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Policy Group
Policy Overview
Transportation in Canada Annual Reports

Table of Contents
Report Highlights
Addendum
1. Introduction
2. Transportation and the Canadian Economy
3. Government Spending on Transportation
4. Transportation and Safety
5. Transportation - Energy & Environment
6. Transportation and Regional Economies
7. Transportation and Employment
8. Transportation and Trade
9. Transportation and Tourism
10. Transportation Infrastructure
11. Structure of the Transportation Industry
12. Freight Transportation
13. Passenger Transportation
14. Price, Productivity and Financial Performance in the Transportation Sector
Minister of Transport
List of Tables
List of Figures
List of Annexes
 
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10

TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Marine Transportation Infrastructure

Ports

Canada's major ports are vital links in the national transportation system: they supplement the railways and roads that serve Canadians travelling for business or pleasure, and are essential for transporting the nation's goods for export or import. The infrastructure that supports these ports includes marine terminals that contain a variety of facilities and organizations related to the loading and unloading of vessels berthed at the wharf. Port authorities operate some of these marine terminals, but often they are owned and operated by independent companies that rent space from the port.

The Port System

Under the National Marine Policy announced in December 1995, Canada's ports system has undergone reorganization aimed at instilling commercial discipline in port operations. The federal government has moved out of the direct operation of ports, giving local users more say in the port services they pay for and receive. The National Marine Policy was implemented under the Canada Marine Act (CMA), which received Royal Assent on June 11, 1998. The policy calls for three categories of ports:

  • Canada Port Authorities
  • regional/local ports
  • remote ports.

The Canada Marine Act has created a National Ports System made up of independently managed Canada Port Authorities (CPAs). The authorities are considered self-sufficient ports that are critical to domestic and international trade. They include former Ports Canada local port corporations, most of the former Canada Ports Corporation's major divisional ports, and most former harbour commissions.

To date, 17 of the 18 ports designated to become Canada Port Authorities have received their CPA status through the issuance of letters patent, and their boards of directors have been established. The implementation dates were as follows:

  • Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver on March 1, 1999
  • Fraser River, Prince Rupert, Quebec, Saguenay, Saint John, Sept-Îles, St. John's and Trois-Rivières on May 1, 1999
  • Toronto on June 8, 1999
  • Nanaimo, North Fraser, Port Alberni, Thunder Bay and Windsor on July 1, 1999.

Canada Port Authority status for the Port of Hamilton, the last remaining port to be designated as a CPA, will be established once it completes the letters patent process, expected in the spring of 2001. In addition to the original 18 ports listed in the Canada Marine Act, Transport Canada received applications for CPA status from two additional ports: the Port of Belledune, a former divisional port of the Canada Ports Corporation; and the Oshawa Harbour Commission. The Minister granted the Belledune Port Authority Canada Port Authority status, through the issuance of letters patent, on March 29, 2000, and has approved the initiation of the CPA implementation process for the Oshawa Harbour Commission. It is expected that Oshawa will complete the letters patent process and receive Canada Port Authority status in early 2001.

The Canada Port Authorities include 11 of the 14 ports formerly defined as Ports Canada, and seven of the nine ports formerly defined as Harbour Commissions. Table 10-8 summarizes the status of these major ports and the date the CPA was created.

Transport Canada is monitoring the compliance of CPAs with the Canada Marine Act and their respective letters patent.

The Canada Ports Corporation was dissolved on November 1, 2000. During the implementation phase, it was kept open with minimal staff to ensure that all ports had been transferred. The Port of Prescott was transferred to the Township of Edwardsburgh on October 11, 2000, and Ridley Terminals Incorporated became a parent Crown corporation on November 1, 2000, upon the dissolution of the Canada Ports Corporation.

On March 1, 1999, Part II of the Canada Marine Act came into force for existing public ports. Under the National Marine Policy, the majority of ports under the control and administration of Transport Canada were designated as regional/local. These ports range from operations that support significant local and regional commercial activity to very small facilities with little or no commercial traffic.

Whether a port supports an isolated community or several large industries, Transport Canada's operational role is normally limited to enforcing regulations regarding public port and public port facility use, monitoring port operations, and collecting user fees. Services such as cargo handling are supplied by the private sector.

