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2001
Transforming Agriculture: The Benefits and Costs of Genetically Modified Crops (disponible en anglais seulement)
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Prepared For
The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee Project Steering
Committee on the Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods
By Murray Fulton, Hartley Furtan, Dustin Gosnell, Richard Gray, Jill
Hobbs, Jeff Holzman, Bill Kerr, Jodi McNaughten, Jan Stevens, Derek
Stovin
March 2001
Table of Contents
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Introduction
-
Biotechnology and Industry Concentration
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Environmental Impacts of Transgenic Crops
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Agronomic Costs and Benefits of GMO Crops: What
Do We Know?
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Consumer Responses to Food Quality, Food Safety,
and Health Concerns
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Labelling Food Containing GMOs: The Segregation
Requirement
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Commercial Trade Issues in Biotechnology
-
Biotechnology and Lesser Developed Countries: An
Overview of the Issues
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Overview and Conclusions
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Introduction
Richard Gray
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Background
Scientific advancements in molecular biology have resulted
in new and controversial biotechnologies that allow much
greater scope for the genetic manipulation of life forms.
Among the most controversial is transgenics, a
biotechnology that allows the transfer of genes between
species. The use of transgenic processes — often
referred to as genetic modification — to produce new
crops has spawned considerable public debate over the
costs and benefits of these crops. Those who are strongly
opposed to genetic modification (GM) argue that these new
life forms pose a threat to food safety, the environment,
and the social structure of agriculture. Those who come
down in favour of GM crop production argue that these
technologies present minimal risks, and have the potential
to create more plentiful, high-quality food at a lower
cost to the environment, and to the benefit of farmers,
consumers, and society in general. Among such strongly
held opposing views on GM technology, it is often
difficult for the public to find objective information.
The purpose of this report is to examine a number of
important issues that are related to GM technology and to
summarize what is known about these issues to this point.
A general economic framework will be used, examining the
social costs and benefits related to each issue. Each
chapter relies on the available literature. On some issues
the economic framework is fully developed, and studies
have calculated the costs and benefits; in such cases, the
authors rely on the scientific literature for their
analysis. On other issues there is a limited amount of
conceptual work, and empirical measurements of the effects
do not yet exist; in these cases, the authors provide a
conceptual framework to identify where impacts are
potentially significant and require further examination.
This report is organised into nine chapters, each with
different authors. This chapter provides an introduction,
some definitions, and the general framework used to
identify and evaluate the issues. Chapters 2 through 8
systematically address specific issues related to GM
technologies. Chapter 9 summarizes the report and
identifies outstanding issues that will need to be
addressed by the industry and by policy makers.
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Definitions
The following definitions are used throughout this report:
-
A Genetically Modified Organism, or GMO, is
any organism that contains recombinant DNA; that is, in
which DNA has been transferred from one organism to
another.
-
Genetic Modification is the process of
creating a GMO.
-
A GM product is a product produced from a GMO.
These definitions have been adopted principally because of
their widespread use in the popular media. It is important
to be aware, however, that the scientific community has a
much broader conception of genetic modification, one that
differs considerably from narrow popular definitions.
Figure 1 depicts the scientific community’s view
that there are many processes that can bring about genetic
modification. Traditional methods of genetic modification
include selective crossbreeding and hybridization. Other
methods include interspecies and intergeneric protoplast
fusion, in vitro gene transfer techniques, somaclonal
selection, haploid doubling, and mutagenesis (McHughen,
2000). In the scientific sense, virtually all agricultural
crops have been genetically modified over time. Rather
than using the term “GMO,” then, the
scientific community prefers “genetically
engineered,” “genetically transformed,”
“rDNA technology,” “gene
splicing,” or simply “transgenic.”
Figure 1: Scientific View of “Genetic
Modification”
The narrower definition of genetic modification used in
this paper is illustrated in Figure 2. It refers
specifically to the form of biotechnology which is at the
centre of the policy debate.
Figure 2: The Popular Use of “Genetic
Modification”
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The Cost-Benefit Approach
This report discusses the potential costs of and benefits
to be gained from GM crops. Economists recognise that
these are both private and social. Private costs and
benefits are those which can be fully accounted for in
market prices. When there are no distortions in the
marketplace, the benefits that a product provides to
consumers who buy and consume it will be reflected in its
price. Similarly, firms incur costs in producing goods and
services. These costs are incorporated into the price they
charge for their products. A higher price therefore
reflects the additional costs that a firm incurs in
producing a good.
Sometimes, however, markets fail. When this happens, the
market price does not accurately reflect all the relevant
costs and benefits arising from the production and
consumption of a good. Non-market externalities arise from
market failure; the market under-provides goods or
services with external benefits (also known as positive
externalities). Among health-care services, for example,
vaccines that combat communicable diseases benefit not
only the person who is vaccinated but others who do not
pay for the benefit. Or an individual may pay to have a
tree planted in her front yard; the tree provides an
aesthetic benefit for the community, yet she is not paid
for it. Conversely, the market over-provides goods and
services that generate external costs (negative
externalities). A pulp mill may pollute a body of water,
for instance, causing hardship for those who live
downstream. The mill is creating a negative externality if
those who are negatively affected are not adequately
compensated by the pulp mill. These external costs are
said to occur outside the market. Both negative and
positive externalities are sometimes referred to as
spillover effects (Gray et al, 2001).
When market failure occurs, the equilibrium market outcome
is inefficient, leading to losses in social welfare. As a
result, when making an evaluation of a GM product, it is
important to identify these non-market externalities so
that they can be considered in the assessment of the
good’s desirability. Market failure provides the
rationale for government intervention to correct the
failure through taxation, subsidisation, regulation, the
public provision of goods, and/or direct legislative
action. Whether intervention is desirable will depend on
the nature and size of the externality and the costs
associated with it. Economic analysis has a critical role
to play here. Will policy intervention to correct market
failure result in a net gain to society? Which is the
appropriate policy intervention, given the market failure
identified? Cost-benefit analysis is an important tool for
evaluating the desirability of policy intervention.
Three key steps are involved in cost-benefit analysis.
First, the relevant costs and benefits, both private and
external, must be identified. Second, a value must be
placed on those costs and benefits. Finally, an overall
assessment must be made as to whether there are net social
welfare gains or losses over time. This report focuses
primarily on the first of these steps, although it
summarizes research — when such research is
available —that addresses the second step. It most
cases, however, it is too soon to move to step two. The
report therefore seeks to identify both gaps in our
knowledge and the research necessary to enable a more
formal quantification of costs and benefits in the future.
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Organization of the Report to
Identify Costs and Benefits
The genetic modification of crops is a new technology with
a great number of potential costs and benefits. These
impacts accrue at different stages in the marketing chain,
including variety sales, farm production, marketing, and
consumption. Moreover, the parallel links throughout the
non-GM marketing chain can be positively or negatively
affected by the introduction of a GM crop. In addition to
the effects on domestic marketing chains, there are
effects on other countries as well, through trade and
research and development costs. Finally, there are
important environmental costs and benefits.
The approach taken in this report is to somewhat
arbitrarily divide the costs and benefits into seven
chapters that address certain aspects of the larger set of
GMO-related issues. Chapter 2 assesses the impacts on GM
technology of the structure and control of the crop
genetic research industry. Chapter 3 reviews the
environmental costs and benefits associated with GM
breeding and farm production. Chapter 4 assesses the
agronomic impacts of GM technology on farmers, both those
growing GM and non-GM crops. Chapter 5 deals with the cost
and benefits to consumers of GM and non-GM products.
Chapter 6 addresses the segregation costs that may be
required to keep GM products separate from non-GM products
throughout the marketing chain. Chapter 7 explores the
issues related to the international trade of GM and
related non-GM products. Chapter 8 examines the impacts on
less-developed countries. Finally, Chapter 9 provides a
brief summary of the report and some general conclusions.
An important objective in compiling this report was to
provide a range of opinions and perspectives on the
economic costs and benefits of GM crops. Inevitably, there
are areas of overlap, and even contradictory perspectives,
among the chapters. This merely reflects the current state
of knowledge and complexity of the issue. The discussion
of related issues across different chapters indicates that
these benefits and costs affect society on a variety of
fronts. Environmental effects, for example, are important
not only in their own right; they may also affect
consumers’ perceptions of the technology and
producers’ agronomic decisions. Contradictory
opinions among the chapters are also a direct reflection
of the lack of consensus in society regarding the
potential costs and benefits of GM crops and the need for
further research to assess more accurately the potential
effects.
The interactions between the chapters and the contribution
each chapter makes to a myriad of issues are depicted in
Figure 3. The boxes in Figure 3 represent parts of the
marketing chains in which the impacts originate and/or are
incurred; the arrows represent the direction of the
effect; and the numbers indicate which chapter deals with
each effect. It can be seen, for example, that the
environmental impacts discussed in Chapter 3 are directly
related to GM research as discussed in chapter 2, and are
affected by the rate at which farmers adopt GM crops, as
determined by the agronomic impacts discussed in chapter
4. Similarly, the agronomic impacts discussed in chapter 4
affect GM farmers directly, but they also have
implications for non-GM farmers and GM marketers and
processors. The segregation issues discussed in Chapter 6
have direct implications for the agronomic decisions of GM
farmers and non-GM farmers (Chapter 4), for domestic GM
consumers (Chapter 5), for international trade (Chapter
7), and so on.
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References
-
Gray, R., J. E. Hobbs and F. Haggui (2001). The
Identification and Classification of GMOs: Implications
for Trade, in C. Moss, G. Rausser, A. Schmitz, T.
Taylor, and D. Zilberman (eds.), Agricultural
Globalization: Trade and the Environment, Hingham,
MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers (forthcoming).
-
McHughen, A. (2000). Pandora’s Picnic Basket:
The Potential and Hazards of Genetically Modified
Foods. New York: Oxford University.
-
Biotechnology and Industry Concentration
Murray Fulton and Kostastinos Giannakas 1
-
The Issue
In the past ten years the seed and pesticide industries
have seen a substantial number of mergers and
acquisitions, an increase in vertical and horizontal
integration, and an increase in the importance of
multinationals, particularly in the seed industry. These
structural changes have occurred at the same time that the
legal framework of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has
been substantially strengthened and as transgenic
technology has been used to develop new products (Lindner,
1999).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the reasons for
the structural changes that are under way in the seed and
chemical industries, to determine the degree to which
market power is present in the seed and chemical
industries, and to explore the importance of this market
power for activities that are carried out in these
industries.
-
Implications and Conclusions
The structural changes under way in the seed and chemical
industries are owing to a number of factors. Some of these
factors are common to all industries and have no specific
link to biotechnology, but intellectual property rights
and the nature of biotechnology products are important in
understanding the structural changes. The horizontal
mergers and acquisitions that have occurred in the seed
and chemical industries can be directly linked to the
R&D costs and to regulatory costs, with greater
expenditures in these areas leading to greater
concentration. The increased vertical linkages in the
industry are linked to the product complementarity
increasingly present between seed and chemical products,
as well as to the difficulty in enforcing the ownership of
certain types of intellectual property. In other cases,
the rise of better-defined intellectual property rights
has been a factor in the joint ventures and strategic
alliances that have occurred.
The large firms in the seed and chemical industries
clearly have market power, with the degree of market power
remaining relatively unchanged over the past ten to
fifteen years. The key impact of market power is on the
distribution of the benefits of the new technology being
introduced. For instance, greater market power on the part
of the innovator in the soybean complex leads to fewer
benefits for farmers using the herbicide-resistant
technologies and less benefit for the groups processing
soybeans. These losses, however, are almost completely
offset by gains to the innovator (Moschini et al,
2000).
The distributional impact is important because it raises
questions about which groups are likely to benefit from
the introduction of the new technology, which in turn
raises questions about the adoption and/or acceptance of
the new technology. When market power is present, for
example, both consumers and producers may be less willing
to adopt new developments in biotechnology because of the
smaller share they obtain of the benefits (Moschini, 2001
Giannakas, and Fulton).
Notwithstanding these results, relatively little is known
about the impact of concentration, and substantially more
research is required. In particular, little is known about
the trade-off that is inherently in place around IPRs and
concentration. At their most basic level, IPRs convey a
monopoly, albeit for a limited period of time and for a
limited product, to the company or individual possessing
the intellectual property. IPRs provide the incentive for
innovation and encourage the diffusion of new technologies
(Lesser, 1998). Thus, there is always a need to ensure
that a proper balance is achieved between the benefits and
costs of IPRs. To date, the research on this question has
not been undertaken.
-
The Changing Structure of the
Agricultural Biotechnology Industry
The first step in determining the structure —
including concentration — of an industry is to
define the relevant market. As Stigler (1982) laments,
economists have neglected market definition both in theory
and empirical applications. The usual approach is to
define the limit of a market as a break in the chain of
substitutes by considering cross elasticities of demand
and supply. Legal definitions of relevant markets have
emerged in the U.S. Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines (Shy, 1996), and in a similar set of Canadian
Merger Guidelines (Competition Bureau, 1997).
Determining the relevant markets for seed and pesticides
is difficult. In some cases, the relevant market is quite
wide, and may apply to a range of seeds or a range of
pesticides. For instance, for a farmer with no defined
crop rotation and climatic conditions that allow the
growing of a large number of crops, the relevant market
for seed would encompass a number of different crop seeds.
Similarly, the relevant market for pesticides may be quite
large if a wide variety of chemicals can deal with the
pests a farmer needs to control. In other cases, the
relevant markets may be small; in some cases, there may be
no substitute product that will deal with a particular
pest problem. In addition, with the introduction of plant
biotechnology, the seed and chemical products are
increasingly difficult to separate. The tying of seeds and
chemicals — a good example is Monsanto’s
Roundup ReadyTM seeds and RoundupTM
— means that the seed and the chemical markets can
no longer be treated as separate (Hennessy and Hayes,
2000).
Notwithstanding these observations, the available data are
generally at a highly aggregate level. The use of this
aggregate data generally understates the level of
concentration present in an industry, since the
substitution possibilities that are available to most
farmers will be much less than what is implied by the
aggregate data (for a good analysis of the effect of the
use of aggregate data on the estimation of market power,
see Sexton, 2000). Thus, the largely aggregate data
presented below generally understates the degree of
concentration present in the seed and chemical industries.
Horizontal Structure — Mergers and
Acquistions
Table 1 (see page 26) presents world sales of the top ten
pesticide and seed firms for 1997 and 1999. As the numbers
in Table 1 indicate, both the seed and pesticide
industries are concentrated. The pesticide industry is
particularly concentrated, with a CR4 of 47%. Longer-term
time series data on the structure of the chemical and seed
company are difficult to obtain. In one of the few
published papers to provide this kind of data, Ollinger
and Fernandez-Cornejo provide CR4 data for the United
States pesticide industry over the period 1972-1989.
During this period, the CR4 oscillates, moving from a high
of 50% in 1973 to a low of 37% in 1982, then rising to 48%
in 1989. These values are consistent with the values
presented in Table 1. When attention is shifted to the
plant biotechnology market, where seeds and pesticides are
combined, an even higher level of concentration emerges,
with three companies accounting for the entire market.
Although detailed data is not available for the 1990s,
there is evidence that industry structure in the seed and
chemical industry is dynamic. One of the major structural
changes that has occurred over the past five years in the
seed and chemical industries is a consolidation of
companies through mergers and acquisitions. Table 2 (see
page 27) outlines selected mergers and acquisitions that
have occurred among the major seed and chemical companies.
Figures 1 and 2 (see pages 28 and 29) provide additional
information on the changing structure of one of the seed
and chemical companies, Monsanto, who alone has made over
twenty strategic alliances, mergers, joint ventures, and
acquisitions with life science, seed, chemical, and
biotech companies.
Figure 3 (see page 30) illustrates that this merger and
acquisition activity is the latest in a series of merger
and acquisition waves. As Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga
(2000) note, firm entry in the crop biotechnology industry
peaked in the early 1980s, with production innovation
continuing throughout the 1980s. The first generation of
products — transgenic plants that provide resistance
to certain chemicals or certain insects — emerged in
the early 1990s. Consolidation began shortly thereafter.
Oehmke et al (1999) also discuss the cyclical
pattern in mergers in the biotechnology industry.
As noted above, aggregate market figures mask the much
higher concentration that exists in specific markets. For
example, in 1998, Monsanto and Pioneer-HiBred (now owned
wholly by DuPont) controlled 15% and 39% of the seed corn
market, respectively. These same two companies controlled
approximately 24% and 17%, respectively, of thepurchased
soybean seed market. For cotton, two companies, Delta
& Pine Land and Stoneville, had 71% and 16%,
respectively, of the seed market (Kalaitzandonakes and
Hayenga, 2000). In Canada, there were approximately
thirteen million acres of canola planted in 1999. About
ten million of those acres were seeded to
herbicide-tolerant varieties. Three companies —
Monsanto, AgrEvo, and Cyanamid — controlled this
latter market (Fulton and Giannakes, 2000).
The determination of the relevant market is not always
done on the basis of output markets. As Brennan et al
(2000) point out, the Federal Trade Commission has used
innovation competition to assess the impact of mergers.
Examining competition in innovation is designed to focus
attention on the impact of a merger on innovative activity
(e.g., does R&D activity rise or fall in the merged
firm? Are there consequences for the efficiency of R&D
expenditure?). Using data on field trials under way each
year, Brennan et al calculate a CR4 ratio at the R&D
stage. Activity at this stage is highly concentrated, with
the four largest firms having 87% of the field trials in
1988. The CR4 ratio declined to a low of 63% in 1995, then
rose steadily over the next few years to reach 79% in
1998. This substantial concentration at the R&D stage
is matched by a substantial concentration in terms of the
number of patents held. The top four firms held 41% of the
corn patents (up to 1996), 53% of the soybean patents (up
to 1997), 77% of the tomato patents (up to June 1997), and
38% of the Bt patents (up to 1998) (Brennan et al, 2000).
It is important to recognize that concentrated markets do
not necessarily imply the presence of market power.
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1992) stress that firms will
not be able to exercise market power if the market is
contestable. A contestable market has all the desirable
properties of perfect competition — cost
minimization and prices as low as possible while still
covering costs (zero economic profits). Moreover, this
result is obtainable with only a few firms, so that highly
concentrated markets can end up with the same
characteristics as perfectly competitive markets.
The key requirements for market contestability are: (1)
potential entrants must not be at a cost disadvantage to
existing firms; and (2) entry and exit must be costless.
For entry and exit to be costless, there must be no sunk
costs. Sunk costs are expenditures that cannot be recouped
once they are incurred; examples include expenditures made
to obtain regulatory approval, expenditures on
advertising, and expenditures on R&D. If there are no
sunk costs, potential entrants can use a hit-and-run
strategy in which they enter an industry, undercut the
price of the incumbents, reap the profits, and exit before
the incumbents have time to retaliate. In anticipation of
entrants acting in this manner, the incumbents forestall
entry by keeping price at average cost. The consequence is
that, even in an industry that is highly concentrated,
prices can be kept at or near competitive levels.
If sunk costs are present, however, firms entering an
industry are unable to exit again without losing a portion
of their investment. As a result, hit-and-run strategies
are much less profitable and incumbents are able to keep
price above average cost. Thus, with sunk costs, markets
are not contestable and market power is once again an
issue. As will be discussed below, sunk costs appear to be
a key feature of the seed and chemical markets.
Vertical Structure — Mergers, Joint
Ventures, and Strategic Alliances
In addition to becoming larger through growth and
horizontal integration, the major agrochemical companies
have restructured themselves in other ways. One of the
major moves is to become life-science companies that
contain pharmaceutical, biotechnology, agricultural
biotechnology, seed, and chemical components. A further
element of this internal restructuring is increased
vertical integration — e.g., the combining of seed,
chemical, and biotechnology activities in the same company
— and the increased use of strategic alliances.
To provide an illustration of the increased vertical
linkages, Figure 2 shows the companies that Monsanto has
acquired over the past ten years. The pink filling
indicates that the firm was primarily a biotech firm,
yellow implies that the firm was a seed company, and a
combination of the two colours denotes that the firm was
involved in both. Figure 3 shows Monsanto’s joint
ventures, research and development partnerships, and
licensing agreements with other companies in the
agricultural biotechnology sector. Of course, the
strategies followed by Monsanto are not unique; other
life-science companies are restructuring themselves in
similar ways.
It should also be noted that the major firms involved in
agricultural biotechnology are multinationals.
Historically, many countries have had their own local seed
companies that have, over the years, developed seed for a
specific geographical market and operated sales and
distribution systems. These seed companies are
increasingly being purchased by multinationals as a source
of seed material in which to insert the genes for
herbicide or insect resistance (Kalaitzandonakes and
Hayenga, 2000). As examples, in 1997, Monsanto acquired a
30% share of the Brazilian corn seed market with the
acquisition of Sementes Agroceres. With its 1998 purchase
of Cargill’s international seed division, Monsanto
now controls over half the Argentine maize seed market. In
1998, Dow AgroSciences acquired Morgan Seeds,
Argentina’s second-largest corn seed company, and
Brazil’s Dinamilho Carol Productos Agricolas,
another key South American corn firm. Phytogen (majority
owned by Dow Agrosciences) acquired a major cottonseed
breeding program in the Chaco Province of Argentina. In
1998, Mexico-based agribusiness giant, Empresas La Moderna
(ELM) bought two South Korean vegetable seed companies,
and Nath Sluis (agricultural biotech company) of India
(RAFI, 2000). The multinationals are, for the most part,
purchasing local seed companies rather than licensing the
genes to them. For sales and distribution, in contrast,
the multinationals are often relying on local, independent
seed companies to carry out these functions.
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Factors that Affect Horizontal
Industry Structure
Numerous factors are behind the wave of horizontal mergers
and acquisitions that has characterized the seed,
chemical, and agricultural biotechnology industries over
the past ten years. Some of these factors are common to
all industries and have no specific link to these
particular industries. Thus, the mergers and acquisitions
in the seed and chemical industries are, at least in part,
a result of the need to consolidate costs and rationalize
industry capacity, a desire by the management of the firms
involved to extend their sphere of influence, and a wish
by some firms to pre-empt other firms from taking over
valuable assets (Shy, 1996).
There are at least two factors, however, that pertain
specifically to the seed, chemical, and agricultural
biotechnology industries. The empirical and the
theoretical literature both suggest that the following
factors are important in understanding the mergers and
acquisitions that have occurred: (1) intellectual property
rights and R&D expenditures; and (2) the regulatory
requirements that governments have introduced before the
products of the R&D activity can be marketed.
On the empirical side, Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo
(1998) examine sunk costs and regulation in the U.S.
pesticide industry. Using data over the 1972-89 period,
they find that research costs and pesticide regulation
costs negatively affect the number of companies in the
industry, and that smaller firms are affected more
strongly by these costs than are larger firms. Research
and regulation costs also encourage foreign-based firms to
expand into the U.S. market, and to force less-profitable,
innovative firms to exit the market. Ollinger and
Fernandez-Cornejo also point out that their results on the
impact of regulatory costs generally match those found in
other industries.
On the theoretical side, the argument is typically cast
around sunk costs and the economies of scale and scope
that sunk costs tend to create. As Sutton (1991) outlines,
the presence of sunk costs means that, for firms to be
profitable, price needs to be raised above marginal cost,
typically by reducing the amount of competition (i.e., the
number of firms). Sutton identifies two types of sunk
costs: exogenous and endogenous. Exogenous sunk costs are
those such as regulatory costs that are beyond the control
of the firms in the industry. Endogenous sunk costs, in
contrast, are firm-level strategic variables, such as
advertising and R&D. Firms choose their expenditures
on these costs depending on the characteristics in the
market (e.g., the size of the market, the nature of the
competition) and the nature of costs in the firm (e.g.,
the nature of economies of scale and scope).
The rest of this section examines the connections between
IPRs, R&D expenditures, regulatory costs, and
economies of scale and scope. The nature of IPRs used in
agriculture is examined first. A discussion of IPRs,
economies of scale and scope, and sunk costs, as well as
their impact on industry structure, then follows.
Intellectual Property Rights
Prior to the 1980s, there were few property rights
associated with agricultural products, and consequently
few incentives for private firms to invest in research. As
a result, the public sector played a large role in plant
breeding during this period. Beginning in the early 1980s,
governments around the world have taken actions to
establish property rights over life forms and the
processes used to develop life forms.
In the context of agricultural biotechnology, an IPR
grants a company limited ownership over either the use of
a technology used to create an organism or the genetic
information in an organism. Four major types of IPRs are
used in agriculture: patents, Plant Breeders’ Rights
(PBRs), trade secrets, and trademarks. Of these, patents
and PBRs are the most important. PBRs, which apply to
plants only, are a form of protection granted to plant
breeders that allows them to exclude others from producing
or commercializing material of a specific plant variety
for a period of fifteen to thirty years. The PBRs system
has traditionally allowed unauthorized use of protected
varieties for two purposes: research or breeding, and
reseeding by farmers (the so-called farmers’
privilege). The research or breeders’ exemption
allows third parties to use the protected variety to
create new varieties and/or to conduct scientific
research. Under the farmers’ privilege, farmers can
retain seeds from the production of the protected variety
for re-sowing on their own land. Thus, PBRs are not
effective for protecting engineered genes in a plant
(Lesser, 1995).
Patents are a temporary and partial monopoly granted to
the inventor by society. In Canada, the length of patent
duration is twenty years following application. The
partial nature of the monopoly is determined by the scope
of the patent or the degree of difference required before
a related development is not covered by the patent. For a
patent to be granted, the invention must also be novel. In
exchange for the partial monopoly, society receives a
disclosure of the invention. Disclosure not only permits
competition when the patent lapses; it also provides a
storehouse of technical knowledge that would not otherwise
exist. Unlike PBRs, under patent law all unauthorized use
of patented material, including on-farm seed saving of
patented plant varieties, is prohibited. Gene patents are
presently possible in Canada (Lesser, 1995).
The limited monopoly inherent in IPRs is granted to
companies and individuals to encourage innovation and the
development and diffusion of new products and technologies
to undertake research and to invest in intellectual
property. From a public policy perspective, IPRs thus
represent a trade-off between the short-run effects of
resource misallocation because of the presence of market
power and the long-run benefits from greater R&D
(Gallini and Trebilcock). The establishment and
strengthening of property rights in agriculture has
certainly led to an increase in private investment in
agricultural research (Moschini and Lapan). For example,
private canola research in Canada has increased from less
than $1million per year in 1970 to over $85 million in
1998 (Gray et al, 1999). This large influx of investment
has increased research output with over forty new
varieties of canola being produced each year.
