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Annual Report to Parliament 2003-2004
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AIR
Occurrence Statistics and Investigations
ANNUAL STATISTICS
Canadian-registered aircraft, other than ultralights, were involved in 296 reported accidents in 2003, an 8% increase from the 2002 total of 274. However, this is an 8% decrease from the 1998-2002 average of 323. Flying activity in 2003 is estimated to have increased by 3% from 2002 to 3,789,725 hours. This resulted in an accident rate of 7.8 accidents per 100,000 flying hours compared to the 2002 accident rate of 7.4 and the 1998-2002 average rate of 8.3. Canadian-registered aircraft, other than ultralights, were involved in 31 fatal occurrences in 2003, with 58 fatalities. This is slightly fewer than the 1998-2002 average of 33 fatal occurrences, with 66 fatalities. About half the fatal occurrences involved privately operated aircraft; 3 of the remaining 14 fatal occurrences involved helicopters.
The number of accidents involving ultralights increased from 36 in 2002 to 46 in 2003. However, the number of fatal accidents decreased from 9 accidents with 12 fatalities in 2002 to 7 accidents with 9 fatalities in 2003.
The number of foreign-registered aircraft involved in accidents in Canada increased from 13 in 2002 to 30 in 2003. Fatal accidents increased from 1 accident with 2 fatalities in 2002 to 6 accidents with 8 fatalities in 2003.
In 2003, a total of 834 incidents were reported in accordance with TSB mandatory reporting requirements. This represents a 4% decrease from the 2002 total of 865, but a 7% increase from the 1998-2002 average of 783.
Figure 8 - Air Occurrences and Fatalities
![Figure 8 - Air Occurrences and Fatalities](/web/20060205153135im_/http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/publications/annual_report/2004/images/report2003_2004_figure_6.gif) [D]f8
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AIR INVESTIGATIONS STARTED IN 2003-2004
The following information is preliminary. Final determination of events is subject to the TSB's full investigation.
2003.04.07 |
Lake Temagami, Ont. |
Found Brothers FBA-2C1 |
A03O0088 |
2003.04.09 |
CYPE Peace River, 13 nm SE, Alta. |
Robinson Helicopter R44 |
A03W0074 |
2003.04.23 |
CYPA Prince Albert (Glass Field),
6 nm SW, Sask.
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Beech 99 |
A03C0094 |
2003.05.22 |
CJS9 Lac du Bonnet (North), Man |
de Havilland DHC-3 |
A03C0118 |
2003.05.22 |
Active Pass, B.C. |
de Havilland DHC-3 Sikorsky S-76A |
A03P0113 |
2003.05.31 |
CYCW Chilliwack, 7.5 nm E, B.C. |
Cessna 182 |
A03P0133 |
2003.06.05 |
Lake Wicksteed, Ont. |
de Havilland DHC-6-300 |
A03O0135 |
2003.06.06 |
Lillooet, 30 nm NW, B.C. |
Bell Helicopter 206B |
A03P0136 |
2003.06.17 |
Gisborne, New Zealand |
Convair 340/580 |
A03F0114 |
2003.06.24 |
Wasaga Beach, 5 mi WSW, Ont. |
Mooney 20 E |
A03O0156 |
2003.06.26 |
A036 Buchans, 25 nm SE, N.L. |
Polskie Zaklady Lotnicze PZL-18 |
A03A0076 |
2003.07.04 |
Lac Boucher, Que. |
Bell Helicopter 206B |
A03Q0092 |
2003.07.07 |
CYTZ Toronto/City Centre, Ont. |
Beech 58 |
A03O0171 |
2003.07.13 |
Manning, 75 nm NE, Alta. |
Bell Helicopter 204B |
A03W0148 |
2003.07.16 |
Cranbrook, 9 nm SE, B.C. |
Lockheed 188A |
A03P0194 |
2003.07.18 |
Harrison Hot Springs, 24 nm NNW, B.C. |
Cessna 172M |
A03P0199 |
2003.07.26 |
CYQB Québec/Jean Lesage Intl, 6 nm E, Que. |
Cessna 172M |
A03Q0109 |
2003.08.05 |
London, 40 nm NE, Ont. |
Boeing 767-200 Fokker F-28 MK 100
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A03O0213 |