Transport Canada began commercializing its public ports before the introduction of the Canada Marine Act, as legislative authority was not required for this process to begin. Under the National Marine Policy, regional/local ports are being transferred to other federal departments or to provincial governments, municipal authorities, community organizations or private interests over a six-year period ending in 2001/02. Public ports are also being deproclaimed once Transport Canada has relinquished the last of its ownership interests, including the harbour beds as appropriate, to a new owner. Once the public port or public port facilities have been deproclaimed, Transport Canada no longer has the authority to regulate activities in these waters. For this reason, federally appointed harbour masters, whose prime responsibilities are to administer public port regulations, are being removed once the ports are deproclaimed.

As of December 31, 2000, 382 of the 549 public ports and public port facilities under Transport Canada's control and administration have been transferred, deproclaimed, demolished, or have had the department's interests terminated.

Table 10-9 summarizes the changes that have taken place in responsibility for ports operations since 1996.

As of December 31, 2000, a total of 167 regional/local and remote ports and port facilities remain under Transport Canada control. An additional 15 sites remain where the public port has not yet been deproclaimed because the harbour bed has not yet been divested. Table 10-10 summarizes the regional distribution of the ports administered by Transport Canada from 1995 to 2000.

Of the 155 public ports and public port facilities transferred to date, 39 sites were transferred to provincial governments, 64 to other federal departments, and 52 to local interests. As previously mentioned, 15 of these 155 sites have yet to have their public port status deproclaimed.

Since the start of the program, 255 public ports have been deproclaimed overall. Of these, 26 harbours were found during subsequent archival research and are therefore not included in the original 549 port sites identified in the National Marine Policy. In addition, 18 of these public ports were adjacent to port facilities that had already been transferred.

Transport Canada is monitoring local port entities for compliance with the terms and conditions of any contributions that may have been received by these entities.

The federal government will continue to maintain remote ports that serve the basic transportation needs of isolated communities, unless local interests express a willingness to assume ownership of such port facilities. In 2000, one remote port in British Columbia was transferred to a local interest group, bringing the total number of remote ports transferred to 27. Also in 2000, the Port of Cap-aux-Meules, Quebec, was changed from a regional/local port to a remote port following a review of the port facility's classification under the terms of the National Marine Policy. As a result, Transport Canada continues to administer 34 remote ports nationwide (10 in Quebec, three in Ontario, one in Manitoba, and 20 in British Columbia).

Table 10-11 shows the divestiture status of regional/local and remote ports as well as the number of ports remaining on a regional basis.

As Transport Canada relinquishes its ownership interests in public ports and public port facilities, a growing number of "other" ports are being operated by provincial or municipal governments and private interests. At the end of 2000, there were 133 other ports, including 64 private, 40 provincial and 29 municipal ports. These include sites such as Port Cartier, Quebec, and Nanticoke, Ontario, used to ship large volumes of cargo, and Quyon, Quebec, which is used for an interprovincial ferry service on the Ottawa River.

Financial Performance

Audited financial statements for 2000 are not yet available. As a result, the following results for 1999 are provided for the 17 ports designated as Canada Port Authorities as of December 31, 1999.

Table 10-12 shows revenues, expenses and some key ratios for Canada Port Authorities in 1999. In that year, the CPAs posted total revenues of $240 million, with a net income of $36 million and an operating cash flow of $57.7 million. Among the 17 designated Canada Port Authorities, Vancouver and Montreal accounted for over 56 per cent of the total revenues generated. Four Canada Port Authorities accounted for 64 per cent of total cargo, by volume, handled by CPAs: Vancouver handled 34 per cent, while Montreal, Saint John and Sept-Îles each handled 10 per cent.

The overall operating ratio for the Canada Port Authorities was approximately 88 per cent in 1999, with the individual ratios ranging from 58 to 142 per cent. Except for Sept-Îles (58 per cent) and Vancouver (71 per cent), ratios for all other Canada Port Authorities were above 80 per cent.

The return on assets for the Canada Port Authorities was 3.3 per cent in 1999. Windsor (25 per cent) had the highest return on assets, followed by Saguenay (20 per cent) and Trois-Rivières (15 per cent).

Table 10-13 shows revenues, expenses and incomes for all the Harbour Commissions and Ports Canada ports for the 1995-1998 period, while 1999 data reflects all ports that have Canada Port Authority status as of December 31, 1999.

At first glance, the figures in Table 10-13 indicate that the total revenues decreased in 1999 from $287 million to $240 million. It is important to note, however, that the 1999 revenues do not include the six major ports that were not considered Canada Port Authorities as of December 31, 1999. Table 10-14 compares revenues, expenses, and net income for 1998 and 1999. It includes only those Ports Canada ports and Harbour Commissions that were Canada Port Authorities as of December 31, 1999.

