DPR 2004-2005
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

3. High levels of compliance with the regulatory framework

The CNSC rigorously enforces its regulatory requirements through a variety of measures. Licensee compliance is verified through inspections, reviews, audits and assessments. The CNSC requires any licensee found to be non-compliant with either its licence conditions or the regulatory requirements to resolve the issue and demonstrate improvement by a specified deadline, or face enforcement action.

During the reporting year, the CNSC continued to conduct its compliance program that involved ongoing monitoring of the production, use, storage and flow of nuclear material at Canadian nuclear facilities, and the maintenance of a national nuclear materials accountancy system. CNSC staff report on licensee operations through mid-term performance reports, status reports, significant development reports and annual industry reports. This is in addition to performance information provided in licensing hearings, transcripts of which are available to the public along with records of proceedings. The CNSC Annual Industry Report on the Safety Performance of the Canadian Nuclear Power Industry is prepared on an annual basis, and contains the Report Card on Nuclear Power Plant Performance. The most recent Report Card is an evaluation of safe and secure installations, and is available in Section IV . CNSC staff observed, through inspections and reviews, that the power reactor industry operated safely in 2004. No worker at any power reactor station or member of the public received a radiation dose in excess of the regulatory limits.

Compliance planning and management

Designed to administer, promote and assess compliance, the CNSC has commenced the use of risk-informed formulas to determine inspection frequency and resource requirements. The CNSC is implementing the new Type I and Type II ² inspection planning program, along with associated compliance tools, working cooperatively with licensees to improve transparency, communication, performance and safety. During the reporting year, the CNSC also conducted extensive training of staff in the various facets of the new risk management program, reviewed the risk-profile of certain nuclear facilities, and revised baseline compliance plans.

In March 2004, the CNSC initiated the Power Reactor Regulation Improvement Program (PRRIP), intended to ensure a power reactor regulation program delivers the best possible performance for licensees and the public. The PRRIP will achieve this by examining and improving all relevant aspects of the regulation program, from planning and problem-solving to communication and management methods. The goal of the PRRIP is to facilitate the CNSC’s management of the risk to public health, safety, security and the environment arising from the operation of nuclear power reactors in Canada. For more information see "An Improved Program for Regulating Power Reactors" .

² *Type I inspections are on-site audits and evaluations of a licensee’s programs, processes and practices. Type II inspections are routine (item-by-item) checks and rounds that typically focus on the outputs, or performance of licensee programs, processes and practices. Findings from Type II inspections play a key role in identifying where a Type I inspection may be required to determine systemic problems in licensee programs, processes or practices.

Nuclear security

CNSC staff continued to monitor potential threats to Canadian nuclear facilities, and inspected and evaluated licensees’ physical security programs, placing priority on higher-risk facilities. Specifically, security inspections were conducted at nuclear power plants, nuclear research facilities, fuel fabrication and tritium processing facilities, radioisotope facilities and waste management areas. Security inspections of other facilities such as hospital and university laboratories that use, process or store high-risk radioactive sources were also conducted and resulted in measures to improve security. Overall, CNSC staff were satisfied that licensees are taking appropriate measures to meet the requirements for physical protection of their facilities.

Radiation protection for carriers

During the reporting year, the CNSC continued to actively promote the new international requirements for radiation protection for licensed and non-licensed carriers, which came into effect in June 2004. These requirements improve radiation safety of transport carriers and other stakeholders. To build awareness of the new requirements, the CNSC prepared a supporting guide (G-314) to help carriers establish their own radiation protection programs. It also undertook numerous activities such as conducting awareness sessions and encouraged carriers to submit their radiation protection programs to the CNSC for review and follow up as to whether or not their programs will meet the new requirement if subjected to a compliance inspection.

As of May 31, 2004, carriers not licensed by the CNSC were required to have work procedures and a radiation protection program in place based on the risk of worker exposure to radiation. Visits to approximately 30 transport companies were conducted to promote compliance with this new requirement and Transport Type I inspections have been conducted at approximately 10 sites. Implementation of the Radiation Protection Program for these transport carriers not licensed by the CNSC is underway.