IPRs, Sunk Costs, and Economies of Scale and
Scope
Sunk costs and the economies of scale and scope they often
create are major factors in propelling industries toward
concentration. Economies of scale exist when average costs
fall as more output is produced, while economies of scope
exist when the total cost of producing two outputs
together is less than the cost of producing the two
outputs separately. Since economies of scale and scope
mean that larger and diversified firms have lower average
costs, there is clearly an incentive for firms to get
large (Fulton, 1997; Lesser, 1998; Hayenga,1998). Indeed,
those that do not get large are vulnerable to being driven
out of the market by larger and more cost-efficient firms.
Of course, there is a limit to how large firms can get.
While development and production costs may fall with an
increase in the size of the firm, other costs rise,
particularly those associated with administration.
Nevertheless, economies of scale and scope clearly create
pressures for consolidation.
Sunk costs often create economies of scale and scope
because sunk costs are generally created as a result of
investment in non-rival goods. Unlike rival goods —
such as materials, labour, and energy — which can
only be used in one place, by one person, and at one time,
non-rival goods — such as R&D, advertising, and
regulation expenditures — can be used in more than
one place, by more than one person, all at the same time.
This feature of non-rival goods — namely, that they
can be used over and over again — means that output
can be increased without having to increase all inputs. As
a consequence, economies of scale and scope are created
(Romer, 1990; Fulton, 1997).
Intellectual property, of course, is a good example of a
non-rival good. Indeed, ideas generally are considered
non-rival goods. It is widely believed that many of the
hightechnology industries, including the biotechnology and
information industries, are subject to increasing returns.
Romer postulates that this is a result of the distinction
between physical goods and ideas. Ideas are not scarce, so
any industry based primarily on the trade of intellectual
property will not face diminishing returns in its primary
resource, the idea. An example illustrates the connection
between intellectual property and economies of scale and
scope. Suppose a biotechnology firm has some intellectual
property, such as a technological advancement that
provides a unique understanding of a particular biological
process or a particular gene that has been isolated. In
both of these cases, this intellectual property can be
used over and over again as the firm expands its
activities. If the company wishes to develop seeds for a
new crop, it will not have to invest again in the research
that isolated the gene and that provided the unique
understanding of a key biological process. While the
development of a new seed will require additional lab and
greenhouse space, labour, and materials, the expenditure
on the technological advancements do not have to be made
again.
A similar result occurs if the firm needs to invest
substantially in obtaining regulatory approval for a seed:
while the production of additional units of the seed will
require additional costs, the regulatory expenditures do
not have to be made again. Once again,large companies
typically have an advantage, since they are able to spread
the costs of obtaining regulatory approval over more
output. Thus, the greater the regulatory requirements in
an industry, the more concentrated the industry is
expected to be.
Intellectual property may also create economies of scope.
If the unique understanding of a key biological process
can be used in the production of an entirely different
product, then the production of both products together
will be less than if the products were produced
separately. Similarly, once a specific gene has been
isolated — for instance, a gene that confers a
resistance to a particular herbicide — it can then
be put in a number of crops. Once again, the production of
a number of products together will be less than if the
products were produced separately.
To recap, R&D expenditures and regulatory costs are
both sunk costs and a source of economies of scale and
scope. Since economies of scale or scope mean that larger
and more diversified firms have lower average costs, there
is clearly an incentive for firms to get large. As firms
get larger, concentration in the industry rises.
-
Factors that Encourage Increased
Vertical Linkages
A number of factors encourage increased vertical linkages
in the agricultural biotechnology industry. These factors
can be divided into supply side and demand side factors.
The supply side factors are mostly linked to intellectual
property rights (IPRs), while the demand side factors are
linked to the substitutability and complementarity of
biotechnology products.
Demand Side Factors: Complementarity and Substitutability
in Agricultural Biotechnology
To date, agricultural biotechnology has focused on the
creation of crops that are resistant to particular insects
(e.g., corn, cotton, and potatoes) and herbicides (e.g.,
corn, soybeans, cotton, and canola). With new genetic
coding, seeds have become both complementary and
substitute products for chemicals. For instance, Roundup
ReadyTM soybean seeds are complementary
products to the glyphosate in RoundupTM and are
substitute products for the herbicides traditionally used
to control weeds in soybean crops.
There is some evidence that the direct market effects of
product complementarity and substitutability are
economically significant. For instance, in the United
States, the adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans was
associated with small increases in yields and variable
profits, and significant decreases in herbicide use. The
adoption of herbicidetolerant cotton in 1997 was
associated with an increase in yields and variable profit,
but was not associated with significant changes in
herbicide use (ERS 1999a, 1999b). Of course, looking at
total herbicide use masks the fact that the introduction
of herbicidetolerant crops means that the demand for
certain herbicides increased, while demand for others
declined.
As Just and Hueth (1993) point out, strong demand
complementaries mean that a single firm producing both
chemical and biotechnology products can be more profitable
than can separate firms producing these products. A single
firm can be more profitable producing both these products
because it can price the products so that the use of the
complementary product is encouraged. Thus, demand
complementaries appear to be important factors in
explaining the amalgamation of seed and chemical
companies.
Demand substitutability is also an important factor in
determining industry structure, although the impact is on
industry consolidation rather than on vertical linkages.
Demand substitutability is a key element in what is known
as an escalation strategy. An escalation strategy is one
in which a company spends large amounts on R&D to
achieve a dominant role in the market — i.e., the
firm tries to leap-frog its competitors to become the
dominant firm. Escalation can be a profitable strategy
when there is a high degree of substitutability with
competitors’ products on the demand side and there
are scope economies on the supply side (Sutton, 1998).
Both these factors are present in the agricultural
biotechnology industry. On the supply side, the isolation
of a gene that provides particular advantages and which
can be inserted into a number of crops means there are
economies of scope. There are also clear scope economies
associated with the enabling technologies that are
required to use these genes. On the demand side, herbicide
and insect-resistant seeds and the accompanying chemicals
are clearly a substitute product for traditional seeds and
herbicides and pesticides (Hayenga, 1998). As the theory
suggests, the combination of these two factors does appear
to be linked with escalation strategies. One example of a
firm that appears to be following this escalation strategy
is Monsanto (see Figure 2), although Dow and others are
following somewhat similar strategies.
Supply Side Factors: Intellectual Property
Rights
The way in which organizations and contractual
arrangements are structured is also influenced by IPRs.
Intellectual property rights create pressures for either
greater vertical integration or strategic alliances and
contracting, depending on the nature of the intellectual
property and the rights associated with it.
If IPRs are well defined, then transaction costs —
costs associated with negotiating, specifying, monitoring,
and enforcing contracts — are usually fairly low
(Merges, 1998). As a result, contracting and strategic
alliances are now more likely. Independent companies can
efficiently and effectively operate alongside each other,
each focusing on their specialty and at the same time
having access to the intellectual property of other firms
through contracts, licenses, or joint venture agreements.
However, if IPRs create opportunities for exploitation, or
if the intellectual property is associated with intangible
assets (which are inherently difficult to monitor and
enforce in contracts), then the transaction costs may be
fairly high. In this case, IPRs are expected to make
vertical integration more likely. For instance, the
opportunity for exploitation may arise if IPRs give one or
two companies the ability to exert considerable market
power visà- vis the companies they trade with. This
market power may deter other companies from investing in
new technologies or developing new products. To remedy the
situation, the companies with the market power may decide
to vertically integrate and take over R&D and market
development.
The vertical structure of an industry can also be affected
by the presence of intangible assets. Intangible assets
are those factors that are important to a transaction, but
difficult to specify and measure. Transferring a new
biotechnology process from one company to another, for
example, may involve more than simply specifying the steps
that are required. Often the precise timing of the steps,
or subtle nuances in how the steps are performed, can
affect the results in important and significant ways. In
these situations, licensing the new process to another
firm may be relatively ineffective, and the other firm may
be unwilling to pay for the technology under a license
agreement. In such situations, vertical integration is
often a solution. The purchase of local seed companies by
multinationals is one example of a strategy that is
consistent with this theory. It would be difficult to
license a new gene to a seed company; the seed company
would generally not have the expertise to use the
technology. Licensing the seed from the seed company is
also difficult, since it opens the multinational firm up
to problems of license renegotiation and license
infringement down the road.
The need to deal with intangible assets is also an
important factor in the creation of multinational firms.
As Caves (1996) argues, multinational firms often develop
because the mother company is unable effectively to
license an important technology to a company in another
country. To make use of the technology, the mother company
sets up a subsidiary in the other country, thus creating a
multinational.
Quality assurance factors are also important in
determining industry structure. Agriculture is
increasingly moving away from commodities and toward
various forms of identity preservation (Boehlje, 1996).
Quality assurance will become more and more an issue as
food companies develop specialized products, and as the
quality of the final product is increasingly linked to the
crop grown on the farm, the manner in which it is grown,
or the manner in which it is transported and processed.
When quality and/or the identity of a product can easily
be determined, independent firms linked by contracts are
likely to emerge as a dominant institutional form (Barzel,
1999). When quality is difficult to determine, other
organizational forms — such as those that rely more
on personal relationships and reputation than on legal
contracts — may be required to deal with monitoring
problems. Thus, at least for a period when the quality of
genetically modified products is difficult to determine,
personal relationships and reputation are likely to emerge
as an institutional mechanism between farmers and seed and
chemical companies (or between farmers and grain marketing
and processing companies).
-
Expected Results of Concentration
Market concentration in the agricultural seed, chemical,
and biotechnology industry is relatively high, and appears
likely to remain that way for some time. Is this structure
having an impact on the pricing of agricultural
biotechnology products or on other aspects of the
behaviour of agricultural biotechnology companies?
Analyzing the behaviour of seed, chemical, and
biotechnology companies is difficult, and no studies can
be found to date that explicitly examine the pricing
behaviour of firms in these industries. Despite this lack
of information, several conclusions can be drawn from the
literature.
First, sunk costs appear to be a key feature of the seed
and chemical industries. Research costs and pesticide
regulation costs have been found to negatively affect the
number of companies in the industry, with the smaller
firms more strongly affected by these costs than larger
firms (Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998). The
importance of sunk costs suggests that the seed and
chemical industries are not contestable, and, given the
relatively high degree of concentration, that market power
is likely to be an issue. Second, the basic premise of the
current literature is that non-competitive pricing is the
rule in the seed, chemical, and biotechnology products
industry. For example, in the two papers to date on the
impact of biotechnology products on producers, consumers,
and life science companies, Falck-Zepeda et al (2000) and
Moschini et al (2000) both assume that the
observed pricing of the biotechnology products (Bt cotton
and Roundup ReadyTM soybeans, respectively) is reflective
of some degree of market power. Falck-Zepeda et
al find that 26% of the total benefits accrue to the
gene developer and the germ plasm supplier because of
their market power, while Moschini et al find
that 45% of the total benefits in their base case are
captured by the innovator.
Third, the explicit recognition of market power is
important when examining the impact of changes in an
industry, such as the introduction of biotechnology
innovations. In a general discussion of market power,
Sexton (2000) shows that even relatively small amounts of
market power can have significant impacts on the
distribution of welfare benefits among the various players
in a sector. Sexton’s results show that even when
the overall welfare loss from market power is very small,
the losses to consumers and producers can be large. In
fact, these groups can suffer losses even when there are
substantial efficiency gains to the other sectors of the
industry because of higher concentration. Sexton also
points out that even small amounts of market power can
substantially reduce the incentives for producer groups to
undertake advertising or agronomic R&D.
Similar results to Sexton’s are found in Moschini
et al (2000). They show that biotechnology
innovation in the soybean complex resulted in substantial
benefits to the entire industry. While the presence of
market power did not reduce the overall benefits of the
herbicide-resistant technologies, it did significantly
alter the distribution of these benefits. For example, in
their study, the surplus that accrued to the innovator
when market power was present (an amount equal to 45% in
the base case) was almost completely offset by a loss to
consumers and producers.
The incorporation of market power also affects the
distribution of market power between consumers and
producers. Moschini et al show that when market
power is zero, consumers receive 150% of the total
consumer and producer benefits generated in the home
country — the country in which the innovation was
created (producers in the home country lose because the
wholesale adoption of the technology in the rest of the
world decreases prices). When market power is high,
consumers receive 460% of the total consumer and producer
benefits.
Thus, the examination of market power becomes a critical
factor in understanding the distribution of benefits among
the innovator, consumers, and producers. The
distributional impact is important because it raises
questions about which groups are likely to benefit from
the introduction of new technology; this in turn raises
questions about the adoption and/or acceptance of new
technology. In the presence of market power, both
consumers and producers may be less willing to adopt or
accept new developments in biotechnology because of the
smaller share they obtain (Moschini, 2001; Giannakas and
Fulton).
Moschini et al further point out that the
benefits captured by the innovator are a significant part
of the benefits received by the home country. When market
power is zero, the home country receives only 22% of the
total benefits, whereas when market power is high the home
country receives 58% of the benefits (assuming the
innovation is adopted around the world). Thus, the
encouragement of a highly concentrated innovating sector
within its borders could become part of a strategic trade
policy for a country wishing to maximize the benefits it
receives from biotechnology.
Fourth, the recognition of market power is important when
examining the pricing practices of seed and chemical
firms. Fulton and Giannakas argue that Technology Use
Agreements (TUAs) are a form of differential pricing:
farmers pay a set fee for the right to use the seed, as
well as paying the per-unit cost of the chemical to which
the seed is resistant. The need to pay a set fee
regardless of how much chemical is used makes TUAs a form
of price discrimination; farmers that purchase only a
small amount of chemical effectively pay a higher per-unit
price for the chemical than do farmers purchasing a large
amount. Price discrimination does not emerge in perfectly
competitive industries; attempts to introduce a fixed fee
would be met with an undercutting of the fee by the other
firms. Thus, the use of TUAs suggests that pricing is
non-competitive, a point also made by Hennessey and Hayes
(2000).
Price discrimination could also be carried out across
geographical regions, since farmers in different locations
likely have a different willingness to pay for a seed and
chemical package. Evidence from the United States and
Canada suggests that differences do exist in willingness
to pay. Whereas herbicide-resistant technology is being
adopted widely in some areas, for example, it is being
adopted less widely in others. On the Southern Seaboard,
over three-quarters of soybean production is from
herbicide-tolerant varieties; in contrast, the Northern
Crescent region has much lower adoption rates for soybeans
than the other regions (ERS 1999a, 1999b). The adoption
rate in Canada for herbicide-tolerant soybeans is also
relatively low, and there is evidence that the cost of
alternative weed- or insect-control packages and agronomic
characteristics vary by region and by farmer (Carpenter
and Gianessi, 1999; Klotz-Ingram et al, Fulton
and Keyowksi, 1999).
Despite the difference in the willingness to pay, the
price of biotechnology products appears to be similar
across the United States and across Canada. This lack of
price discrimination is likely a result of a desire to
limit arbitrage within these markets. Evidence for this
conclusion comes from the observation that, on the
international front, the same firms do practice price
discrimination. Lindner (1999) provides an example in the
case of cotton, where the TUA fee was set substantially
higher in Australia that in the United States. In a
well-publicized case, the U.S. General Accounting Office
provided evidence of how Roundup ReadyTM
soybeans are priced significantly lower in Argentina than
in the United States.
In conclusion, there is some evidence that the pricing of
biotechnology products is non-competitive. Since companies
appear to be limited in their ability to price
discriminate among producers within the North American
market, the rate of adoption is different depending on the
region and the agronomic characteristics of farmers. On an
international level, however, there is evidence of price
discrimination.
Finally, the recognition of market power is important in
understanding other aspects of the behaviour of firms in
the seed and chemical companies. In an examination of the
behaviour of life science companies, Hennessey and Hayes
(2000) attempt to infer the structure of the market from
the strategic decisions made by the life science companies
with respect to the tying of seed and chemical products.
The starting point of their analysis is that the presence
of tying strategies — the linking of the sale of
seed and chemicals — means that seed and chemical
companies have market power. Hennessey and Hayes provide
evidence that the behaviour of Monsanto up to the 1998
crop year is consistent with Monsanto having a monopoly in
Roundup ReadyTM technology, all the while
facing substantial competition in the chemical
(glyphosate) market. After 1999, the behaviour of Monsanto
is more consistent with a model in which Monsanto is
involved in a duopolistic seed market and a relatively
competitive chemical market.
-
Summary and Conclusions
In the past ten years, the seed and pesticide industries
have seen a substantial number of mergers and
acquisitions, an increase in vertical and horizontal
integration, and an increase in the importance of
multinationals, particularly in the seed industry. These
structural changes have occurred at the same time that the
legal framework of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has
been substantially strengthened, and as transgenic
technology has been used to develop new products (Lindner,
1999).
The structural changes under way in the seed and chemical
industries are owing to a number of factors. Some are
common to all industries and have no specific link to
biotechnology. For instance, the mergers and acquisitions
in the seed and chemical industries are, at least in part,
a result of the need to consolidate costs and rationalize
industry capacity, a desire by the management of the firms
involved to extend their spheres of influence, and a wish
by some firms to pre-empt other firms from taking over
valuable assets.
Intellectual property rights and the nature of
biotechnology products are also important in understanding
the structural changes that have occurred. The horizontal
mergers and acquisitions in the seed and chemical
industries can be linked to the R&D costs, economies
of scale and scope, and to regulatory costs. The increased
vertical linkages in the industry are linked to the
product complementarity that is increasingly present
between seed and chemical products, as well as to the
difficulty in enforcing certain types of intellectual
property. In other cases, the rise of better-defined
intellectual property rights has been a factor in the
joint ventures and strategic alliances that have taken
place.
The large firms in the seed and chemical industries
clearly enjoy some market power, although the degree of
market power appears to have remained relatively unchanged
over the past ten to fifteen years. One conclusion that
can be drawn is that the key impact of market power is not
on the total economic surplus (i.e., the size of the pie),
but rather on the distribution of the surplus (or pie)
(Sexton, 2000). Moschini et al (2000) provide
evidence of this outcome in the agricultural biotechnology
area. In a study of the soybean complex, they show that
increased market power by the seed and chemical industry
leads to fewer benefits for farmers using the
herbicide-resistant technologies and less benefit for the
groups processing soybeans. However, these losses are
almost completely offset by gains to the biotechnology
companies. Thus, while the overall benefits were not
unduly affected by the exertion of market power, the
distribution of these benefits was substantially affected.
Notwithstanding these results, relatively little is known
about the impact of concentration, and substantially more
research is required. In particular, little is known about
the trade-off that is inherently in place around IPRs and
concentration. At their most basic level, IPRs convey a
monopoly, albeit for a limited period of time and for a
limited product, to the company or individual possessing
the intellectual property. IPRs provide the incentive for
innovation and encourage the diffusion of new technologies
(Gallini and Trebilcock; Lesser, 1998). Thus, there is
always a need to ensure that a proper balance is achieved
between the benefits and costs of IPRs. To date, the
research on this question has not been undertaken.
-
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Table 1: World Sales of Top Ten Pesticide and
Seed Companies
Company
|
1997 Pesticides
|
1997 Seed
|
1999 Seed
|
1998 Plant Biotech
|
|
millions $
|
DuPont (Pioneer) USA
|
3,126
|
1,800
|
$ 1,850
|
|
Pharmacia (Monsanto) USA
|
2,518
|
1,800
|
$ 1,700
|
88 %
|
Syngenta (Novartis) Switzerland
|
4,199
|
928
|
$ 947
|
4 %
|
Groupe Limagrain (France)
|
|
686
|
$700
|
|
Grupo Pulsar (Seminis) Mexico
|
|
375
|
$531
|
|
Advanta (AstraZeneca and Cosun) UK and Netherlands
|
2,674
|
437
|
$416
|
|
Sakata (Japan)
|
|
349
|
$396
|
|
KWS AG (Germany)
|
|
329
|
$355
|
|
Dow USA
|
2,200
|
|
$350
|
|
Delta & Pine Land (USA)
|
|
|
$301
|
|
Adventis Group (Hoechst/Rhone-Poulenc)
|
4,554
|
|
|
8 %
|
Bayer
|
2,254
|
|
|
|
American Home Products
|
2,119
|
|
|
|
BASF
|
1,855
|
|
|
|
Sumitomo
|
717
|
|
|
|
Agribiotech
|
|
425
|
|
|
KWS
|
|
329
|
|
|
Takii
|
|
300
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total World Sales
|
30,900
|
23,000
|
24,700
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CR4
|
47 %
|
23 %
|
21 %
|
100 %
|
CR10
|
85 %
|
32 %
|
31 %
|
100 %
|
Source: Brennan et al; RAFI (2000)
Major Mergers and Acquisitions By Selected
Chemical and Seed Companies
Company: Monsanto
Date:
-
March 1996: Increase equity stake in DeKalb Genetics
-
April 1996: Acquired plant biotech assets of W.R. Grace
& Co.
-
September 1996: Acquired Asgrow Agronomics from
Epmresas La Moderna
-
January 1997: Acquired Holden’s Foundation Seeds,
Inc., Corn States Hybrid Service, and Corn States
International
-
May 1997: Completed purchase of all outstanding shares
of Calgene Inc.
-
November 1997: Completed purchase of all outstanding
shares of Calgene Inc.
-
July 1998: Acquired Plant Breeding International
(Cambridge)
-
October 1998: Acquired international seed business of
Cargill Inc.
-
December 1998: Purchased remaining 55% of DeKalb
Genetics
-
April 2000: Merger of Monsanto and Pharmacia-Upjohn to
form Pharmacia Corporation.
Company: Dow Agrosciences
Date:
-
January 1996: Dow Elanco acquired 31% of shares in
Mycogen
-
December 1996: Dow Elanco receives controlling interest
(51.8%) in Mycogen with purchase of shares from Pioneer
Hi-Bred
-
May 1997: Dow Chemicals acquires the 40% share of Dow
Elanco from Eli Lilly and Company (Dow Elanco now
wholly owned by Dow Chemicals. Becomes Dow
Agrosciences)
-
December 1997: Purchase of Sentrachem (South African
chem. Co)
-
March 1998: Extension to 63% ownership of Mycogen
-
September 1998: Acquired remainder of Mycogen
-
November 2000: Mycogen then purchases both Hibridos
Colorado Ltda. and FT Biogenética de Milho Ltda.
In the same month Mycogen acquires Cargill Hybrid Seeds
from Cargill International
Company: Novartis AG
Date:
-
December 1996: Novartis formed via merger between
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz
-
May 1997: Purchased Merck &Co.’s crop
protection business
-
May 1998: Purchase of Oriental Chemical
Industries’ crop protection division
-
1998: Purchase of Seoul Seeds Co. Ltd.
-
August 1998: Purchase of Agritrading (Italian seed co)
-
1998: Acquired 50% equity in Wilson Seeds Inc. (owned
by Land O’Lakes)
-
October 2000: Novartis and Zeneca Agrochemicals merge
to form Syngenta
Company: Agrevo (Aventis Cropscience)
Date:
-
1994: Formation of AgrEvo via merger between Hoechst
and Schering
-
August 1996: Purchase of Plant Genetics Systems
(Belgium)
-
1997: Purchase of Nunhems (vegetable seed)
-
February 1999: AgrEvo acquires India-based Proagro.
-
December 1999: AgrEvo merges with Rhône Poulenc
Agro to form Aventis CropScience
Company: Dupont
Date:
-
September 1997: Acquires 20% of Pioneer Hi-Bred
International Seeds
-
April 1998: Acquires Hybrinova S.A. (wheat breeder)
-
October 1999: Acquires remainder of PHI.
Company: Zeneca Agrochemicals
Date:
-
1997: Acquires Mogen International
-
December 1997: Acquires Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd.
(fungal control)
-
October 2000: Novartis and Zeneca Agrochemicals merge
to form Syngenta
Figure 1: Mergers and Acquisitions By Diversified
Biotechnology Firms
Source: Kalaitzandonakes and Hayenga
Figure 2: Monsanto Acquisitions, 1990–1999
Source: Gray
Figure 3: Monsanta’s Strategic Alliances, 1990 to
1999
Source: Gray.
Key to Figure 3
Company Type
|
Colour of Box
|
Agreement Type
|
Colour of Link
|
Seed
|
Yellow
|
Research and Development
|
Navy
|
Agbiotech
|
Mint Green
|
Liscensing Agreement
|
Dark Red
|
Biotech
|
Pink
|
Joint Venture
|
Orange
|
Chemical
|
Lavender
|
Equity
|
Grey
|
Pharmaceautical
|
Mustard
|
Other
|
Black
|
Other
|
Sky Blue
|
|
|
-
Environmental Impacts of Transgenic Crops
Jan Stevens
-
The Issue
In any examination of genetically engineered crops, one
controversial issue that arises is their impact on the
environment. The debate is adversarial; activist groups
vehemently protest the dangers presented by the release of
GMOs while producers and corporations rally just as
vigorously in their defence. Informed, knowledgeable
discussion on the issue is rare, especially in the popular
press. This chapter will strive to present the legitimate
environmental issues in a reasonable manner that
accurately reflects the scientific knowledge behind
biotechnology.
To date, most genetically modified agricultural crops
offer herbicide tolerance, insect resistance, and/or virus
protection. Briefly, the environmental concerns
surrounding these transgenic crops can be expressed in
terms of:
-
Gene flow / Seed dispersal
-
Outcrossing with non-modified plants
-
Development of pest resistance
-
Adverse effects on non-target organisms
-
Implications and Conclusions
Concerns over the impact of agriculture on the environment
are valid and must be addressed. Indisputably, it is the
consensus of the scientific community that risk assessment
must focus on the characteristics of the plant itself and
the environment into which it is to be introduced rather
than on the method of genetic manipulation by which it was
produced; the product, not the process, must be the focus
of investigation. It is, then, of critical importance to
note that these environmental issues do not relate
exclusively to transgenic crops. Rather, any real or
perceived risks pertain equally to traditionally bred
plants. The genetic engineering process used to create
GMOs, however, has the advantage of being a more precise,
faster, and cheaper way of bringing about desired genetic
change. The extent and pace of genetic innovation will
require, increasingly, that more resources be made
available for testing and registration purposes.