In comparing the same ports from 1998 to 1999, revenues increased from $234 million to $240 million, or approximately 2.5 per cent. Nine of the 17 Canada Port Authorities reported an increase in revenues ranging from $0.1 to $3.7 million. Fraser River and Vancouver reported the highest increases, at $3.7 million (32 per cent) and $3.4 million (five per cent), respectively.

According to Table 10-13, it would also appear that in 1999, expenditures decreased by approximately 6.5 per cent; however, the expenses for 1998 included all Ports Canada and Harbour Commissions expenses. Upon further analysis, expenditures for the same ports indicate that expenses have increased slightly, from $194 million in 1998 to $212 million in 1999. Montreal expenses increased from $50.4 million to $57.7 million (14.5 per cent), while Fraser River expenses increased from $10.2 million to $14.3 million (40 per cent). Twelve of the 17 Canada Port Authorities recorded increases in expenditures that ranged from $0.1 to $7.3 million, and four reported decreases between $0.4 and $0.8 million. Operating expenditures at Port Alberni remained constant at $3.2 million over the two-year period.

Net income for the major ports that obtained Canada Port Authority status as of December 31, 1999, has increased significantly, from $18.4 million in 1998 to $36 million in 1999, an increase of approximately 96 per cent.

Tonnage for the Canada Port Authority ports in 1999 compared with the tonnage for the same major ports in 1998 indicates a decrease from 207.3 million tonnes to 204.9 million tonnes. Based on this tonnage, the revenue per tonne increased from $1.13 in 1998 to $1.17 in 1999, while expenses per tonne increased from $0.94 to $1.03.

Transport Canada Ports

Ten per cent of the ports remaining under Transport Canada's control generated 73 per cent of the total revenues in 1999/2000. As shown in Table 10-15, revenues have fluctuated year over year, because of numerous factors, including tariff increases implemented in 1995 and 1996, a reduction in the number of Transport Canada ports as a result of divestiture, and various utilization factors of Transport Canada's ports and port facilities.

For fiscal year 1999/2000, gross revenues at the remaining facilities were $19 million, while expenses were $26.2 million. This left an operating revenue shortfall of $7.1 million and an operating ratio of 137 per cent. Capital expenditures for the year were $7.6 million. An additional $16.6 million in grants and contributions was expended during fiscal year 1999/2000 for costs related to transfers associated with port divestitures.

Since the National Marine Policy came into effect, maintenance expenditures have been reduced to a minimum in anticipation of regional/local port divestiture. Because of divestiture delays, however, some unforeseen maintenance expenses and capital expenditures were incurred in order to maintain safety standards. This had the effect of increasing expenses in 1999/2000. In some cases, capital projects were carried out in remote sites for which Transport Canada will continue to maintain full responsibility. A few port transfers of substantial value were concluded during this reporting period accounting for the increase in grants and contributions.

Between 1995 and 1999, revenues per tonne increased from $0.22 to $0.29, or by approximately 32 per cent, while expenses per tonneNote 4 over the five-year period have remained relatively stable, decreasing from $0.43 per tonne in 1995 to $0.40 per tonne in 1999.

Table 10-15 summarizes the financial details of ports and harbours remaining under Transport Canada's control from 1995/96 to 1999/2000.

Port Traffic

The following preliminary data shows the traffic at some Canada Port Authorities in 2000:

  • Halifax: 13.9 million tonnes; 138,000 cruise ship passengers
  • Montreal: 20.4 million tonnes; 25,200 cruise ship passengers
  • Prince Rupert: 7.6 million tonnes
  • Quebec: 16.3 million tonnes
  • Saguenay: 0.401 million tonnes
  • Saint John: 19.7 million tonnes
  • Sept-Îles: 21.1 million tonnes
  • Thunder Bay: almost 8.9 million tonnes
  • Toronto: two million tonnes
  • Vancouver: 69.8 million tonnes; 1.1 million cruise ship passengers
  • Windsor: 5.4 million tonnes

Based on preliminary data provided by Statistics Canada (available only up to 1999), Canada's ports handled 386.9 million tonnes of cargo in 1999, an increase of approximately three per cent over 1998.

Figure 10-5 shows traffic shares by port groups in 1999, based upon port classification as of December 31, 1999.

Traffic data presented for 1999 is based upon port classification as of December 31, 1999, while 1998 traffic data has been restated to reflect the change of former Canada Port Corporation ports and Harbour Commissions ports to Canada Port Authority status in 1999.

