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Q1. What does the Army’s chain of command mean by “Soldiers Come First”?
A1. The Army’s chain of command has great concerns regarding the demands being placed on our soldiers. The Army can only consider itself successful if the soldiers and their families are taken care of.
Personnel tempo, operational demands, taskings, training, and uncertainty should be wisely managed and every measure taken to reduce the pressure on our soldiers. Those measures include examining the training the Army conducts and how it is delivered, and planning to attain the right balance between operational requirements and the need for quality of life for our soldiers and their families. 
Q2. What do you mean when you say you are transforming the Army? Preparing for the Three-Block War versus the Cold War (snakes versus bear). All three blocks simultaneously, in the center of populations, and in big cities. Towns where the people we help are also trying to kill us. How do we fight? How do we train? How do we command? How do we generate and sustain forces?
A2. The Army has to evolve from a Force that was Cold War oriented, that is structured to face heavily mechanized forces in a Northern European theatre, to an agile knowledge-based Force better suited for the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century – terrorism, suicide bombers.
To achieve this, the Army must change the way it generates forces, the way it trains and the way it fights. To do so, the Army released its Army Strategy in 2002. An element of this strategy is the development of the Army of Tomorrow, which will ensure the Army provides to the government affordable, combat-capable, sustainable forces by 2020.
The evolution towards this Army of Tomorrow has been broken up in interim targets with the initial five-years grouped together in an initiative known as Interim Model Implementation. The actions associated with the five-year targets are seen as evolutionary in nature and are designed to set the conditions necessary for the revolutionary change envisioned for the Army of Tomorrow.
The recent operational tempo, coupled with fiscal reality (budget), has lead to the Army’s structures being increasingly difficult to sustain, and unrealistic to achieve the Interim Model Implementation. It also triggered a need for a regeneration period. The two initiatives, the Army Transformation and the Regeneration Plan, are operating at the same time, so that the Army will emerge from its regeneration period with combat-capable, sustainable force structures that are in synchronization with the Interim Army Model Implementation.
Q3. How will you regenerate the field force?
A3. The Managed Readiness cycle changes how a unit trains, prepares for deployment, and deploys the number of troops in a task tailored force depending on the mission.
The regeneration period will happen as units are placed in a 36-month Managed Readiness cycle. This cycle means that the Army will always have the right equipment and better-trained troops ready to deploy. This cycle includes recovery time as a part of the approximate 21-month regeneration period known as “Support”.
The Army is combining its efforts to achieve an Interim Model Implementation that will be able to increase its sustainment base by reorganizing unit structures, and at the same time advancing in transforming into a more agile force better suited to meet today’s threats, increase its capability and capacity to meet the Army’s operational missions and tasks, and synchronize its training accordingly.
Q4. How can the regeneration period help in expanding the Army?
A4. The regeneration period as such will not expand the Army. The regeneration period has been established in order to allow the Army to reorganize its forces in such a way that when the operational tempo resumes its normal pace, in February 2006, the Army’s contribution to the high readiness tasks are sustainable indefinitely.
Q5. How can the regenerating period improve the Army’s capability and readiness?
A5. The current high operational tempo, combined with the present budget reality, has led to an Army that is becoming less and less capable of meeting sustaining commitments to its assigned tasks. During this regeneration period, the Army will improve its capabilities and readiness by improving its ability to sustain whatever forces it deploys for an extended period, by transforming the structures of the forces committed to high readiness operational tasks (such as the task forces committed to NATO or United Nations/Standby High Readiness Brigade (UN/SHIRBRIG)), by increasing its ability to meet operational requirements, ensuring the modernization of its equipment, and by synchronizing its training.
This means that the Army’s commitments will improve its readiness posture by providing a Brigade Headquarters and Signal squadron of approximately 400 personnel and up to two task forces, including a National Support Element and the Army’s portion of a National Command Element. Each task force could add up to approximately 1,000 personnel.
Q6. Will soldiers really see a difference in the number of deployments that affect them?