Scientific evidence would suggest so far that the
environmental impact of genetically engineered crops has
been positive. For instance, the environmental advantages
of herbicide-resistant crops have clearly outweighed the
disadvantages. Besides an overall reduction in herbicide
application, the reduction in tillage and soil erosion is
particularly significant. Any problems that have arisen
— for example, herbicide-resistant volunteer canola
— have been manageable using standard farm
management practices. Herbicide resistance is not an issue
in unmanaged areas where herbicide is not traditionally
used.
The impact of pest-resistant transgenic plants is somewhat
more controversial. There are ongoing studies to determine
if genetically engineered, insect-resistant plants
accelerate the inevitable development of
pesticide-resistant insects, but to date, the reliable,
constant, and predictable dosages offered by GM crops seem
preferable to the often unreliable, inconsistent, and
unpredictable consequences of spraying.
Virus-resistant crops are truly in their infancy. No
problems have arisen with them, either, but this area will
require continuing vigilance on a case-by-case basis.
In Canada, the established regulatory systems have proved
to be dependable and well equipped to monitor any
potential adverse impacts of agricultural crops, whether
transgenic or traditional. As more genetically modified
crops are introduced in the near future, it is of
paramount importance that sufficient resources be
allocated to regulatory agencies. This is especially true
since increasingly complex concerns, such as gene stacking
and multiple tolerances, will be the next issues with
which farmers, industry, and regulators must grapple. The
development and introduction of stress-resistant crops
will require, further, that regulators not only assess the
risks that these crops present, but also that these risks
be weighed against the benefits of their release.
-
Background
Genetic Engineering: The Process
The term “genetically modified,” or
“genetically modified organism,” is somewhat
misleading. Virtually all agricultural crops have been
genetically modified over time by traditional selective
breeding methods. Rather than “GMO,” the
scientific community prefers such descriptions as
“genetically engineered”; “genetically
transformed”; “rDNA technology”;
“gene splicing”; or simply,
“transgenic.” In this paper, the terms will be
used interchangeably.
Very simply, the generally accepted definition of
“GMO” is any plant which contains recombinant
DNA; that is, in which DNA has been recombined from one
organism to another. This is accomplished by identifying a
single gene out of the thousands of genes in an organism,
manipulating it in the laboratory, then transferring it or
introducing it into a host plant cell, and later
recovering a complete new organism (Lemaux, 2000b).
There are many traditional methods of genetic
modification, including selective crossbreeding and
hybridization. Others include interspecies and
intergeneric protoplast fusion, in vitro gene transfer
techniques, somaclonal selection, haploid doubling, and
mutagenesis (McHughen, 2000). These techniques have become
increasingly sophisticated over the years, but they still
rely largely on the process of hybridization. Generations
of plants must be produced, from each of which the most
desirable are taken and bred. The development of an
improved plant through traditional means is a
time-consuming process, taking up to fifteen years before
a crop is ready for the market.
Recombinant DNA technology, on the other hand, offers the
advantage of increased precision in the breeding process.
Because only one specific, well-characterized gene is
spliced into a target plant, the process may take only one
or two generations, at most. Valuable time, and costs, are
saved in getting a crop to market.
Even if concern over transgenic crops were focused solely
on the process rather than the product, there are
considerable advantages to the process itself. As Dr.
James Cook, a plant pathologist from Washington State
University, states, “since traditionally bred crops
are accepted as the standard of safety, then crops
developed by genetic engineering are at least as safe and
are probably safer because of the greater precision of the
genetic modifications and knowledge of the protein
products and their function” (Cook, p. 38 1999).
Moreover, if a desired trait is not available in a
sexually compatible plant, no amount of traditional
breeding will yield an improved strain. Genetic
engineering, in such cases, becomes the only option. This
is also true in instances where the desirable trait is
available in a sexually compatible plant, but is
inextricably linked to an undesirable trait — for
example, an unpleasant taste.
Genetically Engineered Crops Currently in
Production
Essentially, the products currently in production are the
result of herbicide- and insectresistant crops. They
represent what has been called the “first
wave” of agricultural biotechnology, and they
reflect the developments of ten to fifteen years ago. In
terms of genetic engineering, these qualities were
relatively easy to develop, as they involved transference
of single, easily identifiable genes. In the future, as
crops with multiple desirable traits are introduced,
today’s technology will seem elementary by
comparison.
In Canada today, there are forty-three novel foodstuffs,2 including fifteen corn,
eleven canola, five cotton, four potato, three tomato, two
squash, one flax, one soya bean, and one wheat (Health
Canada, 2000). Of all the “first-wave” GMO
crops, of particular importance to Canadian farmers is
herbicide-resistant canola. Canola is this country’s
second largest crop, with 13.7 million acres planted in
1999, and gross revenues almost equal to the revenues from
the sale of spring wheat (Canadian Canola Growers
Association, 1999). Canola represents Canada’s most
significant foray into genetic engineering; it is
estimated that 55% of canola crops planted in 2000 were
modified (Buth, 2000).
The most common modified canola is Roundup Ready, which
has been genetically altered to tolerate Roundup herbicide
(glyphosate) produced by Monsanto. Glyphosate is a
broad-spectrum, low-toxicity herbicide that degrades
quickly in the soil and is safe for humans and animals.
Similar products include Liberty Link canola, which is
produced by AgrEvo and is resistant to glufosinate, and
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, which produces bromoxynil-tolerant
canola and was grown for commercial production in Canada
for the first time in 2000 (Buth, 2000). There are also
smart canola varieties that are resistant to Odyssey and
Pursuit, but they are not considered to be genetically
engineered, as they originated from induced mutations
(Canadian Canola Growers’ Association, 1999).
Crops designed to be insect resistant also play an
important role in Canadian agriculture. Of special
interest is corn, which is Canada’s third-largest
grain crop, after wheat and barley. Corn was grown on
almost three million acres in 1999, producing seven
million tonnes of grain. It is estimated that 30% of that
crop was genetically engineered, either for herbicide
resistance or to contain the naturally occurring soil
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, commonly called
Bt, or both (Ontario Corn Producers’ Association,
2000). Bt plants are designed to express various forms of
toxins that kill target insects, especially, in the case
of corn, the insidious European corn borer.
Also available are products that are the result of
virus-resistant crops, specifically squash and potato.
Just as humans are vaccinated for protection against
disease, these crops are engineered to develop immunity to
viral infections that commonly affect them. Genetic
engineering has been particularly valuable in this area,
as resistance to many plant pathogens is not available in
sexually compatible species. Biotechnology is, in many
cases, the only option. Since pest epidemics can devastate
entire crops, and thus rural communities in general,
biotechnology is a valuable agricultural tool with immense
potential. In the future, more virus-resistant crops can
be expected.
Herbicide-Resistant Crops
Herbicide-resistant crops are designed to tolerate
broad-spectrum herbicides. Thus, it has been reasonable,
or at least understandable, for the public to conclude
that there will be an ever-increasing amount of herbicide
applied to agricultural crops. This, however, is not the
purpose — nor has it been the result — of this
genetic modification. Rather, these crops allow the
application of a single, broad-spectrum herbicide to an
established crop rather than the traditional pre-emergence
and post-emergence cocktail of up to fifteen conventional
herbicides that provides only partial weed control
(McHughen, 2000).
There have been other fears surrounding herbicide-tolerant
crops. In particular, opponents claim that their
introduction will upset delicate ecosystems, that they
will reproduce unrestrictedly and be impossible to
eradicate. Scientists are “letting the genie out of
the bottle.” There are also concerns that these
plants will cross-breed with nearby weeds, creating
“superweeds.” Meanwhile, the benefits of the
technology are ignored, as well as its potential to
improve the environmental impacts of farming, and increase
agricultural sustainability generally.
The Gene Flow / Seed Dispersal Concern
The phrase “letting the genie out of a bottle”
implies that transgenic plants represent some
extraordinary force that is being unleashed into the
environment and will become an uncontrollable pest. It
implies that genetically engineered pollen or seed will
escape, spread throughout the community, and establish
itself where it falls. Fortunately, this fear is easy to
allay, for it is based on the misconception that
genetically engineered plants will behave like
non-indigenous plant pests. For example, the kudzu vine, a
ubiquitous weed, has been impossible to eradicate since it
was introduced to the United States in the 19th
century. Similarly in Canada, the major weed problems that
reduce crop yields are plant species that have been
introduced as ornamentals. Of the top twenty weed species
in Saskatchewan, eighteen were introduced, mostly from
Europe and Asia, and only two are native plants (Canadian
Canola Growers’ Association, 1999). These species
became pests because they were introduced into an
environment to which they are suited and in which they
have no natural enemies. Crop plants that have been
genetically engineered, however, are merely
reintroduced “into the same or a similar
environment from which they were taken, so they are not
analogous to the introduction of nonnative species”
(NAS, p. 14 1987). Thus, the comparison of GM crop plants
to non-indigenous plants is inaccurate at best. It is
important to remember that a trait such as herbicide
resistance is a minute modification of an established crop
plant, about which there is already a storehouse of
knowledge. Because the genetic variation is performed on a
plant whose traits are already well known, there is a
broad base upon which to predict future behaviour.
It is important also to note that there is no evidence
that any crop plant has ever become a weed. The National
Academy of Science describes the chances of a crop plant
reverting to a weedy condition as “negligible”
(NAS, 1987). No crop plant is designed for survival in the
wild, but is, as the result of generations of development,
dependent on human nurturing to survive. The longer a
plant has been cultivated, the less likely it is to become
weedy, as these traits will have been deliberately bred
out of it for generations. To expect a crop to survive in
the wild is analogous to expecting that “a Chihuahua
would survive in a pack of wolves” (Trewavas, p. 4
2000). A plant’s propensity toward weediness will
not be increased merely by gene-splicing a herbicide
resistance trait into it, as it is merely one alteration
to one of many genes that the plant already possesses.
Nonetheless, the impact of the resistance gene will be
felt in agricultural fields, manifested by the emergence
of, for example, Roundup-resistant volunteer canola.
Volunteers can complicate crop rotations, but they can be
controlled through standard management practices. Even
though they will not be eradicated by the application of
Roundup, they will still be susceptible to Liberty.
Alternatively, farmers have been advised to add 2,4-D or
MCPA to their Roundup mix in order to achieve an effective
chemfallow (Canadian Canola Growers’ Association,
1999).
Outcrossing
Outcrossing refers to the cross-hybridization of a crop
plant with a weedy relative. The concern here is that
herbicide- or pest-resistant crops could breed with nearby
weeds, creating what have been called
“superweeds.” It is a misleading term. A
herbicide-tolerant plant that breeds with a weed does not
make the weed a greater pest; rather, it makes a weed that
is resistant to a specific herbicide. In the wild, the
transfer of herbicide resistance is not relevant, as
herbicides are not sprayed in unmanaged environments.
Because there would be no selection pressure to retain the
trait, it would likely disappear in a matter of
generations (House of Lords Select Committee, 1999). In an
agricultural setting, or in ditches or along roadsides
where herbicides are traditionally sprayed, these weeds
would be handled by traditional management practices.
Many conditions must be present in order for
cross-hybridization to occur in the first place. There
must be a wild relative with which the crop plant can
breed. Most of the novel plants so far approved for
release in Canada — including potatoes, tomatoes,
corn, soybean, and flax — do not have wild relatives
(CFIA, 1998a). In the event that a wild relative does
exist, as is the case for canola and squash, many further
conditions must exist in order for outcrossing to occur.
The wild relative must be in range of the crop pollen, and
it must flower at the time that the crop pollen is
available. Fertilization must occur in the wild relative,
producing viable seeds. These seeds must then survive and
germinate, and the progeny of the hybrid seeds must be
fertile or survive vegetatively (OECD, 1993). Even if the
progeny is fertile, it still has thousands of crop plant
genes, and is unlikely to survive untended.
In the event that the potential for environmental damage
is significant, regulatory safeguards prevent the release
of a dangerous organism. The Canadian Food Inspection
Agency (CFIA) has the authority to discontinue field
trials and suspend further development of the plant if it
feels so justified. The CFIA derives its authority to deal
with plants with novel traits, including those produced
through genetic engineering, under the Plant Protection
Act and the Seeds Act. An important part of the
CFIA’s assessment process involves a thorough
investigation of the risks of outcrossing. The
“novel trait” — in this case, herbicide
resistance — is examined carefully, including an
analysis of the presence of weedy relatives to the plant
itself, and the significance of that relative in managed
and unmanaged ecosystems. Each novel product is examined
on a case-by-case basis; if it is determined that the
product raises no potential environmental concerns when
compared to its traditionally developed counterparts, it
will be considered acceptable (CFIA, 1998b).
Have Herbicide-Resistant Crops Reduced Chemical
Inputs?
Because the technology is so new — Roundup Ready
crops were first grown commercially in 1996 —
statistics regarding reduced herbicide application are
just now becomingavailable. In the United States, the
Federal Department of Agriculture (USDA) indicates that
the adoption of genetically engineered crops is associated
with a decrease in the number of acre-treatments of
pesticides — that is, the number of acres treated
multiplied by the number of pesticide treatments
(Heimlich, 2000). It is more difficult to calculate the
reduction in volume of active ingredients. For example,
while there was a rise in the amount of Roundup used on
United States soybean crops as the adoption of transgenic
crops increased, the use of other synthetic herbicides
decreased by a greater amount (Economic Research Service,
1999), so there was a significant decrease in
overall herbicide application. It is
important to note, when comparing different mixes of
herbicides, that synthetic herbicides are at least three
times as toxic as glyphosate and persist in the
environment nearly twice as long (Heimlich, 2000).
Concern has been expressed that, if the use of Roundup is
increasing because of the advent of GM crops, the weeds
will eventually develop resistance to glyphosate.
Certainly, the development of herbicide-resistant weeds is
a problem with conventional programs. This is because
traditional herbicides (including imidazolinone,
sulfonylurea, and sulfonamide) all have the same mode of
action, inhibiting the ALS (acetolactate synthase) enzyme.
Several ALS-resistant weed populations have emerged,
limiting the effectiveness of these compounds (Carpenter
and Gianessi, 1999). However, glyphosate is not an
ALSinhibiting herbicide; it is a post-emergent herbicide
that inhibits the protein EPSP synthase. This unique mode
of action and lack of residual activity greatly reduce the
chance that resistant weeds could appear over time in a
weed population (Monsanto, 1998).
An independent Monsanto study indicated that Roundup Ready
crops required 10%- 40% less herbicide in total. This
research also noted that Roundup Ready soybeans had
pesticide residue levels one-third the maximum level for
conventional soybeans (Monsanto, 1999). The best results
were realized by farmers who had previously been
experiencing troublesome weeds, such as stork’s bill
or cleavers, that were difficult to control with
traditional methods. Less-significant gains were realized
with the easier-tocontrol weeds, but farmers still
appreciated the ease and simplicity of a
herbicide-resistant crop (Lemaux, 2000b). Dr. C. S.
Prakash estimates that this reduction in herbicide
application saved North American farmers U.S. $30 per
hectare, and also increased crop yield due to less
competition from weeds (Prakash, 1999).
Other Benefits of Herbicide-Resistant
Crops
Herbicide-resistant crops were designed to have advantages
other than reduced chemical inputs. Most significant is
their ability to reduce tillage and lower soil erosion. In
a zerotillage system, seed is placed directly into the
soil with a seeder, allowing the soil to remain
undisturbed. As Dr. Cook notes, “I can say from
working in this area over these two decades that no
herbicide has done more than Monsanto’s Roundup to
allow farmers to move towards the use of no-till farming.
The availability of crops with built-in resistance to
Roundup only means that more crops can be grown without
the use of tillage” (Cook, p.29, 1999). Farmers also
appreciate the flexibility and increased weed control
strategies that herbicide-resistant crops afford. They can
seed their crops earlier in the spring, thus avoiding
periods when certain disease and insect infestation are
common. Compared to traditional herbicides, crop injury is
dramatically reduced, and there is no carryover to
rotational crops. Fewer passes in the field reduce
manpower and fossil fuel costs. Weather concerns are
allayed, as glyphosate is effective in either wet or dry
conditions (Carpenter and Gianessi, 1999). Placing plants
closer together, in narrower rows, can increase yields. As
Roundup lacks toxicity, farmers prefer to handle it
instead of traditional herbicides.
Insect-Resistant Crops
Insect resistance was developed simultaneously with
herbicide resistance. It, too, was a relatively simple
trait to incorporate, as the most commonly used gene to
instill insect resistance is the naturally occurring
Bacillus thuringiensis. Bt, as it is known, is a
natural pesticide that has been widely used since the
1950s in insecticidal powders. It is certified organic,
and organic farmers rely on it heavily. Bt toxins are very
specific in the species they affect, and exhibit low
toxicity to humans and other animals (McHughen, 2000).
Although the agricultural community has always embraced
Bt, the fact that it has now been inserted directly into
the plant through the process of genetic engineering has
raised special concerns — particularly that, because
transgenic Bt crops express Bt toxins in their tissue at
all times (as opposed to spraying, which is periodic), the
development of pesticide-resistant insects will
accelerate. Parallel to the term “superweeds,”
such insects have been named “superpests.”
It has also been suggested that the process of genetic
modification could have a detrimental impact on the
existence of beneficial, non-target insects such as the
Monarch butterfly. This concern arose from a preliminary
laboratory study that was published as a letter in the
scientific journal Nature. The exquisite Monarch,
already an unofficial symbol of conservation, thus became
the “Bambi” of the GM debate. Meanwhile,
studies that have outlined the advantages of Bt crops have
been largely ignored.
Development of Pest Resistance
Insects have always been remarkably adept at developing
resistance to insecticides, and are ever evolving in an
effort to assure the survival of their species. As Dr.
Cook notes, “This issue is not new to
agriculture” (Cook, p.42, 1999). It is commonly
accepted that, since resistance-proof insecticides do not
exist, it is imperative to stay one step ahead of the
insects. So, Bt resistance is to be expected, whether or
not Bt crops are used. This is a grave concern to all
farmers, as well as to governments and regulators. It is a
legitimate issue, but it is not a GM issue per
se; rather, it is a management problem that applies
equally to traditional as well as organic agriculture.
Resistance must be avoided if possible, as the loss of
availability of Bt would have far-reaching consequences.
In Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has
stepped in to help farmers develop insect resistance
management (IRM) programs. Compliance is voluntary and
that there is no enforcement mechanism in place.
Nonetheless, CFIA makes the following recommendations:
-
All growers should plant a minimum of 20% non-Bt corn
not sprayed with insecticides;
-
Non-Bt corn should be planted within one-quarter mile
of the farthest Bt corn in a field to provide a refuge
where Bt-susceptible moths may exist;
-
Non-Bt corn hybrids for use as refuges in a field
should be selected for growth, maturity and yield
traits similar to the Bt hybrid used in the remainder
of the field;
-
Refuge areas may be planted in blocks on the edges or
headlands of fields or in strips across the entire
field. When refuge corn is planted in strips across a
field, a minimum of six rows should be planted with
non-Bt corn alternating with Bt hybrid across the
entire field. Refuge created by mixing seed in the
hopper is ineffective;
-
The Bt Corn Coalition recommends that individual corn
producers using Bt technology be responsible to ensure
that the minimum 20% refuge occurs on their farm.
(CFIA, 1999)
The basis for this IRM plan is the belief that these
refugia will allow Bt-susceptible insects to survive and
multiply. They will then be available to breed with
resistant insects. Assuming, genetically, that pesticide
resistance is a simple recessive trait, then it is less
likely that two resistant insects will mate and produce
offspring that are homozygous, or completely resistant to
Bt (CFIA, 1999).
Ongoing studies are addressing the issue of whether
transgenic Bt crops will accelerate pest resistance, but
so far there is growing evidence of the advantage of Bt
crops over Bt spray. The precision of genetic engineering,
allows for a much more accurate and consistent dose of the
toxin (Shelton, 1999). This makes refugia much easier to
study as scientists seek more information about resistance
development. As well, farmers avoid the variable dosages
that are an inevitable part of spraying; there is no
danger of accelerating resistance through an inadequate
dosage. Transgenic Bt will not wash off in the rain, and
since sprays make contact only with the tops of leaves,
there is no danger with Bt plants that pests who feed on
the underside of leaves will evade the toxin (Felsot,
2000).
Bt plants attack only those insects that prey upon them,
as opposed to sprays, which will attack all susceptible
insects in the field (House of Lords Select Committee,
1999). This may also be a factor in determining whether
resistance is accelerated or postponed by the use of
transgenic Bt crops.
Dr. Milton Gordon, a biochemist from the University of
Washington, raises yet another point: whereas sprayed Bt
is really a cocktail of different Bt compounds, each of
which is encoded by a different gene, Bt crops express
only one of these genes. Therefore, he extrapolates, it
would be preferable to develop resistance to only one gene
rather than to a cocktail of many. In a letter to the U.S.
Subcommittee on Basic Research, he states:
Talking about Bacillus thuringiensis toxin as a single
compound is very similar to talking about all of the
antibiotics that have been discovered and are now being
used in humans as a single compound. If the pathogenic
bacteria become resistant to one type of antibiotic, it is
possible to switch to another type and still get good
results. The same is true of Bt. (Gordon, 1999).
Additionally, the technology of “gene
stacking” could make Bt plants even more effective
than they are today. This would involve inserting multiple
genes, each producing a different form of the toxin, into
a single plant variety. Thus, an insect would have to be
resistant to each form of the toxin to survive. While
current Bt crops produce only a single form of the Bt
toxin, it is anticipated that future crops will benefit
from multiple-resistance genes (U.S. Subcommittee on Basic
Research, 2000).
Adverse Effects in Non-Target Organisms
The furor over the effect of Bt crops on beneficial
insects arose out of a study done by John Losey and
published in a letter to Nature in May, 1999. The
study, the result of a single laboratory assay, reported
the death of 44% of Monarch larvae that were fed
genetically modified Bt maize pollen (Losey et
al, 1999). Those that were fed ordinary pollen
survived. The report was interpreted to mean that genetic
engineering caused the death of Monarch butterflies. This
is a typical example of how the process of genetic
modification is confused with its products.
Every entomologist recognizes that the death of
Lepidopteran insects, including Monarch
butterflies and the European corn borer, is the expected
result of an application of Bt. The concern that Bt will
affect insects other than those that are harmful to crops
is undoubtedly valid, but it is immaterial whether the Bt
is delivered through a transgenic plant or through a
traditional spray used by an organic farmer. Either way,
the concern still exists, and needs to be addressed. One
problem with the Losey study is that the larvae were not
fed maize pollen dusted with ordinary Bt. Had Losey done
that, he may have been able to report that larvae fed with
ordinary Bt pollen also suffered large losses.
Unfortunately, it was this lack of a critical control that
enabled the public to make the connection between the
process of genetic engineering and the death of Monarch
butterflies (McHughen, 2000).
Losey’s report was a preliminary study of an
experiment that was conducted only once, and it did not
address the behaviour of Monarch butterflies in the field;
rather, the larvae in the lab were force fed the pollen.
Entomologists have long understood that Monarch
butterflies are unlikely to ingest Bt corn pollen.
Monarchs prefer to lay their eggs on milkweed plants.
Milkweed is considered a noxious weed and is routinely
eradicated from farm fields. Corn pollen, meanwhile, is
extremely heavy and does not drift far from its parent
plant. It is therefore unlikely to be found on milkweed,
and Monarchs are unlikely to lay their eggs in areas where
Bt pollen is present. Larvae do not like to eat pollen, in
any case; they much prefer milkweed leaves that have no
pollen on them. But in the Losey study, they had no
choice. Even if they did like to eat pollen, Monarch
migratory patterns suggest that their larvae are not
present when corn is shedding pollen, a process which
takes place over a short five- to ten-day period (CFIA,
2000; Felsot, 2000; Irwin, 1999; U.S. Subcommittee on
Basic Research, 2000).
The furore over transgenic Bt is perhaps misplaced. Any
reduction in spraying should be of advantage to beneficial
insects. The refugia recommended by the CFIA to delay the
development of pest-resistant insects will also benefit
non-target insects, as they will provide a buffer zone
between the insects and managed agricultural areas.
Perhaps public anxiety will moderate when new lines of Bt
corn, now in development, are introduced. These new plants
have been modified so that Bt is expressed only in the
leaves and tissue of the plant, and not in the pollen.
Only insects that attack the corn will be affected
(Lemaux, 2000a).
As an interesting aside, entomologists report that Monarch
populations flourished in 1999 (Branom, 1999; Felsot,
2000, Prakash, 1999; Trewavas, 2000).
Have Insect-Resistant Crops Reduced Chemical
Inputs?
Like herbicide resistance, one of the goals of
insect-resistant crops is to reduce overall chemical
inputs. Again, because the technology is so new, the
results are just starting to come in. For some crops
— for example, cotton — the reports have been
astonishingly positive. It is estimated that, in the
United States, there has been a reduction of two million
pounds of insecticides that have traditionally been used
to control the tobacco budworm, the cotton bollworm, and
the pink bollworm that feed on cotton. As a result, yields
and returns are expected to increase dramatically
(Carpenter and Gianessi, 1999).
The story is much more complicated for Bt corn, however,
for it is difficult to measure the overall impact of
chemical reduction. This is because of the problems that
farmers have traditionally experienced in eliminating the
European corn borer. As its name suggests, this insect
bores its way into the corn stalk, where it is impervious
to Bt sprays. Any spraying for the European Corn Borer is
a matter of delicate timing: the insect must be found and
destroyed before it has had the opportunity to get into
the stalk. Because the window of opportunity is so small,
few farmers (about 5%) bother spraying at all (Carpenter
and Gianessi, 1999). As a result, prior to the
introduction of Bt crops, the European corn borer was
largely uncontrolled, and caused massive production
losses, ranging from thirty-three to over 300 million
bushels per year (Carpenter and Gianessi, 1999).
The advent of Bt corn may not have reduced chemical inputs
per se, but there have been substantial yield increases in
many circumstances. In the United States there were yield
advantages of approximately twelve bushels per acre in
1997 and four bushels per acre in 1998 (Carpenter and
Gianessi, 1999). Overall, depending on the level of
infestation, corn growers can expect a gain from using Bt
crops (Carpenter and Gianessi, 1999; CFIA, 1999; Powell,
2000).