In 1999, Canada Port Authorities handled the largest amount of traffic, with a 53 per cent share of the total. The four ports still classified as divisional ports of the Canada Ports Corporation or as Harbour Commissions as of December 31, 1999, transported four per cent of the total, while another 17 per cent of cargo was moved through Transport Canada facilities. The remaining 26 per cent was handled by other facilities, including those managed privately and those managed by or on behalf of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and provincial and municipal governments.

Calculating 1998 traffic for Canada Port Authorities and comparing that with 1999 totals shows a decrease from 207.3 million tonnes to approximately 205 million tonnes, a decrease of approximately one per cent. As a result of 34 divestiture transactions completed in 1999, the total tonnage that moved across Transport Canada public ports and public port facilities decreased by 17 per cent. This, coupled with a former Canada Ports Corporation port (Port Colborne, Ontario) being transferred to a new entity, resulted in a significant increase of traffic moving over other ports.

At those declared public ports where Transport Canada has no facilities and cargo is transported across private wharves, cargo shipped totalled 16.3 million tonnes, or 25 per cent of the total traffic handled by Transport Canada ports. Approximately 102 million tonnes of cargo crossed "other" ports. In this category, Port Cartier, Quebec, with approximately 19.9 million tonnes, handled the most cargo, followed by Nanticoke, Ontario, which carried 12.3 million tonnes. The balance was carried by the remaining 110 other ports that reported cargo tonnage to Statistics Canada.

Table 10-16 compares details of tonnage handled in Canada's port system.

Small Craft Harbours

During 2000, the Small Craft Harbours (SCH) program of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) continued to make progress toward divesting derelict/ low-activity fishing harbours and recreational harbours from its inventory. At the end of this exercise, all recreational harbours will have been transferred and the number of fishing harbours under DFO/SCH responsibility reduced to fewer than 750.

Fishing harbours

Since the late 1980s, the SCH has supported the creation of local Harbour Authorities to take over management of commercial fishing harbour facilities in their communities. Harbour Authorities are local non-profit organizations made up of fishers and other harbour users, to which SCH leases the management of the harbour. The Harbour Authorities provide services, maintain the facilities, and manage the harbour operations on a day-to-day basis. As of January 3, 2001, Harbour Authorities managed 604 sites across the country, representing close to 80 per cent of the SCH program's target. Fishing harbours not able to generate the community interest necessary to form and manage a Harbour Authority will be disposed of or, if necessary, demolished. Such harbours are usually low- or no-activity sites and have negligible impact on the commercial fishing industry.

Table 10-17 shows the fishing harbours remaining in the Small Craft Harbours portfolio as of January 3, 2001, by region and type of management.

Recreational harbours

The Small Craft Harbours program is committed to the divestiture of all recreational harbours in its inventory and has achieved 71 per cent of its target since 1994-95, with 599 recreational harbour sites transferred, or in the final stage of divestiture. Recipients are mainly municipalities, local non-profit organizations, First Nations or other federal departments. In Ontario and Quebec, the main recipients of SCH federal recreational harbours are municipalities.

The disposal strategy adopted by SCH complies with the Program Transfer Flexibilities approved by Treasury Board in 1995. Disposals done under this program (i.e. for a $1.00 consideration) have conditions, including a requirement to maintain public access for at least five years. Recreational harbours are offered to potential recipients in a preset order of priority: other federal departments first; provinces, municipalities, local non-profit associations or First Nations second; and the private sector through a tendering process last. Prior to transfer, SCH conducts an environmental assessment of the site and completes any necessary repairs to ensure that the facilities are transferred in a safe and reasonable condition. In the absence of a public body interested in acquiring the facilities, they are offered at market value. Should there be no private interest in the facilities, they are demolished. The recreational harbour divestiture program is expected to continue for several more years.

Tables 10-18 to 10-20 summarize, by region, the status of the Small Craft Harbours recreational harbour divestiture program, recipients of harbours divested, and type of management of the remaining harbour sites in the SCH inventory.

As a result of its Harbour Authority and Disposal Programs, Small Craft Harbours revenues for 2000/01 from leases, licences, and berthage and wharfage are projected to be 33 per cent less than in 1999/2000. The largest decrease is expected in Ontario, for the second consecutive year, with revenue declining by $548,140, or 36 per cent. Close to 94 per cent of the 2000/01 budget is allocated to harbour repairs, while salaries and contributions make up 5.8 and 0.3 per cent of the budget, respectively.