2003.08.10 |
CYDC Princeton, B.C. |
Cessna 210 A |
A03P0239 |
2003.08.11 |
CYZT Port Hardy, 26 nm W, B.C. |
Boeing 757-200 Boeing 747-400 |
A03P0244 |
2003.08.17 |
Bonaparte Lake, B.C. |
Bell Helicopter 204B |
A03P0247 |
2003.08.23 |
Vernon, B.C. |
Airbus A319-100 |
A03P0259 |
2003.08.29 |
Penticton, 10 nm N, B.C. |
de Havilland DHC-2 |
A03P0265 |
2003.09.03 |
CYHC Vancouver Harbour, B.C. |
de Havilland DHC-6-200 |
A03P0268 |
2003.09.11 |
CJV7 Summer Beaver, 3 nm W, Ont. |
Cessna 208 B |
A03H0002 |
2003.09.16 |
Mayo, 80 nm N, YT |
Bell Helicopter 206B |
A03W0194 |
2003.09.23 |
CYYC Calgary, 49 nm S, Alta. |
Cessna 414 A |
A03W0202 |
2003.09.26 |
CYYZ Toronto/Lester B. Pearson Intl, Ont. |
Israel Aircraft (IAI) Astra SPX |
A03O0273 |
2003.09.27 |
CYGP Gaspé, 2 nm NE, Que. |
Piper PA-31 |
A03Q0151 |
2003.10.04 |
Linda Lake, B.C. |
Piper PA-18-150 |
A03W0210 |
2003.10.09 |
CYKZ Toronto/Buttonville Municipal, 2 nm SSE, Ont. |
Cessna 172N |
A03O0285 |
2003.11.04 |
CYOW Ottawa/MacDonald-Cartier Intl, Ont. |
de Havilland DHC-8-100 |
A03O0302 |
2003.11.06 |
CYVR Vancouver Intl, B.C. |
Airbus A330-300 |
A03P0332 |
2003.12.16 |
Jellicoe, Ont. |
de Havilland DHC-3 |
A03O0341 |
2004.01.13 |
La Grande, 160 nm SSW, Que. |
Boeing 777-200 Boeing 767-300 |
A04Q0003 |
2004.01.15 |
CYHD Dryden Regional, Ont. |
Fairchild SA-227-AC |
A04C0016 |
2004.01.17 |
CYPT Pelee Island, 0.5 nm W, Ont. |
Cessna 208 B |
A04H0001 |
2004.01.19 |
CYYZ Toronto/Lester B. Pearson Intl, Ont. |
Airbus A321 |
A04O0016 |
2004.01.26 |
CYYZ Toronto/Lester B. Pearson Intl, Ont. |
Boeing 767-200 |
A04O0020 |
2004.02.20 |
Prince Rupert, 40 nm SSE, B.C. |
Robinson Helicopter R22 Mariner |
A04P0033 |
2004.02.25 |
CYEG Edmonton Intl, Alta. |
Boeing 737-200 |
A04W0032 |
2004.03.03 |
CYVR Vancouver Intl, B.C. |
Boeing 737-200 Cessna 182D
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A04P0047 |
2004.03.04 |
Swift Current, 3.8 nm SW, Sask. |
Bell Helicopter 206B |
A04C0051 |
2004.03.08 |
CTG2 St-Hubert Helicraft, Que. |
Schweizer 269C (300C) |
A04Q0026 |
2004.03.12 |
Nanaimo, 20 nm NW, B.C. |
Cessna 185E Cessna 185F
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A04P0057 |
2004.03.20 |
Ralf, Sask. |
Baby Bell Helicopter |
A04C0064 |
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AIR REPORTS RELEASED IN 2003-2004
2001.02.15 |
VCBI Colombo, Sri Lanka |
Airbus A330-300 |
Loss of engine power |
A01F0020 |
2001.04.03 |
Sydney, 12 nm W, N.S. |
de Havilland DHC-8-100 |
Multiple engine flame-outs |
A01A0030 |
2001.04.04 |
CYYT St. John's Intl, N.L. |
Boeing 737-200 |
Runway overrun |
A01A0028 |
2001.06.05 |
CCH4 Charlottetown, P.E.I. |
Piper PA-31-310 |
Collision with terrain |
A01A0058 |
2001.06.27 |
Roberval, 80 nm N, Que. |
Bell Helicopter 212 |
Fuel exhaustion - hard landing |
A01Q0105 |
2001.07.22 |
Abbotsford Parachute Centre, 1.5 nm SW, B.C. |
Pilatus PC-6T |
Loss of engine power - forced landing |
A01H0003 |
2001.10.08 |
CYYY Mont-Joli, 22 nm SE, Que. |
Piper PA-23 |
Loss of control - stall - collision with terrain |
A01Q0165 |
2001.11.08 |
Buhl Creek, B.C. |
Aerospatiale SA 315B |
Loss of engine power - collision with terrain |
A01P0282 |
2002.02.01 |
CYXX Abbotsford, B.C. |
Boeing 737-200 |
In-flight engine nose dome detachment |
A02P0021 |
2002.03.04 |
CYYR Goose Bay, N.L. |
Fairchild SA-227-AC |
Loss of directional control - collision with snowbank |
A02A0030 |
2002.03.26 |
CEK4 Blairmore (Forestry), 12 nm N, Alta. |
Eurocopter AS 350D |
Loss of control - hard landing |
A02W0057 |
2002.04.18 |
SU34 Hare Field, Ont. |
