction and control, such thoughts are only *involuntary* acts, not *voluntary* or *human acts*, even though they are mental. On the other hand, eating and sleeping are physical acts that humans do in common with brute animals, but they become voluntary or human acts if the person does them knowingly and willingly. To put food in one's mouth while in a distracted state of mind is an *involuntary* act, but to determine deliberately to eat this food is a *voluntary* or *human act*. To be overcome by drowsiness and fall asleep is an *involuntary* act, but to go to bed intentionally for the purpose of sleeping is a *voluntary* or *human act*. Although it is impossible to have a *human act* unless it is guided by intellect and will the act itself can be of any sort. A human act can be either physical or mental provided it is deliberately willed.

2. Rightness/Wrongness/Oughtness:
If the subject matter of ethics is Human Conduct, then Rightness/Wrongness or Oughtness, is the point-of-view of ethics. The moral guidelines we choose in our own individual, social, professional, and family lives, are the tools we equip ourselves with in order to maintain the integrity of our ethics. Let us consider our standard of morality by putting a definition in place:[2]

> *Morality is the quality or value human acts have by which we call them right or wrong, good or evil. It is a general term covering the goodness or badness of a human act without specifying which of the two moral values is meant.*

This definition is intentionally neutral. What determines whether a particular act is labelled as right or wrong then, is the choice of our ethical conditioning; our conscience. In Europe and the Americas, the 'eye for an eye' mentality is not considered morally correct, whereas this mentality is acceptable in countries that are predominantly Muslim, such as Iran, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia. In judging the morality of a human act, we must take into consideration the subjective aspects of the agent (the doer of the act) and look at the act as conditioned by the agent's knowledge and consent, background, training, prejudices, emotional maturity and stability, value-orientation, and a host of other personal traits. In approaching morality in this way it is then that we do so *subjectively*, since the rightness or wrongness is determined against the person's personal judgment of conscience. However, if we consider the act itself, and ask if any individual whom we (*we being society as a whole*) believe to be in full control of their

faculties would commit such an act given the circumstances, then we consider the moral *objectivity* of the act and not the subjective state of the doer.

i.e., "Is murder wrong?" "Is truthfulness right?" (these are objective)

i.e., "Did this man fully realise what he was doing when he killed that child?" "Did this woman intend to tell the truth when she blurted out that remark?" (these are subjective).

Morality in its completeness includes both its subjective and its objective aspects. Neither aspect is more important than the other. Unless acts have a rightness or wrongness of their own with which a person's judgement of conscience can and should be in agreement, anyone's judgement is as good as anyone else's.

3. Modifiers of Responsibility

Whenever we voluntarily commit an act, whether good or bad, the act is considered to be *complete* or *perfect* if the person has full knowledge and full consent with regard to the act. However, if there is something wanting in the individual's knowledge or ability to consent, then the act is considered *diminished* or *imperfect*. Our given faculty of *free will*, wonderful as it is, can easily be corrupted in the decision-making process whenever we make incompetent choices. This does not necessarily mean we are incompetent persons, but rather we choose, either by our own volition or because of outside influences, to engage a decision with the greatest of intents but without the proper tools or information to make the correct decision. Let us briefly consider five modifiers:

(a) Ignorance: affecting our knowledge,
(b) Strong Emotion: affecting the consent of the will,
(c) Intellectual Fear: opposing to the will a contrary wish,
(d) Force: actual use of physical compulsion, and
(e) Habit: a tendency acquired by repetition.

(a) Ignorance:

Ignorance may be explained as, the degree to which our lack of knowledge affects our voluntary actions to the point where our actions become less than competent human acts. From an ethical point-of-view, the only ignorance with any degree of importance, is ignorance a person ought not to have. There are three kinds of such ignorance:

(i) Ignorance that can be overcome by acquiring the requisite knowledge is called *vincible ignorance*.
(ii) Ignorance that cannot be overcome because the requisite knowledge cannot be acquired is called *invincible ignorance*.
(iii) Ignorance deliberately cultivated in order to avoid knowing what ought to be known is called *affected or studied ignorance*.

Each of these forms of ignorance can be looked at as a lack of knowledge which affects the person's voluntariness and thus their degree of responsibility.

(i) *Vincible Ignorance*, which does not preclude responsibility but merely lessens it, occurs when the individual knows they are

ignorant, and the knowledge to correct it is obtainable, but does nothing to obtain it. Such a person, by failing to gain the necessary and available knowledge and acts anyway, becomes voluntarily responsible for the outcome of their actions. Now, since the individual is in ignorance, the outcome of their actions may not be fully understood and therefore, is less responsible than someone who, with full knowledge of the consequences, acts and permits the results to occur. For instance, a surgeon performs an operation he is not fully qualified for and subsequently looses the patient, versus a surgeon who is fully qualified, knows that the operation will kill the patient, and yet performs the procedure. The first example would be manslaughter, whereas the second would be murder.

(ii) *Invincible Ignorance* precludes responsibility and, as such, requires knowledge. Those who are said to be in invincible ignorance, are those who have no access to the knowledge necessary to correct their ignorance. These persons cannot be held responsible for their actions when in such a state, since their actions are not to be considered voluntary. For example, a woman who buys a coat with counterfeit money, but is unaware of the counterfeit money, does no wrong. The act of buying the coat is voluntary, but not the use of counterfeit money.

(iii) *Affected Ignorance* can both decrease and increase a person's responsibility. This kind of ignorance lessens responsibility, as does any lack of knowledge, since the person acts without understanding the full import of their actions. However, if an individual is aware of their ignorance and uses it as an excuse for improper actions, they are all the more responsible for the outcome of their actions. For instance, a soldier who knows that his turn is up for a particular duty but has not been specifically told of the timings, is fully responsible for the vacant duty regardless of his plea that no one told him. (Affected ignorance is usually associated with racial prejudice).

(b) Strong Emotion:

Whenever we feel emotions strongly and act out of the power of our emotion, our will within the action intensifies more so than it would when our emotions are under normal control. Strong emotion increases the force of the will-act, but to the degree the emotion lessens the voluntariness of the act, it also lessens the responsibility. Subsequently then, the act is that much less a human act.

When our emotions arise spontaneously, we may have the tendency to act before our will does. It is essential to understand, also, that our emotions are constantly mixing and mingling with our senses, and as such can promote spontaneous unwilled actions. For example, when we feel an object our emotions stir at the same time as our senses do and we react with joy or disgust at the beauty or ugliness of the sensation. It is the sudden feeling of joy, anger, hatred, grief, shame, pity, disgust, and so forth that we are talking about here. If these emotions erupt strongly and/or violently, then the modification of responsibility must be taken into consideration. In conjunction with these points, we should recognise two kinds of strong emotion. They are antecedent and consequent emotion.

(i) *Antecedent* emotion is involuntary since it acts before the will does and, as such, may lessen or preclude responsibility altogether. If the emotion is so sudden or violent as to wholly block the use of our intelligence, and makes deliberation impossible, then the will-act is neither free nor voluntary and the person not to be held accountable. Such out bursts are rare at best. However, in most cases, even when moved by strong emotion, we remain in control of our actions. Despite the reality that we may have enough knowledge and consent remaining to make the act both voluntary and free, and thus incorporating responsibility, calm intellectual deliberation may remain or become more difficult, since the motives on both sides cannot be discerned with careful impartiality. As such, the will is predisposed more strongly towards one side rather than the other, and therefore hampers the freedom of the person to act with full responsibility. Since the will of the person is not calm when the act is committed, the degree to which one is held responsible is equivalent to the degree of their voluntariness.

(ii) *Consequent* emotion is when we voluntarily put ourselves into a strong or violent emotion. The fostering of thoughts that create uncontrollable emotion which lead us to actions in order to dispel the thought that has evoked us, creates a greater level of responsibility in the person. For example, a person that deliberately broods over an insult in order to work up to an act of revenge. This person is using the emotion as a means to accomplish the goal of revenge, and so both the emotion deliberately worked up and the act of revenge taken, are directly voluntary. To add a twist to this, let us consider a different angle. For instance, a man who does not want to kill someone but sees that his continual brooding over wrongs done to him gets him into such a frenzy that he will most likely kill. In spite of this, he continues to brood and nurse his anger, which eventually leads him to a point of insanity where he kills his enemy. His emotional state must be considered deliberate and directly voluntary, since he willingly put himself into this emotional state; but the act of killing his enemy is indirectly voluntary, since he foresaw the consequences of his rage and did nothing to prevent him from falling into a state of insanity. The man is held responsible for the death of the person and his rage because of the deliberate fostering of his emotions, even though the killing may not have been premeditated as above, the responsibility of the person remains increased due to his voluntary brooding. The difference here can be described in terms of Murder 1 and Murder 2.

(c) Intellectual Fear

Fear is the emotion used to apprehend impending evil and manifests itself in the desire to get away, avoid, or escape from the impending threat. The sole aim of fear is to protect us from anticipated evils. In correlation to basic fear, we have intellectual fear. Intellectual fear is when we have understanding of what a threatening evil will bring, and we are moved to take rationalised action in order to prevent the impending or supposed fear. For example, a man steals because he is afraid of living in poverty, or murders someone out of fear of being blackmailed. When we evaluate intellectual fear, we must consider

it against the person and the circumstances they are in. This is essential, since the elements which may produce slight fear in one person, may create grave fear in another.