St. Lawrence Seaway

A shared responsibility between Canada and the United States, the St. Lawrence Seaway is a unique inland waterway, extending into the industrial heartland of North America and serving 15 major international ports and some 50 regional ports on both sides of the Canada-US border.

The Seaway locks (15 in total) connect the shipping channel in two major sections: Montreal-Lake Ontario and the Welland Canal. Between Montreal and Lake Erie, the locks lift vessels up to the height of a 60-storey building above sea level. The Montreal-Lake Ontario section has seven locks - five Canadian and two American. The Welland Canal links Lake Ontario and Lake Erie with a series of eight locks. The locks and channels are capable of accommodating vessels 225.5 metres long, 23.8 metres in beam and eight metres in draft. Figure 10-6 shows the St. Lawrence Seaway System.

Second Year Under New Management

In 2000, the Canadian Seaway saw its second full year of management by the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation (SLSMC). The SLSMC began operations of the Canadian portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway on October 1, 1998, following the successful negotiation of a management contract with the federal government pursuant to Part 3 of the Canada Marine Act. This agreement is in force until March 31, 2018.

Responsible for managing, operating and maintaining the Seaway, the SLSMC must submit a five-year business plan, throughout the term of the agreement, to the Minister of Transport. The plan includes anticipated revenues and operating and asset renewal costs. The corporation is required to charge tolls and generate other revenues to finance the operation and maintenance of the Seaway. For its ports, the federal government is required to provide financial assistance to eliminate operating deficits, if they arise.

North Channel Bridge and the All-Canadian Seaway Option

In 2000, the Minister of Transport announced that an "all-Canadian Seaway" option is no longer required and that the Federal Bridge Corporation Limited is free to begin developing options to replace the high-level bridge at Cornwall. The announcement marked an end to the government's commitment to an all-Canadian Seaway option, which dates back to the 1950s.

During the 1950s, the Seaway project went ahead after receiving support from both Canada and the United States. At the time, however, Canadian interests were concerned about the US commitment to the project; therefore, the federal government decided to retain the option to construct the Seaway as a solely Canadian project at some point in the future. For this reason, the Cornwall Seaway International Bridge was built to Seaway height over the Cornwall Canal, which would have been the routing of an all-Canadian Seaway.

A review of the long-term maintenance strategy for the North Channel portion of the crossing concluded that the cost of major maintenance on the 40-year-old bridge could be as much as double the cost of constructing a new low-level bridge.

Traffic

In the 2000 season, combined traffic on the two sections of the Seaway was down by over one million tonnes from 1999 levels to 46.5 million tonnes (based on preliminary traffic data). This was due largely to lower grain traffic through the system. This decrease in grain was partly offset by an increase in general cargo traffic (primarily iron and steel products) over 1999 levels.

The 1999 navigation season extended for 270 days, with 24-hour navigation of the system beginning on April 1, 1999, and the last ships exiting St. Lambert Lock and the Welland Canal on December 25, 1999.

Traffic decreased slightly from 1998 levels, returning to 1997 levels. While US grain exports increased, activity in the steel industry decreased. Combined Seaway traffic for both major sections totalled 47.86 million tonnes, a decrease of 5.2 per cent from the 1998 total of 50.51 million tonnes. Traffic decreased by about 7.2 per cent to 36.5 million tonnes on the Montreal-Lake Ontario section, and by 7.9 per cent to 37.4 million tonnes on the Welland Canal.

Vessel transits on the Montreal-Lake Ontario section in 1999 were nearly identical to 1998, 3,141 vessel transits compared with 3,158, respectively. On the Welland Canal section, vessel transits increased to 3,626, 199 more than in 1998.

Table 10-21 shows the volume of cargo movements on both major sections of the Seaway from 1990 to 2000.

Highlights of Traffic by Commodity for 1999

Grain

Once again, Canadian grain traffic was below average levels, while US grain shipments increased. Grain traffic totalled 13.6 million tonnes on the Montreal-Lake Ontario section, a 4.5 per cent increase over 1998, and 13.5 million tonnes on the Welland Canal, a 2.6 per cent increase.

Iron Ore

Iron ore shipments totalled 10.69 million tonnes on the Montreal-Lake Ontario section, a 3.8 per cent decrease from 1998, and 5.82 million tonnes on the Welland Canal section, a 10.6 per cent decrease. These shifts reflect a greater reliance by Canadian steel mills on iron ore originating from Quebec-Labrador.