Schweizer 269C (300C) |
Loss of control - collision with terrain |
A02O0105 |
2002.04.25 |
Stephenville, 38 nm ESE, N.L. |
Beech 1900D |
Window failure - rapid depressurization |
A02A0046 |
2002.04.25 |
Saskatoon, 63 nm E, Sask. |
Boeing 747-200 Boeing 747-400 |
Risk of collision |
A02C0079 |
2002.05.21 |
CCW4 Stanley, N.S. |
Schempp-Hirth KG Cirrus |
Seat failure - loss of control |
A02A0065 |
2002.05.27 |
CZJN Swan River, Man. |
Cessna TU206 F |
Loss of engine power - forced landing |
A02C0105 |
2002.06.02 |
Tobin Lake, Sask. |
Bell Helicopter 205A-1 |
In-flight engine fire - forced landing |
A02C0114 |
2002.06.06 |
Needle Peak, B.C. |
Cessna 182P |
Visual flight rules (VFR) flight into adverse weather - collision with terrain |
A02P0109 |
2002.06.11 |
Winnipeg, Man. |
Piper PA-31-350 |
Fuel exhaustion - collision with terrain |
A02C0124 |
2002.06.14 |
EDDF Frankfurt/Rhein-Main Intl, Germany |
Airbus A330-343 |
Tail strike on take-off |
A02F0069 |
2002.06.19 |
Kamloops, B.C. |
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter 369D (500D) |
Main rotor blade failure |
A02P0126 |
2002.06.20 |
North Atlantic (Cymon Intersection) |
Boeing 747-400 Boeing 767 Boeing 767-300
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Loss of separation -
risk of collision
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A02A0079 |
2002.06.27 |
CYQF Red Deer (Vicinity), Alta. |
British Aerospace Jetstream 3112
Fairchild SA227-DC
|
Loss of separation -
risk of collision
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A02W0115 |
2002.06.28 |
Sasaginnigak Lake, 10 nm S, Man. |
de Havilland DHC-2 MK I |
Loss of engine power -
forced landing
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A02C0143 |
2002.06.29 |
Engemann Lake, Sask. |
Cessna 185 F |
Collision with water |
A02C0145 |
2002.07.01 |
CZBB Boundary Bay, B.C. |
Cessna 172 N |
Aircraft stall on take-off -
collision with terrain
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A02P0136 |
2002.08.08 |
Wendle Creek, B.C. |
Sikorsky S-61L |
Loss of main rotor drive -
collision with terrain
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A02P0169 |
2002.08.18 |
CYYR Goose Bay, N.L. |
Bell Helicopter 212 |
Loss of control -
collision with terrain
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A02A0098 |
2002.09.04 |
CZHP High Prairie, 7 nm SE, Alta. |
Piper PA-34-220T |
Collision with terrain |
A02W0173 |
2002.09.18 |
CYYZ Toronto/Lester B. Pearson Intl, Ont. |
Piper PA-44-180 de Havilland DHC-8
|
Loss of separation |
A02H0002 |
2002.09.28 |
Natashquan, 57 nm N, Que. |
de Havilland DHC-3 |
Collision with terrain |
A02Q0130 |
2002.10.15 |
Porcher Inlet, B.C. |
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter 369D (500D) |
Collision with water |
A02P0256 |
2002.11.12 |
CYZP Sandspit, B.C. |
Cessna 550 |
Gear-up landing |
A02P0290 |
2002.11.20 |
CYVR Vancouver Intl, B.C. |
Boeing 747-200 Shorts SD3-60
|
Loss of separation -
risk of collision
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A02P0299 |
2003.01.11 |
CYYT St. John's Intl, N.L. |
Beech 1900D |
Collision with windrow |
A03A0002 |
2003.01.29 |
CYPM Pikangikum, 2 nm SW, Ont. |
Beech 99 |
Collision with terrain |
A03C0029 |
2003.02.02 |
CYHZ Halifax Intl Airport, N.S. |
Boeing 737-200 |
Loss of directional control |
A03A0012 |
2003.02.04 |
Badger, 19 nm WNW, N.L. |
Cessna 188 B |
Fuel starvation -
forced landing
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A03A0013 |
2003.02.11 |
CYQG Windsor, Ont. |
Airbus A320-200 |
Runway excursion |
A03O0034 |
2003.05.22 |
