Against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Our ultimate goal is the total elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and introducing effective controls on their means of delivery. We also aim to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear power in a safe and secure manner.

The illicit possession and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (generally referred to as Weapons of Mass Destruction, or WMD), as well as their means of delivery, presents a grave threat to Canadian national security.

This threat can come from both state and non-state actors. It challenges us at home. And it places our national interests overseas in jeopardy. Given rapid advances in and the spread of scientific and technical knowledge (especially in the life sciences, and missile technology), the threat is likely to grow. Failing to act decisively now risks allowing the problems to fester and multiply.

Our response to this threat is based around a strategy that aims to address three broad areas: Motive, Access, and People as Proliferators (MAPP).

Motive: the intent to acquire or retain WMD

As a first step, we need to remove the incentive to try to develop or illicitly retain (and ultimately use) WMD, by increasing the political and economic costs of doing so, reducing the perceived benefits, and addressing the root causes leading to efforts to acquire or retain such illicit weapons.

Wider peace-building or conflict prevention policies, such as attempts to re-energise the Middle East Peace Process, or encouraging closer ties between India and Pakistan, have an important role in furthering our non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.

The main multilateral treaties (the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)) create a powerful international norm against developing WMD. These multilateral treaties help deter, complicate, and raise the political cost of pursuing such weapons. In this regard, continued support for the multilateral fora responsible for such treaties is paramount. But, in itself, it is not enough.

When such treaties and regimes are coupled with effective verification regimes, such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), they help further deter non-compliance, and build confidence in states' undertakings. States determined to pursue WMD may be forced into expensive denial and deception efforts, further limiting the potential to develop such weapons and raising the economic cost of proliferation. Ultimately, effective inspection regimes should be able to help reveal illicit covert activities, and to promote greater openness and transparency. Sanctions against transgressor states or entities also help raise the political and economic cost of proliferation.

Canada remains committed to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament in a manner consistent with our membership in NATO. Until our ultimate goal of universal nuclear disarmament is reached, we must recognize that deterrence can continue to play a key role in dissuading potential aggressors that would seek to threaten our national security. Finally, we also need to reduce the perceived benefit of WMD possession and threat of use. Developing our defensive capabilities and effective emergency management - including civil defence - helps demonstrate our resilience, and makes clear our determination not to be cowed by the threat of WMD

Access to equipment and material

National and multilateral export controls on sensitive goods, technology and expertise help control or denying access to WMD-related material and technology. The various export control regimes (such as the Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, or the Australia Group) bring together like-minded countries to establish international standards to control the export of proliferation sensitive equipment and material.

The Global Partnership, launched during the Canadian G8 Presidency in 2002, aims to help address the threats posed by the Cold War legacy of WMD and related materials, initially in the Russian Federation. For example, Canada's Global Partnership Programme is helping dismantle Russian decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines, construct a facility to destroy Russia's extensive chemical weapons stockpiles, and provide physical protection upgrades at nuclear facilities.

In addition, we need to control existing stocks of related material. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 introduced a binding requirement on all states to introduce, and enforce, domestic controls to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to WMD-related material.

Interception of illegal shipments of WMD-sensitive items, for example under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), can help disrupt or sever WMD trafficking networks and hinder covert proliferation programmes.

People as proliferators

Finally, we need to consider the crucial part played in any weapons development programme by the procurement agents and the suppliers, as well as the scientists, engineers and technicians who piece together the disparate elements. In short, we need to deter the proliferators themselves.

Encouraging co-operation between intelligence and military services, and in law enforcement, can help identify individuals involved in illicit activities. Once such individuals are identified, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 also obliged states to ensure that proliferation-related activities are effectively criminalised, and proliferators punished.

Co-operative threat reduction projects in the former Soviet Union, such as the Nunn-Lugar Amendment and the G8 Global Partnership, provide alternative gainful employment for former WMD scientists help to ensure that proliferation-sensitive expertise is not sold to the highest bidder.

Implementation

Acting decisively requires a strategy against WMD that takes our policies beyond the political-diplomatic world of negotiation and international institutions. It requires the active involvement of other Government departments in order to be successful.

Proliferation poses a global challenge: it requires a collective international response. For example, the export controls regimes are only as strong as their weakest link, and multilateral negotiating fora are only as strong as the commitment of participating states. Canadian national policies and activities are being augment with bilateral cooperation and through multilateral organisations, such as the IAEA, OPCW, G8, NATO, UN, and the Conference on Disarmament, to achieve our national security objectives.