Management in the Government of Canada: A Commitment to Continuous Improvement

2. ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT

To strengthen accountability, the Government of Canada will:

• provide Parliament and Canadians with better and more timely information with which to hold it to account;
• have clearer rules and back them up with effective controls to ensure stewardship;
• ensure rigorous oversight of performance by organizations and the Treasury Board;
• facilitate compliance through training and tools, and reinforce them with sound values and effective consequences; and
• ensure that high ethical standards continue to guide public service employees.

THE CHALLENGE

Accountability is the cornerstone of responsible government. It has two dimensions: accountability of the government, both collectively and through individual ministers to Parliament for spending and results; and internal managerial and operational accountability, whereby ministers account to the prime minister and deputy ministers account to ministers and institutions within the government on how they are discharging the authorities conferred upon or delegated to them.

The accountability regime under our system of responsible government must do the following:

• provide assurance to Parliament and Canadians of the government's proper use of lawful authorities and public resources;
• reinforce all parties' compliance with established legal requirements and management policies; and
• promote a culture and practice of continuous improvement in governance and administration in the Public Service.

With a sound accountability regime, there is a powerful incentive to do what has been committed to and do it in the right way. It is marked by three core features:

• well-defined roles and responsibilities, where those with authority have the capacity to carry out their duties;
• a credible process, where those with responsibilities answer for their performance against expectations of them; and
• the assignment of consequences, good and bad, for performance.

Details of the responsibilities and accountabilities of ministers and senior officials and the challenges faced in the practice of our regime of accountability can be found in the companion document to this action plan at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca.

Parliament's role, on behalf of Canadians, is to hold ministers to account for the activities carried out under their authority or under those authorities vested directly in departmental officials. The complexity of government-the range of objectives and the number of different organizations and individuals carrying out initiatives in support of them-makes it a challenge for Parliament to provide effective scrutiny of the government and its operations. Parliament itself is looking at ways to strengthen its capacity to hold the government to account (such as increasing research staff for parliamentary committees or more effective use of committee time in scrutinizing the Estimates). The government is prepared to support such measures and improve how it explains itself to Parliament-through written reports, as well as through its interaction with parliamentarians.

Another challenge lies in ensuring that there is a solid link between ministers, who account to Parliament for management performance, and deputy ministers, who are responsible for the execution of management responsibilities. This link needs to be forged in a way that acknowledges that the government's policy direction is implemented by a non-partisan public service. Ministers must be assured that the appropriate degree of managerial control exists within their portfolios. More must be done to reinforce the respective responsibilities of ministers and deputy ministers and to provide assurance that departments deliver on ministerial priorities, respect the management standards set for them by the Treasury Board, and maintain the appropriate non-partisan nature of the Public Service.

To fulfil their responsibilities, deputies need to be supported by strong management expertise within their departments, by having the essential internal controls, and by a healthy audit function. In short, they need to have a sound internal management and oversight regime. The challenge is to strengthen these regimes in government, reinforce their role and mandate, and rebuild their capacity.

A further challenge lies in defining the appropriate role for the Treasury Board in relation to departments. Historically, the Board's role has evolved, depending on the management challenges facing the government. At times, it has been heavily engaged in helping build capacity in departments so they can exercise their management functions. Through its policies, it sets the rules governing departmental management practices and, based on these policies, it provides oversight of almost 1,000 departmental transactions per year. Given the number of transactions and the detailed work required on them, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat has traditionally monitored organizations largely through the lens of these departmental transactions. This approach and the absence of reliable performance information has limited the Treasury Board's capacity to assess and address the management deficiencies or risks affecting the government as a whole and to inform strategic, government-wide expenditure decisions. Its involvement in departmental transactions has also at times blurred the lines of accountability between departments and the Treasury Board and risked supplanting the internal management of the department and eroding the accountability of ministers and the deputy minister.

Finally, a broad compliance framework is needed to reinforce public-sector values, reward performance excellence, and prescribe clear consequences for underperformance and non compliance. Many consequences and sanctions for individuals are already in place: to foster excellence, there are performance pay, promotions, and recognition awards; for non-compliance, written warnings, suspensions, demotions, terminations, and in rare cases criminal sanctions. However, managers are not always properly supported to employ these tools; when they do so, it is not always done in a uniform manner and the outcomes of their actions are not always transparent or widely reported. This has led to a perception that there are no consequences, for misconduct or mismanagement.