A6. Yes, soldiers will see a difference in personal tempo. Presently units training cycles are not properly geared towards upcoming deployments, leading to increased personal and operational tempo within units. To establish a “Train to need” approach, that is identify for each unit, its training objectives and deadlines. The Army is introducing a new system, called the Army’s Managed Readiness system. It will ensure that soldiers are more aware of the planned activities of their units. Providing soldiers much more predictability in their careers and their family life.
Within the three-year cycle of the Managed Readiness system, a soldier will encounter one high readiness phase, which may include an operational deployment. After the high readiness phase, there will be a recovery/individual training phase that will prepare the soldier for the next collective training phase, in preparation for the next high readiness phase.
The key to success, in order to reduce the Personal tempo for the soldier, will be the strict execution of the Army Managed Readiness system within the Managed Readiness cycle.
Q7. How will regeneration improve Army sustainability?
A7. During the regeneration period, the Army will rebalance its forces from its current structures into deployable task forces that will be sustainable indefinitely. Typically, those task forces will be smaller than the units the Army has deployed in the past. The Army will also increase the manning level of some of its unique capabilities; like PSYOPS, and build up operationally committed stocks, pre-positioning those in Canada in order to meet future operational requirements.
Q8. How will regeneration rebalance the Field Force?
A8. During the regeneration period that is from now until February 2006 the Army will rebalance its field force with a one-time allocation of money required to move 615 personnel in FY 05-06 for the manning shortfalls of distressed or unique capabilities. The best example is that of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) in Wainwright, which is the Army’s top transformation priority and unique capability.
As well, it will also start adjusting its unit’s manning levels in accordance with their position on the Managed Readiness cycle. The year 2005 will also see a concrete example of Army transformation with the integration of the Tow Under Armour, currently held by the infantry, into an armoured unit.
Q9. How much money has been identified to implement the Regeneration period?
A9. Currently, the identified costs of the Regeneration plan amount to approximately $15M. Those millions will be divided up for many requirements, such as to help finance the reallocation of existing vehicles and equipment within the Army. Remaining costs to be identified include the costs associated with operational stocks, movement of ammunition stocks, matching the operational stocks with the TO&E and the rental costs of commercial vehicles and equipment.
Q10. Can you give examples when you say that you will build operational stocks to meet operational commitments?
A.10 After the regeneration period, the Army has committed to provide two task forces for international deployment, and to maintain that kind of commitment for an indefinite period. The Army will identify and commit the equipment required for those task forces by pre-positioning it in Canada for initial deployment (in Montreal). After deployment in a single or in two separate theatres, this equipment will either remain in theatre for follow-on rotations or be re-deployed in Canada or in another theatre for subsequent operations. We also have collective training, individual training, logistic and unit stocks.
Q11. Can you give some examples of ongoing or future projects that will help the Army field new capabilities?
A.11 Specific examples include: The establishment of a tactical unmanned air vehicle (UAV) sub-unit, the creation of a single Direct Fire unit containing Mobile Gun System (MGS), Tow Under Armour (TUA), and Air Defence Anti-Tank System (ADATS) and the arrival of the man-portable Advanced Lightweight Anti-Armour Weapon System (ALAAW).
From an institutional perspective, the Army is setting up the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC), which, using state of the art technology will validate and confirm the operational preparation of those army units set to deploy internationally.
Q12. What will regeneration do to improve the field force operational readiness?
A12. The Regeneration plan will improve the field force operational readiness in three different ways. First, by establishing and maintaining a new force generation model. This means that the Army will change the way its assets to be deployed overseas are generated back in Canada. The model is based on the current Land Force units providing “building blocks”, at sub-unit level, for the High-Readiness task forces.
Second, the Army will set-up a Surge / Strategic Reserve capability, of unit size, on top of its current High-Readiness tasks, for domestic or international deployment. Finally, a greater emphasis is going to be placed on the integration of Reserve capabilities, especially for Domestic Operations and augmenting task forces.
Hence the on-going work happening within the Army to rebalance its forces, to generate task forces of up to 1,000 personnel including the National Support and the National Command elements, to increase the manning levels of some of its unique capabilities and to build-up its Operational stocks. By the end of the Regeneration period, in February 2006, the Army will be able to support its operational commitments indefinitely.
Q13 What is wrong with the way the Army has been training up to now?