Sealed source tracking

The CNSC played a significant role in developing the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources , which has been endorsed by the Government of Canada. It also played a significant role in developing the IAEA Technical Document 1344 entitled The Categorization of Radioactive Sources .

In support of this Code of Conduct , the CNSC began to build a national sealed source registry database and tracking system for high-risk radioactive sources. Under the new system, radioactive sources are ranked and assigned to one of five categories to provide an internationally-harmonized foundation for making risk-informed decisions. Implementation of tracking the highest risk categories is scheduled for January 2006. The completed system will enhance the CNSC’s regulatory control of radioactive sources used in medical, industrial and research activities throughout Canada. The system will be available to stakeholders through a Web-enabled user interface. Licensees will update inventory data electronically, enabling the CNSC to track the movement of high-risk sources.

Safeguards, non-proliferation and the Nuclear Material Accounting System

In response to safeguards measures introduced in Canada in 2000, IAEA verification objectives have undergone a major shift including extension to include facilities not previously subject to safeguards requirements. To establish national-level safeguards in Canada, the CNSC has worked collaboratively with the IAEA in areas such as:

• Installation of new safeguards equipment at facilities.
• Implementation of an enhanced nuclear material accounting system allowing licensees to make submissions electronically and allowing the CNSC to meet its international non-proliferation and safeguards obligations more effectively.
• Development of a new safeguards approach at Canada’s uranium refining and conversion sites.
• Exchange of bilateral nuclear inventory reports with other countries, and reconciliation of inventories with them. Such activity ensures that international transfers of nuclear items are for peaceful purposes only, and in accordance with Canada’s bilateral and multilateral nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
• Provision to the IAEA of periodic nuclear material accounting reports and other information required under Canada’s Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA
• Facilitation of access by IAEA safeguards inspectors to nuclear facilities and other locations in Canada.

In a major effort by the CNSC to ensure that Canadian uranium conversion and refining facilities conform to new safeguards requirements, the CNSC conducted ongoing negotiations with the IAEA and industry to establish a system of accountancy for nuclear material and a plan for IAEA verification of initial inventories in mid-2005 at refining facilities.

Safety culture and management

The CNSC encourages licensees to embrace a safety culture that results in behaviour that exceeds expectations of the regulator. Safety culture refers to the characteristics of the work environment, such as the values, rules, and common understandings that influence employees’ perceptions and attitudes about the importance that the organization places on safety. During the reporting year, the CNSC participated in workshops in Canada and internationally on safety culture and management. This involvement allows the CNSC to influence the direction of the nuclear industry on safety culture at home and abroad, and to adopt successful practices deployed elsewhere.

The CNSC held a safety culture symposium for industry in 2004. The workshop highlighted the significant progress the industry has made in the area of safety culture and the recognition of its importance. For example, some facilities have developed safety culture frameworks, while others have developed and piloted evaluation methods for performing safety culture self-assessments. The CNSC has been developing a safety management program that will address information requirements to be presented to the Commission Tribunal, providing a complete picture of operators’ performance and safety trends.

Other compliance-related initiatives:

• The CNSC conducted compliance inspections of high- and moderate-risk licensed activities, which included 959 of the 2380 planned inspections of medical, academic and industrial licensees. In the 2005-2006 fiscal year, the CNSC will be requesting additional resources to enable us to ensure an appropriate level of compliance inspections while handling to an increase in regulatory workload. Compliance efforts identified and responded to 117 reportable occurrences, of which 10 involved the transportation of nuclear substances, 27 involved the recycling industry and 24 involved lost or stolen material. The reportable occurrences in these activity areas resulted in the issuance of four orders related to health and safety and six incidents of exceeding dose limits to nuclear energy workers.
• The CNSC continued to emphasize integrated audits at licensed facilities. Multi-disciplinary teams carrying out audits of more than one safety area can identify more comprehensively potential risks to workers, the public and the environment, and set priorities for remedial actions.
   

4. CNSC cooperates and integrates its activities in national/international nuclear fora

The CNSC works cooperatively on an ongoing basis with a number of national and international organizations to advance nuclear safety and security at home and abroad, and to provide benchmarking information.