ACTION PLAN

Efforts to strengthen accountability are focussed in three areas:

• stronger accountability relationships;
• shared responsibility for oversight; and
• public service values.

The measures included in this action plan stand as the recommendations from the reviews of the doctrine and practice of ministerial responsibility and of non-compliance with the Financial Administration Act. The President of the Treasury Board conducted these reviews at the direction of the Prime Minister, following the tabling of the Auditor General's November 2003 report that dealt with, among other things, accountability and ethics in government.[3] The two reviews are companion documents to this action plan and can be found at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca.

Stronger Accountability Relationships

Enhancing Parliament's ability to hold the government to account

The government set out commitments to improve parliamentary reporting in Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability: An Action Plan for Democratic Reform and in the 2005 budget. Beginning in the fall of 2006, it will report annually to Parliament on the state of government-wide management and on human resources management.

But more can be done to improve reporting to Parliament. Currently, the information presented to parliamentarians is voluminous, but not always useful. In 2004, the government tabled over 1,000 statutorily required reports in Parliament. Few parliamentarians have the time or the staff resources to read all this material.

The government will consult with parliamentarians in 2006 to identify their priorities for performance information. Subject to consideration by Parliament, the government proposes to:

• seek ways to better reflect budget spending forecasts in the Main Estimates and link commitments made in reports on plans and priorities with results set out in departmental performance reports and support better parliamentary scrutiny of the Estimates;
• make the Public Accounts timelier and easier to use;
• better communicate the government's overall strategic plan at the beginning of each fiscal year to help parliamentarians assess spending proposals; and
• use technology to make spending and performance information more accessible to parliamentarians.

Clarifying and reinforcing accountabilities of ministers and deputy ministers

Maintaining and reinforcing ministerial accountability to Parliament is central to the government's efforts to strengthen accountability. The essential tenet of Canada's system of responsible government is that Parliament can hold individual ministers accountable for the management direction they provide to their organizations and for all actions taken on their behalf by officials. In this context, being held to account does not equate with being blamed. It means the minister must answer for what happened, take corrective action as necessary, and, depending on circumstances, accept personal consequences if the matter is attributable to the office holder's inappropriate action or inaction.

To give greater effect to their accountability to Parliament, ministers will attend more parliamentary committee meetings to explain and account for management performance. Likewise, to bolster oversight of management matters, the Treasury Board will call upon ministers and their deputy ministers more frequently to report on strategic management and spending plans, performance, and key management challenges and problems in their departments.

A range of measures will support ministers in providing leadership on the direction and overall management of their organization. Some of these are already best practices in departments and agencies. Ministers will:

• upon taking office, receive, along with the staff that work in their offices, a thorough briefing on matters of ministerial accountability, prepared by recognized experts both inside and outside the Public Service;
• receive detailed assurances that management control systems are in place to ensure the sound exercise of delegated authorities by officials; and
• set a schedule of regular accountability sessions with their deputy ministers on management matters and review progress by the department against established priorities.

Revised guidelines will make clear the appropriate roles and responsibilities of political staff in ministers' offices in dealing with departmental officials and underscore that the minister is accountable for their actions. The government will also provide detailed briefings to new senior staff in ministers' offices to ensure that they are aware of their roles and responsibilities and the boundaries with the non-partisan Public Service.

The deputy minister is accountable to the minister and to the Treasury Board specifically for ensuring:

• resources are organized to deliver departmental objectives, under the minister, in the most economical, efficient, and effective way;
• effective systems of internal control;
• compliance with financial policies and procedures;
• staffing and human resources planning and management;
• stewardship and safeguarding of public funds; and
• sound management of resources related to horizontal initiatives.

Deputy ministers will enter into management agreements with their ministers based on the department's Report on Plans and Priorities. Assessment of performance against the management commitments in these agreements will be one factor in the determination of a deputy minister's performance pay that will be made through the normal process of approval by Governor in Council, on the advice of the clerk of the Privy Council.

Deputy ministers are not accountable to Parliament, as this would undermine the political accountabilities of ministers and would undermine the non partisan nature of the Public Service. In supporting their respective minister's accountability, deputy ministers are answerable to parliamentary committees in the sense that they have a duty to inform and explain, as for example when appearing before them. Only ministers are accountable to Parliament.