Coal

Fewer shipments of coal were recorded on the Welland Canal, due to lower demand from Ontario Hydro and the Hamilton steel mills. Traffic amounted to 4.52 million tonnes, a 2.4 per cent decrease from 1998. On the Montreal-Lake Ontario section, coal traffic increased because of additional shipments to industries along the St. Lawrence. Total traffic was 266,000 tonnes, an increase of 35.2 per cent.

Other Bulk Commodities

For other bulk commodities, there was an overall decrease in shipments of major commodities (coke, petroleum, stone, cement, chemicals). On the Montreal-Lake Ontario section, 7.23 million tonnes were carried, a decrease of 8.8 per cent from 1998. On the Welland Canal, 10.06 million tonnes were carried, a decrease of 7.4 per cent.

Table 10-22 shows Seaway traffic by commodity from 1993 to 2000.

Rates and Tariffs

In keeping with the agreement negotiated with Seaway users, a two per cent toll increase for the Canadian section of the Seaway was implemented in 2000. Similar increases were implemented during the 1998 and 1999 seasons. The 1998 increase was the first increase since 1993.

These two per cent annual toll increases, with no discounts or reductions, were negotiated for 1998, 1999 and 2000 as part of the Seaway commercialization agreement. Had the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation been unable to achieve the cost targets set out in its business plan, however, it would have been required to increase the tolls beyond the two per cent level. This was not necessary, however, because the successful 1998 and 1999 seasons allowed SLSMC to meet and even exceed targets. Years four and five of the plan (2001 and 2002) may even see toll discounts or reductions if the corporation continues to exceed the business plan requirements.

Financial Profile

Revenues for 1999/2000 amounted to $76 million, an improvement of over $3.5 million from the estimate in SLSMC's business plan, but on target with its operating budget. Revenues were down from the 1998/99 fiscal year, which generated $83.9 million. However, 1998/99 was also a landmark year, earning the highest toll revenue in Seaway history. In 1999/2000, the revenues derived from ship transits amounted to $73.2 million, a decrease of $6.1 million from the previous year. This decline was largely the result of a 35 per cent reduction in general cargo tonnage for iron and steel. The revenue from other navigation activities and licence fees totalled $1.7 million in 1999/2000. Expenses include the winter works program, such as asset renewal and major maintenance.

The corporation's financial results are not compared with previous years' financial statements from the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, which exclude the revenues and expenses pertaining to the non-navigational assets, the income taxes relating to the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, amortization expenses, and other expenses that are treated differently.

Table 10-23 provides the financial results of the St. Lawrence Seaway.

Maintenance Activities

As part of the commercialization agreement, the SLSMC is responsible for asset renewal, which budgets $126 million in infrastructure maintenance and capital expenditures over the five years of the business plan. The actual expenditure for the 1999/2000 fiscal year was $23,357,000. During the first two years of the business plan, the SLSMC spent $49 million on infrastructure, or 39 per cent of the overall allocation.

While the SLSMC manages asset renewal, the Capital Committee which is made up of two members from Transport Canada and two members of the corporation's board, is responsible for approving the asset renewal budget. The committee approves changes to the plan as required, as well as the plan for the next fiscal year.

Marine Pilotage

Legislative Framework

The Pilotage Act of 1972, as amended in 1998 by the Canada Marine Act, governs marine pilotage in Canada. Under this Act, four regional pilotage authorities were established - Atlantic (APA), Laurentian (LPA), Great Lakes (GLPA) and Pacific (PPA). Each authority is mandated to provide safe and efficient pilotage services that respond to the particular requirements of its traffic, as well as to the varied geography and climatic conditions of the waterways concerned. Although they are not considered agents of the Crown, all authorities report directly to the Minister of Transport.

Financial and Operating Performance

In 2000, pilotage revenues, on a nationwide basis, did not exceed expenditures. As shown in Table 10-24, only one of the four pilotage authorities, the Atlantic Pilotage Authority, managed to return modest surpluses.

The results for 2000 represent a shift from the trend toward positive net incomes over the last few years. Financial results for each authority from 1996 to 2000 are shown in Table 10-25.

Total revenues have risen less than expenses. In 2000, expenses increased by more than inflation. Nevertheless, Figure 10-7 shows clearly the trend toward improved bottom lines for pilotage authorities up until 2000.

To measure efficiency of pilotage services, the average number of assignments per pilot is commonly used. Based on this measure, efficiency increased between 1996 and 1998 but declined in both 1999 and 2000.

Table 10-26 shows the number of assignments for each pilotage authority and the total for all authorities between 1996 and 2000. The variations among the authorities and the fluctuations over the period are in response to traffic levels. Overall, total assignments have grown by 10.3 per cent since 1996.