Virus-Resistant Crops
In a discussion of herbicide- or insect-resistant plants,
the concern is the impact of gene flow from the transgene
to the same, or a related, species of plant. With
virus-protected plants, however, there is the
additional concern that the virus will
flow to other viral populations. Of particular concern is
that the virus resistance transgene will recombine with an
attacking virus, creating a virus with modified biological
properties (Teycheney, 2000). Potentially, these modified
viruses could have greater virulence or a broader host
range. To date, this has not happened; neither potato nor
squash has been the source of any new virus. In field
tests, even crops injected with other viruses have not
caused recombination. In Hawaii, a virus-protected papaya
plant has been extremely successful and stable over years
of testing (McHughen, 2000). As yet unpublished research
suggests that fears of viral recombination may not be as
serious as once thought, owing to the potential effects of
gene silencing (Allison, 2000). In any event,
virus-protected plants will have to be considered on a
case-by-case basis, weighing the advantages against the
risks. The potential for these kinds of crops is vast if
it means that previously virus-infested regions can be
made arable.
-
Discussion
It has been shown that transgenic crops have been
manageable, so far, using traditional agricultural
methods. As biotechnology improves, however, and more and
more traits are introduced, there may be increasing
potential for environmental impacts. Already there is some
concern about “pyramid” effects. In Alberta,
for example, canola volunteers have emerged that are
impervious to both Roundup and Liberty (AgWest Biotech,
1999). Should such resistances be allowed to
“stack,” giving rise to weeds that are
tolerant to a range of herbicides, fewer conventional
management methods would be available to control them.
Eventually, farmers could end up using increasingly more
herbicides to eradicate these weeds, thus damaging
non-target biodiversity (Johnson, 2000).
Strategies have been proposed to minimize the effects of
potential gene stacking. For example, farmers may be
advised not to plant crops with differing herbicide
tolerances adjacent to one another. This approach,
however, is largely dependent on the co-operation of
farmers. It may be necessary to devise alternate ways of
achieving genetic isolation using traditional knowledge
about isolating certain conventionally bred crops. There
may be some areas in which it is determined that
transgenic crops should not be introduced at all. Further
research should be done in the area of genetic isolation,
including the potential for “one-use” crops to
eliminate the risk of gene flow. These types of crops
could be developed in a variety of ways, including male
sterility, pollen incompatibility, altered flowering
times, and genes conferring negative fitness (frost
susceptibility, for example) closely linked to the
transgene (Johnson, 2000).
It is critical to remember that herbicide- and
insect-resistant plants represent the
“firstwave” products of agricultural
biotechnology. The “second-wave” crops will
have more tangible environmental benefits. Crops resistant
to such stresses as drought, frost, and salinity will have
the obvious advantage of allowing producers to use
previously nonarable land to grow food. However, while
herbicide resistance is of no advantage in the wild, where
herbicides are not sprayed, frost resistance (for example)
is an advantage anywhere. A frost-resistant crop plant
could potentially cross-breed with a weedy relative,
survive, multiply in the wild, and be the sole survivor of
a killer frost. Given all that is known about crop plants,
this is unlikely. A frost-resistant weed would still
contain thousands of crop-plant genes and be unlikely to
survive without human intervention. Still, the advantage
that stress resistance gives must be kept in mind. The
risks of introducing stress-resistant crops must be
weighed against the advantages (House of Lord’s
Select Committee, 1999).
Fortunately, the Canadian regulatory system examines each
plant with a novel trait, including those produced through
genetic engineering, on a case-by-case basis, and the CFIA
is equipped to assess and monitor any potentially adverse
environmental effects. The CFIA does not, however, address
the environmental benefits that a novel
trait may present. The British House of Lord’s
Select Committee recommends that risk assessments instead
be called “environmental impact analyses” that
include benefits as well as risks. The Canadian regulatory
system could certainly benefit from this approach; at the
least, it would be a means of providing the public with
more balanced information.
Environmental impact analyses would be especially
beneficial when considering the release of virus-resistant
plants. As these crops may expose ecosystems to more
complicated risk factors, it will be imperative to weigh
these risks against the potentially enormous benefits
these crops offer. Continued research in the area of viral
recombination is essential.
The Canadian regulatory system has also been effective in
establishing IRMs for the management of insect resistance
development. So far, the high dose/spatial refuge strategy
has been successful. Target insects should be monitored
for genetic changes that might indicate that resistance to
Bt is developing, so that the CFIA can make changes to its
IRMs if necessary. Despite the strongest efforts of
governments and regulators, however, ultimate resistance
to Bt may be inevitable. Alternative organic pesticides
should be investigated so as to minimize the potential
loss of Bt to organic farmers. Efforts must continue in
examining the effects of Bt on non-target insects. The
advantages versus the disadvantages of transgenic Bt must
be considered in this regard.
Regulators must determine if, for example, the advantage
of periodic spraying outweighs the fact that transgenic Bt
destroys only those insects that attack the plant
directly. The continued development of plants that express
Bt only in their leaves and tissue, but not in their
pollen, should be encouraged.
Overall, any analysis of the environmental impact of
agricultural crops must focus on the characteristics of
the plant itself rather than the method by which it was
produced. Environmental concerns apply to traditionally
bred and genetically engineered crops alike. Any
discussion of transgenic crops should take place in the
context of crops in general, keeping in mind that, no
matter what the method of production, there will always be
management issues with which to contend. Agricultural
crops, whether transgenic or conventionally bred, will
always pose environmental issues, but genetically
engineered crops can reduce overall chemical inputs and
provide farmers with economic and environmental
advantages. Their rate of success is dependent on each
farmer’s situation. At the least, they can be a
valuable addition to a producer’s management system.
-
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Allison, Richard (2000, July). “Recombination in
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Branom, Mike (1999, September 27). Monarch butterfly
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Buth, JoAnne (2000, August 24). Canadian Canola Growers
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Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) (1998a, May).
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_____. (1999, February 8). Responsible Deployment of Bt
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_____. (2000, March 30). Preliminary Report on the
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Carpenter, Janet, and Leonard Gianessi (1999, Spring).
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Felsot, Allan S. (2000, March). Insecticidal Genes:
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Gordon, M. (1999). Letter to Subcommittee Chairman Nick
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McBride, Cassandra Klotz-Ingram, Sharon Jans, and Nora
Brooks (2000, July). Adoption of Genetically Engineered
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Johnson, Brian (2000, July). The Environmental Impact
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Lemaux, P. (2000a, May 10). From Food Biotechnology to
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Losey, J. E., L. S.Rayor, and M. E. Carter (1999).
Transgenic pollen harms monarch larvae. Nature
399: 214.
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McHughen, Alan (2000). Pandora’s Picnic
Basket: The Potential and Hazards of Genetically
Modified Foods. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Monsanto Company (1998). Glyphosate Public Issues: Weed
Resistance Development. (http://www.monsanto.com/)
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_____. (1999, June 22). Residues In Roundup Ready Soya
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Powell, Douglas (2000, May 2). Genetically Engineered
Crops and Reduced Pesticide Use. Agrifood Risk
Management and Communications Project Fact Sheet.
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Prakash, C. S. (1999, October 5). Why Do We Need
Genetically Modified Crops? Testimony submitted to the
U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Basic
Research hearing on “Plant Genome Research: From
the Lab to the Field to the Market, part
II.”Serial No. 106-60. Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office. (www.house.gov/science/106_hearing.htm#Basic_Research)
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Shelton, Anthony M. (2000, March 2). BT Crops on Trial.
Nature Biotechnology. (
http://www.foodsafetynetwork.ca/gmo/pr-bt-crops-on-trial.htm)
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Teycheney, Pierre-Yves; Rachid Aaziz, Katalin Salanki,
Ervin Balazs, Mireille Jacquemond, Mark Tepfer, et
al (2000, July). Potential Risks Associated With
Recombination in Transgenic Plants Expressing Cucumber
Mosaic Virus Sequences. Presented at the
SixthInternational Symposium on the Biosafety of GMOs,
Saskatoon, SK.
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Trewavas, Anthony (2000, June 5). GM is the Best Option
We Have. AgBioview. (www.agbioworld.org)
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April 13). Seeds of Opportunity: An Assessment of the
Benefits, Safety, an oversight of Plant Genomics and
Agricultural Biotechnology. A report prepared by
Chairman Nick Smith of the Subcommittee on Basic
Research and transmitted to the Committee on Science
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Agronomic Costs and Benefits of GMO Crops:
What Do We Know?
Hartley Furtan and Jeff Holzman
-
The Issue
The introduction of genetically modified crops has been
accompanied by questions regarding the potential
production costs and benefits of the new technology.
First, what happens to the agronomic conditions on the
farm, and what does this mean in terms of profitability?
Second, what are the impacts of one farmer growing GMO
crops on other farmers in the neighbourhood?
The majority of genetically modified crops currently being
grown in Canada feature input-reducing traits, the two
most common being herbicide tolerance (HT) and insect
resistance. Crops with these traits are designed to reduce
input and may provide better yields. The issue of the
long-term cost and benefits of such crops has not been
fully addressed.
-
Implications and Conclusions
The first conclusion, drawn from the data presented, is that
farmers have rapidly adopted GM canola varieties. This is
consistent with the forecast economic benefit, which ranges
from $5 to $8 per acre. These benefit forecasts do not
account for the convenience factor associated with many GM
crop varieties. The longer-term costs and benefits of GM crop
varieties have not been measured, because no data yet exist
either to validate or dismiss people’s concerns. The
remote possibility of increased weed infestation due to GM
crops must be weighed against the environmental benefits of
releasing less herbicide and pesticide into the environment.
-
Background
What are Genetically Modified Organisms?
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are developed
through a process known as genetic engineering, which
involves the transfer of genetic material from one
organism to another. Genetic engineering allows genes to
be transferred between closely related organisms, but the
process also enables genes to be crossed between entirely
different organisms (Feldmann et al, 2000).
The process of genetic engineering has allowed researchers
to transfer a number of desirable traits into plants,
including insect resistance and herbicide tolerance.
Transgenic crops with these traits were developed in an
effort to improve crop yields and reduce the cost of
production. Because of these traits, genetic engineering
has been important in developing new crops that
potentially increase the profitability of agriculture.
The insertion of the Bt gene into plants to develop
insect-resistant crops is another example of genetic
engineering. Bt, Bacillus thuringiensis, is a bacterium
that induces plants to produce a protein that is toxic to
certain insects (Feldmann et al, 2000). The pest
resistance obtained from the Bt gene provides benefits in
terms of increased yields, reduced chemical use, and an
increase in quality (such as reduced secondary
infections).
Another trait that has been successfully inserted into
plants through the use of genetic engineering is herbicide
tolerance (HT) — although not all HT crops are GMOs;
most crops are resistant to some herbicides that are used
to control weeds. Inserting the HT trait into plants
provides resistance to specific herbicides; that is,
tolerance to herbicides that cannot normally be used on
those plants. The most common HT trait inserted into
plants is tolerance to the chemical RoundupTM.
The Roundup ReadyTM trait was developed by
Monsanto and provides plants with resistance to glyphosate
herbicides. The gene has been inserted into varieties of
cotton, soybeans, corn, and canola. Similar to the case of
the Bt gene, the development of HT technology provides
potential benefits both in terms of increased crop yields
and reduced production costs (Mayer and Furtan 1999).
Flax was the first genetically modified crop to receive
regulatory approval in Canada (McHughen, 2000). It is
important to remember GM flax was never grown in Canada
because producers were afraid of consumer reaction. Canola
was the second crop for which GM varieties were developed
in Canada. The rapid adoption rate of HT canola in western
Canada indicates that farmers have seen benefits in its
use. Indeed, HT canola is one of the most rapidly adopted
technologies in the history of western Canadian
agriculture. The market share of HT canola in Canada has
reached 70% of total canola production in 1999 (Fulton and
Keyowski 1999). Producers have more than one alternative
when considering the use of a HT canola system. The two
most common HT canola systems that have become available
through genetic engineering are the Roundup
ReadyTM variety and Liberty LinkTM.
SmartTM canola is HT but is not a GMO; rather,
it was developed through a process known as
mutagensis (see McHughen 2000).
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Why do Farmers Adobt GMO Varieties?
Farmers adopt new technology because they believe it is in
their best interests economically. The results usually
show up as an increase in output or a decrease in
production input, either of which can have considerable
impact on the profitability of the farming operation. If
the new technology causes a permanent increase in the
level of profit, land values will increase to reflect this
higher profitability.
Most new technologies result in higher output levels and
lower consumer prices. The latter benefit consumers, not
farmers, and the consumers of farm products are most often
processing firms. These firms are thus able to source
their raw product at a lower cost, and some of these
savings are passed on to the final consumer. The amount
passed on to the final consumer depends on the degree of
competition in the processing and retail sector (Moss and
Schmitz, 2000).
Why does the cost of production decline when farmers adopt
a technological change? First, output may increase without
a corresponding input increase, lowering the per-unit cost
of production. Second, certain characteristics of the
product may change — for example, the rate of
ripeness in fruit or resistance to diseases and pests.
Finally, management may be simplified, allowing farmers to
increase the size of their operations without a
corresponding increase in machinery or labour. The use of
HT crops, for example, requires a less complex use of
herbicides, increasing the farmer’s ability to
expand acreage. All these factors may cause the cost of
production to decline, potentially making the farmer
better off.
Canadian farmers have generally adopted new technology
when it has become available. The evidence of this is
everywhere on the modern Canadian farm — new crop
varieties, new breeds of animals, computer-guided
equipment — yet many producers feel they have not
benefited from the process of adopting new technology.
They feel that most of the benefits have been passed on to
processors and consumers and, now with biotechnology,
input suppliers.
The statement has often been made that, if farmers do not
adopt new innovations and technology, they will be worse
off economically, but there is no general agreement as to
the truth of this statement. If farmers had not adopted
Marquis wheat, they would certainly be worse off today. On
the other hand, their refusal to adopt rBST in the
Canadian dairy industry does not appear to have hurt
either dairy farmers or consumers.
Two important assumptions must be made before we can
assert that technology improves the economic welfare of
farmers. First, we have to assume the new technology does
not lower the profit farmers receive for their product
after the innovation has been fully adopted. For a small
country like Canada, it is usually assumed that an
increase in output has no impact on world price. This
presumes that other countries do not adopt the same
technology. If we take wheat, for example, a new variety
made available to prairie producers may also be used in
Australia, Russia, or parts of the United States. Taken
together, the new variety may lower the world price,
reducing benefits to farmers (Edwards and Freebairn,
1984). As shown by Edwards and Freebairn (1985), if the
price effect is large, the benefits from adopting the new
technology may be negative for farmers. Second, the
presence of government subsidies can make the aggregate
benefit of adopting new technology negative, especially if
the increase in output is exported (Schmitz et
al, 1997).
For example, a recent paper by Flack-Zepeda et al
(2000), estimating the benefits of Bt corn, completely
disregarded the subsidies corn farmers receive for the
production of corn.
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Adoption of GMO Crops
The adoption of GM crops is occurring at a rapid pace. The
world area planted to GM crops in 1996 was approximately
6.4 million acres. GM crop production has increased each
year since 1996, with an estimated 102.1 million acres of
GM crops planted in 1999. The United States is the leading
producer of GM crops accounting for 75.4 million acres of
the total GM crop acres. Argentina is second, producing
14.3 million acres of GM crops. Canada produced an
estimated 9.8 million acres of GM crops in 1999, which
accounted for approximately 10% of the total world
production of GM crops (Directorate-General for
Agriculture 2000).
As of January 2001 there is no publicly available survey
or data on how individual farmers have benefited from the
adoption of GM crops in Canada. Therefore, it is not
possible to say how much economic benefit farmers have
experienced from adopting this technology. There are
estimates of expected economic benefits, for example Mayer
and Furtan 1999, but these remain forecasts until a survey
of actual farm experience has been completed.
There have been a few studies completed in the U.S. that
estimate the economic benefit to farmers from adopting GM
crop varieties, for example Carlson et al 1997.
These results can not be extended to Canada because in
most cases the crops are completely different. As well,
some of the methodological assumptions made in the U.S.
studies do not apply to Canada, for example the importance
of the export market. None the less we do draw on these
U.S. studies because they are the best that is currently
available.
The majority of Canada’s GM crop production has been
in the form of HT canola. In 1996, the first commercial
production of HT canola took place in western Canada. At
this time HT canola accounted for only 4% of total canola
acres (see table 1.). After only four years of commercial
production the number of HT canola acres had risen to
approximately 70% of total canola acres.3
Table 1. Adoption of HT Canola in Canada (000s acres)
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
Total Canada
|
8,843
|
12,040
|
13,535
|
13,700
|
Herbicide Tolerant (HT)
|
350
|
4000
|
6000
|
9500
|
Percentage of Total
|
4
|
33
|
44
|
70
|
Sources: Fulton and Keyowski 1999, CCGA 1999.
The rapid adoption of GM crops would indicate that
producers have experienced benefits from the use of GM
varieties. Producer adoption of GM crops will depend on
whether GM varieties provide an advantage in terms of
profitability and/or make farm operations more convenient.
The profitability criteria will be dependent on a
comparison of both the yield and cost of production for GM
and non-GM crop varieties (assuming no price differential
for either crop). The convenience factor will be measured
by estimating the labour and management requirements for
GM and non-GM crops.
Yield Comparison of GM and non-GM Crops
The first factor that will determine the profitability of
any new crop variety is its yield potential compared to
existing varieties. Several studies have been reported
that make yield comparisons between HT and conventional
crop varieties. The most important factor in comparing HT
and conventional crop yields is the level of weed
infestation and the subsequent control provided by the
herbicide. The major benefit of HT crops is they permit
the in crop application of non-selective herbicides such
as glyphosate. Non-selective herbicides control weeds such
as cleavers, wild mustard, buckwheat, and stinkweed that
are traditionally difficult to control with selective
herbicides. Controlling these weeds not only provides a
potential yield advantage, but also reduces the amount of
dockage in the grain.
In the United States, the majority of studies have focused
on comparing the yields of HT and conventional soybeans.
Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride (2000) found a statistically
significant relationship between the adoption of HT
soybeans and an increase in soybean yields. Although the
yield gains were statistically significant, they were
relatively small and varied across regions.
In terms of insect resistant crops, a number of studies
have compared the yields of conventional and Bt corn.
Trials conducted in the United States found that Bt corn
provided yield gains of up to 8% over conventional
varieties (Koziel et al, 1993). The studies
pointed out that yield gains attributed to Bt corn are
very sensitive to weather conditions and the level of
insect infestation.
There is very little empirical evidence available to show
the yield impact of HT canola. The evidence that is
available suggests that the adoption of HT canola
varieties has resulted in increased canola yields due to
improved weed control. Research has also shown that
seeding canola in the fall or early spring increases
canola yields and reduces the risk of frost. Weed control
problems often prevented producers from seeding in the
fall or early spring. Introducing HT canola varieties
tolerant to post emergent herbicides that control a
broad-spectrum of weeds has allowed producers to take
advantage of fall or early spring seeding (CCGA, 1999).
Cost of Production Comparison
The second factor that will determine the profitability of
GM crops versus conventional crops is the cost of
production for each crop, including seed, pesticides, and
fuel. In terms of seed, GM varieties are generally more
expensive than conventional seed varieties. On the other
hand, GM crop varieties are expected to provide cost
savings by reducing the application of chemical
pesticides. Reducing the number of chemical applications
should also result fuel cost savings.
The cost of Bt corn seed, for example, exceeds that of
conventional corn seed by U.S. $12 to U.S. $13 per acre
(Directorate-General for Agriculture, 2000). On the
positive side, the introduction of Bt corn varieties has
also reduced the use of insecticides, resulting in
estimated cost savings of U.S. $2.80 to U.S. $14.50 per
acre (Carlson et al, 1997). Potential fuel cost reductions
would likely increase the estimated savings of Bt corn.
The cost of HT soybeans exceeds conventional varieties by
U.S. $11 to U.S. $13 per acre (Fernandez-Cornejo and
McBride, 2000). This cost includes the technology use fee.
The benefit of planting HT soybeans is the reduction in
the number of chemical applications required to control
weeds. Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride (2000) estimated
herbicide cost savings from the adoption of HT soybeans to
be in the range of U.S. $9 to U.S. $11 per acre. This
estimate does not include potential fuel cost savings
resulting from a reduction in chemical applications.
Fulton and Keyowski (1999) compared the Canadian
production costs of HT and conventional canola varieties.
The results presented in Table 2 indicate seed cost
premiums for HT varieties in the range of Cdn. $5 to Cdn.
$11 per acre. As was the case with HT soybeans, the
introduction of HT canola appears to provide herbicide
cost savings. The study estimated herbicide cost savings
attributed to HT canola in the range of Cdn. $4 to Cdn.
$10 per acre.
Table 2. Canola System Cost Comparison (Canada)
|
Roundup Ready
|
Liberty Link (Hybrid)
|
Smart
|
Conventional
|
Seed Cost ($/acre)
|
$18.70
|
$24.75
|
$18.70
|
$13.47
|
Herbicide Cost ($/acre)
|
$5.00
|
$22.75
|
$26.20
|
$30.00
|
TUA ($/acre)
|
$15.00
|
$0.00
|
$0.00
|
$0.00
|
Total Cost ($/acre)
|
$38.70
|
$47.50
|
$44.90
|
$43.47
|
Source: Fulton and Keyowski (1999)
Overall Profitability of GM Crops
The complexity of the variables involved in the comparison
of yields and production costs make it difficult to
determine the overall profitability of GM and conventional
crops. The results appear to be mixed on whether HT crops
have increased producer profits as compared to
conventional crops. Carlson et al (1997)
estimated that HT soybeans increased producer profits by
an average of U.S. $5.65 per acre. In contrast, the
USDAERS (1999) study showed increase in profits from
adopting HT soybeans to be insignificant. Marra et al
(1998) found that yield gains attributed to Bt corn
outweighed seed premiums and technology fees, resulting in
net gains of U.S. $3 to U.S. $16 per acre.
A limited number of studies that have examined the effect
of HT canola on producer profits. Mayer and Furtan (1999)
estimated the economic impact of introducing HT canola in
the range of Cdn. $5 to Cdn. $8 per acre for farmers in
western Canada. These benefits accounted for all cost
increases such as technology fees, and cost reductions
such as reduced herbicide usage.
Convenience Factor
A third benefit from GM technology is that it may allow
for greater economies of size as it simplifies the
production system. The use of HT canola, for example, has
given producers greater flexibility in terms of the timing
of weed control (Fulton and Keyowski, 1999), but
calculating the economic benefit of this flexibility is
difficult. The benefit of only having to use one herbicide
— for example, RoundupTM — is greater than
simply the reduced cost of herbicide. The introduction of
GM crops has also reduced the number of pesticide
applications required, with a concomitant reduction in the
amount of labour and management time required to control
pests. The labour-cost savings attributed to the
introduction of GM crops is not always factored into
profitability assessments.
Whether the adoption of GM crops will provide a labour and
management advantage in the long run is still uncertain.
As the number of GM crop acres continues to rise, there
may be additional management costs involved in controlling
the spread of GM plants. For example, producers will have
to take additional management precautions to prevent the
development of volunteer HT plants and herbicide resistant
plants.
-
Environmental Impacts of GM Crops
An important consideration in the debate over GM crops is
the effect this new technology will have on the
environment. The environmental impact of GM crops is a
topic in itself, and chapter three of this report deals
with it in detail. Nevertheless, there may be important
agronomic costs and benefits arising out of the potential
environmental impacts of GM crops that deserve discussion
here. The potential environmental concerns associated with
the introduction of transgenic crops include the potential
for gene transfer, crop and herbicide rotational
restrictions, and the development of pest-resistant
species. These problems could increase the production
costs for adopters and non- adopters of GM crops alike.
The environmental impacts of GM crops, however, are not
all negative. Environmental benefits may well accrue from
reducing the amount of pesticides used in crop production.
Contamination from GM Crops
The first environmental concern over the introduction of
GM crops is the potential transfer of genes from GM crop
plants into non-GM plants. The most common form of gene
transfer is through hybridization, in which pollen from
one plant is carried by wind or insects to fertilize the
stigma of another (Powell, 1999).
There are two areas of concern regarding gene transfer
from GM plants. The first is that genes from GM crops will
transfer to non-GM crops. The likelihood of this is
dependent on a number of factors, including the crop
species and its location. The potential for gene transfer
is clearly increased if GM and non-GM crops are grown
adjacent to one another. Gene transfer is not only
possible between members of the same species, but also
between crops of different species. There is concern that
herbicide-tolerant genes will be transferred to
non-herbicide-tolerant crops, or to other GM crops,
resulting, in future crops, in HT volunteer plants that
cannot be controlled by conventional methods (Royal
Society, 1998). The second area of concern is the
potential transfer of genes from GM plants to wild
species. The likelihood of this is, again, dependent on
the species and the location of the crop. The potential
for gene transfer is minimal when no sexually compatible
wild relatives are found in the region (Royal Society,
1998). It is also unlikely for inbreeding crop species
such as rice and soybeans. With out-breeding crops that
have many wild relatives, there is a greater danger of
gene transfer.
The main concern regarding gene transfer is in the area of
HT crops, in that genes may transfer to wild relatives of
the crop species and produce weed species that are
resistant to herbicides (Royal Society 1998).
Mayer and Furtan estimated the potential economic loss
caused by increased weed infestation through gene transfer
(see Table 3).
Table 2. Canola System Cost Comparison (Canada)
Roundup Ready
|
Liberty Link (Hybrid)
|
Economic Loss Given Yield ($Cdn/ac)
|
18 bu/ac
|
22.78 bu/ac
|
27 bu/ac
|
32 bu/ac
|
2
|
5
|
5.53
|
6.99
|
8.29
|
9.82
|
4
|
10
|
11.05
|
13.98
|
16.58
|
19.65
|
5
|
15
|
16.58
|
20.98
|
24.87
|
29.47
|
10
|
22
|
24.31
|
30.77
|
36.47
|
43.22
|
15
|
27
|
29.84
|
37.76
|
44.76
|
53.05
|
20
|
32
|
35.36
|
44.76
|
53.05
|
62.87
|
Note: Canola price is assumed to be $6.14/bu.
Source: Mayer and Furtan, 1999.