Given the Treasury Board's responsibility for government-wide management standards and policies and the Secretariat's role in working with departments to ensure compliance, the Treasury Board plays an important role in ensuring that the appropriate interpretation of management policies is communicated to departments in a timely way. Should unresolved questions arise on the interpretation of standards and policies, departments should ask the Secretariat for an advance interpretation in order to clarify the matter. This will help to avoid disputes over the interpretation of Treasury Board management standards and policies that would require a decision of the Treasury Board. Should the issue remain unresolved, the minister may seek a Treasury Board decision on the interpretation and application of the standard or policy. Treasury Board decisions are shared with the Auditor General of Canada.

For other unresolved questions not related to the interpretation or application of Treasury Board management policies and standards, the current practice will prevail. When these situations arise, the deputy minister will discuss the matter with the clerk of the Privy Council, who may ultimately seek the consideration of the prime minister. In both cases, consistent with the principle of collective responsibility, this approach will ensure that the actions of any one minister do not detract from the advancement of government priorities as a whole.

Strengthening the accountabilities of deputy ministers and reinforcing their relationship to ministers in the manner outlined above will also help strengthen accountability for horizontal issues that cut across departmental lines. In our system of government, Cabinet decides collectively on the approach to be taken across departments on key cross-cutting issues. Individual ministers are fully accountable to Parliament and the prime minister for the aspect of the policy or program they are called upon to deliver. For major horizontal initiatives, Cabinet will provide ministers with overall direction and the Treasury Board will provide oversight for the management of their delivery and reporting requirements.

Shared Responsibility for Oversight

As the government's management philosophy has evolved-through a continuum of central control to increased flexibility for departments and agencies-its approach to oversight has also shifted. Oversight is a shared responsibility, principally between the Treasury Board, and departments and agencies. The Treasury Board executes its oversight in a manner that respects the accountabilities for sound management that rest with ministers and their organizations. In turn, deputy ministers need adequate assurance capacity in order to be confident that management controls in their organizations are working.

Strengthening departmental management control systems

The provision of strong assurance services in key areas such as internal audit and financial management better enables deputy ministers to fulfil their management responsibilities. Strong oversight within departments and agencies, where accountabilities lie, is essential to maintaining the appropriate balance within the accountability regime between departments and central agencies.

In Budget 2004, the government committed to reorganize and bolster the internal audit function government-wide. Strengthened internal audit will provide assurance to deputy ministers; reinforce good stewardship practices and sound decision making; and enable the Treasury Board to focus on government-wide strategic matters dealing with risk.

• The Government of Canada will designate a senior executive in each government department and agency to be known as the "chief audit executive." Recruitment and training for these new positions will begin as a priority.
• The Comptroller General of Canada has issued guidelines on qualifications of chief audit executives and the professionally accredited chief audit executives will be responsible for overseeing and promoting the professional conduct of internal audits, providing assurance on the adequacy of internal audits within departments, including assessing the adequacy of controls over financial management, financial reporting, and value for money of programs and activities.

Most departments and agencies have internal audit committees. To further protect the integrity of the audit process, the government will make these audit committees more independent of the management of the organizations they review. Within three years of the effective date of the policy, all audit committees will have a majority of members coming from outside the Public Service, with the remainder coming from outside the department in question-with the exception of the deputy minister, who may chair the audit committee or be an ex-officio member.

The Comptroller General will establish competency profiles for external members of the audit committee and, jointly with the deputy minister, will participate in their selection. Deputy ministers will continue to brief ministers on significant audit matters. It is expected that the minister will meet annually, in camera, with the Internal Audit Committee for assurance regarding risk management, control, and audit systems. It is also expected that the deputy minister will routinely be briefed by the Audit Committee on its assurance findings.

Taken together, these initiatives will standardize the audit function across government and build its capacity, objectivity, and independence. The government will monitor the implementation of the Internal Audit Policy and report on progress through departmental performance reports of both the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat and individual organizations.

Consistent with the new audit policy, internal audit capacity is being strengthened across government. In addition, capacity is being increased within the Office of the Comptroller General, to conduct horizontal audits in areas considered to be of high risk, such as compliance with contracting and human resources rules.

In addition, the Office of the Comptroller General will conduct focussed internal audits of more than 40 small departments and agencies starting in 2006. This is an efficient and cost-effective way to strengthen internal control and performance measurement and improve the ability of these smaller organizations to meet policy and regulation requirements.

The government is also realigning the functions of Consulting and Audit Canada to separate its consulting and audit services. The consulting services of Consulting and Audit Canada will be moved within Public Works and Government Services Canada. Over the next few months, Public Works and Government Services Canada will be working with the Office of the Comptroller General to determine how best to use the current audit services to strengthen the internal audit function government wide.