With intellectual fear, the responsibility that bears upon an individual is directly related to his acting from fear as opposed to acting with fear. For example, a soldier who deserts his post in battle because of cowardice, is motivated by fear and acts from fear. However, if this same soldier stays at his post in spite of the danger, he may have just as much fear, but even though he acts with fear, he does not let the fear influence his conduct. This relates similarly to difference between will and wish. When a person acts regretfully and reluctantly, choosing to do something they would rather not be obliged to do, there is conflict between the will and the person's wish. For example, the Captain of an ocean freighter jettisons his cargo during a storm in order to save his ship and crew. The option is there to attempt riding out the storm and hoping for the best, but survival seems most unlikely. Subsequently he makes his choice and jettisons the cargo.

Despite the contrary wish of not having to jettison the cargo, his will to do so in order to preserve the lives of his crew and integrity of the ship motivates him to jettison. He is responsible for the loss of the cargo but not to the greatest extent, since no contrary wish was present.

In understanding fear and how it affects our ability to act and/or react, we must always consider the circumstances under which a person, when faced with impending evil, chooses to act. Regardless of how others may have acted/reacted, the level of fear experienced and action/reaction taken can never be accompanied by full culpability, since fear naturally generates a motivation towards instinctive survival. The ability, or lack thereof, of a person to deliberate intellectually in a crisis is as variant as snowflakes are. No two are exactly alike!

(d) Force:

Force, violence, or compulsion is physical power used to make someone do something against his or her will. One who yields to a threat of violence is said to be forced, yet this is not actually force but rather fear and as such, the person's voluntariness and level of responsibility is to be judged by the criteria for fear. It is essential to understand the difference between force and fear. For instance, if I hand over my money to a thug who thrusts a gun into my chest, that is fear; if he physically overpowers me and rifles my pockets for money, that is force. Force in this physical sense cannot reach the will directly, for physical action cannot touch the act of the will. We can continue to will the opposite, no matter how violently we are forced to do the act. Hence the act we are forced to do is involuntary, so long as we do not will it. Someone may have the physical strength to make us do something, but he cannot make us will it. The victim of force has no responsibility if he or she does not consent. If the victim consents reluctantly, then they have reduced responsibility because of the contrary wish. If a person actually wants to do what they are being forced to do and, for example, pretends to resist, they are responsible because they are no longer true victims of force.

(e) Habit:

When we think of habit, we generally define it as a constant way of acting, which has been obtained through repetition of the same act. Subsequently, the actions that follow in the footsteps of habit, become spontaneous and so automatic that deliberate guidance becomes unnecessary, resulting in a greater difficulty to overcome. Let us briefly discuss the three types of habit:

(i) Deliberately Acquired Habit
(ii) Voluntary Actions Known to be Habit-Forming
(iii) Unintentional Habit

(i) *Deliberately Acquired Habit* occurs when we try to learn how to do something for its own sake. Playing the piano or a game of some sort. The habit is directly voluntary, and the acts that follow are either directly voluntary or indirectly voluntary, depending on whether or not the action is performed with the intention of acquiring the habit, or if the subsequent actions are the unintended but foreseen consequences of the habit. This form of habit imposes full responsibility on the person for both the habit itself and the resulting actions.

(ii) *Voluntary Actions Known to be Habit-Forming*, such as smoking or the use of narcotics, ay not be intended for their own sake but still the individual. Since the consequences are known, and the decision to commit the action is freely willed, the person necessarily takes responsibility for the actions resulting from the habit they have acquired, even though these actions may be unintentional.

(iii) *Unintentional Habit* is when we acquire an action without realising that it was habit forming. This can be as simple as our morning routine, or as complex as using masturbation as a means of falling asleep at night. Because we have done something for such a long period of time, and have become comfortably dependent on doing things in a certain way, the action becomes habitual. The responsibility we acquire as a result of this kind of habit, is weighed against our level of ignorance of the habit. We may not analyse the fact that we always brush our teeth right after we comb our hair in the morning, or the fact that we may stir our coffee in a certain way. In these cases, we are not responsible for the habit or for the acts that unintentionally follow from it, so long as we remain ignorant of the habit. However, once we realise that we have a particular habit, we face the choice of either keeping the habit or trying to get rid of it. Regardless of the decision, a new act of the will is called for. If we decide to keep the habit, our possession of it automatically becomes directly voluntary and we accept full responsibility for it and the subsequent actions, even if they are indirectly voluntary. However, if we decide to kick the habit, we become the victim of two determined forces: (a) the will to get rid of the habit, and (b) the persistent nature of the habit itself. The willpower to get rid of a habit may require a lengthy period of time, and can often reappear in weak moments, despite the efforts taken to shake the habit. Vigilance and constant determination are essential tools when fighting against long standing habits.

4. Principle of Double Effect:

The world in which we live is a mixture of good and evil that affects each of us as we try to live an upright moral life. We seem to be caught on the horns of a dilemma: either human life cannot be lived as it actually is, or we are compelled to do evil and to do it voluntarily. Regardless of either of these statements, our human nature is such that even these remarks can never be drawn up so cut and dry. Since our nature grants us the power of reason, an endless mixture of action and reaction is made possible. The choices we make and the reasons we give for them, may not be completely good or completely bad, which means they must be somewhere in the huge grey middle. Interestingly enough, this is where we spend the majority of our moral lives; wandering merrily in the fuzzy, grey middle. Yet there is hope, and it comes in the form of the double effect principle. This principle has a long and dubious history, and can help resolve a good portion of the moral complexity we face in our lives.

There are two basic aspects to this principle. Firstly, that no evil must ever be directly willed simply for its own sake, either as end or as means, for if the evil were willed in either of these ways, it would be the direct object intended by our willing and would necessarily render our entire action as evil, even if there were good, morally correct consequences that ran from the act. Secondly, evil may be willed indirectly as a foreseen but unwanted consequence; an incidental and unavoidable by-product or side effect in the achievement of some good the person rightfully seeks. It is necessary to understand here that, although we are never allowed to will evil directly, we are not always bound to prevent the existence of evil. When we allow evil to exist as a side effect, the following conditions apply:

(a) The act to be done must be good in itself or least indifferent.
(b) The good intended must not be obtained by means of the evil effect.
(c) The evil effect must not be intended for itself but only permitted.
(d) There must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.

(All four conditions must be fulfilled. Violation of any one of them makes the evil a directly willed effect and not merely permitted as an incidental by-product).

We must realise that the principle of double effect does not do away with responsibility, but it does make it possible for a person to act in some conflict situations without incurring moral guilt or blame for the evil effect that is permitted.

Concluding Remarks

Throughout history, humans have engaged themselves in asking questions about the good life; we have also made judgements about what the right and the wrong things are to do. This is part and parcel of our collective human experience, the *fact* that we make judgements about right and wrong. It is from this fact of our human experience that *ethics* begins. The development of ethics throughout human history reveals our persistent effort to account for this facet of our lives, which is evident in the moral theory we have developed. Yet the questions persist and the dilemmas continue. Are we doing

what is morally correct? Will I get caught if I do this thing I know to be wrong? The ability to reason towards the good or convince ourselves that the evil we commit or permit is the best thing to do, then only to turn around and put ourselves into a tailspin re-examining what it is we have just done, is the drawback of being human. By our nature, therefore, we can never be fully satisfied with the results we achieve when confronted with ethical problems. The best we can do is act to the moral extent we are capable of, hoping that our choice continues to lead in the right direction. What *we must understand*, however, is that the responsibility for freely chosen actions is ours completely. We can never act and then disown those actions when they blow up in our face. The path to becoming an ethical and moral person is in the constant endeavour to be the best we can, while remaining fully prepared to wear the responsibility for what we do. Then, and only then, can we ever hope to go beyond our current ethical level to a greater one. So have your cake and eat it too, but when the time comes to burn off the calories, don't ask where they came from!

Endnotes

1. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I–II, q.1, a. 1.
2. Fagothey, *Right and Reason*, p. 53.

In the National Interest

Leading Seaman John M. Roach

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Introduction

The culture of the Canadian Forces has never been under such public scrutiny as it has been in recent time. Striking photographs vivid in colour from east Africa, home videos broadcast by national media sources and not least of all, the oft quoted testimony of a senior military leader denouncing subordinates lack of "moral fibre", have all contributed to a new focus on the Canadian military and its members.

Efforts are being made in every quarter to understand, define, admit and deny perceived or real problems with the military. By discussing openly for or against change, whether to the structure, practices, or philosophy presently held about the CF, Canadians are giving thought to renewed visions of military service in Canada.

Much of the examination with regard to the Canadian Forces relates to the question of ethics in the military, for it is ethics that forms the apex of professions and is the tool for tempering practitioners actions.

Ethics defined, as by the *Dictionary of Philosophy Terms*, is "that branch of philosophy concerned with the evaluation of human conduct."[1] The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* defines ethics as "the discipline dealing with what is good and bad, and with moral duty and obligation."[2] A third definition from the *Political Dictionary*, states that ethics is "the study of standards of conduct and moral judgement."[3] While all three definitions are substantively adequate in understanding what ethics is, it is the functional or normative ethic that provides development of theories which systematically organize appropriate actions towards what we are trying to achieve.