CJS9 Lac du Bonnet (North), Man. |
de Havilland DHC-3 |
Engine failure - forced landing |
A03C0118 |
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ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSES TO AIR RECOMMENDATIONS ISSUED IN 2002-2003
Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia - 2 September 1998
Smoke in the Cockpit - Swissair MD-11HB-IWF
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Occurrence No. A98H0003 |
A03-01
Regulatory authorities quantify and mitigate the risks associated with in-service thermal acoustic insulation materials that have failed the Radiant Panel Test (RPT).
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TC's response contends that a material's failure to pass the RPT is not, in and of itself, indicative of an unsafe material. Rather TC argues that metallized polyethylene terephthalate, the only thermal acoustic insulation cover material which has been deemed to be unsafe by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was so designated because of both its ease of ignition from a small ignition source and propensity to propagate fire. |
Unsatisfactory |
No action taken to date. |
A03-02
Regulatory authorities develop a test regime that will effectively prevent the certification of any thermal acoustic insulation materials that, based on realistic ignition scenarios, would sustain or propagate a fire.
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An advisory circular (AC) designed to complement the rule change implementing the RPT is under development by the FAA. TC intends to adopt the RPT and will be reviewing this FAA AC for application to its own relevant regulations. |
Satisfactory intent |
No action taken to date. |
A03-03
Regulatory authorities take action to ensure the accurate and consistent interpretation of the regulations governing material flammability requirements for aircraft materials so as to prevent the use of any material with inappropriate flammability characteristics.
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TC intends to contact the FAA to request that this issue be considered by its International Aircraft Materials Fire Test Working Group. The group, which involves Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), including TC, and the international aviation industry, is the prime focus for the development of aircraft materials' flammability test criteria and standards. |
Satisfactory intent |
No action taken to date. |
A03-04
Regulatory authorities require that every system installed through the supplementary type certificate (STC) process undergo a level of quantitative analysis to ensure that it is properly integrated with aircraft type-certified procedures, such as emergency load-shedding.
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TC did not agree that a quantitative assessment is always required for every system installed through the STC process, and stated that the regulatory requirements are in place to deal with the approval of STCs. TC plans to develop advisory material emphasizing the need to verify that system integration requirements are adequately addressed during the STC process, to initiate awareness training for industry delegates and TC certification engineers, focussing on "non-essential, non-required" systems, and to continue its harmonization efforts related to US Federal Aviation Regulation 25.1309. |
Unsatisfactory |
No action taken to date. |
A03-05
Regulatory authorities establish the requirements and industry standard for circuit breaker resetting.