The ability of public sector organizations to manage their financial affairs properly from the outset is as important as the audit function. Since Budget 2004, the Office of the Comptroller General has, therefore, established a model to put a chief financial officer (CFO) in every department. The CFO will meet common certification standards, as well as review and sign off new spending proposals for that department for all initiatives having large financial impacts.

The government will begin ongoing annual audits of departmental financial statements, with an initial focus on about 20 of the largest organizations that represent about 90 per cent of government expenditures.

Departmental CFOs will provide Canadians and Parliament with increased confidence that public finances are being managed responsibly. Supported by professionally qualified financial officers, CFOs will provide deputy ministers with objective, credible advice and a strong assurance of due diligence and sound financial management. They will ensure the integrity, relevance, and reliability of financial management information, analysis, and advice.

Finally, the Management Accountability Framework provides deputy ministers with a comprehensive picture of the state of departmental management, complementing the work of internal audit and financial management units, and will assist deputies as they chart their respective agendas to strengthen management within their departments.

Modernizing Treasury Board oversight

The approach of the Treasury Board to its role as the management board of government will be modernized. Building on the Prime Minister's decision in December 2003 to re-focus the role of the Treasury Board, the Board will take a more strategic approach to its core responsibilities of:

• setting the highest standards of public management, consistent with public service values;
• aligning resources to achieve government priorities and results for Canadians;
• overseeing, controlling, and reporting on public expenditures based on sound principles of public management (as articulated e.g. in the Management Accountability Framework); and
• serving as the employer of the core Public Service.

Rather than putting in place more rules or focussing on individual departmental transactions, the Treasury Board's oversight role will rely on better and more timely information on program expenditures, human resources, and performance results-enabled by standardized information and business processes across government. This will help the Treasury Board focus on significant management policy challenges, as well as allocation and reallocation of resources for policy and program priorities, and provide oversight of horizontal initiatives and high-risk transactions.

Two initiatives are essential to enabling the Treasury Board to play this new role: firmly establishing the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) as the comprehensive accountability regime and streamlining the suite of Treasury Board management policies.

Introduced in 2003, MAF summarizes the government's expectations of deputy ministerial leadership in all areas of management-from financial to people management, from assigning accountabilities to reporting results. Used initially as a framework for informal discussions between the secretary of the Treasury Board and each deputy, MAF has matured through two cycles of departmental assessments.

The MAF assessment process has become a formal and large part of the annual government-wide planning and reporting cycle. Each year, all large departments and half of all small agencies undergo a Treasury Board assessment-nearly 70 organizations every round-against all MAF indicators. No other national government conducts so comprehensive an annual assessment of its management practices. Priorities identified for immediate action are to become part of a deputy minister's performance agreement with the clerk each year. The third cycle of MAF assessments now underway will be completed in January and findings will inform public and parliamentary reporting on the state of public service management in 2006.

The government is strengthening MAF as the basis of renewed oversight on the part of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. All Secretariat analysts are being trained to apply MAF and provided with new tools for managing MAF intelligence. MAF indicators are being made more precise and MAF information will, in due course, be publicly available in user friendly form. MAF assessments will eventually inform Treasury Board decisions to reallocate resources government-wide. As year-over-year information grows, MAF should make it easier for ministers, parliamentarians, and Canadians to assess whether and how public service management practice is improving.
Through MAF, among other things, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat monitors institutional compliance with Treasury Board policies and decisions and the Board will, where appropriate, grant increased flexibility to departments and agencies that demonstrate exemplary management practices in the use of their authorities. Equally important, based on these assessments, the Treasury Board will reinforce its measures and take consistent and definitive action in cases of mismanagement (e.g. requiring audits and evaluations, constraining authorities, freezing allotments of resources, and so on).

As the Treasury Board's role evolves, the government will make every effort to avoid entrenching hierarchies within decision making processes. Central controls should not undermine the individual accountability of ministers and deputy ministers for the management of organizations but provide the assurance for responsible innovation.

The government will also simplify and streamline the Treasury Board's management policies in order to:

• set out what is expected of ministers and deputy ministers to ensure the appropriate control mechanisms are in place and monitored;
• provide the basis for increased use of authority and indicate the appropriate response in cases of mismanagement;
• focus reporting requirements and ensure the provision of meaningful performance information;
• strengthen the requirement to monitor compliance in key risk areas, notify the Treasury Board in cases of mismanagement, and ensure a corrective response; and 
• support deputy ministers and managers in meeting policy requirements through an appropriate combination of tools, training, and internal communications.