The primary purpose of this paper is to review a number of concepts which are to assist the understanding and promote the further development of a Canadian military code of ethics. These concepts are intended to assist in the discussion of ethics in practice and should not be overlooked in light of current agenda items such as leadership, policy and discipline.

Strategic Genesis

The genesis for any conceptual framework in which to construct a military code of ethics should begin with a clearly understood object or end to which the profession endeavours. The methods that are adopted and formalized of how to get there will breath life into its standardized beliefs and behaviours.

Karl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, wrote about armed conflict being an extension of politics carried out by other means in the arena of international politics. In the theoretical extreme, international actors could through reciprocal actions achieve absolute war, a state in which unbridled, wanton destruction is carried out. Realistically, the means for conducting military operations are limited. Limitation is caused by the "fog of war" but also by the magnanimity of the political objectives themselves. Success is achieved by maximizing resources in achieving political goals, without the use of force, or the threat of violence itself becoming self-defeating. The relevance of Clausewitz's tenants in a bi-polar international relation system are summarized by Phil Williams [1974], Department of Politics, University of Aberdeen in an article as such;

> *Where the use of military force carries enormous risks of escalation, it must be managed to an unprecedented degree. Thus the nuclear age is also the era of deliberately limited international violence. Limited war has become the norm. It is the only type of warfare which retains any utility. We might even describe it as Clausewitzian war par excellence since it demands strong civilian leadership, a careful tailoring of military means to well defined political ends and an ability to contain pressures for the intensification of the conflict. Limited war remains a continuation of policy by other means, but the calculations which go into both its initiation and conduct have to be more refined than ever before.*

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of limitation remains reasonably applicable to modern systems of international security such as peacekeeping and peacemaking. Therefore, when searching for agents on which to base a code of military ethics, limitation of violence should be a principle consideration.

The requirement of a modern military organization is simply not to prepare for the application of violence, but should be understood as a national instrument that relies on its ability to act in a reasonable fashion matching required force with state interests.

To be considered professionals engaged in the art of war, those that enter the service must feel a responsibility to exercise both the universal maxims of strategic thought and nationally defined means. Success in achieving political goals without the means itself becoming self-defeating requires a strong cognitive awareness of national policy, societal expectations and dedication of the individual to those expectations.

Institutional Considerations

The question of what relationship does the military have with other civil institutions in a democracy is thus proposed. Is the military in Canada an independent entity trying to act on its own accord? From observation we can safely answer no. As with most legitimate democratic regimes, legislation establishes and limits activities which the military can or can not engage in. But legislation is not the only limiting factor in the behaviour of the military.

At the very core of military service is the inescapable fact that there is the possibility of giving up one's own life, often described as the "ultimate liability". But equally important is its reciprocal, *the possibility of deliberately taking of life for the state in pursuit of its political*

objectives. This fact constitutes a qualitative difference in the military's role as a civic institution and expectations of the service member.

> *Given the role of the soldier, it is clear that some code of values is necessary to give a human and humane dimension to the soldier's awesome task and responsibilities … Without ethics the military practitioner becomes a value-free technician who applies his skills in a moral vacuum simply because they were ordered by the state.*[4]

Both objective (external influences, i.e., legislation, regulation) and subjective (internal influences i.e., values, ethics, morals) play crucial roles in the dynamics of the military organization. Sources of influence on the military can not be sacrificed or be allowed to dominate at the cost of the other. The inherent danger of allowing only external influences to guide martial activities, is a loss of internalized moral direction in military service. Service members devoid of an internalized appreciation for the work that they perform merely serve another bureaucratic artery of the government. Operations that are conducted will rely on highly disciplined troops, controlled by an officer corps guided by ethics of character rather than an integrated entity striving for mission accomplishment.

> *An institution that has become merely another entrepreneurial bureaucracy is characterized by the following traits: (1) the organization professes an external code of ethics that is contradicted by internal practices; (2) internal practices encourage, abet, and conceal violations of the external code; (3) prospective "whistle-blowers" are intimidated into silence; (4) the few courageous outspoken men [sic] have to be protected from organizational retaliation; (5) collective guilt finds expression in the rationalization of internal practices and (6) those whose role it is to reveal corruption rarely act, and when forced to do so by external pressures, they excuse an incident as an isolated rare occurrence.*[5]

Stakeholders in Canadian military affairs can not help but to feel ill at ease if they recognize some of these traits demonstrated in our living history.

In stating the obvious, military service in Canada is voluntary. There are no mandatory requirements for Canadians to serve in the military to gain civil privileges such as voters rights. Nor is there special social status that places members of the military above the laws of Canada or in control of other Canadians. In fact, by definition, *members of the CF are mercenaries*, in that they are *hired* soldiers, sailors and air personnel. Thus, the greater the imperative for having a clear vision of a normative national military ethic, least military service in Canada become an occupation in which its members are focused on careerism.

Once careerism has besieged a military force its cancerous infection is displayed by the rites of hazing or initiation, rank is equated to employee compensation in terms of status and privilege, discipline is required from the top down, while parades and ceremonies only serve to act as reminders that employees are so-called military members.

Past Approaches

In *Toward a Normative Code for the Military*, Yedidiah Groll-Ya'ari, a senior staff officer with the Israeli Defence Force (Navy),

presents a typology of two classical approaches to military ethics intended to influence the legal use of force, by legally established armed forces. The first approach is preventative or the "Moral Approach" and second is the constructive or "Functional Approach."[6] The moral approach seeks to preserve the ability to draw lines of permissibility and legitimacy, while the functional approach stresses professionalism as the ultimate value of soldiery.[7] "The practical range of our perceptions of military ethics presumably lies between these two extremes. Beyond these extremes, the very notion of the citizen-soldier in a democracy is in danger of becoming a case of either/or," states Groll-Ya'ari.

The thrust of the moral approach lies in the process of weighing the constraints of war conventions and international law against military necessity in achieving objectives.

> *The inner structure of the military, with its ethical imperatives, are relevant only to the extent that they produce results on the battlefield that are in accord with the external criterion of the war convention … moral demands are either external to the military or imposed on the "citizen" part of the democratic citizen-soldier.*[8]

Military service in this ethical context is simply instrumental.

The functionalist approach is based upon social-military relations and is characterized by central values of leadership and obedience, subordination of the armed forces to legal civilian authority, officer accomplishment based on successful execution of missions and finally, enlisted personnel are treated as human resources since, in justifying the right of the officer's corp to issue orders, there is a duty to obey.[9]

Groll-Ya'ari maintains that a merger of the two approaches into a modern context is possible in light of the "new military environment." The idea of a new military environment considers the operation of four basic elements; 1) the multi-dimensional battlefield; 2) the increase in weapon systems technological architecture; 3) growing responsibilities and accountability of the ranks, and 4) the maturing sense of the individual's rights in the armed forces of democracies.[10]

In achieving political objectives by other means, mission fulfillment is now accomplished by the synthesis of joint C4I (command, control, communication, computers and intelligence), which blurs traditional strategic distinctions of Army, Navy and Air Force. Technology is also redefining the relationship between officers and the ranks. Operation of technologically advanced weapons systems require skills, expertise and knowledge by operators whose competency not only affects their own direct survival but indirect survival of others. Controlled application of force is no longer a division of labour but is a merger in overall mission accomplishment.

Also mentioned by Groll-Ya'ari, is the fact that, "by making military operators responsible for obeying unlawful orders, we tacitly grant them the prerogative to judge their superior's orders and to override them in given instances." A lesson that is drawn from the application of international law regarding war crimes.

The growing sense of an individual rights in the military is a condition of politico-

socialization processes potential military candidates have undergone living in a democratic society prior to entering military service. Greater social-self awareness, greater literacy and greater mass media accessibility are effects of modern existence on the service member. Social conditioning prior to military service is rendering traditional concepts of leadership, obedience and duty void, while causing cries of "civilianization" of the institution by military traditionalists.

Conclusion

If the CF and DND are to incorporate ethical values and obligations into everyday activities and operations, the suggestion made here is that a shift in understanding the military's role and structure has to permeate our collective consciousness. Infusion of a military professionalism begins with each individuals motivation towards the type of activities preformed at all levels that ultimately support Canadian domestic and international policies. In a general sense it is similar to a calling a person may have to other professions such as medicine, law or science. Service then is reflective of a commitment to the field of military science, rather than government employment based on regional social or economic considerations.

It must be appreciated that historically in international intercourse — from the potential threat, right through to the actual use — violence is a norm and will continue to be. What ennobles democratic states in ethical military action is the ability to artfully control the level of physical persuasion used in achieving political objectives of national interest whether it is sovereignty protection or regional and global security.

As a civil institute, the institution of the military must be understood as qualitatively different from other bureaucracies due to the nature of work that is preformed. With a well-defined normative code of ethics used as an anchor of Canadian military professionalism, there should be no cognitive dissonance for any Canadian service member about being a warrior, peacekeeper or peacemaker.

In managing the military to accomplish its missions, both objective and subjective influences must be incorporated into a code to guide the service member in how they *ought* to carry out their work. A mature code of ethics that will moderate modern democratic military forces is no longer based on virtues of character enforced by autocratic leadership of the officer corps. Attention must be given to the fact that the rank and file, with their expanded responsibilities, technological knowledge and social-self conscious in the "new military environment", are capable of professionalism in the roles they play in carrying out missions.