The potential economic losses presented in Table 3 show
that any increase in weed infestation quickly removes the
economic benefits of growing GM varieties. The potential
also exists for HT genes to transfer into crop and weed
species in neighbouring fields. If gene transfer is a
problem, the production costs for neighbouring producers
will also be significantly increased.
The other concern regarding potential contamination from
GM crop varieties is the spread of seeds via spillage from
farm machinery. The fear is that GM seeds will spill from
farm equipment such as combines, swathers, and grain
trucks into the field being harvested. The potential also
exists, particularly for small-seeded crops, for seeds to
be transferred into neighbouring fields and ditches,
resulting in volunteer GM plants sprining up in the
following year’s crop. A volunteer GM crop will
create a farm management problem for the producer.
Controlling it may require the use of alternative
chemicals, and will likely increase the producer’s
cost of production. Volunteer crops also reduce the yield
potential of the commercial crops grown the following
year. If spillage into adjacent fields results in
volunteer GM crops, this will also be an additional cost
for neighbouring producers.
It is difficult to measure such costs. Weed infestation on
the land of a neighbouring farmer who does not use HT
varieties is an externality that has never been measured.
Nonetheless, it remains a potential cost.
Pest-Resistant Species
The second environmental concern regarding the
introduction of GM crops is the potential for pests to
develop resistance to traditional pesticides. This has
been a problem in the past with conventional crops, and
there is now concern over the potential development of
resistant insect species owing to the regular use of Bt
crops. The problem with Bt crops is that they are present
in the environment longer than Bt sprays, therefore
potentially shortening the time for insects to develop
resistance to Bt sprays. Insect resistance to Bt could
have devastating effects on both conventional and organic
producers who rely on Bt sprays.
There is also concern over the increasing numbers of
herbicide-resistant weed species. In 1998, an estimated
216 species had become resistant to one or more herbicide
(Heap, 1999). It is difficult to predict how the
introduction of genetically modified HT crops will affect
the number of herbicide-resistant weed species, but the
concern is that HT crop varieties encourage the use of a
single herbicide or herbicide group for weed control. The
continued use of a single herbicide could increase the
chances of developing herbicidetolerant weed populations.
If weed species do develop resistance to common
herbicides, producers will have to consider alternative,
and potentially more expensive, herbicides.
Herbicide-resistant weeds are not only a problem for HT
crop producers, as it is likely that would spread to
neighbouring fields. Controlling herbicide-resistant weed
species would affect the production costs for both
adopters and non-adopters of HT crop varieties.
Rotational Restrictions
The third concern regarding the introduction of GM crops
is the potential restrictions that may be imposed on
traditional crop and pesticide rotations. Crop rotations
will play a major role in reducing the risk of developing
pesticide-resistant species. If a number of genetically
modified HT crops are available on the market, for
example, it will be important to ensure that a single HT
technology is not overused in a crop rotation.
The choice of HT crops in a rotation will also have an
effect on traditional herbicide rotations. The use of
glyphosate herbicides on GM crops may impose a restriction
on current herbicide rotations. Glyphosate is currently
used for weed control in chem-fallow, as a spring burn-off
chemical, and a pre-harvest desiccant. Producing Roundup
Ready crops may limit the use of glyphosate in these
areas, forcing producers to use other herbicides for weed
control. In many cases, producers have been forced to
tank-mix 2,4-D to control volunteer Roundup Ready canola.
If GM crop contamination is a problem, neighbouring
producers may also be forced to change crop and herbicide
rotations. Forcing producers to use alternative crop and
herbicide rotations could increase production costs for
both adopters and non-adopters of GM crops.
Environmental Benefits
The majority of pesticides used by producers today are
more environmentally sensitive than those used in the
past. But they can still have negative environmental
effects when they enter the air, soil, and groundwater.
One of the benefits of GM crop varieties is the potential
to reduce the amount of pesticides used in intensive
agriculture. A study performed by the USDA-ERS (2000)
found that the introduction of Bt cotton resulted in a
significant decrease in the use of insecticides such as
aldicarb. This clearly benefits the environment by
reducing the amount of chemical residue and potentially
decreasing the deaths of non-target organisms.
The development of genetically modified HT crop varieties
has allowed producers to use non-selective herbicides
during the crop season. The use of non-selective
herbicides has reduced the number of chemical applications
required, thereby reducing the amount of herbicide that
can enter the soil and groundwater. The ERS report
examined the affect of HT soybeans on the amount of
herbicide use. The study found that introducing HT
soybeans increased the amount of glyphosate herbicide
used, but also resulted in a large decrease in the amount
of synthetic herbicide used. The net result was an overall
reduction in pounds of herbicide applied.
The chemical activity of glyphosate herbicides such as
Roundup may also benefit the environment. Roundup only
affects the plants which it contacts directly and is
deactivated by micro-organisms once it reaches the soil
(Powell, 1999). This reduces both the amount of chemical
residue left in the soil and the potential contamination
of water through runoff or leaching. Improving the quality
of the soil and groundwater through reduced pesticide use
will benefit both GM crop producers and their neighbours.
A final environmental benefit relates to the impact HT
crops have had on directseeding operations. Direct
seeding, in which there is no tillage prior to seeding,
maintains surface cover and is a proven method for
reducing erosion (CCGA, 1999). Previously, canola
producers used pre-emergent herbicides for weed control,
which required additional tillage in the spring or fall.
The introduction of HT crops has reduced the need for
preemergent herbicides, allowing producers to convert to
direct-seeding practices and still maintain effective weed
control. The expanded use of direct seeding benefits both
producers and society through decreased soil erosion.
-
Conclusions
The review of the available literature indicates that the
introduction of GM crops has improved the producer’s
ability to control pests, which has, in turn, resulted in
an increase in the yield potential of GM crops compared to
conventional varieties. What is uncertain is whether the
introduction of this new technology has, in fact,
increased the profitability of farmers. The rapid adoption
of HT canola varieties in western Canada would indicate
that producers have benefited from adopting the new
technology.
A question that needs to be addressed is the impact that
more than one GM crop in the rotation will have on
profitability. As yet, there is no data on this important
question.
-
References
-
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2000). Economic
Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops on the Agri-Food
Sector. Ottawa: Directorate-General for Agriculture.
-
Canadian Canola Growers Association (CCGA) (1999).
Producer’s Perspective on Biotechnology. (http://www.ccga.ca/OrganizationHome.htm)
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Carlson, G., M. Marra, and B.Hubbell (1997). Transgenic
Technology for Crop Protection. Choices (Third
Quarter), 31-36.
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Edwards, G. W., and J. W. Freebairn (1984, February).
The Gains from Research into Tradable Commodities.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
6(1): 41-49.
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Falck-Zepeda, J.B., G. Traxler, and R. G.Nelson (2000,
May). Surplus Distribution from the Introduction of a
Biotechnology Innovation. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics. 82(2): 360–370.
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Feldmann, M., M. Morris, and D. Hoisington (2000).
Genetically Modified Organisms: Why all the
Controversy? Choices, First Quarter.
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Fernandez-Cornejo, J. and W. McBride (2000).
Genetically Engineered Crops for Pest Management in
U.S. Agriculture. (http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer786/).
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Fulton, M., and L. Keyowski (1999). The Producer
Benefits of Herbicide-Resistant Canola. AgBioForum,
2(2), 85-93.
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Heap, I. M. (1999). The Occurrence of
Herbicide-Resistant Weeds Worldwide. (www.weedscience.com/)
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Koziel, M. G., G. L. Beland, C. Bowman, N. B. Carozzi,
R. Crenshaw, L. Crossland, J. Dawson, W. Desai, M.
Hill, S. Kadwell, K. Lannis, K. Lewis, D. Maddox, K.
McPherson, M. R. Wright, and S. V.Euola (1993). Field
performance of elite transgenic maize plants expressing
an insecticidal protein derived from Bacillus
thuringiensis. Bio/technology,
4(11):194–200.
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Marra, M., G. Carlson, and B. Hubbell (1998). Economic
impacts of the first crop biotechnologies. (http://www.ag-econ.ncsu.edu/faculty/marra/FirstCrop/)
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Mayer, H., and W. H. Furtan (1999). Economics of
Transgenic Herbicide-Tolerant Canola: The Case of
Western Canada. Food Policy, 24: 431-442.
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McHughen, A. (2000). Pandora’s Picnic Basket:
The Potential and Hazards of Genetically Modified
Foods. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Moss, C.B. and A. Schmitz (2000). Vertical Integration
and Trade Policy: The Case of Sugar. Agribusiness:
An International Journal (forthcoming).
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Powell, D. (1999). Seminal paper of Agriculture
Biotechnology: A summary of the science. (www.plant.uguelph.ca)
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Royal Society (1998). Genetically Modified Plants
for Food Use. (www.royalsoc.ac.uk).
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Schmitz, T., A. Schmitz, and C. Dumas (1997, June).
Gains from Trade, Inefficiency of Government Programs,
and the Net Economic Effects of Trading. Journal of
Political Economy, 105(3): 637–647.
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USDA-ERS (2000). Impacts of Adopting Genetically
Modified Crops in the United States. (www.ers.usda.gov).
-
Consumer Responses to Food Quality, Food
Safety, and Health Concerns
Jill E. Hobbs
-
The Issue
Consumers have expressed growing unease with genetically
modified (GM) food. However, these concerns are not
universal. There appear to be significant differences in
consumers’ awareness and acceptance of GM food and
in their trust of national regulatory systems. Whether the
presence of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) should
be labelled, and how this might be implemented and
enforced, are contentious policy questions. Consumer
preferences are important. Regardless of whether they have
a scientific basis, we need to understand and respect
these preferences, whether as regulators developing policy
responses or in the private sector developing industry
strategy.
-
Implications and Conclusions
There is a growing, yet disparate, body of survey evidence
documenting consumer preferences toward products of
biotechnology in different countries. While providing
useful background information, such evidence often lacks
the deeper analysis and interpretation necessary for the
formulation of policy and industry strategies. Other
research has explored the conceptual issues underlying the
consumer information problem and different policy
scenarios. This work has been important in framing the
nature of the problem and exploring potential outcomes. It
needs to be taken to the next step to quantify some of
these effects. A cohesive research strategy is called for
which combines both these elements and focuses on four key
areas: deepening our understanding of consumer segments,
mapping expected reactions to future biotechnological
developments, measuring willingness-to-pay, and examining
the efficacy of regulatory systems.
-
Background
Consumer Survey Evidence
Surveys of public opinion in various countries toward GM
food, and toward biotechnology in general, broadly agree
that the level of awareness with respect to
“biotechnology,” “genetic
engineering,” or “genetic
modification”4 is
higher in northern European countries relative to the
United States and Canada. Also, the extent of consumer
concern is greater (for example, Angus Reid Group and
The Economist, 2000; Perdikis et al, 2000; Hoban,
1998; Hoban, 1999; Bredahl, 1999). The levels of awareness
and concern have increased in most countries, although to
differing degrees, since the mid-1990s.
Eurobarometer surveys of public opinion toward
biotechnology in the European Union were conducted in
1991, 1993, 1996, and 1999. Although some of the questions
changed between the surveys, several broad trends were
evident (European Commission, 2000). The proportion of
respondents who believed biotechnology would improve their
way of life in the next twenty years declined from 50% to
45% between 1996 and 1999, while the percentage believing
that genetic engineering would lead to improvements fell
to 37% from 43%. The Eurobarometer surveys found that the
public’s knowledge of biotechnology and genetics
improved only slightly between 1993, 1996, and 1999. Two
notable exceptions emerged. First, there was a marked
improvement in the understanding of what is meant by
“cloning.” There was more uncertainty,
however, about the potential outcomes of biotechnology.
For example, more people were unsure whether a
person’s genes could be modified by eating a
genetically modified fruit in 1999 (34%) than had been the
case in 1996 (29%).5
In the 1996 and 1999 Eurobarometer surveys, attitudes
toward four applications of biotechnology were compared:
the production of food, the development of insect
resistance in plants, the development of medicines or
vaccines, and the use of genetic testing to detect
hereditary diseases (European Commission, 2000). Over the
three-year period, public opinion became less optimistic
about the potential usefulness of these applications,
although there was little change in attitudes toward the
perceived riskiness of the applications. Fewer respondents
felt the applications to be morally acceptable, and fewer
(12%-16%) thought these applications should be encouraged,
relative to the 1996 survey results.
Apparent contradictory results between some of the surveys
reported in the literature may stem from differences in
methodology. For example, Hoban (1998) found that over 70%
of U.S. consumers surveyed through the 1990s supported
agricultural biotechnology, whereas the Angus Reid Group
(1999) put the acceptance of GM foods in the United States
at around 47%. They further suggest that 60% of U.S.
consumers would be less likely to buy food if labelled as
containing GM ingredients (Angus Reid Group and The
Economist, 2000).
Although still positive, it appears that acceptance in
Canada may be on the decline (Angus Reid Group, 1999). It
is argued that Canadian public perception of the issue has
shifted from a science and technology issue to one of food
safety and public health — a shift that has not
occurred to date in the United States. This finding is
confirmed by Einsiedel (2000), who compared the attitudes
of Canadian consumers in 1997 and 2000. Although Canadians
remained “cautiously supportive” of
biotechnology, Einsiedel found their optimism had declined
since 1997. She also found that consumers were relatively
more positive when the term “biotechnology”
was used than when the term “genetic
engineering” was used. This illustrates how the use
of different terminology in a survey can elicit a
different response, and underlines the need for caution
when comparing surveys that were conducted using different
methodologies.
In assessing the attitudes of consumers in the United
States and Canada toward different food safety issues, a
number of researchers have found that pesticide and
chemical residues and bacterial contamination of food are
regarded as bigger food safety threats than GM food
(Hoban, 1999; Einsiedel, 2000). Consumers appear to be
less accepting of the use of biotechnology in animals
relative to plants, and appear more accepting of its use
in medicine than in agriculture generally (Hoban, 1998;
Hoban, 1999; Einsiedel, 2000; Moses, 1999).
What Are the Consumer Concerns?
The negative consumer response toward GM foods is
multi-faceted. Another branch of research has focused on
understanding and interpreting these concerns. Four broad
groups of concerns are apparent: specific food safety and
quality concerns, fear of the unknown, ethical objections,
and environmental concerns (Hobbs and Plunkett, 1999;
Einsiedel, 2000; Moses, 1999).
Specific food safety and quality concerns include the fear
that transgenic manipulation of genes could introduce
allergens to products — for example, if a peanut
gene were to be used in soya. The use of
anti-biotic-resistant marker genes has raised the spectre
of increased anti-biotic resistance in humans and animals
(Hobbs and Plunkett, 1999). Other potential side-effects
identified in the literature include known toxicants,
whereby toxicants naturally occurring in a plant at safe
levels are unintentionally magnified to unsafe levels.
Unintended changes in nutrient content or nutrient
absorption properties is another concern (Nelson et
al, 1999). These potential risks are dealt with
specifically — and, many would argue, adequately
— in current national regulatory systems for product
approval and varietal development. Nevertheless, there
remains unease among some consumers who do not trust
regulatory systems or the science used to assess these
risks.
In addition to these specific food safety concerns, some
consumers simply fear the unknown.6 This is not a typical food
safety fear, e.g., “If I eat this GM canola product
for lunch, will I be sick by tonight?” Rather, it is
the fear that there may be unforeseen negative
side-effects from consuming a GM food over a long period
of time. This creates problems for public policy and
industry strategy because it undermines the effectiveness
of risk assessment, risk management, and risk
communication. There is a difference between
“risk,” where one can provide
scientifically-determined statistical probabilities of an
event occurring, and “uncertainty,” where one
cannot. It is not possible to calculate the probability of
something completely unknown and totally unforeseen
becoming a problem in the future. Yet we need to know the
probability of an event for risk assessment.
An entirely different set of consumer concerns are ethical
and relate to the notion that genetic engineering equates
to “playing God.” This is not a safety
concern, per se, but a philosophical objection to the
technology or its application. Finally, concerns over
potentially negative environmental concerns are also
important to some consumers, and are dealt with elsewhere
in this report. It is important to recognize that all
these concerns are manifest, to a greater or lesser
degree, in the reported results of consumer opinion polls,
yet it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the impact of
one concern from another. It is important to separate
them, however, because they may invite different responses
from regulators, different industry strategies, different
roles for science, and different roles for public
information and communication.
Regulatory Implications
The divergence in consumer attitudes is reflected in
different regulatory approaches between countries. The
United States and Canada have adopted a product-based
regulatory system for GM foods in which the focus is on
establishing the safety of the product, regardless of
whether it is GM. If it is shown that a GM food is
substantially equivalent to a non-GM counterpart, the same
set of regulations apply. The EU has taken a processbased
approach with its 1997 Novel Foods regulation, which
applies if the food is transgenic. Implicit in the EU
approach is the notion that the risks of GM food are
inherently different than the risks of non-GM food.
Food labelling regulations also differ. Phillips and
Foster (2000) report that eighteen countries have
indicated their intentions to adopt some form of labelling
for GM foods. This ranges from mandatory labelling in the
EU, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, among others, to
voluntary labelling in the United States, Canada,
Argentina, and Russia. Most countries, including Canada,
are still formulating their labelling policies, and in
only a few cases, such as the UK, have policy decisions
actually been enshrined in regulatory action. Disparate
labelling policy approaches, not least the variety of
“thresholds” setting the level of acceptable
GM content (e.g., 1% in the EU; 5% in Japan), create
significant challenges for the food industry, particularly
for those exporting to a number of different markets with
potentially different regulatory requirements.
Whether or not to label the presence (or absence) of GMOs
is highly contentious. On one side of the debate is the
argument that consumers have a right to know what is in
their food or how their food is produced. This is also
becoming an issue with other “process”
attributes, such as farm animal welfare or environmentally
friendly production practices. These process attributes
are “credence” attributes, meaning that the
consumer cannot detect their presence even after
consumption. In this way, they differ from
“search” attributes — those which a
consumer can detect or evaluate prior to purchase, such as
the size of an orange — and they differ from
“experience” attributes — those which a
consumer can evaluate after consumption, such as the
juiciness of an orange. This is significant because it
creates an information problem for consumers. Process
attributes may be important to a consumer’s purchase
decision for various food safety, quality, or ethical
reasons; however, without more information, consumers
cannot detect the presence of these attributes. Left to
its own devices, the market may fail to provide this
information. This may well be true for GM foods. Unlike
organic foods or environmentally friendly foods, producers
of GM foods might expect a negative backlash against their
product if it were labelled as GM. This is particularly so
for “input-trait” products (e.g., herbicide or
pesticide resistant) with little direct consumer benefit
(Angus Reid Group and The Economist, 2000; Gath
and Alvensleben, 1998). This weakens the incentive for the
firms to label their products correctly, creating
credibility problems for a voluntary labelling system
(Hobbs and Plunkett, 1999).
On the other hand, there may be an incentive for voluntary
labelling of “GM-free” or “Non-GM”
food, as is the case with Non-BST labelled milk in the
United States,7 if some
consumer segments are sufficiently averse to GM products.
Whether or not voluntary labelling is a viable solution to
consumers’ information asymmetry in the long-run
remains to be seen. Certainly, there is anecdotal evidence
of the existence of “GM-free” labels in some
markets, notably in the EU. However, the potential remains
for producers of GMfood to cheat and misrepresent their
food as GM-free if there is a market premium for GMfree
food, and in the absence of a credible system of
monitoring and enforcing voluntary labelling systems.
An alternative is to make labelling mandatory, but this
policy option also has drawbacks. The value to consumers
of a “GM” label that provides no additional
useful information about the known safety or nutritional
value of a product can be questioned. Under the principle
of “substantial equivalence,” GM and non-GM
foods should have the same level of known safety. Critics
of mandatory labelling argue that it misleads consumers,
implying that there is a difference in quality and safety
between GM and non- GM foods which has no scientific
basis. It has been suggested that there is confusion among
consumers over the meaning of the term “genetically
modified” (Kenny, 1999). Furthermore, it is argued
that providing nutritional information may be more
important to the long-term health of consumers. As such,
adding “GM” labels could create a problem of
“information overload,” diluting the impact of
the scientifically proven nutritional information (Kenny,
1999). Presumably, for those consumers with an ethical
rather than a safety objection to biotechnology, mandatory
labelling would still confer information benefits. This
debate highlights the importance of understanding consumer
preferences and distinguishing between ethical, safety,
and environmental concerns.
A further drawback to mandatory labelling lies in the
costly and time-consuming process of testing for the
presence of GMOs — where this is technologically
feasible — and in segregating GM and non-GM
products. Without technological advances in testing, this
can only be expected to worsen as the number of potential
GM traits in complex processed food products multiplies.
Instead, segregation and identity preservation of GM from
non-GM agricultural products will be required.
Paradoxically, it will be the non-GM products that will
likely bear the brunt of this cost, since it will be more
costly to substantiate the absence rather than acknowledge
the possible presence of GMOs (Kerr, 1999). If the
transaction costs incurred in implementing, monitoring,
and enforcing a mandatory labelling policy are
sufficiently high, a ban on the approval, production, and
importation of GM food could be the policy solution which
produces the highest net benefits for society (Hobbs and
Plunkett, 1999). Further empirical work is needed to
determine the answer to this question.
A preliminary assessment of the economic impact of
mandatory labelling of GM food products in Canada has
suggested that compulsory labelling would result in cost
increases equivalent to 9%-10% of the retail prices of
these products (KPMG Consulting, 2000). The total cost to
Canadian consumers of labelling was estimated to be in the
range of $700- $950 million per year. The major component
of these costs is segregation costs. Further discussion of
segregation and labelling issues for GM products can be
found in chapter six.
-
Discussion
An examination of existing research suggests that it falls
into two main camps. The first is a series of consumer
surveys and polls that capture the current flavour of
consumer attitudes. The more useful of these provide us
with a guide as to trends in consumer opinion over time
and the motivations behind these attitudes (for example,
Einsiedel, 2000). In most cases, however, while they
provide a surface-level picture of the state of consumer
attitudes, the studies often lack in-depth analysis of
consumer preferences and motivations. The second set of
research initiatives delves deeper into the nature of the
consumer information problem and the impact of different
regulatory systems. These studies helped define the
problem, setting it in its policy context and laying out
various scenarios or potential outcomes. As yet, there
appears to little empirical work to quantify the potential
impact of these different scenarios. Thus, a number of
gaps in our knowledge are apparent and would benefit from
further research. These fall loosely into four broad
groups:
-
consumer segments,
-
future biotechnological developments,
-
willingness-to-pay, and
-
regulatory systems.
Consumers are not a homogeneous mass. There is not
“a Canadian consumer” or “a
British consumer”; instead, there are consumer
segments with different attitudes. We need a better
understanding of the preferences and motivations of
different consumer segments in the markets of interest to
the Canadian agri-food sector. We need a better
understanding of what motivates consumer attitudes
(positive or negative) toward biotechnology, of who or
what influences consumer opinion, of consumer responses to
“information” messages from different sources,
of consumer responses to different perceived states of
risk, and of which consumers have different attitudes, and
why. This requires a deeper level of analysis and
interpretation than is apparent in much of the opinion
poll research to-date. Caswell and Noelke (2000) propose a
unified framework that combines the insights of economic
models of consumer information asymmetry with those of
applied psychology, consumer behaviour, and marketing that
focuses on perceived quality. Future analyses of consumer
preferences should distinguish between quality
characteristics that are vertically differentiated (i.e.,
all consumers share the same quality ranking) and
horizontal differentiation in which consumers have
different quality rankings.
How will consumers react to future biotechnological
developments? This includes output-trait GM foods with
positive benefits for health or food quality, and
applications of medical biotechnology. Although related on
one level, these two issues need to be treated separately.
Will the positive attribute of an output-trait GM food be
sufficiently valued by consumers to outweigh the perceived
negative attribute of the GM process? This emphasizes the
importance of identifying and understanding different
consumer segments and of being able to separate out food
safety, health, and quality issues from ethical issues. It
has policy implications because the incentives for a
credible voluntary private sector labelling system are
much stronger in the case of output-trait products.
There is a need for research to measure consumers’
willingness-to-pay for “GM-free” food, GMO
labelling, or GM foods with positive output traits. Gath
and Alvensleben (1998) estimate the willingness-to-pay of
German consumers for GM-labelling and tentatively suggest
that, if labelled, the prices of GM food would need to be
30-40% lower.
Theirs is an aggregate analysis, however, and further work
would benefit from identifying willingness-to-pay by
consumer segments. Economists have at their disposal a
number of proven “stated-preference” valuation
techniques that could facilitate this analysis.
A final set of research objectives centres on further
analysis of different regulatory issues with consumer
impacts, including (but not limited to), labelling, market
access, accreditation/certification of GM/GM free
products, product approval, transparency of the regulatory
system, and so on. Necessary background information for
this analysis includes an in-depth understanding of
consumers’ trust in current regulatory systems.
Again, this underlines the importance of a comprehensive
understanding of consumers’ attitudes. How to deal
with consumers’ fear of the unknown is particularly
challenging for the regulatory system (and for private
industry). How do we incorporate uncertainty as to future
outcomes into a policy framework? How does this affect
risk assessment?8
Finally, should there be mechanisms for involving the
public more directly in decision-making? Is this
desirable? How would it be facilitated? Would it assuage
consumer concerns, and would it improve the efficacy and
responsiveness of the regulatory system? Initial research
has touched on this issue (for example, Citizens’
Panel, 1999); however, further exploration of this model
would be useful. Future work should be from an
interdisciplinary standpoint, including input from
economics, political science, sociology, public
administration, and public communications.
Clearly, these four broad groupings of research needs are
inter-related. One forms the information base and policy
framework for another. This suggests that they should be
undertaken in concert in a co-ordinated, strategic
approach, with ongoing communication between the
researchers in each of the areas. The Canadian
Biotechnology Advisory Committee seems well placed to
perform that co-ordinating role.
-
References
-
Angus Reid Group (1999). New Thoughts in Food:
Exploring Consumer Reaction to Biotechnology in Foods.
Angus Reid Group Study Prospectus.
-
Angus Reid Group and The Economist (2000,
January 13). The Economist/Angus Reid World
Poll: International Awareness and Perceptions of
Genetically Modified Foods. Angus Reid Group.