In 2005, the government will update its policies on audit, procurement, project management, and learning and will commence implementation in 2006. By the end of 2006, the Treasury Board will approve policies governing management in other key areas.

The efforts to enhance MAF and streamline Treasury Board management policies will ensure that rules are tightly focussed on real issues, clearly understood, and closely monitored for compliance, particularly in high risk areas. Public service employees will have the training to understand the rules and have the resources and support to help comply with them.

Reflecting Public Service Values

An accountable government is one in which public service employees, political representatives, and private-sector vendors adhere to the values that underlie government rules and practices. It is equally one where government actions are transparent.

Reinforcing compliance and promoting quality performance

Canadians have the right to feel confident that public service employees understand what is expected of them. All public service employees must be knowledgeable about the rules and, in cases of underperformance or non-compliance, be subjected to appropriate sanctions.

When rules are broken, there will be consequences. The government will assure all public service employees, who take pride in their professionalism and integrity, that instances of wrongdoing, however infrequent, will not be tolerated. There is a wide spectrum of actions that can be taken to address cases of misconduct or unsatisfactory performance, ranging from mandatory training through to written reprimands, suspensions, demotions, or terminations, depending on the severity of the problem.

The government is introducing measures to make these remedies more accessible and to ensure that due process is followed.

In dealing with matters of discipline for wrongdoing:

• a quick-action investigative team will be put in place, co-ordinated at the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat-this will ensure adequate capacity for consistent and rapid investigation and disciplinary action;
• enhanced training will be provided to human resources specialists and, along with legal expertise, made more available to managers to ensure cases are dealt with appropriately and expeditiously;
• measures will be taken to increase awareness of and appropriate follow-through on the Treasury Board Policy on Losses of Money and Offenses and Other Illegal Acts Against the Crown to ensure the effective recovery of funds;
• disciplinary guides will be developed to ensure clarity about what constitutes misconduct and what are possible consequences: best practices, such as those that exist at Canada Revenue Agency, will be applied elsewhere; and
• a more rigorous process will be put in place to prevent re-employment of or contracting with individuals who were terminated from the Public Service, including verification of the conditions of departure from the Public Service.

The government will task deputy ministers with ensuring consistent application of disciplinary measures and appropriate follow-through and have them report to the Treasury Board on progress by the fall of 2006, as well as provide recommendations on further measures that may be required (including, e.g. greater flexibility to deploy employees within the Public Service and negotiate the terms of departure in cases of underperformance).

Furthermore, to enhance transparency and accountability, by the end of 2006, the government will report on aggregate numbers of cases of serious wrongdoing and responses taken (with appropriate respect for the law, individual privacy, and the principles of natural justice) to ensure summary information is available to examine trends and areas of risk. The government is pursuing the passage of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (Bill C-11), which aims to strengthen the regime for the disclosure and investigation of wrongdoing in the public-sector workplace.

In dealing with issues of unsatisfactory performance:

• management performance agreements with executives are being strengthened, reinforcing the linkage of compensation to tangible results;
• the new Public Service Labour Relations Act gives more weight to the deputy minister's opinion in cases of unsatisfactory performance, demotions, and terminations, which will give managers confidence that, in cases where their opinion and actions are found to be reasonable, their decisions will not be overturned in the adjudication process; and
• Treasury Board policies will express clear expectations for compliance and consequences for non compliance. In assessing performance using the Management Accountability Framework, the government will require deputy ministers to address compliance issues in their organizations.

A new compliance framework will clarify expectations and requirements, and ensure, through the provision of mandatory training and tools, that employees are equipped to carry out their duties and assess whether their actions comply with the rules.

Equally important, the government will guide managers on how best to reward employees for a high standard of performance and how to help employees who are underperforming improve. Community standards for HR specialists and codes of conduct will accompany this guidance to ensure that the government rewards performance excellence.

Instilling a strong culture of public service values and ethics across government requires continued effort. A new orientation program for public service employees and required training related to the exercise of their respective responsibilities are two key initiatives.