A13. To date, Army unit training was not always linked to high-readiness tasks, which lead to scarce training resources not being fully optimized. Within the Managed Readiness System, the Army will adopt a “Train to need and Just in time” approach linked to operational tasks with each Army unit being fully aware of its training objectives and deadlines.
Q14. How will the Army chain of command synchronize training to improve its readiness posture?
A14. More emphasis will be applied in order to achieve better synchronization of training with operational requirements. A strategic plan will be developed to harmonize both collective and individual training, using a “Train to need and Just in time training” approach. The Army will also push to integrate training for its new capabilities. As well, more emphasis will be placed on the development of ranges and on alternate means of training, such as simulation. Finally, a mature Army training management framework (ATMF) will be put in place.
The end-result of those initiatives is that individual units will have less latitude than before in defining their own training plans and agendas. This is in accord with the Army’s aim of getting the right kit, to the right units, at the right time and the right location. All of this is based on the Army Managed Readiness Synchronisation Matrix. Units will be given their High Readiness Tasks well in advance. Unit COs will still have control over the conduct of Level 1-4 training, which means some latitude will still exist.
Q15. How can this plan be successfully carried out in just over 18 months? Isn’t the Army supposed to be getting a break right now?
A15. The Army is actually getting a break! The Canadian Government has actually accepted that the Army would not deploy a Force of more than about 800 personnel in one location during the regeneration period. This will provide our soldiers with a much-needed reduction in personnel tempo concerning deployments.
The main effort throughout this regeneration period will be the generation and sustainment of the task forces required to meet the high readiness tasks as of February 06. The major challenge faced by the Army over the regeneration period is confronting basic structural changes in the way it generates forces for deployment and employment.
Q16. Why are the CIMIC, PSYOPS and Geomatics roles being given to the Reserves?
A16. Those operational capabilities were devoted to the Reserves, as they are better able to target the existing pool of expertise in the civilian world. An operationally focused Reserve will be responsible for the recruitment initiatives and for the professional development in those highly specialised fields.
Q17. How can the Reserves fit into the 3-year cycle if they mainly train in the summer months?
A17. Each Area is expected to provide, each year, a Reserve Combined Arms Team (RCAT), for possible deployment, at individual or sub-sub unit level (platoon size) as part of an Army task force. The RCAT training will span more than one year, as the sub-unit will need to be formed, trained to level 4 prior to attending a Summer Canadian Manoeuvre Training.
Q18. Can we really believe that the Army can increase the readiness posture of reserve units especially to meet new homeland security tasks?
A18. Over the last few years, The Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) has produced concrete results proving that, the readiness posture of the Army’s Reserve could be increased. LFRR has raised the strength of the Reserves to 15,500. It has reached a consensus on future Reserves roles missions and tasks that, among other things, identify unique operational capabilities devoted to the Reserves.
The Project is also looking at an equal balance in benefits, such as pay and pension between the Reserves and the Regular Force. All of this will provide better motivation for our Reservists and better retention. In a next phase, LFRR will increase the Reserves numbers to 18,500 while putting more emphasis on the Homeland Defence operational commitment.
Q19. How will troops get enough training on vehicle systems if they are not co-located and working with those systems on a daily basis?
A19. The Army will ensure that sufficient number of equipment will be available in sufficient quantity, in each Area, to allow for units getting prepared for a High-Readiness cycle to train properly. Not all units within the same formation will be similarly equipped because equipment distribution will be synchronised with the Managed Readiness cycle.
Q20. What does regeneration mean for the infantry units that have lost their Coyotes, Tow Under Armour (TUA) and 81 mm Mortars?
A20. With the introduction of the LAV III in the infantry battalions, there has been a requirement for additional personnel in the companies to man the vehicles (the LAV requiring a 3-man crew). Some positions gained in the battalions by the transfer of the Surveillance/TUA/Mortar capabilities have been redistributed in the infantry companies.
Q21. What will happen to the soldiers manning the present ADATS, Leopard Tanks, M109 Self-Propelled Howitzer and TUA?
A21. As part of the transformation of the Land Forces into successful medium weight forces, the current ADATS battery primary role will change into a Direct Fire role, although it will maintain its Air Defence capability. The battery will be established as of 2007, as part of the Direct Fire unit, the LdSH (RC).