-
Bredahl, L. (1999). Consumers’ Cognitions with
Regard to Genetically Modified Foods: Results of a
Qualitative Study in Four Countries. Appetite,
33(3):343-360.
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Caswell, J. (1999). An Evaluation of Risk Analysis as
Applied to Agricultural Biotechnology (with a Case
Study of GMO Labeling). In Lesser, W. H. (ed.)
Transitions in Agbiotech: Economics of Strategy and
Policy. Proceedings of NE-165 Conference, Food
Marketing Policy Center, University of Connecticut,
665-674. (
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/detailview.pl?paperid=2198)
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Caswell, J. and C. N. Noelke (2000, June 26). Unifying
Two Frameworks for Analyzing Quality and Quality
Assurance for Food Products. Presented at IATRC/NE165
Conference on Global Food Trade and Consumer Demand for
Quality, Montreal.
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Citizens’ Panel (1999, March). Designer Genes at
the Dinner Table: Citizens’ Panel Final Report.
Citizens’ Conference on Food Biotechnology,
University of Calgary.
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Einsiedel, E. (2000). Biotechnology and the Canadian
Public: 1997 and 2000. Unpublished report, University
of Calgary.
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European Commission (2000, March 15). The Europeans and
Biotechnology. Eurobarometer 52.1. Directorate-General
for Education and Culture, European Commission. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb.html)
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Gath, M. and R. V. Alvensleben (1998). The Potential
Effects of Labelling GM Foods on the Consumer
Decisions: Preliminary Results of Conjoint Measurement
Experiments in Germany. Paper presented at the AIR-CAT
Fifth Plenary Meeting Effective Communication and GM
Foods, 4(3), År Norwegen, S.18-28.
-
Hoban (1998, Summer). Trends in Consumer Attitudes
About Agricultural Biotechnology. Agbioforum
1(1). (http://www.agbioforum.org)
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_____. (1999). Consumer Acceptance of Biotechnology in
the United States and Japan. Food Technology,
53 (5):50-53.
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Hobbs, J. E. and M.D. Plunkett (1999). Genetically
Modified Foods: Consumer Issues and the Role of
Information Asymmetry. Canadian Journal of
Agricultural Economics 47(4):445-455.
-
Kenny, M., Canadian Food Inspection Agency (1999, March
5). Presentation on “Consumer Health and Safety,
Consumer Information” to the Citizens’
Conference on Food Biotechnology, University of
Calgary.
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Kerr, W.A. (1999). Genetically Modified Organisms,
Consumer Scepticism and Trade Law: Implications for the
Organization of International Supply Chains. Supply
Chain Management, 4(2):67-74.
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KPMG Consulting (2000, December 1). Economic Impact
Study: Potential Costs of Mandatory Labelling of Food
Products Derived from Biotechnology in Canada. Prepared
for Steering Committee, Economic Impacts of Mandatory
Food Labelling Study, c/o University of Guelph.
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Moses, V. (1999). Biotechnology Products and European
Consumers. Biotechnology Advances,
17(8):647-658.
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Nelson, G. C., T. Josling, D. Bullock, L. Unnevehr, M.
Rosegrant, and L. Hill (1999). The Economics and
Politics of Genetically Modified Organisms in
Agriculture: Implications for WTO 2000. Bulletin 809,
College of Agricultural, Consumer and Environmental
Sciences, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Illinois.
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Perdikis, N., W. A. Kerr, and J. E. Hobbs (2000). Can
the WTO/GATT Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade be
Renegotiated to Accommodate Agricultural
Biotechnology?. In Lesser, W. H. (ed.), Transitions in
Agbiotech: Economics of Strategy and Policy.
Proceedings of NE-165 Conference, Food Marketing Policy
Center, University of Connecticut, 692-707. (
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/detailview.pl?paperid=2200)
-
Phillips, P. and H. Foster (2000). Labelling for GM
Foods: Theory and Practice. Working Paper #3,
NSERC/SSHRC Chair in Managing Knowledge-based Agri-Food
Development, University of Saskatchewan.
-
Labelling Food Containing GMOs: The
Segregation Requirement
Dustin Gosnell
-
The Issue
By September 2000, eighteen countries and the European
Union, twenty-one food retailers, twenty-nine food
manufacturers, and six restaurant chains around the world
had introduced either mandatory or voluntary labeling
requirements for genetically modified (GM) foods (Phillips
and Foster, 2000). To allow genetically engineered crop
varieties to be grown in Canada while maintaining access
to export markets that request labeling, crop segregation
or identity preservation (IP) systems must be introduced.
These systems have costs that will be borne by consumers,
producers, or marketers. The extent and distribution of
these costs will influence the overall gains or losses
from the introduction of GM varieties.
-
Implications and Conclusions
A growing number of crop segregation and identity
preservation systems are emerging in the agriculture
industry. In the past, these systems have been reserved
for special crops and other markets where premiums exist.
More recently, with the need to separate non-GM and GM
varieties, these systems are becoming more prevalent.
A number of studies have also been conducted examining the
added costs involved with implementing these systems, and
attempts have also been made to determine the most
efficient system available, given varying circumstances.
Finally, a number of studies have looked at the
feasibility of several proposed systems to determine
whether current supply chains can be altered to
accommodate them.
Estimating the costs of such systems can be problematic.
With variables such as tolerance levels and opportunism
playing a large role in each scenario, accurate estimation
becomes difficult. As a result, different studies have
resulted in estimates of system costs ranging between Cdn.
$10 and Cdn. $50 per tonne (Roederer et al, 2000). The
upper end of these estimates represent potentially large
costs for the industry from the introduction of GMOs,
while at the lower end, segregation costs may be small
relative to the potential gains.
-
Background
Labeling food allows the transformation of product
characteristics that consumers are unable to evaluate even
after purchase — referred to as credence attributes
— into search attributes that consumers can learn
about by inspecting a product prior to purchase (Caswell,
1998). With the labelling of attributes that are important
to the decision to purchase, consumers can make informed
decisions about what foods they will purchase. Credible
labelling of GM foods requires that the product be
segregated throughout the supply chain. As a result,
agriculture industries in a number of countries, including
Canada, have recognized the need to implement crop
segregation and IP systems.
Crop segregation and IP systems require the close
management of all links in the supply chain where
contamination could potentially occur. A report prepared
by the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) (1998) outlines the
critical points where monitoring and enforcement are
required to ensure that contamination is prevented. They
propose, first, that variety breeders and owners, seed
growers, and the registration system all be responsible
for ensuring that the initial seed grown is of a
guaranteed quality. The system would include a contract
facilitator, responsible for having a variety-specific
delivery and/or a production contract for the commodity in
question. The system then advances through producers,
primary elevators, transportation companies, and
port/transfer terminals, outlining which member of the
supply chain would bear the responsibility of preventing
contamination and who would be liable should contamination
occur.
Although the system proposed by the CGC includes the
primary elevator infrastructure and other components of
the Canadian bulk grains system, the control points should
not change greatly if a containerized system is
implemented. Reichert and Vachal (2000) allude to this in
their report comparing containerization and the
traditional bulk system. Containerization modifies the
chain by allowing the product to bypass certain critical
points where contamination could occur. The number of
points being bypassed in a system of this nature depends
on where the grain is loaded into containers and the mode
of transportation used.
Roederer et al (2000) identify three potential IP
situations in the context of GMOs: voluntary IP of GM
products, voluntary IP of GMO-free products, and
compulsory IP of GM products. Each alternative outlined in
the report has been analyzed in various studies by other
authors to determine its feasibility and costs. While some
of these studies utilize historical data, others rely on
estimation and comparison to existing IP channels in the
grain industry for their cost analysis. As a result, there
are discrepancies among the studies as to the actual costs
of implementing an IP system.
-
Voluntary IP of Specific GM Traits
In this scenario, all members of the supply chain for GM
varieties voluntarily implement an IP system, and are
therefore also responsible for the costs. In order for
this to work, a specific incentive would be required for
GM producers, grain-handlers, processors, and retailers to
adopt the strategy. This incentive could arise in the case
of genetic modification involving output traits aimed at
providing a product for which consumers are willing to pay
a premium relative to a conventional product. Specific
examples would include specialty oil products, GM
pharmaceutical traits, and nutraceutical traits.
In this type of system, because the costs are borne wholly
within the GM marketing chain, the market can be used to
determine whether the production and segregation of these
varieties is economically viable. Owing to low volumes of
these varieties in the market, this scenario has yet to
play a significant role. There have been a few positively
labelled GM products — Flavr-Savr tomatoes, for
example — that have been voluntarily segregated to
extract market premiums. However, there have been no
studies conducted to determine the costs and effectiveness
of these systems.
-
Voluntary IP of GMO-Free Products
In this scenario, the non-GM supply chain voluntarily
segregates non-GM products and bears the cost of
segregation. This is currently the most common system
being utilized in the market owing to the fact that the
majority of varieties currently registered are those that
contain input traits. Input traits are aimed at providing
cost-of-production benefits to producers, most commonly
through built-in insect and herbicide resistance.
Consumers generally do not benefit directly from this
technology, and therefore are not willing to pay a premium
for the product (Buckwell et al, 1999). Instead,
consumers in regions requesting labelled products may be
willing to pay a premium for a GMO-free product.
The majority of the literature to date focuses on this
scenario. Bender et al (1999) at the University
of Illinois examined segregation costs incurred by the
grain-handling link in a supply chain for specialty corn
and soybeans. The specialty corns were high-oil varieties
that were bred using traditional methods, and segregated
to attract a premium in livestock feed markets as a
high-energy feed alternative. The specialty soybeans, STS
soybeans, were traditionally bred varieties that are
resistant to a specific herbicide. They were segregated to
attract a premium as a non-genetically modified,
herbicide-resistant variety.
Although only part of the University of Illinois study
focused on non-GM crops, the system being examined could
be used to preserve the identity of all non-GM crops.
Their estimates were obtained by surveying a sample of
elevators in the United States that were identified as
possible handlers of specialty oilseeds. The estimates of
added costs were U.S. $0.17 per bushel for corn and U.S.
$0.48 per bushel for soybeans.
Lin et al (2000) modified the Illinois study to provide
estimates for non-GM segregation. Their results indicated
that costs for segregating non-biotech crops could be
higher than the estimates for specialty crops. They made
adjustments to account for increased testing costs and
two-tier segregation. They also mentioned potential cost
increases owing to risk management.
The adjustment for increased testing costs reflects the
higher cost of testing for GM content compared to physical
characteristics such as oil content. The adjustment for
twotier segregation reflects the costs required to
segregate GM from non-GM varieties, and then to further
separate the GM varieties approved for shipment to the EU
from the EUnon- approved varieties. Risk management costs
reflect the implications of contamination when attempting
to guarantee non-GM requirements. In specialty crop
markets, contamination may result in a lower premium in
the market. The contamination of a product targeted at
non-GM markets could result in a load being rejected and
thereby have much more serious consequences for grain
exporters.
Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes (2000) expanded on the
two previous studies in their report on the hidden costs
in IP supply chains. Specifically, they factored in
lostopportunity costs at the primary elevator level,
including margins from value-added activities (i.e.,
grinding), storage, or from carrying grain over an
extended time period in expectation that there will be a
positive spread, the spread being the net difference
between current price and expected future price less
storage and lost-interest costs. The results of their
study show that including these opportunity costs can
result in increased costs to the system in the range of
U.S. $0.07 to U.S. $0.22 per bushel.
Fulton and Giannakas (1999) examined the issue of
contamination and the resulting product mislabelling in
their study of the consumption effects of genetic
modification. When they introduce this concept to their
analysis, they conclude that the higher the probability of
mislabelling, the greater the loss in consumer welfare.
Without faith in the labelling system, consumers will be
less likely to buy GM or non-GM products. Therefore, the
implementation of a segregation system must also instill
consumer faith in order to be effective.
Vandeburg et al (1999) used IP cost estimates from
industry experts when comparing two alternative
segregation strategies; namely, designating specific IP
elevators versus segregating within the elevators. They
use a cost minimization model to determine that, as the
cost of maintaining IP increases, using designated IP
locations becomes the costeffective strategy.
-
Compulsory IP System for GM
Products
A compulsory IP system for GM products could take a number
of forms. The strictest would fall under the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency (CFIA) contract registration provision.
This category of registration is used for those varieties
whose delivery into traditional commodity channels would
cause harm to those channels. Under these circumstances,
the applicant must make available a quality control system
that describes fully how potentially adverse effects of a
variety will be managed (CGC, 2000). To date, there have
been no genetically engineered varieties in Canada that
fit into this category.
Alternatively, there have been cases in which compulsory
systems have emerged from voluntary initiatives on the
part of certain members of a supply chain. To deem these
systems compulsory requires the assumption that, as soon
as rules are imposed on upstream levels of a supply chain,
the system becomes compulsory in nature.
In 1996, the canola industry in Western Canada saw the
commercial production of GM varieties for the first time.
Japan and the EU had yet to approve the varieties being
grown. Because the Government of Canada does not have the
legal mandate to govern the exporting of GM canola, the
industry was forced to implement an IP structure of its
own (Phillips and Smythe, 1999).
The research/seed companies, Monsanto and Agrevo, were
approached by industry representatives and urged to
introduce an IP system until Japan approved the
technologies in question. Both companies co-operated and
vertically aligned themselves with grain companies to
manage the systems that segregated GM canola to ensure
that it remained within the domestic market.
The IP system included contracts with growers, and kept
the export market free from the specific varieties. The
entire production (approximately 100,000 tonnes) was
crushed at Canadian facilities and remained in the
domestic market. Costs of the systems per tonne were
estimated between Cdn. $34 and Cdn. $37 by Manitoba Pool
Elevators and between Cdn. $33 and Cdn. $41 by the
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. Only one dollar per tonne of
these added costs was incurred by producers as increased
on-farm costs. As a result, many producers were still able
to realize a net benefit from adopting the new technology.
The remainder of the costs were incurred during
transportation, by the processor, in administration, and
through opportunity costs. Opportunity costs were included
in the estimates owing to the strict requirement that
segregated grain remain in the domestic market. This
prevented grain companies from marketing products to
countries that were willing to pay a higher price than
that of the domestic market (Phillips and Smythe, 1999).
Table 1 summarizes a number of the studies mentioned,
outlining the crop being studied, their GM/non-GM status,
the identity preservation or segregation strategy
implemented, and the estimated costs.
Table 1: Examples of IP and segregation systems for GM
and non-GM crops
Country
|
Crop
|
Gm/Non-Gm
|
Identity Preservation and Segregation System
Attributes
|
IP Costs
|
USA
|
Soybeans
|
Non-GM
|
Farm loaded containers moved to export position.
|
US $20/ton1
|
USA
|
Soybeans
|
GM Quality Traits
|
Farm level through elevator and processor to
refinery level
|
US $17-$25.2/tonne2
|
Canada
|
Canola
|
GM Input Traits
|
Direct trucking from farm to domestic processor.
|
Cdn $34-$37/tonne3
|
Canada
|
Canola
|
GM Input Traits
|
Direct trucking from farm to domestic processor.
|
Cdn $33-$41/tonne3
|
USA
|
High Oil Corn
|
Non-GM
|
Farm level through to processor/export position.
|
US $0.17/Bushel4
|
including higher testing costs, twotier
segregation costs, and riskmanagement costs.
|
US $0.22/Bushel5
|
including lost-opportunity costs from value-added
activity, storage, and marketing at the primary
elevator level.
|
US $0.29-$0.44/Bushel6
|
USA
|
STS Soybeans
|
Non-GM
|
Farm level through to processor/export position.
|
US $0.48/Bushel4
|
including higher testing costs, twotier
segregation costs, and riskmanagement costs.
|
US $0.54/Bushel5
|
Sources: 1Reichert and Vachal 2000;
2Buckwell et al. 1999; 3Phillips and
Smythe 1999; 4Bender et al. 1999;
5Lin et al. 2000; 6Maltsbarger and
Kalaitzandonakes, 2000.
-
Other Factors
An examination of the existing research indicates a wide
variety of segregation alternatives that are directly
related to or could be altered for use in segregating
GMOs. The majority of these studies agree that the costs
and feasibility of the proposed systems depend on a few
key issues. Requested tolerance levels, testing costs and
procedures, market volumes, agronomic traits, and
differences in approval status of GMOs in importing
countries have immense impacts on system costs.
The range of tolerance levels for GM content being
requested by various countries appears to be between 1%
and 5%. Industry experts and economic studies suggest that
to guarantee contamination levels at or below 1% would
entail much higher costs and require a much more closely
managed system than would the 5% level. The tolerance
levels of importing nations may be the decisive factor in
determining system costs.
Roederer et al specify all points in a given
supply chain where increased costs could appear. Costs
begin to accumulate at the seed research and production
stage, and continue upward until the product reaches the
consumer.
Seed production costs increase as the tolerance level
falls owing to testing requirements and increased
isolation distances between GM and non-GM crops. These
costs depend on the crop in question, as cross-pollination
problems vary with the seed being produced. Industry
representatives indicate that they could provide seeds at
any tolerance level requested; however, the costs of doing
so rise considerably as the tolerance level approaches
zero (Roederer et al, 2000).
Prevention of contamination at the farm level involves
minimizing volunteer plants, avoiding cross-pollination,
and preventing mechanical commingling. Once again, the
costs incurred by farmers will be relative to the
tolerance level requested and the crop being grown. Canola
cross-pollinates relatively easily, for example, and its
pollen can travel further distances than would be the case
for wheat. As a result, controlling this problem will be
more costly when growing crops such as canola.
Current testing procedures for GMOs are both
time-consuming and costly. The fewer the tests required,
the less costly the IP system. However, taking the costs
of a load of grain being rejected into consideration, the
system must ensure that enough testing is conducted to
guarantee that all shipments satisfy the tolerance level
requested. The testing procedure required is dependent on
the number of modified genes within a given variety and
the number of varieties within the grain class that have
been altered.
Enzyme Linked Immunosorbant Assay (ELISA) and
strip-testing can be used if the modification being tested
for is known. ELISA is a lab test allowing quantification
of the GMO content of a sample for a given transformation
event. Strip-tests are qualitative tests, giving a yes or
no answer to the detection of a targeted GMO in a sample
(Bullock et al, 2000). Both procedures are
relatively cheap, and results are known quickly. In the
case of canola, however, ELISA and strip tests would only
indicate whether a specific protein for a given trait is
present. Separate tests would be required for all
potential modified traits.
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests examine the genetic
makeup of a seed to determine if any modifications have
been conducted. PCR is also required if testing is being
conducted on processed food. It is important to note that
testing will become much more costly once plant breeders
begin to stack traits in a single crop, thereby requiring
multiple testing for given samples. Even if the crop
contains only one GM trait, testing would be required for
all other potential GM traits for that crop. If this
becomes prohibitively expensive, it may not be
economically efficient to test them all. Instead, closer
vertical co-ordination may be required to guarantee a
labelling claim through closer supply chain monitoring and
control of downstream activities.
Transportation and storage cost increases will depend on
the number of varieties requiring segregation, the amount
of product being segregated, and the tolerance level for
contamination. Increased trading involving IP crops will
reduce the value of a commodity-based system, and with
lower volume, highly specific trading taking place,
economies of scale may not be reached. Bullock et
al stress the importance of this issue in their study
of the economics of non-GMO segregation and identity
preservation. They conclude that the major costs of the
systems will not come from cleaning machinery or testing,
but rather from the restructuring of the grain handling
system.
The processing industry costs are dependent on variables
similar to the transportation and storage links in the
chain. Costs will increase if processing facilities have
to be shut down and cleaned numerous times throughout the
year to avoid mixing GM and non-GM product. These added
costs could be lowered or prevented if volumes are present
to designate processing facilities to handle only one
product.
After examining the impacts of segregation on a supply
chain, one can see the problems facing the manufacturers
of processed foods. Supply chains of processed products
often involve up to thirty separate ingredients. If all
ingredients being sourced must be GM-free, identity
preservation may become prohibitively costly.
Golder et al examined this issue in their report on the
potential costs of mandatory labelling for food products,
and report that 70%–85% of all processed food
products could be subject to labelling if derived
additives, processing aids, and flavourings are subject to
labelling. Subsequently, labelling costs could be
equivalent to at least 9%–10% of the retail price of
processed food and 35%–41% of producer prices.
Knowing this, some EU processors have reformulated their
recipes to use ingredients from non-GM sources in order to
obtain GM-free status. In such cases, the problem no
longer involves the costs of segregation, but the costs of
substitution and lost markets.
-
Discussion
With segregation becoming essential, the next question is,
Who is responsible for implementing and paying for the
system? The three alternatives outlined show that there is
considerable uncertainty about this. Should non-GM
producers be required to segregate their production when
GM producers gain the cost of production benefits? They
may not be responsible, but they may have an incentive to
do so for two reasons. First, importing regions such as
the EU and Japan may be willing to pay a premium for
imports that are free from GMOs. Second, producers will
see a reduction in demand for their products unless they
incur a cost to segregate their non-GM product.
Depending on the volumes being produced, it may be more
efficient for GM producers to segregate their production.
The problem with this, however, is that they generally do
not have incentives to do so. Until GM varieties emerge
that attract a premium above the cost of production for
the entire supply of a given variety, this will remain a
problem. The question then becomes whether or not
regulatory policies need to be put in place to force these
producers into a compulsory IP system.
A variety of potential systems have been analyzed to
differing degrees and with different results. The most
popular alternatives appear to be segregating within
elevators, designating specific handling, storage, and
processing facilities to handle the product being
segregated, and containerized shipping.
The studies to date provide a good understanding of the
steps and procedures necessary to implement each strategy,
but they do not provide a satisfactory answer to which
system would be most suited to the Canadian grains
industry. As a result, the industry needs to determine
which system will operate most efficiently for given
situations and for each crop being grown.
The problem is that there are many uncertainties over what
situation is being faced. There are uncertainties over the
tolerance level being requested by importing nations.
There are uncertainties over what volumes of GM and non-GM
crops will need to be segregated. There are uncertainties
over how effectively a system will work, given problems
such as opportunism and human error. And there are
uncertainties regarding the markets that will require
labelling. Opportunism may occur in the event that
individual producers realize a potential economic gain
from cheating the system. In the case where non-GM crops
are being segregated for premium markets, for example, GM
producers may attempt to market their grain as non-GM to
gain the premium. These problems create difficulty in
attempting to pinpoint effective systems and, as a result,
need to be solved before an answer can be found. They also
underline the importance of understanding the regulatory
and consumer requirements of target export markets before
a segregation system is designed and implemented.
It is evident that many potential systems exist for
segregating GM and non-GM products, each with a unique
level of reliability, absolute costs, and distribution of
costs. The costs of these systems are part of the overall
cost-benefit impact of GM introduction, and therefore must
be considered. Given the range of cost estimates,
determining the best system is an important decision that
will influence the extent to which GM technology is
beneficial to society as a whole. Further research is
needed to determine the appropriate segregation systems to
be used for specific crops in specific situations and to
assess the wider economic impact of these systems.
-
References
-
Bender, K., L. Hill, B. Wenzel, and R. Hornbaker
(1999). Alternative Market Channels for Specialty Corn
and Soybeans. National Grain and Feed Association
website.
-
(http://www.ngfa.org/).
-
Buckwell, A., G. Brookes, and D. Bradley (1999).
Economic of Identity Preservation for Genetically
Modified Crops. Food Biotechnology Communications
Initiative.
-
Bullock, D. S., M. Desquilbet, and E. Nitsi (2000,
July/August). The Economics of Non- GMO Segregation and
Identity Preservation. Paper presented at American
Agriculture Economics Association Annual Meeting,
Tampa, FL.
-
Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) (1998). Identity
Preserved Systems in the Canadian Grain Industry. A
Discussion paper.
-
Caswell, J. A. (1998). Should Use of Genetically
Modified Organisms Be Labelled? AgBioForum 1(1). (www.agbioforum.missouri.edu).
-
Fulton, M. and D. Gianakkas (1999, December).
Consumption Effects of Genetic Modification: What if
Consumers are Right? Paper presented at the Conference,
The Economics of Quality Control in Agriculture,
Saskatoon, SK.
-
Golder, G., F. Leung, and S. Malherbe (2000). Economic
Impact Study: Potential Costs of Mandatory Labelling of
Food Products Derived From Biotechnology in Canada.
Project report prepared for the Steering Committee on
Economic Impacts of Mandatory Labelling Study,
University of Guelph.
-
Lin, W. W., W. Chambers, and J. Harwood (2000).
Biotechnology: U.S. Grain Handlers Look Ahead.
Agricultural Outlook. Economic Research Service, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, AGO-270.
-
Maltsbarger, R., and N. Kalaitzandonakes (2000). Hidden
Costs in IP Supply Chains. Special Report,
Feedstuffs, Vol. 72, No. 36.
-
Phillips, P., and S. Smyth (1999, December).
Competitors Co-operating: Establishing a supply chain
to manage genetically modified canola. Paper presented
at the Conference, The Economics of Quality Control in
Agriculture, Saskatoon, SK.
-
Phillips, P., and H. Foster (2000). Labelling for GM
Foods: Theory and Practice. International Conference of
the International Consortium on Agricultural
Biotechnology Research, Ravello, Italy.
-
Reichert, H., and K. Vachal (2000). Identity Preserved
Grain: Logistical Overview. USDA, Agricultural
Marketing Service.
-
Roederer, C., R. Nugent, and P. Wilson (2000). Economic
Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops on the Agri-Food
Sector: A Synthesis. Directorate-General for
Agriculture, working document.
-
Vandeburg, J. M., J. R. Fulton, F. J. Dooley, and P. P.
V. (1999, December). Impact of Identity Preservation of
non-GMO Crops on the Grain Market System. Paper
presented at the Conference, The Economics of Quality
Control in Agriculture, Saskatoon, SK.
-
Commercial Trade Issues in Biotechnology
William A. Kerr
-
The Issues
Access to International Markets and International
Protection of Intellectual Property
Firms making investments in developing biotechnology need
transparent rules for determining access to international
markets and for the international protection of the
intellectual property they create. Given that the life
cycles of individual biotechnology products may be short,
access to international markets for exports or to
undertake foreign production will be an important
determinant in investment decisions. Currently, the
international rules for the trade and protection of
international property are opaque, leading to a high
degree of risk.