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TC concurred with the TSB recommendation. TC plans to submit a request that the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee's Transport Aircraft and Engines Issues Group establish the requirements and industry standards for circuit breaker resetting. The objective would be to produce harmonized standards for use by the Civil Aviation Authorities (e.g. FAA, Joint Aviation Authorities and TC) of major aircraft manufacturing states. |
Satisfactory intent |
No action taken to date |
A03-06
Regulatory authorities, in concert with the aviation industry, take measures to enhance the quality and intelligibility of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings.
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TC concurred with the intent of this recommendation. TC acknowledged that the clarity of the CVR recording is improved when the flight crew uses the boom microphones; however, their continuous usage can lead to crew fatigue. To improve the quality of the CVR recording, TC plans to develop a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA), to amend the regulatory requirement for the use of boom microphones from a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet to 18,000 feet above sea level. |
Satisfactory intent |
No action taken to date. |
A03-07
Regulatory authorities require, for all aircraft manufactured after 1 January 2007 which require a flight data recorder (FDR), that in addition to the existing minimum mandatory parameter lists for FDRs, all optional flight data collected for non-mandatory programs such as flight operational quality assurance or Flight Data Monitoring, be recorded on the FDR.
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TC's response did not support the deficiency in recommendation A03-07. Rather, it stated that it plans to work with all concerned to enhance the FDR capability as requirements change. There is no indication in its response to suggest any technical objection to supplementing the current FDR parameters. TC has expressed a concern that any attempt to capture Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) data on FDRs would jeopardize the FDM safety initiative. However, it does not explain why requiring FDRs to be easily augmented with additional parameters and routinely and readily accessed without requiring re-certification would put the FDM program at risk. |
Unsatisfactory |
No action taken to date. |
A03-08
Regulatory authorities develop harmonized requirements to fit aircraft with image recording systems that would include imaging within the cockpit.
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TC supported the recommendation concerning the installation of image recording systems to supplement the current flight recording requirements. It stated an intention to work with other CAAs to develop a harmonized approach to image recorder system standards and to take regulatory action to implement the requirement to install video imaging equipment in cockpits of transport category aeroplanes in commercial service. |
Satisfactory intent |
No action taken to date.
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A03-09
Regulatory authorities harmonize international rules and processes for the protection of cockpit voice and image recordings used for safety investigations.
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TC agreed that all cockpit voice and image recordings used for safety investigations should be protected; that the appropriate forum to gain the necessary international agreement and harmonized implementation of this recommendation is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). TC plans to bring this recommendation to the attention of the ICAO through Canada's representative. |
Satisfactory intent |
No action taken to date. |
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Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Ontario - 13 May 2002
Cargo Bay Fire - Air Canada, Boeing 767-300
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Occurrence No. A02O0123 |
A02-04
The Department of Transport take action to reduce the short-term risk and eliminate the long-term risk, of heater ribbon installation failures starting fires, and coordinate and encourage a similar response from other appropriate regulatory authorities.
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TC indicates that it shares a similar concern and is working closely with the FAA, Boeing and other foreign civil aviation authorities to assess and study the short- and long-term risks of heater ribbon installations, and to determine an appropriate means of addressing the issue.
The FAA indicates that it intends to issue a Service Bulletin and subsequent Airworthiness Directive for more reliable heater ribbons in open cargo bay areas on the Boeing 767 and 747 aircraft. |
Satisfactory intent
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No action taken to date. |
A02-05
The Department of Transport take action to reduce the short-term risk and eliminate the long-term risk, of contaminated insulation materials and debris propagating fires, and coordinate and encourage a similar response from other appropriate regulatory authorities.
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TC indicates that it shares a similar concern and is working closely with the FAA, Boeing and other foreign civil aviation authorities to assess and study the short- and long-term risks of heater ribbon installations, and to determine an appropriate means of addressing the issue in both the short and long term.
The FAA indicates that it intends to implement a new maintenance process for airplane manufacturers to remove debris from wiring areas called Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP). EZAP will result in more effective scheduled maintenance.
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Satisfactory intent
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No action taken to date. |
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OTHER AIR SAFETY ACTION TAKEN
- TC identified to NAV CANADA a safety deficiency concerning the degraded performance of anemometers due to ice accretion and has requested that NAV CANADA implement software changes that would suppress incorrect wind information under these conditions.