At the end of the day in successfully carrying out missions, a qualitatively different type of work is performed which requires an internal temperance by all ranks, in all roles. The ethical rule of thumb in operations and daily activities is very similar to that of the *Globe & Mail* test; if actions do not support or contribute to the overall success of the mission, it is not in the national interest.

Endnotes

1. *Dictionary of Philosophy Terms*, http://www.newberry.edu/acad/phil/index.htm
2. *Merriam Webster Dictionary*, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/netdict

3. *Political Dictionary*, htt;://www.fast-times.com/policitical.html
4. Gabriel, R.A. *To Serve With Honor*, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 24.
5. *Ibid*, p. 70
6. Groll-Yar'ari, Yedidah, "Toward a Normative Code for the Military", *Armed forces and Society*, Spring 1994, v20, n3, pp. 457–472.
7. Groll-Ya'ari derives the basis of the Functional Approach from Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1957) and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, (New York: Free Press, 1971) from a common organizational perspective.
8. Groll-Yar'ari, p. 465
9. *Ibid*, p. 463.
10. *Ibid*, p. 468.

Military Ethics: An Oxymoron?

Lieutenant Commander I.C.D. Moffat

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Introduction

Many people not associated with the Military, and even some who are, do not view soldiers or, for that matter, any military people, as engaged in moral or ethical work. The mass media are quick to publicize every act committed by military people which is wrong either morally or legally. This ingrains into the public mind that the Military is immoral or at best unethical. From the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, to scandals of generals using aircraft for their own personal endeavours, to kick-backs for defence contracts; all are trumpeted as evidence of a decadent organization. The most recent scandals of Canadian soldiers killing Somalis or abusing mental patients in Bosnia-Herzegovina followed by allegations of cover-up by senior officers fortifies the view of a lack of ethics in the Military. However, what the mass media fails to publicize, and what is a fact of all organizations, is that an organization is made up of people who, for the most part, are ethical and therefore moral creatures. Moreover, the Military, by the nature of its business, is probably more ethical than other organizations in the nation. For every scandal publicized by the media there are hundreds of acts done by the Military which bring credit to the individuals performing them and to the organization to which they belong. The Somalis praised the Canadian soldiers for the peace they brought to the area and the reconstruction of schools and wells. For every general who misuses his authority, there are hundreds who carry out their duties in exemplary fashion. However, doing one's job and doing it well is not something that is publicized but rather it is what is expected. It is especially expected by society of the people and organizations it employs such as the Military.

A moral or "good" person has ethics or principles which he or she lives by. These principles are a part of a person's character and are a major part of a persons personality. They dictate how a person will act in situations in which a choice of actions can be made. Ethics are learned and may evolve over time, but they are ingrained in a person's character and, once learned, do not fundamentally change without a major catalyst. Ethics may be influenced by the environment or by the companions one has, since ethics are

both personal and community based. Regardless, ethics are a major part of the psyche of an individual. Ethics are also part of a community, particularly of a community made up of like minded people such as a profession. Therefore a person has ethics and an organization may also have ethics. For this reason the term "Military Ethics" is appropriate for the Armed Forces as the terms Medical Ethics and Legal Ethics are related to the Medical and Legal professions. But what exactly are "ethics"?

In this paper I will endeavour to show objectively what ethics are. I will also attempt to show what Military Ethics are and how they differ from the ethics of the community at large, if they actually do differ. It is my belief that Military Ethics are more stringent than the ethics found in the community at large and that individuals in the Military are more ethical than the average person in the general population.

Definition

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ethics as: "…1. relating to morals, treating of moral questions; morally correct, honourable;… 2. set of principles of morals; science of morals; moral principles; rules of conduct, whole field of moral science."[1] The word is taken from the Greek "Ethos" meaning nature or disposition and, in English, has come to mean a characteristic spirit and belief of the community. Father Murray Farwell in his panel discussion during the conference on "Ethics in Defence" defined ethics as " … moral principles of rules of conduct, actions or omissions performed with reason and freedom."[2] This gives a general definition of ethics, but the term Military Ethics has a deeper and more profound commitment in its meaning. Nevertheless, a Military is made up of people and reflects the morals of its members.

The basic problem for an organization to be responsible and ethical is to have people in the organization who are responsible and ethical. An organization cannot be ethical unless the people in that organization are ethical.

The Ethical Person

Plato, in *The Republic*, argued the requirements for the perfect political body and what the make up of this entity would be. In so doing he defined the "Just Man" as:

> *And in truth, justice, as it appears, is something of this kind. But it does not concern a man's management of his external affairs, but his internal management of his soul, his truest self and his truest possessions. The man does not allow the different principles within him to do other work than their own, nor the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with one another; but in the truest sense he sets his house in order, gaining the mastery over himself; and becoming on good terms with himself through discipline, he joins in harmony those different elements, like three terms in a musical scale — lowest and highest and intermediate and any others that lie between those — and binding together all these elements he moulds the many within him into one, temperate and harmonious. In this spirit he lives; whether he is money-making or attending to the wants of his body, whether he is engaged in politics or on business transactions of his own, throughout he considers and calls just and beautiful all conduct which pursues and helps to create this attitude of mind. The knowledge which superintends these actions is for him wisdom, while any conduct which tends to destroy this attitude is for him unjust, and the belief which inspires it ignorance.*[3]

From the Just Person, as described by Plato, one can find the Ethical Person.

The Ethical Person, therefore, must be a good person. The question is; why be a good person? Aristotle, in his book on Ethics, begins his argument by saying virtue is its own reward. That is, a virtuous life is essentially a pleasant life.

> *Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular virtue, our definition is in agreement; for "activity in conformity with virtue" involves virtue. But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the supreme good to depend on possessing virtue or displaying it — on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess a disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative — it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions — since it is among these that the winners are found — so it is those who* act *rightly who carry off the prizes and good things in life.*
>
> *And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as "fond of" so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theatre, and similarly just actions are pleasure to the lover of justice, and acts conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue. But whereas the mass of mankind take pleasure in things that conflict with one another, because they are not pleasant of their own nature, things pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble, and so always are actions in conformity with virtue, so they are pleasant essentially as well as pleasant to lovers of the noble.*[4]

In short, Aristotle says that virtuous acts are good in themselves. Therefore they give pleasure by their very existence and the good person experiences pleasure by the very act of doing good and being good. This is also the basis for Christian and, for that matter, Jewish and Islamic philosophy.

The idea of what is good and virtuous becomes ingrained at an early age and thus the practice of doing what is right becomes pleasurable since it does not impart guilt. Guilt for doing wrong then becomes the penalty and makes one unhappy.

Aristotle explains that ethical virtue is acquired by habit and in fact the Greek word for habit is a derivative of *ethos*. His philosophy then maintains that man is inherently good and acquires his virtue or ethics by repetition, making it, therefore, a human habit or trait.

Aristotle then has the following to say about the happy man:

> *The happy man therefore will possess the element of stability in question, and will remain happy all his life; since he will be always or at least most often employed in doing and contemplating the things that are in conformity with virtue. And he will bear changes of fortunes most nobly,*

and with perfect propriety in every way, being as he is "good in very truth" and "four-square without reproach."[5]

Thus the good or virtuous man will be a happy individual; and since the ethical person is one who does the right or good thing, the ethical person will be a happy person. This is the logic of Aristotle's philosophy.

However, a person does not inherently know what is good and virtuous, but rather must be taught. This instruction starts at birth from one's parents, and continues and is augmented by the society one lives in. Aristotle believes this part of virtue is the intellectual portion and increases from experience and time. The ethical portion of virtue is that acquired by habit and the two form the whole of a good person. Nevertheless, the basis for the ethical philosophy is that man has the potential to be good or virtuous by nature and increases his virtue through habit and experience.

Aristotle argues his philosophy as follows:

Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit (ethos), and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word. And therefore it is clear that none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered by habit. …. The virtues therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit. Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first in potential form; we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. This is clearly so with our senses: we did not acquire the faculty of sight or hearing by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly listening, but the other way about — because we had the senses we began to use them, we did not get them by using them. The virtues on the other hand we acquire by first having actually practiced them, just as we do the arts.[6]

Since man has a natural tendency to be good or virtuous[7], then any group of people will have a tendency to be good overall. This ancient view of man having a tendency to be good is echoed by some scholars in today's modern society.

James Rest, a professor of Educational Psychology, supports Lawrence Kohlberg's work in the study of Moral Psychology. Dr. Kohlberg supported the Aristotlean view that morality comes from the individual who determines what is right and wrong. "The individual interprets situations, derives psychological and moral meaning from social events and makes moral judgements."[8] Kohlberg's theory and research were based on work done in the 1930s by Jean Piaget.

The idea that the group will reflect the morality and ethics of the people who are part of the organization is supported by Dr. Richard De George. In his lecture to the United States Air Force Academy in 1991, he stated that "morality was a seamless fabric that binds all human beings" and that one cannot have a different morality in private life from that in business or military occupations.[9] In this way the Military, as an organization made up of normal people drawn from the society of which it is a part, will be a good or ethical organization.