Protecting Consumers and the Environment from the Possible
Risks Associated with a New Technology
Biotechnology is a major technological change. As with all
new technologies, there are risks and unknowns. Countries
must weigh the need to protect the health and safety of
their consumers and their environment against their
international obligations to provide access to their
markets for foreign products. Domestic regulatory
agencies, consumers, and those who are concerned with the
environment in different countries have appraised
biotechnology in different ways. The existing World Trade
Organisation (WTO) rules do not appear to be sufficiently
robust to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of all
parties. This suggests that renegotiation may be
necessary. Until a new agreement is reached, the rules of
trade in biotechnology will remain opaque and the
potential for trade conflicts high.
Developing Countries’ Trade at Risk
Some developed countries may either ban imports of
Genetically Modified (GM) food products or require imports
to be labelled. This will require product segregation and
certification that may be beyond the technical capability
of developing countries’ governments. This may
result in the closure of some existing markets to the
products of export-dependent developing countries with a
low degree of technical capability, or those
countries’ having to rely on transnational
agribusiness firms to organize their international trade.
Neither result is likely to be consistent with those
countries’ development goals.
-
Implications and Conclusions
Lack of Transparency in the International Trade
Régime
Given the high levels of investment involved and the
differing degrees of resistance to the acceptance of
biotechnology in different countries, trade negotiations
in this area are likely to be long and acrimonious. As a
result, in the near term, countries will put in place
regulatory régimes that do not take account of
international disciplines. This means that the rules for
market access and the protection of intellectual property
will remain opaque for those wishing to engage in
international transactions in the products of
biotechnology.
Costly Investments in Segregation Systems and
Infrastructure
As countries will, at least in the intermediate run,
individually determine the rules for access, a plethora of
different importing régimes will evolve. This will
require exporting countries licensing biotechnology for
production either to invest in segregation and
certifications systems or to write off some foreign
markets.
Risk of Trade Conflicts High
As the existing WTO rules are not able to resolve the
issues pertaining to biotechnology to all countries’
satisfaction, trade conflicts will arise. These will
likely lead to some disruptions to existing trade in
unrelated industries and increased international animosity
until a new mutually agreed international trade
régime can be negotiated.
-
Background
Little or no empirical work on the international trade
aspects of biotechnology has, as yet, been undertaken.
This is because GM foods and other products of
biotechnology have only recently become available for
international trade. Governments around the world are
scrambling to put domestic regulatory régimes in
place for the licensing of production using biotechnology
and the conditions under which GM products can be sold.
Countries’ international trade régimes follow
the implementation of domestic régimes and reflect
their intent. As a result, the international trade picture
for GM products is in considerable flux. As no government
provides separate statistics on trade in GM and non-GM
products as yet, the literature on trade issues
surrounding biotechnology remains largely theoretical.
Biotechnology and the WTO
The most recent round of international trade negotiations
(Uruguay) was completed in 1994, just before trade in GM
products became a major issue. The Uruguay Round led to a
major revamping of the multilateral international trade
régime. The new WTO was constituted to incorporate
the existing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which regulates trade in goods, and to encompass
two new agreements, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). The inclusion of the
TRIPS agreement under the WTO was at the insistence of
developed countries. They wanted a means of coërcing
developing countries into protecting the intellectual
property of their firms. That mechanism is crossagreement
retaliation, whereby trade sanctions can be applied to the
exports of developing countries for violation of TRIPS
commitments (Kerr and Perdikis, 1995). As the value of
biotechnology is largely intellectual property, the
operation of the TRIPS and WTO will be of central
importance for those investing in biotechnology.
The Uruguay Round also incorporated a new sub-agreement of
the GATT — the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (SPS) that
established rules for putting trade barriers in place to
protect human, animal, and plant health. Any trade
restrictions are to be science-based, and require that a
formal risk assessment be done. Trade restrictions can be
put in place in cases of insufficient scientific
information, but the restrictions are expected to be
temporary and the country must be actively seeking to fill
in the gaps in its information. It should be remembered
that the SPS is new and untried, and, thus, its
interpretation at the WTO is not yet clear. The Uruguay
Round also strengthened disciplines on technical barriers
to trade (TBT), the major improvement being that, if
barriers are put in place to protect consumers, the
benefits to consumers must be commensurate with the costs
imposed on producers in meeting the regulations.
The WTO, however, has not been able to come to grips with
issues dealing with trade and the environment; it has only
agreed to study the issue (Nelson et al, 1999). The WTO is
also not an international legal system; rather, it is a
political compromise in which limited sovereignty is
temporarily surrendered to the organization. Countries can
choose to ignore the WTO, but not without cost. The
current cost is retaliation of other members for
violations of WTO commitments. When countries choose to
accept retaliation, it indicates that the political
compromise has broken down and renegotiation is required.
Access to Foreign Markets
The returns to investment in biotechnology will be
determined, in part, by the size of the market and the
life cycle of the product. Given the rate of technological
change currently taking place in biotechnology, the
life-cycle of any product is likely to be short, with new
products with superior traits being developed quickly.
This means that firms will require access to the largest
possible market. Given that the major value of
biotechnology lies in its intellectual property, access to
foreign markets has two elements: firms can capture the
value of intellectual property by embodying it in goods
that are exported to foreign markets, or they can capture
the value by licensing the product for foreign production
or producing it in a foreign subsidiary (Kerr et
al, 1999). In the latter two cases, protection of
intellectual property in the foreign country is required.
If reverse engineering is relatively simple, then
intellectual property protection will be required in the
case of directly exported products. Thus, market access
will depend critically on the efficacy of the WTO’s
ability to enforce TRIPS commitments. Developing countries
hold serious reservations regarding protecting foreign
intellectual property in the case of pharmaceuticals and
seeds — major areas of biotechnology (Yampoin and
Kerr, 1998). Given that some developing countries are not
likely voluntarily to protect intellectual property, the
question arises as to whether the as-yet-untried,
cross-retaliation application of trade sanctions for TRIPS
violations will be sufficient to induce compliance.
Theoretical examinations of this issue to date indicate
that the levels of retaliation currently allowed in the
WTO will not be sufficient to induce countries to live up
to their TRIPS commitments (Kerr et al, 1999; Tarvydas
et al, 1999). This suggests that market access
will be limited unless stronger disciplines can be
negotiated. Developing countries can be expected fiercely
to resist any strengthening of the TRIPS.
Intellectual property protection is relatively strong in
developed countries, and trade issues have focussed
instead on the licensing of products for local production,
access to markets for GM products, and conditions of
access of GM and non-GM products. If products are not
licensed for local production, then foreign production
under license or through a subsidiary is a moot point.
Thus, intellectual property protection is not an issue,
but market access remains an issue. If a product is not
licensed domestically, should foreign products be allowed
access, and under what conditions? This becomes the
central issue. It is complicated by the fact that
biotechnology gives a technological advantage to producers
who are allowed to use the product relative to those who
cannot (Weatherspoon et al, 1999a). Producers in
countries where the product is not licensed will lobby for
protection from foreign producers who are allowed to use
the more efficient technology, even if this is not the
primary reason for the trade restriction.
Countries have been licensing GM products at different
rates. This is largely in response to consumer acceptance
of GM products and the influence of those who fear the
effects of biotechnology on the environment. In
particular, the EU has been slow to develop mechanisms to
licence biotechnology, reflecting a high level of consumer
and environmentalist concerns (Perdikis, 2000). In the
United States, on the other hand, consumer resistance and
the influence of environmental lobbies has been minimal.
As a result, licensing has been taking place at a much
faster rate. The United States and the European Union
represent extremes, but all other countries are in the
process of putting regulatory régimes in place that
probably lie somewhere along a continuum between the two.
This means a plethora of régimes and significant
problems for international trade.
While the unofficial (but real) reason for the differences
in the European and U.S. approach to licensing GM products
is different levels of consumer/environmentalist pressure,
the official reason is alternative regulatory approaches.
The United States treats GM products as simple extensions
of (substantially equivalent to) existing foods. The EU
treats GM products as new (novel) products requiring a
much stricter (and evolving) licensing régime
(Perdikis, 2000). The reality is that the development of
an EU licensing régime has ground to a halt as
European politicians attempt to find a way to licence
products in a way that will satisfy consumer and
environmentalist concerns.
Firms in the United States that have invested in
biotechnology and have had their products licensed for
production in the U.S. seek access to the European Union
and other international markets. The United States
considers the products safe and tends to see foreign
foot-dragging in protectionist terms. Countries, such as
the EU, which do not wish to license biotechnology
domestically have three policy options: ban the import of
nonlicensed products, require that products be labelled as
GM and allow their import, or simply allow unlabelled
imports. Unlabelled imports may reduce welfare if some
consumers perceive biotechnology products as undesirable
(because their quality cannot be detected it becomes a
market for lemons — i.e., all products are suspect
of being inferior). An import ban has been shown to be
inferior to labelling (Gaisford and Lau, 2000) on strict
welfare grounds, but countries continue to contemplate
both policies.
Restricting Trade on Health Grounds
If a country wishes to ban imports for health reasons, it
must do so under the rules of the SPS agreement. The SPS
requires a scientific justification for the implementation
of a ban. In the case of GM products, however, there is no
scientific evidence as yet to justify their exclusion. The
problem is that biotechnology is a relatively new
technology and it can be argued that there is insufficient
scientific information (Kerr, 1999a). In that case, the
country imposing the ban must be actively seeking to fill
the gaps in scientific knowledge. The problem in the case
of biotechnology is that the questions being asked relate
to longterm health concerns rather than short-term food
safety. The SPS is set up to deal with questions such as
“If I eat this tomato for lunch will I be sick at
dinner?” rather than “If I eat these GM
tomatoes for twenty years will I be at increased risk of
cancer (or liver disease, or heart disease)?” This
raises the question, How much science is enough? Science
is both statistical and open ended; you can always find
new questions to answer. One cannot have a
science-based system if recourse to more
science is always allowed (Kerr, 2000). The SPS attempted
to handle that question by allowing for a scientific
consensus through the establishment of international
standards — for food safety at the Codex
Alimentarius. Given the newness of biotechnology, there is
no scientific consensus. Further, it seems clear that a
major problem in the EU is that consumers (or at least a
sufficient number of them that they cannot be ignored by
governments) no longer trust the scientific establishment
(Kerr, 2000).
The recent case regarding the EU import ban on beef that
had been produced using hormones suggests that, regardless
of an international scientific consensus and large
quantities of scientific information, EU officials do not
feel they can remove the ban, and have accepted
retaliation (Roberts, 1998). They would do the same if
faced with an SPS challenge on biotechnology. As expected,
given that the political compromise has broken down, the
EU has asked that the SPS be renegotiated to allow for
consumer concerns. The SPS, however, is probably working
as intended, and negotiations regarding consumer requests
for protection may need an entirely separate agreement
(Perdikis and Kerr, 1999). Such negotiations are likely to
be long and involved. In the interim, exporting countries
will be faced with being shut out of some markets
(Weatherspoon et al, 1999b). Further, they must
put segregation and certification systems in place if they
wish to retain access for non-GM exports. Developing
countries may not have the technical capacity to prove
that their crops are GM free, and thus face exclusion from
banned markets. To retain market access, some developing
countries may have to turn over control of their
international trade to technically capable multinationals.
Neither prospect is likely to appeal to the governments of
developing countries. Of course, developing countries with
higher levels of technical capability will be able to put
in place systems that protect their market access, and
some, like Thailand, have already done so — by, for
example, changing the source of soy oil they use in
canning tuna from GM sources to non-GM India.
Labelling
Some countries may opt for the labelling of products,
whether or not they licence them domestically, to provide
information for consumers. Exporters must then be able to
certify and segregate their products. Firms producing or
handling GM products in exporting countries have resisted
this approach because they feel that their products are
not different, and signalling them as different to
consumers through labelling may create false concerns and
negative impacts on demand. The TBT agreement, which deals
with non-health consumer protection issues, may provide
some recourse, given its provision that the cost of
implementing the standard must be proportional to the
purpose of the standard: consumer benefit versus exporter
cost. The TBT is untested at the WTO; how a panel would
rule on a challenge on biotechnology is unknown. Firms
wishing to export GM products might, however, actually
benefit from labelling. The direct cost of labelling
products that contain GMs is low; one simply puts a label
on the product. No one will care if the GM product is
contaminated with non-GM products. Producers of non-GM
products, however, must establish expensive segregation
and certification systems because some consumers will care
if non-GM products are contaminated with GM products. The
cost of ensuring that products are non-GM may put those
producers at a considerable commercial disadvantage (Kerr,
1999b). If the commercial disadvantage is sufficient, the
intent of the labelling policy — to give consumers a
non-GM choice — may be thwarted. As a result, the
level of tolerance for contamination becomes of crucial
importance, because lower tolerances may become
prohibitively expensive. Negotiations in this area will be
complex.
Trade and the Environment
Countries may wish to control the import of the products
of biotechnology for environmental reasons. The WTO has
consistently put forth the position that it does not have
competency in environmental questions, and that these
issues should be handled in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs). The WTO’s Committee on Trade and
the Environment has not, however, yet been able to clarify
the relationship between the WTO and MEAs and, in
particular, which organization’s rules should take
precedence when trade provisions of MEAs conflict with the
WTO (Kerr, 2000).
The BioSafety Protocol — or Cartegena Protocol
— is an MEA that was reached in Montreal in January
2000. It was initiated under the auspices of the
Convention on Biodiversity, but appears to go well beyond
biodiversity issues that might be affected by trade in GM
products. In particular, it goes beyond regulating trade
in seeds or other organisms that are destined to be
released directly into the environment to cover trade in
GM products generally. The preamble fails to clarify the
relationship between the Biosafety Protocol (BSP) and the
WTO, and it has many provisions that directly conflict
with those of the WTO (Phillips and Kerr, 2000). The
BSP’s trade provisions directly conflict with the
WTO principles and practices in four areas: (1) trade
barriers justified on the basis of production practices
(e.g., biotechnology is a process); (2) inclusion of the
precautionary principle as a reason for import bans (in
direct conflict with the SPS scientific approach); (3)
allowing socio-economic factors to be considered in the
decision to import (e.g., if jobs might be lost), and; (4)
mandatory labelling of GM products (the TBT requires
benefits to be weighed against costs). The arguments need
not be detailed here (see Phillips and Kerr, 2000 for
details). Given that it has not been established which
rules apply, trade will be in confusion and disputes
likely. Further, because the BSP and the WTO do not have
totally overlapping memberships, two sets of rules may
apply, depending on the trading partner. Most important,
the United States is not party to the BSP. Further, the
BSP will not come into force until it is ratified by fifty
countries.
Given that regulatory régimes are in a state of
flux, major exporting countries have not had their export
markets significantly disrupted as yet. One of the reasons
for this is that the EU, where resistance to GM products
has been strongest, was already relatively closed to
exports. The major exception is in feed grains where the
market has remained open to GM products such as corn and
soy products (Ballenger et al, 2000).
-
Discussion
The area of trade in biotechnological products is clearly
in flux. This is because the current international trade
régime is not equipped to regulate the trade in
genetically modified products; no political consensus
exists among the major trading countries. The central
problem is the domestic treatment of GM products. These
vary considerably, and the import régimes (or, more
often, the proposed import régimes) largely reflect
differing domestic approaches to GM products. Part of the
problem relates to the newness of the technology. It seems
clear that some renegotiation at the WTO will be
necessary. Further, even within Canada, there is a direct
conflict between our WTO commitments and what was agreed
to in the Biosafety Protocol. Fundamentally, the rules of
trade are there to provide transparency for firms wishing
to engage in international trade. Currently, there is no
transparency regarding the trading régime that will
apply to GM products.
No strong, well-researched proposals for finding an
acceptable solution to the differing positions of the
various trading parties exist. Canada is one of the
countries that has been early to licence GM products. Its
agricultural sector is heavily dependent on exports. It is
important to have the trade issue resolved. But so far
there has been little innovative thinking regarding trade
in GM products. Developing a well-reasoned set of
proposals for resolving the multitude of issues
surrounding international trade in biotechnology could be
a major contribution in moving the process of devising new
rules along. Until these issues are resolved, the true
potential for the role of biotechnology in Canadian
agriculture cannot be assessed — particularly for
those who are considering investing in the technology.
-
References
-
Ballenger, N., M. Bohman, and M.Gehlhar (2000, April).
Biotechnology: Implications for U.S. Corn and Soybean
Trade. Agricultural Outlook, USDA, Washington,
DC.
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Gaisford, J. D. and C. Lau (2000). The Case For and
Against Import Embargoes on Products of Biotechnology.
The Estey Journal of International Law and Trade
Policy, 1 (1): 83-98.
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Kerr, W. A. (1999a). International Trade in Transgenic
Food Products: A New Focus for Agricultural Trade
Disputes. The World Economy, 22 (2) 245-259.
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_____ (1999b). Genetically Modified Organisms, Consumer
Scepticism and Trade Law: Implications for the
Organization of International Supply Chains. Supply
Chain Management, 4 (2): 67-74.
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_____ (2000, February 12-14). WTO and the Environment.
A paper presented at a symposium entitled Globalization
and New Agricultural Trade Rules for the 21st Century,
Saskatoon, SK.
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Kerr, W. A. and J. E. Hobbs (2000, July 3). The North
American-European Union Dispute Over Beef Produced
Using Growth Hormones: A Major Test for the New
International Trade Regime. A paper presented at the
International Economics Study Group Conference on
International Trade Disputes, Birmingham, UK.
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Kerr, W. A. and Perdikis, N. (1995). The Economics
of International Business. London: Chapman and
Hall.
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Kerr, W. A., J. E. Hobbs, and R. Yampoin (1999).
Intellectual Property Protection, Biotechnology and
Developing Countries: Will the TRIPS Be Effective?
AgBioForum, 2(3&4): 203-211. (www.agbioforum.org)
-
Nelson, G. C., T. Josling, D. Bullock, L. Unnevehr, M.
Rosegrant, and L. Hill (1999). The Economics and
Politics of Genetically Modified Organisms in
Agriculture: Implications for WTO 2000. Bulletin 809,
College of Agriculture, Consumer and Environmental
Sciences, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
-
Phillips, P. W. B. and W. A. Kerr (2000). Alternative
Paradigms: The WTO Versus the Biosafety Protocol for
Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms, Journal of
World Trade.
-
Perdikis, N. (2000). A Conflict of Legitimate Concerns
or Pandering to Vested Interests? Conflicting Attitudes
Towards the Regulation of Trade in Genetically Modified
Goods — the EU and the US. The Estey Centre
Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 1
(1): 51-65.
-
Perdikis, N. and W. A. Kerr (1999). Can Consumer-Based
Demands for Protection be Incorporated in the WTO? The
Case of Genetically Modified Foods. Canadian
Journal of Agricultural Economics.
-
Roberts, D. (1998). Preliminary Assessment of the
Effects of the WTO on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Regulations. Journal of International Economic
Law, 377-405.
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Tarvydas, R., J.D. Gaisford, J. E. Hobbs, and W. A.
Kerr (2000). Agricultural Biotechnology in Developing
Countries: Will it be Technology Transferred Through
the Market or Piracy?” In Lesser, W.H. (ed.),
Transitions in Agbiotech: Economics of Strategy and
Policy. University of Connecticut: Food Marketing
Policy Centre, pp. 407-424
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Weatherspoon, D. D., J. F. Oehmke, C. A. Wolf, A.
Naseem, M. Mywish, and A. Hightower (1999a). Global
Implications from a North-North-South Trade Model: A
Biotech Revolution. AEC Staff Paper, No. 99-48,
Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State
University, East Lansing.
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_____ (1999b) North-North-South Ag-Biotech Policy:
Implications for Growth and Trade. AEC Staff Paper, No.
99-51, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan
State University, East Lansing.
-
Yampoin, R. and W. A. Kerr (1998) Can Trade Measures
Induce Compliance with Trips? Journal of the Asia
Pacific Economy, 3 (2): 165-82.
-
Biotechnology and Lesser Developed
Countries: An Overview of the Issues
Richard Gray, Jodi McNaughton, and Derek T. Stovin 9
-
The Issue
The impact of agricultural biotechnology on Lesser
Developed Countries (LDCs) has become an area of
considerable public debate. While these countries share
many of the issues that are a concern in developed
countries, many LDCs have characteristics that differ from
developed countries, specifically: (1) food production and
consumption make up a larger portion of the economy; (2)
nutrition and food security continue to be important
challenges; (3) there is a lack of the research resources
to develop and apply these technologies in either the
public or private sector; and (4) there is a lack of the
institutional infrastructure effectively to manage any of
the biosafety risks associated with the technologies.
These characteristics will influence the impact that
biotechnology will have on LDCs.
As occurs with most “drastic” technological
change, two schools of thought have evolved. One school
(the proponents) believes that agricultural biotechnology
will be beneficial to LDCs, and the other (the opponents)
believes that agricultural biotechnology will be
detrimental to LDCs.
-
Implications and Conclusions
The use of biotechnology to create genetically modified
transgenic crops has potential benefits for both the
developed and the developing worlds. Like any
technological change, however, there are adjustment costs
and potential adverse outcomes. Given the disparate income
levels, production methods, and institutional structures,
the effect on LDCs will differ from developed countries.
There are a number of products of genetic modification
(GM) that offer a great deal of promise in lowering the
cost of production, improving crop yields, and improving
food quality. These potential benefits are of greater
relative importance to LDCs because of their heavy
reliance on agricultural production and the prevalence
and/or threat of malnutrition in many of them. GM crops
are seen as a potential means of addressing critical food
and resource issues, and consumers are much more willing
to take additional food safety risks to obtain greater
food security.
The ability of a particular LDC to benefit from
biotechnology will be dependant on whether the country
will have low-cost access to new genetics adapted to their
growing conditions and economic situation, whether they
have institutions in place effectively to mitigate any
risks associated with the technology, and whether they
continue to have access to their agricultural export
markets. Given that these conditions are unlikely to be
met in many LDCs, the net benefits from agricultural
biotechnology will likely vary a great deal by country.
Given the potential of GM crops to address food and
resource issues in LDCs, there should be an onus on the
international community to provide the support necessary
for these countries to take full advantage of the
technologies. In the short run, this will require
significant international public investment in
biotechnology that is targeted toward the creation of
crops and genetic traits suitable for LDCs. It will also
mean facilitating the transfer of knowledge to the LDCs
and the creation of human capital in the LDCs in order to
develop and effectively manage these technologies. Given
the difficulty in segregating GM products in LDCs, there
is a need to recognize the adverse impact that labelling
standards and import restrictions will have on the
development of these countries. Finally, given the very
real differences between developed and lesser developed
countries, it is important that LDCs are allowed the
opportunity to make informed and independent decisions
about the adoption of genetically modified crops.
-
Background
Transgenic Research and Adoption in LDCs
The are a number of LDCs currently involved in transgenic
research, but few countries with commercial plantings of
GM crops. In the year 2000, 24% of the world-wide
plantings of GM crops was in LDCs, with the vast majority
of these acres in China and Argentina. (Pinstrop-Anderson
and Cohen, 2001). While planting in the developed
countries fell between 1999 and 2000, area increased by
more the 50% in LDCs, suggesting that LDCs may be in the
process of more widespread adoption.
As outlined by Skeritt (2000), several governments in
Asian countries including China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam
have committed significant human and financial resources
for R&D in modern biotechnology. Biotechnology
research in other LDCs has been limited, and what there is
is dominated by expenditures by domestic governments and
international research organizations. Despite massive
private investments in some developed countries, there is
little private funding of biotechnology research in LDCs.
The differences in the pursuit of GM technologies among
the LDCs can be explained by three main factors. The first
has to do with the effect of income and expenditure shares
on the choice or the willingness to take perceived risks
related to GM consumption. The second has to do with the
potential production-related benefits. The third relates
to the institutional barriers that may prevent the
creation and adoption of the technologies.
Potential Benefits of GM Crops in LDCs
Individuals in developing countries can potentially
benefit from transgenic crops in three main ways: improved
incomes for small farmers, greater long-run stability in
local food supplies, and better health through
nutritionally enhanced foods. These benefits will only be
realized if suitable GM crops are developed for LDCs and
widely adopted by their producers.
Small farmers in developing countries are currently faced
with pre- and post-harvest crop losses from insects,
diseases, weeds, and drought. In addition, acidic soils,
low soil fertility, lack of access to reasonably priced
plant nutrients, and other biotic and abiotic factors
contribute to low yields, production risks, and the
degradation of natural resources (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1999;
Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen, 1999). Farmers must often
clear forests or farm marginal land in order to maintain
production. Increased urbanization exacerbates the
situation through the loss of quality farmland (John Innes
Centre, 2000). New developments in agricultural
biotechnology can counteract these production problems. GM
techniques can produce plants that use less water and can
survive drought, flooding, or extreme temperature
(Robinson, 2000). The development of cereal plants capable
of capturing nitrogen from the air could contribute
greatly to plant nutrition and help small farmers who
cannot afford fertilizer (Pinstrup-Andersen and Cohen,
1999). In addition, the introduction of genes that delay
ripening or spoilage could help reduce postharvest losses
of perishable fruits and vegetables, especially for areas
where poor farm-tomarket roads, inadequate transportation,
and inadequate storage facilities is the norm (Spillane,
2000). Weed control is a major time-, labour-, and
resource-consuming task for most farmers, especially
resource-poor farmers who cannot afford herbicides. It is
estimated that in developing countries approximately 60%
of farmers’ time is spent weeding (Spillane, 2000).
Much of it is done by women and children, and is unpaid
work. Herbicide-resistant crops could bring advantages to
poor farmers, especially those with limited labour
availability. Labour previously spent weeding could be
released for more productive activities, such as
increasing literacy and schooling for children. While
herbicide tolerance may be of limited value for these
small holdings, the development of crops with a greater
ability to compete with weeds may be important for them.
Agricultural biotechnology could also result in
significant health benefits to individuals. For example,
scientists have now developed a new strain of rice that is
enhanced with Vitamin A (Spillane, 2000). Vitamin A and
iron deficiency cause severe health problems in LDCs.
Approximately 100 million children suffer from vitamin A
deficiency, and each year half a million go blind, and
some two million die (Conway, 2000). Iron deficiency is
also common. Approximately 500 million women of
childbearing age (15-49 years old) are afflicted by anemia
caused by iron deficiency. Other health problems stem from
the limited supply of vaccines owing to the prohibitive
expenses of production and the lack of effective cold
storage facilities (Spillane, 2000). There is potential
for agricultural biotechnology to alleviate some of this
problem by using plants such as bananas and potatoes as
vaccine delivery mechanisms (Smith, 2000). Opponents note,
however, that these products may have to be distributed
freely, and must be culturally accepted if they are to be
effective.