The President of the Commission Tribunal is an active member of the Tribunal Heads, a group consisting of 22 federal tribunals, as well as the Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals. In addition, she is a member of the Heads of Agencies steering committee and co-chair of the Heads of Agencies Governance sub-committee. The work has enhanced the visibility of the Commission and its image as a leader among Canadian administrative tribunals.

Cooperative frameworks

The CNSC developed a framework for establishing and reviewing domestic cooperative arrangements with federal and provincial organizations, departments and agencies. The framework enhances cooperation and integration ensuring that administrative arrangements are consistent with the CNSC mandate and remain effective.

The CNSC also developed a framework for tracking and coordinating Memoranda of Understanding, cooperative undertakings with foreign governments/agencies and international organizations, and a framework for assessing the value of participating in international activities and subsequently evaluating the results. Targeted involvement with international fora is essential to achieving the CNSC’s commitment to promote nuclear safety, non-proliferation and safeguards objectives in Canada and worldwide.

International nuclear non-proliferation activities

In Canada, the CNSC is responsible for implementing the international nuclear non-proliferation obligations agreed to by Canada. It does so through its regulatory programs under the Nuclear Control and Safety Act (NSCA) and through its participation in multilateral non-proliferation initiatives on behalf of the Government of Canada. The CNSC acted as technical advisor to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2004 Preparatory Committee and inactively preparing for the May 2005 Review Conference.

The CNSC advised the Vienna Permanent Mission to the IAEA, Foreign Affairs Canada and other Canadian stakeholder organizations in order to advance Canadian positions on safeguards, export controls and non-proliferation with a view of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The CNSC also held consultations on the implementation of bilateral non-proliferation trade agreements with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, EURATOM, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States for the purpose of assuring that Canadian exports of nuclear items are for peaceful purposes only, and to contribute to the international non-proliferation regime. For example, in 2004, the CNSC amended an Administrative Arrangement with the Russian Federation to assure adequate non-proliferation verification measures are in place for Canadian transfers of uranium to Russia.

The CNSC continued its ongoing international work on multilateral guidelines with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the 35-nation NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee to toughen nuclear export controls, particularly in response to emerging non-proliferation challenges.

IAEA Safeguards - Domestic and international

In 2004-2005, the CNSC participated in numerous activities with the IAEA to address domestic safeguards challenges and provide support for strengthened IAEA safeguards. Key cooperative activities included:

• Participation in a major international review of the IAEA’s safeguards system to provide recommendations aimed at maintaining the credibility of the safeguards system and enhancing its effectiveness and efficiency.
• Continued installation of new, technologically advanced safeguards equipment at Canadian nuclear facilities, to be completed at all locations by the end of 2005. Assistance has been provided at Pickering and Gentilly-2 to replace aging video surveillance systems with digital ones that include remote surveillance capabilities. Assistance was also provided to the IAEA to find secure, cost-effective methods to gain remote access to safeguards data collected at facilities. This cooperation with the IAEA in both planning and funding, and the ability to remotely monitor activities relevant to safeguards, are crucial to establishing a state-level safeguards approach in Canada.
• Completed a major software upgrade to the equipment used by the IAEA to remotely monitor the discharge of spent fuel from CANDU reactors. The ability to collect and review this data at the IAEA offices reduces expense and disruption at the facilities and also allows the IAEA to review and analyze data more quickly.
• Continued work with the Swedish nuclear regulator on improvements to the Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device used by the IAEA to verify long-cooled, low burn-up fuel held in storage pools. It is a more cost-effective technology.
• Co-operation with the IAEA and its member states to improve safeguards implementation by providing input into the IAEA revision of a safeguards publication on State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) guidelines.
• Ongoing formal consultations with the IAEA and the Canadian nuclear industry on a Canadian integrated safeguards approach.