This is the argument that the Military, as a part of society, will tend to be ethical, reflecting the morals of the majority of the people within it and of the society of which it is a part. The next step in the argument then, is to show the dilemma and the resolution in ethics of a "good" organization which has to deal with ethical or moral choices that are normally considered unethical in the larger society — for example, killing other people. However, first we must deal with the question of whether having a Military is ethical for society as a whole.

The Ethics of Maintaining the Military

There are some in society who maintain that the existence and use of a Military is unethical. Those who truly believe this are usually fervent passivists who believe any use of violence is immoral and thus unethical. They firmly believe that violence only begets violence and the only moral answer to violence is love as a moral persuader. Unfortunately for mankind, this is not the view or practice of the majority of individuals or societies. Saints are few and, for the most part, dead. However, the majority of societies believe a Military is necessary. This need is for the overall protection of the society to which the Military are a part of. Fotion and Elfstrom argue:

> *…that most people must have a strong preference to live and that they therefore have a strong preference for the means necessary for life, such as food and shelter, and, further, they have the preferences for the secure enjoyment of their lives. They do not want to live in fear of their lives or in fear of being prevented from living as they wish. We will assume that they assign a strong weight to these preferences, stronger than to other preferences they may have. As a general rule, then, actions that support the lives and security of people are morally good while those which undermine or destroy are morally bad. Harm is to be measured in terms of damage to people's lives and security, while benefit is to be measured in terms of support for these things.*[10]

They go on to say:

> *Of all the possible justifications for maintaining a standing army, the most fundamental, and the most readily understood as containing important benefits for particular individuals, is the argument for security. It is most basic because it refers to the very lives, freedom from attack, and access to the means of life of a people. If military forces are to be justified at all, it must ultimately be in terms of the security they provide.*[11]

Based on need — the protection of society — the existence of a Military is therefore ethical. This can be supported by statements put forth by Elizabeth Anscombe in her paper *War and Murder* and quoted by Manuel Davenport in his paper *Ethics and the Military Organization*.

Ms. Anscombe stated that certain necessary human values require the existence of a stable and secure society which cannot be maintained unless some organization or agency of society is authorized to restrain those elements which would disrupt that society. Moreover, the authorized organization must be allowed to use violence, if necessary, to carry out authorized restraint because there are those who will not cease their anti-social behaviour unless forcibly subdued, incarcerated or killed.[12] Based on these two arguments, it is ethical to have a military organization.

A democratic society gives to the Military the exclusive right to use massive force for the protection of and to achieve the aims of that society. This exclusive right places a heavy obligation on the Military to use this force only when society deems it necessary and only after the Military has been given a lawful order by the civilian institutions placed over it to unleash its controlled might. This obligation carries responsibilities that must be maintained by the Military for the Military to retain the respect and support of the society it is part of.

Like other professions, the Military has responsibilities to its clients and to itself. In the case of the Military, the client is the public or citizens of the country that they are a part of. According to Manuel Davenport, their paramount duty is to promote the safety and welfare of the general public, which means humanity. Their next duty is to serve their clients with all their skill and knowledge available to them. The last priority of responsibilities is their duty to themselves, that is the organization to which they belong.[13] These are the responsibilities of a Military and thus the responsibilities of the people who make up the Military. This view was echoed by Admiral Noel Gaylor of the United States Navy who, in 1983 during a lecture to the United States Air Force Academy, said:

> *We must be effective in the service of the United States and its allies or we have failed to do our duty. We must be humane or we will have failed humanity. How do we reconcile these demands? The only possible way to reconcile them is through* alert professionalism.[14]

By this statement he acknowledged that the Military has a duty beyond merely getting the assigned job done or achieving the aim by any means required. Alert professionalism requires ethical practices. Colonel Paul Viotti considered the defining characteristic of a professional soldier, and therefore by extension, the professional military person, to be the merging of competency and moral responsibility.[15] However, it is not just a modern notion that being ethical is important for a Military. Marshal Maurice de Saxe in his *Reveries on the Art of War* urged that troops enlisted for a fixed term must have their contract honoured. He wrote in his first chapter of his book on tactics:

> *When recruits are raised by enlistment it is unjust and inhuman not to observe the engagement. These men were free when they contracted the enlistment which binds them, and it is against all laws, human or divine, not to keep the promises made to them. What happens when promises are broken? The men desert. Can one, with justice, proceed against them? The good faith upon which the conditions of enlistment were founded has been violated.*[16]

He also considered the recruitment by fraud to be an "odious practice". So it can be seen that ethics were still considered important for military commanders as early as 1732 when De Saxe was writing. De Saxe also believed harsh punishment was required for looters, but he does not elaborate whether this was to punish for disobeying orders or for stealing from non-combatants. Nevertheless, De Saxe's book reveals that ethics has been a concern of the Military for centuries, although what has been considered ethical practice has evolved over the years.

Military Ethics and the Ethical Military

Since having a Military is an ethical decision by a society and, despite the views of the ardent pacifist, the controlled use of violence for the protection of society is ethical, the Military must use their powers in an ethical manner. However, there is a view, held by many, that the ethics of an organization differ from the ethics and morals of an individual. If an organization is made up of ethical people why are organizational ethics needed and for that matter what are they? What are Military Ethics and why have them?

Military Ethics, as any organizational ethics, are a code of principles for acting in various circumstances. The code or codes of ethics will have, as a basis, the morals and ethics that prevail in the society in which the organization — in this case the Military — is part of. The idea is to have a given criteria on which to act in situations when there is no time in which to do critical thinking about the situation, or the circumstances surrounding a given emergency. A code of ethics saves time by keeping the military person from having to think through what he is supposed to do on every occasion when faced with a problem. Without some code of ethics, the military person would be forced to conduct critical thinking every time a problem was confronted and would become paralysed into inaction.[17] This is Military Ethics — a code of behaviour.

An important reason for having a code of Military Ethics is the nature of how a Military operates. Unlike other professions, the Military operates like a radio-controlled robot. The individual giving the direction or orders is often remote from the individual or unit carrying out the order. In other professions, the responsible person is the operator, such as the surgeon doing an operation or the dentist filling a tooth. In the Military, the general issuing the order to capture a town is remote from the battle where the tank and infantry regiments are actually firing weapons and coming face-to-face with both the enemy soldier and the civilian non-combatant. For this reason it is even more important for the Military to have a code of ethics than it is for other professions.[18] Moreover, military codes of ethics are directly concerned with life and death issues for large numbers of people and thus have a direct impact on society as a whole and not just the Military as an organization.

Some people believe that ethics are situational and therefore change as the situation changes. This philosophy is often seen as applicable to organizations and therefore would present itself in an organization where situations often arise that pose an ethical dilemma. This could easily be the case for the Military, but it is the wrong attitude to have for an organization that has the task of using force to achieve its assigned task from society. The philosophy of situational ethics, to my mind, is incorrect. It presents itself as an excuse for not doing the right thing or as a salve to the conscience for having done something unethical because it was easier at the time than doing the right thing.

However, Dr. Gilles Pacquet, in his address to the Canadian Forces Symposium on Ethics, proposed a middle ground between Situational Ethics and what he calls the absolutist ethics as professed by Blaise Pascal. Dr. Pacquet does not believe that universal ethical codes can answer all the ethical dilemmas faced by a hierarchial organization such as the Military. In his words

"non-trivial ethical issues involve rivalrous goods and evils and dilemmas that are insoluable, undecidable by rational reflection."[19] The term "Connoisseurship" is used to depict an ethical philosophy between the absolutist of Pascal and the value relativism of situational ethics. Dr. Pacquet explains that this Connoisseurship must be learned and developed over time from the experience of various situations.

Although Dr. Pacquet views this method of ethical development as a process of learning from experience and is designed to develop ethical actions on the part of people in positions of responsibility, such as officers in the Military, it does not depart from the basic idea of Aristotle and Pascal. His Connoisseurship in fact is very close to what has been accepted as individual ethical behaviour and therefore is not akin to Situational Ethics. He sees Connoisseurship as a development of ethical actions in senior leaders, but to do this the person must first be ethical and virtuous in the sense that Aristotle meant. To develop ethics you must practice and make a habit of being ethical. The basis of ethical practice is that the individual tends toward what is good and has the desire to be good. For the Military, the development of ethical action is a continuous process throughout an individual's career. As more experience is acquired and more responsibility is bestowed upon the military person with progress through the ranks, the ethical decisions will be natural since they have become habitual through life. When a mistake is made by the individual, he will still make the ethical decision and take responsibility for his actions. By doing this continuously and by the majority of the people making up the organization, that is the Military, then the organization as a whole remains ethical.

This can be illustrated by referring back to Davenport's hierarchy of responsibility. The Military must be responsible first to humanity as a whole, then to the society which gives them their mandate and lastly is responsible to themselves as an organization only after they have fulfilled their previous two responsibilities. Where the responsibilities come into conflict the ethical answer is to follow the hierarchy. Thus, if a mistake is made by the Military then the responsibility to society to make the mistake known and have it corrected takes precedence over the protection of the good image and reputation of the Military. This is why it is the responsibility of a soldier's own Military to hold him accountable for War Crimes which he may commit, rather than the opponent to conduct the trial. This is part of the ethics of being responsible to humanity as a whole before being responsible to the society which gives the mandate.