Consumer Concerns for Food Safety
The issue of food safety that has led to consumer
opposition in the EU and other developed countries is
generally far less of an issue in LDCs. Seventy nine
percent of consumers in China and 76% of consumers in
India favour biotechnology for the development of
pestresistant crops, as compared to 54% and 36% of
consumers in Germany and the UK, respectively
(Pinstrop-Anderson and Cohen, 2001). As Pinstrop-Anderson
and Cohen effectively argue, this differing perspective is
likely owing to the importance of food quantity over food
safety. In LDCs, consumers spend a large portion of their
household resources to acquire food, and are therefore
willing to accept some risks for lower-cost food.
Consumers in developed countries, in contrast, spend a
much smaller portion of their income on primary
agricultural products, and are willing to forego a
potential reduction in food prices to avoid any perceived
risks associated with GM foods.
Given the potential for GM crops to lower the cost of
nutritious food production and the concern for food
quantity over food safety, many citizens of
lesser-developed countries agree that the benefits of
biotechnology are greater than the risks. But the view is
not unanimously held. Wealthier consumers in these
countries may share concerns about food safety with
consumers in other countries. In addition, many LDCs lack
the institutions that will allow them to take advantage of
new technologies, and, as a result, they will be left
behind the countries that do. Opponents expect that these
new technologies will contribute to income disparity, and
not address the farm income, poverty, or food insecurity
problems. Without complementary social policies, good
governance, and sufficient public financial resources, it
is argued that the potential benefits of biotechnology for
LDCs will not be realized (Leisinger, 1999).
Agricultural Biotechnology and Institutions in LDCs
The potential benefits of transgenics for LDCs can be
realized only if these technologies are applied to create
GM crops that are grown by these countries in such a way
that existing markets and biosafety are not jeopardized.
These conditions are not currently met within LDCs for a
number of reasons.
Perhaps the greatest challenge will be to obtain the
resources required to do the research and development.
Funding for biotechnology research in developed countries
is characterized by private sector investments in
research. Private, commercial-sector expenditures in the
United States fund approximately 70% of the agricultural
biotechnology research (Falconi, 1999). In lower-income
countries, on average, the private sector accounts for a
mere 8% of biotechnology research. This is a real problem,
given that public institutions are significantly
under-investing in agricultural research. The World Bank
recommends that each country invest at least 2% of its
agricultural GDP in agricultural research and development
(Spillane, 2000). Currently, developing countries spend
less than 0.5% of the value of their agricultural
production in agricultural research (Pinstrup-Andersen and
Cohen, 1999). In Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, real
spending per scientist has fallen by 2.6% a year since
1961, with the rate of decline accelerating from 1.6% a
year during the 1960s to 3.5% a year during the 1980s
(Spillane, 2000).
A large amount of private biotech research in developing
countries is unlikely to be forthcoming for a number of
reasons. Given the small holdings and largely
self-sufficient nature of production, it is difficult for
private firms to capture the value of their innovation
from the marketplace in these countries. The long-held
traditions of retaining seed, the lack of property rights,
and the large number of small producers makes it difficult
for firms to capture the value for their GM crops. To
compound the problem, many of the crops grown in LDCs are
small, regional crops grown on acreage that is extremely
limited. These “orphan crops” are likely to be
ignored in transgenic research programs, and the nature of
the growing conditions makes it difficult to cover the
fixed costs of cultivar development. Finally, many LDCs
lack the human and physical capital required to take
advantage of transgenic technologies. This makes it very
expensive for private firms to conduct research.
If large-scale private research is unlikely to occur in
many LDCs, the public sector must play a large role in
research and development. This presents problems of its
own. First, tax revenue is difficult to raise. Second, it
is increasingly difficult to obtain public access to
genetics and processes protected by Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR). Finally, there is often a lack of human and
physical capital. The inability of LDCs to attract and
keep scientists with advanced training is particularly
problematic. Further, training in developed countries,
using technologically advanced and expensive equipment, is
often not appropriate to the conditions under which
scientists in LDCs must conduct research (Woodward, Brink,
and Berger, 1999). If any type of research in LDCs is to
be performed successfully, however, broad infrastructure
needs must be met. It is not possible to master
biotechnological methods or products without the proper
buildings, laboratories, and equipment (Brenner, 1997). In
addition, modern communication systems are not readily
available (Brink, Woodward, DaSilva, 1998). Without the
basic components of human and physical capital,
biotechnology research is unlikely to take place in many
LDCs. Getting enough biotechnology research to create
transgenic crops adapted to LDCs is a significant
challenge.
Segregation and Market Access
Many agricultural products and processed goods are
exported from LDCs to developed countries. Often these
exports make up a large portion of foreign exchange
earnings. The EU has placed a ban on the import of some GM
food products, and requires labelling of others. Other
countries, including Japan, Korea, and Australi,a have
introduced mandatory labelling requirements. A recent poll
suggested that 75% of Canadians would not buy GM food if
they had a choice (McIlroy, 2000). North Americans are
thought to be much less concerned about GMOs than their
European counterparts. Retaining access to these markets
may require that exporters guarantee the GM-free status of
their exports. This will require an effective segregation
system, which may be very difficult for LDCs to achieve.
If physical segregation of GM and non-GM commodities were
to be required, LDCs could find the costs of compliance
prohibitive. The physical and institutional infrastructure
necessary for LDCs to segregate GM from non-GM food
currently does not exist. Basic physical infrastructure,
such as roads, telecommunications, and refrigeration, is
still lacking to a considerable degree in many LDCs.
Transportation and storage facilities are inadequate for
current commodity markets to function efficiently, let
alone for sophisticated markets that require credible
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Even if the
physical resources and infrastructure were available, the
lack of effective monitoring and enforcement would be a
severe problem. Thus, if agricultural biotechnology were
available for production of a particular commodity in an
LDC, international markets would likely treat all of that
country’s product as GM.
Biosafety
Managing the risks associated with the genetic
modification of crops requires resources to identify
health and environmental risks, an efficient means of
developing the regulations to address the problems, and
the ability effectively to enforce the regulations. LDCs
often lack all three.
LDCs generally lack the resources required for the
adequate testing of new products. In developed countries,
GM crops and their products are subject to testing and
assessment to determine whether they pose a threat to
human health or pose environmental risks. While some would
argue that these tests are inadequate to quantify all the
risks, there is nevertheless a system in place in most
developed countries to protect citizens against large
quantifiable risks. For instance, GM foods are tested for
known allergens. While the owners of the innovation incur
substantial costs to test products, the public regulators
also require a substantial human and physical
infrastructure to review the evidence provided to them.
Without the resources to assess these technologies, many
LDCs will by default have to rely on testing and
assessment done in other countries. This situation exists
currently in many non-agricultural products.
The creation of regulations designed to protect human
health and the environment is often a difficult process in
LDCs. In many countries, other, more important issues take
priority in governance. Often there is a scarcity of the
human resources to draft the statutes required to regulate
new products. In some countries, the process is further
complicated by frequent radical changes in leadership or
government structure.
LDCs often also lack the legal infrastructure and the
resources required effectively to enforce regulations that
could restrict the production of a hazardous GM crop. Most
LDCs have a large portion of their population engaged in
agriculture, with much of the consumption taking place in
the same households that produce the products. The shear
number of producers makes the enforcement production
difficult and expensive. If a GM crop was found to be a
threat to human health after it was introduced, a
regulation that banned the production of this variety
would be difficult to enforce once the seed was in the
countryside. Regulating production would be prohibitively
expensive, for the same reasons that the enforcement of
IPR and segregation would be difficult to achieve. To a
large extent, this makes the decision to introduce a GM
crop essentially irreversible in many LDCs.
-
Discussion
Despite the potential benefits of agricultural
biotechnology for LDCs, concerns remain regarding the
accessibility of new technologies. Owing to economies of
scale in agricultural biotechnology research, a small
number of multinational companies produce the vast
majority of these new products. Even if the institutional
structure was sufficient for multinational companies to
choose to make their intellectual property available in
LDCs, could small-hold farmers afford the new production
technologies? Many observers believe that the current GM
products, which are typically labour saving, would not be
in high demand because labour on small farms is plentiful
and hard currency is scarce.
The challenge remains to facilitate the adoption of
technologies that benefit the agricultural sector in LDCs,
thereby acting as a catalyst for economic development.
This challenge is magnified because of the poorly
developed legal, financial, and market institutions
typical of LDCs. In many ways, this is the classic problem
facing developing countries, and is not peculiar to
agricultural biotechnology. Policy makers in developed
countries need to be aware of the challenges faced by LDCs
in dealing with the multifaceted aspects of agricultural
biotechnology. They also need to be aware of the vital
importance of agriculture in the economies of these
countries, and their vulnerability when faced with the
current climate of uncertainty internationally with
respect to GM food.
Some of the lack of biotech research can be addressed
through public and private collaboration. It has been
suggested that public-sector institutions develop new
partnerships with the private sector and advanced research
institutions (Serageldin, 1999). This collaboration would
give LDC public sectors a means of accessing research
tools, attaining technical expertise, and expanding their
financial resources. The private sector may also benefit
from reduced investment risk, improved public relations,
and a better understanding of local cultures, leading to
improved assessments of market opportunities (Lewis,
1999).
-
References
-
Brenner, C. (1997). Biotechnology Policy for Developing
Country Agriculture. OECD Development Center Policy
Brief No. 14. (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/1919108.pdf,
PDF Format).
-
Brink, J. A., B. R. Woodward, and E. J. DaSilva (1998).
Plant Biotechnology: A Tool for Development in Africa.
Nature Biotechnology, 1(3).
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Conway, G. (2000, March 28). Crop Biotechnology:
Benefits, Risks and Ownership. Paper presented at the
Conference on GM Food Safety: Facts, Uncertainties, and
Assessment. The Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Conference on the Scientific and
Health Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods,
Edinburgh, Scotland. (
http://www.rockfound.org/display.asp?context=1&Collection=4&DocID=141&Preview=0&ARCurrent=1
).
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Falconi, C. (1999). Measuring Agricultural
Biotechnology Research Capacity in Four Developing
Countries. AgBioForum, 2(3&4), 182-188.
(www.agbioforum.org).
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Leisinger, K. M. (1999, October). Biotechnology for
Developing Country Agriculture: Problems and
Opportunities — Disentangling Risk Issues. 2020
Focus 2, Brief 5 of 10. (http://www.cgiar.org/index.html).
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Lewis, J. (1999, October 21-22). Leveraging
Partnerships Between the Public and Private Sector -
Experience of USAID’s Agricultural Biotechnology
Program. Paper presented at the CGIAR/NAS Biotechnology
Conference. (www.cgiar.org/biotechc/lewis.htm).
-
McIlroy, A. (2000, Saturday, January 15). Canadians
wary of genetically altered foods. The Globe and
Mail, Section A, pp. 2.
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Pinstrup-Andersen, P. (1999, October). Biotechnology
for Developing Country Agriculture: Problems and
Opportunities — Developing Appropriate Policies.
2020 Focus 2, Brief 9 of 10. (http://www.cgiar.org/).
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Pinstrup-Andersen, P., and J. I. Cohen (1999). Modern
Biotechnology for Food and Agriculture: Social and
Economic Risks and Opportunities for Low-income People
in Developing Countries. Paper presented at the
CGIAR/NAS Biotechnology Conference, October 21-22. (www.cgiar.org/biotechc/pinstrup.htm).
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Pinstrup-Anderson, P. and M. Cohen (2001, January 22).
Rich and Poor Country Perspectives on Biotechnology.
Paper presented at the Agricultural Biotechnology
workshop, Adelaide, Australia.
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Robinson, C. (2000). GM Issues. John Innes Centre. (www.gmissues.org).
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Serageldin, I. (1999). Biotechnology and Food Security
in the 21st Century. Science, 285, pp.
387-389.
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Skerritt, John (2001). Biotechnology policies for Asia:
Current activities and future options. Paper presented
at the Agricultural Biotechnology workshop, Adelaide,
Australia.
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Smith, F. B. (2000). The Biosafety Protocol: The Real
Losers Are Developing Countries. Washington, DC:
National Legal Centre for the Public Interest. (www.nlcpi.org).
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Spillane, C. (2000). Could Agricultural Biotechnology
Contribute to Poverty Alleviation?
AgBiotechNet, 2. (
http://www.agbiotechnet.com/reviews/available_old.asp#2000).
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Woodward, B. R., J. A.Brink, and D. Berger (1999). Can
Agricultural Biotechnology Make A Difference in Africa?
AgBioForum, 2(3 and 4), 175-181.
-
Overview and Conclusions
Richard Gray and Jill Hobbs 10
GM crop production is a new technology with a wide range of
effects that have the potential to influence the well-being of
many groups and individuals in the world economy. The recent
commercial introduction of these crops means that many of the
impacts of these technologies are still hypothetical in nature
and have yet to be realized. Many alleged costs and benefits are
reported with a wide range of reliability; some are inconsistent
with scientific or economic theory; some have the potential to
exist in theory but have yet to be measured, while initial
estimates of others have been made. Therefore, while there is
much discussion of potential effects, in most cases it is simply
too soon to provide concrete measures of the size and
distribution of actual effects.
Many issues have yet to be resolved. While there is little
concrete evidence of major adverse affects at this point, most
would agree that many of the potential adverse effects would
take a number of years to develop. Thus, it is simply too early
to be sure. The unresolved uncertainty about the effects of GM
crops creates a difficult situation for policy makers. On the
one hand, if GM technology is eventually accepted as safe, then
it would be important to continue to invest in and develop the
industry. On the other hand, if the technology has some large,
unforeseen costs, or even if consumers continue to mistrust it,
then making in some cases irreversible decisions to adopt these
technologies could come at an extremely high cost. This dilemma
suggests that it would be prudent to spend resources continually
to evaluate these technologies as more information becomes
available. The uncertainty also suggests that irreversible
decisions should be made with caution, and that it may be
prudent in some cases to postpone some irreversible decisions
until more information becomes available. Finally, as with any
new technology, there will be both costs and benefits, winners
and losers.
The analysis summarized in this report clearly illustrates that
many of the costs and benefits are external to the GM marketing
channel. Thus, the ability of a GM product to survive in the
marketplace does not indicate the overall viability of the
technology. The complex trade-offs involved suggest that the
public needs to be as informed as possible so that they can
participate in the debate and in the democratic processes
required to make these important decisions.
Chapters 2 to 8 of this report reviewed some of the most
important issues associated with the introduction of GM crop
technologies. With a review of the literature, they attempted to
summarize what is currently known about the costs and benefits
of these technologies.
Table 9.1 below summarizes some of the key issues, research
findings, or conceptual insights and research and policy needs.
Table 9.1: Summary
Issues
|
Research Findings/Conceptual Insights
|
Research and/or Policy Needs
|
Industry Structure
-
Increasing concentration in seed and chemical
industries
-
Increasing vertical linkages through
“lifescience” platforms
-
Is/will there be an abuse of market power?
-
Role of intellectual property rights in creating
incentive for investment in R&D
|
-
Industry structure in state of flux
-
Estimates of concentration ratios are preliminary
and change rapidly
-
Appears to be limited opportunities for price
discrimination in North American market but more
evidence on international market
|
-
Clear picture yet to emerge as to nature of
concentration and whether this will create
long-run losses in economic welfare
-
Lack of good data on production and R&D costs
in biotech Sector
-
A need to determine whether business practices
reflect anti-competitive behaviour or normal
business practice.
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Environment
-
Potential environmental benefits from
virusresistant, insect-resistant and
herbicide-resistant crops, including reduced soil
erosion, reduction in chemical inputs
-
Potential environmental costs include gene flow
dispersal, outcrossing, increased pest and
herbicide resistance, negative impacts on
non-target organisms
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-
Little direct scientific evidence for many of the
environmental concerns, given usual conditions of
production environment
-
Too soon to observe actual long-run environmental
costs and benefits. Research is largely
theoretical or based on forecasts, not direct
estimate of effects.
-
Although early evidence appears positive, very
little known about potential impact (negative or
positive) of virus resistant crops — too
new.
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-
Potential irreversibility problem from releasing
new varieties creates long-run uncertainties
which are difficult to quantify
-
Possible need for stronger enforcement mechanisms
— currently farmer insect resistance
management programs are voluntary
-
Policy and research evaluations should also
consider relative costs and benefits of
conventional agriculture to provide a benchmark
comparison
-
Case-by-case evaluation of environmental costs
and benefits required
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Agronomic
-
Potential producer benefits from input-trait
crops include improved yields, reduced input
costs and a convenience factor
-
Potential consumer benefits include lower prices
(depending on competitiveness of downstream
sectors)
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-
Most research has focused on US crops and US
production situations
-
Good evidence of improved ability to control pest
and increase yields, etc.
-
Impact on producer profitability is less certain.
Estimates only available — suggest gain of
Cdn. $5- $8/acre
-
Rapid adoption by western Canadian farmers
suggests an improvement in profitability
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-
A need for Canadian, crop-specific studies
-
Need for research to include establish impact of
having more than one GM crop in rotation on
profitability
-
Current lack of data to allow sufficient analysis
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Consumer
-
A mixture of consumer concerns:
-
Specific food safety concerns (allergens,
toxicity, nutrient content)
-
Long-run fear of the unknown food safety
effect
-
Ethical concerns
-
Environmental concerns
-
Compulsory vs Voluntary labelling
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-
Numerous consumer opinion poll surveys but
usually lack a basis of comparison
-
Conceptual research discussing the nature of the
information problem and the different regulatory
approaches to product approval, labelling, etc.
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-
A need for research to disentangle these concerns
and understand causes & solutions
-
Research needed to identify consumer segments
with different preferences and understand the
motivations for those preferences
-
Research needed on likely consumer reaction (by
segment) to future outputtrait GM products
-
Research needed to measure consumers’
willingness to pay (positive or negative) for
labelling information, output traits.
-
Methods and desirability of involving public in
decision-making need to be evaluated.
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Labelling & Segregation
-
What are the costs of segregation?
-
Who bears these costs?
-
Should the system be voluntary or is there market
failure indicating the need for a compulsory
system?
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-
Almost all analyses is in absence of widespread
segregation
-
Existing studies produce a wide range of
estimates of the costs of segregation and
labelling, ranging from Cdn. $10-$50/tonne.
-
Estimated costs depend on key assumptions
regarding accepted tolerance levels;
effectiveness of system (degree of cheating),
testing costs and procedures; market volumes of
GM vs non-GM crops
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-
Difficult to generalize U.S. studies to Canadian
situation
-
Need for crop-specific, situation-specific
analyses of which system(s) would be most suited
to Canadian grains industry
-
Uncertainties over key variables, including
tolerance levels and volumes make sensitivity
analysis critical
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Trade
-
Access to international markets and the role of
intellectual property rights
-
Protection of domestic consumers (health) and
environment vs. obligations under international
agreements
-
Threat to developing countries markets
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-
Little or no empirical work because it is too
soon. Most countries still putting domestic
regulations in place so international rules in a
state of flux
-
Existing work theoretical and conceptual
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-
No government statistics yet exist on trade in GM
and non-GM products
-
Need to improve transparency of international
rules with respect to market access and
protection of intellectual property rights
-
Expect complex negotiations over issues of
labelling and market access. May require
re-negotiation at WTO to establish mechanism for
dealing with consumer concerns.
-
Need clearer picture of which international
agreement takes precedence — e.g. WTO or
Biosafety protocol.
-
Need for a well-reasoned, theoretically sound,
yet politically realistic set of proposals for
resolving looming trade issues.
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LDCs
-
Potential benefits include improved incomes for
small farmers, greater long-run stability of food
supplies, and improved health through
nutritionally enhanced foods.
-
Lack of research resources (public or private) is
a severe constraint
-
Inadequate physical & institutional
infrastructure may hamper adoption and regulation
of biotech products, and will certainly create
severe problems if segregation of GM/non-GM
products required.
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-
Lack of consensus as to whether these potential
benefits can be realized given the resource,
infrastructure, and human capital constraints
faced by many LDCs.
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-
Net benefits likely to differ country by country
-
Need for policymakers to be aware of vital role
agriculture plays in LDCs
-
Need for international community to find ways of
supporting public investment in biotech research
designed for specific LDC needs.
-
Need for policymakers to recognize potential
adverse impact of labelling & import
restrictions
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Overall
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-
In most cases it is too soon for definitive
estimates of aggregate gains or losses in
economic welfare
-
Important theoretical groundwork has been laid
for later empirical work and to provide better
understanding of the issues
-
Existing monetary estimates of costs and benefits
are in most cases estimates or projections
effects across society.
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-
Need to establish data collection procedures to
allow on-going monitoring of costs and benefits
as they emerge
-
Need for multidimensional analyses which take
into account trade-offs among producers,
consumers, and non-market externality effects
across society.
-
A need to establish a procedure for evaluating
trade-offs between possible irreversibility of GM
investment/release decisions vs potential costs
of innovation foregone
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-
Policy Implications
As is clearly illustrated in this review, there are a
large number of diverse impacts from GM crop production.
Potential adverse environmental and food safety
consequences are at the centre of the GM debate, and
create a ripple effect throughout the GM and the non-GM
marketplace. While concrete evidence of adverse impacts is
difficult to find, there remains a doubt in the minds of
many consumers and some producers. Even a small
probability of long-term adverse effects can be enough to
reduce consumer demand for many of these products, and can
induce consumers to demand that their governments ban
these products, block trade, or require labelling. These
market impacts have the potential to create large economic
costs for GM and non-GM marketers and producers.
Three related policy implications emerge from this
analysis:
-
Information & Data
In the short run, there is a need to gather as much
information as possible and swiftly address any
concerns if there is evidence that an adverse impact
exists. Equally important is the provision of credible
information to the public when the concerns are
unfounded. Over the longer run, there is a need to
establish data-collection procedures to allow on-going
monitoring and measurement of costs and benefits as
they emerge. Information requirements include: measures
of industry concentration, production and R&D costs
in the biotech sector, environmental impact analyses,
adoption rates of GM crops by region and crop type,
producer agronomic and market benefits, measures of
consumer preference and attitudinal changes over time
and between regions, assessments of the costs of
alternative segregation systems, statistics on trade in
GM and non-GM products, and tracking of existing and
proposed import regulations affecting GM products.
-
Multi-Dimensional Analyses
The costs borne by non-GM producers, marketers, and
consumers can be substantial. As far as is possible,
given the data limitations mentioned above, steps
should be taken formally to incorporate these costs
into the decision to license a GM crop technology.
Hence, there is a need for multi-dimensional analyses
that take into account trade-offs among producers,
consumers, and non-market externality effects across
society. Frequently, this will present serious
analytical challenges, since many of the costs may not
become apparent until after commercialization, and will
depend on the extent and rate of technology adoption.
Rather than relying on a strict quantification of
measurable costs and benefits in making a licensing
decision, qualitative consideration of additional
post-commercialization effects also will need to be
made. Critical to the credibility of this assessment,
then, will be an open and transparent licensing system
in which the considered decisions of regulators are
subject to public scrutiny.
-
The Irreversibility Conundrum
When there is uncertainty about whether an adverse
impact exists, the irreversibility of the introduction
of a GM technology suggests that a cautious approach
should be adopted, with careful consideration of the
benefits of waiting until more information is
available. In many cases, the approval of a GM crop for
licensing and commercial adoption may be a one-time
only decision in terms of its potential environmental
impact or the consequent need to segregate non-GM
crops. There may be effects that cannot be undone by
“de-licensing” the crop at a future date
should it be discovered that its release had
detrimental environmental or market impacts. Of course,
there are two sides to this issue. A cautious
“wait-and-see” approach may in itself
create costs in the form of innovations foregone and
economic growth and development opportunities passed
by. Ultimately, we need a means of determining when
“enough information is enough” to allow an
irreversible investment decision to proceed. There is a
need to establish procedures for evaluating the
expected trade-offs between irreversibility of GM
investment and release decisions versus the potential
costs of innovations foregone. In an ideal world these
would be internationally agreed-to procedures.
International consensus is necessary to avoid the
inevitable trade friction and market access issues that
will result from the application of conflicting
domestic policy approaches to what is essentially the
same problem across a number of countries. Ongoing
information collection and analysis, as identified in
point 1 above, should help in this regard. Existing
international institutions such as the Codex
Alimentarius Commission and the World Trade
Organization may provide the forums through which
international consensus can be reached.
1 Murray Fulton is Professor and
Head, Agricultural Economics, University of Saskatchewan. Kostastinos
Giannakas is Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska.
2 The Canadian regulatory system is based on product
novelty, not process. So, of these forty-three foodstuffs, not all
were the result of genetic engineering. Some, such as
imidazolinone-tolerant wheat, were produced by such traditional
breeding methods as mutagenesis (CFIA, 1999d).
3 Only 55% of total canola acres are seeded to genetically
modified HT varieties (CCGA 1999). This includes both the Roundup
ReadyÆË and Liberty LinkÆË canola systems.
4 A variety of different terms are used in the consumer
surveys, and the terms may or may not be defined. This makes
comparisons between the studies problematic, and partly explains why
the results of different studies sometimes appear contradictory.
5 The question was not asked in the earlier Eurobarometer
surveys.
6 In a recent study, fear of unknown impacts was the second
most important risk or disadvantage from GM foods mentioned by
consumers in six of eight countries surveyed (Canada, the United
States, France, Germany, Japan, and Brazil) and was the most important
risk mentioned by consumers in the UK and Australia (Angus Reid Group
and The Economist, 2000).
7 The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for
suggesting the Non-BST milk example.
8 See Caswell (1999) for a discussion of risk analysis as
applied to agricultural biotechnology.
9 Richard Gray is a Professor in the Department of
Agricultural Economics; Jodi McNaughton is a Research Assistant in the
Centre for the Study of Agriculture, Law, and the Environment (CSALE);
Derek Stovin is a Professional Research Associate in the Department of
Agriculture Economics. All are at the University of Saskatchewan.
10 Richard Gray is a Professor and Jill Hobbs is an
Assistant Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics,
University of Saskatchewan.
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