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About Adobe Acrobat PDF Documents
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Toronto Harbour Live Exercise -
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On the morning of September 20, four packages were placed on a commercial flight to Toronto Island Airport. The packages contained a small amount of explosives with an altimeter detonation device set to explode when the aircraft descended below 500 feet on its final approach to the airport. The flight crashed into Humber Bay in Lake Ontario at 10:10 Eastern Time, with 20 people and 1,000 pounds of fuel on board. The Toronto Island Airport was the first to hear about it and they made immediate calls to both the Joint Rescue Co-Ordination Centre (JRCC) in Trenton, Ontario and to the Toronto Police Marine Unit.
A Toronto MMU Unit boat, CCG C&A and CCGA vessels responded. The MMU, which was first on scene, had one Marine EMT aboard. Some casualties were assessed and triage was initiated. The casualties were then transported in to the casualty collection point (HMCS York). On arrival at HMCS York with the casualties, the Marine Unit Officers found that EMS had not been notified. The staff at HMCS York, upon having injured people arrive at their location, notified EMS, activated their response plan and began first aid on the casualties. Meanwhile, an MMU Zodiac was recovering some bodies from the water.
On arrival of the first EMS units at the casualty collection point the triage/treatment area was established and one of the EMTs was tasked to return to the crash site on the Marine Unit vessel so that there were now two EMTs at the crash site and two vessels to provide transport. By this time the Marine EMT had all the remaining casualties on the Marine Unit vessel. Initially there was some confusion as to who would return on which vessel, but all the casualties were placed on one. It should be noted that the CCG C&A Rescue Specialist was not utilized. The confusion caused a slight delay in transport to shore. All casualties were transported back to HMCS York where they were treated and distributed to hospitals.
The Metro Toronto Police Dive Unit was unable to participate in the recovery operation because of high seas caused by Hurricane Isabel that had passed through the day before.
Further to three planning sessions held in Toronto in the spring of 2003, a Table-Top exercise was conducted in Toronto on July 10th, in which representatives from all of the involved jurisdictions participated. All agreed that it is crucial to conduct a Table-Top exercise prior to the Live-Ex in order that all players understand their roles and responsibilities and to iron out any difficulties/problem areas that may be identified. This Table-Top was of particular importance due to the fact that the exercise area was just outside of the Toronto Western Gap and had the potential for a high volume of marine traffic and accumulation of onlookers. The SAR protocols were of the utmost importance for all participating agencies.
A CPX took place in Toronto on August 27 and 28, 2003. The CPX is also a critical part of any live exercise as participants are able to better understand each other's SAR structures, including the control systems for achieving a coordinated response. The CPX finalizes the respective roles of each agency and allows for simulated testing/validation of the response functions. In this instance, a site visit was part of the CPX and for logistical and security purposes, exercise organizers selected an alternative site.
The two principal response agencies, the CCG C&A and the MMU had their own sets of goals and objectives.
1. Stage a realistic exercise designed to evaluate a SAR response to a marine distress incident with extenuating circumstances.
Objective met.
2. Evaluate the capabilities of the CCG C&A/CCGA to respond to a major incident and their ability to work with other involved agencies
Objective partially met. See Observation/recommendation 10, 13 and 24. The CCG C&A and the CCGA did work well together.
3. Evaluate the ability of the SAR teams in the treatment of survivors and their ability to evacuate the simulated casualties to the safety of a stable platform for continued advanced EMT evaluation and treatment.
Objective Not Met. See Observation/Recommendation 10, 13 and 24.
4. Collect and provide objective data on the response and support functions for the exercise to each participating organization. The information will be used to improve the contingency response plans of the participating agencies.
Objective met. This data will be used to develop Standard Operating Guidelines.
1. Evaluate in a dynamic forum the interoperability between municipal, provincial and federal agencies within the GTA when tasked with a major incident.
2. Evaluate current levels of training within the Toronto MMU and test equipment and response capability of the unit in the event that a major event takes place within its area of operations.
3. Evaluate the capabilities of the Underwater Search and Recovery Unit to work in partnership with other agencies in providing support with recovery of search objects, victims and on-scene investigation.
1. Radios inadequate on VHF with serious squelch noise. Each agency had
its own means of communication and had problems relating to each other.
Observation: Radio communications are a nation-wide problem and
the NSS is leading a review of ways to mitigate this issue.
2. On-scene Commander (OSC) did not seem to have good communication with
MMU.
Recommendation: OSC, through JRCC, should notify all players of
correct radio frequency that is assigned through MCTS. MCTS should keep
radio contact to essential-only. Proper protocols should be followed.
3. OSC not clearly identified, especially during radio communications.
Due to radio problems, it was difficult to contact those "in charge"
and finalize who was in charge of what.
Recommendation: OSC should be identified to players. Provinces and
municipalities do not use the National SAR Manual and thus may not be
aware of its recommended protocols. Advanced SAR training for provincial
and municipal representatives would greatly improve their understanding
of the National SAR System and enhance their ability to work together
as a team while participating in SAR exercises or real incidents.