From this example it can be seen that, unlike other organizations, Military Ethics requires a more stringent adherence to principles. Medical ethics and legal ethics do not require the organization to place the good of humanity or society above the individual or the client. In fact, legal ethics requires that a solicitor do whatever he can for his client even to the detriment of society as a whole; i.e., giving a criminal such a good defence that he is acquitted even though he is guilty of the offence for which he was charged.

Thus the moral responsibility to protect humanity to the best of its ability while carrying out its mandate of preserving the safety of the individual — that is the citizen of the society which gives the mandate — requires the Military to act ethically in all it does. Then the first principle by which a

Military in a democratic society must abide is that the Military is subject to the controls and orders of the civilian population. For the vast majority of times this means that the Military must act in accordance to the direction of the duly elected civilian government. However, this does not mean to act blindly. Even elected governments may demand unethical behaviour in order to preserve themselves from embarrassment or political attack. In this case, the Military must still act ethically towards the population as a whole and not just the government of the day. If this means that senior military officers must resign to avoid carrying out the order, they must do so and must do so as publicly as possible to preserve the responsibility to society as a whole. This is line with the hierarchy of responsibilities. In this case, the government is self-serving and must fall into the third area of military responsibility described by Davenport, that is the responsibility to itself. The responsibility to society takes precedence over responsibility to the government of the day.

In many cases for the Military, achieving the goal, that is to win the war requires ethical decisions to be made. The means of achieving the goal can present ethical dilemmas to the individual and the Military as an entity. Going to war is an ethical dilemma in itself. However, once a democratic society decides that war is the only means to achieve the moral goal, that is participating in a "just war" and winning, then the means to win becomes moral. In the words of Colonel Kenneth Walker, a former professor of Philosophy at the US Air force Academy:

> *If the war is to attain such an important moral end, then it becomes morally important as a means to that end that we in fact win the war — not necessarily in the sense of militarily crushing the enemy, but rather in the sense of achieving the moral end for which the war is fought.*
>
> *Militarily necessity, simply put, is that which is necessary or useful for attaining the moral end for which the war is fought. And because it is the means to a moral end, it becomes morally important.*[20]

From this, Colonel Walker is forcing an ethical dilemma on the Military. If winning a just war is a moral responsibility and the means of achieving this goal are military necessities then ethical dilemmas in achieving the great moral goal will occur continuously. To be sure that the Military acts ethically in its actions, it must have and practice a code of ethics.

In actions against a nation's enemies in war, the Military still must act ethically while doing the utmost to carry out the mandate given by society. Dr. De George in his address on Ethical Behaviour, noted that integrity was basic to being moral. He stated:

> *In all cases integrity is at the core of what it means to be a moral being. Acting with integrity means both acting in accord with one's highest self-accepted norms and imposing on oneself the norms demanded by ethics and morality. Although integrity requires that norms be self-imposed and self-accepted, they cannot be arbitrary. The norms must be justifiable, proper, and integral to the self-imposed process of forming a whole with a set of positive values.*[21]

Thus a person and therefore an organization must follow ethical and moral principles at all

times in order to maintain integrity. For the military, this is paramount in order to retain its legitimacy in the society it is part of. Colonel Paul Viotti stated the moral dilemma of the commander as follows:

> *Not only is the combat commander committed to accomplishing legitimate military objectives (a moral obligation in itself), but he is also responsible for minimizing loss of life of those under his command and for avoiding unnecessary death and destruction to civilian populations on either side. In addition, the commander has responsibilities towards the enemy on the battlefield, both in terms of the means he employs in combat and in his treatment of those he captures. Thus the commander's moral obligation to accomplish legitimate military objectives — the mission — is constrained by these often competing moral responsibilities.*[22]

Colonel Viotti acknowledged the moral challenge to a commander which must be faced and resolved. Dr. De George, in his lecture, suggested a number of ways to meet this moral challenge.

Dr. De George listed ten principles which he considered a means to combatting unethical opponents. Not all ten are directly applicable to the individual but all can be applied to the Military as an institution. Although his principles can form a basic code of ethical behaviour many are not new or novel. They are principles that are basic to morality. These principles are not an absolute but they could form a basis or be one of a set of codes of ethics. Some principles have been codified in the Geneva and Hague conventions for the conduct of war, while others are basic to human existence. Nevertheless, the Military needs guidelines in order to judge themselves and their actions as ethical or not and they need the guidelines so the actions taken in critical and time pressured situations will be the right decision automatically.

De George's first principle shows the maintenance of integrity. It states that "In responding to unethical activity do not violate the very norms and values that you seek to preserve and in terms of which you judge the adversary's actions unethical."[23] Colonel Walker reflected Dr. De George when he said "If we are prepared to put morality aside in favour of the practical in one situation, then we will be prepared to set it aside for the practical in other situations."[24] This is basic since a person or an organization cannot be ethical if it uses unethical means to achieve its aims. In this case the Military cannot use unethical means to defeat or attack an opponent even if that opponent uses unethical means to attack you. It would have been wrong for the allies to hold Iraqi civilians as hostages in retaliation to Saddam Hussein's action of keeping foreign nationals in Iraq during the Gulf War. If unethical means are used to meet unethical actions then the first step has been taken to becoming an unethical organization or individual. This does not mean that when attacked by unethical enemies using unethical means, the ethical Military must retreat and accept defeat. What it requires is for the ethical commander to use his imagination. In fact De George makes this his second principle — respond to the unethical opponent by using moral imagination.[25] This means the commander, or for that matter any military person, faced with unethical attacks must use his or her imagination to meet these actions with an ethical response. The opponents of Marcos in the Philippines used passive resistance to

fight the troops sent out to oppose them. The troops were won over when women, in the crowds of demonstrators for democracy, placed flowers down the barrels of the rifles of the soldiers. This passive and peaceful resistance won over the troops and they eventually joined their countrymen to peacefully remove the unethical Marcos from power. This method would not work in the heat of battle but it is an imaginative reaction to unethical actions and shows what going outside the normal channels of thought to come up with an effective response to unethical attacks means.

The next two principles put forth by Dr. De George are actually legally binding as well as ethically and morally right. The first principle requires that any force used must be the minimum required to achieve the aim and the next principle requires the use of proportionality of force. That is any force employed must be proportional to the attack suffered and to the good to be achieved.[26] This does not mean that massed artillery can't be used against a town held by an enemy, but it does mean that all factors must be taken into account when preparing the plan and the means to be used. If an artillery barrage is required it may be unethical to continue the barrage until every structure is levelled and every enemy soldier is dead. Proportionality and minimum force to achieve the aim are ethical and legal requirements in any use of force. Many would argue that proportionality is an abstract which is only determined after the fact. However, proportionality must be part of the ethical thinking of the Military as an organization since it must be considered in plans and orders. It would be unethical to issue orders to level every structure in an enemy town before the attack. The result may actually be that after the battle, but to have it as part of the operational order would be unethical unless there was a valid military objective that the destruction would achieve.

Dr. De George's next three ethical principles apply mostly to an organization but do have some application to the individual. His fifth principle suggests that when responding to unethical foes an individual or organization use "ethical displacement". De George points out that moral dilemmas are situations where none of the choices are morally acceptable.[27] In this situation the decision may have to be "kicked upstairs". This method of addressing a moral or ethical problem is not intuitive but requires thought and diagnosis. For this reason it is not a principle that would be used immediately but can be used where there is some time to seek guidance or assistance from higher authority.

The ethical dilemma for the commander of United Nations forces in Srebrenica in Bosnia was terrible for an individual commander and needed assistance from higher authority. He was surrounded and cut off from supplies by the Bosnian Serbs and was ordered to leave by them. He was pledged to protect the Muslims in the town by the United Nations but was given no support. If he left he was certain that the Muslims would be killed by the Serbs despite their reassurances. If he stayed his own troops may have been killed and would assuredly have been starved while at the same time he had no means to protect the Muslims in the town. By staying he would not have been able to save the Muslims and may have condemned his troops to death. By leaving he was certain the Muslims would be killed. This dilemma had no correct choice and whichever choice was made would have ethical consequences for all concerned. As a commander he owed his troops

protection and leadership and he owed his superiors and the United Nations the professionalism to accomplish the mission of protecting the Muslims. As history shows the decision was made not by the commander on site but by the United Nations higher authority to abandon Srebrenica to the Serbs. The troops were saved but the Muslims were killed. The ethical dilemma was resolved at a higher level, albeit with disastrous results, but the individual commander was relieved of the ethical decision. It would have been better for the higher authority to use force to accomplish the mission but the unethical decision to abandon the town was made corporately and not as an individual.

The example Dr. De George uses is from the business world. He describes the scandal of bribery in international trade and points out that a single business could not change the practice and so the next level was government. The United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Business law that was able to stop the practice by American companies.[28] They also used the next principle De George proposes and that is to "use publicity to underscore immoral actions."[29] Using publicity in a democratic society ensures that unethical behaviour will be heaped with opprobrium. This can ensure that individuals will have their actions changed while with Military opponents the publicity may gain allies or cause the enemy to lose support internationally.

