FAQs
Nuclear Security in Canada
Updated: October 2005
1. How did the CNSC and its licensees respond on September 11, 2001?
Immediately after the attacks in the United States, CNSC security advisors
instructed major licensees to implement enhanced security measures at their
facilities. CNSC subsequently instructed licensees that enhanced security
measures were to remain in place until further notice. On September 11, 2001,
the CNSC activated its emergency response centre to monitor the situation and
coordinate communications with licensees, domestic security forces, the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Enhanced security measures now form an integral component of licensees’
security program which is reviewed by the CNSC on an ongoing basis.
2. What actions have been taken since September 11, 2001?
Heightened levels of security continue to be maintained. The CNSC remains in
close contact with licensees, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada,
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
On October 1, 2001, the CNSC instructed major licensees (including some
research facilities at universities and isotope processing labs) to report
within two weeks on security measures in place, including voluntary measures.
The provisions licensees have made are being assessed on an ongoing basis
against international practices and the recommendations of recently completed
studies on internal and external threats to nuclear facilities and vital areas
in CANDU facilities. These studies continue to be reviewed and will be updated
to reflect current security concerns of Canada.
As a result of this review, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission ordered
licensees to take immediate action on a number of measures to increase security
at major nuclear facilities. The measures covered such items as:
- immediate, on-site armed response available twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week.
- enhanced security screening of employees and contractors involving
background, police and security checks
- protection against forced vehicle penetration of the Protected Area with
the addition of vehicle barriers
- improved physical identification checks of personnel utilizing card access
and palm scanners
- searching of personnel and vehicles utilizing explosives detectors, X-ray
screening and metal detection equipment
On October 19, 2001, the President of the CNSC met with senior executives of
Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Power, Hydro Québec, New Brunswick Power and
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to inform licensees of this order and its
content.
The CNSC completed a second phase of the Security Review on November 16,
2001. The licensees of a 'second tier' of nuclear facilities (e.g. uranium
refineries, mills and fuel fabricators) were informed of: a) the security
measures to be enhanced at their facilities; and b) the terms of a vulnerability
assessment which they are to conduct. Some of the security enhancements were to
take effect immediately, while others required gradual or longer term action.
The third phase of the security review continues and will eventually cover
all 4,500 licensees. For each class of licensee, the review:
- examines the current state of security using a risk based approach
- assesses whether measures currently in place are adequate
- provides recommendations, action notices or directives to upgrade the
physical security when/if required for improvement
- where required, the CNSC conducts a follow-up assessment
A significant number of the higher risk sites have now been inspected and
where required additional physical protection measures have been put in place.
3. Will security requirements be further strengthened?
Work continues to determine what other measures are appropriate. The
President of the CNSC has ordered a complete review of Canada's Nuclear Security
Regulations to determine appropriate levels of security measures for Canadian
nuclear sites in the future. This review included consideration of the results
of studies commissioned in 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2003 as part of the CNSC's
on-going assessments of security at nuclear facilities and research facilities.
The focus of these studies was the potential for sabotage or theft at nuclear
installations and the identification of vital areas within CANDU facilities and
nuclear research facilities.
The review of the proposed Nuclear Security Regulation amendments is
continuing and the CNSC anticipates that the amended Nuclear Security
Regulations will come into effect in early 2006.
4. Prior to September 11, 2001, what were the normal security requirements at Canadian power plants?
The CNSC required licensees to demonstrate that they were capable of
preventing unauthorized access to their sites. All operators of Canadian nuclear
power plants were required to have security measures in place to deal with acts
of sabotage in order to protect those who worked at the plant and those who
lived in the vicinity, to ensure the security of the plant itself, and to
prevent the theft of nuclear materials and information.
CNSC staff monitored the status of security plans as part of the CNSC's
compliance program, and regularly reviewed the adequacy of the security measures
in consultation with Canadian security agencies and the operators of facilities.
Security plans and measures were reviewed by CNSC staff and approved by the
Commission before an operating licence was granted or renewed.
5. What would happen if an airliner crashed into a nuclear power plant?
Canadian nuclear power plants have been designed and built with layers of
safety features to protect the health and safety of the public in accordance
with an approach known as ‘defence in depth.’ The containment buildings are
extremely resistant structures, designed to withstand extreme events such as
earthquakes and tornadoes. However, nuclear power plants, like other public
infrastructure, are not required to be designed to withstand this type of event.
CANDU reactors are also designed with redundant safety systems, such as
diverse and separate cooling systems, in order to ensure continuous cooling of
the reactor in the event of an incident. Diverse and separate reactor shutdown
systems are also in place, designed to respond quickly and effectively to a wide
range of incidents that might damage the reactor. Finally, all reactor operators
are certified by the CNSC; they are trained to shut down the reactors safely in
emergency situations.
6. Could a plane crash trigger a nuclear explosion?
No. CANDU reactors are designed to shut down automatically in the event of
accidents, including loss of coolant, loss of electrical power, etc.
7. What about the safety and security of transportation of radioactive materials?
CNSC regulations prohibit the disclosure of location, routing and timing of shipments of nuclear materials1, such as spent fuel. The shipment of radioactive material is also governed by Transport Canada's
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations, which require shippers to have emergency response plans in place.
8. Who is responsible for emergency response plans?
The licensee is responsible for implementation of on-site emergency response
plans and procedures. The provinces have primary responsibility for emergency
preparedness and response for the areas beyond nuclear facilities. The CNSC
regulates on-site emergency plans for nuclear facilities. These plans are tested
regularly, including their security aspects.
The CNSC as a good corporate citizen has facilitated consultations with
Health Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, provincial
partners and first responders by holding workshops to identify best practices to
ensure that the emergency preparedness and response network is strong and
effectively coordinated. The report on the outcomes of the workshops was
provided to Commission Members in the spring of 2003. The CNSC continues to
facilitate discussions with Federal and provincial partners to improve the
emergency preparedness and response network.
1 - Nuclear materials are defined in the
Schedule (Section 1) of the Nuclear Security Regulations
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