4. The level of participation of the JRCC was hampered by poor flow of
information and communications disconnect between JRCC/MCTS/OSC/MMU.
Recommendation: Situation Reports should be sent as directed and
the allocated radio frequency maintained by all responders at all times.
Standardized marine SAR radio training should be undertaken.
5. Cell phone numbers could have been dispersed as a form of back-up.
Observation: This may not work in an actual situation, however but
cell phone numbers are available from JRCC for all vessels. VHF radios
should always be the communications vehicle of choice.
6. EMTs in the "hot zone" are responsible for ensuring communications
to OSC.
Observation: This is part of the communications protocol.
7. Having paramedics as "casualties" would allow for valuable
observations.
Recommendation: In future this would be a tremendous asset to have
paramedics either as "casualties" or as observers. (Note: The
"casualties" were, in fact, paramedic students.)
8. More paramedics should respond.
Observation: In an exercise one must "play" with whatever
resources would be present in an actual emergency.
9. Tag mannequin casualties as "dead".
Recommendation: Agree. All mannequins should be marked so as to
avoid confusion.
10. One rescue unit took most of the casualties, which created an overcrowding
situation on the rescue vessel, leaving little room for medical treatment
to be administered properly.
Recommendation: First vessel on-scene should request assistance
from all available resources. (See Recommendations 13. and 24)
11. Identify observers as required.
Recommendation: Agree. Observers were, in fact marked, but in future
markers should be more evident. The Peel Regional Police boat was also
not identified as an observer and this may have contributed to further
confusion.
12. CGR 100 and MMU did not seem to be "in synch" and it appeared
as if there were 2 OSCs.
Recommendation: VHF marine radios should not be shut off for any
reason. All pertinent information should go to the OSC, who in turn should
pass it on to JRCC.
13. Casualties could have been transported to shore more quickly.
Recommendation: Agree. First vessel on scene should seek assistance
from other available resources. (See Recommendations 10 and 24)
14. Rescue boats approached at full speed.
Recommendation: At all times rescue area should be approached using
principles of good seamanship. Responders who fail to use due caution
or who do not check for safety first should:
a) If observed by the OSC, the OSC should take immediate corrective action as part of the exercise.
b) If observed by an Exercise Team Member, he/she should advise the Exercise Team Leader immediately and, time permitting, stop the responder and make the unit perform the activity in a proper manner instead of waiting for the debrief. At least a deficiency would be pointed out and the responder would learn how to do the activity correctly and would have an opportunity to practice it during the exercise.
15. Indelible markers should be included in the crash boxes for victim
identification.
Recommendation: Crash kits should be updated as required (e.g. waterproof
bags) but indelible markers are not recommended for exercise purposes.
16. OSC should place vessel closer to crash site.
Observation: The OSC must have the discretion to decide where best
to place his own unit. If required, the Rescue Specialist can be deployed
to the accident site.
17. There was no manifest of passengers prepared in advance.
Recommendation: An Exercise manifest should be prepared in advance.
18. Triage tag system sometimes differs between agencies and should be
standardized.
Recommendation: Tag system should be standardized.
19. The exercise identified a lack of knowledge of "reverse triage".
Recommendation: More triage training recommended, especially for
marine environments.
20. Recommendation: The staff of HMCS York requires a thorough briefing of the National SAR System and should possibly provide SAR training to some of their members.
21. Overall confusion as to when OSC takes over from JRCC.
Observation: JRCC maintains overall control until a capable unit
is identified as OSC.
22. Toronto fireboat had no pollution boom on board.
Observation: Fireboat was there for fire suppression purposes only.
23. Too many unscheduled scenarios (e.g. power outage on CGR 100).
Observation: In a real emergency many unscheduled events will occur
so it is important to be prepared for any contingency.
24. MMU vessels took charge of casualty recovery and did not share information
with other participants.
Response: MMU vessels should have requested assistance from other
participants and communicated information with CCG C&A and JRCC. CCG
C&A should have also been more forceful in obtaining information and
forcing MMUs to communicate in the proper manner.
25. Observers should be properly briefed before the exercise or should at least have some understanding of how marine SAR works.
26. An Exercise Beachmaster should be appointed for shore-based coordination.
27. First vessel on scene should notify JRCC of what is happening.
28. People taking part in the exercise should act as if it is an actual rescue. Failing to do so contributed to the MMU's improper recovery techniques as captured on film.
29. It is useful for exercise staff to have the MCTS audio tape for analysis.
30. If possible, bodies should not be placed on same vessel as casualties.
This exercise emphasized the importance of staging frequent multi-jurisdictional
exercises. Although not all of the exercise objectives were fully met,
lessons can still be learned and improvements to the system effected.
The next exercise will take place next year, probably in one of the Great
Lakes.
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