The seventh principle proposed is to "seek joint action … and work for the creation of new social, legal or popular institutional structures."[30] This means that the ethical person and organization must work to change established thinking and institutions so that ethical behaviour becomes the norm. For an Ethical Military, lines of communication direct to an Inspector General should be established so that institutionalized unethical behaviour can be investigated and corrected by independent bodies. An Ethical Military must have an independent watch dog to protect the Military from itself and maintain the reputation of the Military to the society it serves.

Dr. De George's last three principles apply to individuals but if practiced by individual military personnel, will make the overall Military an ethical organization. The principles are to "act with moral courage when responding to unethical activity", "when responding ethically to an unethical opponent be prepared to pay a price, sometimes a high price" and "in responding to unethical activity, apply the principle of accountability."[31]

Acting with "moral courage" in the military could mean disobeying an illegal order or going over the head of immediate superiors to reveal unethical behaviour. However, this type of action requires moral courage and leads to the next principle of being prepared to pay a price. Courts martial could ruin a career and a dishonourable discharge could ruin a life. Nevertheless, ethical behaviour ultimately allows the individual and the organization to live with himself and itself. Therefore acting with moral courage and being prepared to accept the consequences of the action must be a fundamental aspect of the person and of the Military.

The last principle requiring the application of accountability means that everyone is responsible for his actions. In a Military, this requires that the organization must accept the responsibility and be accountable for the

actions of its members. This principle means enforcing the Laws of War on one's own troops as well as the enemy. It means making public the wrong doings of individuals so that justice is seen to be done. In this way the integrity of the Military is maintained with the society which it serves and to humanity as a whole.

De George's principles are not the only code that will make a Military ethical but they are an example and parts of them should be found in any ethical code of any organization, particularly one that is licensed by society to manage violence. The code is the basis for Military Ethics and Military Ethics ensure an ethical Military.

Conclusion

An organization, to be ethical, must be made up of ethical people. Aristotlean philosophy contends that man is, by nature, basically an ethical and moral being. Therefore a Military made up of basically ethically people will be an ethical organization. Nevertheless, as an organization, the Military is faced with ethical dilemmas in carrying out its mandate from society. It has a duty to humanity followed by a duty to the society it serves and finally a duty to itself. These hierarchial duties can come into conflict when the Military is carrying out its duties. To resolve these conflicts a code of behaviour is needed so that the dilemmas will be resolved in an ethical manner. The title of this paper asks the question whether Military Ethics is an oxymoron; however, the evidence presented shows that Military Ethics exist and are required for the Military to carry out its mandate. The standard of behaviour required of the Military is higher than for an individual and is in fact higher than required for other organizations because society gives the Military the task of using violence to protect that society. Therefore, for this reason, the answer to the question of the title must be a resounding *no*!

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A Descriptive Framework for Loyalty: Introducing Insight and Functionality

Major Marek Wakulczyk

A Descriptive Framework for Loyalty: Introducing Insight and Functionality

Major Marek Wakulczyk

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Introductory Material

Background

It has long been accepted that an organization will only maximize its effectiveness if its members are loyal to the same ideology. The debate continues, however, over exactly *what* such a loyalty is. Some traditional thinkers contend that loyalty is a one-dimensional absolute that forms a bond between two elements, whether individual or philosophical. This opinion, and its strong influence, have unfortunately limited discussion in literature on *how* leaders can deal with the reality that loyalties are more often multi-facetted, if not conflicting. As a result, there is a shortage of models or tools offering help.

Given the limited tools, the leader at the centre of competing-loyalties situations has undue difficulty making the best ethical decision.

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework that provides insight into the question of competing loyalties. The featured model increases understanding of the fact that loyalty is multi-dimensional, and is a tool to bring targeted stakeholders to a "win/win" resolution.

Discussion

General

This discussion of the Descriptive Framework for Loyalty follows the following sequence:

- Refining an appreciation for the complexity of loyalty
- Providing detailed description of the Framework; and
- Communicating basic application of the principles.

Loyalty is Multi-Facetted

Do you remember the last time you heard someone described as "a disloyal employee"? If we push aside any injustice related to such a comment, we can question whether the use of the word loyalty is appropriate. I contend not. The query should not focus on "Are they loyal?", the attention should investigate "To *what* are they loyal?". The difference is significant: the former implies that loyalty is binary (yes/no), the latter acknowledges that it is multi-facetted. Clearly, it should not be marginalized as being limited to issues of reciprocity and obedience.

As the next millenium approaches, organizations and individuals will continue to find themselves entangled in an increasingly complex world. As organizations, we are becoming transnational, corporate citizens, and trying to create win/win situations with all stakeholders. As individuals, we are juggling a multitude of roles in days that steadfastly seem to have fewer hours: we are parents, children, spouses, friends, subordinates, leaders, volunteers, Canadians, Manitobans, students and teachers. Though the Stephen Coveys of the world would congratulate us for having these delineated roles, a life with multiple commitments takes its toll on our ability to remain true to our values and their associated loyalties.

But how do we define "remaining true" to so many things? I believe this can only to done through greater understanding of those competing loyalties and how they interact with the environment.

Loyalty has Levels

Evidently, the individual *extent* of dedication to our selected roles and commitments is not binary. Both organizations and individuals apply *a measure* of commitment to each; both also apply a corresponding *measure* of loyalty to their selected set, ranging from "loyalty out of convenience" through to "absolute loyalty". Though purists would disagree that "loyalty out of convenience" even qualifies, the fact remains that loyalty, like commitment, is not binary either; it describes a spectrum. This range in the intensity of loyalty should not be a surprise, since it describes the apportionment of emotional and resource investment in these.

In case this discussion is not complex enough already, time adds yet another dimension. The priorities we assign to our value elements can change over time, as we grow professionally, personally or emotionally. So it follows that the dedication to each of those value set elements can also change. The shift is usually subtle, but it can also be dramatic if we are faced with a significant emotional event. Given the extent to which our values affect how we interact, that means how we view our world is typically changing, slowly, slightly. By extension, the fact that both individual and organizational value sets change over time, it should then be obvious that there is a high probability of conflict between our commitment items, and our loyalty items, as their priorities shift.

Aligning the Loyalty Vectors

On a practical, daily level, conflicts arise when we do not understand the fact that different activities call upon different

samplings of our competing loyalties. The problem for the leader at the centre of the situations described is that there exist few frameworks to provide insight and assist them to make the best ethical decision. For the leadership, lack of understanding can lead to undue hardship on the individuals involved and the organization. What we therefore should seek is to maximize the alignment of individuals' various loyalties. Just as martial arts techniques emphasize skeletal alignment for maximum impact force, alignment of personnel's loyalties will greatly improve the effectiveness of any operational group.

Detailed Description of the Loyalty Framework

Given the premise that awareness and understanding are a key step to facilitating organizational renewal and improved effectiveness, the model defines the kinds of loyalties, called stratums.

The Descriptive Loyalty Framework stratums are summarized on page 173.

Basic Application of Principles

The Descriptive Framework for Loyalty (figure 3) reveals the multiple dimensions of loyalty typical to a work environment. Pictorially, the model represents the ideal, where all loyalty vectors are aligned.

The application of the model always starts with the self. The premise is that the low-order Maslow needs of personnel must be addressed first, so that they can then focus on issues of loyalty. Its application is actually far simpler than the convoluted logic that created it. In fact, it is very similar to many process improvement approaches and conflict resolution techniques:

1. Define the present.
2. Identify areas of agreement and seek to understand the areas of disagreement.

#	LOYALTY STRATUM	OVERVIEW
1	Self	This stratum is the starting point for application of the model, and is *sine qua non* (without which not). Loyalty to one's self is the foundation and frame of reference for all other loyalties. Before an individual can have a predisposition to issues of loyalty their basic human needs of food/shelter/security must be addressed (Maslow). Only after the basic needs are met, will the individual be prepared to address their higher-order needs and loyalty needs. Note that the model does address that at that later point they may *choose* to marginalize those basic needs in support of a higher loyalty. Here they will seek out and be loyal to those endeavors that align with their morals and values.
2	Peer	This independent stratum of loyalty focuses on those loyalties based on an emotional bond, or on principle. Examples include family members and friends.
3	Immediate Authority	This independent stratum of loyalty is with the person's immediate supervisor, and what they represent in the workplace context.
4	Organizational Authority	This independent stratum of loyalty is with the senior authority figure of the person's organization, and what they represent.
5	Organizational Culture	This independent stratum of loyalty is with the culture, traditions and beliefs of the organization, and what it represents. The loyalty aspects of this stratum go beyond any authority figure.
6	Regional Culture	This independent stratum of loyalty is with the culture, traditions and beliefs of the broader societal group with whom the individual interacts, and what they represent.
7	National Culture	This independent stratum of loyalty is with the culture, traditions and belief attributed to the nation, and what it represents.
8	Universal Principles of Justice and Equality	This independent stratum of loyalty is with the more abstract universal principles of justice and equality for human beings and their environment. (Kohlberg stage 6)

3. Envision and document the desired future; using the areas of agreement, build consensus of what represents the "best case" scenario.
4. Create a plan to systematically minimize the significant gaps between the differing positions.