Canadian Coast Guard

Responsibilities

The Canadian Coast Guard's mission is fourfold: ensure safe and environmentally responsible use of Canada's waters; support understanding and management of ocean resources; facilitate the use of Canadian waters for shipping, recreation and fishing; and provide marine expertise in support of Canada's domestic and international interests. The Coast Guard also advances the oceans mandate both through its internal partnership with its Department of Fisheries and Oceans' (DFO) sector counterparts and through its primary role of ensuring safe and environmentally responsible use of Canada's waterways.

The Coast Guard's five business lines - marine navigation services; marine communications and traffic services; icebreaking operations; rescue, safety and environmental response; and fleet management - are delivered across DFO's five regions. These business lines cover a range of marine programs, policies and services that deal with a broad cross-section of clients within the marine community, including commercial shipping interests, recreational boaters, the fishing industry, ferry services, tug and barge resupply operations in the North, cruise lines, private-sector shippers, and provincial, municipal and territorial governments as well as federal government departments. The Coast Guard also serves the general public through its role in preserving ecosystems, ensuring that water supplies remain unpolluted by oil and chemical spills, and protecting recreational resources.

The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has two key result commitments:

  • the conservation and biological sustainability of fisheries resources, marine and freshwater habitats, and a protected environment; and
  • the provision of safe, efficient and accessible waterways and harbours.

The Coast Guard's contributions to these commitments are found in each of its business lines in such areas as response to marine oil emergencies, efficient and effective aids to navigation infrastructure, annual deliveries by ship to northern settlements and military sites, and client and public awareness of programs and policies.

Marine Navigation Services

The overall objective of the Coast Guard's Marine Navigation Services (MNS) business line is to provide safe, efficient and accessible waterways. In keeping with this commitment, the Marine Navigation Services provides, operates and maintains a system of navigational aids; ensures waterways are safely designed and maintained; provides navigation safety information to mariners; ensures protection of the public right to navigation; and protects the environment.

The Marine Navigation Services navigational infrastructure consists of 262 automated light stations, 52 of which are staffed; five LORAN C communication stations; 20 Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) transmitter sites; and over 6,000 land-based fixed marine aids and more than 12,000 floating aids.

During 2000, the Marine Navigation Services continued to move forward on a number of activities in support of its mission. It continued to modernize navigational aids, for example, through several initiatives, including the complete implementation of a full DGPS in the spring of 2000. It also continued to modernize, maintain, implement and upgrade information systems such as the national databases on the use of Canadian waterways, the Aids Program Information System (APIS), the Marine Aids Costing Model (SRAN), and the Navigable Waters Database System. The Marine Navigation Services also continued to pursue amendments to the Navigable Waters Protection Act.

Marine Communication and Traffic Services

All the functions of the Marine Communication and Traffic Services (MCTS) are derived from a regulatory framework based primarily on the Canada Shipping Act and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention. Marine Communication and Traffic Services provide distress and safety communications and co-ordination; vessel screening to prevent entry of unsafe vessels into Canadian waters; regulation of vessel traffic movements; and management of an integrated system of marine information and public correspondence services. Along with ensuring safe marine navigation, the Marine Communication and Traffic Services also support economic activities by optimizing traffic movements and port efficiency, and facilitating industry ship/shore communications.

The Marine Communications and Traffic Services group is supported by an infrastructure that includes staffed communications centres and remote transmitter and receiver sites.

This business line is a core element of the national movement toward sustainable development for oceans and marine resources. As such, it fully supports the Oceans Strategy by looking for ways to improve the monitoring and management of marine protected areas.

The Marine Communication and Traffic Services group is also working to improve its surveillance capability by developing implementation strategies for universal Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) - a leading-edge marine navigation technology that provides mariners and competent authorities with a more efficient and cost-effective means of service delivery. To improve its communications capability, the MCTS is continuing to implement the Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS), and review infrastructure to find further efficiencies through the application of technological changes.

Icebreaking Operations

Activities under the Icebreaking Operations business line include providing icebreaking escorts, channel maintenance, flood control, harbour breakouts, and ice-routing and information services for marine traffic navigating through or around ice-covered waters. It also co-ordinates the movement of cargo for the annual resupply of northern settlements and military sites using contracted commercial carriers.

Traditionally, the icebreaking program has provided a wide range of free services; over the past several years, however, it has moved to a more client-focused, demand-driven service that reflects recent downsizing activities. Commercial users now pay a percentage of the allocated costs in the form of an icebreaking service fee.