Two of the three Armoured regiments will re-role into Surveillance units, manned by the Armour soldiers. The remaining Leopard tanks will be with the LdSH (RC) until 2007 when the Mobile Gun System (MGS) will become operational.
The gunners manning the M109 self-propelled howitzers, will revert to the 105 towed howitzers and will modernize with precision guided ammunitions and greater detection capabilities.
TUA has been taken out of the Infantry battalions, with the exception of those in 1PPCLI and 2PPCLI. The remaining company’s worth of TUA will be incorporated into the Direct Fire unit, meaning that infantry personnel will be posted into that mixed unit LdSH (RC) as early as 2005.
Q22. How can training at CMTC Wainwright be advantageous to the soldiers getting ready to meet new mission threat?
A22. CMTC is being established in Wainwright to provide state-of-the-art force on force training to Task Forces (TFs). CMTC will prepare TFs to operate, survive, fight and win in the new global security environment, where asymmetric threats dominate the spectrum of conflict. The 28-day training phase at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre will confirm the Task Force’s Operational effectiveness, prior to its eventual deployment.
Q23. How will the concept of Whole Fleet Management improve the ability to deploy troops over the world?
A23. The Whole Fleet Management (WFM) concept will assist in managing the major Army equipment by providing Army authorities (G3, G4) with visibility over the entire equipment fleets, such as vehicles, radios, etc… WFM will provide a supportable, effective, and economical way to meet the stated operational, training, and support requirements of the Army.
Whole Fleet Management will be combined with the Army’s Managed Readiness system so as to ensure that equipment allocation to units is done based on immediate need for training and operations.
The Army Support Restructure (ASR), another Regeneration guiding concept, is under way to change how the support to the Army equipment, by unit and formation maintenance people, is to be provided. Whereas in the past we have equipped units according to structure, in future we will equip units according to training requirements based on the Managed Readiness System.
Q24. Is Army regeneration on target with the upcoming Defence Review?
A24. Understanding the impact of the Defence Statement, the Army is very confident that the Army Regeneration plan meets the objectives of the statement and sets the conditions for an effective Army Managed Readiness System.
Q25. How long will the Army be able to sustain its missions if new positions announced by the Government Speech of the Throne do no get filled by recruits? Or do not get filled as quickly as you would wish?
A25. The Army held a Structure Working Group, early in October 2004, and created its task forces. Those task forces will be sustainable for an indefinite period, although this will leave the Army with little flexibility. The structures arrived at did not take into consideration the new positions announced by the Government. Any additional positions will however be welcomed to relieve the anticipated pressures created after the regeneration period.
Q26. Are we moving away from the Regimental system by using “building blocks” for task force generation?
A26. The Army is not moving away from the Regimental system by using a “building blocks” approach to task force generation. In garrison, as in domestic operations, there will not be any change to the designation and make-up of our units. What may change is the origin of some of the task force elements, notably sub-units, to be deployed outside of country.
Depending on the operational requirement, a task force, based for example on 1 R22eR, may end up being made-up of sub-units (building blocks) coming from other units. The unit HQ and two infantry coys would come from 1R22eR for sure, however other capabilities would come from elsewhere: EW from LFDTS, direct fire capability from LFWA, PsyOps from SQFT, etc.
Under the Army’s new structures, it is possible, though not probable, that a Task Force deploying under one of our current unit’s name, for example RCD, may include more assets coming from other units than from RCD. In fact, in the most extreme scenario, depending on the operational requirement, it may occur that a RCD Task Force, only includes the Battalion HQ from that unit.
Q27. Why are we calling the deploying units “task forces” instead of battle groups as we used to?
A27. Task Force better reflects the reality in terms of various capabilities and capacity. The main element will consist of approximately 700-750 soldiers and the support elements will consist of approximately 250-300 soldiers, for a total of 1,000 soldiers.
Q28. Why are task forces based on 750 personnel and not more?