Other cooperative activities

• Consultation with other government stakeholders to develop mechanisms that support efficient, effective and accountable assessment and licensing of applications for the import and export of controlled nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use substances, materials, equipment and technology.
• Provision of technical support for a major G8 initiative aimed at preventing the acquisition of weapons and materials of mass destruction by terrorists or those who shelter them.
• Publication in 2004 of Canada’s Third Report on the Convention on Nuclear Safety by the CNSC in consultation with industry representatives and other Government of Canada departments. In April 2005, the President and CEO of the CNSC, Ms Linda J. Keen, will preside over the Third Review Meeting of the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, the first Canadian to chair a nuclear safety convention review meeting.
• As President of the Commission Tribunal, Ms. Keen was active in many international nuclear fora during the reporting period, including the International Nuclear Regulators’ Association meetings in Japan, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety in Beijing, the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in London, a visit to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Washington, D.C., the Global Nuclear Energy Summit 2004 in Toronto, the G8 Heads of Regulators Meeting in Moscow and the Nuclear Energy Agency’s Regulatory Forum in Paris.

Domestic cooperation

• The hosting of a three-day annual meeting of the Federal Provincial Territorial Radiation Protection Committee, whose purpose is to harmonize regulation and standards across the industry by sharing progress, new ideas and priorities.
• The co-hosting of a Canadian forum on the 2005 International Committee on Radiation Protection (ICRP) Recommendations, attended by the public industry and other regulatory and government bodies. Such activities provide the CNSC with the opportunity to communicate regularly with various government and industry stakeholders and ensure that Canadian needs and viewpoints are taken into account in developing international standards. They also allow the CNSC to influence the development and application of international standards and to adopt best practices from our peers around the world.

Nuclear Emergency Management

The CNSC is employing a collaborative approach in developing a new Nuclear Emergency Management (NEM) policy and upgraded programs. It is being developed in partnership with external stakeholders, and has included extensive consultations with licensees, provincial, municipal and federal government organizations involved in emergency preparedness management.

The CNSC NEM policy provides the foundation for all CNSC emergency management activities. Specifically, it outlines responses consistent with the risks at hand, clarifies roles and responsibilities, and helps maintain current capacity while taking future requirements into account. The policy will be adopted following public consultation.

In addition to developing the policy, key elements of an improved nuclear emergency management program have been identified and updated emergency plans and procedures are under development.

In addition, the CNSC Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) has been redesigned and reorganized to increase reliability and functionality and enhance back-up resources. Extensive training on roles, responsibilities, procedures and emergency response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related events has been conducted for staff and other Government of Canada departments. A wide variety of activities have been undertaken, ranging from creating a federal-provincial-territorial committee on radiological/nuclear emergencies to the installation of an emergency power generator at CNSC headquarters to maintain the CNSC’s capacity in the event of an outage.

Strengthening Safeguards The verification approaches and measures utilized by the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, are commonly referred to as ‘safeguards’. In 1972, Canada was the first country to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA for such verification as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The CNSC also is cooperating with the IAEA in developing new safeguards approaches for Canadian facilities and contributes to efforts to strengthen safeguards internationally. Through its regulatory process, the CNSC ensures that all relevant licensees have in place policies and procedures that include the reporting and monitoring of nuclear material and nuclear activities and the provision of access to nuclear facilities for IAEA safeguards inspectors. The CNSC performs compliance and auditing activities to ensure that these policies and procedures remain sufficient to meet safeguards requirements. Through its Safeguards Support Program, the CNSC also assists the IAEA in developing advanced safeguards equipment or techniques aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation. The Program also supports domestic needs in resolving specific safeguards issues related to Canadian nuclear facilities and the use of nuclear material. At all stages of the nuclear cycle, from uranium refining and conversion sites to nuclear power plants and waste management facilities, the CNSC has been actively working with the IAEA to design better approaches for meeting Canada’s international obligations. For example, since 2002, as a result of strengthened safeguards, there has been a dramatic increase in the resources required to track transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit power reactor sites in Canada. To address this issue, the CNSC collaborated with the IAEA and Ontario Power Generation on a successful field trial at the Pickering reactor site in April-May 2004 to test a more cost-effective approach to track transfers of spent fuel to dry storage. All participants agreed that the trial provided a feasible approach that could be implemented at any multi-unit CANDU station. The CNSC’s experience in this area led to an invitation to participate in a similar field trial in April 2005 at a single-unit CANDU station in the Republic of Korea. Participation in this field trial reflects the CNSC’s ongoing efforts to optimize the national and international implementation of safeguards.