During 2000, Icebreaking Operations continued to work with the US Coast Guard, the North Atlantic Ice Patrol and other governments involved with icebreaking activities to maintain international expertise and recognition. It also continued to strengthen its collaboration with Transport Canada's Marine Safety Branch for the Harmonization of Polar Ship Rules to protect Canada's position and take a proactive role in forums dealing with icebreaking operations or ships operating in ice-covered waters. Preliminary results of an economic study on the benefits of icebreaking services indicate that benefits far surpass the costs of providing this service.

Rescue, Safety and Environmental Response

The Rescue, Safety and Environmental Response (RSER) business line encompasses the following major activities: marine search and rescue (SAR); environmental response and departmental national emergency preparedness; and the promotion of boating safety to the marine public through prevention and regulation. Its main objective is to save lives and protect the marine environment.

RSER supporting infrastructure includes SAR stations with in-shore rescue boats and several spill-response equipment depots.

This business line moved forward on a number of fronts in 2000, including implementing major new regulating measures to improve boating safety. In particular, these measures covered mandatory operator competency; age and horsepower restrictions; and modernization of small vessel regulations. The group also worked to improve the effectiveness of the oil spill preparedness and response regime by reviewing regulations, standards and guidelines.

The Rescue, Safety and Environmental Response division continued to develop a Canadian hazardous and noxious substances response regime by maintaining the consultation process with major stakeholders and providing an effective maritime search and rescue service through quality and enhanced evaluation initiatives.

Fleet Management

The Fleet Management business line supports all Department of Fisheries and Oceans performance commitments. Its goal is to provide a safe, efficient and cost-effective sea and air fleet and the related services necessary to support DFO's program delivery, as well as improve client satisfaction.

To support this commitment, the Fleet Management group acquires, maintains and schedules DFO's vessel and air fleets in support of the following program areas: Marine Navigation Services; Icebreaking Operations; Rescue, Safety and Environmental Response; Fisheries Management; and Fisheries and Oceans Science and Hydrography. These program areas provide the funding to crew and operate the fleet. Fleet Management also arranges for any required increase in fleet capabilities by arranging for other government departments and the private sector to provide additional sea and air support to the programs.

Fleet Management activities in 2000 included a move toward a base-fleet concept in which an established minimum number of vessels deliver the program requirements and provide a stable base for financial, operational and human resource planning. In addition, the group continued to implement the fleet safety management system to the standards of the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships (ISM Code) and a costing model to give managers and clients a true understanding of the cost of fleet operations.

Table 10-27 lists the vessel, aircraft and facility assets held by the Canadian Coast Guard in 2000.

Financial Situation - Canadian Coast Guard

Through a combination of efficiency measures and reduced operations, the Coast Guard has permanently reduced its net expenditures on all these services. These reductions have lowered expenses by $140 million, or 30 per cent, over the four-year period ending 1998/99.

Table 10-28 shows the Coast Guard's financial results for its five major business lines for the last four fiscal years. Results for 2000/01 reflect forecasted expenditures to fiscal year-end and will not be finalized until the end of the fiscal year.

To obtain a fair contribution from users for programs from which they directly benefit, the Coast Guard has implemented user fees for some programs. The Marine Navigation Services Fee, for example, was introduced in June 1996. It generates $28.1 million annually, including administration costs.

The Maintenance Dredging Services Tonnage Fee for the St. Lawrence Ship Channel, which came into effect in September 1997, is only an interim measure to cover the total costs incurred by the Coast Guard to provide these maintenance dredging services. The Coast Guard is continuing to work with representatives of the commercial marine transportation industry to arrive at a long-term arrangement, including discussions regarding the transfer of responsibilities to industry for these dredging services.

On December 4, 1998, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans proposed changes to the Icebreaking Services Fee that would generate $6.9 million annually, including administrative costs. The proposal is built around a transit-based ice-breaking fee that would be uniformly applied to each transit to, from or within the ice zone during the ice season.

Table 10-29 shows a breakdown of the Coast Guard's revenues and expenditures by its five main business lines for fiscal year 2000/01.

 

TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Rail Transportation Infrastructure

Road Transportation Infrastructure

Marine Transportation Infrastructure

Air Transportation Infrastructure

Appendix 10-1 Airports Capital Assistance Program - Projects Approved in 2000

 

CHAPTER 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 11

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ANNEXES

NOTES:

4 Tonnage statistics include cargos moved across private facilities within Transport Canada public harbours.


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