More specifically in the context of understanding and resolving situations where loyalties are questioned, the process corresponding to the previous must:

1. Identify and understand *what* are the parties' loyalties, as per the model; then, define the extent or intensity for each one of those loyalties.
2. Compare the matrix of loyalties (and related intensities) against that of all other parties involved. Identify areas where the loyalties align (by subject), then review the intensity of the loyalties felt for each. Now identify commitments and loyalties that do not align, and conduct the same analysis.
3. Realizing that perfect alignment of all loyalties felt by all parties is difficult, if not impossible, an important question is "Does having alignment on this particular loyalty issue really matter?". When documenting the vision or end state, the goal is optimization and the improvement of esprit de corps, not creating photocopies of individuals.
4. Create/apply a plan to bring the parties or stakeholders towards that vision. By maximizing the alignment of the individuals' loyalties, organizational effectiveness will also increase.

Application Notes for the Model

First, it is significant to note that there is no stratum for "loyalty downward", which is a critical aspect of the effective organization. The reasoning is that "loyalty downward", I contend, is the superior's demonstration of loyalty to the other stratums shown (for example organizational culture, universal justice), and is not a different kind of loyalty.

Second, beyond the "self" stratum, it would be normal to see only a sampling of the other stratums for a given person or context. With the exception of the "self" loyalty stratum, no stratum is a prerequisite for any other.

Third, the model does allow that once an individual has satisfied their lower-order Maslow needs, they may later *choose* to marginalize those basic needs in support of a higher loyalty item.

Conclusion

It is recognized that peak individual and organizational performance will only occur when conflicting loyalties are minimized. The Descriptive Framework for Loyalty is a unique tool; it acknowledges the multi-dimensional nature of loyalty, and provides the situational insight required to nurture esprit de corps, and resolve conflicts.

The Role Of Ethics And Young People In Our Society

Captain Gordon Leek

The Role Of Ethics And Young People In Our Society

Captain Gordon Leek

Captain Leek is the Commanding Officer of an Alberta Army Cadet Corps. After serving as a member of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry he joined the Calgary Police Service in 1980. His present duties are as an investigator for youth related crimes and issues in Calgary's southwest.

In reading this paper it would not be out of place to wonder what youth crime and its inherent problems have to do with ethics in Canadian Defence. It is too easy for members of the Canadian Forces (CF) and the media to concentrate on the role of the CF during overseas operations. Canadians have always been willing and eager to help others improve their lot, whether that be in a peace keeping role or providing aid in time of natural disaster. However, in doing so we can often overlook what is happening in our own backyard.

If the mission of the CF is to defend Canada and Canadian interests at home and abroad, then there is an obligation to ensure that our domestic interests are stable and secure. This can only be done by ensuring and developing a moral and ethical base in our young people. A role that the CF has allocated to others.

We are constantly barraged in the media about the increase in violent youth crime in our Canadian cities and towns. Rarely now are we able to open a newspaper or watch the evening news without seeing an article about the Young Offenders Act (YOA) and how it is contributing to the demise of our society. Whether youth violence and youth crime is on the increase is a hotly contested subject and is beyond the scope of this paper. Regardless, the perception of the increase in violent youth crime is one that contributes to the average citizen's fear of crime.

Most of us have heard how the youth of today only hang around on the street corners waiting for an unsuspecting victim. That all teenagers are trouble; interested in only sex and drugs and have no concern about the welfare of this country. This is a perception that has been around since the 1950's. It is nothing new. The youth of today are no different then they were 20, 30 or 50 years ago. Unfortunately we have a tendency to look back at a simpler time and remember the "good old days."

During this time, there was what could be likened to a moral stream that flowed between all levels of society, regardless of social/economic standing. This was a time when it was expected that one follow a prescribed moral code and set of values. If a young person strayed, or branched from this, they were put back on course by members of the community. There was not the fear of retribution or of overstepping one's bounds as there appears to be prevalent today. Today the conviction that it is proper to guide and correct our youth, whether they are your own children or not, has been lost for the most part.

Youth today are different however in one very important way. The almost limitless

choices that they have and the almost unprecedented pressure on them to achieve can be overwhelming at times. Most are able to rise to this challenge; unfortunately, too many succumb to it.

As an investigator with youth crimes in the city of Calgary I have observed several elements that are common in dealing with young people that have been in conflict with the law. In no particular order they are: an intensity of emotion in their relationship with others; a need to belong and identify with a group; lack of focus in the present and the future; and a desire for discipline and order.

During this adolescent period, a young person is experiencing emotional and physical changes that are all too difficult to understand. This results in constant changes of severe emotional highs and lows. Young people become impassioned with every decision that they make. Often these extreme emotions crystallize into commitments that form the basis for the beliefs and convictions that they will carry with them into adulthood. Impassioned arguments regarding moral values can be fused into a young person's character based on a small amount of fact.

When we read in the paper that a youth gang committed an act of violence we immediately envision the stereotype portrayed through television and movies. However, this is not necessarily the case. Many "gangs" are no more than a loose association of young people; the make-up and dynamics constantly changing as different interests develop. To differentiate and to avoid confusion, I will use the term association when talking about groups of young people.

Our young people are social beings and the need to belong to a group can be very powerful indeed. When young people develop an association they become fiercely loyal to the group, even defying and abandoning their previously held beliefs. In addition the dynamics of a family have been changed. Increasingly single parent families and two income families require a young person to develop their bonds outside the family unit at an earlier age. This does not necessarily mean that they will move into conflict with the law. However, from the safety of numbers it is easier to challenge the rules of both home and society.

The third element is that of a lack of focus and direction. More and more we are demanding of our young people to grow up and decide what they want to be at an earlier age. We all want our children to be better off than we were. However, in this desire to prepare them for the future we sometimes deny them the right to be children.

Coupled with this is a growing lack of imagination that our young people appear to have lost. It is becoming increasingly rare for our young people to play in the sandbox and build their castles. The inundation of computer and role-playing games that tell the person who the character is and what he can and cannot do has robbed the fundamentals of imagination from our young people. Even imagination-developing toys, that used to allow a child to build anything, are now designed to be used in elaborate sets and scenarios. Deviation from the plans is encouraged but definitely not necessary.

The concept of discipline in our modern society always tends to raise objections. Too often it is

misconstrued to mean some form of punishment or abandonment of choice. We forget that it is simply a tool that allows an individual to achieve their goal. Young people need, and in some instances crave discipline and order; be that a structured family and school environment or one that imposed upon them through the courts.

The YOA declaration of principle states:

> *3(1) (c) young persons who commit offences require supervision, discipline and control, but, because of their state of dependency and level of development and maturity, they also have special needs and require guidance and assistance;*

In dealing with young offenders and speaking to several at a young offenders centre, those that are planning to put their past behind them have admitted that the structure of incarceration has helped them focus and develop a plan for their lives. Others that have had court imposed restrictions placed upon them, and by default their families, have also benefitted from the imposed structure.

These, briefly, are some of the common elements that have been identified; not only in young people in conflict with the law but also with young people in general. So what does this all mean to the CF as a whole. What it means is if the CF is to fulfil its mandate both at home and abroad it has to ensure that the principals and ethics that it is defending are present at home.

The Armed Forces, throughout history have always been bastions of tradition and values. Regimental history and pride, naval traditions, mess rules and etiquette have shaped our society in numerous ways. However, with today's constraints upon the resources of the CF and the ever diminishing physical presence at home, this role is becoming more difficult to meet.

As mentioned earlier, it has been my observation that young people need and want a focus and a purpose. They are receptive to discipline and require identification with a group. And once they belong to a group they develop a fierce loyalty to that group and the members of it. All these components are met in a cadet program.

The Cadet movement is an often over-looked component of the CF. However, it is a component that can be a cornerstone to develop a strong and proud military ethic.

It is frustrating to read about the millions of dollars that governments at all levels pour into developing new programs to meet the needs of youth today. Although well intentioned, the majority of these programs are designed to meet the needs of perhaps 10 per cent of the youth population. Those young people that do not come into contact with the law, or do not experiment with alcohol and other drugs do not necessarily benefit from these programs.

All too often I have sat in meetings and conferences with members from various levels of government and self-proclaimed experts that are trying to develop a program that will teach young people the values our society holds important. It is disappointing to watch these same well-intentioned people eyes glaze over when the cadet organization is mentioned.

It is here that the CF can make an impact and carry out its role. The Cadet movement can often be the only visible presence of the CF

in communities throughout Canada. Often in rural areas people find it difficult to distinguish between the CF and the cadets, considering them another component of the CF.

The Cadet Instructor Cadre (CIC) consists of the largest officer pool of all elements in the CF. Generally these are men and women that have a sense of loyalty and pride in their country as displayed by the CF. They have taken on the task of educating our young people in the values embodied by the CF. Through their efforts, ideals such as pride, self confidence, loyalty and patriotism are not something that a young person should feel embarrassed about. They are instead values that are encouraged and embraced.

But the CIC is a small force operating on a large front. They require reinforcements to achieve the goals they have set for themselves. And that is where a joint, concerted effort involving the CF, the courts and other government agencies can help to influence young people by providing them with the focus and fellowship that they are looking for at this time in their lives.

By proactively encouraging members of the CF to become involved with external organizations our young people learn from them. By publicly taking pride and celebrating the achievements of members of the CF in all of its roles we show that there are values and principles worth making sacrifices for.

Through this mentorship, the underlining principles and values that we hold in our society can be encouraged and developed in our young people. The CF can and should be a part of laying this cornerstone to build a stable base for our young people.