- NAV CANADA issued a station bulletin to all St. John's Flight Service Station personnel clarifying the procedure for reporting estimated winds in an aviation routine weather report. NAV CANADA also issued a bulletin to all units informing air traffic services units personnel to be vigilant during icing conditions and the actions to be taken if they suspect the anemometer is affected by ice accretion.
- Following an accident involving an input freewheel unit failure, TC published an article entitled "Freewheel Units" in Vortex, Issue 2/2002. The operator reduced the inspection interval for the component to 400 hours and the aircraft manufacturer issued a Safety Alert reminding operators of the maintenance manual's requirement for a specific inspection requirement for the part.
- Following an in-flight engine nose dome detachment, TC communicated with the FAA regarding a possible Airworthiness Directive to have all engine accessory supports replaced with modified accessory supports that have been strengthened.
- WestJet Airlines carried out a fleet-wide campaign to replace all engine accessory supports with modified accessory supports.
- TC is conducting a review of the applicable Bell 205A-1 instructions for continuing airworthiness to determine if action is necessary regarding the instructions for the installation of starters/generators and fuel lines.
- Following an accident involving fuel exhaustion followed by collision with terrain, TC conducted a post-accident regulatory audit and - at the request of the company -a systems safety review.
- Following a loss of separation occurrence, NAV CANADA Toronto ACC revised control procedures to include the requirement of matching radar targets to flight data strips as part of sector hand-over procedures.
- Following a collision with terrain accident, TC recommended that the company amend its standard operating procedures to state that after take-off, no turns will be performed below 1,000 feet above ground level unless instructed to do so by air traffic control.
- In response to a series of engine failures, the operator's Flight Operations Training Department amended the training program in areas specifically dealing with the recognition of turbine engine malfunctions, Extended Range Twin-Engined Aircraft Operations diversion procedures and in-flight communications. The engine manufacturer issued two Alert Service Bulletins to provide inspection procedures for specific engine parts.
- Following a double engine flame-out in the presence of ice on the lower engine nacelle cowl, the aircraft manufacturer issued a revised ground procedure training guide containing a more detailed description of the areas to be inspected and cleaned, and issued a Customer Special Installation on enlarging drain holes in the engine air inlet ducts. The operator incorporated the revised procedures into its training program.
- Following an aircraft window failure in flight, the operator issued a Quality Assurance Bulletin changing the inspection schedule from 1,200 hours to 200 hours. TC reviewed the operator's standard operating procedures to determine if improvements could be recommended.
- NAV CANADA issued an Operations Bulletin to personnel in the Edmonton Area Control Centre, drawing their attention to the necessity of following ATC MANOPS in matters pertaining to strip marking for aircraft operating at altitudes inappropriate for direction of flight. NAV CANADA also issued a Notice to Airmen and made permanent corrections to an en route pilotage chart which had depicted inaccurate information regarding an airway.
- Following a gear-up landing occurrence, the operator decided to require the fitting of a Ground Proximity Warning System on all fixed wing aircraft operated on their behalf by contracted carriers.
- TC proposed an amendment to the Canadian Aviation Regulations, which would require passenger-carrying aircraft of the class involved in the gear-up landing occurrence to be equipped with specific types of terrain avoidance warning systems.
- As a result of a loss of separation occurrence at Vancouver International Airport, NAV CANADA revised the Vancouver Tower Class C airspace procedures to require all arriving and departing aircraft operating under visual flight rules to obtain discreet transponder codes so that all aircraft tracked by radar might be correlated with flight number and flight plan information and be more conspicuous on the radar display.
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY
Accident |
In general, a transportation occurrence that involves serious personal injury or death, or significant damage to property, in particular to the extent that safe operations are affected (for a more precise definition, see the Transportation Safety Board Regulations) |
Incident |
In general, a transportation occurrence whose consequences are less serious than those of an accident, or that could potentially have resulted in an accident (for a more precise definition, see the Transportation Safety Board Regulations) |
Occurrence |
A transportation accident or incident |
Recommendation |
A formal way to draw attention to systemic safety issues, normally warranting ministerial attention |
Safety Advisory |
A less formal means for communicating lesser safety deficiencies to officials within and outside of government |
Safety Information Letter |
A letter that communicates safety-related information, often concerning local safety hazards, to government and corporate officials |
Footnotes
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