Consistent with Bill C-11, the government will also develop a charter of values of public service that sets out the principles and values that should guide federal public-sector employees in all their professional activities. The Charter will strengthen the framework of principles and guidance for public service employees in areas where public-sector values and conventions have been subject to pressure in recent years. The government will also develop a code of conduct for the entire federal public sector that translates the proposed Charter into specific rules of behaviour that underscore the high sense of professionalism within the Public Service.

Increasing transparency

Information makes government more open and accountable. The Access to Information Act remains an important vehicle for Canadians to obtain unpublished information on government operations to hold the government to account. To increase transparency, the government already brought 10 additional Crown corporations under the Act in 2005[5] and will now amend legislation to require another seven to adhere to its provisions.[6] To guide the direction of further changes, the Minister of Justice has sought the views of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy, and Ethics on the approach outlined in the Comprehensive Framework for Access to Information Reform he tabled in April 2005, with a view to expanding the provisions of the Act.

Proactive disclosure of information is another important way to make information available to Canadians. The government already provides proactive disclosure of hospitality and travel expenses, reclassification of positions, and contracts worth over $10,000. Beginning in the spring of 2006, the government will make information on grants and contributions available through proactive disclosure, initially for those above $25,000.

As noted, following consultations with parliamentarians, the government will confirm its plan to report to Parliament and to the public in a more efficient way and on more varied aspects of public sector management.

Canadians have a right to expect that the working relationship between the government and the private sector-which involves transactions worth billions of dollars each year-be founded on integrity. To ensure this relationship is framed within an enhanced culture of integrity, the government will immediately begin working with the private sector to develop a strong code of fair contract practices, an integrity pact between government and those with whom it contracts.

The Code of Fair Contract Practices will consolidate the government's existing suite of conflict of interest and anti corruption policies, including anti bribe measures, as well as other integrity measures such as the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service. As an overarching framework, it will form a comprehensive statement of expectations of suppliers when dealing with public service employees, and vice versa, that will be communicated within the Public Service and to its suppliers. Codifying and communicating such a framework will promote awareness of the government's expectations and increase the level of transparency and accountability in this important relationship. Over time, the Code could be expanded by incorporating new measures.

As part of this new approach, integrity provisions will be embedded into all contracts to provide a clear statement of the obligations currently set out in the Criminal Code, including the prohibitions against paying, offering, demanding, or accepting bribes or colluding with others to obtain a contract. As well, the integrity clauses would include the disclosure requirements contained in the Lobbyists Registration Act.

We call this Code an "integrity pact" because we will form a partnership on these issues with suppliers. The Government of Canada will deal only with suppliers who are prepared to work within this framework. Contracts will provide for a range of sanctions for improper or illegal conduct, including exclusion from future procurement opportunities.

In building a stronger partnership with the private sector, the government will also work with suppliers to learn from their best practices and encourage others to establish and expand their own codes of conduct where such practices do not exist. Through the Code of Fair Contract Practices and by embedding integrity provisions into contracts, the government will clarify expectations for both suppliers and public service employees.

Minimizing the conflict between private interests and public service duties is critical to upholding the values of the Public Service. While the need to avoid conflict of interest is most pressing during a public service employee's career, it is also critical once an employee leaves the Public Service. This is especially important since an increasing number of retiring public service employees are seeking new employment opportunities as their careers come to an end. To further ensure that retiring employees do not find themselves in a position of real, apparent, or potential conflict of interest, the government will take steps to clarify the suite of post employment measures articulated in the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service. In particular, the post employment measures will be clarified to ensure that recently retired employees do not find themselves in conflict of interest when working for, or sub-contracting with, firms contracting with the government.

On another front, important amendments to the Lobbyists Registration Act that came into force in June 2005 will help strengthen transparency in lobbying activities. The registrar enforces the Act and the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct. To further strengthen its independence, the Office of the Registrar will operate as a stand-alone entity within Industry Canada, pending further potential enhancements to the Office's independence.

Conclusion

Taken together, the government's initiatives to strengthen accountability will result in significant reform. An accountable government is clear about roles and responsibilities, and all players-from individual employees to ministers-fulfil their responsibilities and answer for their performance. It has a robust oversight and compliance regime that safeguards public funds, reduces risk, promotes innovative problem solving, and ensures that there are consequences when rules or public service values are knowingly compromised. It recognizes that having the courage to be forthright about what went wrong can lead to continuous improvement and better results. It ensures that parliamentarians and Canadians have the information they need to assess the government's performance. Finally, accountable government is guided by the ethics, integrity, and core values of a non-partisan, professional public service.