A28. One of the principles of the Managed Readiness plan is that, after the regeneration period, the task forces that the Army will field as part of its High-Readiness commitments, must be sustainable indefinitely. In the past, the Army fielded units of such size that they proved to be unsustainable. This lead to personnel shortages, to a rapid decline of Army equipment and stocks and to a reduction of the Army’s overall readiness. Fielding of smaller task forces, that are sustainable, will ensure that the Army’s efficiency and readiness levels are maintained while remaining relevant and decisive on operations.
Q29. Can the Army deploy more than two (2) task forces?
A29. On top of the two task forces that the Army will train every six months, the Army may be called upon to deploy a Brigade HQ and a Headquarters and Signal squadron during a one-year period. As well, a strategic reserve / surge capability will be identified that could be deployed for six months up to one year, in and out of rotations.
Q30. Can the support trades deploy enough troops to support the task force on a sustainable basis in deployed Operations?
A30. The Army will be able to field and sustain two National Support Elements (NSE) and National Command Elements (NCE) consisting of 250-300 personnel each. Each task force will deploy with an NSE. Should an additional task requiring the deployment of a Headquarters and Signal squadron or the strategic reserve / surge capability come up, a tailored NSE and NCE would also deploy.
Q31. The TOW Under Armour capability will transfer to LdSH (RC) soon; Will the infantry soldiers have to re-badge? Are they going to wear the black beret? To whom will they report for career issues and promotion?
A31. The infantry soldiers will not have to re-badge. The LdSH (RC) will become a mixed unit that will be the first to validate some of the concepts brought forward by the regeneration plan and by Army Transformation. As early as 2005, on top of the TUA company, three infantry personnel will be posted to the unit Regimental HQ as a first step transforming the unit. Then in 2006 another sub-unit, this one an Air Defence Battery, will also join the unit.
Q32. Will the task forces see their efficiency reduced following their downsizing in number of soldiers?
A32. The task forces will be approximately 750 personnel strong, supported by a National Support Element of approximately 250 personnel, bringing the Army’s contribution to a theatre to approximately 1,000 personnel. Though it will be smaller than battle groups deployed in the past, the task force will be capable of carrying out its assigned mission so there will be no loss in efficiency because they will use speed, agility, and information dominance to achieve their tasks. Task forces size will be relevant to the current threat and theatre of operation.
As this number is far less than the previous battle groups and support elements that the Army deployed over the last few years, the Army will have to do more planning, notably in task selection for its task forces, prior to deployment. In other words we will have to live within our means.
It used to be that a Canadian unit would deploy overseas in such numbers that it could accomplish all possible tasks in a theatre. These oversized units proved to be impossible to sustain and caused the Army to require the regeneration period. The new approach envisaged is similar to the one of our traditional Allies.
Q33. What will replace the Tow Under Armour capability for infantry units?
A33. The Advanced Lightweight Anti-Armour Weapon System (ALAAWS) capital project will field a missile system to infantry units, beginning in 2007. This system will be man-portable and vehicle-mounted. It will operate in the medium range and cover the ranges 300-2000 m and will be able to destroy any tanks known.
Q34. What is the "3-D" approach?
A34. The Canadian government has a Team Canada “3-D” approach to international affairs - that is the integration of Canadian diplomacy, defence and development efforts. With this approach, DND is working much more closely with other departments and agencies, such as Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, in order to maximize the effectiveness of Canada's involvement on the international scene.
This “3-D” approach has been an unqualified success in Afghanistan. Canadian diplomats are assisting the Afghan people rebuild their country's institutions; Canadian aid workers have undertaken numerous humanitarian projects; and our troops are in Kabul contributing to the stability needed for the other two groups to succeed in their work.
Q35. What is the three-block war?
A35. The three-block war was a term first coined by General Charles Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. He envisioned that friendly forces could be called upon to carry out, on the same day, three very different kinds of operations within an area the size of three city blocks. Block 1 could involve feeding and clothing displaced refugees, or providing humanitarian assistance. Block 2 could be keeping two factions apart, stabilization, or peace support operations. Block 3 is mid to high intensity fighting or war fighting. The three-block war concept has now been adopted by all major countries.
The key for Canada's Army is that we must be ready to conduct these operations simultaneously and very close to one another. We must be prepared to conduct them in large urban centres and complex terrain. This leads to the image of the Canadian soldier as a warrior-diplomat-humanitarian.
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